Colombia: Civil-Military Relations
at a Crossroads

"En Colombia, que es tierra de las cosas singulares dan la paz los militares y los civiles dan querra."

Gregorio Gomez, Sociologia Politica Colombiana


The problems facing the Colombian regime today are complex and violent, and they seem to be threatening the legitimacy of Colombia's political institutions. The magnitude of the challenge of coping with ever increasing levels of social violence, civil disorder, corruption, narcotrafficking and insurgency is threatening the very fabric of civil-military relations - civilian control.

The aim of this paper is to explore the current state of civil-military relations in Colombia. In this single case study, my central argument is that civil-military relations in Colombia have eroded sufficiently to be a source of concern to students of political-military relations. This paper will discuss how the roles played by the National Front, the current political regime, U.S. military aid and budgetary restrictions have contributed to heightening the tension between civilian and military actors in the Colombian political scene. I will conclude with an appraisal of the possible consequences if the deterioration of civil-military relations in Colombia continues unchecked.

While the Congress and the Executive have done little or nothing to address the current state of the nation, the Colombian Armed Forces have served the country's political forces faithfully and professionally for over 60 years. Even today, as Colombia is experiencing an undeclared internal war on two fronts--the guerrilla movement and the well organized drug cartels--the military remains supportive and loyal to the regime.

However, "[t]he professionalism of the military has not kept them out of politics. Rather it has given the armed forces a strategic political good--the capacity to influence fundamentally the outcome of internal political conflict--which the contenders seek to diminish" (Maulin 1973, 113). This role of guardians of internal order' has been one of the several factors in the erosion of civil-military relations in Colombia. Since, according to Wendy Hunter "strong civilian control is difficult to sustain when the armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict (Hunter 1996, vii)." The other significant factor is the question of legitimacy surrounding the Ernesto Samper presidency. His administration has been plagued by serious allegations of presidential involvement with financial contributions from the cartels and continuous guerrilla activity.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that on only four occasions has the Colombian military overthrown a constitutionally chosen president: 1830, 1854, 1900 and 1953. For Latin America, an area plagued by military coups and military junta types of government, this speaks highly of the legitimacy and control exercised by the political authorities over the armed forces. This deviation from the norm -- if the norm is considered to be the military governments that existed in Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil during the 1960s and early 70s -- could be a direct result of a "semiconscious policy by the Colombian upper class to keep the military in its place and prevent any challenge to civilian rule" (Dix 1967, 295). Yet, other factors might have played a more significant role than those discussed by Robert H. Dix in Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. A closer inspection of the role played by the National Front in Colombian politics would support this view.

The National Front, an "elite pact",1  responded to two threats in the Colombian political landscape of 1956: first, mass mobilization, over which the elites had lost control and was turning to mass violence. Second, to the threat posed by the military government of General Rojas Pinillas, as it attempted to displace the political parties and perpetuate an authoritarian regime (Peeler 1992, 95). In essence, what the National Front provided was a vehicle through which the political elite could exercise dominance over the political, social and economic process, promoting their own interests while avoiding social unrest. Nevertheless, the co-optation of the military by the civilian elite granted officers in the institution vast privileges and virtual autonomy (Otis 1998).

Military professionalism and the reluctance of the political elite to sponsor military solutions to domestic problems also contribute to the current civil-military panorama in Colombia. Edwin Lieuwen points out two controlling factors that acted on the Colombian military as early as 1950: first, "the participation of a Colombian battalion in the Korea conflict, which stimulates the army's sense of nationalism and gives it a sense of mission; and second, the influx of U.S. military aid" (Dix 1967, 299). However, the Brazilian experience with the return of its military contingent from the European theater in World War II and the recent de-certification of Colombia seem to refute both of these factors. In the Brazilian case the increase in the professionalism of the armed forces caused by their participation in the European theater of operations seems to have precipitated the institutions taking part in government. Furthermore, the U.S. de-certification of Colombia, seems to indicate that other factors, in addition to military aid, need to be present in order to increase the armed forces professionalism. Richard Maulin, in 1973, stated that U.S. military aid served two objectives: first to raise the military's effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations and internal security missions; and secondly to promote the military's contribution to social and economic progress (Maulin 1973, 100).

Nonetheless, today the insurgency problem continues to plague the nation, and social and economic problems seem more acute. Antonio Caballero, writing in Semana, directly accuses the military for the increase in subversive acts in the country. He wrote "They [the military] are in fact the principal cause for the increase. For decades Colombia's government has given the military a free hand to put an end to subversion and the subversion has merely increased" (Raymont 1996, 3). Peru, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil have had to confront a leftist threat. However, "the repression of the Colombian left and the magnitude of its losses [over 30,000 left wing militants, activist and sympathizers killed] are unparalleled in modern Latin American history" (Casta¤eda 1994, 116). By the late 1980s, it was obvious that the military had lost control over both the subversive forces and the drug cartels. With regard to the issue of military participation in nation building, according to Wendy Hunter, military participation in civic and developmental roles contribute to create a positive image for the military, while it undermines the development of civilian institutions and contribute to a greater military role in government (Hunter 1996, 6). In the Colombian situation, the military's expanded involvement with civic and developmental programs in the country would further weaken the Colombian government in terms of efficacy and efficiency.2  This would lead to further erosion of civil-military relations, as civil society would perceive the regime as being unable to meet, through the use of civil institutions, the social, economic and security objectives of the population.

The fact remains that "a fear of an upsurge of militarism is spreading [throughout the area] at a time when the Latin American community is committed to demilitarizing the region and strengthening civilian society" (Raymont 1996, 9). Nonetheless, an analysis of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database on Colombia's military spending from 1986 to 1995 clearly shows that militarism, at least for the Colombian military is not on the rise. On the contrary, Colombian armed forces have experienced a significant decline in their operating budget since 1993, at which time it was 1.1 billion dollars; 1994, 900 million; and 1995, 825 million dollars (SIPRI Database, 1996). Furthermore, according to the National Planing Department, military expenditures during the period from 1990 to 1994 totaled 3.4 billion dollars. This is during a period in which Colombia's long-running war with leftist guerrillas claimed more than 17,000 lives at a cost of about 12.5 billion dollars between 1990 and 1994 (Reuters 1996). For example, according to the National Defense Council, combined income sources yield an average income of 70,000 dollars per guerrilla, compared to 900 dollars per soldier in the Army (Raymont, 1996). These budgetary cuts have done severe harm to political-military relations, since not only have they affected salaries, pensions and benefits, they have impacted on the military's operational capabilities as demonstrated by the institutions failure in the recent combat in El Caguan. 3 

Colombian columnist Clara Nieto Ponce de Leon, writing in El Espectador, points out that "the military do not need a coup in order to exercise power; the government--more debilitated than ever--will give them free rein" (Raymont 1996, 4). If Linz is correct in asserting that the monopoly on the use of force belongs to the state, then Colombia, with its proliferation of violence, questions the legitimacy of the state. President Samper denies the turning over of the country to the military forces and recently reasserted his leadership as Commander-in-Chief with his handling of disgruntled officers over concessions to guerrilla groups in the peace process. There is no doubt that in the war to eradicate guerrilla violence and drug traffic, the armed forces enjoy the support of both the business and political sectors. But, after four decades of fighting guerrillas, the armed forces are still in search of a national and military strategy that will bring a peaceful solution to the conflict.

In conclusion, Colombia's " pattern of control in which civilians respect military autonomy over operational matters in exchange for voluntary military subordination to civilian authority on other matters" is experiencing severe strain (Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995, 5). The civilian elites' use of subjective civilian control, which originated with the creation of the National Front, has been successful in co-optig and politicizing the armed forces. However, it is no longer effective in dealing with Colombia's current political challenges. The military aid provided by the U.S. gives the Colombian military the means by which to protect its autonomy, but has failed to meet its objective of increasing military effectiveness in promoting internal security, social and economic progress. Furthermore, the tension between civil and military elites continue to rise due to the failure of the current regime to frame a solution to the insurgency problem based not only on the use of military force, but also on social, economic and political justice. Another factor contributing to the erosion of political-military relations is the question of legitimacy that plagues the Samper presidency. Finally, the budgetary reductions suffered by the armed forces have made them non-combat effective', which threatens the institutions ethos - its professionalism.

One can categorically state that the armed forces in Colombia remain supportive of the political system and under firm governmental control, although tensions are high. Thus, they are not in a position to act as a main protagonist in any move to stifle the continual development of democratic institutions. Yet, NOTIMEX has reported, and U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frachette confirmed, that civilians have approached the U.S. Embassy in Colombia in order to explore relations with the U.S. in case of a coup. The Colombian military as a supporting actor is a distinct possibility, especially as the level of frustration continues to grow over their inability to stem the increase in guerrilla and cartel activity. The use of the armed forces in Argentina, Peru and Brazil has already demonstrated that the dependence on the armed forces for the maintenance of internal order is detrimental to the development of sound democratic principles. The continuous focusing of the Colombian military on internal roles and missions without a national strategy and a concerted effort for dialogue between the military, guerrillas and policymakers will only serve to intensify the unease in current civil-military relations in Colombia.

REFERENCE MATTER

Casta¤eda, Jorge G. 1994. Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War. New York: Vintage Books

Colombia, Military Spending 1986-95. 1996. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.; available from www.sipri.se/projects/milex/expenditure/Colombia.html; Internet.

Dix, Robert H. 1967. Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. New Heaven: Yale University Press

Higley, John and Gunther Richard. 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hunter, Wendy. 1996. State and Soldier in Latin America: Redifining the Military's Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 10.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Linz, Juan J. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration<,p/i>. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Maulin, Richard. 1973. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Lexington: Lexington Books.

NOTIMEX. 1996. "Government Condemns US Official's Remarks on President Samper."; available from British Broadcasting Corporation; LEXIS/NEXIS.

Otis, John. 1998. "Colombian Army Stuck in Quagmire Against Insurgency."; available from The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company; LEXIS/NEXIS.

Peeler, John A. 1992. "Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela." Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. ed. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Penhaul, Karl. 1995. "Feature-Colombia War Fever Grows, Rebel Confidence High."; available from on line from AOL News@aol.com.

Raymont, Henry. 1996. "Latin America: Guerrilla Offensive Rekindle Militarism."; available on line from FBIS, Document Number FBIS-TOT-97-001-L.

Reuters. 1996. "Colombia Counts Cost of Long-running Guerrilla War."; available on line from ATS-L@etext.org.

Snider, Don M. and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew. 1995. U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition. ed. Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Endnotes

1. See John Higley and Richard Gunther. 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.BACK

2. For a more in depth explanation see: Linz, Juan J. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. BACK

3. Penhaul, Karl. "Feature - Colombia War Fever Grows, Rebel Confidence High." Available from AOL News. El Caguan is located in Caqueta Province, and is the site of the latest FARC and Colombian forces skirmish, which resulted in the death of 83 members of the 3er Mobile Brigade.BACK

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