A Deconfrontation Agreement Reached in Cyprus:
How U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Expertise Complemented a Diplomatic Initiative


By Ambassador Bill K. Perrin and Colonel Stephen R. Norton, USA

President Clinton has recently announced that former Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke ,will be responsible to lead the United States' efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. He will assisted by a newly appointed Special Cyprus Coordinator, Ambassador Thomas J. Miller, the former Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Athens, Greece. While this article deals with events that happens seven and eight years ago; it has applicability for those dealing with the Cyprus problem today today for several reasons: deconfrontation, and security in general, remains an element of the overall problem; it contains personal observations of some relevant individuals and positions; it demonstrates how issues of this type can be successfully orchestrated in a complex politico-military milieu; there are insights into the workings of U.S. foreign policy which illustrate the importance of using a non-traditional approach in certain cases; and finally, it is an example of why "instincts" are still important in foreign policy decision making.

The politico-military situation in Cyprus is complex, tense, highly emotional, and involves soldiers from two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) facing each other across a so-called Green Line in a neutral, non-aligned, island nation in the eastern Mediterranean. The Green Line runs east to west across almost the entire island, cuts through and divides the Cypriot capital city of Nicosia, and is a direct result of the events of 1974 when the ruling military government in Athens overthrew the Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, and installed Nicos Samson, a man known for his desire to unite Cyprus with Greece over the objections of Turkey. This Greek-sponsored coup ultimately led to a Turkish military intervention and the current division of the island. Where the Turkish army stopped in August of 1974 is known as the Turkish Cease Fire Line and is the northern boundary of the Green Line. Where the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces stopped is the Greek Cease Fire Line and marks the Green Line's southern boundary. The area between the two cease fire lines is known as the "buffer zone" or "no-man's land" and is the responsibility of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Observation posts (Ops) are maintained along the Green Line by all three forces: Turkish (including Turkish Cypriot), Greek Cypriot, and United Nations. Since 1974, there has been remarkably little cooperation between the two opposing military commanders with one notable exception -- a UNFICYP sponsored deconfrontation agreement reached in 1989, which called for the demanning of a number of Greek and Turkish Ops in the middle of Nicosia where the buffer zone is at its narrowest and where incidents between the military forces are highest. In this area, UNFICYP increased its Ops to compensate for the loss of the Greek and Turkish presence.

This paper looks at the period 1988 to 1989 when the Deconfrontation Agreement was reached. The 1989 agreement was the last significant military one reached on Cyprus. UNFICYP is currently trying to negotiate a package of confidence building measures between the two military antagonists, including the demanning of more Ops. Then, like now, negotiations became seriosly bogged down. Without an intense effort by the American Embassy in Nicosia, there would not have been an agreement signed nine years ago.

The Military Command and Control Situation

There are six separate military commands in Cyprus, five of which are directly involved in the Cyprus problem. The sixth, British Forces Cyprus (BFC), is confined to two sovereign base areas that were retained when the United Kingdom granted independence to Cyprus in 1960. The commander BFC, reports directly to the British MOD, is not officially linked to the British High Commission in Nicosia, and does not actively engage in military activities with either the Greeks or the Turks. In the northern part of the island, known as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" (a self-proclaimed sovereign state headed by Mr. Rauf Denktash 1  and not recognized by the United States), there are two forces: a Turkish Army Corps commanded in 1989 by Lieutenant General Esref Bitlis 2 , and a Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF), commanded by Brigadier General Ali Yalcin. 3  Yalcin was a regular Turkish Army flag officer who was seconded to the TCSF and nomially reported to the "MOD" of the "TRNC," but who cleared his actions with General Bitlis. This is a key point that will be discussed later. Bitlis reported directly to the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara.

On the Greek Cypriot side, there are also two distinct forces. The Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) then commanded by Lieutenant General Panayiotis Markopoulos 4 , and a regular Greek Army contingent commanded by Colonel Dimitrios Dimou. 5  Markopoulos was a retired Greek officer who was seconded to Cyprus and reported to the Cypriot MOD. However, no serious military decision would be made without the concurrence of, or at least notifying, the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) in Athems. Colonel dimou's regiment was kept under the direct command of Athens except in times of emergency when command was transferred to General Markopoulos.

Between these forces is a multinational United Nations Force, UNFICYP. From 1981 to April 1989, UNFICYP was commanded by an Austrian Major General, Gunther Greindl. He was followed by a Canadian Major General, Clive Milner, who commanded UNFICYP until 1992. The UNFICYP commander reported directly to UN HQ in New York.

General Markopoulos' relationship with the HNDGS in Athens, the President of Cyprus (George Vassiliou), the Cypriot MOD, and the Greek national contingent did not pose any problems during the discussions on deconfrontation. He was clearly in charge of the GCNG and had the latitude to negotiate with UNFICYP over the particulars of the proposed plan. In the "TRNC," however, it was a different matter. We will see later how personalities, strict Turkish military protocol, and the politicization of the deconfrontation plan by Mr. Denktash almost precluded getting any agreement at all.

General Greindl's Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

General Greindl was a very experienced hand at peacekeeping and his specialty was Cyprus. No noe has ever served in Cyprus in a significant military capacity longer than he has. Simply put, General Greindl knew all the personalities involved with the Cyprus problem and knew what was "possible" for his UN command to pursue. He developed a close working relationship with the U.S. Defense Attache, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Norton. Shortly before the new American Ambassador, Bill K. Perrin, arrived to take up his post in April 1988, General Greindl discussed three initiatives with Colonel Norton that he was working on: the first, and most difficult, was the reopening of the resort town of Varosha 6  under UN auspices; second was the opening of the Nicosia Airport; 7  and third was the demanning (deconfrontation) of part of the Green Line in Nicosia where the proximity of Greek and Turkish Ops led to consistent problems, including fatal shootings.

Opening Varosha and Nicosia Airport were low-probability but high-gain CBMs. Deconfrontation would be an easier CBM, but even that was considered a long-shot. General Greindl was very cognizant of the fact that there had never been any military-to-military agreement on Cyrpus since the events of 1974 and he knew the difficulties involved in making any of his CBMs a reality. His plan was to explore the possibility of the Varosha and airport ideas on the political level with President Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash while pursuing the deconfrontation idea with the two military commanders, Bitlis and Markopoulos.

Altering the status quo on Cyprus is extremely difficult, yet Greindl pushed his CBMs at every opportunity. President Vassiliou had many concerns and questions about the Varosha and airport initiatives, but he nonetheless supported continued UNFICYP negotiations on these issues. As for the deconfrontation, General Markopoulos saw it as an opportunity to make the Green Line safer without weakening the Greek-Cypriot political position. But could he trust his Turkish counterpart? And how could he make that judgement?

Mr. Denktash was supportive of the Nicosia Airport idea because it would provide a convenient and legal way for tourists to enter into the economically troubled "TRNC." As for Varosha, he was less motivated to change its control from the Turkish Army to UNFICYP and showed almost no interest, either way in the early discussions on deconfrontation.

Negotiations on Deconfrontation Begin

As noted earlier, General Greindl, the consummate professional on the intricacies of Cyprus, saw deconfrontation as the easiest of the CBMs to achieve and one which could be worked largely at the military level. He already had support in principle from General Markopoulos so he focused on selling his idea to the "TRNC." But where to begin? For him the answer was simple. The Turkish Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Bitlis, was clearly the most powerful official in the north on all matters pertaining to security issues and Turkish policy vis-…-vis the Green Line. He began there.

The U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO), consisting of two Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), Lieutenant Colonel Norton and Major Wade O. Popovich, 8  had established a routine of meeting with Generals bitlis and Markopoulos on a bi-weekly basis. After many meetings, hours of conversation, and numerous meals together, the USDAO team became well known to the two commanders and gained their trust. It was mainly through these regular contacts that the USDAO was kept abreast of UNFICYP's deconfrontation initiative. However, there was no role for the USDAO at this point, other than to stay informed. General Greindl seemed to be making good initial progress. Soon, however, the situation changed.

For reasons unrelated to the CBMs, General Greindl inadvertently found himself in deep trouble with Mr. Denktash and the "TRNC." Mr. Denktash provided some information to the general -- which was meant to be "privileged" -- on an incident in the buffer zone. Unbeknownst to General Greindl, another U.N. official shared this information with the Greek Cypriots. "TRNC" officials assumed that it was the UNFICYP Commander who has betrayed their trust and General Greindl came under intense criticism in north Cyprus. The campaign against him included extensive negative press coverage in "TRNC" newspapers, banners across the main streets in north Nicosia reading, "Greindl Go Home," 9  and the refusal of the "TRNC" to even allow him to enter north Cyprus. Among other things, this terminated his ability to continue meeting with General Bitlis.

General Greindl's deputy was a newly arrived British Brigadier, Wlater Courage. With Greindl unable to continue his initiative in the north, he asked Brigadier Courage to see General Bitlis. These meetings were short lived. General Bitlis told the USDAO that the UNFICYP Deputy Commander was a little to rigid in his approach and that he (Bitlis) felt that he should deal only with the UNFICYP Commander. Bitlis referred the Deputy Commander to the TCSF Commander, General Ylcin, because it was more appropriate for a "one-star" to deal with a "one-star."

To keep things at the same level, General Markopoulos also had the UNFICYP Deputy Commander deal with a one-star officer. As the Greek Commander told Colonel Norton, "working any agreement in the Near East is a little like buying a carpet in the bazaar. There is a lot of posturing to get the best deal." The UNFICYP Deputy Commander and his staff worked hard at getting an agreement, but they were working in a very different milieu from what they were used to. For various reasons, deconfrontation began to become unraveled.

The American Embassy Gets Involved

When Ambassador Perrin held his first meeting with his country team, he announced that we were not in Cyprus to record events for Washington officials to read; rather, we were there to positively influence events which furthered U.S. interests in the region. For the embassy in Nicosia, Ambassador Perrin saw these as lowering the tensions between the Greek and Turkish sides and promoting a mutually-agreed solution to the Cyprus problem. He invited any member of the country team who had ideas in this regard to see him directly. He was ready to lend himself, his position, and the prestige of the United States to any positive idea that helped strengthen U.S. interests.

Colonel Norton saw Ambassador Perrin immediately after this meeting. He explained the merits of General Greindl's deconfrontation plan, the problems that had developed when General Greindl was forced out of the issue and the unique access enjoyed by the USDAO with the various military commanders, and suggested that he (Norton) and Major Popovich try to keep the initiative alive.

The Ambassador was new to Cyprus and was still "feeling his way." Others in the embassy believed that the USDAO should not involve itself in UNFICYP negotiations and, in any event, felt that direct discussions with the Turkish Corps Commander were inappropriate. They preferred to limit U.S. involvement to supporting UNFICYP proposals with Cypriot and "TRNC" civilian officials. The Ambassador went with his instincts and told Norton and Popovich to press on and keep him and the UNFICYP commander informed.

General Milner Takes Command of UNFICYP

General Greindl's tour of duty came to an end and he was replaced by Canadian General Clive Milner, who took command bursting with energy and focused on getting Greindl's deconfrontation agreement approved. Like his Greek and Turkish counterparts, he too came from a NATO country and a good, close bond developed among these three officers. He believed that it would be a good approach to keep Brigadier Courage working the details of the plan at the one-star level with both sides while he would meet, as required, with Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos.

Quite naturally, General Milner looked to his deputy commander for advice in his early months in command. The briagdier was protective of UNFICYP's prerogatives and roles in furthering the peace process in Cyprus and he viewed the American Embassy's involvement in the deconfrontation process as inappropriate. Neither Generals Greindl nor Milner seemed to share this view, and they welcomed whatever advice or insights the Americans had to offer.

The USDAO contacts with Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos were now increased based on the latter's wishes. Milner was letting his deputy commander do the negotiating without undue interference on his part. Bitlis and Markopoulos, however, were convinced that without the direct and active participation of General Milner the initiative would be lost. They made all this abundantly clear to Norton and Popovich on numerous occasions.

Colonel Norton passed on the views of the Greek and Turkish military leaders, as well as his own views, to General Milner. He explained that Ambassador Perrin was very interested in helping and that he, himself, was going to continue to meet with Bitlis and Markopoulos. The USDAO would be glad to pass on any information to General Milner out of these meetings that would be useful in his mission. General Milner did, in fact, step up his contacts with the Greek and Turkish Commanders, however, he also kept his staff engaged on both sides at the lower level.

Establishing Some Trust Between Generals Markopoulos and Bitlis

Ambassador Perrin met with both Generals Markopoulos and Bitlis from time-to-time as a visible sign that the United States was interested in a deconfrontation agreement and to lend credibility to the work being done by Norton and Popovich. On one visit to Geneeral Markopoulos, the question of trust came up. Given the political climate in Cyprus, the two opposing force commanders never met face-to-face, so it was difficult for them to develop any degree of trust, which, of course, would be necessary before either one agreed to remove their soldiers from Ops in Nicosia.

The Ambassador asked how we could help. Was there something that we could ask Bitlis to do on Markopoulos' behalf as a sort of signal of his intentions? The Greek commander thought for awhile and then asked if we could get General Bitlis to remove a Star and Crescent 10  symbol from one of the hills that was easily visible from the south. General Markopoulos had asked UNFICYP several times to relay the same request but without results. This particular symbol was relatively new and was made of painted stones on a hillside just below where a Turkish OP was located in a former Greek Orthodox chapel. The soldiers manning the OP constructed it so it was easily visible to anyone driving between Nicosia and Larnaca Airport. To Markopoulos it represented an unnecessary irritant to the Greeks who were already annoyed that the Turks were using a former chapel for their OP, flying flags of Turkey and the "TRNC" from the bell tower. Markopoulos wanted us to ask Bitlis to remove it as an act of "good faith."

Ambassador Perrin and Colonel Norton discussed this request privately. How much effort should they put into something like this? What were the chances of getting it removed, especially since UNFICYP had already been involved without success? In the end, Ambassador Perrin felt this was a very important point of principle for the Greek side because it represented not just the removal of a symbol, but the element of trust. If the Turkish commander promised to remove it and then followed through, maybe Markopoulos could then trust Bitlis to live up to the conditions of the demanning plan.

Colonel Norton arranged a dinner with General and Mrs. Bitlis at an embassy owned house in north Cyprus. During the evening he discussed the Markopoulos request and what it meant, both from a practical and a symbolic view. A long time was spent explaining how Greeks felt whenever they glanced at the chapel occupied by Turkish soldiers. By putting a large visible Star and Crescent just below it, everyone's attention was now drawn to the hill and to the chapel. It gave the impression that the Turkish Army was totally insensitive to Greek feelings and even went out of its way to annoy the Greeks. By the end of the evening, General Bitlis agreed to have the symbol removed. He did not ask for a reciprocal favor.

Deconfrontation Becomes Political

General Bitlis was a very competent and self-assured officer. Neither Norton nor Popovich ever saw him lose his composure, except once. During one of their regular calls 11  with Bitlis, he received a phone call from the TCSF commander, General Yalcin. Yalcin reported that UNFICYP had brought the deconfrontation issue to the "TRNC" Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Dr. Kenan Atakol. Atakol saw a political side to deconfrontation that had, theretofore, been missed by him and Mr. Dentkash. If UNFICYP could be made to work deconfrontation solely through the "TRNC" chain (Yalcin as TCSF commander, Atakol as "TRNC MOD" and Dentkash as "TRNC President") it would lend credibility and subtle recognition of the "TRNC" as a sovereign state. Bitlis was furious!

General Bitlis had pushed the UNFICYP Deputy Commander to work with General Yalcin. This was not a big problem since Yalcin really reported to the Corps commander and only nominally to Dr. Atakol. But, now that UNFICYP had brought in Atakol, it created a new dilemma for Bitlis, one that he didn't enjoy. The more that the "TRNC" leaders got involved with deconfrontation, the more they were convinced that the UNFICYP plan should be approved by them and not by the Turkish General, Bitlis. For President Vassiliou, however, the Greek Cypriots would never sign an official agreement with a government they refused to recognize. When UNFICYP got deconfrontation out of purely military channels they almost doomed it to failure.

One evening, the chief of intelligence for the GCNG (a colonel in the Greek Army) came unannounced to Colonel Norton's quarters in Nicosia. He said that General Markopoulos would not be able to deliver on his promises to support deconfrontation as long as Mr. Denktash insisted that negotiations be headed by his "MOD," Dr. Atakol. He wondered if there was anything General Bitlis could do and could the American Embassy help? Once more Ambassador Perrin met with his USDAO team to look at the options.

The Ambassador was upset with UNFICYP for its naivete in discussing this with Dr. Atakol in the first place. The military discussions, while drawn out and needing a lot of behind the scenes help from the American Embassy, were almost at the point of completion. The Ambassador was already thinking beyond the deconfrontation agreement and was working on ideas to capitalize on this UNFICYP CBM with more significant movement on the political level. But, deconfrontation was an important, and maybe even a necessary step towards discussions on more complex issues. Unless a way could be found to get this back into a military channel, this initiative would fall into the category of "missed opportunities."

Norton and Popovich were asked to work with General Bitlis while Ambassador Perrin would engage President Vassiliou and Mr. Dentkash in an effort to salvage the deconfrontation plan. President Vassiliou could not let his MOD work with the "TRNC" "MOD" and Mr. Dentkash wouldn't agree to any plan not worked with his "MOD."

General Bitlis Finds a Way Out

General Bitlis' position was being made very uncomfortable by the "TRNC" officials. Bitlis agreed with UNFICYP that deconfrontation would lower incidents between Greek and Turkish soldiers without hurting the security of either community. He made commitments to General Markopoulos (through the USDAO) that he would support and honor the UNFICYP plan, and he didn't want "TRNC" politicians encroaching on issues which he felt were his responsibility.

While he didn't work for Mr. Dentkash, neither could he publicly disagree or question policy statements made by the Turkish- Cypriot leader. When Mr. Dentkash raised deconfrontation talks to the political level, he didn't ask General Bitlis. General Bitlis made it known to the USDAO that he felt his hands were tied by Mr. Dentkash. Without some kind of outside intervention, Bitlis felt that Mr. Dentkash would never voluntarily give up a chance to promote the "TRNC's" legitimacy. The military benefits of a deconfrontation agreement (lower tensions, fewer incidents between armed guards, etc.) were important to Bitlis but were secondary ones for Dentkash.

General Bitlis suggested that Ambassador Perrin might want to host a dinner at Tatli Su, 12  his house in north Cyprus. A small gathering with Mr. Dentkash, the Turkish Ambassador, and General Bitlis was recommended. Colonel Norton was asked to tell Ambassador Perrin that Bitlis was optimistic that such a dinner would produce positive results.

The Tatli Su Dinner

Ambassador Perrin pondered the idea. Some embassy staff thought that it was too risky and doubted that General Bitlis' optimism was well founded. They argued that Mr. Dentkash would not bow to U.S. pressure and that he had more power over the Turkish Corps Commander that General Bitlis wanted to admit. Besides, permission from Wahsington would be needed and that would take time.

Again Ambassador Perrin went with his instincts. He had spent more time with Mr. Dentkash than any of his predecessors and knew him well. He also had met with General Bitlis many times and greatly trusted his judgement. If Bitlis thought this would work, he must have thought it through well. As for Washington guidance, Ambassador Perrin felt he had all he needed and knew full well what points had to be made. In the end, he asked Colonel Norton to arrange the dinner, and limit it to five people, the "TRNC President," the Turkish Ambassador to the "TRNC," the Turkish Corps Commander, Ambassador Perri, and Colonel Norton.

When the five were seated for dinner, the Ambassador raised the deconfrontation issue with Mr. Dentkash. He explained how it was not a politically risky idea, that it would lower tensions in Nicosia, possibly save some young soldiers' lives, and had the full support of the United States Government. He went on to explain that there were rumors that the "TRNC" would look very bad the next time there was an incident in the area under discussion and the "TRNC" would get a lot of criticism. There are times, he said, when UNFICYP needed support for their initiatives. This was one of them and the Ambassador asked if the "TRNC" was ready to support deconfrontation.

To everyone's surprise (except possibly General Bitlis") Mr. Dentkash said the Green Line and "TRNC" security are largely the responsibility of Turkey and he deferred to the Turkish Ambassador. The Ambassador turned to General Bitlis and said these were issues under military jurisdiction. Ambassador Perrin then asked General Bitlis if he was ready to agree to the UNFICYP plan. After the general gave a quick and short affirmative answer, the American Ambassador turned again to Mr. Denktash and asked if it was all right for him to call General Milner the next morning and tell him deconfrontation was approved from the Turkish side. It was, Mr. Dentkash replied.

Shortly thereafter, General Yalcin signed the deconfrontation agreement on behalf of the Turkish side. General Bitlis purposely obfuscated General Yalcin's link to either himself (Turkish Army) or to Mr. Atakol ("TRNC").

Some Conclusions

UNFICYP (especially General Greindl) should get full credit for the idea of demanning Ops. However, left to their own devices, UNFICYP would never have brokered a deconfrontation agreement in 1989. Both UNFICYP commanders during this period (Greindl and Milner) were supportive of discreet involvement by the USDAO and the American Ambassador, but their staffs were not. It is doubtful that the American Embassy's role would have been successful without the support of the two UNFICYP commanders.

Direct involvement by the American Ambassador was necessary to keep deconfrontation on course politically and to ultimately get it approved. However, he left the majority of the military discussions to his USDAO team and trusted their judgement as to when he should interject himself into the process.

Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos persevered in their goal to get a deconfrontation agreement. Their commitment to the idea kept the proposal alive when there were problems. The time spent convincing them of the merits of the plan in the early stages of the process was time very well invested.

The personal relationships forged with President Vassiliou and Mr. Dentkash by Ambassador Perrin proved invaluable. For example, Mr. Dentkash agreed to end the previously mentioned anti-Greindl campaign as a result of the Ambassador's personal -- not official -- request.

The FAO training, background, and experience was crucial for Norton and Popovich to establish themselves with the Greek and Turkish commanders. Their knowledge of the area, the issues, and the culture, were absolutely essential for their role in the deconfrontation plan.

Any issue in Cyprus can be easily stopped by making it politically unacceptable to one side or the other. As seen in this article, it is also possible to "depoliticize" certain issues as well.

Bill K. Perrin was appointed by President Reagan to be Ambassador to Cyprus in 1987. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Asia, Regional Director for Peace Corps Africa, and President of the Inter-American Foundation. Ambassador Perrin is now retired and living in Florida.

Colonel Stephen R. Norton is a Army FAO and is currently the Defense Attache to Greece. He has had previous attache tours in Turkey and Cyprus. In 1991/1992, he served as SACEUR's Special Assistant for the Eastern Mediterranean and was the Politico-Military Planner for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1984 to 1986. He holds a Master's Degree in International Affairs from the American University, Washington, D.C. and is a 1990 graduate of the Army War College.

Endnotes

1. Rauf Denktash is the "President" of the "TRNC" and has been the leader of the Turkish Cypriots since 1974. He is highly respected by the Turkish Cypriots, is a master politician, and continues in his leadership role to the present day.BACK

2. Esref Bitlis was promoted to full General in the summer of 1990 and left Cyprus to command the Jandarma in Ankara. He was subsequently killed in a plane crash in Turkey.BACK

3. Ali Yalcin has been promoted to Lieutenant General and is serving again in Cyprus, this time as the comander of the Turkish Corps.BACK

4. Panayoitis Markopoulos was the commader of the Hellenic First Army before being assigned to command GCNG. Hellenic First Army is the premier command in Greece and Markopoulos had a reputation as an excellent soldier, trainer, and visionary.BACK

5. Dimitrios Dimou has recently been promoted to Lieutenant General and is now commanding Hellenic First Army. He was not directly involved in the deconfrontation agreement but probably gave Athens his independent appraisal of the concept.BACK

6. Varosha was the major seaside resort town in 1974 and was the centerpiece of the Cypriot tourist industry. It is next to the medieval city of Famagusta and is better known internationally by that name. When the Turkish Army arrived at Varosha, they found it completely deserted and sealed it off with barbed wire. With minor exceptions, it remains uninhabited and sealed off to the present time. It represents the single most important territorial "bargaining chip" that the "TRNC" has to use for a Cyprus solution.BACK

7. The Nicosia Airport ended up in the buffer zone after the 1974 fighting and has remained closed since that time. The Greek Cypriots compensated for its loss by enlarging Larnaca Airport, while the Turkish side converted a former Royal Air Force field into a commercial airport called Ercan Havaalani in Turkish. Greindl's idea was to reopen Nicosia Airport and allow incoming passengers to then enter either the Turkish or Greek side of the island.BACK

8. Major Popovich served a four year tour on Cyprus and was with Colonel Norton for virtually every meeting with the UNFICYP, Greel, and Turkish commanders. He was a key member of the team that got the deconfrontation agreement approved. He has since been selected for promotion to Colonel and is currently serving in European Policy, OSD.BACK

9. Ambassado Perrin privately asked Mr. Denktash to remove the banners and end the campaing against General Greindl. He explained that it was totally unfair to tarnish a man who wokred so hard to promote peace in Cyprus over an insignificant incident not of his making. It made the "TRNC" look petty. The signs came down a few days later and Mr. Dentkash even hosted a farewell reception for General Greindl when he left Cyprus.BACK

10. The Star and Crescent are integral parts of the flag of Turkey and the "TRNC." It is traditional for Turkish military units to construct large replicas of this symbol, or quotations from Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, on hillsides. What was done at this particular OP was not unique, but it was recent.BACK

11. Office calls with General Bitlis generally consisted of just Norton, Popovich, and one Turkish Cypriot reserve officer as interpreter. Bitlis always selected Turkish Cypriots who had abvanced degrees from either American or British universities and were totally bilingual. The length of these calls varied from one and a half to three hours.BACK

12. Tatli Su means "sweet water" in Turkish. It was the name of the American Ambassador's residence in north Cyprus. Because the Green Line divides the island. Turks and Turkish Cypriots could not visit the Ambassador's residence in Greek Nicosia. Therefore, several embassies kept houses on bot sides in order to conduct diplomatic business.BACK

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
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