So where are the two sides now following the Kargil crisis, Gen Musharraf's coup,
the Indian Airlines hijacking, and apparent stepped up fighting in J & K? A broad brush
description of each country's strategy, would look something like this:
The Indian strategy:
-Invest heavily in Counter-Insurgency Operations (form new Para-military units capable
of conducting COIN) and increase security force presence.
-Form a new division in J & K.
-Seal the LOC as much as possible.
-Propagandize the Pakistan madrassas (religious indoctrination camps), fundamentalism,
and Islamabad's direct link to terrorists.
-Wage psyops war in Kashmir (hearts and minds campaign).
-Get Pakistan declared as a state, which sponsors terrorism.
-Convince the Pakistanis that the Indians will not buy into Pakistan's nuclear umbrella,
which might allow Pakistan to act with impunity.
-Reiterate India is prepared to wage limited conventional war to secure Kashmir despite
the nuclear factor.
-Convince the world that India is a responsible/mature de facto nuclear (indigenously
developed by the way) democracy, and downplay the threat of inadvertent nuclear
escalation.
-Paint the danger of Pakistan proliferating nuclear weapons to other Islamic states.
-Leverage Kashmiri fear by allowing ambiguity over the possible abrogation of Article
370 of the constitution (some Hindu nationalist parties are suggesting this), which would
take away special status for Kashmiris, and allow Hindus to migrate, own land in Jammu
and Kashmir, and change the demographics. The Kashmiris great fear would be losing
their majority status in the state as a result of Hindu migration. Implications of such
would be a future plebiscite obviously favoring remaining within the Indian union.
The Pakistan strategy:
-Re-ignite the "grassroots" aspect of the rebellion in the Valley.
-Bleed the Indians on the Siachen Glacier, along the LOC, and throughout the state of J
& K.
-Make the pressure so great that Indians will negotiate.
-Operate under the protection of the "nuclear umbrella" and expect/hope the Indians will
not escalate to full-scale war.
-Use the threat of nuclear war to garner international mediation.
-Never give up on Kashmir issue. To give up on Kashmir is to give up on Pakistan.
Can a solution to Kashmir be negotiated? It seems India and Pakistan are still at
diametrically opposed ends. The Indians reject the demand for a referendum on Jammu
and Kashmir, as per the UN Resolution, on the basis that a referendum could only be held
after Pakistan vacated the occupied portion of Kashmir. Adding that the entire Jammu
and Kashmir formed part and parcel of India and they claim, "we will not rest till the
remaining part of Kashmir is secured." According to the Indians, the people of Jammu
and Kashmir had on a number of occasions made it clear that they wanted to remain with
India, adding that all elections, particularly the one in 1977, had been praised by
independent observers. New Delhi won't talk to Islamabad until Pakistan ends it aid to
the insurgency. Certainly the coup in Pakistan, the subsequent Indian Airlines hijacking,
(believed to have been engineered by the Pakistanis), complicated and make it unlikely
that any Indian coalition government will agree to a deal with Islamabad, as well as to
third party mediation. To do so would vilify its bedrock policy, be seen as weak, and
bring down the Indian government.
That there appears to be little chance for resolving the Kashmir dispute under the
current conditions seems a foregone conclusion. There are too many players, too many
divergent viewpoints, not enough outside leverage, and no real national interests for
major powers to intervene. The Track II approach (using retired military and
government officials to open dialogue) is hamstrung by an unwillingness of the Indian
bureaucrats to give up their authority. At present, the Indian PIOs and NRIs 2 and Pakistani Diaspora do not seem
sufficiently motivated (when compared to the Israeli lobby) to strongly lobby their newly
adopted governments (read spend lots of money) in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. to get
these governments more actively involved. The present killing and the potential nuclear
holocaust of untold dead thousands (perhaps millions), of South Asians, means this
essentially boils down to a humanitarian issue for outside actors.
A virtual "cottage industry" of analyses and commentaries has flourished during the
53 year-old Kashmir dispute. Regionally focused pundits have written countless articles
about this dispute and conceived many proposals on how it might be resolved. It is
certainly a great coincidence of statecraft history that the treatise "Danger In Kashmir,"
written in 1966 by Joseph Korbel, (Secretary of State, Madeline Albright's father) was
one of the more prescient pieces on the subject. 3 As the U.S. presidential visit to India (and possibly Pakistan
set for late March 2000), approaches, Indian bureaucrats in and South Block (India's
Pentagon & Foggy Bottom), party hacks in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its
opposition, are coping with varying degrees of paranoia, questioning to what extent is the
U.S. Secretary of State committed to "third party mediation" (read U.S. meddling).
Again, this is clearly evident and heightening as one follows the major Indian dailies.
The ever-suspicious and superstitious Brahmin leadership in Delhi undoubtedly is
ruminating a version of mental "connect-a-dot" (Albright-Korbel-Kashmir) and now it
must cope with the "down side" of a presidential visit (the first since Jimmy Carter), that
is, the potential for greater U.S. regional interest and involvement in Kashmir. Indian
strategy obviously is to make the focus of Clinton's visit India's economic potential
(trade and technology, etc), as well as India's democratic characteristics (let's avoid the
issue of good governance), while simultaneously downplaying the potential for nuclear
irresponsibility. India's Ministry of External Affairs must ensure that President Clinton
(in his waning days in the Oval Office) does not attempt to force on Kashmir what he has
tried to do in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Northern Ireland.
For most Indians, U.S. involvement in this dispute not only represents a threat in
that it delays the inevitable (Pakistan's complete loss of legitimacy on claims to
Kashmir), but, moreover, it would give Pakistan its much dreamed of outside leverage.
The "land for peace" recipe might work for the Middle East, however, this solution will
not resonate well with the Indian elite who have always maintained that every inch of
Kashmir belongs (and will remain) inside the Indian union. Recent Indian press coverage
of pronouncements by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee go to even greater extremes by
indicating New Delhi's aim is to secure all of Kashmir (even "Pakistani
Occupied Kashmir"). This hard line approach is not only meant for domestic
consumption. By setting the Indian bargaining mark extremely high at first, India will
appear to be making a major concession when it proffers the lesser measure of
transforming the LOC into the International Border (IB). Were this to happen
(conversion of the LOC), it would obviously cast a very different light on cross-border
violations by the Pakistanis or their surrogates. India could then be justified to retaliate
against Pakistani-led or Pak-supported incursions with greater resolution (perhaps "hot
pursuit"). Indian current strategy on the de facto border appears to be focused on
semantics. Repeatedly using the term "respect for the sanctity of the LOC" is clearly an
attempt to "morph" the LOC without Pakistan's acquiescence into a "de jure" boundary.
Use the word "sanctity" enough times and perhaps the rest of the world will start to
repeat this mantra.
The Indians, however, have an amazing ability to withstand external pressures and
to slow roll an unpleasant situation. After all, the Mughals and British came and went
after a mere several centuries, and Hinduism still thrives and dominates South Asia.
Slow roll they have done on Kashmir and will continue to do so despite Washington's
well meaning efforts or suggestions. The "No War-No Peace," (as Indian's call the
situation) immensely expensive imbroglio in Kashmir will be with South Asians for
perhaps another 50 years, unless, of course, the U.S. deems the issue an important
national interest to solve, and U.S. interest in South Asia's development becomes more
than simply a passing sound bite. Until either of these happens, there is nothing in it for
the major actors to change their current positions on Kashmir. The danger that India and
Pakistan might, of course, solve the dispute through a Darwinistic event (all out
conventional conflict), becomes likelier each day given the current dynamics: one side's
military dictatorship, stepped up provocations, one essentially "failed state," intensifying
Hindu nationalism, and lack of desire for rapprochement. Even J & K's flamboyant
Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, during a public rally in his state not too long ago,
suggested the "battle it out option" might be the only way. Indo-Pak relations are clearly
at low ebb.
Recently, while escorting a high-ranking, very intelligent, Indian Army officer
through George C. Marshall Hall at the National Defense University, I was reminded of
the Indian view on South Asia. My guest, whom I have known for a few years, paused
with great interest to examine the many U.S. Civil War exhibits, which focused on the
defining aspect of the brother-on-brother conflict in U.S. history. My Hindu friend
lamented that "if only the Hindus and Muslims had done the same in 1947" (i.e. "had
gotten it over with," the sub-continent would not be under the curse it is now under with
the Kashmir dispute. My friend blamed India's lack of fast progress on its having been
preoccupied with Kashmir.
While Indian strategy is to "slow roll" the Kashmir issue, time is clearly not on
Pakistan's side as it faces the likely prospect of national Balkanization and further
economic meltdown. The Pakistani strategy seems clear. Increase the pressure (military
operations) along the LOC, re-ignite the instability in the Valley, and other areas, cause
the Indians to either come to the bargaining table or force them to over-react, and raise
the specter in Western minds that a nuclear exchange might inadvertently occur.
Pakistan's ultimate aim is to engage the UNSC, and or the U.S., U.K. and perhaps China
in the issue.
Western analysts and strategic gamers have developed worst case scenarios in
which ratcheting events over Kashmir propel India and Pakistan across the "threshold" of
limited conflict and into an unlimited conventional war with unknown aims. Indian
reactions inadvertently hit Islamabad's "nuclear tripwire." The possibility of this
scenario obviously weighs heavily in Pakistan's favor. Islamabad leverages this fear
(and the surrounding ambiguity) to enhance its national survival against Indian military
adventurism. Recent U.S. administration officials' statements to congress on C-Span
tend to reinforce this fear. In open testimony, U.S. officials claim Kashmir is a "very
short fuse that could ignite a nuclear exchange."
The "64,000 dollar" question for all policy-makers who cover this issue is
obviously, "how can Kashmir be solved?" What proposals could possibly result in
Indian and Pakistan agreement? Not to mention, what can be done for the poor
Kashmiris caught in the middle? Optimists (and there are a few) remain committed that,
although it is an immense uphill battle, nevertheless, a "win-win" solution that cuts three
ways (Indian-Pakistani-Kashmiri) is possible. There is no dearth of possible solutions,
for example:
1. In December 1998, a Kashmir Study Group in consultation with Indians and
Pakistanis came up with the "Livingston Proposal" which recommended a portion of the
former state of Jammu and Kashmir be reconstituted as a sovereign entity (without an
international personality), enjoying free access to and from both India and Pakistan. The
portion of the State to be so reconstituted shall be determined through an internationally
supervised method to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people on either side of the
LOC. India and Pakistan would be responsible for defense and would work out financial
arrangements for the Kashmiri entity. Kashmiris would be entitled to either Pakistani or
Indian passports, etc. This proposal gets complex and would require an amazing amount
of cooperation between India and Pakistan, the likes if which have not been seen.
2. Then there is the long proposed plebiscite option on national self-determination
for the Kashmiris. Kashmiris have three options: a. Independence, b. Pakistan, or c.
India. Of course, this proposal flies in the face of Indian elites who assert that the
Kashmiris have already made the choice in previous elections. In any case, New Delhi
will not agree unless Pakistan stops its involvement.
3. There is the option of a final partition of Kashmir along the LOC, (i.e. turn the
LOC into the legal International Border.) However, this course creates a winner and
loser. India wins by holding on to the major chunk of Kashmir. What then does the Pak
military do with its belief system that the premise for Pakistan was the "two nation-
theory that has sustained it through the dark days?"
4. Some have proposed a Northern Ireland style peace effort, which seeks to satisfy
all parties by ensuring there is no clear winner. Again, this would require a radical shift
in trust between India and Pakistan, and would more likely be "slow rolled" by India. In
the wake of the Lahore bus diplomacy that was undercut by the Kargil surprise, no Indian
politician can be seen negotiating with the "duplicitous" Pakistanis. Certainly no
negotiations can take place with a military junta. As my Indian friends have asked me
rhetorically, "whom can we negotiate with?"
5. Some assert that only parallel efforts by U.S., China, and Russia have the best
chance of affecting Kashmir negotiations. An interesting idea, however the Chinese are
in no position to push on Kashmir because of Tibet, Taiwan, and the fact that it also has
to resolve its own territorial disputes with India. Is Russia in a position to push for
state's rights for self-determination (how about Chechnya?). Meanwhile, New Delhi
elites, long paranoid over "U.S. ulterior designs" in South Asia, remain neuralgic over
U.S. meddling and have to spin the Clinton visit to their advantage. Focus on what the
world's most populous democracy can do as a responsible nation, and focus on great
economic potential. Sign CTBT, perhaps? Make major concessions on Kashmir, never!
If there is a bottom line in this complex dispute it is the obvious one that as long as
the "zero-sum" construct prevails in the minds of the legalistic Hindus in Delhi and the
Quixotic Muslims in Islamabad, there is no room for solution. Students of the Indian
mindset grow weary of the reflexive chant of the "secularity" mantra, which cuts to the
chase of India's founding principle as a nation state. Those who have interacted
frequently with Indian national strategists know there is a deep paranoia over what
Indians term "fissiparous tendencies" (be they in Kashmir, Punjab, the North Eastern
states, or Tamil Nadu), and a zealous belief among the entrenched Delhi bureaucrats and
other elites that any softening on the issue of Kashmiri autonomy will only encourage
known and potential irredentists. A Muslim Kashmir state remaining in the Indian union
proves India's national concept and vindicates the wisdom of its founding fathers. The
"centers of gravity" for India (a lawyer rich environment, by the way) are a steadfast
belief in the inviolability (sanctity) of the Instrument of Accession, and the belief that the
ground rules set down by the departing British were "fair and square."
For those who have had opportunities to talk with Pakistanis on the issue, the
frustrating bi-polarity of the dispute is unavoidable. The Pakistanis cannot and will not
come to terms with the contrariety and paradox of a Hindu Maharaja signing away the
fate of the Muslim majority in 1947. The "two-nation" theory (that a Hindu majority
nation cannot or will not cater to the needs of a Muslim minority), and most importantly,
Hindus and Muslims are two distinct peoples, are as sacrosanct for the Pakistanis as the
theory of secularity is for Indians.
For the Pakistanis, a peaceful and viable Muslim majority state in a Hindu nation is
anathema to Pakistan's raison d'etre. Pakistanis remain convinced that India's founding
fathers coerced the Instrument of Accession, that the Simla Agreement of 1972
(committing the Pakistanis to bilateralism) was signed under duress, and that the
Kashmiris have never been given the legal right to express their national druthers. While
articulating in public that they would support an independent Kashmir, no right-minded
dyed-in-the wool Pakistani would give up on incorporation of Kashmir inside Pakistan
because so doing would mean the eternal vision of a cohesive Muslim state in the
Himalayas could not be obtained.
Expected Utility Model
It is instructive that when a high tech policy analysis tool such as the "Expected
Utility Model" 4 is used to try to
come up with solutions to break the deadlock, discouraging results are shown which
mirror my earlier assessments. Participants in this academic experiment identified most
of the players (internal and external), their degree of interest, and their degree of
influence in India, Pakistan, and Kashmir (Azad and Jammu & Kashmir). The baseline
data was plugged into the model by Dr. Jacek Kugler of Claremont College, (a renown
expert in using the Expected Utility Model as a policy negotiation tool). The following
are the results: 5
- The central concern in the Kashmir debate focuses on levels of regional autonomy.
- With current policies in place, the crisis in Kashmir will linger. Disgruntled forces
either in Pakistan's Azad Kashmir or India's Kashmir region will continue guerrilla
actions. If and when these incursions take place, the anticipated reaction by India is a
military clamp down on rebels -- once more escalating this protracted conflict.
1. The vicious cycle of conflict in Kashmir could be altered if the United States
chose to initiate political change now, adopting and supporting conversations on
autonomy for Kashmir that do not exclude the option of independence. If the US
chose to play this pivotal role our analysis discloses that:
2. Indian leaders could reduce tensions in the region by substantially increasing
Kashmir's autonomy.
3. Indian leaders could produce a lasting peace by accepting Kashmir's
independence.
This is not a two way street. Any attempt by the US, by other foreign actors like China or
by Pakistan to press for a solution that integrates Kashmir into Pakistan would fail.
The following expected utility brief provides a policy path for what can be done.
The policy outcomes on the Kashmir crisis were identified as follows:
0: Kashmir becomes a part of Pakistan and is fully
integrated.
20: Kashmir becomes a part of Pakistan with low degree of
autonomy.
45: Kashmir is a part of Pakistan with a relatively high degree of autonomy.
50: Kashmir exists as an independent nation-state.
55: Kashmir is a part of India with a relatively high degree of autonomy
90: Kashmir remains a part of India with a relatively low degree of autonomy
100: Kashmir is fully integrated into the Indian federation
While there are numerous stakeholders that have slightly different positions on this
issue, they can be classified into five clusters. The appendix lists all relevant policy
stakeholders. These groups must be involved in any solution to the current impasse on
the Kashmir:
1. Indian groups
2. Pakistani groups
3. Kashmiri groups
4. Azad Kashmiri groups
5. International actors
In Figure 1, and the following presentation is a limited summary of the more
complex data presented in the Appendix. Note that in round one, which provides a
situation assessment prior to analysis, the Indian position on Kashmir ranges from the
status quo position to a tighter integration of Kashmir into India. While most groups,
including Prime Minister Vajpayee, key Cabinet Ministers including the External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh, the Defense Minister, the Home Minister L.K. Advani, the
Congress (I), and the Military, are satisfied with the status quo position, the ruling party's
(BJP's) coalition partners demand a closer integration of Kashmir into the Indian
federation. At first glance, one would not expect that negotiation over the status of
Kashmir would find support among Indian decision-makers. However, our analysis
suggests that such an opportunity exists only if Jawant Singh (External Affairs Minister)
were persuaded to take the initiative.
Figure 1 - Base Case |
|---|
In round one, Pakistan's main stakeholders
advocate closer ties between Pakistan and Kashmir without Kashmir's formal accession
to Pakistan. Most Pakistani policy makers including the Prime Minister/Gen. Musharraf,
Military commanders, and the Pakistani National Security Council hold this position.
Pakistani intelligence however, adopts a position that calls for a complete integration of
Kashmir into Pakistan. As in the case of India, Pakistan's position appears intransigent
on Kashmir. Our analysis suggests that this perception is correct, only minor concessions
will follow and no new Pakistani initiatives are likely to succeed.
Policy stakeholders within Kashmir itself are also divided. Kashmiri Hindus
demand closer ties to the Indian federal government, while the Muslim groups, including
religious leaders, call for Kashmir's independence. Likewise, Azad Kashmir within
Pakistan is divided; the nominal Prime Minister advocates Kashmiri independence, while
the Muslim population and the guerilla groups demand the integration of Kashmir and
Pakistan. Finally, the international community, including the US, EU, Russia, and the
UK, support the current status quo while China is beginning to diverge, tilting
toward advocating greater autonomy for Kashmir. Despite the constellation of foreign
powers interested in the Kashmir crisis, their involvement level suggests that they are not
likely to take the initiative. Rather, the international community will react to policy
decisions by the regional and direct players in India, Pakistan or Kashmir.
Expected utility analysis of future projections (rounds 2-12) shows that under
current conditions there will be no major negotiation efforts to resolve the Kashmir
dispute. Pakistan's leaders would like to see movement toward Kashmir's independence
but are unwilling to alter their current stance. Indian leaders will seek to restore order by
discussing or allowing increased autonomy in Kashmir, but would reject any proposals
that challenge Kashmir status within India. Similarly, the various factions within
Kashmir continue to mirror Indian and Pakistani policy initiatives. The Hindu faction in
Kashmir will accept added autonomy, but opposes any movement towards independence
from India. Muslim factions advocate autonomy while the stronger groups in Azad
Kashmir advocate annexation by Pakistan. The international community is flexible and
will react positively to any incentive that increases autonomy for Kashmir. However,
their potential influence is unlikely to materialize in offering specific proposals of their
own.
In sum, under current conditions the Crisis in Kashmir is likely to linger.
Disgruntled forces either in Pakistan's Azad Kashmir or India's Kashmir region are
likely to continue guerrilla actions. If and when they take place, the anticipated reaction
by India is a military clamp down on rebels -- once more escalating this protracted
conflict. Without a major policy shift, a political solution is unlikely.
POLICY PATH TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK
Despite this grim prospect, the expected utility analysis identifies a policy strategy
and option that, if implemented, could increase the stability in the region. There is an
opportunity for India's leaders to provide substantial autonomy that will settle the
dispute. However, the likely outcome of such negotiations is independence for Kashmir.
Figure 2 - Policy Initiatives |
|---|
The expected utility policy model identifies
that India's External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, can play a critical role in a policy
initiative. Singh is unaware of his opportunity to persuade India's PM to change his
position from minimal autonomy to a willingness to discuss full autonomy, and over time
eventually the independence of Kashmir (move from 90 to 45 on the policy scale). Were
Minister Singh aware of this option -- through discussions with the United States -
negotiations over the future of Kashmir can become productive. Figure 2 provides the
possible outcomes following such an initiative.
One can immediately note the very rapid convergence of all groups towards
independence. Kashmir and Pakistani actors would be sufficiently encouraged by these
proposals to abandon demands of annexation of Kashmir into Pakistan, shifting their
support toward independence. More importantly, this initiative can change the
fundamental nature of the Kashmir crisis. The expected utility analysis of conflict levels
suggests that both Indian and Pakistani stakeholders would begin to view the Kashmir
issue as less confrontational and move the issue to a negotiated policy framework.
Following such an initiative, beneficial bilateral negotiations are possible. The
policy distance between India, Pakistan and Kashmir stakeholders would be reduced
sufficiently to allow serious discussions. Details of the exact negotiations require
additional information once they begin. However, the United States could play a pivotal
role in adopting and supporting conversations on autonomy for Kashmir that do not
exclude the option of independence. With the exception of Russia and Britain, the
international community would also endorse this effort. However, the United States and
regional groups can act quickly to avoid any semblance of a foreign imposed solution in
Kashmir.
DATA APPENDIX 6
| Description | Resources | Salience | Position | Round
2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|
PAK Musharraf | 0.114 | 0.75 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Army | 0.08 | 0.75 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Air Chief | 0.023 | 0.4 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 50 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 49
|
|
PAK Foreign Minister | 0.085 | 0.75 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Intel | 0.091 | 0.95 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
PAK Feudal Leaders | 0.017 | 0.1 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Jamiat Islami Party | 0.034 | 0.8 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Industrialists | 0.023 | 0.1 | 50 | 60 | 56 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 49 | 49 | 49
|
|
PAK Media | 0.011 | 0.75 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
PAK NSC | 0.006 | 0.85 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Navy Chief | 0.011 | 0.15 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 49 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 49
|
|
PAK President | 0.003 | 0.1 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
PAK Prime Minister | 0.001 | 0.01 | 40 | 42 | 42 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 47
|
|
AK Minister | 0.005 | 0.85 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
AK JKLF | 0.002 | 0.95 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
AK Population | 0.005 | 0.85 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
AK Peoples Party | 0.002 | 0.8 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
AK Islam Guerrillas | 0.034 | 0.95 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
AK Muslim League | 0.002 | 0.8 | 45 | 45 | 48 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
K Muslims | 0.08 | 0.9 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50
|
|
K Guerillas (Muslim) | 0.06 | 1 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50
|
|
K Hindu | 0.01 | 0.85 | 100 | 94 | 94 | 94 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63
|
|
K India Chief Minister | 0.05 | 0.95 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
K India Governor | 0.03 | 0.95 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
K India Military | 0.08 | 1 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
K Media | 0.02 | 0.9 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
K Mirwais | 0.04 | 1 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48
|
|
K Paramilitary | 0.03 | 0.95 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
U. P. Muslims | 0.002 | 0.1 | 90 | 90 | 86 | 85 | 71 | 68 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 66
|
|
BJP Partners | 0.084 | 0.2 | 95 | 94 | 94 | 88 | 75 | 70 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67
|
|
Congress Party | 0.034 | 0.3 | 90 | 89 | 88 | 82 | 72 | 68 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67
|
|
External Affairs | 0.126 | 0.7 | 100 | 90 | 76 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61
|
|
Prime Minister | 0.168 | 0.6 | 90 | 45 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60
|
|
Home Minister | 0.101 | 0.6 | 90 | 45 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60
|
|
Army Chief | 0.059 | 0.8 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
Air Chief | 0.034 | 0.5 | 90 | 60 | 55 | 55 | 48 | 63 | 48 | 63 | 48 |
|
Chair Atomic Comm. | 0.025 | 0.1 | 90 | 90 | 86 | 85 | 70 | 68 | 67 | 67 | 66 | 66
|
|
CCNS | 0.067 | 0.6 | 90 | 45 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60
|
|
Defense Minister | 0.067 | 0.7 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
Indian Media | 0.042 | 0.7 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20
|
|
Navy Chief | 0.017 | 0.1 | 90 | 90 | 86 | 85 | 70 | 68 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 66
|
|
National Sec. Council | 0.025 | 0.5 | 90 | 60 | 60 | 50 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60
|
|
Other Parties | 0.008 | 0.2 | 90 | 90 | 86 | 78 | 75 | 71 | 67 | 67 | 66 | 66
|
|
Principal Secretary | 0.126 | 0.6 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60
|
|
Scientific Advisor | 0.017 | 0.1 | 90 | 90 | 86 | 85 | 70 | 68 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 66
|
|
SARC (Religious) | 0.048 | 0.03 | 75 | 77 | 74 | 68 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 66
|
|
OIC Islamic States | 0.096 | 0.05 | 50 | 57 | 56 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 49 | 49 | 50
|
|
UN | 0.191 | 0.15 | 70 | 70 | 53 | 55 | 55 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54
|
|
China | 0.096 | 0.1 | 70 | 71 | 54 | 55 | 54 | 55 | 54 | 54 | 54 | 54
|
|
EU | 0.096 | 0.05 | 90 | 90 | 87 | 74 | 67 | 59 | 56 | 54 | 54 | 54
|
|
Russia | 0.048 | 0.01 | 90 | 90 | 87 | 80 | 77 | 77 | 75 | 74 | 74 | 74
|
|
USA | 0.287 | 0.17 | 90 | 90 | 89 | 85 | 67 | 58 | 57 | 56 | 56 | 55
|
|
UK | 0.191 | 0.15 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 80 | 74 | 69 | 68 | 67 | 67 | 67
|
|
Amnesty Int. | 0.048 | 0.15 | 50 | 65 | 52 | 52 | 51 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50
|
|
Forecast | | | 90 | 45 | 50 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 48 |
About the author:
LTC (P) Steven B. Sboto is a South Asia Foreign Area officer currently working as a
Senior Military Fellow at the War Gaming and Simulation Center, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington D.C. He served as Army
Attaché in India from 1996-1999, attended the Indian Defense Services Staff
College 1988-1989, and served as a J-2/JCS analyst covering South Asia from 1989-
1992. The views expressed in this article are the author's and neither represent official
U.S. opinion/policy nor that of the National Defense University.
Endnotes
