Never before have the eyes and ears of our nation's strategic scouts, the foreign area officer, been more relevant or important to the defense of our nation. The deserved pride one feels when identified as a FAO must be matched with a dedication equal to the demands this relevance/importance places on each officer in the FAO corps. While the entire chorus of the siren song of FAO capabilities--advanced civil education, advanced military education, foreign military school attendance, language, country and regional familiarity, demanding and varied assignment pattern--are as important in the 21st Century as they have ever been, the emerging need for a foreign area officer who is well-read and conversant in even broader international affairs and globalization trends places increased emphasis on that element of the 21st Century FAO's personal and professional preparation. With an eye toward aiding in achieving this worthy end, this article introduces the FAO reader to two dominating books which should be read and internalized by all current FAOs. This is not a book review; rather, it is an introduction to key concepts and ideas embedded in the two volumes, and how the FAO's understanding of these 21st Century trends will make one a more competent, complete advisor and scout across the wide array of foreign area officer assignments.
On publication in 1996 Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) generated an intense firestorm-- in both praise and condemnation of his work. Less fiery was the reception to Thomas L. Friedman's The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). Regardless of whether or not one agrees with either author's fundamental world view, each informs the debate on our world's current state, and are powerful intellectual tools with which the foreign area officer can do analytic battle for the Department of Defense and beyond. The author selected these two works because they exist at two extremes of a fulcrum--on one end the globally connected, interactive world of Friedman, and at the opposite end the divisive, clashing, unconnected world of Huntington. Such a breadth of opinion and point of view positions the careful reader with natural points and counter-points of engagement with those with whom the FAO comes in professional and personal contact.
Huntington's thesis is boldly stated. "In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest levels, civilizations." (21) The result " is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world." (20) What this produces, in Huntington's view, are fault lines where disparate cultures or civilizations meet--and where fault line wars have become the norm rather than the exception. Huntington also strongly affirms that the majority of these fault line wars exist between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Many of Huntington's harshest critics can be disarmed using his own words. He does not mean his work to be a work of social science, but rather a paradigm, a framework--what this author would characterize as a lens with which to view the opening and coming years of this century. That, I would recommend to the FAO reader or any other, is the best way to read and digest this seminal work. Think of the book as an extended editorial--the book is in fact an expansion of a 1993 Foreign Affairs article--one which the reader can read with interest, use data bits of interest, and make compelling debate points either for or against the thesis without resorting to complete buy-in of Huntington's point of view.
Huntington clearly demonstrates that the bi-polar world of the Cold War is gone. No surprise or argument there. He states that this polarity has been replaced by nine world civilizations--Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. Some argue that in so organizing the world for this thesis, Huntington has eliminated the importance of the nation-state. One can refute this point of view with ease; at every turn Huntington refers to "core states," states linked to a major cultural or civilization that guides that civilization either forward (or backward--in many cases because a civilizational core state is not present, in the Muslim world for example). And this reinforces Huntington's "multipolar, multi-civilizational" worldview. Huntington's own words refute the argument that he diminishes the role of the state-- "States are and will remain the dominant entities in world affairs." (34)
To counter the importance of states, however, Huntington then posits an alternate view of how the 21st Century's multi-civilizational model will function. "Publics and statesmen," he says, "are less likely to see threat emerging from people they feel they can understand and trust because of shared language, religion, values, institutions, and culture." (34) Whereas global forces of integration serve to join us and make the world flat in Friedman's world, these same forces generate counterforces of cultural assertion, civilizational consciousness, and fragmentation of shared interests in Huntington's world.
Huntington defines the major cultures as the "Big We." Unfortunately, anytime we have an "Us," we must, by needs, have a "Them" ("People define themselves by what makes them different from others," 67); and that, to Huntington, is at the root of our world's challenges, a globe currently enmeshed in numerous conflicts along global fault lines-- fault lines and conflicts which are by majority pitting Muslims against non-Muslims.
In order to "clash", one civilization must have contact with another. Huntington's internal essay on civilizational contact should be required reading, and certainly required understanding, for all foreign area officers. Civilizations were--for the majority of global history-- separated by time and space. Moving by foot and without the wheel or beasts of burden, clans or tribes could exists within a few straight-line miles, yet have distinct cultural identities--religions and languages chief among these tribal traits. Although some coastal contact by some cultures existed, prior to 1500 horses and continental cultural contact was the norm. The emergence of seapower--principally of the Western powers--combined with "sustained, overpowering, unidirectional impact of the West on all other civilizations." (50) And it was Western technology--not religion or culture--that supplied the Western power to expand.
Where Friedman sees technology uniting the global community, Huntington sees a totally different past and future. Huntington believes that peace does not and has never emerged solely from trade and communications; Friedman would disagree. Rather, Huntington again asserts, "The more fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, religions, and civilizations remain and spawn new conflicts." (67) The classical Western legacy of Catholicism and Protestantism, of European languages, of the separation of spiritual and temporal authority, of the rule of law, of social pluralism, or representative bodies, and most importantly of the importance of the individual are truly antithetical to other civilizations. This includes the Sinic, Japanese, and certainly the Islamic worlds. And all of these are rising stars on the global horizon--two due to economic strength, and one due to the 21st Century's tools by which the small man can become the big bully (Islamic terrorism).
Huntington's thesis is no where more compelling than his discussion of the Islamic civilization. Although it possesses no core state as its undeniable backbone, its tribal background, religion, culture, and lifestyles represent an incredibly strong unifying force for those living in that civilization.
Civilization's in Huntington's world can coexist. They do so at where their common interest meet. That often means where a common "Them" can be identified that facilitates a pair of civilization's mutual way ahead. Such a worldview helps explain increased Muslim ties to the Sinic world. This is a particularly dangerous and potentially volatile alignment--an alignment which Huntington states the interaction of "Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness" (183) is poised on the explosive edge at all times.
Understanding cultural/civilizational fault lines is key to living and working in the new century in Huntington's world. The total disappearance of any such line defines Friedman's world. When Commodore Perry sailed into Japan in 1853, sea power ruled the world. It had opened up intercontinental, global seaborne connectivity in a manner similar to horses and the wheel had done centuries before in the continental age of global expansion and connectivity. The ships, "giant dragons puffing smoke", marked a new age in linking the globe in a civilizational manner. This age, to Friedman, is what he terms Globalization 1.0--where horsepower then steam/sea power ruled. Following roughly the same historical paradigm as Huntington, Friedman views the world as shrinking as multinational companies spread, and as our world became bi-polar (Globalization 2.0).
At this point, Friedman and Huntington diverge widely in world view. Huntington sees separate civilizations vying for cultural identity in a more fragmented world. Friedman sees a completely different world. It is one where connectivity has shrunk the world and provided more commonality. Globalization 3.0, in Friedman's world, is the result of global electronic connectivity due to the World Wide Web (9). Where the world was once separated by time and distance, mountains and seas no longer represent insurmountable obstacles. Where there are no obstacles, "The world is flat."
Where Huntington sees separation, Friedman sees convergence. Where Huntington sees cultural Great Walls, Friedman sees collaboration and connectivity. Where Huntington sees a world where the lack of a core state will continue to marginalize the Muslim world, Friedman sees a world where "Untouchables"--to use a caste descriptor--can become self-actualizing, raising themselves from their previous status though sheer effort and the power of global communications. Previously, Western domination of technologies provided a global edge to Western culture. Now, " these are just technologies. Using them does not make you smart, moral, wise, fair, or decent. It just makes you able to communicate, compete, and collaborate farther and faster." (374) Friedman's connected world empowers the disempowered, allows opportunity to the previously frustrated.
Friedman does, however, admit to the downside of connectivity and empowerment of the little, angry man. Given the lack of a core state--and given its long-term history as a global power from the past--as its empowering voice, Islam has suffered what Friedman calls the "poverty of dignity." He goes on to state that "Humiliation is the most underestimated force in international relations and in human relations." (400) Friedman admits that globalization and connectivity have allowed al-Qaeda to solidify a revival of Muslim identity and solidarity (430). It has allowed the on-line development of a "suicide supply chain" of great power, because "it enables the small to act big, and the way it enables small acts--the killing of just a few people--to have big effects." (401)
Friedman is also quick to identify the irrationality of the Internet. Irrationality, or polemics, are powerful tools on the Web, since they are extreme views that incite outrage and action. In addition, Freidman repeatedly cautions against what he hears all the time--"I read it on the Internet so it must be true." Some people believe that the thin patina of modernity the Internet provides must certainly ensure that what is stated in blogs must, of course, be true." The insidious nature of the Internet is that one's biases are too easily reinforced by like thinking people--who then reason that if enough people possess a point of view, then it must have substance. While most reasoning persons understand that is not the case, those ready to feel ostracized and desiring a way to destructively engage in violence in the opening years of this century find plenty of ammunition for the fight in our connected world.
So is the world suffering from a loss of commonality with the decline of the West and the emergence of other civilizational centers as Huntington suggests, or are we all intrinsically connected in a manner that will relieve frustrations and allow opportunity to touch all civilizations in the future as Friedman might posit? The intent of this short introduction is not to answer that question for you. Instead, it is an attempt to introduce two opposing worldviews of our new century. There is no doubt, as any experienced FAO will tell you, that in your assignments and professional and personal interactions as a foreign area officer, you will be confronted with arguments and debates from both sides of this editorial fence. The goal here was to ensure that two seminal works concerning our 21st Century multipolar world are known to the FAO community and employed with careful understanding to make every FAO a stronger proponent for our organizations and our country.
In closing, the role of language proficiency, country and regional familiarity, and cultural-focused civil and military education for the foreign area officer is as important as it has ever been. But a broader worldview and understanding--such as that gained by studying Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order and Friedman's The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century will produce a more valuable, flexible, coherent strategic scout who is often a frontline voice on the international stage. As LTC Tucker Mansager envisions, in his March 2005 Foreign Area Officer Journal article, Foreign Area Officers Unbound", a more broadly prepared FAO is one that is of greater strategic value to the United States and one that is armed to represent our strategic interests not only in the region of expertise, but around the world in our Global War on Terror. Even the briefest review of these two books represents one, positive step in that direction for the individual foreign area officer.
Rod Propst is the Principal Terrorism and Security Analyst at Analytic Services, Inc., in Arlington, Virginia. He has previously published articles on diplomacy, escape and evasion, and a book review of The Ugly American in the Journal. A retired U.S. Army officer, among Mr. Propst's FAO assignments was as the Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City.