U.S. GLOBAL POWER AND FUTURE
MIDDLE EAST CHALLENGES
Security Threats and Alternatives to Confront and Subdue Them
by Major (P) David D. Wisyanski, U.S. Army
The United States' (U.S.) strategic advantage of global power will face more
challenges in the Middle East than any other region in the future. Current U.S. interests
in the Middle East are central to its national security strategy and likely will remain so for
the next decade. Consequently, as the U.S. continues its military transformation to
protect these interests, it probably will require mid-course corrections to deal with
threats peculiar to the region that will evolve in this time period. While these threats
could be directed against the U.S. homeland, they more likely will be perpetrated within
the Middle East itself . . . . . where potential targets of opportunity offer the advantages
of operational proximity and fewer coordination complexities.
This will be the case as the U.S. continues prosecuting the War on Terror while
securing Middle Eastern oil resources for its own and the world economy, resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and building democracy in Iraq. Most challenges will come in the
form of state and non-state actors employing asymmetric strategies such as terrorism
and, to a lesser extent, WMD tactics that may be emboldened by the development of
improved capabilities. Motivations for these actions will come from perceptions of
unequivocal backing of Israel at the expense of Palestinian Arabs, exacerbated by a
protracted occupation of Iraq, and underpinned by seemingly unjust economic
disparities and undesirable cultural influences.
The U.S. will continue to be the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world.
Its strong economic position in large part will be attributable to its superiority in scientific
research, technological know-how, and capital holdings. This position also will be the
case because the world will continue to take its consumer trend cues from the U.S. as it
has for decades. Hence, the U.S. will continue to export its ideas to other nations who
in turn will attempt to develop their economies through manufacturing with assistance
from the U.S. market.
However, it is probable that U.S. global economic leadership will not benefit all
equally and may be a cause for political violence. So, while the global community's
prosperity becomes more widespread by virtue of U.S. economic power, the world also
will look toward the U.S. as the guarantor of the global economy, compelling it to be the
guardian of its secure functioning and equitable distribution. Being positioned at the
epicenter of the international political economy in this way will oblige the U.S. to
maintain its mantle of leadership of international security.
Nature of Conflict
In contravention to current strategic thought, the U.S. likely will not be challenged
by a "near-peer competitor" within the next decade. Other nations will not seek to
compete with the U.S. for global political-economic primacy, but instead will try to
leverage, or profit from, U.S. leadership of the global political economy and international
security. This leverage would be made possible by mutual commercial ties and shared
political interests, compelling the U.S. to remain engaged in global security. Even
China, thought to be the likeliest future rival to U.S. power, seems to be on a strategic
path toward leverage of, rather than competition with, the American economy.
Moreover, its current security focus is regional rather than global, i.e., Taiwan. A
revanchist Russia is less likely as it continues to strive for internal stability and
economic growth. 1 Europe also is an unlikely candidate as it
will seek to match U.S. economic power at the expense of its defense-related GDP.
Most European countries will continue to rely on U.S. security guarantees via NATO
despite disagreements over Iraq. Thus, conflict will not be the result of another peer
nation, rival empire, or political-military bloc seeking to supplant U.S. global leadership.
Future conflict will emerge from state and non-state actors who perceive
themselves as not benefiting from or culturally suborned by U.S.-led globalism. The
U.S. will remain the world's most materially abundant and culturally sophisticated
society and likely be envied or disdained for being so. Some of the world's
societies/groups will believe they have been deprived of expected benefits from U.S.
global political and economic leadership and resort to violence as a means of redress.
Consequently, the U.S. will be viewed both as the solution to and the cause of
instability.
Seeds of social discontent will be sown as nations are unable to satisfy material
needs for their populations. This discontent likely will be expressed through grievances
about economic parity or cultural marginalization, and possibly vented through political
radicalism. Islamic religious extremism will have a central role in fanning the flames of
conflict, but not to the degree whereby politically radicalized religious groups/nations will
seek to superimpose Sharia law on others. Islam will not be the new monolithic threat
to Western society as was Communism in the 20th Century, the Al Qaeda
vision of a revived Islamic Caliphate notwithstanding. 2 However, Islamist-based
movements could find fertile ground within Arab/Muslim societies that believe they are
not equally benefiting from the global economy. These threats could be given energy
by religion--especially radical religious leaders working to convince people that moral
aberrations are at the root of socio-economic inequities. 3 Thus, Islam probably will serve
more as a catalyst rather than a foundation for conflict.
Fundamentally, the world system will move toward secularism or pantheism
wherein religion will be seen either as a hindrance to, or irrelevant in maintaining, a
stable world order. Worldwide Islamic radicalism more likely will be viewed as a
nuisance to be dealt with periodically, especially when it threatens the stability of
Islamic nations predisposed to U.S. interests. These nations will be more prone to
cultural "purification" movements, such as that espoused by Osama Bin Laden for
Saudi Arabia, which of late has included both anti-government and anti-American
violence. Perceived successes or nobility in the cause may spawn similar initiatives in
other areas of the Islamic World.
Attempts to neutralize these initiatives will take different forms within the nations
where they emerge. For the most part, their containment will be carried out less
through persecution and more through molding public opinion as to the futility of
religious extremism in meeting the economic needs or maintaining the social order of
society. Political leaders and societal elites --to include the intelligentsia--either will
attempt to suppress or to co-opt radically politicized religious movements to the extent
where their impact will be contained locally.
This kind of political and social pressure will coincide with, or be reinforced by,
local security and law enforcement measures. Nevertheless, host-nation governments
may not necessarily control religiously inspired movements from operating globally, thus
providing de-facto sanctuary. Saudi Arabia serves as a current example where internal
political schisms hinder its security forces from reigning in extremist groups' lethal and
non-lethal terrorist activities directed abroad. 4
The U.S. and Future Middle East Threats
The U.S. will continue to have the predominant geopolitical influence in the Middle
East region in the future. This will be on account of its continued interest in access to
Middle East oil to sustain both its domestic needs as well as the global economy, and
on account of its commitment to Israel's security and seeing through its effort to build a
stable democracy in Iraq. These regional interests will become strategic centers of
gravity for the U.S. in maintaining its global power. The world in general, and the
Middle East in particular, will have begun to base their relationships with the U.S. on its
ability to maintain both its historical role and future commitment to these issues, as they
will see the U.S. as holding in balance the global economy and international security.
In maintaining its role and fulfilling its commitment, the U.S. yet again will
have to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict being the core challenge to its overall national
security strategy. If the U.S. fails to bring about a permanent resolution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict that includes Palestinian statehood, it will exacerbate terrorist threats not
only regionally in Israel and Iraq, but also domestically in the American homeland.
Bringing the Peace Process to a satisfactory close would have the benefit of removing
the historical Causus Belli for most Middle Eastern-based extremist
groups who would perpetrate these threats.
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Symbol of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
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The Arab and Muslim Worlds perceive Israel and Iraq as interrelated interests for
the U.S. Its involvement in Iraq will continue to be viewed primarily as the U.S.
preserving Israel's existence, and secondarily as the U.S. superimposing secular
Western culture on the Muslim World. This perception will continue to be a source of
cultural alienation and regional friction which underpins terrorism directed against the
U.S. at home and abroad. 5 The threat especially will be
acute against the U.S. presence in Iraq. The U.S. military footprint there will continue to
be significant and will serve as an inviting target for those who believe its presence is a
cause of political, economic, and social harm.
Should Iraq emerge a stable democracy, it probably still will rely on the U.S. for
security guarantees--if not for internal stability, then for protection against external
threats such as conventional and asymmetric ones emanating from Iran. Those in the
Arab and Muslim World who believe their societies are being degraded by Western
influences or believe their individual lot is diminished by Western presence and
exploitation will be ripe for recruitment into extremist groups. These groups will find the
U.S. military forces in Iraq an easier and more lucrative target upon which to vent their
frustrations than the civilian population in the U.S. homeland. U.S. forces in Iraq will be
easier targets in that geographically they are in the vicinity of where most of these
groups form and operate. Moreover, attacking U.S. military targets in the region, as
symbols of U.S. cultural encroachment, will have a greater impact as it will be viewed as
driving out unwelcome outsiders. Such attacks will pay off internationally as well in that
soldiers and, in some cases, their in-country military contractor support structure are
more acceptable targets than are innocent civilians.
If Iraq's transition to democracy becomes protracted, it could become a strategic
liability especially regarding terrorism directed toward U.S. forces. Iraq potentially may
become a "strategic Dien Bien Phu" for the U.S. While the U.S. intended Iraq to
become a new strategic base from which to preempt would-be terrorists and transform
their state sponsors/supporters, it instead has drawn into it those whom the U.S.
intended to deter from attacking its homeland. Thus, while democracy may internally
stabilize Iraqi society, extremists who affiliate themselves with regional jihadist networks
may consider driving the U.S. from Iraq a more noble task than inflicting harm on
innocent Americans at home. 6
Increasing the incentive for disaffected Arabs and Muslims to attack Americans in
Iraq would be the perceived lack of a just settlement for the Palestinians in the Middle
East Peace Process (MEPP). The continuing escalation of violence between the
Israelis and the Palestinians is having a spillover effect in Iraq. Arabs from other
nations show their solidarity with the Palestinians by fighting a perceived co-belligerent
with Israel in the conflict. There is no evidence that this would not be the case
throughout the next decade should the status quo remain static.
While a protracted resolution to the Peace Process and democracy building in Iraq
are logically-deduced challenges, the prospect of interstate and intrastate conflicts as a
result of socio-economic inequities seems incongruous by virtue of the region's oil
wealth. However, with the perception that equal distribution of wealth is the panacea to
satiating domestic contentment, friction is inevitable. Perceived inequities in wealth
distribution will be its cause.
This friction will be acute in an infant Palestinian state, Egypt, Jordan, and the
Arabian Peninsula. The Palestinian case is obvious. Should they have a new state,
Palestinians will experience economic growing pains by virtue of a high population
density and the lack of investment incentives. 7 Currently, Palestinians in Gaza
and the West Bank receive their economic sustenance from expatriate remittances
from abroad and migrant labor opportunities in Israel. After achieving statehood the
latter opportunities will diminish, the expectation being that meaningful employment will
be available within the new state. In addition, Israeli domestic labor politics, not to
mention security concerns, will demand it.
The Palestinian's expectations will be high and, thus, they will be disillusioned if
either wealthy Palestinians abroad or other oil-rich Arab nations fail to invest in or
provide economic aid to their young state. In this event, the Palestinians would have
two choices: turn inward and seek socio-economic justice through Islamist movements,
such as the current day Hamas, or pursue an external guardian.
The likeliest course of action would be turning inward toward an Islamist
movement not only for socio-economic redress, but also to counter corrupt and
ineffective internal political leadership. Doing so could cause further regional instability
in the future. One scenario would be Palestine's alienation from other regional states or
the global system as a whole. A Palestinian state probably would be viewed as an
extremist society by virtue of its government being a theocracy having little value or
utility to the world system. If backed into such a corner, as it were, such a state may
turn to terrorism to achieve its aims. Inevitably, this course of action would impel the
Israelis to deter any would-be threats to it through renewed incursions or occupations.
In the other course of action, a regional hegemon could emerge whose legitimacy
would be built upon assuming a mantle as the Palestinians' guardian. In order to do so,
this hegemon will have to achieve either strategic superiority to or parity with Israel as
well as develop the ability to intimidate the U.S. Both capabilities would have to be
achieved through asymmetric means in that attaining parity with the U.S. and Israel in
conventional forces would be formidable. Hence, pursuit of WMD capabilities and
supporting terrorism by proxy would be more likely courses of action.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq was suspected of moving toward this kind of strategy last
year, but since then evidence has revealed its objectives were limited to regime
maintenance. On the other hand, Iran fits this pattern currently. It is carrying out a
strategy of encouraging and assisting terrorist groups such as Hizballah in Lebanon and
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization in Israel all the while pursuing a more
capable, ergo more lethal, WMD capability than had Iraq. It likely will remain upon this
course if its only impediments continue to be current IAEA inspections and a restive
younger generation demanding political liberalization.
Egypt, Jordan, and the Arabian Peninsula are less ostentatious threats of any
sort, but potential future challenges nevertheless. These areas will face socio-
economic challenges of a different kind. Theirs will involve internal security and
stability.
Egypt and Jordan suffer from stratified societies where wealth is either
concentrated in the hands of a few (Egypt) or in the hands of a predominant ethic group
(Jordan). Egypt has had a latent insurgency in the south and festering urban discontent
over the lack of economic opportunity. This insurgency has fed off the economic
inequities caused by government elites who have retained the nation's wealth.
Moreover, it has found ideological strength in radical political Islam.
Both Jordan's economic backbone and economic liability is its Palestinian
community that numbers close to 70 percent of its population. This group largely
represents the wealth holders and the welfare recipients. Thus, the indigenous
Jordanian population has expectations that Palestinian statehood will enable its own
prosperity. Indigenous Jordanians believe they will be able to run the nation's
businesses and alleviate its budgetary and infrastructure strains with a
Palestinian exodus. These expectations may be unrealistic in that a majority of those in
the Palestinian community may remain in Jordan where they have prospered financially
or have received generous welfare. Unrealized, these expectations could result in
future internal instability of a key U.S. ally in the region.
Even though oil-rich, the Arabian Peninsula also may suffer internal challenges in
that wealth is not distributed evenly now and will be less so when oil supplies become
more depleted. Grievances resulting from such inequities also may find their outlet in
politicized Islam that threatens regimes and U.S. presence in the region. An unresolved
MEPP and unresolved instability in Iraq also will fuel these grievances.
These kinds of challenges have been manifested in Saudi Arabia recently by anti-
government oppositionists who increasingly are being recruited by terrorist groups or
jihadist networks. The motivations of these oppositionists include frustration with
worsening economic opportunities apparent in the GDP of Saudi Arabia's young adult
population being only a third of that of its parents' generation. Motivations also include
disgust with the corruption of the Saud Dynasty and its association with U.S. political,
military, economic and, by default, cultural influence in the region. Inflaming this
frustration and disgust is the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the recent abuses by U.S.
forces of Iraqi detainees. Hence, an unresolved situation in both the MEPP and the
stabilization of Iraq is likely to fertilize recruitment of anti-government oppositionists,
such as those in Saudi Arabia, into terrorist or extremist groups which could challenge
U.S. regional interests in the future.
Strategic Choices for the U.S.
In the event that a just Middle East peace and a stable democracy in Iraq are not
achieved, U.S. interests will become an object of hostility at home and abroad. The
U.S. could face both asymmetric WMD threats and terrorist attacks domestically and/or
against its presence regionally. These threats would necessitate both a homeland
defense capability and the ability to preemptively strike or intervene in the region to
protect American citizens. However, preemption only will have credibility either when a
verifiably clear and present danger exists, or when a cluster of regional states believes
its security is threatened. If these conditions are met, it is likely that regional states will
either invite or at least cooperate with U.S. military interventions as was the case in the
Gulf War. The former case likely will come with the condition that an intervention be
under the auspices of the U.N. or other coalition arrangement.
Homeland defense vis-a-vis Middle East-based threats will require a reorientation
of the U.S. Armed Forces. Rather than being solely designed around power projection,
military forces also will need to fulfill security requirements at home. These security
requirements, to be satisfied, need more than the current evolving intelligence
collection, coordination, evaluations, alert declarations, and notifications functions of the
Department of Homeland Security. The operational dimension that appears to be
missing exists in the Department of Defense (DoD) through a statutory, albeit
neglected, mandate to train for and carryout domestic security operations--a capability
overlooked in the structural changes made to address homeland security in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks.
Lead responsibility for homeland security--which includes countering domestic
terrorism--had belonged to the DoD since its formation in 1947 and belonged to the
War Department before then. Despite domestic security being within the scope of the
DoD's constitutional mandate, there currently seems to be no appreciable institutional
emphasis and corresponding readiness. Its role in domestic security appears to have
atrophied into a secondary and, in some cases, a tertiary concern. Elevating its priority
may become imperative. Doing so would require the U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) to reprioritize its missions and roles from primarily a force provider for
power projection to becoming a "domestic theater command" for Reserve Component
(RC) land forces under the overall combatant command of the U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM). This reorientation also may require the National Guard to reassume its
traditional domestic missions and roles at the expense of its current function of
reinforcing Active Component (AC) forces' overseas expeditions.
Historically, FORSCOM and its long past predecessor, the Continental Army
Command (CONARC), was responsible for carrying out the DoD mission of homeland
security. In 1973 FORSCOM inherited this role from the CONARC which involved
homeland defense through preparation, and command and control, of Continental U.S.
Armies (CONUSA). CONUSAs not only oversaw the training of RC forces, but also
acted as their controlling headquarters in domestic operations as necessary. 8
In the future, reinforcing border security, protecting domestic infrastructure and
government facilities, and responding to civil crises may become equally as critical as
FORSCOM's current priority of providing ready forces for contingencies abroad.
More consistent in homeland defense has been the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) in its mission and role of protecting U.S. air space. However,
NORAD needs better synergy with civilian aviation should Middle East-based terrorists
attempt a repeat of the 9/ll attacks. Additionally, it ought to begin a transition in
becoming the executive agent for the National Missile Defense program. While WMD
delivery means of terrorist groups or states more than likely will be asymmetric, ballistic
missile delivery capabilities also will be in the realm of possibility. Iran could be capable
of intercontinental ballistic missile reach to at least Europe if its program is left
unchecked.
The
Iranian Shihab-3 Missile |
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The U.S. also will need to explore critically how a smaller, more technologically-
oriented conventional military capability can easily transition to and effectively carry out
long-term occupations. Although a large-scale war is possible if a regional hegemon
with a formidable conventional capability emerges, its likelihood is less probable. As
stated earlier, an emerging hegemon probably would resort to more unconventional
means. The U.S. military will need to develop forces of expeditionary and
interventionist nature to counter these means. However, while these forces will need to
be light, agile, and potent enough to carry out this role, they still will need the capability
to occupy and stabilize an invaded nation should an operation of the magnitude of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) be a future requirement. 9 It has been argued
that the Marine Corps already owns the expeditionary role; but, doctrinally and force
package-wise, occupying and stabilizing an invaded country over a mid- or long-term
would overburden them in terms of current strength, organization, and capabilities.
The former Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stated the need to develop
mobile strike force packages which can be quickly deployed and yet lethal against most
opponents. This concept he envisioned was the Army's proposal to the greater
transformation program of the U.S. military. STRYKER brigades were to be able to
fulfill the roles envisioned for the Army's transformation. Nevertheless, legacy
capabilities such as those within Army airborne, Marine expeditionary, and joint special
operations forces would still be in demand especially when threats involve smaller,
more dispersed entities such as terrorist cells and sanctuaries in remote, rugged, or
built-up areas. 10
On the other hand, there will be situations that demand larger, heavier forces that
not only are able to quickly deploy by air and sea, but also are fluid enough to transition
from conventional combat to the stabilization and support tasks of an occupation. Joint
operational doctrine as outlined in Joint Pub 3.0, then, will remain relevant. But it will
require both a political will and a military commitment to organize, train, and employ a
force sizable and agile enough to carry it out. This will be critical especially should the
U.S. consider invasions along the lines of Iraq in other Middle Eastern countries.
U.S. Military Doctrine and Capabilities for Middle East Commitments
So far, the Army's current course of transformation builds upon the concepts
contained in its field manuals FM-1 (The Army) and FM-3.0 (Operations) through its
modular structure of "Brigade Combat Team Units of Action" that enable commitment of
quickly deployable and lethal forces to trouble spots. This move has been accelerated
in part to provide more troops for occupation duties in Iraq and Afghanistan without
having to increase the Army's size. These kinds of units will be agile enough to strike at
elusive terrorist groups operating in those areas currently and elsewhere in the Middle
East in the future. The goal is to transform the Army to this structure completely in the
next few years. However, due to a lack of light infantry and engineers, this structure
appears not to have the capability to carry out the constabulary duties and
reconstruction activities involved with nation building. These capabilities along with
military police are among the most essential elements necessary to carry out an
occupation which could likely occur in another country in the region in the not-too-
distant future.
U.S. Army soldiers prepare to enter
a house in
Mosul |
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In this regard, the strategic lesson of Iraq has not been the validation of Army FM-
1's "Decisive Action" as a military doctrine in quickly defeating battlefield opponents.
Rather, it has been the absence of operational consolidation as a conceptual
precondition within Joint Pub 3.0's guidance for defining end states and for what
constitutes conflict termination. In other words, audaciously executed military
operations rarely, if ever, intimidate a civilian population into submission. Hence, a
powerful force able to defeat any conventional adversary must be agile enough to
quickly phase into pacifying the population to which it belongs, or from which it receives
support or sustenance. Joint doctrine calls for this capability under the concepts of
postwar Stability and Support Operations, but the joint community has yet to
institutionally embrace its criticality in attaining "Decisive Victory" emphasized in Army
FM-1.
Consider the implications of this disparity using the current trends of anti-
government activity against Arab regimes in the region. These threats could evolve
over the next decade into open challenges against U.S.-friendly governments. The
most harmful scenario impacting U.S. interests would be the fall of a friendly
government whereby extremists emerge as the new leadership. Among the threats to
U.S. and global security could be interrupted oil supplies and sympathy and support for
regional and international terrorist groups. While the U.S. military could quickly seize
the affected country and remove such leadership, rooting out pockets of dispersed
resistance and pacifying the population would demand applying relevant forces,
capabilities, and doctrine.
As the primary broker of a lasting Middle East peace agreement, the U.S. may
need to consider employing its military instrument of power to support diplomatic ends
in a similar pacification environment. Within the scope of a peace agreement, securing
Israeli-Palestinian borders and the political status of Jerusalem through a peacekeeping
mission might be required. An arrangement along the lines of the Multinational Force
and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai may need consideration.
As an alternative, Jerusalem could be placed under the protection of some sort of
international constabulary mission under the auspices of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization (UNTSO). To ensure confidence in maintaining overall
security and stability between Israel and Palestine, a U.N. Chapter Six peacekeeping
mission such as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the
Golan Heights could be placed along the agreed-to borders. Essentially, if military
transformation does not implement changes to acquire capabilities that match doctrine
mentioned above then the U.S. may have to resort to its allies or the international
community for assistance in peace operations.
Conclusion
In maintaining its position as the world's sole superpower, the U.S. likely will
face a multitude of esoteric and unconventional challenges rather than a
quantifiable monolithic threat from a peer competitor. As explained above, being the
hub for the global political economy will place demands and expectations on it from the
international community to facilitate their prosperity and even their protection. If such is
the case, the U.S. surely will remain engaged in the Middle East to sustain its own
domestic as well as the global economy.
In one case, should the U.S. exercise its global leadership and power in achieving
a comprehensive Middle East peace, threats to the U.S. homeland would be reduced
significantly in that the ideological winds which sustain terrorist groups or rogue states
would have less impetus to hold the U.S. responsible for the region's perceived ills. Its
collateral effect would be a more stable Iraq as Arab and Muslim nations would have
incentive to assist the U.S. by clamping down on would-be Muslim extremists and
extremist groups. A price, on the other hand, would include assuring Israel's internal
security concerns while protecting the Palestinians from Israeli incursions. The cost of
doing so might have to include commitment of U.S. forces to tasks requiring doctrine
and capabilities yet to be grasped.
In the final analysis, U.S. global power will encounter threats at home in addition to
those in the Middle East especially if there is no further resolution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict or the probable continuing instability in Iraq. As outlined above, this will leave
the U.S. two courses of action in developing and employing the appropriate kind of
military capabilities to properly address these threats. One is of an expeditionary nature
with sufficient strength to face a conventional regional hegemon while the other is
constabulary in nature, e.g., to maintain a delicate peace between Israel and Palestine,
and to ultimately pacify a politically unstable Iraq. Both capabilities will be necessary to
prevent, subdue, or defeat the most likely threats able to undermine U.S. global
interests in the future--threats that will continue to reside in the Middle East.
Author Bio
Major (P) David D. Wisyanski is an Army Middle East Foreign Area
Officer serving as an Iraq political-military analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Commissioned from the University of Texas at Arlington ROTC program, he holds an
M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. His military
education includes the U.S. Army Field Artillery Officer Basic and Military Intelligence
Officer Advanced Courses. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College and the Royal Jordanian Artillery School.
Endnotes
1. Brian Michael Jenkins. "Redefining the Enemy: The
World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not," Rand Review (Rand Corp,
Spring 2004), p. 19. See also George J. Gilboy's "The Myth Behind China's Miracle,"
Foreign Affairs, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 83, No. 4,
July/August 2004).BACK
2. Jenkins, p. 21; Graham E. Fuller and
Ian O. Lesser. A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, (Rand
Corporation: Greater Middle East Studies Center, 1995), pp. 1 & 84.BACK
3. Oliver Roy. "Changing Patterns among
Radical Islamic Movements," The Brown Journal of World Affairs, (Providence,
RI: Brown University, 1999), pp. 109-111.BACK
4. See Michael Doran's "The Saudi
Paradox," Foreign Affairs, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 83,
No.1, January/February 2004), pp. 35-39.BACK
5. Doran, "Saudi Paradox," pp. 42-44.BACK
6. See Ahmed Hashim's "Iraq's Chaos,
Why the Insurgency Won't Go Away," Boston Review (Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vol. 29, No. 5, October/November 2004).BACK
7. The Gaza Strip has the highest per
capita birth rate in the world.BACK
8. Russell F. Weigley, History of the
United States Army, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967),
pp. 528-529.BACK
9. See Anthony Cordesman's "Four Wars
and Counting: Rethinking the Strategic Meaning of the Iraq War," (Washington D.C.:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1, 2003), p. 6. BACK
10. Cordesman, "Four Wars and
Counting," p. 8.BACK
2005, Foreign Area Officer Association
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