A
Commander's Asset
It has been my experience that sometimes as we FAO's go through our very
individualized training and "out of the box" assignments, we forget just why our Service
is making a substantial investment in our training and education. It is not because we
are great guys! The higher-ups in the DoD and Service leadership appear to understand
that FAO's can be real force multipliers in the various theaters of war, and at a time
when Defense is facing critical trade-offs, such potential force multipliers are very
important. Hence the continued high funding of FAO training and the continued efforts
to improve the personnel system so that it will promote "out of the box" types like us to
O-6.
The problem is that the Services can't afford failures when they are diverting funds
from other training activities and investing in their FAO programs. They expect results,
and frankly on a macro-level given the money and time that they are investing in the
program, are justified in those expectations. This is where we as individual FAO's
comes into the picture. FAO training varies between Services, but in none of the
Services is it so good that it punches out fully qualified regional specialists (directly out
of training). Each of us has to work throughout our careers to become competent in our
regional specialty. In fact, we must really work doubly hard because we need to retain
our competency in our basic military skills, even as we strive to become better and
better in our regions.
I believe that the success which our Service demands of us requires a certain
mind-set of each FAO. WE SERVE THE COMMANDER. Our advice and analysis
affect real world events. While our brother officers are training for war at Ft. Hood,
Texas, or on a range in the Mojave Desert, most of us are involved in a day-to-day OJT
in out of the way places in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. We often are required to
operate alone with little or no direct supervision. Even when we work within the
structural framework of a major headquarters, we are often the only specialist in our
particular region and, therefore, on our own. Because it is a real world environment, the
results of our every action has potential real world consequences. Failures can be
quantified in terms of lost opportunities (for the Command or even for the Nation) and in
extreme cases in terms of lost lives of our brother officers and men. This sounds
unnecessarily melodramatic, even to my ears, but it is really serious. Every time we
make a decision or advise a commander we need to ask the question "Have I prepared
myself sufficiently to advice my commander?" The answer, if we are honest, will almost
always be no, but we also need to answer that we are as well prepared as possible.
This mind-set demands that when in graduate school we will take the extra course,
that we work to perfect our first language and try to add a second or third to our
repertoire, that we read everything available relating to both our regions and to our
Service, and that we build and use networks of contacts to back up our "expert" opinions
to the commander. The reason for this overachieving, workaholic mind-set is simple.
The commander involved might actually listen to you and act on your advice -- and that
makes you responsible for the consequences of his action or inaction.
1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield,
Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve
Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org