Commander's Intent - A Strategic Vignette

by LTC Karl Prinslow (June 1997)

The idea of Commander's Intent is taught in the Army's junior officer's training courses with focus at the tactical and operational level. This philosophy is no less applicable as the junior officer faces operational and strategic level concerns while serving at more senior levels. Commander's Intent is "the commander's stated vision which defines the purpose of an operation, the end state with respect to the relationship among the force, the enemy and the terrain; it must enable subordinates to quickly grasp the successful end state and their part in achieving it". The following recalls how the lessons learned by a Foreign Area Officer when serving as a tactical unit staff officer and commander applied to an operational or strategic level situation.

In September 1994, the U.S. committed over 3,000 personnel from all services to support a humanitarian relief operation to halt starvation and disease brought about by ethnic fighting and mass emigration from Rwanda. The U.S. Operation Support Hope deployed naval ships, air force strategic and tactical lift, Military Sealift Command pre-positioned ships and Army personnel for their off-loading to East Africa. A Joint Task Force was organized by the European Command (EUCOM) and headquartered in Kampala, Uganda. Across the border in Kenya, within the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), USAF personnel and aircraft supported over 30 flights a day of relief supplies into Rwanda, being re-fueled by tankers stationed in Zimbabwe. The military liaison office to the government of Kenya, called the Kenya U.S. Liaison Office (KUSLO) is a CENTCOM J4/7 field office that coordinates U.S. Security Assistance programs and CENTCOM contingency operations and training exercises in Kenya.

Much like the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was a supporting CINC to the European Command for this operation. There was no formal command relationship between the KUSLO and the JTF. Personal contact leading to the following described events was only via message traffic and occasional (and very difficult to complete) phone calls.

On a Friday afternoon the KUSLO read, in an otherwise routine message, of the possibility of Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) personnel conducting a site-survey and reconnaissance of East Africa in preparation for the possible employment of JSDF units to the humanitarian relief operation. This site survey was to begin the following Tuesday. No guidance, requests for assistance or orders to provide support to the Japanese delegation was provided to KUSLO nor to the JTF. Over the weekend the Chief KUSLO received a phone call from the First Secretary of the Japanese embassy requesting the KUSLO's help.

On early Monday morning Kenya time (about midnight in Washington) a rep of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, called the KUSLO to inquire as to whether KUSLO was aware of the Japanese delegation's mission and what will KUSLO do to support it? KUSLO informed him of their awareness of the pending delegation and their lack of details and guidance or direction from CENTCOM or the JTF. MAJ Bittrick provided additional details of the Japanese advance party travel schedule and thus the implied deadlines. After about 5 minutes of exchanging uncertainties as to what is to take place and who is required or expected to act, it became clear to a KUSLO officer that among reasons for the American DOD's interest in the Japanese delegation was a letter sent by President Clinton, the Commander in Chief, to the Prime Minister of Japan pledging all available U.S. assistance to the Japanese delegation and humanitarian relief operations. This letter was sent to Japan during the preceding week, about two weeks prior to President Clinton's first meeting with the new Japanese head of state. Although many in the U.S. Department of Defense were not on the letter's distribution, members of the government of Japan were well aware of the letter. Their interpretation of its contents was a promise of the U.S. military's ability to support their elegation with aircraft, ground transportation, introductions to civil authorities in three countries and providing current intelligence and sitreps.

An awareness of the letter and its contents caused the following phone conversation:

- KUSLO officer to MAJ Bittrick " What branch of service are you?"

- "Army"

- "Then you know what Commander's Intent' means and refers to?

- "Yeah"

- "It sounds to me like we have the Commander's intent to support with all means available the Japanese delegation that arrives in Kenya tomorrow, the advance party for which arrived over the weekend or arrives today."

- "Yes I think that's correct."

- "I also understand that assistance to the Japanese delegation should not be done at the expense of supporting the ongoing humanitarian effort, i.e. don't bump relief supplies to accommodate the Japanese."

- "Yes, you've got it."

- "Good, then since it is coming up on one A.M. your time, why don't you get some sleep and when you come back to work call me and I'll tell you what we've done."

MAJ Bittrick then faxed a copy of the President's letter to Kenya.

With a clear understanding of the commander's intent (the Commander in Chief's intent in this case) and an appreciation for the sensitivity of U.S.- Japanese relations, the importance of the JSDF deploying combat troops outside the territory of Japan for the first time since 1945 and the dire emergency ongoing in east Africa, the KUSLO officer began to plan, organize and coordinate assets required to support the Japanese delegation.

The members of the Japanese delegation and schedule was confirmed by a visit from the first secretary of the Japanese embassy two hours later. Because of the possibility that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) may have already arranged air transport, the next step was to coordinate with the UNHCR in Nairobi, UN air coordinator in Zurich, Switzerland and then the JTF air cell in Kampala, the EUCOM air operations cell in Stuttgart and the JTF air component commander in Mombasa, Kenya. The itinerary for the site survey, briefings and recons were coordinated with the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) located in Kampala, Uganda as well as in Kigali.. The CMOC also arranged the ground transport plan with their UNHCR representative.

By 1600 hours Nairobi time, KUSLO was able to meet the Japanese advance party. American face' was saved. As the Commander in Chief had promised, the U.S. military was able to confirm their aircraft departure time and place for the next morning, a tentative itinerary for the rest of the week and points of contact and briefings at each of their stops. The J-3 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said of the KUSLO officer's efforts, "You really pulled our chestnuts out of the fire. In eight hours you planned, organized, coordinated and started execution on what we here in Washington couldn't decide to do in three days. Thanks. This would have been really embarrassing with President Clinton going to Japan in less than two weeks."

The success of the Japanese site survey and recon allowed the delegation members to convince the Japanese parliament and respective Ministers to deploy JSDF combat units to this humanitarian crisis. It eliminated a potentially embarrassing issue between the two national leaders at a time of inter-governmental friction about pending trade talks. The close support and cooperation between the Japanese delegation and the American military liaison office paid dividends for further U.S. - Japanese relations in East Africa and especially throughout the humanitarian relief operation. It may have also demonstrated to the host nations of East Africa the value and resolve that these two nations have in maintaining support to their partners and even allies in the region as well as the U.S. commitment to humanitarian interests as being among our stated strategic interests.

LTC Karl Prinslow is an experienced Sub-Saharan African FAO, who currently works as the African Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. He has contributed numerous articles to a variety of military journals.

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
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