Partition's Princely Pawn: The Saga of Kashmir
By Major Randy Koehlmoos, USA, 48D
Figure 1
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The current dilemma over possession of the area
historically known as Kashmir poses the greatest threat to the security and stability of South Asia.
No issue is more complicated or multi-facetted than the dispute over Kashmir and it continues to
be the most divisive issue in the Asian subcontinent. This dilemma involves two nuclear weapons
capable belligerents--India and Pakistan; both possess instinctually militant personalities and
gross misperceptions of the opposing force, and both desire ownership of Kashmir. The Kashmir
saga involves the endless search for truth; India and Pakistan do not even agree that the territory
is disputed and interpret history differently to justify their bipolar positions. The problem of
Kashmir is not so much one of resources, strategic ground, or of its historical or international legal
status, but an issue of domestic political legitimacy. When the first India-Pakistan war ended with
a UN cease-fire in January 1949, about two-thirds of the Kashmiri population was under Indian control
and the rest under Pakistani control separated by a temporary cease-fire line (CFL). After two wars, 50 years of
continual battle involving Kashmir, and upwards of 20,000 deaths, a nonmilitary solution to the situation
does not exist, and to date no formal effort has ever been made by the international community (if such an
organization even exists) to affix responsibility for the emergence of the Kashmir situation. Little indication
exists that either India or Pakistan will make an effort in the future to find a solution to the Kashmir problem, which is at the core of
problems in India-Pakistan relations. Neither side can politically afford peace, because in
reference to Kashmir each side wins (at least politically in the short-term domestic arena) by
constantly challenging the other.
The history behind the current Kashmir dispute
The former Indian Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir is made up of many regions, but is
called Jammu & Kashmir (J&K or just Kashmir for short) because the two most populous
regions in the state are named Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir sits at one of the crossroads for
invasion into the Indian subcontinent. It is a large multi-ethnic territory consisting of Dogra Hindus
in Jammu, Punjabi Muslims in Poonch and Mirpur, Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits of the Srinagar
Valley, the Shias of Kargil, and the Buddhists of Ladakh. 1
Scythian Hindu princes ruled the area for centuries, followed by Tatars and then by Muslim
invaders in the 14th century. Akbar conquered the area in 1586 and the Muslim
Moguls ruled until their empire fell in the 18th century. An Afghan tribe ruled Kashmir
until their defeat in 1819 by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (who left no heirs). Gulab Singh, a tributary
chief and ruler of Jammu, collaborated with the British in helping them subdue the Sikh Punjab in
the middle 19th century, and for this act the British (by the Treaty of Amritsar in
1846) gave the Valley (Vale) of Kashmir forever to Maharaja Gulab Singh and his male heirs. In
return, the Maharaja acknowledged the supremacy of the British Indian Government in the areas
of defense, foreign relations, and communications.
The precursor to the current Kashmir situation was British partition of the sub-continent in
1947 and the creation of India and Pakistan; a partition that resolved very little of the religious
based problems it sought to pacify. Britain's main priority after WWII was to get out of the area as
quickly as possible before anti-colonial politics became more radical and the violence more
deadly. Britain agreed to indigenous self-rule and appointed Lord Mountbatten to relinquish power
as the last Viceroy. In the succeeding negotiations, he directed the date of independence to be
midnight of 14/15 August 1947.
At that time there was not a unitary idea of how to structure the new post-British government.
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian Congress Party wanted a strong central government to
implement economic development and national integration. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his
Muslim League rejected this, as they wanted autonomy for their own Muslim nation. Jinnah was
forced by both the Congress Party and the British to decide between an undivided India without
any guarantee of the Muslim share in power, or a sovereign Pakistan carved out of the Muslim-
majority districts of Punjab and Bengal; Jinnah chose the latter.
When Lord Mountbatten announced on 3 June 1947 his plan to partition British India, he
informed the rulers of the 565 semi-autonomous Princely States that after partition Britain would
not be able to recognize any of them as independent dominions and expected them each to join
with either India or Pakistan. 2 After Mountbatten
released the final boundary awards, communal riots continued to rage, and a two-way exodus
began with Muslims moving west to Pakistan and Sikhs and Hindus moving east to India.
Though Maharaja Sir Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir let 15 August come and go without
announcing a decision, the Maharaja probably ceded to India two months later. The
exact circumstance under which the accession to India was made is merely speculation as he left
no known account of his life or of the historic moments that preceded and followed Indian and
Pakistani nationhood. One can speculate that he was surely drawn to India by his own religion
(Hinduism), but also towards Pakistan because of his Muslim population, the close geographical
and economic links to Pakistan, and the power, status, and prestige he hoped to retain. One can
conversely argue that the Maharaja probably became increasingly reluctant to cede to Pakistan as
he viewed Pakistan as a one community theocratic state, whereas Kashmir nominally enjoyed a
secular equality among its Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim population. 3
The fact that Patan tribesmen attacked across Pakistan's border with Kashmir on 22 October
1947 is not in question. The Patans captured Muzaffarabad two days later and advanced in the
direction of the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar. Kashmiri State forces, already weakened by
attempting to quell an internal disturbance in Poonch (western Jammu), were overwhelmed. The
Maharaja appealed to India for military help to repel the invaders, and Indian troops arrived in
Srinagar only after the raiders already held one-third of the state. As a condition for sending
troops, the Maharaja had to first agree to cede his land to India as Lord Mountbatten viewed this
as sending federal troops outside the country. Fighting continued in Kashmir until India referred
the issue to the UN and a subsequent UN-sponsored cease-fire ended the conflict on 1 January
1949.
The 1949 Cease Fire Line (CFL), renamed the Line of Control (LOC) in the 1972 Shimla
Agreement, today divides all but 40 miles of Indian and Pakistani controlled sectors of Kashmir.
The area currently defined as the disputed territory of Kashmir is not the same area as 1947
Kashmir. 4 China has occupied the area of
Ladakh known as Aksai Chin since its 1962 war with China, and with the 1963 Border Agreement
between Pakistan and China, Pakistan lost ground marked on the map as Kashmir to China but
gained a formal demarcated northern boundary. In the early 1980s, the dispute over the Siachen
Glacier arose. Siachen lies beyond the northern terminal point of the LOC at map coordinate
NJ9842, which is 40 miles short of the China-Pakistan border as defined by their 1963 agreement.
Pakistan discovered in August 1983 that an Indian reconnaissance patrol had established a camp
on one of the glacier's branches, and on 13 April 1984 India launched Operation Meghdoot
that placed troops on mountain outposts that dominated the approaches to the Siachen Glacier.
Since then, the two countries have battled over where (and whether) the real border exists.
While Hindu-Muslim violence continued with increasing frequency and with growing numbers
of lives lost in all of India, the problem took on a new dimension in Kashmir in the 1980s. In
Jammu and Kashmir, the arguments about political and cultural estrangement from the Indian
Union are to a large extent refracted through the belief that India had economically neglected and
marginalized Jammu and Kashmir. 5 Severe
unrest followed by breaches of the LOC destroyed the relative peace in existence since 1972.
The hostage-for-prisoner swap by the Indian Government in 1989 marked the start in earnest of
Kashmir's armed separatist insurgency. 6 Some
people also point to the rigged Indian national elections of 1986 and 1987 as the reason that
pushed the Kashmiris over the political edge; others state multiple causes based on policy failures
in New Delhi, political and social events in Kashmir, or of course to the political designs of
Pakistan. Muslims in Kashmir appeared frustrated with the denial of full democracy as well as the
federal autonomy promised after independence and are always fearful of the rise of militant Hindu
nationalism. After India's imposition of emergency rule and the suspension of constitutional rights
within Kashmir, the entire movement continued to grow and started to include the demand of
independence from both Indian and Pakistani controlled portions of Kashmir.
Since 1989, India has dealt with the Kashmir crisis as a crisis of foreign intervention and an
issue of Islamic fundamentalism rather than one of political legitimacy and representation within
the Indian Union. 7 Pakistani estimates are that
by 1993 over 600,000 India military and para-military personnel were active in the Kashmir area
operating against up to 35 different militant resistance groups, some opposed as much to each
other as to the Indian government. As one ethnic group seeks to assert its rights, other groups
react and seek to define and defend their own interests.
Conclusion
Because neither the Indian nor Pakistani government is politically strong enough to make
major concessions on the Kashmir issue, the chance of a settlement remains remote. 8 India relies on the religious based chaos in the
Kashmir valley to justify the need to maintain a strong, centralized, and secular government. For
Islamic Pakistan, the struggle against the Hindu bogeyman is the unifying factor to which it
is wholly subservient. As long as India and Pakistan both covet the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar,
and see the dispute in highly emotional and ideological terms, every conceivable bilateral
settlement is insupportable. Any solution would inevitably make one side or the other conclude
itself the loser, and this would be political suicide for any party in power to accept.
Historically there has been little external support to end this dilemma, because after the
expenditure of substantial political capital by many world governments, neither India nor Pakistan
was flexible or willing to seek a solution. For now, the only bilateral solution agreed to is war, and
fighting over Kashmir will continue. As South Asia is perhaps the only region in the world where
conflicts occur under the threat of nuclear weapons use by both belligerents, this is justification
enough to continue to pursue this problem outside of its regional boundaries.
MAJ Randy Koehlmoos is a South Asia FAO who conducted in-country training at the Pakistani
Command and Staff College, Quetta Pakistan. He is currently assigned to HQ, USCENTCOM.
Endnotes
1. The estimated 1985 population of the Pakistan
controlled portion of Kashmir was 2.8 million people, and the estimated 1991 population of the Indian
controlled portion was 7.72 million. In rough terms of geographic size, Pakistan controls an area the size of
the US State of South Carolina, India that of Kentucky, and China that of Maryland. Source: Microsoft
Encarta 99 Encyclopedia. BACK
2. The Indian Princely States (of which J&K was one)
were those areas in the Indian subcontinent which were for internal purposes outside the administrative,
legislative, and judicial sphere of the British Government of India. These states covered more than half the
area and were referred to as "Indian India". The other India was British India, comprising the provinces
and certain other areas. The two Indias disappeared with the Indian Independence Act of 1947, and by
subsequent integration of the Princely States with the Dominions of India and Pakistan.BACK
3. Mohammad Ali Jinnah's desire was for a secular
Muslim homeland that still respected those persons of other religions. It was never his idea to create a
sectarian nation ruled by Islamic law. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity, p. 104.BACK
4. The historical area of Kashmir is roughly equal in
square miles to the US State of Utah. BACK
5. Vernon Hewitt, The new international politics of
South Asia, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997, p. 143.BACK
6. Jonathan Karp, "Caught in the Middle," Far Eastern
Economic Review, August 1995, p. 14-15.BACK
7. Hewitt, p. 13.BACK
8. Ahmed Rashid, "Out of the Shadows," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 23 December 1993, p. 23.
BACK
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