A Summary of the Longstanding Disputes Between Greece and Turkey

MAJ Kevin Dougherty
MAJ Aric Whateley

While events in Kosovo dominate the headlines, the greatest threat to the long term survival of NATO and to vital U.S. interests in Southeastern Europe remains the possibility of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. Such a conflict could involve open warfare between two NATO members, would likely necessitate U.S. or NATO intervention, and, depending on the U.S. and NATO response, could lead Greece to expand its ties to Russia or Turkey to expand its ties to the Middle East in ways contrary to U.S. national interests. With so much at stake, it is important to understand the sources of the longstanding tension between Greece and Turkey. This paper will highlight five bilateral disputes that contribute to this tension: Aegean Sea issues, Cyprus, the Balkans, the PKK, and Thrace.

Aegean Sea Issues. The Aegean Sea lies between Greece and Turkey and is responsible for a wide assortment of disputes. These include ownership of certain Aegean islands, the continental shelf, territorial seas, airspace control, and the militarization of certain Greek islands.

Islands. The Aegean Sea contains almost 2,400 Greek islands within a compact area of about 80,000 square miles. Only about 100 of the islands are inhabited, and many are no more than small projections of rock. The critical problem is that many of the islands are within a hundred meters of the Turkish coast, making disagreements over sovereign rights almost inevitable. Turkey espouses a "gray area" policy in which ownership of any island not specifically mentioned in an international treaty is open to dispute. Each side views the other as pursuing expansionist aims in the Aegean.

The most notable incident involving island ownership occurred in January 1996 when Greece and Turkey came close to hostilities in a dispute over an island near the Turkish coast that the Greeks call "Imia" and the Turks call "Kardak." U. S. President Bill Clinton personally intervened to defuse this specific crisis, but the overarching issue remains unresolved.

Continental Shelf. Greece and Turkey disagree on how to delineate the continental shelf in the Aegean which the two states share. The issue is not just one of territory, but, more importantly, of the right to exploit the mineral resources which include known oil deposits. In 1976, the two countries nearly went to war over this issue when Turkey conducted a mineral exploratory mission. Greece wants the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on the continental shelf dispute, but the ICJ said in 1979 that it had no jurisdiction when Greece tried to unilaterally present the case. With Greece favoring a legal course of action and Turkey favoring a negotiated one, the issue is at an impasse.

Territorial Seas. The 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty allows a 12 mile limit on territorial seas. Greece is a signatory to UNCLOS. Turkey is not. Greece currently claims only a 6-mile territorial limit around the islands and says it does not intend to extend the limit. Nonetheless, it will not renounce its right under UNCLOS to claim a 12-mile limit. The main reason for Greece's maintaining this right is to protect its claim to the continental shelf, island populations, commercial trade activity, and fishing industry. However, if Greece did extend the limit, ships could not travel between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, or from Turkey's Aegean ports, without traversing Greek waters. When UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, Turkey declared that it would regard such an extension of Greek territorial waters as cause for war.

Airspace. On the basis of a 1931 executive proclamation, Greece claims control of air space for 10 miles around its territory, to include its islands. In 1960, Greece agreed to a 6-mile airspace for NATO purposes, but since the 1974 Turkish intervention on Cyprus, Greece has protested whenever Turkey flies within 10 miles. These overflights often result in Greece scrambling interceptors and pilots engaging in mock dogfights.

The Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) was established in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Athens FIR gives Greece air traffic control responsibility for virtually the entire Aegean area. Turkey accepted this arrangement from 1952 until the Cyprus crisis of 1974, but since then it has maintained that such extensive Greek control of air traffic threatens Turkish security. It wants a new FIR boundary drawn over the middle of the international waters in the Aegean.

Militarization of Greek Islands. Greece has placed military forces on a number of islands close to the Turkish coast that Turkey insists should be kept demilitarized under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the 1923 Straits of Dardanelles Convention, and the 1947 Treaty of Paris. Turkey's concern is obvious, with some islands like Samos lying within a kilometer of the Turkish mainland. Greece maintains that the fortification of these islands is necessary and justified under the right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations Charter and, because of the creation of the Turkish Fourth Aegean Army in 1975 with its potential for amphibious assault on the Greek islands. Greece also maintains that the 1936 Montreux Convention supersedes the Straits of Dardanelles Convention and permits the fortification of islands previously required to be demilitarized. Greece has gradually built these forces up well beyond their original internal security function, but still maintains the facade by having some units wear National Guard patches.

Cyprus. While Cyprus plays host to 3,000 years of Hellenic tradition, it geographically is much closer to Turkey, lying less than 50 miles from the southern coast of Turkey and more than 500 miles from mainland Greece. While Turkish Cypriots represent only 18% of the island's population, they control 37% of its land area. Some 30,000 Turkish troops occupy northern Cyprus in order to keep it that way. A Joint Defense Doctrine between Greece and Cyprus guarantees Greek support if Turkey attacks Cyprus. A United Nations peacekeeping force mans a buffer zone as narrow as 20 meters in some places that separates the two communities that were once completely intermingled. British troops occupy two Sovereign Base Areas guaranteed to Britain by treaty. Turkish Cypriots claim to belong to a republic that only they, Turkey, and a very small number of other Islamic nations recognize.

This current complex situation in Cyprus has equally complex origins. Once part of the Ottoman Empire, the island was a British Crown Colony from 1878 until 1960. The Greek and Turkish ethnic communities lived together in relative harmony until after World War II, when Greek nationalists began agitating for union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish nationalists then began demanding partition (taksim) of the island into separate parts going to Greece and Turkey. Neither side particularly wanted independence, but that was the result that emerged from negotiations conducted by Britain, Greece, and Turkey between 1955 and 1960. In February 1959, the parties concluded the Zurich-London agreements that outlined the framework for an independent Republic of Cyprus. On 16 August 1960, Cyprus became independent.

The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus provided for a unitary government with various guarantees to protect the rights of the Turkish minority. Cyprus became a nonaligned state, belonging to neither Cold War alliance, but Great Britain retained sovereign rights over two military bases and the right to use certain other areas.

As part of the agreement, Greece, Turkey, and Britain were given legitimate roles in guaranteeing security on the island. Provisions were made for a bi-communal Cypriot Army, but such an organization never materialized. Instead, both ethnic communities developed armed forces with the help of their Greek or Turkish champions.

Three years of peace followed Cypriot independence, but there was always an undercurrent of tension between the two communities. This tension erupted into major fighting in 1963. The 7,000-man Cypriot garrison that Britain maintained as a guarantor of the Zurich-London Agreement proved ill-suited to keep the peace, and on 21 March 1964, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution to establish the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). UNFICYP was successful in separating the belligerents, but both sides strengthened their warfooting, and Greek and Turkish involvement escalated.

Archbishop Makarios III had been elected President of Cyprus in December 1959 but had suffered from opposition charges that he had betrayed enosis. In June 1974, Makarios felt strong enough to confront his opposition. He announced a purge of disloyal officers in the National Guard and attempted to crack down on terrorist activity associated with enosis.

Makarios' challenge was not well received. On 15 July, a coup d'etat was initiated by Greek officers in the National Guard, almost assuredly acting on instructions from the right-wing junta then in power in Greece.

Fearing the threat such a coup posed to the Turkish Cypriot population, Turkey launched a seaborne assault near Kyrenia in northern Cyprus on 20 July. A United Nations imposed cease-fire took place on 22 July, but Turkish troops continued to advance outside the cease line lines in order to secure enclaves of Turkish Cypriots (the ethnic populations were not segregated geographically then as they are now). Turkish troops continued to flow in through Kyrenia. On 14 August, two divisions of the Turkish Army spearheaded an offensive that crumbled the Greek Cypriot resistance. By 16 August, the Turkish troops occupied 40% of Cypriot territory and ordered a cease- fire. The de facto partition of Cyprus had begun. In November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots issued a unilateral declaration of themselves as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a declaration recognized only by Turkey.

Tensions worsened in the 1998 as Cyprus prepared to accept the delivery of Russian surface-to-air missiles. While public Turkish objections focused on the military aspects of the deal, an underlying Turkish concern was the increased Russian presence the missiles would bring. The crisis was avoided when Cyprus agreed to divert the missiles to the Greek island of Crete.

Current negotiations to make Cyprus a member of the European Union (EU) highlight the complexities of the island's political division. Since the EU includes Greece, but not Turkey, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or "TRNC" President Rauf Denktash has resisted EU membership for Cyprus, fearing that it would isolate and weaken the TRNC. The issue is especially heated given the EU's pointedly harsh rejection of Turkey at the same time it began reaching out to Cyprus. Denktash wants to delay Cypriot EU membership until after Turkey becomes a member and after a settlement on the status of the TRNC. However, Greek Cypriots expect EU membership with or without a settlement concerning the TRNC and oppose any direct TRNC role in the accession talks.

Efforts to resolve the Cyprus conflict face obstacles that appear to grow larger with time. Greek and Turkish Cypriots disagree on the fundamental structure of a future government for Cyprus. The Greeks want a centralist government with a parliament in which Greek and Turkish representation is proportional to each group's percentage of the total population. Currently about 78% of Cyprus' 750,000 person population is Greek and 18% is Turkish. The native Turkish Cypriot population is in fact declining, with many of the current Turkish population having emigrated from Turkey. If the Turks cannot unite with the mainland, they want a federation with separate Turkish and Greek regions, each having a separate constitution, with equal voice for each group on major issues of common concern, and a Turkish veto over majority decisions.

Balkans. One of the reasons cited for the necessity of U.S. intervention in Kosovo was that if the crisis went unchecked, it could ultimately result in war between Greece and Turkey. This worst case scenario was articulated as follows: continued Serb crackdowns in Kosovo lead to increasing ethnic Albanian refugees pouring into Albania and FYROM; with no prospects of returning to Kosovo, the refugees try to make their way to Greece where they can achieve an appreciably higher standard of living; desiring to prevent such an influx, Greece deploys military forces to Albania and FYROM to block the refugees and clashes between Greek soldiers and refugees occur; Turkey intervenes on behalf of its fellow Muslims and suddenly Greece and Turkey are on opposite sides of the conflict. The scenario is largely overstated and is unlikely to reach such a drastic climax, but it nonetheless represents the complicated Greek and Turkish agendas in the Balkans.

Both Greece and Turkey have historical and religious ties to the Balkans and want to exert their influence in the region. They also have regional concerns in the area of their national self-interest. Greece, which currently plays host to some 500,000 Albanian workers, is concerned about containing further Albanian immigration, while Turkey views the Balkans as its gateway to Europe. Both countries favor regional stability and are willing to participate in peacekeeping efforts. Both provided support to the Albania crisis in 1997 and to Kosovo in 1999 and both countries remain participants in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia.

Both countries are also members of the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial and its peacekeeping force, the Multinational Peacekeeping Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). The MPFSEE proved to be an important pawn in the Greek-Turkish battle for regional leadership. In an undisguised display of competition, both countries provided alternative plans for the organization, trying to woo the support of Albania, Bulgaria, Italy, FYROM, and Romania, the other participant nations. One especially contested issue was the location of the MPFSEE headquarters with both Greece and Turkey offering to be the host for obvious reasons. A compromise was eventually reached with the solution of a rotating headquarters to initially be located at Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The MPFSEE debate demonstrated the vulnerability of less advanced Balkan states to Greek and Turkish influence. NATO-hopefuls found themselves in the difficult position of being pressured from two NATO member nations, upon whose support their future aspirations would depend.

PKK. Turkey has long accused Greece of supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish insurgency group that often employs terrorism and that Turkey considers a key national security threat. On February 1999, Turkey captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan after he had been sheltered in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The circumstances of Ocalan's capture were particularly embarrassing to the Greek government and were exploited by Turkey with charges that Greece was a state sponsor of terrorism. As a result of its assessment that Greece was supporting the PKK, Turkey refused to implement the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) brokered by NATO in June 1988. This gesture was primarily symbolic, as the CBMs, with the exception of the mutually beneficial moratorium on summer military exercises designed to protect the tourist season, have been largely ignored. The crisis in Kosovo served to distract both Greece and Turkey from the Ocalan dispute, but Greece's credibility remains damaged. While the PKK issue in end of itself is not the sort of thing to lead to war, it is one of the several sources of tension between Greece and Turkey.

Thrace. A final point of contention is the status of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace, which some Greeks see as a potential pretext for Turkish irredentism. Greek defense planners consider Turkish military actions against Greece possible on three fronts: an attempt to capture Greek islands in the eastern Aegean, extension of the Turkish occupation zone in Cyprus, or invasion of Thrace in order to "protect" the Muslim (Turkish) minority. The last is the least likely scenario, as there is no territorial dispute over Thrace and the problems of the Turkish minority are not severe enough to spark a conflict by themselves. A military conflict in Thrace would be likely only in connection with a Greek-Turkish war breaking out over Aegean claims or Cyprus. Nonetheless, Thrace, like Greek support for the PKK, represents a secondary source of tension between Greece and Turkey.

Conclusion. While certain of these perennial Greek-Turkish disputes may seem somewhat inconsequential to an outside observer, Greeks and Turks take all of them very seriously. So many issues in such a little space causes almost constant friction. The Greeks and Turks habitually respond to such affronts in a spectrum ranging from heated rhetoric to military posturing. Both sides routinely find themselves in untenable positions after their initial rash response. It is particularly at times like these that an otherwise small mistake could lead to escalation and conflict. In such a scenario it is inevitable that the U.S. and NATO would intervene. Therefore it is important for us to understand these sources of tension, both in an effort to help resolve them during peace and mitigate them during conflict.

MAJ Kevin Dougherty is the Aegean and Balkans Action Officer in HQUSEUCOM, ECJ2. MAJ Aric Whatley is a student at NPS. Both are 48Cs with Greek backgrounds.

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