The Conflict in Kosovo
A Primer For the Layman

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article was published in COSMOS, a journal of the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens. While it is written from a Greek point-of-view, it still can serve as an excellent primer on the background of the Kosovo Conflict. JDT

It has become one of the paradoxes of history: the battle of Kosovo, on 15 June 1389, was an Ottoman victory which led to the conquest of the medieval Serbian kingdom. In the folk memory of the Serbs, however, it was transmuted into a spiritual victory and has since been regarded as a source of national pride. The progressive enfeeblement of Serbia allow Albanians from the north to weigh more heavily on Kosovo until they became the majority in the early 18th century. The numbers of ethnic Albanians continued to grow, especially after World War II, when the region became increasingly unfriendly for Serbs causing overtime some 400,000 to depart from the area.

The recent phase of the conflict started in March 1989, when Kosovo's autonomous status was abolished. Serbia has since inaugurated a policy of "serbinization" of property and population: discriminatory new measures resulted in the transfer of public property, infrastructure, industrial and other resources to the state of Serbia or to Serbian companies. About the same time, the Parliament the Republic of Kosovo in June 1990 and in the May 1992 elections, Ibrahim Rugova, a professor of Albanian literature, was elected President. Slowly but steadily the Albanian society formed parallel institutions and even a separate taxation system.

Apart form the fundamental causes of the dispute, economic considerations are also prevalent: Kosovo is rich in mineral resources vital to Serbia's economy. The ultimate Kosovo Albanian goal appears to be secession and independent statehood, and eventually, possible merger with Albania. Their claims are based on self-determination: they make up 90% of the nearly 2 million inhabitants of the region. If their birthrate remains at 23.1 per 1,000 (the highest in Europe) Serbs will become an ethnic minority within Yugoslavia by the year 2020! Ethnic Albanians also regard Kosovo as Albanian soil, claiming that their Illyrian and Thacian ancestors were the first to settle the region, long before the arrival of the Slavs. Serbia, on the other hand, insists that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and the Albanian constitute an ethnic minority rather than a nation with a concomitant right to self-determination.

In the early 1990's, the moderate line prevailed with Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo pursuing a policy if non-violent resistance to Serbia's authoritarian government. In the midst of the troubling Yugoslav wars, this was expected by the Kosovars to expose the Serbian "terrorism" and thus gain Western support for their nationalistic cause. However, the Dayton accords were a turning point for this region: Croatia retook the Krajina region, forcing 120,000 Serbian refugees to flee to Serbia; Serbian officials forcibly resettled them in Kosovo, provoking the Albanian majority which saw in this resettlement an orchestrated attempt to take a firmer Serbian hold on the region. More importantly, the total omission of the Kosovo question from the Dayton accords disillusioned the Kosovars who began questioning Rugova's pacifist stance. The first mention of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) originates during this period in early 1996. In the next three years it managed to gain control over an estimated 30% of the region's territory and caused Serbia to commit 40-50,000 police and troops to counteract the separatists' armed struggle.

The international community has concentrated its activities largely on the human rights situation. Otherwise, there are essentially two major impediments to any mediating effort: One is discord within the six-nation Contact Group. Apart from Realpolitik considerations, Washington fears a general Balkan war, if Albanians in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania itself are dragged into the conflict. FYROM would then disintegrate, Turkey might send supplies and Bulgaria or Greece might feel compelled to pursue their perceived historical interests with regard to the situation. Furthermore, a US Information Agency representative office was established in Kosovo which was viewed by the Kosovars as a quasi-embassy. Washington also pressed for collective intervention by NATO, promising plans to deploy troops or launch air strikes against Serbian operations in Kosovo. Most recently, Richard Holbrooke, the head of a US shuttle-diplomacy mission to the region, brokered a temporary peace settlement. Russia, on the other hand, objects to the American lead in these affairs: its international prestige and its influence in the Balkans are literally at stake. Moreover, a strong pro-Serbian lobby within Russia identifies with a Slavic and orthodox group in conflict with a Muslim community. Finally, the Russian leadership fears a precedent for troublesome minorities in its own territory (for example the Chechens). Irrespective, the six major powers imposed an "outer wall of sanctions" on Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1998, blocking its entry into world financial institutions and organizations.

New mediating efforts are also restricted by intransigence of the parties involved: Milosevic (the President of Yugoslavia) has been stubbornly rejecting further foreign mediation as an unacceptable interference in a strictly internal matter of his country. Similarly, the KLA and its political allies have made a point of not reducing their demands for independence.

However, it is possible that an unofficial, non-governmental approach by an organization that has the confidence of the parties involved might achieve considerable headway. In September 1996, negotiations mediated by the Vatican-based organization Sant' Egidio, led to an agreement on education (the only bilateral agreement of any sort until the recent peace. Although, in fact, the outbreak of fighting that led to the recent settlement left this agreement unimplemented, it sets an example of an alternative method by which the disputants might be brought to the negotiating table.

There is indeed a range of options that need to be negotiated. They are:

(1) Independence for the Province. This option would require that the existing international boundaries be redrawn and is therefore contrary to the will of the international community;

(2) Autonomy for the Province. This option is still favored by Serbia, but does not guarantee the respect of the Kosovars' civil and national rights; and finally,

(3) The Republic Option. This option would upgrade the status of Kosovo to that of a third republic under the federal framework of Yugoslavia, alongside of Serbia and Montenegro. It has the advantage of not altering external borders while offering the province equal status with its rival Serbia.

The latter option seems the most acceptable to all parties involved in this situation. After the posturing ends, it should offer a logical middle ground of a final settlement for the region.

1999, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org