Iran's Concerns for Russia's Reaction
to NATO Enlargement

By Captain Jin Pak

The following is an analysis of how NATO enlargement could affect security issues surrounding the Caspian Sea in light of Russia's declining influence. The paper uses a scenario planning framework to analyze the security challenge from Iran's viewpoint. This paradigm uses analytical such things as driving factors, uncertainties, and historical trends to generate four distinct possible scenarios over a two year horizon. It is important to mention that the purpose of the paper was not to pick the most likely scenario, but to give four possible futures.

Problem Summary.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia's subsequent attempts at political and economic reform have provided a backdrop for NATO to enlarge its scope, power, and influence. During the 1990s, Russia faced the unfortunate dilemma of trying to maintain its hegemony, increase its economic power, and contain NATO. But the attacks on Sep 11, 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C. may have changed Russia's outlook towards the defense alliance it has feared for so long. This presents a problem to Iran that could have immediate effects in the short run. This analysis will predict possible scenarios and its effects on Iran.

The end of the cold war ushered in a new era in which Russia has suffered from an identity crisis. It still has a nuclear arsenal large enough to maintain its superpower status, but its economic and political troubles have rendered it powerless to influence not only the world but even the former Soviet Republics with whom it shares its border. The current economic quagmire that Russia faces is due to many factors including:

- Shock Therapy" reforms it underwent under U.S. advice immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In hindsight, many experts agree that incremental reform measures would probably have served Russia better.

- Inefficient raising of tax revenue which in turn led to large budget deficits. This forced the government to devalue its currency in 1998 and default on its debts. Russia's total international debt rose to a level it could not afford.

- Large capital outflows that deter western investments. Too often aid money is siphoned off to a class of powerful and elite people known as oligarchs.

Realizing that Russia must improve its economy in order to regain prominence, President Vladmir Putin stated economic progress as a top priority during his inauguration speech. Furthermore, he recently selected Mikhael Kasyanov as new prime minister, a man whose background lies in the field of economics and finance. Western governments responded well to this choice, and Kasyanov was immediately successful in eliminating half of Russia's outstanding IMF debt. Thus, it is presumed that Russia will continue to make economic reform and progress a top priority, and will cooperate with the West towards that aim. Yet, it remains unclear if Russia will make any significant economic progress during the next two years. While it is true that the country is experiencing a modest recovery, most of that is due to the rise in oil prices, and not due to any real market reform.

Yet, when analyzing non-economic issues such as NATO enlargement, it is unclear whether or not Russia will adopt a similar pro-West policy. Until recently, Russia's has regarded NATO as an organization bent on containing Russian influence. Many recent events contributed towards this view including:

- In 1998, NATO and its allies mounted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, a close Russian ally. Russia was powerless to prevent this from occurring.

- In 1995, NATO decided to reverse an earlier decision not to enlist new members.

- In 1999, NATO admitted three former Soviet republics: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In response, Russia decided to revoke its no first strike policy on nuclear weapons, and embarked on a 15 year military modernization plan.

All these events have reinforced Russian anti-NATO views until Sep 11, 2001. The events on that fateful day have created a global environment of empathy towards the U.S. that is unprecedented. In light of this, President Putin recently decided to support America's war in Afghanistan, and to re-look Russia's current policy on NATO enlargement; he stated that Russia may become more tolerant of NATO expansion during a trip to Brussels after Sep 11. Indeed, President Putin, may have pragmatically decided to cooperated with the U.S. and NATO may support Russia's national interests in light of recent events.

However, Russia policy is influenced by another growing entity, this time from the East, China. With a yearly GDP increase of over 7%, the world's largest market, a huge border with Russia, and the world's largest Army, China is a force with whom Russia must reckon. Recent events prior to Sep 11 have indicated that Putin fully realizes this as evidenced by his recent tour of China. It is presumed that Russia will continue its efforts to maintain a good relationship with China, a country which is wholeheartedly against NATO expansion. Thus it is unclear if Russia will adopt an policy of Atlanticism (pro-West) or Eurasianism (pro-East).

Significance to Tehran:

Iran's primary issue and concern is the nature of Russia's reaction to NATO enlargement, and its consequent effects on Iran-Russia relations and regional stability in the Caspian Region.

It is presumed that NATO will continue its efforts to stop Russia from selling arms to Iran, and to expand further into former Soviet republics, possibly in the Caspian Region. Should Russia adopt an Atlanticism approach and tolerate NATO expansion efforts, it would have a negative impact on Iran-Russia relations, and would present a significant de-stabilizing factor in the Caspian Region. Russia and Iran currently share a mutually beneficial relationship through arms sales, the sharing of nuclear technology, and a common support of anti-Taliban efforts. However, this was not always the case as evidenced by the last two decades of history.

After the fall of the Shah in 1979, it appeared that Russia would stand to gain a lot from that development. However, the opposite became evident when the Khomeini regime dissolved the Moscow influenced Tudeh Party in 1983. 1  Relations between the two countries deteriorated even further when Russia supplied arms to Iran's mortal enemy during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Iran responded by supporting Muslim rebels fighting against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989.

The fall of the Soviet Union coincided with a thawing of Iran-Russia relations, predicated by Iranian President then Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow during June 19-23 1989. This visit spurred a Russian commitment to sell arms and nuclear technology to Iran. In addition to the benefit of receiving hard cash from Iran for these commodities, Russia has also gained an ally in its territorial disputes in the Caspian Sea. Russia and Iran claim that the body of water should be treated as a lake and not a sea. Treating at a sea would give more territorial rights to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The dispute is especially important to all concerned parties due to the projected 70-200 billion tons of oil expected to lie underneath the Caspian Sea. 2 

Currently, Azerbaijan and Kazahstan both have contractual partnerships with Western oil companies such as BP (foot), and have expressed a desire to join NATO. It is unclear how NATO will react, and it is unclear if Iran will take proactive steps to prevent that from happening. Indeed, recent events imply that Iran would take extreme measures. In June 01, in response to a joint oil drilling effort between British Petroleum and Azerbaijan, Iran mobilized troops along the Azerbaijan border, and sent military aircraft through its airspace. 3  Russia has also shown its resolve in this matter by conducting live ammunition naval exercises on the Caspian Sea.

Iran's preferred outcome is that Russia tries to contain NATO enlargement and adopt a more Eurasian foreign policy doctrine.

Russia's preferred outcome is an increase in power and influence through economic and political means. Cooperation with NATO may or may not help in this purpose.

Driving Factors. (Note: stakeholders are in bold, and factors are underlined)

Political: Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a severed downturn in political influence. To reverse this course President Putin will have to decide whether to reverse its tolerance of NATO in order to bargain for other Russian national interests, or try to contain NATO influence by working with other superpowers such as China. The former Soviet republics, encouraged by the power vacuum created by a declining Russian hegemony, are also factor in that countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have indicated a desire to join NATO. Such developments have driven Russia's continued efforts at political reform. In Iran, President Khatami, although seen as a moderate force in the region, is solidly against NATO or western influence in the Caspian Region. China, a country with an unusually strong central government, is expanding its influence globally and regionally. China is against NATO expansion and will presumably pressure Russia to support this view.

Economic: At the national level, Russia is enjoying a modest economic recovery due to a rise in oil prices, but it is no way permanent unless the country institutes further economic reform. Until now, Russia was unsuccessful in reversing its deterioration of economic influence at a regional level over the former Soviet republics. When Russia suddenly released price controls on its market after the fall of the Soviet Union, its economy suffered from shock. Hyperinflation resulted and ultimately caused the devaluation of the rouble, and default on IMF loans. The quick pace in which the government pursued privatization also had negative consequences. Corruption became rampant, as a class of oligarchs emerged who illegally bribed officials with stock guarantees in return for privatization and government contracts. Without a fair and impractical court system, this sort of corruption scared away western investment, and a huge capital outflow resulted which continues to this day. Needless to say, the recent rise in oil prices cannot counter these factors without true reform. Putin has made this goal a top priority, and has selected a prime minister, Kasyanov, who is completely focused on it.

The economic deterioration of Russia has global effects as well. Former Soviet Republics have started to look elsewhere than Russia to attract lucrative business deals and investment. Azerbaijan's recent collaboration in the Caspian Sea with western businesses such as British Petroleum is only one such example. This is a source of pressure for Russia to reverse its economic decline by either cooperating with the west or concentrating on eastern markets such as China.

Social: The social welfare of Russia is driven by many factors to include: level of nationalism, and economic welfare. The economic doldrums in Russia have included high unemployment, low wages, and an increase in poverty. The downturn in the economic welfare of the Russian people has had a negative impact on the level of nationalism in Russia and the health of its people. It has also fueled a relatively high distrust of the federal government and the social elite. However, a recent economic recovery due to increased oil prices, may drive a subsequent rise in nationalism, but that remains unclear.

Critical Uncertainties.

Russia's Tolerance of NATO: range of futures. While Russia's reaction to NATO enlargement is ultimately ambiguous, it is more defined within a two year horizon. Putin will have to make a decision between adopting a doctrine of Atlanticism (pro-West) in cooperation with NATO or one of Eurasianism (pro-East), concentrating on Asia. One extreme could result with heavy NATO influence in the Caspian with Russia and Iran losing territory rights in that highly contested area, and with Caspian countries joining the defense alliance. Heavy mobilization could result and the threat of regional conflict in that area would increase dramatically. The opposite extreme could result with a strong economic and possible military relationship with Russia and China, thereby serving as an effective force for NATO containment. This arrangement would benefit Iran and Russia since China is projected to become the world's largest market for energy.

Russian Economic Influence: true ambiguity. An extreme case is that oil prices collapse due to an expanding war on terrorism, and Russia's economic situation deepens. This will force the country to concentrate on domestic issues and diminish its role in international affairs as well as the regional dispute in the Caspian. This would create an "open door" for NATO to enlarge and negatively influence the Caspian from Iran's perspective. In the opposite extreme, Russia prospers economically and is successful at attracting the interests of former Soviet Republics. In this case, the trend of these countries looking to the West would decrease, and regional stability, in the eyes of Iran, would increase.

Russia's Political Reform: range of futures. While Russia is committed to political reform, the extent of these reforms is unclear for the next two years. If it remains a strong centralized government, the chance that Russia would act more decisively to counter NATO would increase. However, if major liberalizing reforms are passed that re-distribute power back to territories and provinces, Russia's foreign policy may suffer, and even worse, states may vie for autonomy. Furthermore, this uncertainty is closely tied to the economic uncertainty facing Russiia; if the country prospers, political reform would also prosper.

Scenarios.

NOTE: SCENARIOS 1,2,3,4 ARE ORDERED IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE TO IRAN WITH 1 BEING THE MOST PREFERRED.

Scenario 1: The Bear Awakens. This scenario is most preferred Iran because it projects a more powerful Russia with greater economic clout. Russia's improved economy reverses the current trend of former Soviet Republics looking to the West, and establishes open trade partnerships which fosters a regional economic powerhouse to rival the EU and NAFTA. Western businesses benefit tremendously here, and are sympathetic to Russia's grievances concerning NATO enlargement. Russia enters into an expanded economic partnership with the East and the Middle East. This benefits Chine immensely as it needs Russian and OPEC's energy reserves. NATO views the developments in alarm, and decides to delay expansionist plans in the Caspian. Russia convinces Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to give up their territorial claims on the Caspian, and NATO does nothing due to China's threat to give Russia unilateral access to its domestic markets. Iran gains from this development in the Caspian, and continues to receive Russian aid. It becomes Russia's principle agent in the Middle East.

Scenario 2: All Growl No Teeth. Russia declines further economically, and must resort to military saber rattling to try and contain NATO. As the economy worsens, nationalistic movements gain strength in the Dumas, and they view NATO increasingly as a military threat. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan continue to drill in the Caspian with western oil companies, and continue to press for NATO membership. NATO announces that it will allow them to enter, and Russia responses with massive mobilizations along its Caspian and European borders. Yet, NATO continues to court the Caspian because it views Russian military as obsolete. Indeed the worsening economic conditions have driven operational strength of Russia's military to a historically low. Its equipment is out of date, and their is an unprecedented morale problem within the ranks. NATO pauses in its enlargement goals, but continues to actively pursue them. Iran feels that it can no longer count on Russia as a formidable ally, and is forced to consider inciting rebellion among the large Shiite Muslim populations in the Caspian countries.

Scenario 3: The Bear Whimpers. Russia prospers economically due to a heavy increase in western aid, and the passage of economic reform. This increase in prosperity also ushers in a new wave of liberalizing political reforms. However, due to NATO attacks on Kosovo, which it still remembers keenly, it continues to oppose NATO enlargement. While this gives the alliance pause, it does not prevent them from pursuing more members because Russia has become so reliant on Western businesses and investments. As NATO looks to the Caspian, Iran begins clandestine planning of covert operations against western interests in the area. Without a Russian counterweight there, U.S. more openly backs Azerbaijan and Kazahkstan, and consequently becomes an increasingly large target for Iranian backed operations. Russia spouts rhetoric against NATO expansionism, but does nothing physically to stop it.

Scenario 4: A Happy Bear Goes to Sleep. Ironically, while this scenario is the best from an American standpoint, it is the worst for Iran. Here Russia enjoys spectacular growth through increased foreign investment after the passage of economic reform and a strengthening of its court system. As the economy improves, liberal political reforms are passed, and the Russian government becomes more closely aligned with Western ideology. More importantly, it views NATO as a political organization and not a threatening defense alliance. Thus, it happily allows NATO to continue its encroachment, content that it can mutually benefit. The territorial dispute is resolved with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia the clear winners with the backing of NATO. Furthermore, NATO convinces Russia discontinue its sales of arms and nuclear technology to Iran which it complies because it no longer needs the funds. Iran will seek unconventional and asymmetrical means to retaliate.


Endnotes

1. Katzman, Kenneth, "Iran, Russia, and the New Muslim States," http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/124.htmBACK

2.The Economist, "Storm in a Precious Teacup," Aug 2, 2001.BACK

3.Ibid.BACK

2002, Foreign Area Officer Association
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