Korea: the Next Urban Battlefield

by Robert F. Hynes

"The rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege."

-Sun Tzu

Following North Korea's invasion of the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950 U.S. and ROK military forces found themselves engaged in a three-year armed confrontation that spanned a battlefield gamut from barren valleys to populated cities. These were not the first of our military's experiences with the effects of cities and towns, as such was common during the Second World War. Nevertheless though insignificant by today's standards, these urban areas encumbered military operations on both sides and in some cases caused major setbacks.

During the time of the Korean War, the country was predominantly rural. Even the largest of cities such as Seoul and Pusan rarely had buildings higher than two stories. Korea's total population numbered 25 million of which only 38% lived in the cities 1. Combat was especially intense in the urban areas such as for the 5th Marines during the battle for Seoul in September 1950. The enemy had emplaced barricades of rice and fiber sandbags across the streets with anti-tank mines along the front. The North Koreans fired machineguns and anti-tank weapons from behind the barricades and from adjacent buildings. A single barricade could hold up an entire battalion for an hour 2. North Koreans also used the buildings to conceal equipment and combat positions. During the approach on Yongdungp'o on September 17, 1950, Lieutenant Robert L. Grover's platoon from Easy Company, 1st Marine Regiment spotted the barrel of a T-34 85mm main gun protruding from a hut. Before the North Korean crew could aim or fire, the marine Pershing's 90mm gun fired two rounds and destroyed both the hut and the concealed tank. Shortly afterwards a hut nearby to the first exploded into flames. The hut had been used to store ammunition 3. There were even occasions when the belligerents used the infrastructure itself as a weapon. In April 1951, Chinese Communist Forces used the dam at the Hwachon Reservoir in an attempt to flood and isolate the 8th Army. When the CCF opened the sluice gates on the dam, the subsequent deluge dangerously split IX Corps across the Pukhan River. One of the IX Corps bridges was destroyed completely, and the other was pushed back to the bank by the current 4. It took several days to resume normal combat operations.

Since 1950 the mountainous and rural battlefields that predominated the peninsula during the Korean War have been vanishing, as rural terrain gradually transforms into urban. Such programs as President Park Chun Hee's Saemul Undong (New Community Movement) during the 1970's and President Chun Doo Won's Two Million Housing Unit Plan in the 1980's have helped to foster the growth of new cities outside of the major hubs. Today, 79.3% of Korea's 46 million population resides in urban areas throughout the country. Improvements in public transportation and the rise of mini-cities in outlying areas have made it easier to commute to Seoul 5. As these outlying small cities' economies and living standards mature, the migratory trend is that people are drawn out of the major cities and into the cities of outlying areas, thus increasing their size and depth 6. Moreover, as these rural areas that we anticipate to be our battlefields become more populated and developed, and our mission to defend the peninsula remains the same, the importance of planning for urban factors during military operations likewise increases. Today, many outlying cities are larger and denser than was Seoul in 1950.

Despite the prevalence of urbanization in Korea and the advantages it provides to the defending force, some military planners are reluctant to capitalize on it. In general, our war plans provide for us to fight our battles outside of the cities. During a recent defensive mission planning exercise for combat operations around the city of Taejon, not one of the four student groups at the ROK Army Staff College considered placing combat positions or logistical bases in or around the city. These students were all field-grade officers, having completed company level command and some with higher level staff experience. Only one of the four groups considered placing their division headquarters inside the city.

North Korean military strategy for forcible unification calls for a massive strike against the south on frontlines and in rear areas with the objective of capturing the entire peninsula before U.S. reinforcements can arrive 7 . North Korean forces are expected to strike along existing lines of communication such as on the Chorwon-Munsan approach, just as they did in 1950. ROK-U.S. combined forces are postured to defend against these North Korean invasion routes. However, the thatched huts that once cordoned mere unpaved roads have been replaced with modern structures amid built-up areas. It is these built-up areas in which the initial battles will inevitably take place. Like weeds in a flowerbed, miniature cities have begun to sprout in many rural areas. Avoiding built-up areas in Korea will be possible only up to a point. In the future, combat in built-up areas may be an inevitable result of war in Korea.

In preparation for future conflicts, we must also consider the political changes that have occurred since the Korean War. Whereas in 1950 U.S. policy dictated the course for the ROK to follow, today the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea hinges on its ability to act as an equal partner in the security alliance 8. Destruction of buildings and cities by U.S. forces whether inadvertent or out of military necessity will harm the ROK U.S. alliance by creating the perception that the U.S. is bent on a war of destruction rather than of unification and without concern for the people of the ROK. The commander's information operations campaign must demonstrate respect for the sovereignty of the South Korean government through close liaison with ROK counterparts and the use of measured firepower. The presence of many noncombatants in proximity to the battlefield will require the conduct of civil military operations, meticulous adherence to the rules of engagement, and close coordination with the office of the J4 Wartime Host Nation Support. Involving local officials in decisions will help to bolster legitimacy of the U.S. cause in the eyes of the civilian population.

Contemporary military operations on urban terrain have met with some success through the introduction of non-traditional doctrine. The traditional view of urban combat is that of "attrition style warfare," requiring masses of infantry, combined arms, and stockpiles of ammunition 9. The combatants risk disease, supply shortages, and worst of all the loss of operational tempo 10. The modern urban battlefield is fully three-dimensional and includes combat with forces on the ground, on rooftops, in basements and sewers, and through walls and doors 11. As this terrain limits the effects of conventional weapons, Russian forces in Chechnya have employed flame throwers to clear buildings and have utilized air defense guns as direct fire weapons, as these weapons could elevate their fire to levels where tanks could not 12. Historically, the key to victory on urban battlefields has been a high degree of initiative by independent small units. The U.S. Marine Corps has already begun a review of its current doctrine on urban warfare. According to a recent study, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command recommends combined arms integration at the squad and platoon level along with the use of new technologies such as remote imaging systems used by U.S. counter-narcotic teams to see inside of buildings 13. Meeting the enemy on the urban battlefield will require changes in our combat doctrine, lest we devolve into the traditional battle of "attrition."

Commanders and staffs at all levels must understand the nature of the three-dimensional battlefield and how it will impact their mission. Fighting on these urban battlefields if done haphazardly will prove costly, particularly if the fighting regresses into house-to-house "attrition" style combat. Although the mission to defend the Republic of Korea against the threat of an armed invasion from the north has not changed over the past 50 years, the battlefield upon which such as war will be fought has changed significantly. Urbanization has spread to the most rural of areas and thus transformed the ground upon which we must fight. What were once empty rice fields have become mottled with growing towns and built-up areas and with significant populations and infrastructure. In a future conflict on the Korean peninsula, combat operations will require the employment of weapons inside and around these built-up areas. The skills required to prevail under such conditions can only be obtained through realistic combined arms training integrated at the lowest levels and conducted on simulated MOUT terrain. Although our war plans imply that we will avoid fighting in built-up areas, continued urbanization may make adherence to this tenet impossible. For future operations, we must explore revolutionary tactics, weapon systems, and new methods of integrating our current systems to ensure the highest degree of success.

Figure 1 - U.S. tanks move through a street in Seoul September 25, 1950

U.S. tanks move through a street in Seoul during an offensive against the North Koreans, September 25, 1950. None of the visible buildings are larger than two stories. U.S. Army photograph, Ridgeway, Matthew B., The Korean War. Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1967, page 101.

Figure 2 - Route 1 running through Uijongbu on 12 January 2000. Once a collection of farms.

Route 1 can be seen running through Uijongbu, a city north of Seoul that was once a collection of farms, January 12, 2000.

Figure 3 - City of Ch'orwon a formerly rural area ten kilometers south of DMZ

The city of Ch'orwon, a formerly rural area is located only ten kilometers south of the demilitarized zone on the Ch'orwon-Munsan approach.

Endnotes

1. National Statistical Office, Homepage (English text), http://www.nso.go.kr and Korean Government, Homepage, "Koreanet," (English text) http://www.korea.net. BACK

2. Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1961, page 535. BACK

3. Heinl, Robert Debs Jr., Victory at High Tide. J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and New York, 1968, page 153. BACK

4. Blair, Clay, The Forgotten War. Anchor Books, New York, 1988, page 790. BACK

5. Korea Highway Corporation, site visit and interviews, February, 1999. BACK

6. Koreanet. BACK

7. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "White Paper," Chapter 3, 2000. BACK

8. Keefe, Michael (International Relations Analyst); Lieutenant- Colonel Lee JeJune (Branch Chief), Major Richard Springette (Communications and Plans Officer), C5 Plans Division Civil Affairs Branch, Combined Forces Command -- Korea, interview, March 23, 2001. BACK

9. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, "A Concept for Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain." Virginia, 1997. BACK

10. Ibid. BACK

11. Ibid. BACK

12. Thomas, Timothy L., "The Battle for Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth. BACK

13. USMC. BACK

2002, Foreign Area Officer Association
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