CULTURAL AWARENESS AND NEGOTIATION SKILLS

by Anthony D. Marley (March 1997)

I served more than half of my Army career as a Foreign Area Officer specializing in Sub-Saharan Africa (48J). During the latter stages of my career, while assigned to FAO positions in the Pentagon and the Department of State, I had the opportunity on several occasions to participate in negotiations -- peace negotiations seeking to end African civil wars, as well as negotiations at the UN with NATO allies as we sought to hammer out the terms of a mandate for UN peacekeeping forces in Africa. While my thoughts are primarily drawn from my experience in Africa, I would hope that they may bear applicability to other regions of the world, because many of the issues with which we grappled are global in their nature.

The purpose of this essay is to identify and discuss the "cultures" with which I believe a FAO must be thoroughly knowledgeable if he or she is to successfully participate in negotiations. I will then discuss some basic "lessons learned," and conclude with recommendations concerning specific training and experience that FAOs should seek to better prepare themselves to serve in such a capacity. "Negotiations" as discussed in this paper are from the perspective of the U.S. as a Third Party to the talks as a mediator, or as an observer-participant, not from the perspective of the U.S. as a principal party to the conflict being negotiated.

Culture

I believe that there are four "cultures" or traditions with which an American military negotiator must be familiar. These are: the requisite foreign culture; U.S. political culture; culture of Western democratic trad-ition; and military culture.

Foreign Culture.

In the area of "Foreign Culture," a negotiator must be well-versed in regional history and culture, as well as possess a soph-isticated understanding of regional politics and relationships. This know-ledge is essential to give a would-be peacemaker a sense of the timing regarding the prospects for peace; to determine the ripeness of the situation for the reaching of a peace settlement.

The negotiator must under-stand the background and nature of the specific conflict in question, the par-ticipant state, and the factions involved. This includes an apprec-iation or awareness of such factors as ethnicity, history and pre-colonial tra-ditions, patterns of political control, religion, and language. The negotiator must get into the personalities of the key players central to the conflict.

An awareness of the follwing subjects, as they pertain to the conflict, is also required:

- the identity and motivations of the foreign backers of the parties to the conflict;

- regional political dynamics;

- the possible political agenda of the mediator(s);

- the role and agenda of the reg-ional organization (if any) in the area; and

- the role and agenda of the United Nations and its various sub-agencies.

U.S. Political or Politico-Military Culture.

As concerns our own country, a military negotiator should have a thorough grounding in U.S. civil-military relations and U.S. nat-ional policy.

The situation demands that the military negotiator understand American national political goals pertaining to the conflictual state and the region. Beyond "peace," what are the goals that the U.S. seeks as the endstate of the negotiations process, and how solid is the U.S. political sup-port for that endstate? What resources, if any, is the U.S. willing to commit to support the process, itself? The negotiator should also be able to frame the conflict in question against U.S. policy criteria for support of peace-keeping operations.

Understanding our own civil-military relations must include such seemingly esoteric elements as the fact that we swear an oath to uphold the Constitution rather than to stand by the President or a particular political movement, to the fact that while the President serves as the Commander-in-Chief only Congress can declare war. The officer should also understand what right military personnel do and do not possess pertaining to par-ticipatory politics. An American military negotiator must be able to explain to foreign interlocuters that the Constitution, as amended, not only establishes the Federal Government, but specifically limits the authority of that government in protecting the rights if the states and the individual citizens. The ability to explain the differences in our approaches to these issues to the foreign participants will go a long way to building the frame of references necessary for a successful negotiation.

Western Democratic Traditions.

There are many forms of democracy currently practiced by our Western allies and other countries around the world. How do they differ from each other, and how does each of them differ from the U.S. practices of democracy? The military negotiator should understand, in a general way, how the European forms of democracy evolved, their politico-military tra-ditions, and how they operate. These countries held the colonial reins of much of the Third World until the re-cent past and it is these forms that overlay the native traditions and con-dition the conflictual state's actions and reactions in the negotiation process.

Military Culture.

A thorough under-standing of general military culture is the greatest single asset that the mil-itary negotiator brings to the table.
Additionally, the military negotiator needs to understand the military aspects of the peace pro-cesses: Encampment and disarm-ament, demobilization of forces, and force integration (to include force sizing, structure, organization, and training). The bottom-line is that this officer needs to know what solutions have been tried elsewhere; what has worked and why; and what has not worked and why. He/she brings a professional "sanity check" to the process, ensuring that discussion remains focused on real solutions rather than idealized fantasy.

Lessons Learned.

The military negotiator should be perceived as being a neutral. There usually are not "good guys" and bad guys" in a con-flict; there typically is plently of blame to attach to both sides of a war. A "carrot and stick" approach lets one party off the hook and focuses too narrowly on punishment for the other party. Such an approach risks hard-ening the positions of both parties. The negotiator must understand, and make the parties understand, that they have a mutual problem, and must find a solution together. The positive elements of a proposed agreement must be emphasized in an effort to convince all the players that they must cooperate to acheive any mutually beneficial outcome.

Politically, the negotiator benefits from the linkage between diplomacy and power. The U.S. is rightly perceived as a superpower, as well as being the leader of a strong military alliance. On the flip side, however, the negotiator must disabuse the parties in the negotiations of unrealistic expectations as to the extent that the U.S. can or will provide economic or security assistance.

A peacemaker should be a careful listener. This requries listening across cultural lines, and being able to provide advice and candid, credible opinions. Bluntness has its place in the process; to be direct rather than diplomatic, even with high ranking government officials can be beneficial.

On the other hand, there may be times when a peacemaker cannot say something directly, or in an open forum with all sides present and observing. On occasion, informal meetings or even discussions over drinks may be more useful than a formal negotiating session. But the trick remains communicating across cultural lines and creating an approp-riate atmosphere for a settlement.

Training.

The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to lead to the issue of what FAOs must learn if they are to serve effectively as a military negotiator. In addition to being con-versant with the four "cultures" out-lined earlier, the FAO must learn his or her assigned foreign language(s) to a degree that permits participation in high level negotiations not conducted in English. To have to rely on trans-lators for critical nuances is to invite failure. The goal of a FAO must be to read, speak, and comprehend the lan-guage with accuracy and confidence.

Second, the FAO must truly be familiar with the region of special-ization. This includes widespread travel, consecutive assignments in the region or dealing with it, and staying abreast of professional and academic discussion dealing with it.

Third, the FAO should under-stand how Washington, DC, "works." He or she must comprehend the dynamics of the interagency process in matters dealing with foreign and defense policies.

Last, if possible, the FAO should receive formal training in negotiation techniques. I had the opportunity to attend the State Department's course in "negotiating Arts and Skills," but only after I had already participated in peacetalks dealing with four separate conflicts. Fortunately, prior to that, I was men-tored by an ex-FAO with extensive negotiations experience. In addition to the State Department course, the Army War College and the FBI conduct courses on negotiating, and several universities have negotiations courses as part of their curricula. It is in the interest of the Army to see to it that FAOs are sent to such training.

Participation in international negotiations is both interesting and rewarding in a professional sense. FAOs must be prepared to play thier part if an opportunity comes their way.

LTC(R) Marley is an African FAO, a graduate of CGSC, and the Cameroon Staff College. He was the first SecurityAssistance officer in Cameroon. He was the Army Attach‚ in Liberia. While in Washington, DC, he served in the Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs and in the State Department as Military Adviser to the Bureau of African affairs. During his career, he participated in negotiations in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Liberia.

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
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