The Iron Majors: Promoting Democracy

Major Joseph Izaguirre, USA, 48B




"And in the fog of uncertainty, a wide-ranging intellect is called for to feel out the truth with instinctive judgment."

Karl Von Clausewitz



Introduction

American foreign policy is established and created at the highest levels of government and approved by our President. Although American foreign policy, led by the State Department is implemented by numerous organizations, in times of conflict, foreign policy is mainly executed by relatively mid-level American military officers. Robert Kaplan, in his article "Supremacy by Stealth," refers to these officers as "The Iron Majors."1

Today, around the world, from South West Asia to South America, it is these young military men and women who interact with officers of foreign governments within the toughest environments. They are truly the face of American foreign policy.

In explaining the unique role of the Iron Majors in his article Supremacy by Stealth, Robert Kaplan quotes author John Henry in his book, A Bell for Adano:

[Men like Joppolo are] our future in the world. Neither the eloquence of Churchill nor the humanness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, no dreamer's diagram so symmetrical and so faultless on paper, no plan, no hope, no treaty--none of these things can guarantee anything. Only men can guarantee, only the behavior of men under pressure, only our Joppolos2

My point is simple. America needs to build more "Joppolos." As we continue to place ourselves in challenging situations (such as Afghanistan and Iraq), our need to exercise foreign policy and meet our objectives will require knowledgeable and skilled individuals (area specialists) who can operate in a variety of circumstances, where other organizations cannot.

The military is the best organization to support this national requirement; it has the character and possesses the qualities necessary to adapt to such dynamic circumstances. Military philosophers from Sun Tzu to Machiavelli, and more modern statesmen such as Winston Churchill, all understood the importance of leveraging the military's wide-ranging intellect: those individuals, selfless and tenaciously curious, with an uncanny ability to reach people and understand their environments --- our eyes and ears, and feelers in the world.

While this article stresses the need to develop and sustain our eyes and ears around the world, it is important to understand our threat - not modern at all. In fact history shows how this unrest is a normal product of development. But most important, history shows us that our current dilemmas are the same as those faced by empires of the past. The issue is whether we only choose to heed those lessons.

"Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by waking."3

Spanish Proverb

Understanding modern-day threats

The events of September 11th demonstrated America's vulnerabilities and her inability (or unwillingness) to understand the world. As America prospered, disparities around the world grew. While mediums broadcasted American wealth, resentment towards our affluence grew, setting the conditions --- a petri-dish for the cultivation of terrorism.4 We are in the most dangerous time in history.4 Why? Simply put they resent us.

Asymmetric threats are not so much a matter of actions but a matter of resentment. The true concern is not the acts of terrorism themselves, but the deep hatred at the source of those attacks. Although clearly the Bin Ladens of the world pose a direct threat, the greater danger is their ability to influence credulous people to take, or support, such shortsighted acts.

These threats are not isolated to the Mid-East. Quite the opposite--the state of the world has left itself ripe for the spread of this inane yet menacing mindset. America's great prosperity, whether right or wrong, is felt as unjust and humiliating. The masses of poor and uneducated people (exploited by corrupt regimes and power seeking elements) fail to understand that prosperity is a reward of the western way of life and not the root cause of their condition.5

Poverty has not created the current upheaval; on the contrary, the cause of this turmoil has been development.7/8 The natural process of development creates conflict particularly with those who are unwilling to adapt to the demands of globalization. Temporary disparities create anger. The problem lies in rising expectations that overwhelm governments and create the sort of resentment and conditions that we see today.9 Add a growing population (young males between 15 and 30), the technology of media (displaying the great wealth of the America citizen), and abuses or corruption of governments, you'll find a situation where populist movements (political and spiritual) arise and monstrously exploit the masses in the name of some utopian idea. It is here where resentment (not having the same American quality of life) is transformed into hatred.

Jason Burke's book, Al-Qaeda, furthers this idea by categorizing the threat in two groups of people: Intellectual Activists, such as the Osama Bin Ladins, and Violent Activist, such as those recruited from the most poorest and brutalized elements of society.10/11

The Intellectual Activists are the masterminds of modern populous movements rallying the masses to their calling. These are not poor men, but are in all essence undeclared politicians. They are generally wealthy educated people. As Burke states, "These are the men who use the words of great religious teachers for their own unenlightened ends."12

On the other hand, there are the Violent Activists. Tactically, these are the greater concern. A more illusive threat, they are generally young males who make up the majority of the growing population and are brutal as well as difficult to track. These are the mid-level leaders and executors, disciples, those who embrace the teachings of the intellectuals, and in exchange for their commitment, receive the reward of empowerment and pride.13 Look at the alarming demographics of unemployed young males around the world and you'll find an ample supply of easily influenced young men looking for meaning, purpose, and power.

Latin America, for instance, a region which most Americans consider to be generally unthreatening to the US, is displaying similar characteristics. Honduras, for example, is plagued with an intimidating anarchistic gang problem. Brazil's social problems are so large that its military is finding it difficult to maintain order against such populist movements such as the Landless Peasants Movement "Sim Terra" and those found in the drug-backed "favelas" of Rio.14 Add the region's increasing economic disparities caused by mass corruption and elitist greed, and one can see how Intellectual Activists can leverage populous resentment and wield it against "Big Brother" up North. The rhetoric "in your face" character of some Latin American leaders only instigates this resentment.

Let's not forget that Latin America's terrain, corruption, illicit financial activities, and our porous borders make it a perfect staging base for terrorist operations. We must be vigilant, for it is as easy to supply shoulder-fired missiles to the South American continent as it is to smuggle them (or something worse) past our borders.

Again, America, although valued because of the quality of life it provides its citizens, is not liked for that very same reason. Resentment, whether justified or not, leads to a sense of injustice and humiliation. This is what our foreign officers and intelligence specialists need to gauge. It is the regular citizens that we must reach and understand in order to influence foreign policy and respond when crisis arises.

"Code of conduct (law), the supreme, though essentially imperfect, it is the instrument
for the moral salvation of society; the dispensation of reason -- Plato
"

Establishing order while promoting democracy

The tragedy and damaging effects of Sept 11th gave the US new focus and commitment regarding its interaction with the world. As a result we will be ever more involved, and our military will have a tremendous role in implementing foreign policy and establishing the order necessary for democratic peace and growth. However, to do this we must correct three major obstacles that impede field commanders' success:15

1. We must lead, that is adopting Kaplan's "Speak Victorian and Think Pagan".16
2. We must limit restrictions on those who execute policy:17
3. We must produce and field more area specialists.18

In his most recent book, Diplomacy, Kissinger states, "America is able neither to dominate nor withdraw from the world; we are powerful and totally vulnerable we must not abandon the ideas which have accounted for its greatness!" Therefore, when confronted with the question, "why should we lead the world?" the answer is that we must.19

The fact of the matter is that western economic power, military might, and our value of the rule of law and social contracts are without a doubt the model for a better way of life. The Chinese model was perhaps a strong candidate. But today China's direction appears to be parallel with that of the West --- rather than sporting little red books, the Chinese are carrying checkbooks.20 Future Sino- American tensions will be more economic than political.

However, looking at the results of history and the nature of antithesis, Kaplan indicates that America will continue to be faced with an ancient dilemma - the controversy of being ruthless when needed while continuing to be the beacon of democracy. The military professional will require a Pagan Ethos.21

War will continue to be increasingly asymmetric - unconventional, undeclared and fought within the states as opposed to between them. Tie in the technology, urbanization, and populous movements and you have a recipe for disorder --- our true enemy.22

Kaplan references philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who in his book, The Leviathan, about the social contract. He warns of a particular problem that plagued past-empires during their "dangerous" times --- the mistake of confusing Freedom and Order.

"The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not."

Here Hobbes warns, "Let not (during conflict) Victorian principles and Right be the normal behavior against those who do not honor or understand the virtue of social contract .Freedom becomes an issue only after order is established." The nature of man is to comply only through reason or fear. When reason fails, one must use fear. Failure to use the necessary force or fear will waste one's Army, decay support, and leave in question the ability to maintain order and lead development.23

New York Times Correspondent, Peter Maass, interviews Professor Major John Nagl who provides us historical example of how to deal with the "disturbers". "The key issue for a counter insurgency army is to calibrate the amount of lethal force necessary to do the job with the minimum amount of nasty, counterproductive side effects."24 However given lack of international unity, naïve liberal ideals, and the media's critical eye, it has become difficult for the military to do what must be done in order to establish order for a future democratic peace.

How should our field officers (both military and diplomatic --- if there is a difference today) accomplish the state's goals? Kaplan will argue that restricting a field commander and questioning their methods is certainly not the way.
A clear example of this is the recent dismissal and reprimand of Lieutenant Colonel Adam B. West, whose questionable actions yielded success on the battlefield.25 West understood his realities. As a just man, West employed Hobbes' principles, being formidable when needed, for the good of the mission.26 The fact of the matter is that our military officers, respected and loved by their society and detrimentally obedient, are being restricted by public idealistic principles in an environment of a malevolent reality. Fear, not kindness, yields results when dealing with this clever and lucid enemy. To root-out insurgents, a good soldier must be ruthless.

My personal experience in Iraq led me to understand the importance of Human Intelligence gained from captives. This information was critical for rooting out the "Violent Activists" that take a daily toll on our soldiers and our efforts to establish order. My impression was that application of Victorian methods against these people just did not work --- they feared nothing from our kindness and enjoyed better conditions as a POW than they had out in the streets. As Hobbes states, fear is the only way to yield compliance from a people who have no understanding of order. At times, fear must be instilled by good hearted and just people --- and we must trust their judgment and minimize the influences of critical entities who are not responsible for our nation's interests. If we continue on the path of questioning commanders, we work to defeat ourselves.27

Hobbes writes, "Vanity and overconfidence make men blind so does fear make them see clearly and act morally." As a just and moral society we must not fear being formidable when necessary. If we know we are just, then our actions are reasonable, such as in the case of LTC Adam West. In order to lead effectively, we, as a nation, must be committed to democracy but willing be act forcefully.

"To prevent total destruction, reason must prevail and those in the pre-political state of nature must collectively acknowledge the creation of a civil authority as the only solution if peace is to be achieved and self-preservation assured."

Thomas Hobbes

"The decisive fact about human beings is that at any time and in any place they can be made into soldiers; the most urgent or important task of politics is to make them so and to use them well."

Niccolo Machiavelli

Using the military to implement foreign policy and promote democracy

If there were ever doubts on this theme, certainly current military operations around the world dismiss them. It is indeed these Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels, who are actively executing (and at times developing) foreign policy.28

General John Abizaid (CINC-CENTCOM) understands this when quoting English Brigadier Micheal Harbottle, "there is no doubt in my mind that the success of peacekeeping operations depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests."29

Kaplan states, "The U.S military will increasingly churn out such chameleons: operatives who combine the traits of soldier, intelligence agent, diplomat, civilian aid worker, and academic."30 This has been witnessed in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Department of Defense recognizes this and has placed special emphasis on developing "country-specialists": Special Forces, Foreign Area, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Officers. While highly effective in a strategic setting, the problem is that there aren't enough of them at the levels needed to effectively execute tactical missions.

Look at current military operations in Iraq. One example is Captain Greg Mitchell31 who, while assigned as his squadron's adjutant, performed the following duties:

1. Commander's linguist
2. Unit liaison to the mayor of Fallujah 32
3. Chief police trainer for the Free Iraqi Police
4. Director of public utilities
5. Public projects and funds manager
6. Project coordinator and liaison to Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other government agencies.
7. Soldier

Although quite talented, the intensity of daily operations in such an austere environment and the lack of "specialists" wear on these individuals. The process to get anything done is slow at best. This in turn results in demonstrations, violence, and a perception (propagated by the media) that US Forces are incapable. The threat understands the importance of hampering and discrediting US humanitarian assistance. Because of this, they often target these talented shakers and movers thereby seriously impeding unit efforts.

To borrow from Kaplan, we need more "Joppolos" at all levels. Having two or three Civil Affairs Teams per division covering an area the size of Los Angeles during the summer months just won't cut it. LAPD consists of eight thousand police officer33 dedicated specifically to law enforcement in the city of Los Angels. Now, imagine asking them to do not only law enforcement but also the myriad of nation-building tasks in a hostile-uncertain environment, while under the close scrutiny of a critical media? Oh, and tell them to do it in a foreign language and culture. The Army is doing exactly this, but with half the numbers.

Field commanders never envisioned that they would be required to build towns on their own. (They had been told to expect assistance from other nations, NGOs and other contractors).34 Once reality set in, they found that sustaining post war operations was challenging. They needed more linguists, specialists and additional personnel to execute the myriad of nation building and daily security tasks at the speed required by political pressures.35 Daily tasks revolved around three things: rooting out violent activists, establishing and enforcing the rule of law, and conducting rebuilding operations such as establishing and maintaining government utilities, medical and educations services, and setting the conditions for NGO and humanitarian support. All of this requires cross-the-border language abilities.

When I was in Iraq, our inability to communicate hampered our ability to instill confidence in the people. For example, our analysis in 3ACR's area of operations indicated that the Iraqi people were frightened, confused, and very reluctant to assist with rebuilding efforts. Simultaneously, public works leaders and religious clerics (most of them employed by the Baath Party) discredited US efforts, by destroying or sabotaging what we had rebuilt. Adding to the problem were Baath Party efforts to target anyone suspected in leading or supporting these efforts, as in the case of CPT Greg Mitchell.36 Though civil affairs and psyops officers implemented a noteworthy information campaign, the task was monumental given the area of coverage necessary and the enemy's counter information efforts. Again, efforts to establish order were limited by the lack of linguists and area specialists at all levels.

As the Army continues to transform, it will not only be required to be rapid, lethal and mobile, but also capable of conducting these post-war occupation tasks. The swiftness and lethality of US forces is beyond question, but our ability to establish order and create the conditions necessary for a post-regime democracy after a conventional force is vanquished still remains a challenge. To establish post-battle order, our forces must have sufficient understanding of the culture and language in order to use the necessary force when old Victorian means fail. So what can we do?

First, we need more WHINSECs.37 Our presence will be needed not just in the Western Hemisphere, but also throughout the other regions of the world. Both invited foreign instructors and students receive advanced education in the application of democratic principles while understanding how economics and politics apply and dispelling whatever misconceptions and conspiracy theories exist about the way the US does business. Not only will establishing other hemispheric or regional schools help create more "Joppolos", but it will expose foreign officers to western values and ideals that could be applied in their respective countries.38 But if for no other reason, the relationships established here between our officers and theirs will be a catalyst towards future crisis resolutions and the establishment for global order and peace.

Second, the US should establish Country Specialist Response Teams (CSRTs): A team of about 30 area experts, who can assist battalion commanders and their staffs in identifying post war needs, focus occupation efforts, coordinate for unique requirements/resources, and quantifiably gauge progress. These personnel would be a mixture of DOD (JOINT), CIA, DOS, and Engineers who can help Tactical Commanders accomplish post-war objectives. These teams would create effective communications and transportation, while bringing regional expertise and communications to the operational unit.

Third, emphasize language training within the new military force structure, particularly the Striker Brigades. Although Captains and Majors are leading the majority of post war nation-building tasks, it is the ground soldiers, the non-commissioned officers, who are directly implementing these strategies. While a rapid-deployable force will be capable of responding in record time to defeat a threat anywhere around the world, the challenges of post-battle ops against an illusive insurgent threat remains, and so will our need for the linguist-soldier.

Only through effective communications will we have the capability to gain actionable human intelligence, gain public trust and support, execute nation-building tasks and better focus the necessary force needed to root-out remnants of a nuisance regime.

"Nothing is great which is not at the same time calm." " Gladiators are protected by their skill, but left defenseless by anger."39

Seneca, as referenced by Robert Kaplan

Conclusion

As the war in the mid-east region subsides, others, with greater experiences, will return and echo similar thoughts on this subject. The force will return with an unprecedented amount of experience and apply great lessons learned in dealing with the "modern" threat. After action reviews will prove the need to sustain a lethal, and mobile force, but will also lead to recommendations of maintaining our Armor and the development of techniques in dealing with crowds and insurgents.

But of the greater theme, will be the call for more linguists and area specialists. For it is through them, from the strategic to tactical levels, where we will be able to conduct foreign operations, better gauge progress and resolve conflicts. We must use the experience of today's young Lieutenants and Sergeants and mold them into future "Joppolos", for they are the ones who understand through firsthand experience, the challenges that lay ahead for commanders. They will be our Iron Majors; the future of democracy.

Endnotes:

1 See Robert Kaplan's article referencing Major Victor Joppolo's positive impact as governor appointed of recently liberated Sicilian town of Andano. Kaplan mentions Joppolo's full resourcefulness, with minimal or vague guidance, to solutions on behalf of the town. Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, Supremacy by Stealth, 10 rules for managing the world, Robert D. Kaplan, pg69

2 See web-site review of John Henry in his book, A bell for Adano, http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=upsell_review&reviewID=VE1117788977 &cs=1

3 As referenced in Henry Kissinger's book, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, 1994, conclusion.

4 See Financial Sense News Hour's interview of Robert Kaplan's and review of Warrior Politics, http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm

5 Ibid.

6 See Jason Burke's, Al Qaeda, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003, NY, pg 246.

7 See Financial Sense News Hour's interview of Robert Kaplan's and review of Warrior Politics, http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm

8 See Hernando de Soto's book, The Mystery of Capitalism, Why capitalism triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, pg 2 "The triumph of capitalism only in the West could be a recipe for economic and political disaster."

9 Ibid.

10 Burke, Al Qaeda, pg 246.

11 See John Fitzpatrick's Article, Lula as Pontius Pilate, Infobrazil, March 2003, www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm

12 Burke, Al Qaeda, pg 246.

13 Ibid.

14 Fitzpatrick Article, Lula as Pontius Pilate.

15 See Robert Kaplan's article, Supremacy by Stealth, 10 Rules for Managing the World, Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, pg69.

16 Ibid. Note rule #10

17 Ibid. Note rule #8

18 Ibid. Note rule #1

19 See Robert Kaplan's, Warrior Politics, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, pg 82. Note he references philosopher Thomas Hobbes, "but it is morality of need not of choice."

20 NPR radio commentary by Daniel Shorr on President Bushes visit to China; indications that China may be leaning more towards capitalism.

21 See Robert Kaplan's, Warrior Politics, Vintage Books, 2003, NY

22 Ibid, pg 132 referencing the term chieftaincy alluding to the need for one leader and her ability to maintain order.

23 Kaplan, Warrior Politics, pg 81, referencing Thomas Hobbes philosophy on the social contract.

24 See Peter Maass' article, Professor Nagl's War, 11 Jan 2003, New York Times Magazine,http://nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/11IRAQ.html?ex=10748472138 &ei=1&en=50a5f4062a3fd1c5

25 See web-site article on case of LTC Adam B. West. http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36062

26 Ibid.

27 Kaplan, Warrior Politics, pg 124.

28 Personal experience during military operations in the cities of Ar Ramadi, Al Fallujah, and Habaniyah, Iraq, May 2003.

29 See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.'s Article, Brief Lives: Abizaid of Arabia, Atlantic Monthly, December 2003, pg32

30 Kaplan, Supremacy by Stealth, pg76

31 CPT Greg Mitchell is an Armor Officer serving 2nd Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in central and western Iraq.

32 Al Fallujah is one of the western cities near Baghdad forming part of the Suni-Triangle.

33 See LAPD organization chart and statistics, http://lapdonline.org

34 Observation during the V Corp's phased planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom; Germany, 2002.

35 Daily tasks revolved around three things: Rooting out violent activists, establishing and enforcing the rule of law, conducting rebuilding operations such as, establishing and maintaining government utilities, medical and educations services, and setting the conditions for NGO and humanitarian support.

36 CPT Greg Mitchell was wounded during an ambush in Ar Rubtah, Iraq on 12 October 2003.

37 Western Hemisphere for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) is a DOD program, located at Fort Benning, GA, hosting a large number of Latin American and Canadian Officers each year, http://www.benning.army.mil/whinsec

38 Article by SGT Daniel Monroy, Strengthening International Ties, 2003, http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2002/textonly/whinsec.htm

39 See See Robert Kaplan's, Warrior Politics, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, Also wee Seneca's, On Anger, in his moral and Political Essays, John M. Cooper and J.F. Procope, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1955 pg 41,28.




About the Author:

Major Joseph G. Izaguirre is an intelligence and foreign area officer (LATAM specialist) currently attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), Fort Benning, GA. He has had numerous tactical intelligence assignments in maneuver units to include his latest deployment to the mid-east, where he served as the Regimental S2 for the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. There he observed the myriad of challenges of tactical intelligence as applied to the threat, as well its impacts on commanders and soldiers.

The Author hopes his audience will understand: building quality area specialists and supporting the institutions that produce them is a critical necessity when implementing foreign policy through the use of the military. It is the military that will continue to embody diplomatic, civil, and intelligence skills necessary for planning and crisis resolution at all levels of military operations. If we are to establish global order, it is these talented young men and women who will set the conditions for peace, democracy, and human progress around the world.




Bibliography

Robert Kaplan's, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership demands a Pagan Ethos, Vintage Books, NY, 2002

Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1993

Jason Burke's, Al Qaeda, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, NY, 2003

Thomas Hobbes', The Leviathan, trans by Prometheus Books, NY, 1998

Plato's, The Laws, Trans by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Classics, London, 1970

Niccolo Machiavelli's, The Prince, Discourses on Livy, Trans by Christopher Lynch, The University of Chicago Press, Chigaco, 2003

Carl Von Clausewitz's, On War, Penguin Books, London, 1968

Philip Dunn, The Art of Peace, Balance Over Conflict in Sun-Tzu's The Art of War, J.P.Tarcher, NY, 2003

Robert Kaplan's Article, Supremacy by Stealth, 10 rules for managing the world, The Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, pg66

Transcripts of Financial Sense News Hour's interview of Robert Kaplan's and review of Warrior Politics, http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm

Garrett Jones' Article, Iraq: We have seen this before, Foreign Policy Research Institute; A Catalyst for Ideas, December 15, 2003, www.fpri.org

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. Article, Brief Lives: Abizaid of Arabia, Atlantic Monthly, December 2003, pg32

John Fitzpatrick's Article, Lula as Pontius Pilate, Infobrazil, March 2003, www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm

John Fitzpatrick's Article, Terror Strikes II: Do Brazilians Care?, Infobrazil, Sep 15-21 2001, www.infobrazil.com/conteudo/front_page/analysis/jf2114.htm

Web-site: Transcendental Ideas--Social and Political Reform http://www.vcu.edu/engweb/transcendentalism/ideas/reform.html

2004, Foreign Area Officer Association
Herndon, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
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