IN THE FRONT AND IN THE REAR-- FAOS IN PAKISTAN DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

By Colonel Dave Smith, USA, ARMA Pakistan

Although the crisis in South Asia is not yet resolved as this is being written, the editor of the Journal asked me to write a piece about my experiences in USDAO Islamabad during Operation Enduring Freedom. Many of you may remember me as the former editor of the FAO Journal. Despite a pretty robust OPTEMPO in Islamabad for the past four months, being well aware of the pressure the editor always has to fill the pages each quarter, how could I say no? To those claiming they do not have the time these days to write an article, I say, "Give me a break!"

I found myself in Islamabad a little over a year ago for the third time, having done my FAO ICT at the Pakistan Army Staff College in Quetta in 1982, and served previously as Army Attaché from 1994 to 1997. Perhaps as a result of these prior experiences, personal relationships going back nearly 20 years with most of the high command of the Pakistan Army, and the dearth of suitably trained 48D colonels willing to serve, I was asked by DAO in late 1999 to return as a "civilian" attaché following my second retirement in June 2000 (I had been recalled for one year to serve as the Director of Army Foreign Liaison). How that eventually came to pass may be a good subject for a future article, but it is currently beside the point.

Every attaché assignment is unique in its own way, but all share certain characteristics. We generally have three major tasks: be overt collectors of military information, represent and explain our service to the host country (and sometimes vice versa), and provide military advice to the Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador, in our country of accreditation. A major ancillary task, as will be seen below, is to host visitors from the U.S. that may "drop in" from time-to-time.

My purpose in writing this article is not to demonstrate what a great American I am, nor to trumpet any particular accomplishment. There are many FAOs serving down range whose accomplishments are far more spectacular than mine, and many serve in far more arduous conditions. My aim, within the limits of classification, is to disclose a few of the requirements that were levied on our DAO and, hopefully, to illustrate the added value that Army FAOs bring to the country team when a major international crisis occurs.

THE BEGINNING.

September 11, 2001 was a typical day at the office for USDAO Islamabad. At the weekly "pol-core" meeting chaired by the Ambassador, and including the Deputy Chief of Mission, Political Counselor, Chief of Station, SAO Chief and DAO representative, discussion centered on the arrival the next day of the CINCCENT, General Tommy Franks, who would be making his second visit to Pakistan. Afterward, a smaller group met to discuss the current status of the complex web of decade-long military and economic sanctions against Pakistan, the result of Pakistan's nuclear program and recent Missile Technology Control Regime violations. At this meeting, newly arrived Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin announced her goal of trying to get all layers of sanctions removed within three years. Most of us with experience in South Asia nonproliferation matters merely smiled, not nearly so optimistic. Other routine matters filled the remainder of the day, none worthy of note.

Figure 1 - Pakistan and Afghanistan
Later, having just returned to my quarters, the phone rang. It was our Admin NCO. "Turn on the news, right now!", she shouted into the phone. I complied immediately. On CNN, anchorman Aaron Brown was standing on a rooftop with the burning World Trade Center in the background. As I wondered what was happening, within a few minutes the answer quickly became apparent when an airliner struck the second tower of the WTC. For the next two hours, like millions of other Americans, I watched in horror as other news came in--a third plane had struck the Pentagon, another was not responding and then crashed in Pennsylvania, first one tower of the WTC imploded, then the second. When was this all going to end?

Finally, the phone rang again. Ambassador Chamberlin had just announced an Emergency Action Committee meeting at her residence for all embassy principal officers. As we quietly filed in, the television in the background still carried breaking news and endless repetitions of the collapsing towers in New York. Who was responsible? Osama Bin Laden was right next- door in Afghanistan and his activities, along with those of the Taliban regime, had long been the focus of embassy intelligence collection efforts. There was no doubt in our minds who was the chief suspect.

As the meeting got underway, the Ambassador's phone rang. It was the State Department Operations Center announcing the possibility of planned attacks on overseas diplomatic missions. Many embassies in the Middle East and other locations around the world decided to close down for a few days until the situation clarified. After reminding us that this time the crisis was in Washington and not overseas, the Ambassador asked, "What should we do?" We decided not to hunker down. Instead, we would remain open for regular business and "show the flag" by attending all scheduled social functions. Also, we immediately began to collect information on OBL and Afghanistan while Washington recovered from its shock and pulled itself together.

Figure 2 - Tea with the Kyber Rifles. From the servant left to right, MJ Taj Ul Haq, IG, Frontier Corps, LTG Qadir Baloch, Commander 12th Corps, VADM Tom Wilson, Director, DIA, BG Amjad Rauf, ISID and Colonel Smith.
In the next four months, events seemed to divide themselves into four distinct phases: preparing for military operations in Afghanistan (11 September to 7 October), execution of military operations in Afghanistan (8 October-mid-November), mopping up and preparing for a new government in Kabul (mid-November to mid-December), and crisis with India (late-December to the present). Each had different challenges, priorities, and stresses.

Through each phase, our team of Army FAOs played a key role. I was extremely fortunate to have Lieutenant Colonel Tom Wahlert as my Assistant ARMA. He was finishing a very tough and eventful three-year tour in Pakistan, but instantly volunteered to remain in Islamabad to assist. A graduate of the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College, his knowledge of the country, personal contacts, and years of in-country experience would prove invaluable through the first two phases before he moved to his new job at USARPAC. As 48Ds with the most country experience, Tom and I were called on early to "carry the ball" in the collection effort and serve on various ad hoc country team planning cells. Later, as our workload multiplied, Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Carlsen, Tom's replacement, and Lieutenant Colonel Rich Girven, who had been yanked from Sinhalese language training in Washington, arrived at the beginning of Phase 2. Both served superbly, accomplished great things for their country, and deserve of more praise than I can possibly express.

PHASE 1, PREPARING FOR MILITARY ACTION.

Our political and military relationship with Pakistan was rocky. Sanctioned for a decade, isolated within much of the international community because of its close relationship with the Taliban government, conducting attaché business with the Pakistan military was tough. Despite having two fully-trained 48Ds in the DAO, both with personal and professional relationships in the Pakistan Army going back in some cases nearly two decades, access was spotty, particularly with the nine corps commanders, the "feudal barons" of the Army. Coincidentally (and fortunately), one of my former instructors at the Staff College in Quetta, the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the Pakistani counterpart of the Director of Central Intelligence, was in Washington on 11 September and saw firsthand not only the extent of the destruction, but the angry resolve of the government to fight back. Meeting with high-level officials in the CIA and at State, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed was given a stark choice--join us, or become our enemy. His return to Pakistan marked a significant turning point in our military relationship.

Figure 3 - Afghanistan where 21st century warfare meets 17th century warfare
Within days, Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, agreed to a series of USG "requests" for assistance and cooperation in obtaining information about OBL and Al-Qaida. Working closely now with both the Station Chief and the DAO, ISID turned over all of its information about Afghanistan and the Taliban armed forces. Their former DATT in Kabul was made available to us for frequent de-briefings and we met frequently with Mahmud's deputy. At our request, daily situation reports were provided on happenings inside both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It quickly became clear that Pakistan had long been frustrated with the Taliban government and did not have nearly as much influence--or information--as we had imagined. Their policy had been one of insuring that a stable, friendly government, however unsavory in other ways, was in power in Kabul. Nevertheless, rescinding the decade-long policy on Afghanistan, one that had sympathy in Pashtun-speaking parts of the country and in the country's religious political parties and religious schools, or madrassahs, seemed a risky business for the military government to undertake.

By this time, Washington had recovered from its trauma and requests for information flooded into the DAO. How stable was the government? Did the rank and file in the Army support the decision to abandon the Taliban? What would be the domestic reaction? Were the nine corps commanders on board? How much sympathy was there within the Army for the Taliban? Was there any possibility of a coup? Were the nuclear weapons safe and under positive control? Who precisely were the Taliban? What were their names? Which one were more important than others? How well supplied were their armed forces? How was their military campaign against the Northern Alliance going? Could we work with the Northern Alliance? Who could be trusted? Who could not? What would India do? What were the -stans doing? Iran? China? Russia? Were embassy personnel at risk? And there were seemingly hundreds of similar questions.

These questions came arrived from a wide variety of locations and headquarters. The majority came through our normal operational channel, the Defense HUMINT Service in Clarendon, Virginia. Many others came from DHS support elements in the regional commands. Still others came from the National Military Joint intelligence Center (NMJIC) and other command and intelligence centers. Most were sent on our internal attaché HOCNET system; others came by telephone from individual consumers or other headquarters. Individual analysts in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) occasionally queried us directly. Answering these many questions was a daunting and time- consuming task.

Figure 4 - U.S. Forces searching al-Qaeda hideouts
Fortunately, the superb relationships the DAO had forged earlier with the rest of the embassy country team paid off dramatically. From the Ambassador on down, everyone in the embassy realized very quickly that the attacks in New York and Washington were likely to be answered by military action. They also realized that building the intelligence picture of the battlefield in Afghanistan was their highest priority as well as ours. Everyone pitched in to help us. We started meeting each morning with the embassy Political Section to synchronize military and political reporting and to share information. Eventually others joined this ad hoc group, sometimes even the Ambassador, and it became for a time a daily mini-country team planning cell. The consulates, particularly Peshawar with its window on Afghanistan, contributed greatly. The Economics Sections had valuable information about the educational system within the country, particularly about the madrassahs, whence came much support for the Taliban within the country. The Refugee Counselor provided badly needed information about the location of refugee camps, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Afghanistan, and precise locations of other non-military targets to preclude civilian collateral damage should the decision be made to strike the Taliban government directly. The Narcotics Affairs Section and Drug Enforcement Agency provided much-needed information on the sensitive, isolated tribal areas of Pakistan abutting the Afghan border. The Ambassador's insights into the senior ranks of the Pakistan government were exceptionally helpful as well. As FAOs with long service and experience in Pakistan, we spent long hours working our network of active military, retired military, foreign attaché, and Pakistani civilian contacts.

By mid-September the decision was made by the Ambassador and State Department to evacuate dependents and children from Pakistan and to close the Consulate General in Lahore. Within a week, CENTCOM was considering various military options and a team from the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived to discuss what Pakistan might be able to provide to support of various contingencies. Most of this was (and is) classified information, but it is common knowledge that four airfields, the complete use of two-thirds of Pakistan's airspace, and a wide variety of logistical support was made available. The DAO role was to facilitate much of the interaction between this and other U.S. teams and the Pakistan Armed Forces. As in so many other requirements, much of our job involved explaining Pakistan and its political and military culture to Americans, and explaining the American political and military culture to Pakistanis. Once the initial agreements were in place, we left the execution to others and dropped back into our "attaché lane".

PHASE 2, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM--THE DIE IS CAST

On the evening of 7 October 2001, having learned a few days earlier that coalition military operations against the Taliban government would commence that evening, the Ambassador told everyone to move onto the embassy compound for additional security should the domestic reaction in Pakistan be adverse. Remembering that in November 1979 the embassy had been burned to the ground by a rioting mob, many of us were skeptical about just how secure we were going to be. Late that evening, the Ambassador called us in to announce another bombshell: Musharraf had undertaken a complete re-shuffling of the Pakistan Army senior leadership. Every general considered sympathetic to the Taliban or closely linked to Islamic groups was retired or sidelined. This included the three most widely considered to be responsible for Musharraf's successful coup in 1999, the ISID head, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff, and the influential corps commander in Lahore. The first two were my former instructors at Quetta and had been useful personal contacts.

Again the questions from Washington flew in: What did it mean? Was there any danger of a coup? Who else in the Army was being moved? What were the new leaders like? Was Pakistan more or less stable than before? How would Operation Enduring Freedom be affected?

Coupled with these were still other questions about the new military campaign in Afghanistan: How effective was the bombing? Were the Taliban sufficiently impressed to give up OBL? What might happen if coalition pilots were shot down and captured by the Taliban? What was the condition of U.S. and other foreign detainees being held captive by the Taliban in Kabul? Would they be moved? If so, to where? Would the Northern Alliance help us? Who was a potential partner and who could not be trusted? Would the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups help us or rally to the Taliban?

And, by the way, what would be the domestic reaction in Pakistan to our bombing fellow Muslims? Were we going to be safe in Islamabad? How about the consulates in Peshawar and Karachi? What about the four locations where U.S. forces were temporarily deployed in Pakistan? Could Musharraf and his regime weather the storm? We heard rumors that students in the madrassahs and followers in radical religious groups in Pakistan were planning to join the Taliban in Afghanistan on a new "jihad" against the U.S. and coalition forces. Was this true? How many were going? From where? Would they be military effective?

Again, the days became long, as did the nights, as these and many more questions came in from our consumers. Days were taken up with meetings with embassy principals, as well as meetings with senior officers in ISID, Joint Staff Headquarters, and Army General Headquarters, nights with other meetings with retired military and civilian contacts. Soon day and night became one and the only time we knew the specific day of the week was when we wrote down an appointment on rapidly filling calendar pages. Quick trips to Lahore and Peshawar provided answers to many questions as well as restoring a sense of normalcy when we realized, happily, that the reaction in Pakistan was mostly positive. Despite the best efforts of the radicals, most Pakistanis supported Musharraf and had no great love for the Taliban. Demonstrations after the first week dwindled eventually to zero.

PHASE 3, THE TALIBAN COLLAPSE AND A NEW AFGHANISTAN

Unlike many others, we were always confident of military success in Afghanistan. As we often tried to explain to Washington and elsewhere in our reporting, many things were different from the 1980s when the Soviet Union suffered defeat. First, there was no safe haven for the Taliban. Every regional state bordering Afghanistan was hostile to them. Second, they had no usable high technology weapons. During the 1980s, our provision of the STINGER missile to the mujahideen had turned the tide of war in their favor. This time there was no superpower patron for them to turn to. Third, the technology of warfare had leaped ahead. High altitude bombing with precision-guided munitions meant immunity from primitive air defenses, and special operations forces would "own the night" against the primitively armed Taliban fighters.

However, like everyone else, we were surprised at the speed of the eventual collapse. Within just over a month of commencing operations, the northern keystone of Taliban defenses, the city of Mazar-I-Sharif had fallen and the Taliban were in full retreat to the south, not even stopping to defend Kabul. Within two weeks they were confined to their southern redoubt of Kandahar, and Marine Corps troops had established a nearby base at Camp Rhino. The end was in sight, or so it seemed.

One thing should be made perfectly clear about OEF. It might have been accomplished without strong support of the Government of Pakistan, but not nearly so quickly or easily. Pakistan was never an unwilling or reluctant ally dragged along by fear of retribution should it not cooperate with us. Pervez Musharraf was enthusiastic from the very beginning, as were most if not the great majority of his senior commanders. Perhaps he saw an historic opportunity to turn Pakistan from the near-pariah it had become into the tolerant, moderate Islamic state once envisioned by its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. And he seized it. To the many coalition requests, the answer was always 'yes', never 'maybe' or 'we'll see', but firm, immediate acceptance, followed usually by helpful suggestions about how to make the action requested even more effective.

Figure 5 - A visit from the Secretary of State, General Colin Powell. Tom Wahlert is fourth from the left, Rich Given is to Gen Powell's right, COL Smith is to Gen Powell's left and Calvin Carlsen is to COL Smith's left.
Nevertheless, military success meant new requirements came in to the DAO for the third time: Could a new government be formed? Pakistan didn't trust the mostly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance. What would be its response to the Northern Alliance seizing Kabul? And then there was this fellow, Hamid Karzai. We had met him from time to time on the cocktail party circuit in Islamabad during the past two months. He had now gone into Afghanistan with a few trusted followers and seemed to be doing fine for himself. Could he be the new Pashtun leader everyone was looking for? What was he really like? Would others support him? What about the Northern Alliance, how would it react to Karzai's newly acquired prominence? Would it hold together or fragment along ethnic lines?

Our biggest problem now became how to seal our victory. With most of Afghanistan now under coalition control, what would senior Taliban officials do, and what about the Al Qaida fighters, mostly Arabs, but with a sprinkling of other foreigners? The 2200-kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan had always been porous. In many tribal areas, the Pakistan Army, like the British Indian Army before it, could not operate without taking casualties. How could such a border be sealed so that Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives could be brought to justice?

Again, at our urging and following several military-to-military discussions, Pakistan stepped up to the plate and deployed four regular Army divisions from its two corps located in the western part of the country. Additionally, the paramilitary Frontier Corps in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province deployed to the border areas. Negotiations between the ethnic Pathan corps commander in Peshawar and tribal maliks, or leaders, in the NWFP yielded an historic agreement to deploy the Army into the former "politically inaccessible areas", the first time in history this had been achieved. Similarly in Balochistan, the first ethnic-Baloch corps commander (who had been sent there in October as part of the Army shakeup) would reach a similar arrangement with the Baloch tribal sardars. Amazingly, perhaps as many as 100,000 Pakistani troops now guarded the once-lonely border and hundreds of Al Qaida eventually would be picked up by them and turned over to U.S. control.

PHASE 4, THE "TWO-FER"--SOLVE ONE CRISIS, GET ANOTHER ONE FREE.

As Christmas loomed on our horizon, things had started to get back to a semblance of normality. The workday became shorter, routine business began to dominate the schedule, fewer and fewer new requirements came in from Washington and elsewhere. Now we started looking forward to the return of our dependents. Perhaps by Christmas? It seemed possible.

Then on 13 December, Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and our breathing period ended abruptly. Until 1989, the Kashmiri people had been relatively quiescent. Predominantly Muslim in the scenic valley that is the prize in the disputed territory, an indigenous militancy had sprung up and for 12 years had been simmering. Perhaps 350,000 Indian Army and other security forces struggled to maintain control. Lately, militants from Pakistani and other foreign groups had gotten into the act and Pakistan was regularly excoriated by India for promoting cross-border terrorism. In fact, the Kashmir militancy, like the Taliban government, basically had been "high jacked" by foreigners who had threatened to take the war into the heart of India. The first blow had been struck at the Red Fort in New Delhi the previous year, the second in October 2001 in Srinegar. For India, 13 December was the last straw, and it began mobilizing its armed forces and deploying them westward.

Early in the morning of 18 December, I was awakened by the Deputy Director of ISID and told that hostilities with India were "imminent". This is precisely the kind of telephone call attaches do NOT want to receive! Rushing to the embassy, I spoke with him again and he amplified the earlier conversation by telling me that the Indian Air Force, which had been in a relatively high state of alert for several months beforehand, was deploying strike aircraft to forward locations and uploading bombs and missiles. He expected an attack within a few hours. After making calls to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and other locations, I waited for the war to begin. Fortunately, it didn't-- but the experience was a good way to get everyone's attention focused on our next challenge.

In the next few days, it became apparent through frequent meetings and briefings with ISID that the scale of the Indian military buildup was massive and unprecedented in its scope. For the first time ever, India was sending large numbers of troops from its Eastern Army Command to the west. In its previous wars with Pakistan, this had never been done. Three Indian "strike corps" were deploying, as had the bulk of the Indian Air Force. This was (and is) truly the nightmare scenario for Pakistan. With its attention turned toward the unstable situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan now had the full armed might of India to contend with.

At this point, I will no longer bore you with the questions and requirements that began to flow in. They are obvious, particularly the ones dealing with weapons of mass destruction. Once again we hunkered down trying to answer them. It quickly became apparent that Pakistan would have to match the Indian mobilization in order, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff explained to us, "to avoid embarrassment". Much to our amazement, but at our strong urging, Pakistan continued to meet its commitments to the coalition by keeping a substantial quantity of its forces deployed to screen the Afghan border for Al Qaida fugitives and to provide logistical support to OEF.

"I'M FROM WASHINGTON AND I'M HERE TO HELP YOU".

If all we had to do during these crises was satisfy a "few" intelligence requirements, provide occasional military advice to the country team and various military and other agency liaison teams, and represent the Mission in the attaché and wider diplomatic communities, we would have been fully occupied. However, as mentioned earlier, visitors to an embassy sometimes end up being a fulltime job as well. They have to be treated well because their perception of the Mission's competence and treatment of them often may spell the difference between success and failure of the overall mission--particularly if your visitors provide your budget, in the case of congressional delegations.

Figure 6 - Colonel Smith with Senator John McCain
During the past four months, our embassy had more than our fair share of high-ranking visitors. In the past 30 days, just as an example, we hosted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretary of the Army, half a dozen congressional delegations (including one led by Senators Lieberman and McCain and seven other senators), Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Secretary of State (for the second time in three months), Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Director of the FBI, and a whole host of lesser mortals.

Normally, the visit of the Secretary of State or a prominent senatorial visit caps weeks and weeks of intensive effort. In our case, they continue to come so fast and furiously that anyone below the rank of General, senator, or cabinet secretary now rarely causes anyone to bat an eyelid. Nevertheless, all visitors expect to be treated well (and deserve to be), so itineraries have to be drawn up and coordinated with the host country, social events have to be planned and invitation lists prepared, papers for briefing books have to be written and biographies assembled, and time must be set aside for preliminary briefings, separate agendas for lesser ranking delegation members catered for, and, of course, shopping expeditions have to be planned--and led.

TAKE THE FBIS--PLEASE!

Another major distraction throughout both crises has been the reliance on Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports by operations centers and other offices seemingly as their primary source of information about the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. FBIS operates much like the Early Bird, the daily Pentagon print and broadcast media summary, as a clipping service of stories printed or broadcast in local English-language and vernacular media. Unfortunately, its readers have no way of judging the reliability of the information reported in these media outlets, and, consequently, their reporting tends to generate lots of requests for confirmation. Imagine the Early Bird containing extracts from the National Enquirer as well as the New York Times.

My favorite FBIS experience came during the first week after the events in New York and Washington. A local newspaper in Pakistan carried a brief story suggesting the 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne (Airmobile) had departed CONUS enroute to Pakistan. We read it and laughed. Next day, a duty officer in a headquarters that shall not be named called us to confirm or deny the story. He had read it in the FBIS and his senior duty officer wanted to know if it was true. With tongue firmly in cheek, I told him the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon might be a better choice to obtain this information.

While this episode at least HAD a bit of humor connected with it, others did not, and each one required valuable time to research (to find the story carrying the full text) and reply. The biggest problem for us was (and is) that such stories take on a life of their own in the consciousness of policy makers who have no regional context in which to place the stories. Pakistan frankly has a negative media image and such stories, even when proven untrue, serve usually to reinforce negative caricatures. Therefore, when the Government of Pakistan makes a formal announcement, the questions from Washington become not "what does it mean?", but "is it true?" and "can they be trusted?" Again, much valuable time is wasted gathering answers, the implication apparently being that if we found out that the announcement was untrue we wouldn't report it.

"TRUST ME, THIS IS COMPLETELY OFF THE RECORD".

A final distraction was the media. As the old saying goes, 'when Christiane Amanpour comes to town, you know something bad is about to happen'. Christiane and literally hundreds of her fellow journalists came to Islamabad early. The view from the roof of the Marriott Hotel looking toward the President's House should by now be familiar to anyone who watched the evening news the past few months. Hundreds of reporters, perhaps nearly a thousand in all, descended on Islamabad. With the real story in Afghanistan hundreds of miles away, no access to it for several weeks, and a new story to write every day--what a recipe for disaster! Again, we in the embassy spent a lot of time correctly misperceptions caused by careless reporting or simply erroneous reports filed by less-than-scrupulous reporters with no story and a deadline fast approaching.

Many wanted to speak with us, and we realized eventually that it was often far better to provide accurate information--always within the bounds of classification and almost always off the record--to responsible journalists rather than waste our time correcting errors due to lack of accurate information or credible sources. This is not exactly what is taught in Attaché School, but in the real world it is often the most appropriate course of action.

Confining our backgrounders to credible media, and with the help of our Public Affairs Counselor in setting the proper ground rules, to my knowledge no reporter ever knowingly violated the rules of the game. As time went on, we even became friends with many, realizing that we all had a job to do, just a different way of doing it. We also realized that the responsible media could help our mission by providing accurate information and crowding out the outlets contributing to confusion and disinformation about what we were trying to do in OEF.

CONCLUSION.

We do not yet know how these two crises will turn out. Although the interim government in Afghanistan has made a reasonable start, much remains to be worked out. We must keep in mind that it is only an interim arrangement and that a final political settlement awaits. Can a multi-ethnic society be rebuilt and the power of the warlords be curtailed? No one knows at this time. In India and Pakistan, diplomatic efforts by our government and others have diminished the threat of imminent warfare between the two nuclear-armed adversaries, but nearly a million and a half troops still face each other along a tense frontier. Can face on both sides be saved and miscalculation be avoided? Again, no one yet knows. Much mutual distrust still has to be allayed and good will built before security will return to South Asia

I chose the title of this article in an attempt to accurately depict what we FAOs do most often in our service--serve at the "front" of foreign policy in peacetime, attempt to shape the battlefield in a useful way when a crisis occurs that results in military action, and do our best to support from the "rear" when the military operation is actually being executed. It seems highly ironic that after 32 years of military service, including two retirements, I suddenly found myself on the "frontline" of a major military operation in a position to make a substantial contribution to the war effort. My advice to other FAOs is "be patient", if you wait long enough, your time may come as well. If the events of the past four months have taught us Americans anything, it is that we cannot predict the future and must be eternally vigilant in this new and dangerous century we live in.

2001, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org