From January 2006 to January 2007, LTC Matthew Whitney served as the Plans Advisor to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Baghdad, Iraq. He is a Chinese Foreign Area Officer and is very aware of his limits in Arabic culture and understanding. He will begin teaching Chinese at USMA in Summer '07.
I volunteered for Iraq. I did this in order to be a part of my Army's efforts - to be among my fellow soldiers and officers. But when I got here, I still wasn't satisfied!
I was pining away about not having the sexy action-packed and hard-living test I expected. I came here looking for a fight. I was going to test my courage and endure the privations of war. There would be adventure and danger. Imagine my disappointment when I discovered my fight was to be at the pristine operational level. I figured I would never learn what kind of soldier I was.
But then, as I set to work, I discovered that the job I had was one of the most intellectually challenging responsibilities of my life. I discovered just how key FAO skills are to every advisement job; and how deep, honest cultural assessments are (or could have been) critical to the campaign effort. I found out that all that schooling, in-country and language training prepared me better than I would have been without them. I was lucky to deploy with certain tools that many of my non-FAO peers just haven't had the opportunity to develop. As a result I have been able to challenge many assumptions here with credibility and experience that only FAO qualifications could provide.
I have only met four FAOs in Iraq. Each has had a unique credential and understanding born of FAO training. Only two of them were Middle East FAOs. But, each one had insight and wisdom that just isn't had among the non-FAO officers. Each one could seamlessly interact with their foreign counterparts without pretense or apprehension. I could give many examples at this point, but will forbear. The key point is that FAOs can profitably come to Iraq for the good of the mission - regardless their area of concentration (AOC).
But for all of that, here I was, literally ashamed of my comfort and embarrassed by my safety; wondering if I would respond correctly when the lead started flying. So, as I wrote what I felt needed to change about Iraq in the paper I sent you (Editor's note this article was printed in the September 2006 FAO Journal), I realized it was ME!
I, Matt Whitney, was indicative of the very mind set that needed changing. It's men like me who came looking to do exciting things; not content to be about the less-glamorous job of building a Nation and installing an Army that needs changing; who neglected the weightier tasks at hand, unconsciously, in order to have more exciting stories to tell. I have countless examples of mature Army leaders choosing what they anticipate as adventure over legitimate duty in Iraq. Unfortunately, it is easy for men like me to cast aside their real duty and take up the more glamorous tactical fight. Turns out the glamour and the guns at this echelon have turned out to be tremendous distractions from what we should really be about. And the tactical fight as we have approached it happens to be making things worse.
Hence: There is a place for Strategic Scouts regardless of AOC in Iraq. FAOs can make a serious difference here if they can escape the unspoken but real desire to experience conditions for the Combat Action Badge; instead, arriving to do their mission as best they can. That was a hard and humbling lesson for me. Perhaps I continue to articulate it to convince myself I am a real soldier. And here is the Ironic twist. I NEVER needed to come to Iraq to figure this out. The maturity of this revelation -- that non-kinetic mind- expanding staff work is as valuable and even more necessary to the war on terror than being shot at means that FAOs all over the world are making equally valid contributions to the effort. They are sacrificing. They are working hard to make a difference in their spheres. No, their metal isn't being tested the way they imagined when they were in ROTC or West Point, but their contributions as FAOs will have a more lasting effect then they ever could as trigger-pullers.