FAOs on the Front Lines: Disaster
Relief
Operations in the Dominican Republic
By Major Jeffrey H. Fargo, USA
Background
Hurricanes threaten the Caribbean every year and Caribbean nations have learned to deal
with them. It seems that about every twenty years a particularly devastating one strikes the
Caribbean. Hurricane David in 1979 was the most recent particularly devastating one until 1998,
when Hurricane Georges struck the Eastern and Northern Caribbean island nations. Hurricane
Georges reached Category V status, the most powerful hurricane, prior to smashing the Eastern
Caribbean and cutting its swath of death and destruction across the Northern Caribbean. After
initially hitting Antigua-Barbuda and St. Kitts and Nevis, the Hurricane continued on its
westward track and shattered Puerto Rico's infrastructure. Not veering from its westward track,
it continued its furious advance across the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, and the Florida
Keys before ending its path of Caribbean destruction.
Hurricane Georges had spent some of its force by the time it reached the Dominican
Republic; however, it still had 120 mile per hour winds and extremely heavy rains, both of which
resulted in a substantial loss of life, a large number of homeless, and a serious damages to its
infrastructure. The Hurricane struck the Dominican Republic on September 22nd.
Its winds severely damaged the southeastern portion of the country as it traversed the island of
Hispaniola in a southeast to northwest direction. It severely damaged the capital, Santo
Domingo, as it moved through the mountainous central region, inundating the southwestern
portion of the country as it continued into the northern part of Haiti.
The final toll of death and destruction in the Dominican Republic was tragic. Over 280
dead and many more injured. Over 45,000 homeless living in temporary shelters. Infrastructure
damage was estimated at over $1.4 billion. Hardest hit were electricity and water systems,
telecommunications, roads and bridges, airports, and seaports. The road network to the rural area
was seriously damaged, with 54 bridges destroyed and 58 more damaged.
U.S. Southern Command's Role in Disaster Relief Operations in the Dominican Republic
The Caribbean lies within the U.S. Southern Command's Area of Operational
Responsibility (AOR), so the disaster caused by Hurricane Georges was being monitored at the
Command's headquarters in Miami. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) mission is to
command and control all U.S. military activities in its AOR and to coordinate DOD assistance to
U.S. Government (USG) disaster relief operations when directed. SOUTHCOM carries out its
efforts primarily through the use of its headquarters staff in conjunction with the U.S. military
representatives assigned to the embassy, the Security Assistance Office and the Defense
Attaché Office personnel. Due to the large scope and extended nature of the anticipated
disaster relief operations, SOUTHCOM stood up its Crisis Action Center (CAC) with
representatives from the different staff elements to coordinate the Command's response to the
Hurricane and to the projected disaster relief operations.
In the days following the disaster that struck the Dominican Republic, the SOUTHCOM
staff was in constant communication with the U.S. Embassy Country Team, especially with the
Chief of the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and the Defense Attaché
and the Army Attaché. The Chargé (Ambassador's position was vacant) spoke
directly to the SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff and to the CINC by telephone several times
throughout the extended disaster relief operations. In addition to the Country Team,
SOUTHCOM was also in constant communication with the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), the USG agency that coordinates U.S. disaster relief operations to assist
foreign nations.
OFDA is the agency that conducts the on site assessment following the disaster and then
coordinates for disaster relief supplies and services to assist the foreign nation. Although many
of these needs are satisfied more efficiently through civilian contracts, the military has some
unique capabilities that are often required to meet the needs immediately following a disaster.
SOUTHCOM remained in close contact with the OFDA representatives on the ground in the
Dominican Republic so as to be able to respond quickly when OFDA identified a request for
military assistance and provided a fund cite for those supplies or services.
U.S. Military In-Country Representatives Role in the Disaster Relief
Operations
The Chief of the MAAG and the Defense and Army Attachés were the in-
country military representatives that did the on the ground coordination with the Dominican
military and the Country Team to provide the assistance necessary to the Dominican led disaster
relief operations. They provided military representation at the Embassy's Emergency Action
Center (EAC) that was stood up immediately after the disaster to serve as a central coordination
center for the Embassy's assistance to disaster relief operations.
Since the MAAG and DAO were quite small, with only two officers and one officer
assigned respectively, they quickly became overwhelmed by the amount of coordination required
to deal with the disaster. The Chargé attempted to resolve this situation by asking the
CINC for augmentation for the MAAG, which works for SOUTHCOM. This provided the
opportunity for me, the J5 desk officer for the Dominican Republic, to participate in the disaster
relief operations. A week after the Hurricane struck, I was directed to go to the Dominican
Republic for ten days to assist the MAAG.
As a FAO and the country desk officer, I had been to the Dominican Republic on
several occasions and spoke the language well. This made me the logical choice from my
Command to augment the MAAG. The MAAG Chief was extremely busy when I arrived on 1
October and with my prior experience in country I did not require any assistance getting in or
getting to and from the embassy. My experiences during the next ten days with the Embassy
staff, the Dominican military, the Red Cross, and the Catholic Church established the importance
of my previous visits and my FAO training overall.
The coordination efforts of the MAAG and the DAO during the emergency relief
phase of the first three weeks were focused in four main areas: coordinating U.S. helicopter
emergency food delivery missions, coordinating with the Dominican military, representing DOD
to the Country Team and to OFDA, and coordinating for incoming military aircraft with relief
supplies.
U.S. Army South (USARSO) deployed four UH-60 helicopters and U.S. Special
Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) deployed two MH-60 helicopters to deliver food to
rural villages that had been cut off by destroyed roads and bridges. Both units flew for a week
until the decision was made that food could be delivered to the rural areas by truck, using
bypasses and fords. The Army Attaché worked daily with the Dominican Army to identify
the hardest hit areas and to determine where the helicopter missions should deliver food the
following day. The Defense Attaché usually participated in the helicopter missions and
brought back a daily assessment of which areas were still cut off and needed food, based on
aerial observations and from talking to local leaders in the rural areas. Each day the Embassy
had a meeting to review the daily progress in disaster relief operations and to coordinate the
ongoing interagency effort. At that daily meeting, the DAO and MAAG identified the rural
villages for the next day's missions to the Operations Officer for the aviation units.
Twice I participated in the food delivery missions. We received the food from the
Red Cross in 100-pound bags, with 10 pound family bags inside, and delivered them to a few
villages before returning to the Dominican military base to load more. We flew these emergency
relief missions for six to eight hours before returning to base. Aircraft maintenance and a
debriefing to the Country Team on the results of the day's missions followed shortly after our
return. The aviation units used a Dominican Air Force base as their staging and living area.
Having been briefed before the mission on where to deliver the food, we often had an
intermediate stop to pick up a Red Cross or a Catholic Church guide to help us spot the remote
villages from the air. Since the aircraft crew did not always have a bilingual crewmember,
having the Defense Attaché or me on the aircraft was essential to coordinating with the
POC on the ground and to navigating to the proper village. The guide would tell me where to go
in Spanish and I would translate for the pilots. Frequently translation and coordination would
also be necessary at the food pick up or drop off points. To ensure accountability and that the
food was getting to the right people, we were told who the POC would be at the village. When
we offloaded the food, we talked to the POC there (either a Red Cross or Catholic Church
official or the mayor), turned the food over to him, and made him responsible for an equitable
distribution to the local families.
The Army Attaché spent most of his time at the Dominican Armed Forces
Secretariat, their Joint Staff Headquarters. There he monitored new information about the
disaster-stricken areas and determined what possible U.S. assistance the Dominican military
might need to assist in its disaster relief operations. He attended the daily Embassy meeting,
provided valuable input as to where the next day's relief flights should go, and coordinated with
OFDA to ensure that Dominican relief supply requirements were understood. When OFDA
agreed to fund a requirement, he would assist in the coordination for delivery of the supplies.
The MAAG Chief was primarily focused on coordinating the daily flight missions
and resolving any issues that arose with the aviation units' operations at San Isidro Air Base. He
also maintained constant communication with SOUTHCOM headquarters, both by telephone and
by submitting frequent Situation Reports (SITREPs). Part of his time was spent in the
Embassy's EAC, coordinating with other agencies, with OFDA, and keeping the Chargé
informed of DOD issues and actions. Since the MAAG Chief couldn't monitor everything, I
assisted him by spending part of my time at the air base monitoring aviation operations and
collecting information on food deliveries and projected areas for the next day's missions. When
I wasn't involved in relief flights, I stayed at the MAAG, preparing SITREPs and coordinating
with SOUTHCOM by telephone and fax. Toward the end of the emergency relief phase, I was
able to accompany the MAAG Chief when he briefed the Secretary of the Armed Forces
(Dominican equivalent to our CJCS and SECDEF) on the New Horizons exercise concept.
SOUTHCOM proposed this exercise to provide engineering and medical assistance to the
Dominicans, while providing valuable training for U.S. troops.
The Defense Attaché was also responsible for obtaining host nation flight
clearances for U.S. military aircraft bringing relief supplies. The Denton Amendment authorizes
humanitarian assistance supplies to be transported on a space available basis and SOUTHCOM's
coordination was able to coordinate this to a limited extent. The MAAG's station manager, an
Air Force NCO, was heavily involved in the offloading of these supplies, as well as in the
deployment and redeployment of the two aviation units.
U.S. Interagency Coordination for Dominican Disaster Relief
Operations
I was able to see first hand during my ten days in the Dominican disaster relief
operations what a coordinated, interagency effort the U.S. Embassy provided. The Country
Team attended daily meetings chaired by the Chargé and participated in manning the EAC.
Each agency looked to its own capabilities and area of expertise to provide a portion of the
overall Embassy assistance effort. The major agencies that I saw coordinating the relief effort as
I sat in the daily meetings were the Department of State (DOS -- Chargé, Agriculture,
Political/Economics, Communications), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Peace Corps, and the Department of
Defense (DOD -- MAAG, DAO). Each agency would do its own external coordination with
Dominican agencies, other U.S. agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) during
the day and then do its internal coordination within the Embassy at the daily meeting.
The Peace Corps had a large (150 volunteers) well-established presence in the Dominican
Republic that proved important to disaster relief efforts. The volunteers were living in rural
communities and helped coordinate the relief effort by providing telephonic reports to the Peace
Corps office in the embassy, which helped identify the remote areas in most need of emergency
food delivery. They were also instrumental for on site coordination with the Red Cross and the
Catholic Church. They were often present when we landed with food deliveries and helped
locate the proper POC, translate, and provide information about local conditions. Their presence
throughout the countryside aided in the distribution of the emergency relief supplies as well as
seeds for new crops purchased with Peace Corps funding. The volunteers were also able to teach
the rural people how to purify water, since contaminated water was one of the major problems
following the passage of Hurricane Georges and the destruction of many water lines.
Host Nation Coordination for Disaster Relief Operations
The Dominican relief effort was called the "Plan Social," which encompassed their
reconstruction and relief plan. It was coordinated by an interagency and NGO committee, which
included the Red Cross and the Catholic Church. A General Officer was placed in charge of the
committee and made responsible for executing the "Plan Social." The committee formed a crisis
action cell to monitor the disaster and to coordinate the disaster relief operations. It operated
from the Dominican Secretariat, the Joint Staff Headquarters. To maintain strict accountability
and to ensure that the international aid received was effectively distributed to the Dominican
people, the Dominican Government designated the Dominican Red Cross as the agency to
control the relief supplies.
The Red Cross received the supplies at the airport, inventoried them, packaged them into
family size bags, loaded them into 100-pound sacks, and stockpiled them at key distribution
points. Some were delivered by aircraft to remote areas unreachable by road, while other food
supplies were delivered by truck to stricken areas still reachable by road. During the initial
emergency phase, both fixed wing aircraft (Dominican) and rotary wing aircraft (Dominican,
U.S., and French) delivered food to areas unreachable by road. Three weeks after the Hurricane
hit, aerial deliveries of food ceased because the rural areas could be reached by road.
The Dominican Government also had a major problem with electrical blackouts and a
tremendous amount of trees in the city streets and in the secondary roads. These were focal
points of their relief effort and progress was noted daily. Additional portions of the capital,
Santo Domingo, and the rural areas had electrical power restored on a daily basis. Crews with
chainsaws and dump trucks cleared the streets in the capital, streets that were severely constricted
by debris. It took five weeks to fully clear the streets. The secondary roads were cleared as
quickly as possible by cutting the downed trees and getting them off the road. Large piles of
debris remain beside the roads and some debris was being burned. Some of the burning was to
avoid the health hazard of standing garbage, since garbage collection was another problem after
the Hurricane. Garbage collection returned to normal once the streets were cleared of debris.
The Dominican Republic is 95% Catholic and the Church was widely recognized as a key
player in the relief effort. The Government included it in their coordination efforts at the
national level and the priests in the rural areas played a key role in coordinating the delivery of
relief supplies. They had good credibility with the people and by using them and the Red Cross
where possible, instead of the local political leaders, the Government could avoid allegations of
favoritism in the distribution of aid. Competition between the three principal political parties is
fierce, so involving the Red Cross and the Catholic Church to the greatest extent possible was a
wise action.
Conclusion
My experience in Dominican disaster relief operations once again proved the
value of the FAO program. When SOUTHCOM was called upon to send someone to assist the
MAAG during this crisis, I was trained and ready to assist with the MAAG's workload. My
FAO skills stood me in good stead and enabled me to contribute to the successful delivery of
emergency supplies in a critical situation. My knowledge of SOUTHCOM staff procedures and
prior experience in the Crisis Action Center also prepared me to assist the MAAG and the
Embassy in this important effort. Many FAOs are assigned to high level staffs and don't get
much opportunity to do their work in the field or sharpen their skills in a new environment.
Based on my disaster relief experience in the Dominican Republic, I would highly recommend
that any FAO who gets a similar opportunity should take it. I think you will find that you can
make a contribution and come away a more experienced FAO, better prepared for the future.
MAJ Fargo, a 48B/OD officer, is currently assigned as the Dominican Republic
Desk Officer with the Political-Military Affairs division of J5 at U.S. Southern Command in
Miami, Florida.
1999, Foreign Area Officer
Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve
Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org