United States -- China
PERCEPTUAL
DIFFERENCES
LTC(P) Susan Puska, China FAO
INTRODUCTION
The two United States-People's Republic of China (PRC) summits, in October 1997 and
June 1998, appear to have stabilized bilateral relations to a degree not seen since June 4, 1989.
Beneath the positive signs and promise of even greater progress and cooperation, however, lie
persistent uncertainty and potential instability. It remains uncertain whether or not the current
positive trend will collapse overnight in the face of the next bilateral crisis.
Radical swings have characterized much of the history (discus-sed below) of United States-
PRC relations since the mid-1900s. These shifts have ranged from the extremes of idealized
friendship during times of war and strategic alliances to mutual enmity and isolation, such as
during the Korean War and the Cold War period until 1972. Accompanying these swings have
been emotionally-charged extremes in how each country views the other that have often soured
state-to-state relations.
Figure
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The boom-bust nature that has
characterized United States-China relations for the last 150 years can be illustrated as a cyclic
pattern as shown in Figure 1. The U.S.-China paradigm can be divided into at least four
predictable stages -- punishment (including isolation), reassessment and opening that is spurred
by a "breakthrough," followed by high, often unrealistic expectations, only to be disrupted by
mutual disillusionment and recrimination, and once more returning to a negative period.
This paradigm has been facilitated by an asymmetrical power relationship that has, so far,
favored the United States with its stronger components of comprehensive national power
(especially economic, political, and military). 1 This imbalance has permitted the U.S., which
remains overwhelmingly focussed on Europe and Middle East oil, to repeatedly ignore or
neglect U.S.-China relations. The brief periods of alliance between the U.S. and China, during
WWII or the strategic triangle of the 1970s, were only short lived and narrowly focussed to
counterbalance a mutual enemy of the period, i.e., Japan or the Soviet Union.
Despite its comparatively weaker power position, China has successfully thwarted United
States military and political power on China's borders, as it did directly in the Korean War, and
indirectly in the Vietnam War. 2
Chinese leaders are unapologetic about their
weaker power relationship to the United
States, and in many ways see themselves as
America's equal, and even its superior in
some aspects. This sense of confidence and
strong national identity is wedded to a sense
of grievance over past Western oppression
and dismemberment, and a suspicion that the
West (symbolized by the United States)
seeks to prevent China from realizing its full
potential as a regional and global power.
Helping to perpetuate this cyclic
pattern, which has prevented United States-China relations from maturing, is an underlying
mutual perceptual gap. This has proved critical, especially at the point where mutual
expectations bloom. It has often led to mutually unrealistic, even false, expectations, based on
misperceptions. These, in turn, have led to dangerous miscalculations. In the 1995-1996 Taiwan
crisis, for example, Administration and congressional leaders miscalculated how the Chinese
would ultimately react to Lee Tenghui's visit to the United States in April 1995. The Chinese
leadership, in turn, miscalculated how the United States military would respond to its March
1996 missile exercise, as well as the level of concern its "internal" actions would have
throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
As Sunzi recognized centuries ago, to promote one's own interests, it is not merely enough
to know your opponent or to simply know yourself. The one who knows both has the best
chance for success - i.e., "will not be endangered in a hundred engagements." 3 With this goal in
mind, we will examine both the American and Chinese sides of this perceptual gap, primarily in
terms of mutual philosophical and cultural aspects, mutual historical experiences, as well as
lingering ideological problems. This inquiry may assist policy makers, and others engaged in
managing United States-China contacts by providing a deeper understanding of the cultural
underpinning of each country's policy goals, strategies and limitations.
U.S.-CHINA PERCEPTUAL GAP:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Miscommunications and misunderstandings between Chinese and Americans frequently
arise from philosophical and cultural differences. Often there is a complete break in
understanding what is important to the other party and why. For example, in official meetings it
is common for the Chinese to measure their success on the basis of form, such as an office call
with an inappropriately high official, while Americans will often define success in terms of the
substance discussed or agreed upon with the Chinese.
When Americans fail to satisfy the Chinese need for form, they risk offending the Chinese
and undermining feelings of goodwill, thus further degrading opportunities (however slight) for
progress on issues of substance. When the Chinese fail to satisfy the American need for
substance, however, they, in turn, may offend American counterparts, fueling distrust and raising
doubts over the utility of contacts.
The Chinese penchant for personal over institutional relations aggravates the form-
substance gap with the United States. In military-to-military contacts, for example, Chinese tend
to resist institutional ties and following regular procedures. They prefer informal contacts that
depend on a few trusted intermediaries ("friends of China") and ad hoc procedures in pursuit of
Chinese interests and objectives, which actually can undermine relations over the long term.
Informal relations have clear limits for contacts with the United States military, where normal,
non-adversarial relations with foreign militaries are characterized by regularization, institutional
ties, and reciprocity, all of which help build mutual trust, communication, and cooperation.
Regularization also mitigates against changes in contacts that can result from normal rotation of
American military personnel.
One way of understanding the Chinese preference for form, versus the American preference
for substance, is by examining the philosophical roots of Chinese and Western worldviews.
David Hall and Roger Ames 4 have traced the earliest philosophical differences
between the West and China to the period from 800-200 BC, by which time dramatically
different cultural perspectives had developed. China's worldview gravitated toward analogical
or correlative thinking, while the West's showed a preference for rational and causal thinking.
5 Despite
these vastly different preferred perspectives, each culture, nonetheless, retained recessive
elements of the other's preferred view
According to Hall and Ames, Western thinking presupposes: the beginning of things arises
from chaos; the universe is single-ordered; rest has priority over change (i.e. being has priority
over becoming); and the belief in an agency of construal, such as the Will of God, which
ultimately determines the state of affairs in the world. 6
In contrast, Chinese thinking does not presume "an initial beginning nor the existence of
a single ordered world. This mode of thinking accepts the priority of change or process over rest
and permanence, presumes no ultimate agency responsible for the general order of things, and
seeks to account for states of affairs by appeal to correlative procedures rather than by
determining agencies and principles." 7
These cultural and philosophical differences give rise to very different perspectives of time,
for example, that often negatively affect dealings between the two countries. For the Chinese,
time is an open-ended process with no beginning and no end. In a sense, time has "no value" to
the Chinese because it is eternal. 8 While the Chinese tend to take the long view,
looking backward to over 5,000 years of continuous civilization 9 with special pride, Americans tend to
look more to the future and emphasize how fleeting time is. Consequently, the American
tendency to be impatient for change often clashes with the seemingly eternal patience of the
Chinese.
These different perspectives on time are common in the dealings between the United States
and China. In 1988-89 before June 4th, Chinese students I talked with often discussed their
concept of democracy in China. Contrary to popular views at the time in the United States,
many students demanded greater democracy (specifically the vote) for themselves as
intellectuals, but they had a much different view of what was appropriate for the majority - the
peasants. Most argued that the 'backward' and 'uneducated' peasants were not yet ready for
democracy and would first need time to develop culturally. When I asked how long this would
take, it was not unusual for the students to suggest that 50 to 100 years, or one or more
generations 10 of development was needed before the Chinese
majority would be ready for democracy.
It is not uncommon for a Chinese counterpart to ask for patience from the American side,
arguing that points of disagreement will eventually be resolved once generational change occurs
in the Chinese system, for example. Although sometimes such arguments are merely stalling
tactics to set aside a contentious issue while promoting Chinese interests, they often reflect the
"time is eternal" viewpoint. For the American side, however, the promise of change in the
undetermined and distant future, is untenable, especially when the Chinese seek concessions
today on the basis of a nebulous tomorrow.
Figure
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The main elements of the philosophical and cultural
dimensions of the perceptual gap between the United States and China can be depicted as in
Figure 2. Although both cultures can and do occasionally cross the line to selectively (and
temporarily) assume positions of the other culture's world view, both the United States and
China tend to stay within the boundaries of their own cultural and philosophical preferences.
These deeply imbedded differences, which are diametrically opposed to one another, help
explain why miscommunication often arises between China and the United States.
Ames and Hall suggest the United States' tendency to universalize Western values, a
frequent sticking point in United States-PRC relations, is an outcome of Western causal and
linear thinking. 11 Americans tend to see the spread of
Western values as a sacred mission, based on universal principles that are guided by a higher
order than the mere will of man. Further, America's own security and national interests are
often linked to the attainment of universal principles.
United States National Security Strategy (NSS) Versus China White Paper
In the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement,
12 for
example, the connection between the United States' national interests and global conditions in
the post-Cold War era is closely linked and mutually reinforcing:
This national security strategy . . . is premised on the belief that the line between our
domestic and foreign policies is disappearing - that we must revitalize our economy if we are to
sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage
actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people. 13
The importance that the NSS attaches to promoting democracy and market economy abroad
is based upon the belief that:
Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free
market nations with growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more likely to feel
secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our
interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and
promote free trade and sustainable development. 14
America's self-proclaimed mission to globally spread democracy and Western values, and
the unquestioned belief that the values of the U. S. are, in fact, universal, often threatens both the
Chinese Communist Party's political pre-eminence and even Chinese culture. Similar to the
Western missionaries of the 19th century and early 20th century, the
U. S.'s goals for China (and other countries) are based on the fundamental assumption that these
values must be promoted regardless of consequences, because these values are morally "right."
A comparison between American causal thinking and Chinese correlative thinking, as they
affect each country's national security objectives, is depicted in figure 3. Although China and
the U.S. both seek security, stability and greater prosperity, the criteria for attaining these goals
are very different. The United States NSS defines security, stability, and prosperity in terms of
democracy, free market economy, promotion of American values, all of which reinforce one
another and promote American security and national interests.
In contrast, China's recent National Defense White Paper outlines similar national security
objectives - stability, prosperity, peace, and dialogue and cooperation with countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. 15 But, unlike the United States, China sees its
security in the narrower terms of internal stability, prosperity, as well as regional peace and
stability.
Figure
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China's White Paper indirectly criticizes the passe "cold war mentality" of the U. S. and
advocates what it calls a "new concept" for world peace. This is based on the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence, 16 which were agreed upon by China and India in
the early 1960s as a mechanism for the two countries to step back from their brief border war.
These principles (outlined in Figure 3) deter any external interference in the internal affairs,
while minimizing asymmetrical power relationships (such as between developing and developed
countries) by stressing equality (international democracy) and mutual benefit. China unilaterally
applies the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to all of China's territory, including disputed
claims, such as the Spratly 17 and Senkakus (Diaoyutai) Islands, as well as
Taiwan.
The goals of the United States NSS, consequently, conflict in at least two fundamental
ways with China's own goals for maintaining national security. 18 First, while the United States sees its
national security irrevocably dependent upon the promotion of global democracy and market
economies, China pursues market economy as a strategy to promote comprehensive strength.
China further seeks to protect and channel its internal energy in ways that are advantageous and
supportive of its own interests. Democracy, consequently, is problematic in the near term
because it could threaten internal stability and cohesion. Without these, so the argument goes,
China's century-plus dream to recapture its past glory and regain its rightful place within the
Asia-Pacific region and the world could be squandered. China's economic development is
firmly linked to Chinese nationalism, but does not accept prosperity and democracy as mutually
reinforcing.
Further, China does not accept the universality of other Western values beyond market economy
and democracy. As shown in Figure 4, some of these differing values include the American
emphasis on the individual versus the Chinese regard for the group; the American dependence on
the rule of law versus the Chinese reliance on personal relationships; and differences on human
rights.
Figure
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Chinese Self-Strengthening Movement - Then and Now
Although China has resisted Western values, its views toward the West have often been
ambivalent, rejecting foreign influence and interference, while actively seeking foreign capital,
advanced foreign technology, and other foreign assistance to develop China. This contradiction
first appeared in the 19th century, when the scholar Feng Guifen wrote a series of essays that
argued that China must use the West to resist it. Although "the intelligence and wisdom of the
Chinese are necessarily superior to those of the various barbarians," 19 he wrote,
China must strengthen itself (ziqiang) by adopting some foreign methods in order to
meet the Western challenge. 20 Feng's ideas helped inspire the Self-
Strengthening Movement of the late 19th century, which sought to revitalize the
Qing Dynasty with the aid of foreign investment, machines, weapons, and technology. In this
way, Feng believed "China would first learn from foreigners, then equal them, and finally
surpass them," 21 possessing the means to "emphasize China's
autonomy and initiative." 22
Deng Xiaoping's formula for building socialism with Chinese characteristics, 23 which he
articulated in the opening speech of the Twelfth Party Congress on September 1, 1982, reflects
the essence of the Self-Strengthening Movement. While arguing for modernization and opening
to the outside world, Deng, nonetheless, rejected any " mechanical copying and application of
foreign experiences and models" and urged China to base its development on its own "concrete
realities" and "blaze a path of [its] own." 24
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
A second component of the perceptual gap between the United States and China is the
historical experience since the 18th century. This history adds concrete and mythological
elements that effect relations even today. The pattern of relations, as previously shown in Figure
1, has often fluctuated between love and hate.
Several authors described these shifts primarily from the American perspective. 25 Warren Cohen,
for example, divided American views of China into five eras: deference (1784-1841), contempt
(1841-1900), paternalism (1900-1950), fear (1950-1971), and respect (beginning in 1971).
26
Arkush and Lee enriched Cohen's analysis by adding a comparison of Chinese images of
the United States during the same periods. Beginning in 1841, when Chinese officials, such as
Xu Jiyu, the governor of Fujian Province, began publishing accounts of the United States.
27
Arkush and Lee identify four different periods that reflect a similar pattern in Chinese
perceptions of the United States: exotic wonderment and fear (1841-1900); admiration of the
American model, combined with criticism of flaws in its values (1900-1950); rampant anti-
Americanism in mainland China, combined with "friendly familiarity" in Taiwan (1950-1971);
and "rediscovery and respect" (1971-1989). 28
Of these different periods, the time frames between 1841 and 1950 are especially useful in
providing an historical comparison of mutual perceptions between China and the United States
prior to the Cold War. The cyclic and emotionally-charged swings of this period have left a
mutual legacy of old resentments and disappointments, as well as unrealistic hopes and
expectations that continue to haunt relations today.
American contempt versus Chinese wonderment and fear
When reviewing the history of United States and China relations before 1989, several
patterns (and not a few ironies) stand out. The extreme anti-Chinese sentiment that the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 (and subsequent laws) reflected until it was repealed in 1943 is instructive
in that it was the first and only time United States law singled out a nationality for exclusion
from America, even after the United States paternalistically sought to save, protect, and
transform China following the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and even after China and the United
States became allies against Japan in World War II.
The Chinese Exclusion Act and subsequent laws, in the words of John King Fairbanks,
"made racism our national policy" and prompted the Chinese to initiate their first anti-foreign
boycott of United States goods. 29 These discriminatory laws expressed American
beliefs of the time that the Chinese people were "culturally and racially inassimilable."
30 Scores
of Chinese immigrants were murdered in the western United States during anti-Chinese riots in
the 1870s and 1880s. The prejudice and violence inflicted on the Chinese people was
precipitated by domestic economic competition and uncertainty, as well as the American
perception that the Chinese immigrant, beset with "unspeakable vices," 31 represented a
cultural, moral, and religious threat.
When viewing press coverage of China in the United States since 1989, one can see unfortunate
parallels to the negative views of the late 19th century. With notable exceptions,
American journalists have often focused on such "unspeakable vices" as cannibalism during the
Cultural Revolution, buying and selling of women and children, female infanticide, thereby
presenting a negative and narrow view
of China. 32
American negative views of China in the late 19th century were reinforced by
conditions in China itself. Many Americans, as "fresh apostles of progress" after the end of the
Civil War and the opening of the western territories, saw the Qing Dynasty as one in "decay,
actually sunk in poverty, filth, disease, corruption, thievery, and disorder, and apparently
unwilling to do anything about it." 33 America's western expansion helped fuel the
belief that anything is possible if people help themselves. This "self-help" ethos sharply
contrasted with American perceptions of China in the late Qing era. China's defeat in a series of
disastrous and humiliating military confrontations withWestern powers during the
19th century, beginning with the first Opium War of 1840, inspired some sympathy
for China in the United States, but did not earn American respect for a country in decline and
unable to respond to the challenge of Western trade and modernization.
The Chinese Exclusion Act reflected prejudices of the times, as well as a "Yellow Peril"
34 fear,
which sometimes resurfaces even today and overshadows perceptions of China's rise in
economic, political, and military power. This irrational fear of the Chinese was shaped in the
19th century by the enormity of China's population, vast cultural differences, and a
perception of "unfair" domestic competition from Chinese immigrants in America. Although the
Yellow Peril fear was based on distorted views of China's role in the invasion of Europe in the
13th century by the Mongols, 35 it was also kindled by the anti-foreign
Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which John King Fairbanks has described as "one of the best known
events of the 19th century because so many diplomats, missionaries, and
journalists" 36 were involved. Like Tiananmen in 1989,
this event had enduring effects on bilateral relations and mutual perceptions.
The Chinese perceptions of America during the late 19th century largely
incorporated the United States in the general Chinese view of Western oppression (colonialism
and imperialism) and exploitation of China's weakness. "Gunboat diplomacy" achieved by use
of force what political diplomacy had failed to - the opening of China to trade with the West.
Beginning with the Opium War of 1840-42, 37 a series of 'unequal treaties' were imposed
on China, granting special extraterritorial privileges to foreigners and stripping China of
sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and areas on the mainland. Protected foreign enclaves were
established throughout China, which were beyond the rule of Chinese law.
Within this bitter context of weakness and humiliation in China's encounter with the West,
the Chinese see the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 as a benchmark in its "anti-imperialist and
patriotic" struggle against foreign oppression. 38 But the Boxer Rebellion is only the best
known and most violent 39 display of anti-foreignism that has
repeatedly occurred in China since the 19th century. Often this anti-foreignism has
been intertwined with Chinese nationalism and the quest for modernization, 40 as well as
with the need to demonstrate that China has stood up to the West. 41 This anti-
foreign element could be seen in such comic heroes as "Soccer Boy," who in a CD-Rom version
could fight and win the Opium War, 42 or in the popular television soap opera,
"Foreign Babes in Beijing," which pandered to the "the most negative Chinese views of foreign
women." 43 The runaway bestseller of the summer of
1996, "The China That Can Say No," written by five co-authors 44 who have never traveled outside of
China, reflected what the authors called a "post-colonial sentiment" that resents "American
demonization of China over issues ranging from arms proliferation to human rights and family
planning" 45 and "abstract struggles [with China] over
ideology and politics," 46 which ultimately seek to contain China's growth
and development as a strong competitor to the United States.
American paternalism versus Chinese admiration and criticism
The foreign military suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, which included American forces,
devastated parts of Northern China where the uprisings occurred. The ruins of the Old Summer
Palace (Yuanmingyuan), even today, almost one hundred years after the sumptuous
imperial grounds were occupied and razed by foreign troops, remain a potent symbol of a time
when China was impotent to expel foreigners from its soil.
Heavy compensation was demanded of China in the Boxer Protocol of 1901 in retribution
for the loss of foreign property and personnel. The debt, which was not amortized until
December 31, 1940, amounted to $333 million with interest, a tremendous sum considering that
the Qing government's annual income at the time was estimated to be about half that amount.
47
Despite great internal suffering and disorder China successfully survived imperialist pressure
during the late 19th century and early 20th century. In the end, "the
'breakup of China' did not occur¬partly owing to Chinese dexterity ... balancing one imperialist
power against the other." 48 Nonetheless, the trauma of Western aggression in
China left a wellspring of anger and resentment for past wrongs which reflexively permeates
Chinese nationalistic views of the West today.
The United States role in China during the late 19th century and early
20th century was at best ambiguous. Throughout the period the United States was
proud it did not try to establish any colonies in China. The United States, however, readily took
advantage of the most favored nation (MFN) clause, what Fairbanks characterized as a "me-too
policy," 49 which gave each treaty power all the privileges
that any other power acquired in China from the beginning of the treaties established between
1842-44, following the Opium war. 50 The United States also participated in the
violent suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, as well as the imposition of indemnities, but remitted
part of these indemnities in 1908 and the remainder in 1924 51 on the provision that these
funds "would continue to be made available by China mainly for educational purpose."
52 The
United States Open Door policy toward China, which became the traditional basis of United
States policy for decades, helped preserve China's unity by constraining dismemberment by
foreign powers, but was intended not to protect China, but rather to ensure equality of access
among the contending foreign powers. 53
By the beginning of the 20th century the United States had developed a
paternalistic view of China, seeking to save China by transforming it along American lines in
religion, politics, economics, and technology. During this time, support for the Nationalist Party
(Guomindang or Kuomintang, KMT), under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)
who along with his wife, Song Meiling, embraced Christianity, developed in the United States,
setting the stage for its involvement in the Chinese Civil War. 54
The United States supported the Nationalist government in its resistance to the Japanese
invasion, and became openly allied with China after Pearl Harbor. As the war in the Pacific came
to an end, however, Americans became disillusioned with the corruption and inefficiencies of the
Nationalists. Some United States military officers familiar with China, such as Marine Captain
Evans F. Carlson 55 and Colonel David Barrett (the head of the first
contingent to the Yenan Observer Group, the "Dixie Mission"), 56 as well as
other China observers, such as Edgar Snow, advocated cooperation with the Chinese
Communists. These ideas, however, were anathema in the anti-Communist atmosphere
following the end of World War II.
During the Chinese Civil War, the United States, despite its reservations toward the KMT,
continued to provide support and assistance even after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949.
This United States involvement in the Chinese Civil War hardened into Cold War polarization
with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, providing a legacy of support and assistance to
Taiwan that has continued even with normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, and will
complicate bilateral relations for the foreseeable future.
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
"Some senior Chinese Communist Party leaders still see U.S.-China friction in terms of
Cold War struggle between political systems - a perception which is mirrored by many in
Washington." David Shambaugh 57
After World War II, Sino-American cultural differences and historical experience were
intensified through an ideological prism that pitted Western democracy and capitalism against
spreading communism. The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was a
turning point. In the United States, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resulted
in an ethnocentric and hysteric political debate, influenced by anti-Communist sentiment,
58 over
how the United States "lost China." Some of American's most experienced and knowledgeable
China experts were targeted in the process.
Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of
the former Soviet Union, ideological differences remain germane to present and future relations
between China and the United States. The Chinese criticize the United States for retaining Cold
War thinking, while claiming China has transcended ideology to pursue a pragmatic
modernization agenda. They emphasize the socialist rather than the communist nature of the
post-Deng China, using a cumbersome, but politically correct phrase - "socialism with Chinese
characteristics" to describe the political nature of the Chinese state. Further, they point out that
China dropped its pursuit of global communism, while the U. S. continues to pursue global
democratization.
Even though communism in China today lacks ideological substance, it retains the
authoritarian domination by the tiny minority of communist party members. The CCP represents
only 4.5 percent of the population, but dominates over 50 percent of the positions in the Chinese
government, and retains control over the commodities, regulations, and investment
funds, which fuel the market economy. 59
Further, as John W. Garver has argued, the CCP cadres, like the aristocratic Junkers of pre-
World War I Germany, can be viewed as ideologically anti-capitalist. The CCP pursues
economic norms only to improve socialism, not transform it, and to keep it firmly under the CCP
dictatorship. 60 The CCP cadres, like the Junkers, form a
closed elite system. New members are added, not based on open competition or merit, but "via a
rigorous, top-down process of recommendation and sponsorship by existing members, together
with...review of candidates' ideas, activities and social origins." 61
In the United States, no clear post-Cold War paradigm has emerged that would permit a
dramatic abandonment of the goal to transform residual communism. If anything, the objectives
of United States policy have been broadened to target all other non-democratic authoritarian
forms. Whether communism holds minority power over a tiny and impoverished island, such as
Cuba, or an unpredictable but fast declining country, such as North Korea, or the fastest growing
economy and one quarter of the world's population in China, the ultimate goal for the United
States is to encourage the spread of democracy to all countries.
This "change or die" attitude toward the CCP has been characterized by the Chinese as the
threat of peaceful evolution. Some American officials would take this goal even further, as
Senator Jessie Helms did in his sponsorship of Radio Free Asia, by seeking nothing less than the
speedy overthrow of the CCP, regardless of the consequences. Until and if CCP rule in China
and/or the United States anti-communism view is eliminated, ideology will persist as an
important dynamic of the relationship.
CONCLUSION - POLICY PROSPECTS
The up and down pattern of the historical relationship between the United States and China,
compounded by cultural, philosophic and lingering ideological differences, suggests that it will
be extremely difficult to develop mature and stable state-to-state relations. Lacking the impetus
of an overarching issue or common enemy, as occurred during the Second World War and the
last two decades of the Cold War, differences will likely continue. Current events do
not bode well for relations between the United States and China, the success of the 1997-98
summits not withstanding.
President Jiang Zemin has consolidated his power base in the post-Deng era. He has
personally invested considerable prestige in promoting ties with the United States, and for the
moment relations, including military contacts, appear to have the green light at the highest levels
of the Chinese leadership. To support this present trend, the virulent anti-Americanism that
characterized the official and public media reporting in China during 1997 have largely
disappeared, replaced by more benign, even romantic, views, such as American Flying Tigers
helping protect Chinese cities during World War II.
While Jiang's position seems secure, a scandal weakened United States President may
prove to be more of a liability than an asset in helping to sustain the latest upturn in Sino-
American relations. The Administration's China policy, which has felt the bipartisan sting of
criticism, since President Clinton's first term, has failed to rebuild a sustainable consensus. This
policy remians overly dependent on economic interests as the raison d'ˆtre for relations between
the United States and China. The concept of the "strategic partnership" is too ill-defined and
justified to garner broad political support. Finally, a laundry list approach to justifying the latest
resurgence of Sino-American relations will likely prove too weak to counter the next crisis,
whether it is hard evidence of possible Chinese interference in United States elections,
proliferation, or other issues, such as the trade imbalance.
Only a strong U.S. President could convince the American public over congressional
criticism to support a nebulous and contradictory China policy. Congressional impeachment
proceedings will likely paralyze the President's ability to carry out foreign policy at a critical
time in the Sino-American bilateral relationship. Since China is neither friend nor foe, it is
likely that relations will be allowed to drift, wasting the opportunity of the last year to move the
bilateral relationship to a more mature level.
Although Jiang's commitment to relations with the United States seems secure, he must
deliver on Chinese domestic expectations, such as an end to the Tiananmen sanctions. A
weakened U.S. President, however, may not be able to overcome congressional criticism to
make such a step, nor will he be able to pursue United States interests as confidently and
forcefully as he needs to deal with this difficult relationship. If the President fails to deliver on
both Chinese expectations (perceived and real) and/or American expectations, another downturn
will likely result, leading to another misstep in Sino-American relations.
Endnotes
1. The elements of power can be distinguished between "natural
determinants (geography, resources, and population) [which] are concerned with the number of
people in a nation and with their physical environment. The social determinants (economic,
political, military and national morale) concern the ways in which the people of a nation
organize themselves and the ways in which they alter their environment." David Jablonsky,
"National Power," Resident Course 2, Vol. 1, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA, 1993, pp.50-82, quoted on p. 2-23, Non-resident Course 2, Vol. II.
BACK
2.Li Jijun, "Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy,"
Military Theory and Conflict, translated in Chinese Ways of Future Warfare, edited by
Michael Pillsbury, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 230. BACK
3.Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer,
West View Press, Boulder, 1994, p. 179.BACK
4.David L. Ames and Roger T. Ames, Anticipating China:
Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1995).BACK
5.Ibid, xvii.BACK
6.Ibid, xvii.BACK
7.Ibid, xviii.BACK
8.Ching-ning Chu, author of The Chinese Mind Game - The
Best Kept Secret of The East, interview on The Learning Channel's Great Books Series,
"Sunzi - The Art of War," 1996. BACK
9.The Chinese commonly say they have over 5,000 years of
continuous history, which coincides with the earliest known dynasty the Xia (2200-1750 BC).
Westerners often use 3,000 years as a benchmark, which is up to the Shang Dynasty (1750-1040
BC), which followed the Xia.BACK
10. Personal interviews, 1988-89. BACK
11.Ames and Hall, 182. BACK
12.White House, A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996. BACK
13.bid., I.BACK
14.Ibid., p. ii.BACK
15.China's National Defense, Information Office of the State
Council, The People's Republic of China, July 27, 1998, p. 5. BACK
16.Ibid., p. 4.BACK
17.The Chinese government claims sovereignty over four
island atoll groups in the South China Sea - the Pratas Islands and Reefs, the Paracel Islands, the
Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. Claims of Chinese sovereignty first appeared in
Western records in the late 19th century, during the late Qing Dynasty. Marwyn S.
Samuels, Conquest for the South China Seas (New York: Methuen, 1982).BACK
18.I would like to thank David Finkelstein for his insights on
this discussion.BACK
19.Quoted on p. 197, Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for
Modern China (W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1990). BACK
20.Ibid.BACK
21.Ibid.BACK
22.John King Fairbanks, The Chinese Revolution: 1800-
1985 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 100.BACK
23.Deng Xiaoping, Building Socialism With Chinese
Characteristics (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1985). BACK
24.Ibid., p. 3.BACK
25.For example, Isaacs describes American views of China in
a series of six different periods (ages) until 1949: respect (18th c); contempt (1840-
1905); benevolence (1905-1937); admiration (1937-1944); disenchantment (1944-1949); and
hostility (beginning in 1949). Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches On Our Minds: American Views
of China and India (new York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), 71. Building on Isaacs' chronology,
Mosher extended the Age of Hostility from 1949 to 1972, when President Richard Nixon and
Mao Zedong brokered the historic reopening of relations. He also added three phases up until
1989: The Second Age of Admiration (1972-1977); the Second Age of Disenchantment (1977-
1980); and the Second Age of Benevolence (1980-1989). Steven W. Mosher, China Perceived:
American Illusions and Chinese Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1990). BACK
26.Referenced in R. Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds. Land
Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the
Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 301. BACK
27.Ibid., 19. BACK
28.Ibid., 302. Xu, who never visited the U.S., was a great
admirer of George Washington for his leadership of the successful revolution against British
rule, and his decision to retire to private life after office, which appealed to Chinese meritocracy
ideals. He wrote favorable accounts of the American political system, based on information he
gathered in China, which remained highly influential for decades. BACK
29.Arkush and Lee, 8.BACK
30.John King Fairbanks. The United States and China
4th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 319.BACK
31.Ibid. BACK
32.In the early 1990s in Beijing it was common to hear
reporters complain that editors did not want to publish positive stories about China. Even
reports of grass roots democracy did not interest editors. Although the media have finally picked
up on village elections, the trend toward negative and exotic reporting still is prominent. In
1996, however, the Chinese official press matched, if not exceeded, negative reporting in the
United States.BACK
33.Ibid.BACK
34.John W. Dower investigates this racial element in War
Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
Examining the racial aspects of the war between Japan and the United States, he observes the
negative racial stereotyping occurred on both sides, and notes how quickly and easily these
"patterns of thinking . . . were transferred laterally and attached to the new enemies of the cold-
war era: the Soviets and Chinese Communists, the Korean foe of the early 1950s, the
Vietnamese enemy of the 1960 and 1970s, and hostile third-world movements in general" Ibid.,
14.BACK
35.The Mongols invaded China and established the Yuan
Dynasty (1279-1368).BACK
36.John King Fairbanks, The Great Chinese Revolution,
1800-1985 (Philadelphia: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.,1986), 138. Also see Peter
Fleming, The Siege at Peking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). BACK
37.For reading on this subject see Peter Ward Fay, The
Opium War, 1840-1842 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), and Hsin-
pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (New York: W.W. Norton and
company, Inc., 1964).BACK
38.Bai Shouyi, An Outline History of China (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1982), 488.BACK
39.The siege of the Peking legation, which lasted from June 20
until August 14, 1900, is the best known event of the Boxer Rebellion. Approximately 475
foreign civilians, 450 troops from eight countries, and about 3,000 Chinese Christians resisted
the eight-week siege until rescued by foreign forces. Two hundred and fifty foreigners, mostly
missionaries, were killed throughout China during the summer of 1900. BACK
40.See Kuang-sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and
Modernization in China: 1860-1980 (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1986).BACK
41.See Beverly Hooper, China Stands Up: Ending the
Western Presence, 1948-50 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986).BACK
42.Steven Mufson, "China's 'Soccer Boy' Takes On Foreign
Evils," The Washington Post, October 9, 1996, A31-32. BACK
43.Keith B. Richburg, "Embracing 'Foreign Babes,'" The
Washington Post, July 21, 1996, 1.BACK
44.Zhang Zangzang, Tang Zhengyu, Song Qiang, Qiao Bian,
and Gu Qingsheng.BACK
45. "Breaking a Spell," Asiaweek, September 27, 1996: 28.BACK
46.Ibid., 29. See also Patrick Tyler, "Rebels' New Cause: A
Book for Yankee Bashing," New York Times, September 4, 1996, A4. BACK
47. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern
China (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1990), 235.BACK
48.Fairbanks, Reichauer, and Craig, East Asia: Tradition
and Transition - New Impression (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 641. BACK
49.John King Fairbanks, The United States and China
4th edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 315.BACK
50.Fairbanks, Reichauer, and Craig, 578-579 and 460.BACK
51.Ibid., 325.BACK
52.Ibid., 248BACK
53.Ibid., 641-643. See Michael H. Hunt, The
Making of a Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983) for a detailed discussion.BACK
54.For background see, for examples, Suzanne Pepper,
Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), and E.R. Hooten, The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War,
1936-49 (New York: Brassey's (UK), 1990).BACK
55.Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-
1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 20-21; Kenneth E. Shewmaker,
Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1971), and Barbara W. Tuchman, Stillwell and the American
Experience in China, 1911-45, (New York: The McMillian Company, 1971).
BACK
56.Schaller, Tuchman, and Shewmaker, 202-203.BACK
57.David Shanbaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to
Asian Security," Survival, 30 (Summer 1994):50.BACK
58.Richard M. Fried argued in Nightmare in Red: The
McCarthy Era in Perspective, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) that American
anti-Communist sentiment preceded both the Cold War and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's
assault on domestic communism. He also argues that even after Senator McCarthy was censored
in 1954, anti-Communist sentiment declined, but did not die out.BACK
59.John W. Garver. Will China Be Another
Germany?, (Carlisle Barracks: Seventh Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War
College, April 1996), 18.BACK
60.Ibid, 16.BACK
61.Ibid, 17.BACK
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