Iran: A Challenge for U.S. and Arab Foreign Policies

By MAJ David F. DiMeo, USA

Since the beginning of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, we have recognized the strategic importance of Iran. It possesses a commanding position on the key Strait of Hormuz and has the longest coastline of any Gulf state. It has a larger population than all other Persian Gulf states combined and roughly the same GDP. It is also the second largest oil producer in OPEC. In addition to Persian Gulf concerns, the U.S. is trying to encourage development and democratization in the former Soviet Central Asian republics and wean them from the Russian orbit. These republics need an outlet to the sea to have any real growth. Of the two possible transit routes from Central Asia to the sea, one (Afghanistan) is not feasible due to civil war. That leaves only Iran as a viable route, forcing a difficult policy choice on the U.S.

This is a critical time in Iran's history. Reformist Muhammad Khatami was elected President in 1997 with 70% of the vote. In February 2000, his party won a sweeping majority in the Iranian parliament. Khatami has courted closer relations with the European powers and Arab states, while attempting to liberalize the strict Islamist regime. Ultimate power, however, remains in the hands of the un-elected Supreme Guide Ali Khameini (the successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) and his hard-line faction. They control not only the supreme political authority, but also the Revolutionary Guards, the strongest military arm in the country. The hard-liners oppose Khatami's liberal moves. This has led to a struggle for power among the two factions, leaving Iran effectively with two different governments.

The battle for control has not been limited to elections. The hard-line establishment has imprisoned some of Khatami's key supporters. Many others have been killed by unknown assailants most likely connected to the hard-liners. Reform- minded youth launched massive street demonstrations in the summer of 1999, the largest since the Revolution. The hard-liners fought back with a brutal crackdown and series of arrests. Although the momentum now seems on the side of the reformers, overall victory is by no means certain. We need only remember the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tianamen Square in 1989, when Western journalists were predicting the end of Chinese Communist oppression.

What is clear is that the stakes are high for U.S. and Arab interests in the Persian Gulf. Formulating an effective policy toward Iran is difficult for the United States. We have followed a policy of "Dual Containment" in the 1990s, meaning the isolation of both Iran and Iraq as pariah states. Meanwhile, our Arab Gulf allies are moving ahead with closer relations with Khatami's government.

Arab Gulf States Policy toward Iran.

Security calculations dictate that the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf cannot ignore relations with Iran. The power configuration in the Gulf has three sides to it. The two major powers are Iraq and Iraq. Even though those two countries have changed governments and ideologies many times, they have generally remained enemies. The third side in the power balance should be the Arab Gulf monarchies. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1980 as a reaction to the threat of Khomeini's takeover of Iran was the most sincere effort to make these states a credible part of the power balance. Despite this, and massive investments in defense, the third side of this power system has never developed its own credible defense capability.

Given this situation, the Arab Gulf monarchies have accepted that they must use their economic power, ties to Western allies and diplomatic skill to balance the two major powers in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia's $80 billion contribution to Iraq's war against Iran was a piece of this strategy. This balancing system was relatively successful until Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The desperate calls for "regional" and "Arab" solutions to the crisis were attempts to hold onto the old system and not fall back on the last resort: a massive superpower intervention.

While the Arab Gulf monarchies certainly appreciate the American military commitment, they would prefer to return to the old system of balancing off Iran and Iraq and decrease the dependence on direct U.S. intervention. Improving ties with Iraq is not an option -- Saddam remains firmly in place and as belligerent as ever. But the swing toward moderation and opening in Khatami's Iran represents a viable choice. Since 1997, diplomatic exchanges between the GCC states and Khatami's government have become quite common. Senior military envoys, including the Saudi and Iranian ministers of defense have participated conspicuously in those exchanges.

The Arab countries have been very careful in making these overtures. Just as Iran today effectively has two competing governments, it also has two militaries: the regular forces, with some allegiance to Khatami; and the more powerful Revolutionary Guards, fiercely loyal to the hard-liners. The Arab exchanges have all dealt with Khatami's wing, and made clear their support and preference for his side.

The GCC states are not looking for a military alliance with Iran. What they are doing, however, is moving away from a "Dual Containment" policy, towards a "Single Containment" of Iraq. The United States, with its massive military and economic power, and global focus, can afford to isolate the two main powers in the Gulf. The GCC states cannot afford to cut themselves off from the rest of the Gulf region.

Challenges in Creating a Coherent U.S. Policy.

If American policy on Iran lacks focus it is not due to neglect. This issue has been studied and analyzed extensively in the academic and government worlds. There are, however, some genuinely conflicting concerns and challenges that confound any attempt at a bold U.S. approach to Iran. Some of these are discussed below:

Black Box View of International Relations. Our tendency to treat states as a uniform whole is a convenient shorthand we have all gotten conditioned to through the media. Unfortunately, this is counterproductive when dealing with a country that is undergoing an internal power struggle. Does "Iran" support terrorism? Does "Iran" export revolution? Some factions within Iran certainly do, while some do not. Which faction prevails may depend in part on policies that the major Western powers adopt. An ideal American foreign policy would selectively reward one faction while punishing the other. Unfortunately, the American voting public has been conditioned to expect a black-and-white answer: either Iran (in its entirety) is a terrorist state that must be isolated, or it is a friendly country that we should embrace. Any American politician advocating improved ties with any element in Iran will be branded "soft on terrorism."

The Iranian Revolution Picture. The 1979 Islamic revolution created a vivid impression of Iranians as radically anti-Western. The death sentence against Salman Rushdie and the suicidal human wave assaults in the Iran-Iraq war did a lot to reinforce this picture. In reality, the 1979 revolution was a reaction against the Shah's Westernization as much as the 1999 street clashes were a reaction against harsh Islamic rule. Ayatollah Khomeini's version of Islamic rule was an innovation. Most senior Shi'ite figures disagreed with his concept. Although Khomeini was only the third ranking religious scholar in Iran in his day, he was the most outspoken opponent of the Shah. This propelled him to leadership in the revolution. During the revolution, Iranian voters went to the polls to mark ballots with two choices: Return of the Shah or Khomeini's Islamic Republic. The fact that they chose the latter hardly meant universal acceptance of Khomeinism. After Khomeini's death, the hard-liners had to dig much deeper to find a Shi'ite leader who would endorse his system of religious rule. The current Supreme Guide (Iran's senior ruler) Ali Khameini was a low-ranking religious figure who rose to the position primarily on his ties to the hard-line security apparatus.

An Unfamiliar System of Government. The Iranian system does not neatly fit into our categories of "democracy" or "dictatorship." The elected offices, such as the president and the parliament have real power, unlike many Middle Eastern countries. Yet, most of the military, judicial, media and security systems belong to the un-elected Supreme Guide. Since such a system is so alien to us, many Americans tend to draw either of two incorrect conclusions. The first is that the recent election victories mean that the reformers have won control of the country. The second is that Iran is a dictatorship any the elections are meaningless. Therefore, any clear U.S. policy toward Iran is likely to be misunderstood by part of the U.S. public.

Weakening Khatami's Position. Both the U.S. and Khatami's party realize that warm relations with the U.S. can be a liability for the reformers. Iranian society is very much in a state of flux. Bitterness toward the United States still lingers from the revolution among many. Also, most Iranians are wary of either extreme: that represented by Islamist radicalism or the Shah's Westernization. In a speech this year, Khatami himself expressed opposition to a direct U.S. military presence in the Gulf. Instead, Khatami presents himself as a man of the center. He has emphasized ties with Europe and the Arab states more than with the U.S. Washington has also been very careful to express its desire for greater contacts in very modest terms.

Conflicting Signals from Tehran. Both hard-line and reformist factions in Iran realize they are sitting on a precarious situation and have to gauge their actions carefully. For example, Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei sounded a much more sympathetic and progressive tone when students were filling the streets in protest in July 1999 than he did two months later after winning back the streets and rounding up the demonstrators. In this divided government, "Iranian" policy is the net result of influences from both sides. Policy toward the United States is one of the most sensitive subjects. Therefore, we should not be surprised to see some Iranian officials proposing restoration of relations with the United States one day and other officials decrying the "Great Satan" the next.

Conclusion

The contrast between the Arab and American approaches to Iranian relations is not as stark as it may seem. We should not assume that the Gulf states' overtures, or the overtures from our Western European allies toward Khatami's government are going on without U.S. awareness and tacit approval. The GCC countries must move faster toward normalizing relations, while the U.S. must be more cautious and gradual. The gestures of cooperation between GCC leaders and Khatami contribute to U.S. interests in the region, as does American restraint in not boldly embracing the embattled Iranian president. This situation also benefits Khatami's reformist party as well, since moving too fast toward the United States could backfire on them. The sweeping election victories of February are an encouraging sign, but the struggle for control is far from over.

MAJ DiMeo is a Middle East FAO currently assigned to USCENTCOM Coordinating Cell in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He completed graduate studies at Princeton University and conducted in-country training in Cairo, Egypt. These views are the author's and do not represent USCENTCOM or the U.S. Army.

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