Moment of Truth in a Land of Challenge
- A Societal-Military Overview of Russia

By LTC (ret) Dan Hartmann and LTC Gary Bauleke

The World dies over and over again but the skeleton always gets up and walks

-- Henry Miller

Although Joshua knew beforehand what was about to transpire, one can nevertheless imagine the general surprise and amazement for the others when Jericho's walls finally fell. For many modern observers, the "fall of the wall'' and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union was greeted with no less wonderment. In the initial euphoria of the breaking of the communist yoke, there were high (and false) hopes that Russia would quickly transform itself and join the family of democratic, free market societies. Now, more than 10 years later, as Russia has completed only its second presidential election since independence, we find ourselves asking once again "What next?" Where is Russia headed, especially in the realm of military affairs? How will it face the changing security environment?

Russia enters the 21st Century facing daunting political, economic, societal, and ecological challenges. The Russian Armed Forces have been particularly hard hit by the upheaval and are plagued by outdated organization, aging equipment, insufficient resources, and chronic lack of funds as well as severe manning problems. Taken altogether, they represent a threat to Russia's stability and, therefore, to regional security. Too radical an approach in meeting these challenges might trigger unwanted responses, while too weak might encourage further problems.

Figure 1 - Old Russia and New Russia: Boris Yeltsin gives way to Vladimir Putin
There is, however, some reason for optimism that Russia will nevertheless manage to meet its evolving security needs. While Moscow struggles to reinvent its economy, continue its experiment with democracy, and adapt to new security challenges, the World should remember that Russian military leaders have often succeeded under the most trying of circumstances, and the people themselves have demonstrated time and again an almost inexhaustible capacity to endure hardship.

Politically, Russia is still suffering from the legacy of centuries of autocratic rule followed by 70 years of Communist Party totalitarianism. There is no culture of compromise, so essential to democratic society. There are dozens of political parties at all points of the political spectrum, none of which can attract a majority. Public mistrust of the government is pervasive. Indeed, following a series of bombings in Russian cities that the government blamed on Chechen terrorists, polls showed that an equal number of Russian citizens believed that the government itself was responsible in order to have an excuse to invade Chechnya. Yet another poll showed that only slightly over one third of the respondents thought that democracy was the best form of government.

On the positive side of the political ledger, Boris Yeltsin's surprise resignation on New Year's Eve and the concurrent appointment of Vladimir Putin as Acting President marked the first voluntary and peaceful transition of power in Russian history. Putin won a clear, if slim, majority in the presidential elections on March 26. While he enjoyed significant advantages as the incumbent, by all indications the elections were relatively free, fair, and open.

The economy struggled throughout the 1990s and still faces stiff challenges. As a former U.S. Ambassador to Russia once commented: "Russia is neither a developed nor a developing country. It is, quite possibly, the most mis-developed country in history." The cumbersome, inefficient Soviet system based on centralized planning and consisting mostly of an aging heavy industry infrastructure did not readily adapt to market forces.

Attempts to jump-start a market-based economy met with only partial success, largely due to rampant corruption. Privatization of state-owned firms was hijacked by an emerging oligarchy. With government complicity for personal gains, some sales were under-priced, allowing public assets to be obtained by the oligarchs at far less than true market value. Banks were not regulated and many improper loans allowed non-viable factories to remain in production. The tax system was totally inadequate. As a result, both government officials and the new class of robber barons moved into state coffers and money that should have been re-invested in the economy was illegally moved out of country.

This loss of capital, coupled with the failure to attract sizable foreign investment, meant that there would be no significant free market development. Indeed, when Russia devalued the ruble in August 1998 and set off the economic collapse that impacted most of Europe, especially the New Independent States, it was not so much a failure of the market, or even of academic and theoretical understanding. It was in fact, reflection of failed economic policy, nonexistent fiscal oversight, and greed.

The collapse of August 1998 taught some bitter lessons, but there are indications that these lessons have been learned and that the economy is beginning to rebound. The rising price of oil is moving revenues into the treasury and boosting prices on the stock market. The Russian Trading System (RTS) index gained 9% in real terms during the first week of March 2000. The ruble appreciated 0.4% during the same week and foreign reserves increased by USD 300 million. Most importantly, with tax reform and revenue collection receiving much higher priority, revenues for that period exceeded expenditures by 12.8 billion rubles; enough to possibly prevent the government from borrowing money from the central bank.

This positive economic performance, although welcome, is fragile. Part of the upward pressure came from the pre-election tactics. Another significant factor is the current high price of oil. However, production quotas might change and prices fall for a number of reasons beyond Moscow's control. So, although encouraging, it remains premature to say that the economy is recovering due to proper application of market economy principles. And it remains sadly true that, for many Russians, the benefits of a strong market economy are far off, and they continue to live at or below subsistence levels.

Corruption and organized crime affect almost all aspects of life and significantly impede any attempts to better the lives of the average citizen through economic performance. Bribery and influence peddling are virtual business requirements, and the heavy toll exacted on the nascent entrepreneurial class effectively prevents them from contributing much societal benefit. In 1996, a report by the California Attorney General estimated that 80 percent of private enterprises and banks in Russia were forced to pay anywhere between 10 and 20 percent of profits to organized crime groups.

These problems are exacerbated by a lack of real business and civil codes and compounded by a weak court and police system. The laws that do exist are enforced capriciously and as a result, foreign businesses, already faced with requirements to sell large portions of hard currency to the state, ultimately find that they are unable to generate sufficient profit to justify their efforts. Many pull out.

The social safety net has, in the main, collapsed. A polluted environment, generally poor living conditions, and a dysfunctional health care system are fueling a five-year decline in population. In 1999, it fell by 0.5%. The birth rate is now well below the number required to simply maintain the population. Moreover, the declining fertility rate means that the population is aging as well. Fewer young people are entering the work force to support those who are retiring. While there is an influx of Russians from the New Independent States who are returning to Russia to avoid ethnic prejudice, the total growth trend remains negative

Even more troubling is the worsening health of the population. The infant death rate is almost twice that of economically developed countries. According to the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, only one fifth of all children born in Russia are healthy. Almost half of the men called for military service in the last 2 years could not pass physical training standards and one third were not fit for service at all. Nutrition is so poor that some Russian conscription authorities reportedly have established camps to nourish inductees back to health so they can serve.

For the military, this negative trend indicates a shrinking draft cohort in the years ahead. This is a significant change. For centuries, Russian political and military leaders enjoyed the luxury of vast human resources. What they lacked in technology or training, they could overcome with sheer manpower. Now, manpower is no longer an inexhaustible resource.

The generally poor health of the population is confronted with even more severe health risks. Inadequate supplies of drugs and improper dosage regimes have allowed certain diseases such as tuberculosis to not only flourish, but to become drug resistant. Drug resistant tuberculosis is rampant among the prison population. HIV infection is rising. Due to substandard living conditions and remote locations, the next high-risk population could be the military.

Ecologically, the country is toxic. Dr. Murray Feshbach coined the term "Ecocide" to describe the problem. Years of industrial development with no regard for environmental concerns contaminated much of the ground water with heavy metals and even biological contamination. The conditions improve overall health and sustain it are eroding and will not regenerate any time soon.

The Russian military, in particular the Ground Forces, appear to have felt the negative effects of transition more than any other segment of society. To appreciate the extent of the turmoil facing Russian military leaders in 1992, consider the following. The Soviet Army began the 1990s with over 150 Motorized Rifle Divisions and 52 Tank Divisions (counting all three states of readiness). The new Russian state inherited the military forces stationed in Russia proper and in East Germany.

By the end of 1999, Russian ground forces numbered about 54 divisions, few at full strength. Russia had to withdraw forces to Russian territory proper, sort out ownership of equipment and weapons, and determine which officers would remain in the Russian armed forces while others took up positions in the new military forces coming into being on its border. Key installations such as the Baikanor space center no longer belong to Russia. Major weapons manufacturing complexes now lay beyond the borders. The 14th Army was stranded in the Russian enclave in the Transdnestr region of Moldova, where fighting between ethnic Russian citizens and Moldovans quickly broke out. Even the nuclear arsenal was scattered across four separate, independent countries: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Russian Federation.

Russia was left to deal with the rump of a huge armed force that had in effect suffered heavy casualties. The Russian military needed to be rebuilt, and nobody knew that better than the Russian military leadership. However, there were other challenges to be dealt with first: among them, recovering the nuclear arsenal, and ensuring survival of the state. With the help of Cooperative Threat Reduction support from the U.S. as well as other states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan became nuclear free countries. Warheads were returned to Russia for dismantling and demilitarization. Although complex, this task proved less trying than that of securing the integrity of Russia, for the collapse of the Soviet Union let loose numerous centrifugal forces bent on sending more parts of the empire spinning away from Moscow.

As the new independent states took shape around the periphery, regions within Russia began to press for independence. Chechnya, under the leadership of former Soviet General Dudayev, made its bid to break away form the Russian Federation. Initially, Russia sent in Interior Ministry troops, supported by the Army, and almost immediately became bogged down in a war heavy mechanized forces were ill suited to fight. Casualties were heavy on both sides, but the Russians clearly got the worst of it when they tried to take the Chechen capital, Grozny. Hundreds of soldiers died, and Russia accepted a settlement that gave Chechnya a greater autonomy that amounted to de facto independence.

The Chechnya humiliation, following so closely behind the disastrous Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, wrecked morale in the Russian military as it entered a period of neglect. Budgets were slashed, and allocations under those budgets were only fractions of the budgeted amounts. The defense budget dropped to less than 20 percent of what The Soviet Union allocated in the late 1980s. Military pay fell into arrears--soldiers, even senior officers, were years behind in receiving allowances.

The Russian military began a reduction in force and reorganization carried out largely by attrition as undermanned and cadre units were eliminated. The officer rank structure became skewed as junior and mid-level officers left. Accession of new officers lagged, and more importantly, the military was losing its experienced junior officers. Russian press articles claim that for the past three years 58,000 lieutenants joined the military while 50,000 lieutenants and captains were among the 120,000 officers that departed. While this suggests a total gain of 8,000 junior officers, in reality it means that 70,000 field grade officers departed, and so did 50,000 of the officers that might have replaced them. Although impossible to quantify with the figures available in the press, it appears that the company-grade and lower field-grade officer cohort is growing less experienced.

Although meaningful reform during the 1990s was derailed by a crushing lack of resources, military planners nonetheless continued examining the future role of the military. Russia traditionally places great importance on defense doctrine as the master plan to organize, equip, and train its military force. Doctrine worked out in the 1920s laid the foundation for the deep striking, tank heavy forces that fought World War II and stood ready to drive west during the Cold War. But that force was not suited for the 21st Century. The adoption of a new military doctrine in 1998 began the process for redefining the role of Russia's military and its transformation, although resources to implement the changes remained as lacking as ever.

The 1998 National Security Blueprint assessed that the likelihood of Russia engaging in a large-scale external war was low. Instead, regional conflicts along Russia's periphery would be the most likely scenario for combat. The burden of maintaining Russia' international military credibility would fall on its nuclear arsenal, much as it had in the 1950s. In short, nuclear deterrence became dominant, while the reduced conventional forces focused on the potential regional crises.

The current Chechen War seems to validate that assessment. It also demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense, while still bureaucratic and tradition bound, can learn from past experiences. While operations are heavy handed and casualty rates high, losses are nowhere near the levels experienced during the First Chechen War (1994-1996). Military leaders have made the most of an opportunity to atone for earlier miserable performance and reclaim some of their former professional pride.

Military operations in Chechnya since last year demonstrated operational flexibility that took into account the capabilities of the forces engaged, met critical time lines, and adapted to considerations not highlighted in past operations. For example, the tactics employed were better suited to the terrain and the type of military forces available. The initial strikes into Chechnya focused on the generally flat terrain to the north, where armored forces clearly had the advantage. Second, air power and extensive use of artillery were used to gain stand-off from the Chechens. Russian casualties were kept much lower than in the first campaign when the Chechens successfully closed with Russian forces. An unfortunate side effect of these tactics, though, was reflected in the significant suffering inflicted on the civilian population.

Planners realized that they could not train a large force to deal with the insurgents during the time available before Winter set in, so a fighting force was assembled from forces across the Russian Federation. Defense Ministry forces augmented Interior Ministry forces initially, and as the fighting intensified, control for the operation shifted to the Defense Ministry. Close interagency cooperation was maintained, and at the end, control went back to the Interior Ministry.

Russian planners took great pains to minimize military casualties, which appeared to be a major planning consideration. This is interesting as, historically, many Russian operations (Soviet and Tsarist) endured enormous casualties. It reflects a growing sensitivity to public opinion on the part of Russia's political leadership. Great effort went into shaping the news accounts of the fighting and reporting the Russian casualties, as the leadership realized that public support for the campaign, so carefully nurtured this time around, would fade quickly if large numbers of soldiers were lost.

Domestic and international public opinion suddenly mattered to the leadership. While Russia is no stranger to propaganda operations, the second campaign demonstrated Moscow's intent to deny the media victory that worked so significantly to the rebels' advantage during the first campaign. As well, it highlighted the greater sensitivity to public opinion that currently exists within Russian government. While the sensitivity was largely due to presidential campaign considerations, it was nonetheless important since this pressure indicated nascent government accountability to the public.

What does this all mean for the future of Russia? More than 50 years after he first uttered them, Sir Winston Churchill's words on Russia still ring true:

"I cannot forecast you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

The Putin Era began officially on May 7, 2000. Will he be able to avoid the mistakes of the Yeltsin Era? Little is known of Putin, the former KGB agent turned "savior." During the election campaign, Putin himself steadfastly refused to comment on what he might do if elected. It became popular to compare him to the Soviet-era myth of the dedicated, capable, patriotic KGB agent, interested only in the good of the state. Like much that is Russian, Putin presents a dichotomy. He has cited the historical and current Russian penchant for a strong and paternalistic state. Yet he is said to favor market reforms--to a degree. He wrote, "We can count on a worthy future only if we manage to naturally combine the principles of a market economy and democracy with Russia's realities." These "realities" mean that, while Russia may continue on the democratic, free market path, it probably will never become a political entity in the mold of the United States or Western Europe.

During the presidential campaign, Putin promised to establish a "dictatorship of law." It remains now to see which is more important to President Putin -- dictatorship or law. He moved quickly to centralize power and change the existing power structure. In an attempt to regain control of the 82 regions that comprise Russia today, he created seven large administrative districts and now must deal with challenges from the regional governors. Even when still the Acting President, he pursued a hard line regarding Chechnya and moved to limit the influence of the so-called "oligarchs," the men who took control of major economic, communications, and media concerns and used them to as bases of power while removing so much of Russia's capital overseas. He reestablished (former KGB) security oversight organizations that Yeltsin abolished from the military. He also announced a refined national defense doctrine. Under Putin, the freeze in military-to-military contacts with the U.S. and NATO that Yeltsin used to protest NATO action in Serbia began to thaw.

Nevertheless, the West is unsure of what a Putin administration will ultimately yield. Will he continue and advance the democratic and capitalist reforms, or could Russia be on the verge of seeing its recent democratic experiment slide back under the shadow of a totalitarian regime? The president of Russia's URALMASH observed that . . . "Reforms only happen when you can't live without them." Putin, at least, has signaled that he believes that Russia can't live without them.

Russia once again faces a moment of truth. The new administration can be expected to take action on the vexing issues that so hindered earlier economic progress. Failure to achieve these immediate concerns will doom Russia to at best a continuance of its current status. It might get worse. But the future of Russia goes beyond these near-term solutions and ultimately hinges on what progress Russia can make on reversing ecological damage, restoring population health, providing adequate food for its population, and overcoming negative demographic trends. A land rich in resources but under-populated is at risk from neighbors with burgeoning populations. Russian leaders will need all their resourcefulness to adapt a plan within their current resources and capabilities, assemble their forces, and act. A decade has passed since the death of the Soviet Union. It's now time to see the skeleton get up and walk.

Dan Hartmann and Gary Bauleke are Russia FAOs who work in the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs). Dan was recently selected to be the Deputy Director of Army Foreign Liaison.

2000, Foreign Area Officer Association
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