Towards a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI):
An Overview

by CPT S.D. Beebe

Since the European Union's inception over forty years ago, it has chartered one of the most unique and successful experiments in economic unity of all times. But for all its success in bringing about a single market and the most dynamic economic force in existence, it has severely lagged behind in complementary political unity. Until recently, the idea of a cogent, espoused common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was a running joke both within the European Union and outside observers. When pushed to sum up the identity of the European Union in one sentence, the most prevalent answer was "Economic giant, political dwarf, and military worm," as one Belgian minister put it. Economic unity does not bear the price of its political sibling, though.

Events of the past decade and as recently as this year have made it overwhelmingly clear that the European Union is in great need of pairing its economic affluence with a consistent political will. In particular, a common foreign policy with a security arm extension. Security policy is never an act of convenience but always borne of necessity. As such, until the demise of communism in the early 1990's, the EU had no need to think of a security policy outside of the NATO framework. These were the "good-ole-days" when the world was colored in bi-polar language and the Europeans could suckle the trans-atlantic relationship. This all rapidly changed in the last decade of the twentieth century.

This paper will present an overview of the European Security Defense Identity as it has taken shape over the past decade by tracing the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in three parts. In Multi-polar World--The Need for a European Defense Identity, the pressing issues of the early 1990s that influenced the debate on developing a distinctive security and defense for Europe will be highlighted. Then in Towards a European Security and Defense Identity, the formalization of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will be discussed in the context of the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice with their inherent shortcomings. In conclusion, The Future of ESDI--9/11 and Beyond will take a look at what is needed for a sustained future viability.

Multi-polar World--The Need for a European Defense Identity

Although, there was--and still is--a strong framework for European security, there was not a distinctive EU-based security identity until the early 1990s. During the Cold War, European security was little more than a consensual nod to the policy objectives laid out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Being pinched between the two world superpowers of the United States and Soviet Union left little room--or political motivation--to seriously think about a complementary or enhanced European defense identity. The security architecture of the cold war was rather clear cut: NATO versus the rest. The defense and security of Europe vis-…-vis the United States was a classic vassal- serf relationship. But then the world changed beginning in 1989.

In his book The Government and Politics of the European Union, Neill Nugent mentions four factors that stimulated the certain need for a distinctive European security identity. First, with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent dissolution of its sphere of influence, the world moved from a bipolar strategic framework to a multipolar entity. Europe no longer found itself between two superpowers. The United States began to look towards Europe to find a partner--or at a minimum junior partner--in creating stability and democracy in the former communist world. Second, with German reunification, there was increased pressure to develop a foreign and security policy framework to ensure a reunited Germany fit squarely inside to avoid any potential political turbulence. Third, the Gulf War was a political embarrassment to the Union as a whole. There was no concerted effort and the military response was a piecemeal effort from sending troops to fight along side the coalition to parliamentary decrees denouncing the Iraqi invasion. Fourth, it was widely understood that the EU's response to the break up of Yugoslavia was another political debacle. They were seen as being inadequately prepared, slow to react, and ineffective.1 Henry Kissinger's famous quote "When we pick up the phone, who do we call in Europe?" gained momentum. As a dominantly equipped, manned and led NATO force into the Balkans began operations, European nations separately and the EU as a political actor sat largely on the sidelines either unsure of how to get involved or incapable of becoming involved in the right way. As one observer on the Balkans conflict once said about the Europeans' involvement: "They come to a basketball game with a football bat and wonder why the Americans get upset when they want in the game." At this point, the European Union was left with little choice than to formally address foreign and security policy.2

Towards a European Security and Defense Identity

From the inception of the European Economic Community, it was understood that intergovernmental cooperation in the foreign policy arena was a benefit to the Community when it was constructive for the parties involved. Member States attempted to consult with one another on international issues with the understanding that foreign and security policy remained the purview of the sovereign state. The idea of formalizing this notion found no part in any treaty until the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). However, this treaty did little more than signal the increasing need for a coordinated, formalized, structure for dealing with these issues.3 Security and defense policy, unlike economic policy, comes only through necessity. As mentioned above, until the events of the previous decade no real discussion was needed. But the decade of the 90's being as it was, the European Union began to take formal notice. This formal acknowledgement was emanated through the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice.

The Maastricht Treaty

Known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Maastricht Treaty came into effect on 1 November 1993. The TEU formally incorporated this idea by establishing common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU. The TEU states:

The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence 4

Article 12 of the TEU continues stating how the CFSP objectives are to be met.

In short, the key points addressed in the TEU were: the creation of a defense pillar to the European Union, the idea of common positions and joint actions on defense related issues, a unanimous voting requirement on defense related issues, and identifying the Western European Union as constituting an "integral part of the development of the Union."5 This was seen as the first significant step towards an independent security identity for the European Union. The basic idea of CFSP created quite a stir amongst member states of the EU. The resultant disharmony on this issue created several overarching concerns and the treaty came under immediate fire. Shortcomings of the TEU were in two major areas: obscure language and uncertain financial responsibility. Although the TEU set out the concepts "common positions" and "joint actions", no where in the treaty was there mention of exactly how these tools were to be operationalized. Other complaints arose over the requirement for unanimity in matters of defense. This was clear. One abstention could derail the efforts of the entire Union should one member choose to do so. Second--and probably the most glaring problem--was the TEU did not address nor create a budget for CFSP as a separate pillar. As such, it would be required to "raid" the Pillar One budget or go directly to member countries.6 Either way, a political time bomb.

The Treaty of Amsterdam

Aware of these shortcomings, the provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) which were implemented on 1 May 1999. Where the TEU was the first formal step towards a European security identity, the ToA attempted to bring about more sensible and practical language to the CFSP pillar. This was to be accomplished by providing measures aimed at strengthening the decision-making procedure through the introduction of new instruments and voting modalities. To this effect, the ToA made it possible to adopt measures through qualified majority vote with the idea of constructive abstention and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorted to a veto. Another facet to the ToA was the addition of foreign policy instrument known as common strategies.8 One of the two most significant improvements of the ToA over the TEU was the introduction of a new post to give the CFSP a higher profile. Entitled the High Representative for the CFSP, this office is supported by a policy planning and early warning unit set up in the General Secretariat of the Council and placed under his responsibility. The second most significant move towards a security identity was incorporating the WEU's "Petersberg Tasks" into Title V of the EU Treaty and opening the prospect to integration of the WEU into the EU as its defense apparatus. The final improvement was addressing the CFSP budget. The ToA provides for expenditure on CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget with the exceptions of operations with military or defense implications or if the Council unanimously decides otherwise.9

Although not nearly as criticized as its predecessor, there were still practical issues to be resolved before CFSP would be seen as a viable arm of the EU. Of particular importance was the need to address manning and support of missions that would be taken on through the Peterberg Tasks. Secondly, with the inclusion of the WEU as the future security apparatus for a European defense identity, the dynamic of balancing this within the NATO architecture took on a decisive and heated new form. Not only were there concerns from the United States, but also within Europe of how to incorporate non-WEU members that were EU members and those NATO members desiring to be--but not yet--EU members.10

The Nice Treaty

The latest treaty addressing a European defense identity was the Nice Treaty. This was set against the backdrop of decisions reached in Helsinki, Finland one year prior. The Helsinki meeting was important as is set forth a headline goal of deploying 50,000-60,000 troops within 60 days and sustainable for 1 year in support of the Petersberg tasks. The Nice Treaty provided for the idea of a European defense in a more realistic framework. It layed out several new permanent military bodies and structures many feel will be the cornerstone of ESDI. In particular, it provided for a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee (MC), and a Military Staff (MS).11 Over British objections the Nice Treaty also introduced the idea of "enhanced cooperation". The French had forwarded this idea and many saw it as a way for the French to de-link the European military capacity from that of NATO. However, the British and French reached a compromise in the wording of the treaty by also recognizing NATO as the preeminent security architecture within Europe and that any forces developed for use by the European Union would be "separate but not separable" from NATO thus allaying any Trans-Atlantic fears.

The Future of ESDI--9/11 and Beyond

Although movement to create a European defense identity had transitioned at a remarkably rapid pace by EU standards, Europe still has no credible force to put into action should it be called to do so. In light of the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the United States, member states of the EU were again reminded of the pressing need for a coherent and viable defense response within Europe. For all of its structural development in this arena, the most difficult of all questions are left to be answered. The somber reality is this: on average European countries spend only 60% of what the United States does on defensenand gets little more than 10% return on their investment when one takes into account the duplicity of effort. More importantly, European defense budgets are declining. Europe lags dramatically behind in defense research and development. The Economist magazine recently suggested a magnitude of spending as much as $45 billion a year to bring Europe in line with the United States.12 Europe has minimal heavy lift capability to move troops and equipment. There remains the dark shadow of conflicting procurement procedures and absence of an all-European producer bringing the need for cooperation in developing military capabilities and negating duplicity into a glaring light.

As recently as 20 November, EU member states discussed these very issues at a Capabilities Conference in Brussels. In short, the jury is still out and will most likely remain so until 2003--the year the "Euroforce" is to become operational. What is clear is this: There is a certain need for formalized security and defense language set forth in treaties, but true legitimacy of a common foreign and security policy--hence a European security identity--only comes with a credible, projectable military force. This rubric has yet to be crossed.

Dr. Thomas Durrel-Young of the Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. Liesbit Hooghe of the University of North Carolina are acknowledged for their insights and comments in preparation and revision of this paper.

END NOTES

1. See a full discussion of this beginning on p. 447 in Neill Nugent, Government and Politics of the European Union, Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, 567 pp.

2. There was considerable debate in the United States Senate at this time as the United States began to reflect on a need for continued spending on our NATO commitment.

3. Nugent, p.451

4. p. 298 in Gabriel Glockler et al, Guide to EU Policies, London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1998, 385pp.

5. Nugent, p. 451

6. p. 42, Fraser Cameron, Roy Ginsberg, and Josef Janning, European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Central Issues Key Players, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, 60 pp.

7. Glockler, p. 303

8. European Union official website: www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000

9. ibid.

10. Although appearing several years later, one may get a general consensus of US impressions in this area by looking at the Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 106th Congress, Second Session, March 9, 2000.

11. See the CFSP website at ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en.

12. Europe Survey p. 9 in the Economist, Ploughshares into Swords, October 23-29 1999.

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