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• respect the integrity of their territories and that no measure is to be taken that is
aimed directly or indirectly against one other;
• communicate with each other on all questions affecting their common interests
to bring about mutual considerations on the treatment of such questions; and
• economic cooperation was dispatched between the two governments.
Ismet Inonu declared Turkey a non-belligerent state soon after the German occupation of France in 1940, even though Turkey was tied to the Tripartite Alliance of October 1939 with France and Britain (2). According to Franz von Papen's Memoirs published in 1952, Hitler sent an official letter addressed to President Inonu establishing the terms of Germany's adherence to Turkish neutrality (3). It stated that German troops would be allowed no closer than 35 kilometers from the Bulgarian-Turkish border. This showed a high level of diplomatic activity designed to further the goals of the Wehrmacht. It is the ultimate example of a reversal of Clausewitz whereby policy and diplomacy is paving the way for military action.
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One of Turkey's political themes since the days of the Ottoman Empire was the idea of Pan Turkism, a political movement, similar to Zionism, for the union of all Turkic peoples stretching from the Volga to China. As the Nazi juggernaut conquered more areas of Soviet soil that were inhabited by Turkic peoples, a few Turkish leaders were tempted to join up with the Nazis to crush the Soviet Union as Germany took further control of the Caucasuses. Senior Turkish military officials felt that the opportunity to attack the southern areas of Russia should be exploited and President Ismet Inonu maintained an offical contact with Berlin over this issue while awaiting the result of the Nazi war on the Eastern Front (7 pg.130).
Germany actively encouraged Pan Turkism. Franz von Papen reported in July 1941 that Turkic interest was illustrated over Turks residing in Azerbaijan controlled by Stalin. In several instances, the German General Staff hosted a tour for Turkish generals Ali Fuat Erden and Emir Erkilet of the Eastern Front. The Turkish generals tried on several occasions to convince President Inonu and Foreign Minister Saracoglu that the Eastern Front has in fact been won by Nazi Germany and in a report dated August 8th 1942, Von Papen stated that he spoke with Saracoglu who had said that as a Turk he was complelely in favour of the defeat of Soviet Russia.
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German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop commented that Germany must "promote and maintain the somewhat dormant Turkish imperialist ambitions." (7 pg. 131). Another aspect of Turkish foreign policy with the Third Reich was the ability to procure armaments and financial aid from Germany. In the summer of 1942, Turkey was offered a loan for arms shipment. An allied official commented "If the Germans fulfill their oath to link arms and equipment to Turkey, within 6 months they would have supplied Turkey in a sixth of the time with thrice the equipment as we have done." On April 29, 1942 Hitler instructed Italian dictator Benito Mussolini that Turkey was moving gradually but assuredly towards the Axis sphere (7 pg.135-136). As Nazi Armies began freezing in the Russian winter and the Red Army began reversing the tides of defeat the Turkish Republic never took that step towards becoming an Axis partner.
Conclusion
This little discussed aspect of World War II, demonstrates the importance of behind the scenes diplomacy, weapons sales and grants in the management of a neutral government that occupies strategic territory. The allies had through co-opting King Farouk of Egypt denied the Axis use of the Suez Canal, it would be vital for Hitler not to see the Bosporus Strait be denied to German shipping. It also shows the irrational exuberance that nationalism can have on a nation's foreign policy. Turkish leaders almost fell into the abyss of joining the Axis, which seemed at the time the rational choice given their loathing of Stalin who controlled Soviet Republics with a heavy population of Turkic people. Although on a smaller scale Marine Corps General Henry Osman and his team used his influence to keep Kurdish factions from lapsing into civil war as coalition forces marched towards Baghdad from the south (8). Had the United States ignored Northern Iraq and Kurds began exploding into civil and factional warfare, it would have provided strategic depth for Saddam loyalists and Islamist extremists who thrive in operating under conditions of civil disorder. Maj.Gen Osman is not as well known as other Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition commanders but his contribution is no less important.
Editor's Note: Mr. Basil Aboul-Enein has just completed his graduate studies in dietetics in Houston, Texas and is working to earn an officer's commission in the U.S. Navy. He has a passion for Middle East military history. LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is Basil's older brother who is Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
1. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/turkgermany.html
2. Butler, J. R. M. History of the Second World War Grand Strategy, volume 2: September 1939 - June 1941 London: HMSO, 1957, pg. 301.
3. Franz von Papen, Memoirs London: A. Deutsch, 1952, pg. 471-473.
4. Weinberg, Gerhard L, A world at arms: a global history of World War II, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pg. 219.
5. Preclusive Operations in the Neutral Countries in World War II," March 20, 1947, RG 169, Office of the Administrator, Records Analysis Division, Historical Monographs Prepared Outside theDivision, Box 5.
6. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs, translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York and Toronto, 1970), pg. 316-317.
7. Selim Deringil (1989). Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War An active Neutrality. Cambridge University Press, UK.
8. Reynolds, Nicolas. Basra, Baghdad and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005) pp. 123-127.