This paper offers a new strategy for Iraq and a radically different approach for our government. The following is solely the opinion of the author -- not an indictment of current Military leadership in Iraq.
I believe it is possible for the United States to extricate itself from Iraq in a charitable way. The below proposes a method for shifting responsibility to the Iraqi government while separating the US Military from the politics of Islam. It advocates establishing an achievable military mission with discernable standards of progress. Under this concept, a measurable military goal could be established and metrics for the withdrawal of US forces could be derived.
Textbook Approach: One often incorrectly applied staple of Army Planning was defined by Carl Von Clausewitz as the Center of Gravity. 1 Proper strategic and operational planning emphasizes protection of one's own Center of Gravity while targeting that of the enemy. In Counterinsurgency, (historically proven to last 10- 14 years,) analysis leads to the belief that the key to victory is adequate favor in the "hearts and minds" or "the support of the people." 2
Application: While this truism applies on a broad level, this knowledge has not helped us to isolate as the main effort those systems that soothe or contribute to the will of the people. A deeper probing of these systems reveals that basic services, economic hope and ultimately Infrastructure Security is the key to Iraq. We understand and profess this knowledge, but our military actions are not tied decisively to the Center of Gravity.
In contrast, the enemy lives by it. They have paid strict attention to target any and all systems that rob the people of basic needs, hope and security. Successful attacks against infrastructure make the government appear powerless. A well placed pipeline blast; fallen tower; or destroyed transfer-station has a greater effect on the people than the destruction of a single Coalition HMMWV and its occupants. The enemy correctly interprets the Center of Gravity as anything that leads to comfort and hope of the people.
Ironically, some enemy factions even offer terrorist dominated neighborhoods continuous power and running water. The Mahdi Militia controls many gas stations. The Civil Affairs work of Hezbollah in Lebanon is legend. Muqtada al Sadir has been able to fuel, power and secure Sadir City. This allows the enemy to provide for the basic needs of the people while the Coalition is cast as the reason for pain and suffering. The enemy understands. Mean time, they quietly target any system they don't control; together with persons that threaten their spread of influence. They can do this at very low cost and remarkably low risk. When they are pushed out of one district, they simply move to another. Hiding to attack another day.
Our tactics, on the other hand, seem to have forgotten Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach in favor of the very frontal approach -- Iraqi-style tactics already shown to alienate more people than they bless. 3 We tell the Iraqis not to canvass neighborhoods, yet the centerpiece of the Baghdad Security plan was to canvass neighborhoods. As expressed by the US Army Spokesman for MNF-I on 20 October, "Operation Together Forward, the U.S. effort to reduce violence in Baghdad, has failed and the United States is looking for a new solution The operation has actually led to an increase in U.S. troop deaths." If called upon to evaluate the Baghdad Security Plan, the following quote from Clausewitz may apply, "Results are of two kinds: direct and indirect The possession of provinces, cities, fortresses, roads, bridges, munitions dumps, etc., may be the immediate object of an engagement, but can never be the final one." Indeed, failures in the current effort in Iraq could be because we have forgotten about protecting our Center of Gravity.
How much priority has the Coalition placed upon Infrastructure Security in the face of the more obvious Counter Insurgency (COIN) fight? In the last eight months, power generation throughout Iraq has decreased dramatically; conversely, effective violent attacks have increased. No sooner does one electrical tower or pipeline get fixed than it is blown apart again. Regardless of localized efforts throughout Iraq, the Coalition is losing the Infrastructure Security war. Transformer stations, towers, pipeline joints and other fixed sites are continually targeted in spite of the establishment of 18 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions and a host of other Coalition-funded protection schemes.
This is because very few of the methods of protection involve the professional Army of Iraq. Please don't misunderstand: The Coalition has taken dramatic and expensive efforts to improve the infrastructure. The sheer volume of resources targeted for use in Focused Stabilization Plans and CMO projects is awe inspiring. But protection of these projects and resources Iraq-wide is not integrated into the plan except as an afterthought; and because the COIN fight commanders don't view defense as the most critical mission in their battlespace. Unless we adjust the main military effort to protecting projects we establish, those efforts will be in vain. One Marine O6 told me that failure to secure civil projects in Falljuah and Ramadi has put those to cities in the state of deterioration they are in today.
Vignette: (As told by an IGFC officer) In Baquba last Fall, a civilian contractor was slated to build a 400 unit apartment complex. They began to build it. It would house 400 families. The building project would employ several hundred men for over two years. Sadly, no one secured the contractors or the site. They were forced off the job by terrorists. Hundreds of jobs were lost. Homes were not built. But at the same time, just a few kilometers away, someone was kicking in a door searching a home and detaining some father of a household.
Another way to evaluate success of our operations in Iraq the way is the American people might. I suggest comparing coalition casualties to the relative to number of deployed personnel. The results have a direct correlation to what Americans view as successful -- or not -- in Iraq. I apologize in advance for the sensationalistic approach.
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An average American, not understanding the dramatic efforts placed in counter-IED research and route security may sense that the situation is getting worse. Many military members would agree. It shows that the current priority of effort has failed to properly address the Centers of Gravity while diffusing the best efforts and resources of the United States in an un-winnable clash with insurgents; and that our efforts somewhat neglect the goal of transitioning stewardship (not just battlespace) to the Iraqi Security Forces.
Although the Coalition has acknowledged that Infrastructure Security is key we have done little substantive and lasting work to actually get at the problem --choosing instead to focus on counter-insurgency. This choice has almost always been at the expense of long-term stability initiatives such as properly equipping, organizing and training the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions; or applying considerable coalition assets to Infrastructure Security missions.
This is not to say that Infrastructure Security has not been viewed as critical to success; but rather, "Baghdad Security" and other COIN initiatives have so dramatically upstaged security of the infrastructure and transition to Iraqi leadership as to stall them completely.
This could be because the US Military is designed and trained as a kinetic and aggressive instrument. It's what we know and reward. The people of the United States wouldn't have it any other way. There is also an assumption that security must precede Infrastructure development. So, we have gone after the enemy. We have searched him out and when we have found and captured him we often release him to attack us again. Perhaps the assumption is flawed.
Perhaps the problem is that we have been fighting the wrong enemy on terrain of his choosing. And try as we may, commanders will never fully divorce themselves from tactics that manufacture more terrorists than they capture. We have allowed "cordon, search, clear, hold, and build" (sequentially) to signify our efforts. While the COIN fight is a heroic effort, as long as the political and economic sources of discontent remain, it is un-winnable. Many who carry out the attacks against us would not if there were jobs and security available to him.
Vignette: (As asked by one IGFC Officer) "Why do you Americans always go right for the strongest part of the enemy. We learned to find the weakness and exploit it. But you go right into the neighborhoods?... In Baghdad you are fighting only the symptom of the sickness, you are not seeking the cure."
Military Recommendations:
• Change the Main Effort to protecting infrastructure and borders rather than fighting insurgents. COIN Operations are a supporting effort as a distant third, behind Civil Affairs Projects and Anti-Terror. Oil, Water and Electricity must be the focus. Tasks -- Conventional Army: Infrastructure Security and Borders. Police and GOI: Counter- Insurgency and Tribal Violence. ISOF/ISR and CJSOTF: Counter-Terrorism.
• Once new boundaries are drawn per a Security/Defense Mission, give the Iraqi Army non-negotiable Areas of responsibility for which Coalition Commanders are not held responsible. Re-draw MND boundaries. Transition must be a real priority. 4
• Once re-distributed and re-aligned, continue to provide ONLY emergency Combat Support and Service Support to Iraqi Army Units from extant operating bases. 5
• Allow provincial control even if it is chaotic until urban areas reach some kind of natural and legitimate stasis. Have the courage to accept civil-authorities solutions to governance in their own areas. They may use methods we cannot condone.
• Amend the vocabulary of the war. Expunge words that legitimize terrorists such as "Jihadist" and "Sectarian Violence" (recruiting tools.)
• Stop wasting effort and money west of the Tigris River. Shrink MNF-West AOR.
Possible Result: The government of Iraq would have political responsibility for their own security in the cities. They would be forced to commit the billions of US dollars already provided to their Security apparatus, as yet unspent. While infrastructure, to include Oil and Electricity are protected and revived, Maslow's needs would ultimately be provided to the people. Insurgents would lose their ability to foment discontent in the urban areas. They would be less able to capitalize off of misery and religious sensationalism.
Assets used to fruitlessly build the west would be re-allocated to protect the strategic center of gravity. The government of Iraq would be "legitimized" in an authentic and more lasting manner by allowing the Prime Minister to co-opt, appease, buy and appropriate existing centers of power unfamiliar and sometimes unacceptable to Western governments.
In the mean time, the Army (Iraqi and US) would enjoy a defined mission with a measurable end-state; aloof of Muslim politics. Forces would be out of the cities and much safer from the perspective of the American people; while they actually made measurable progress in securing prosperity to Iraq.
Mission: Multi-National Force Defends key infrastructure, borders and LOCs in order to deny interdiction and disruption from insurgent and criminal forces.
Intent: Re-position and re-mission MNF-I units to defend key infrastructure until 60% of oil capacity is flowing and 80% of power grid is restored. Periodic review of UNSCR for MNF-I action in Iraq continues to dictate Coalition Force withdrawal. UN and IRQ officials evaluate stability of each province and may recommend early Coalition withdrawal. At 70% oil capacity and 85% power restoration over a period of six months, Coalition Forces will depart without UN Review. Metrics for consideration will be: Provincial Security, Economic Growth, Education Centers, Police Integrity, Civil Satisfaction and representative forms of government (religious, tribal and otherwise.)
Vignette: (Babil) On NPR the day after the tragic incidents in the city of Babil wherein 100 civilians were reportedly killed, the report was "Prime Minister Malaki is under severe pressure as a result of the situation to resolve security issues in the nation. As a result he has fired two of the key leaders in the Ministry of Interior.
Suddenly, the Iraqi public was holding Iraqi leaders accountable with results.
Vignette Continued: The report followed up by saying the US was considering placing the area back under Coalition Control. This was verified by meetings at MNC-I later that night.
Impact: The Coalition undid the good that came of the failure of Babil.
Moral: If we don't allow failure, we don't allow success.
Political Recommendations: As a FAO, I felt comfortable in crossing the line and offering a few political recommendations. Some of what I will say is simply controversial opinion, but sometimes FAOs have to go there. The following outline details differences between the current stance of the Administration and the stance required by the military adjustment above:
Current Approach:
1) The US went to Iraq to depose a dictator, protect national interests and enforce UN resolutions.
Flaws:
• Americans don't like deposing dictators just because we don't like them. There is no constitutional or uniform standard of application.
• WMD plea was for the purpose of gaining world approval. When found empty, the world turned its back. Simplistic ties to Al Quada may have been proven in some circles, but have not been sufficient to turn world opinion in favor of the war.
• Fighting the enemy outside the US, rather than protecting the US at home, means fighting the enemy on terrain of their choosing.
2) The US stayed in Iraq to fight terror abroad; spread Democracy; build/deploy the Iraqi Army; and build a Nation.
Flaws:
• You can't do all four missions simultaneously. Some of them are mutually exclusive.
• The US Army is the wrong instrument for two out of four tasks.
• Department of Justice and State have not fully embraced the Iraq mission.
• Two of the objectives above require a Civil Society first.
Future Approach:
1) The US should stay in Iraq long enough to set the conditions for security and representative government (not necessarily democracy.')
Advantages:
• Focuses on positives
• Plays to the strength of the Coalition Forces as well as new Iraqi Army
• Each term can be defined and articulated.
2) The US will withdraw forces from Iraq once Iraqi Security Forces are capable of providing infrastructure and border security.
Advantages:
• Provides a new discernable and measurable standard for success as well as easily defined Areas of Responsibility.
• Uses the Iraqi Army as a fixed-base defense (as they were designed) and not as an expeditionary force where soldiers are reluctant to either wage war against neighbors or depart from their home towns.
Of Course It's Not THAT Easy: To realign Areas of Responsibility will be a major undertaking. To allow the "Iraqi Solution" in the cities will be distasteful and painful to both the media and some citizens of the United States. Some objections include:
1) Wouldn't neglect of the Urban COIN fight result in wholesale war between factions? Wouldn't it mean some people would gain unfair advantage over others?
It is going to happen anyway -- before or after we depart. Why not let it occur while we are here to minimize the damage. Indeed, there is such mistrust and incompetence among the Sadir-infested Police the situation is bound to devolve into single- party thuggery in some areas; and potentially support forced migration of Shias in Diyala, and Sunnis in Fallujah. This concept already has traction with knowledgeable Iraqi leaders as well: On 13 November, Mowaffak al Rubaie, Iraq's National Security Adviser, said to CBS, "First, there should be a redeployment of U.S. troops. American troops should be pulled off Baghdad's streets and sent back to their bases, leaving the Iraqi Army to take full charge of security in the capital."
Besides, the Iraqi Military wouldn't leave the cities entirely. They would remain to defend transformer stations and civil affairs projects. Moderate influence would remain; and people would realize that withdrawal of those security efforts would directly result in a decreased quality of life. With pure defense of projects and systems known to improve the quality of life, communities would think twice about aligning themselves with militia or parties not supported by the United States or the Government of Iraq. As it is now, people only believe that the withdrawal of the military would result in less bombings and IEDs in their cities and they are probably right. Visibly altering the task of the military in the cities from checkpoints and cordons to protection of projects and power-stations would measurably alter the perception the people have of the Army. One hostile plank of the enemy's blame the Coalition and the Government' platform would be removed.
True, some cities and provinces may become primarily Sunni, Shia or Kurd. The idea of special autonomous areas is already a reality in the North. We just have to get to it in a stable and measured way, constantly proving that it is in the self- interest of the people to support the Nation of Iraq. 6 While arriving at stasis is going to be painful, we must be willing to accept it. And, ensuring a working infrastructure and secure borders is bound to curb some of the pain. What is clear is that remaining in the cities as urban warriors; providing targets and legitimacy to the thugs isn't working. A current look reveals that the Prime Minister is ready and willing for opposing factions to semi-peacefully co- exist. Are we?
2) With Sadir and Jam-controlled areas, wouldn't Iran leverage their resources and influence in Iraq to render it a vassal state; thereby destabilizing the middle-east?
The US must be willing to punish Iran not only for their nuclear program; but for every IED or Foreign Fighter they export to Iraq. Secure borders will ensure the success of this effort. Eventually the influx of instruments of terror; including cash, explosives and personnel would slow. With Infrastructure as the TRUE priority, economic interest in both nations would eventually get the oil flowing, the electricity on, and the people at rest. These are pragmatic people. In other words, we could also buy them. We could buy out Sadir Militia as well. We are already doing it with tribal militias in some areas. The key to this region remains economic support. Europe, (as the primary investor in Middle-east energy,) together with Asia, (the greatest consumer of Oil in the region,) would invest in an oil-producing Iraq. Iraq would become a competitor again because of market pressures; and the Iranian influence in Iraq would deteriorate. Again, watch the Prime Minister closely. He has judiciously protected JAM in both Diwaniya and Sadir City. He knows who his clients are and he probably has an eye toward the security of the nation.
3) What would happen to the local governance if we didn't force them to follow the representational system we hope to impose?
The question answers itself. It is OUR system and not theirs. The Coalition should have a willingness to accept the possibility of a semi-religious state: regionalized. We have been pushing federalism and regionalization anyway. It is only because we are terrified anything different from our Western-centric 21st Century secular-world view that we insist upon mirror-imaging our solution. As was demonstrated in Lebanon, the mirror often produces a backwards image. Whatever we impose, like a bad transfusion, the body politic of Iraq will eventually reject.
Vignette: (From IGFC Officers) In a humorous but embarrassing story, MNF-W counted it a great PR accomplishment to meet with all the Sheiks in Fallujah on TV. Problem is, everyone who is from Fallujah laughed at them because the men the Marines unwittingly invited on TV were not the respected leaders of the tribes; but rather wannabe businessmen who posed as sheiks. Moral of the story: Let them find their own leaders.
We must stop sorting it out for them. There are other more tragic versions of this story that involve importing expatriate criminals for ministerial positions when we first started this effort; but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
4) What would happen with the militias?
Two choices: Disband them or integrate them. In large part, we are integrating the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions. The army hated them at first, but now the MoD at least views them as useful for economy of force missions. And for all the tasks Iraqi Army and Militias can't do (expeditionary failures, command and control failures, logistic failures,) they can at least defend. 7
Unfortunat ely, it already appears to be the Government's choice not to disband some of the militias. Yet, the quiet of Sadir City and Diwaniya of late indicate that such an approach may be satisfactory to Iraqis, no matter how unsavory to us. How much of our vital national interest lies in dictating each aspect of majority-rule in the newly sovereign Iraq?
The decision to disband or integrate would be based on the source of the militia. If they are patri-lineal organizations founded on family and tribal relationships, it may be possible to buy them off or integrate them in the Iraqi Security Force through recruitment and training. A family militia in Anbar could be hired as a private company to secure the highway; for which there would be tangible punishment for failure; and real rewards of both status and protection for success. An Iraqi-Solution.
If the militia is based on extremist or anti-government/coalition rhetoric, it must be disbanded without delay. This would be the responsibility of the MoI. Aware of the present conflict of interest involved, this may also be an appropriate Combined Special Operations mission based solely on targetable intelligence and a Government of Iraq (GOI) request. Obtaining GOI support and in- corruptible MoI reinforcement is the most critical part of this project, and outside the scope of this recommendation.
Conclusion: What we have done is good but has not succeeded. We have been noble and brave, but not careful. We have insisted on giving them the Bill of Rights before they had the Magna Carta. We have implied a Civil Society where none exists. We have neglected systems of power already here; and arrogantly attempted to forge our own. Until we dramatically alter expectations and our approach to Iraq, we will not succeed.
A new strategy and accompanying political stance are needed for Iraq. (I know that seems backwards, but we got into this thing backwards; reversing the formula may just get us out.) We are in need of a Military Strategy that truly and dramatically focuses on Infrastructure Security while acknowledging the true Center of Gravity in Iraq. A political strategy that recognizes the new mission would permit the US to support Iraq while truly empowering the Iraqi Government and Military.
In so doing, the US would step out of the fray of insurgency and lift herself above the politics of Islam. Reverting to a defensive and support mission would only prove to the people that we are here for the general good. It does far better than cordoning off their neighborhood and cuffing fathers in front of children. It would provide us and the Iraqis a discernable measure for our departure; and their pending responsibilities. Defensive missions also require fewer forces.
Simultane ously, if we can get both the US and Iraqi government to appropriate systems of power already extant in the country, to include Caliphs, Imams, Sheiks and the whole gamut of patri-lineal power-players, we will have stability. It may not be "Democracy," but it is still greater representational freedom than they have ever known.
Consider the alternative: Under the status-quo, given competing missions and three years of co-dependency, the IA will continue to refuse to fight unless we are right next to them. And, if we continue to use them in the COIN fight (rightfully a civil police action,) they could return to the tactics and values of the old regime after we depart. All they have learned from our current strategy to include Baghdad Security is that overwhelming military force against a civilian population is an acceptable technique; and that the only way to claim Iraq is to re-invade it. And right now, they are posturing to build a military to do exactly that. Once that occurs, who will be to blame for establishing a heavy-handed population control in Iraq? If we don't dramatically change tactics soon, our legacy will be irrevocably negative.
That said, we really can stay the strategic course while altering the operational route in Iraq. I hope we do. Watching the cities settle into political stasis while instilling legitimate authority may be painful; but with an eye toward defense, there is a positive way out of Iraq. 8
From January 2006 to the present, LTC Whitney has served as the Plans Advisor to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Baghdad, Iraq. He is a Foreign Area Officer to China and is very aware of his limits in Arabic culture and understanding. He certainly doesn't claim to have it all figured out. He only knows FAOs of any AOC can bring much insight to the global war on terror. He will return from Iraq to teach Chinese at USMA beginning Summer '07.
1."Out of the dominant characteristics of both belligerents a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. act with the utmost concentration [trace the ultimate substance of enemy strength to the fewest possible sources. The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity, and if possible trace it back to single one. " Carl von Clausewitz, On War. 1832. Translated, 1908 by Anatol Rapaport. Penguin Books, London 1968.BACK
2."The support of the people, then, is the center of gravity." US Army Field Manuel 3-07.22 (Counterinsurgency). Paragraph 1-13. Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2004.BACK
3.Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy. Faber and Faber. London. Penguin Group. 1991.BACK
4.Right now, Transition is mostly a slogan. "Iraqi Army Lead or IAL" is the term applied to Iraqi units that have progressed sufficiently that they may "assume responsibility for the security of battlespace and for the activities and actions of his forces within that space." Though many units are declared "IAL" the initiative in the area remains held tightly by the Coalition. It is Coalition commanders who continue to plan for, task, and commit Iraqi Forces -- even those "in the lead." In ten months, the author has not seen a single convincing example of Iraqi initiative the Coalition would accept. Until, Coalition commanders stop having the good ideas for Iraqi owned battlespace, transition will remain a mere slogan.BACK
5.One possibility would be for Coalition Forces to focus on primary Oil, Electricity and Transportation Lines of Communication. Coalition could use Intelligence assets to focus on borders. Iraqi Army could focus on securing Civil-Military Projects and secondary lines of communication. There is sufficient proximity between Coalition bases and Iraqi Army areas of responsibility for the Coalition to provide support if necessary. There are many mixes and options.BACK
6.ven academic opposites, Benedict Anderson of Cornell University and Earnest Gillner of the London School of Economics agree that Nationalism is founded on the advance of technology, print media and to some extent industrialism. It follows that if a country does not come into the industrial age on their own, as Iraq did not, nationalism is therefore a completely foreign concept; unable to trump allegiance to tribe, family or local authority. Saddam Hussein found that ruthless dictatorship was the only way to forge nationalism in Iraq.BACK
7.IA deployment failures happened because we formed them to be a constabulary national-guard force, but asked them to execute as a power-projection counter-insurgency force. Now we watch with fascinated horror as the MoD seeks additional Brigades to bring back an era of Military supremacy and civil- control that reigned in the last Regime. Baghdad Security Plan taught them that more is better. Urban COIN taught there is no substitute for Military Control.BACK
8.One often heard commander's intent is "put an Iraqi face" on the operation. That means, the Coalition will plan and mostly execute it, but make sure the Iraqi Army gets credit and therefore legitimacy. This kind of condescension is obvious to the Iraqi people and has just the opposite effect. The only way to put an "Iraqi face" on any endeavor is to have the patience, courage, and will to let them actually do it.BACK