NOTE: This is Part III of a three-part series entitled "Global Trends and Security Strategies." Part I (Sep 2005) of this series discussed current global security threats and how the U.S. and the EU security strategies, of 2002 and 2003 respectively, each addressed these threats. Part II (Dec 2005) of this series discussed how and if the EU is capable of backing its security strategy with its defense forces, and specifically discussed how, and if, the ESDP can accomplish this important task. Finally, Part III discusses the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in contemporary Transatlantic security.
Introduction
The role of the United States (US) Armed Forces during the Cold War was very clear: to deter the threat of a Soviet invasion in Western Europe and to defend it should the need arise. This role is a genesis of the transatlantic bargain initiated following the Second World War (WWII). The bargain is the result of several separate but mutually influencing actions, the culmination of which was the Treaty of Washington in 1949 that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The transatlantic bargain was signed with the understanding that the US would continue its involvement in European security in return for a European commitment to organize itself for both external defense and internal stability. The role of the US Armed Forces in the initial bargain, as agreed to by the US Congress, consisted primarily of strategic bombing and sea control. 1 Europe progressively developed and was successful in providing the internal stability as hoped for by the US. This internal stability was achieved primarily through economic development and integration.
External defense goals, however, were never achieved. Force goals as outlined in Lisbon in 1952 where considered by many to be unrealistic. The reasons for this are arguable and beyond the scope of this paper. However, the effects are that the US Armed Forces began to play an increasingly greater role in European defense. This is particularly true as the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons. The NATO military strategy focused heavily on the threat of using nuclear weapons provided by the US against the Soviet Union. The credibility of this threat was backed up through the presence of US Armed Forces on European soil. 2 The presence of US soldiers in Europe was further necessitated with the NATO strategy development of flexible response in which NATO would meet any Soviet aggression with an equivalent response, whether conventional or nuclear. 3 This required the positioning of significant numbers of conventional forces in Europe. Since Europe had not produced the military forces required for such a strategy, the presence of US forces in Europe was thus vital in order to back up NATO's strategic policies.
The role of the US armed forces in Europe was thus essential to Europe's security. As the Soviet Union developed the capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles against the US, the role of military forces in Europe became even more vital to deter the Soviet threat. While the employment of neither conventional nor nuclear forces was ever required, the US presence provided reassurance, whether real or psychological, against the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this role was no longer valid.
Since NATO was established to counter a Soviet threat, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought NATO's reason for being into question. Yet NATO is fortunately more than just a military alliance. NATO's espousing of democracy, individual freedoms and economic liberty have proved vital to its role in the post Cold War era. These beliefs proved to provide the foundation on which NATO would develop and implement its new strategic concept.
NATO's strategic concept of 1991 provided new direction for NATO. When this concept was released the Soviet Union still existed, but id did not pose a legitimate threat against NATO. While acknowledging the Soviet Union as a holder of nuclear arms, NATO refocused its efforts on the developing democracies on its eastern border. Three general agreements provided the core of the concept. First, NATO agreed to a broader approach to security that would engage its eastern neighbors. Second, military forces would be reduced to a point consistent with needs based on crisis management tasks, and not conventional or nuclear war. Lastly, European members of NATO agreed to assume a greater responsibility for its own security. 4 The intent was to provide political stability that would translate into European security. Yet the democratic movements did not all prove equal. While Poland, the Czech Republic and others where moving in a positive direction, the Balkans proved quite to the contrary.
While the Balkans crisis was evolving, the US began to drastically reduce its military presence in Europe from two corps down to two divisions and supporting elements and commands in Germany and one undersized brigade in Italy. This is consistent with the lack of a Soviet threat. Yet the question remained of what the role should be for the forces that remained. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, or even the new Russia attacking Europe, many questioned and argued the role of US forces in Europe.
As the Balkan crisis evolved, Europe proved itself incapable of meeting its commitments as outlined in the strategic concept of 1991. Its inability to politically 5 resolve the crisis forced NATO, under the authority of the United Nations (UN), to respond militarily. Yet Europe's ability to provide a military response to the Balkan's crisis was unenviable. The US initially wished to remain neutral in the crisis, but as reality proved Europe incapable, the US role increased. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, NATO launched its Implementation Force (IFOR) of more than 60,000 personnel, many of whom where Americans from the First Armored Division stationed in Germany. Therefore, the lack of a European military response capability identified the need for a US military presence in Europe.
With a new strategic concept in 1999 more focused on current threat realities, 6 NATO continued to adapt from the Cold War structure into one that could provide European stability, whether through activities within its borders or without. However, the need for the US military presence in Europe was again identified with NATO's military response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the same year that three former Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO. 7 However, the fact that Europe, under the auspices of the EU, took over the Bosnia mission in December 2005 is an indicator that Europe is moving in the right direction.
With Bosnia and Kosovo as ongoing missions, and NATO continuing to focus on missions associated with its strategic concept of 1999, the world was turned upside down on 11 September of 2001 (9/11) when terrorists attacked American soil, the first large scale attack on Americans and their interests within their own territory since Pearl Harbor. Subsequent to these attacks, President George W. Bush launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT), much of which was focused in areas well beyond NATO's borders and areas of interest. Once again, the role of American troops in Europe was brought into question. With the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in October 2001, the US found that its forces in Europe were not that great of a factor in executing OEF. When Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched in early 2003, the US began to see its military forces stretched almost to capacity, particularly with several of its troops tied up in the Balkans. 8 It could not afford to remain engaged in the Balkans to the level it currently was and execute the GWoT. The role of the US armed forces in transatlantic security as defined by events following 9/11 is the topic of this paper.
The paper will proceed with the intent of finding a response to the central question of this paper which is: "What is the role of the US armed forces in transatlantic security?" The conclusions that will be drawn are based on three initial possible theories: "US forces will continue to play an integral role in NATO, but will shift from a more tactical role to a more strategic and operation role to assist Europe in the development of its own capabilities, as well as to keep a strategic and political influence in Europe via NATO"; or "US forces will retain an active, yet obscure role in NATO in order to counter the influence of the European Union (EU) on NATO and the transatlantic relationship"; and finally "US interests have shifted since the beginning of the GWoT to areas outside of mainstream Europe. Because of this and the EU's strengthening capabilities in security and defense, the US role in transatlantic security will become increasingly diminished."
The paper will proceed by first exploring the transformation of the US armed forces since 9/11 and the new role it has taken on. This will be followed by a similar exploration into the NATO transformation. Drawing on conclusions from the two previous articles in this series and the discussion herein, the paper then concludes by answering the central question.
Transformation
A Lighter, More Adaptable Force
With a changing global security environment and lessons learned following Operation DESERT STORM and the US response to Kosovo in 1999 (Task Force HAWK), senior leaders realized that the current organization of the US Army was no longer modeled to respond to current threats. The armed forces, but more particularly the Army, were still designed around a Cold War threat. A serious need was identified that would shift the Army organization from the Cold War Army to the contemporary-threat Army. With the beginning of the GWoT and the opening of fronts in Afghanistan and later Iraq, the need to develop a more flexible force became increasingly important. The US is a nation at war. This is a prolonged conflict and that has driven the US to make changes to its force and also to re-look the tools that it uses. The US Army must be able to adapt and to be agile. It must be aware. Most importantly, it must have flexible organizations in order to provide Combatant Commanders versatile land power.
With this intent, the Army transformation began in earnest and is well underway. The details of the transformation are well known to many Army personnel and will not be discussed here. The concept to understand is that the new force is based on a brigade-sized modular unit capable of deploying to cover a range of missions and without the need of hierarchical support like that which existed within the divisions of the Cold War. The intent and challenge behind the transformation is to provide Combatant Commanders the ability to mix and match capabilities more quickly and creatively. The purpose, therefore, of the transformation was to create units that are more relevant for Combatant Commanders that are agile, adaptive, and versatile.
Reduction of US Forces in Europe
Just as the US Army transformation just discussed is being driven in a large part by the changing world security environment, so too is the positioning of US military forces throughout the world. Positioning of US military forces during the Cold War was clearly a function of the Soviet threat, which is why there was such a large presence in the European theater, and in particular in Germany which would have most likely been the front line battlefield of a war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Following the break up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the US reduced its forces in Germany by a significant number. United States Army Europe (USREUR) went from a strength of about 213,000 soldiers in 1990 to around 122,000 in 1992, then to an estimated 65,000 by 1995.
The 1995 levels remained relatively stable. Yet as the security environment emerged into how we know it today (and it continues to emerge and evolve), the necessity of having so many units in Europe was questioned. US European Command (EUCOM), as the primary strategic planning element for the EUCOM Area of Operations (AOR), assessed where the threats where and the relevancy of its forces in Europe. 9 For example, the threats assessed by EUCOM include but are not limited to: rise in corruption and instability; rise of Islamic extremism; acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); negative shifting opinion toward the US, primarily due to our war in Afghanistan & Iraq; and neglect and disinterest by the world.
EUCOM's AOR force structure is still based on a bi-polar environment and although the US closed a lot of installations at the end of the Cold War as already indicated, 84% of EUCOM forces are still concentrated in Western Europe. However, in the last 13 years, EUCOM has conducted more than 90 Joint Chiefs of Staff directed (JCS) peace operations, interventions, support to humanitarian assistance operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and out of area support to CENTCOM for combat and peace enforcement. Of these operations, 34 occurred in Balkan states, 24 in Iraq, three in Levant, 30 in Africa, and only two in Western Europe. EUCOM and the US military determined that transformation must continue to gain access to forward basing and training areas to increase operational reach, provide influence to NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants and other allies, and establish a stabilizing presence in nearby ungoverned regions. Because of the location of current threats as well as the location of the majority of EUCOM missions, it is becoming increasingly challenging to address the threats where they are. To address this problem, EUCOM's forces and presence will be more forward deployed and it will increase its use of rotational forces, using an array of Main Operating Bases (MOB), Forward Operating Sites (FOS), Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), Prepositioning Sites (PPS), and Training Locations (TL).
For obvious reasons, US military forces cannot be stationed in most of the regional hot spots. The sites previously discussed help alleviate this challenge. The other aspect is shifting personnel. The figures in Table 1 illustrate the shifts in US military presence in the EUCOM
| Navy | Army | Air Force | ||||
| Previous | New | Previous | New | Previous | New | |
| Military | 13,800 | 8,000 | 62,000 | 28,000 | 29,100 | 27,500 |
| Civilian | 1,300 | 1,400 | 14,000 | 8,000 | 3,000 | 2,800 |
| Bases | 77 | 66 | 234 | 88 | 203 | 161 |
| Dependents | 12,500 | 9,500 | 84,000 | 36,000 | 30,800 | 30,500 |
AOR. The Navy and the Air Force remain relatively the same. However, they have been and are being repositioned to better address and react to the threat and conflicts. For example, the US Navy 6th have consolidated and instead of two entities, one in the United Kingdom and one in Italy, are now one entity in Italy. Additionally, in the case of the Air Force, their long-term goal is to permanently station its F-16 fighters currently at Spangdahlem, Germany to Incirlik, Turkey. However, the political climate in Turkey is such that the US will not be assured of the ability to carry out missions. In the interim the US intends to increase Fighter rotations to Eastern Europe and Africa in order to gain access to better training areas, interact with our allies and friends, and socialize a move to Turkey, or, if failing that, find an alternate suitable location for its fighters.
The significant changes come in the Army. As noted in the table, the Army is reducing is force strength by 61%, with both division going back to the United States and leaving only one Stryker Brigade in Germany and SETAF in Italy, along with other supporting units. In addition, the composition is changing and the location of the Army presence is shifting east and south. For example, SETAF will become a modularized brigade with multiple battalions (more than the current two), thus increasing its strength. Additionally, an Eastern European Task Force (EETAF) will be created that will include a rotational brigade that will rotate from the US for six-month rotations. EETAF, to be located in Constanta, Romania, is scheduled to start rotations beginning July 2007. This site will provide not only sea port access for projection, but improvements in air field infrastructure will also allow air projection, thus allowing flexibility in the type of units that rotate into EETAF.
To summarize the end state of both the Army's transformation to a modular brigade-based system and the shifting of the US presence in Europe to the east and south, the US is becoming more expeditionary and mobile. The threat during the Cold War allowed the US to focus on one region of the world and provide projection capabilities to only that region. However, as the Cold Wad ended and new threats developed, the need to refocus its forces in other global regions forced the US military, and in particular the Army, to reconsider its force structure, unit locations and projection capabilities in order to provide the tools needed to address the threats, whether through preventive peacetime engagement and partnership building, preemptive military actions, or reactive engagement to enemy actions.
NATO Transformation
As evidenced by recent European and American missions in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East, addressing today's security challenges requires a wide range of capabilities that must be deployed and sustained on a global scale. The likely area of operations for both European and US forces no longer resides inside the Euro-Atlantic area, as has already been addressed. Military forces that can quickly protect and advance national interests both at home and abroad are essential. This is why the US is transforming its military as previously discussed. However, conclusions from recent and current operations is that the US and European militaries are not configured to operate well collectively outside NATO's traditional sphere of operations. European militaries, in particular, whose forces where designed for the defense of Europe rather than the conduct of expeditionary operations, have struggled in recent years to respond adequately to the changing security environment. 10
Another aspect impacting transatlantic security integration and cooperation is that as the US and Europe confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century, they are once again at odds over security issues in and beyond Europe. This gap in vision between Europe and the US unfavorably impacts the transatlantic defense relationship.
This gap in vision coincides with economic and technological developments that make the goal of closer cooperation on security matters more and more difficult to achieve, even though the current security developments make the need for enhanced transatlantic defense cooperation more imperative than ever. At the same time, and as previously discussed, the US has recently embarked on a radical reorganization and transformation of not only its military organization, but also its resources and capabilities. This has all been done at a speed and of a scope that current NATO member countries' budgets are in no position to match any time soon. As a result, Europe's transformation ambitions remain subject to budgetary constrains that run counter to the continent's significant potential for innovation and improvements in its military contributions to the transatlantic alliance. 11
Compounding the difference in attitudes and the need to close the military gap between the European NATO allies and the US has become more, not less, pressing in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The dominant role of the US in OEF exposed the capabilities gap once again and underlined the need for improved interoperability, including the allocation of new funds to defense-oriented projects. If the US and European forces in the future are to undertake joint military operations, in as well as beyond Europe, then a serious and committed approach toward solving current tensions cannot be postponed. However, current conflicting impulses and pressures characterize the global environment for defense cooperation. 12
New impetus for reform and transformation has come from the continuing process of European integration. With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European approach to defense changed fundamentally following the European decision to create a foreign and defense policy pillar for the EU. 13
NATO transformation began in reality with the London Declaration in 1990. This essentially changed the NATO approach to security from one that was defensive and reactive to one that is more proactive and focused on spreading security and stability. At this time, the hand of friendship was extended to the east, and has been subsequently extended to the south to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East in 1994, and more recently to the Gulf Region during the Istanbul Summit in June of 2004. 14
Another factor prompting change was the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo that underscored the growing capabilities gap between US and European forces. This realization prompted not only EU action 15 , but NATO action as well. 16 Following the Kosovo campaign NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve their capabilities to confront the new security challenges. Yet Europe faces many of the challenges discussed above in financing and politically supporting the DCI.
Three years after the DCI was launched, and realizing that perhaps its goals were unrealistic, NATO launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), which is essentially a streamlined version of the DCI. Despite good intentions, the PCC has not yet produced the necessary changes to European capabilities. However, two key aspects from the Prague summit have proven positive. The first was the creation of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The ACT is designed to infuse transformational thinking into NATO and national force planning and is tasked with bringing greater coherence to the European defense planning process. One key aspect of the ACT is the establishment of "Centers of Excellence." These are nationally funded centers that provide opportunities for the alliance and its partners to improve interoperability and capabilities, test and develop doctrine, and validate concepts through experimentation. This is why the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal falls under the ACT command. 17
A second positive outcome of the Prague Summit was the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). In September 2002, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, put forward a proposal to create a NATO rapid reaction force. The launching of the NRF initiative was announced several months later, at the Prague Summit. It is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations. These include evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting as an initial entry force' for larger, follow-on forces. At present, the force numbers about 17,000 troops. It is set to reach full operational capability in October 2006, when it will number some 25,000 troops and be able to start to deploy after five days notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if re-supplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving engine of NATO's military transformation. 18 This force is also designed to help European countries build agility into their force planning process and move them away from reliance on US or British rapid deployment forces. This is why the participation of the US in the NRF is primarily limited to enablers, such as strategic air lift and other capabilities that enable the NRF to succeed. This is exactly what the US should want: NRF success with mainly European participation. Hence, when the NRF conducted its final validation exercise in June of this year in Cabo Verde, the forces actually participating in the exercise were mostly European.
To summarize, NATO's intentions to transform into a more capable and relevant force are well placed. However, due to a lack of financing and resources, which is perhaps a function of the European cultural mentality towards war over the last 60 years, NATO's intentions are greatly inhibited. The US is trying to influence change in NATO and support it where it can. The US realizes that NATO transformation will benefit it in its GWoT and in achieving its national security goals as outlined in its NSS, and in proving for not only US national security, but global security as well. In a globalized world the US national security is very much linked to global security, and hence European or transatlantic security. NATO needs the US to help it transform, and the US needs NATO to facilitate its GWoT. However, the US will not and is not waiting for Europe to catch up. Yet catching up is exactly what Europe needs to do. 19
Conclusions
Considering the shifting priorities and the evolving global security environment, it is no wonder the US military is not only redefining itself, but also redefining its role in transatlantic security. It is no longer the backbone of NATO against a Soviet threat. Based on the discussion in the previous two parts of this series and the discussion this paper has presented about US Army transformation, US military force reductions in Europe, and EU capabilities, it is the conclusion of this paper is that transatlantic security has a new post 9/11 meaning. It is related with global security. While providing global security, the transatlantic security is enhanced, if not guaranteed. This is based on a global environment. The US military role in NATO is still very much alive and important. However, the military's direct role in European security is extremely diminished, as shown by the small number of operations it has conducted in Europe and by the reduction in its forces in Europe.
This is not to say, however, that the US military does not have a role in transatlantic security. It does. However it is an indirect role. The national security interests of the US are based more on its own security now than it was during the Cold War. Yet the security of Europe is very much linked to and will impact the security of the US. At the same time, the threats to both the US and Europe typically fall outside the traditional NATO boundaries, as evidenced by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. These threats are being pursued by the US through its GWoT and other initiatives within regions at risk of producing global insecurity. The US very much wants NATO's help in these efforts since a secure world also means a secure Europe. However, the US will still carry on its missions with or without NATO.
Obviously it will be easier with NATO. This is why the transatlantic relationship is still vital to the US. Yet the US priority today is not the European theater. It is the global theater and the global threats that impact US national security. The role therefore of the US armed forces in transatlantic security is today a function of actions on the global scale, which makes its role in European security an indirect role, yet, very much a part of transatlantic security since global security impacts European security as well.
In summary, NATO does not need the US armed forces to provide European security, except perhaps in the case of high intensity conflicts. Yet the US needs NATO in the global fight against terrorism and against any other global threat. Similarly, NATO needs the US to fight global threats that could eventually impact European security. Therefore, today there is not a role for the US military in transatlantic security. Its role is in global security with transatlantic residual effects. In terms of the initial hypotheses developed at the beginning of the paper, this conclusion is a compilation of two of them: "US forces will continue to play an integral role in NATO, but will shift from a more tactical role to a more strategic and operational role to assist Europe in the development of its own capabilities, as well as to keep a strategic and political influence in Europe via NATO"; and "US interests have shifted since the beginning of the GWoT to areas outside of mainstream Europe. Because of this and the EU's strengthening capabilities in security and defense, the US role in transatlantic security will become increasingly diminished." All positioning of US military forces in Europe is to support the global security role the US armed forces have assumed following 9/11, and the same holds true for most of the US military actions within Europe, and around the globe for that matter. Finally, it should be reiterated that the NATO partnership is very much alive between the armed forces of not only the member countries, by partnership countries as well. Even though the US focus has shifted, these partnerships remain vital and will continue. However, the US will not wait for the partnership if there are threats that must be addressed. To do so would risk the deterioration of US and global security.
1. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered, (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 17.BACK
5. It should be noted here that since the end of WWII, Europe has been more focused on political resolution to conflicts that the US. This is in part due to their fear of war following two World Wars on their soil, as well as their lack of ability to respond militarily. The later response has been provided by the US, whose tradition since the end of WWII is that of military force to resolve political issues.BACK
6. Such as proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as terrorism. BACK
7. Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. BACK
8. At the time of the attack, 95% of the First Infantry Division in Germany was either in the Balkans or in the reintegration phase following a Balkans deployment. The only unit it was capable of deploying to OIF was TF 1-63, an armored Task Force of battalion size under the command and control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Italy.BACK
9. All information on EUCOM's transitioning came from an interview with CDR Mark Innes, US Navy, J8, Transformation, HQ USEUCOM, conducted 29 Dec 2005 in Stuttgart, Germany. All information in this article came from an unclassified version of a brief presented during the interview. BACK
10. Robin Niblett et. al., "Achieving an Effective Global Military Capability for the Alliance: The Need for European Defense Integration," in Test of Will, Tests of Efficacy: Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, 2005 Report, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 38.BACK
11. Simon Serafty, Project Director, The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Community: Final Report of the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, January 2003), p. 3.BACK
13. For further discussion on this aspect, refer to Part II of this series, published in the FAO Journal in December 2005.BACK
14. Jonathan Parish, Remaining Relevant, in , NATO Review: Examining NATO's Transformation, Special Issue, Spring 2005, pp. 6-7.BACK
15. Refer to Part II of this series for more on the EU actions.BACK
18. NATO Response Force, information available online at http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html. BACK
19. Whether or not the EU can make this possible was addressed in Part II of this series.BACK