Choosing Autocracy: Politics in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

by Major Bryan L. Lee, USA, Eurasian FAO

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the creation, for the first time in history, of the independent nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the territory of Central Asia was often seen as a more or less homogeneous region, and was governed in this manner by the Soviet authorities, independence highlighted cultural and regional differences that had been long suppressed. To the West, the most visible difference has been the varied approaches to economic and governmental reform. Still, while the approaches to this change varied, few doubted the final destination; history was over, democracy and market economics had won.

Or have they? Kazakhstan, the richest country of the three, initially made rapid economic progress. The issue of a free society, however, has been more problematic. Since 1991, Kazakhstan has had only one presidential election, and that one has been marred by irregularities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) called the most recent (1999) parliamentary and presidential elections "farcical," and has noted the steady disappearance of independent and opposition media sources. 1  Autocracy is winning the race in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan provides another example of resurgent autocracy. There have been no "free and fair" elections in Uzbekistan since independence in 1991. Indeed, both the U.S. and the OSCE refused even to send observers to the 1999 parliamentary elections. 2  In the 2000 presidential election, the "alternative candidate," Abdulhafiz Jalolov, admitted publicly that he voted for the incumbent, President Karimov. 3  Additionally, Uzbekistan is consistently rated one of the region's worst human rights abusers, especially of practicing Muslims. They are frequently targeted as insurgents by this de facto police state.

In many ways, Kyrgyzstan is the most disappointing of the three countries. Once considered Central Asia's "Island of Democracy," it too has seen a move towards autocracy, including government harassment of the press, arrests of opposition leaders, rigged elections, and police attacks on demonstrations. Amazingly, Kyrgyzstan, one of the world's poorest countries, has even managed to be named one of the "Top 20 Enemies of the Internet" by the group Reporters Sans FrontiŠre. 4  In addition, the U.S. Department of State has concluded that "serious problems" exist with Kyrgyzstan's human rights record.

Why are all three of these newly independent nations choosing autocracy over democracy as their political model? Have they been conditioned by a common Soviet heritage or are there other characteristics and commonalities at play that can explain the development paths of the past 10 years?

Kazakhstan

The constitution of Kazakhstan lays out the framework for a democratic system of government, with an elected president as head of state and a 202 member parliament. However, Kazakhstan qualifies as authoritarian because the elections process is essentially skewed to support the incumbent president, Nursultan Nazarbaev.

On January 10, 1999, Kazakhstan held its first presidential election since declaring independence in 1991. The election itself ran smoothly enough, but the road to the election was a little more rocky as rules for candidacy changed frequently. For instance, on October 8, 1998, a joint session of parliament voted for several unexpected amendments to the constitution. The first of these raised the minimum age for eligibility for the presidency from 35 to 40 and also removed the 65 year old maximum age limit. The next removed the presidential two term limit. Then, the presidential term was lengthened from five to seven years. Finally, the requirement for a minimum voter turnout of 50% was dropped. When this work was completed, the parliament called for early presidential elections and established the election date of 10 January 1999. 5 

This announcement left prospective presidential candidates with only three months to register for election and to campaign. To register, electoral rules required 170,000 signatures be collected by 30 November, as well as the payment of 2.4 million tenge (US $31,000). Additionally, candidates had to take a Kazakh language test and prove that they had no administrative or criminal offenses. 6  The OSCE election commission was highly critical of the entire process leading up to the election, and in a recent closed-session meeting the elections were cited as a "warning that even best preparations can be tossed aside by political decisions." 7 

Nevertheless, some opposition candidates managed to make it onto the ballot to challenge the incumbent president Nursultan Nazarbaev, and an amazing 86.3% of eligible voters went to the polls to make their choice. The result was a landslide victory for Nazarbaev, with 80% of votes cast. His next closest challenger, Communist Party candidate Serikbolsyn Abdildin, received just 12%. 8  And, although some irregularities were found during the actual voting, none were serious enough to suggest that election results were falsified. 9 

How can there be such widespread support for a regime that clearly has manipulated the election process in order to remain in power? Why do the vast majority of Kazakh citizens continue to support the present Kazakh regime despite crackdowns on freedom of speech, arrests and harassment of opposition members, and massive corruption? 10  An examination of the larger political situation in Kazakhstan yields some clues.

Most citizens recognize that the growing threat of ethnic violence and territorial disintegration constitute serious threats to the stability of the country, and Nazarbaev has continuously stressed the need for stability as a precursor to prosperity. Polls suggest that the population agrees with him. In 1995 84% of ethnic Kazakhs and 60% of ethnic Russians assessed ethnic relations as "calm," and a plurality (35%) singled out Nazerbaev's role in fostering stability as his best characteristic. 11  Results of a 1997 public opinion poll of Kazakhstanis (all ethnic groups included) stress that the majority prefers a strong, authoritarian leader to a separation of government power (54% to 32%) and a society with strict order over one with unlimited freedom (58% to 37%). Additionally, fully 65% expressed confidence in Nazarbaev's leadership, and more than 80% could not think of a suitable alternative for president. 12 

Since fear of instability seems to account for the popularity of Nazarbaev, is this fear justified? The short answer is yes. Kazakhstan faces credible threats to the regime from both ethnic rivalries and growing regionalism.

By 1989, ethnic Russians comprised more than 37% of the total population of Kazakhstan, with the vast majority living in the northern, central, and eastern regions of the country. 13  Since independence, however, migration patterns and a high Kazakh birth rate have resulted in a 54% Kazakh majority, while the Russian population has dropped below 30%. 14  Moreover, government initiatives to favor ethnic Kazakhs, including a wide-ranging language law, has resulted in a Russian population that feels increasingly alienated and distrustful of the government. 15 

Ethnic tensions are exacerbated by a series of other factors. Russians made up a disproportionately high number of employees in the defense and heavy industry sectors, which have been among the hardest hit by the collapse of the Soviet economy. 16  Kazakhstan's Russian Cossack population has become increasingly vocal with calls for a reunification of the Russian populated northern territories with Russia. 17  And finally, there is some evidence of outside Russian support for a small terrorist movement which has demanded outright independence for the northern territories. 18  When taken all together, the ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan present at the least a serious obstacle to government, and at the most a growing threat of separation. 19 

The second major threat to Kazakhstan's political stability, regionalism, is directly connected to Kazakh cultural traditions. As the Kazakhs were initially nomads, important family ties coalesced into three large tribal based groups, the Great Horde, Middle Horde, and Lesser Horde. 20  The problem today is that existing territorial divisions among the hordes have been strengthened by the changed economic situation. Kazakhstan's renewed emphasis on oil and gas exports has tended to benefit the Lesser Horde, because most known deposits are located on their traditional territory in Western Kazakhstan. 21 

At the same time, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, members of the Middle and Great Hordes residing in the industrialized and Soviet influenced north and east suffered a noticeable drop in their standard of living. This new situation has led to increasing demands from "losing" regions for subsidies and "winning" regions for greater autonomy. 22 

Regional demands are a threat to the government for two reasons. The first is that the regional governments are already aligned along traditional horde divisions, posing serious obstacles to legislative initiatives from the center. The second reason is the tendency for the regions to be heavily influenced by neighboring countries. 23  This in turn has strengthened an existing political divide between the urbanized and Russified Kazakhs in the north and the conservative, rural, and Islamicized Kazakhs in the south and west.

In brief, the evidence is strong that Kazakhstan is facing several credible threats to political stability. The threat to stability is the primary explanation of both Nazarbaev's anti-democratic actions, and the populations' apparent support for these actions.

Uzbekistan

The dictatorship of Uzbekistan is the least reformed politically and economically of the three Central Asian states. President Islam Karimov was the Communist Party First Secretary during the Soviet period, and he has maintained tight control of Uzbekistan until this day, receiving about 92% of the vote in the widely criticized January, 2000 elections. 24  Uzbekistan is ruled through a system of regional henchmen appointed by Karimov, and elections are routinely fixed to ensure outcomes favorable to the regime. 25  Additionally, there is no freedom of the press, and the country is frequently cited as a major human rights abuser. 26  Economically, Uzbekistan is still largely a planned economy. In fact, Karimov's stubborn "go slow" approach to reforms resembles a "no go" approach to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which recently withdrew its Uzbekistan representative. 27 

Most observers, as well as Karimov himself, point to several factors which help to explain the government's autocratic actions. The most common include credible threats of Islamic fundamentalism, regional separatism, and conflict with the neighboring states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Let us examine each of these in turn.

Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is possibly the most studied aspect of politics in the region, probably due to the security concerns of the U.S. and Russia. Karimov is aware of this concern, and frequently uses the "need to fight fundamentalists" as cover for his political maneuverings. Still, whether Karimov's actions are appropriate or not, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is real and growing in Uzbekistan.

During the Soviet period, most of the religious content was drained from Islam, leaving only a strong cultural component and sense of Muslim identity. 28  Karimov has been eager to seize on Islam as a marker of Uzbek identity, but has been careful to keep the religious elements of Islam off of the political stage. This has radicalized some Islamic elements, and has allowed them to define their opposition to the state in religious terms. 29  Moreover, these groups have a high degree of legitimacy as they are frequently seen as "real Muslims" by a community that has largely forgotten the religious customs and rituals of Islam.

Once established, radical Islamic groups are able to bring together a disparate bunch of opposition movements under the banner of pan-Islam. Recent events such as the 1999 bombing assassination attempt on Karimov in Tashkent, and the kidnapping of four Japanese geologists in Kyrgyzstan a few months later, confirm the wider regional appeal of groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). As this appeal gains momentum, the danger of Karimov's oft-cited "Tajik Variant" happening in Uzbekistan seems increasingly more likely. In fact, fighting last summer between IMU rebels and Uzbekistan soldiers came within 60 miles of Tashkent, and resulted in over 100 deaths. 30 

Possible connections to super-terrorist Osama Bin Laden as well as the group's alleged role in drug trafficking has led the U.S. to formally designate the IMU as a terrorist organization, and pledge US $3 million in anti-terrorist aid to fight the group. Russia is also concerned, and has made repeated offers of troops to help secure the borders. 31  So, although some observers worry that the hard-line stance taken by Karimov might actually incite further radicalism and violence, the threat remains credible enough to garner widespread international support for his efforts.

In addition to fighting a resurgent Islam, the Uzbek government claims a strong central government is the only way to deal with growing regionalism. Indeed, numerous internal territorial claims and counterclaims exist, mostly as a result of a struggle over water rights or other resources that have been re-apportioned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 32  A good example is the situation with the Khorezm oasis in western Uzbekistan. The oasis had been under a single government for hundreds of years, but during the Soviet period, water rights were divided among the bordering regions of Karakalpak autonomous republic, the Khorezm Oblast of Uzbekistan, and the Tashauz Oblast of Turkmenistan. Since regional borders were unimportant, this division was insignificant. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, all three regions suddenly had competing claims for this scarce resource. The result has been the creation of three separate water and power systems in order to ensure independence from the ambitions of the other regions.

Although there are vast discrepancies in wealth across Uzbekistan, with the urban areas generally favored over the rural ones, regional separatism seems to play a much weaker role in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan. This is probably the result of Karimov's tight control over the governors (hakims) of the regions. Moreover, Karimov's relatively powerful military is a strong deterrent to any bordering state that would consider supporting any Uzbek region's drive for autonomy. Finally, the significant barriers to foreign trade erected by the central government have ensured that the regions have remained dependent on the center for economic survival, further dampening regional enthusiasm for separation.

The threat of inter-state conflict is the final justification used to explain Karimov's autocratic actions. Uzbekistan's geographic position--it shares borders with every post- Soviet Central Asian state plus Afghanistan-- means that it shares the internal stability concerns of each country in this region. This concern came to the forefront in 1992 when Tajikistan descended into civil war.

Uzbekistan immediately recognized the threat of a spillover onto its territory as well as the danger to the large ethnic Uzbek population living in Tajikistan's Khujand (Leninabad) region. The response was rapid. Together with Russia, Uzbekistan openly began to support governmental pro-Communist forces, mostly out of the hope that they would provide a better chance at stability than the pro-Islamic opposition. Among other things, Uzbekstan provided military equipment, troops, and training for the Tajik government forces. Additionally, Uzbekistan signed an agreement to defend Tajikistan's airspace. 33 

Still, the weak and unstable government in Tajikistan remains a problem for Karimov. Tajikistan is probably the staging area for the military strikes of the IMU against Uzbekistan, and Karimov believes that the Tajik government is supporting the strikes. 34  Furthermore, some nationalist Tajik groups have made claims to the heavily Tajik settled Uzbek regions of Bukhara and Samarkand. 35  Drugs, guns, and crime are also a concern as civil order has yet to be fully restored in some Tajik regions. Tajikistan is the worst off economically and socially of all of the Central Asian countries. Until this root cause can be addressed, Tajikistan will remain unstable and a security concern for Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan's is also threatened by competition with other countries for increasingly scarce resources. Uzbekistan's thirsty agricultural sector (the country is the world's fifth largest producer of cotton) is responsible for Uzbekistan consuming more fresh water per capita than any other country in the world. 36  This has led to a increasingly bellicose stance and tense negotiations with Kyrgyzstan, the upstream source of much of Uzbekistan's water. 37  Land is also a problem, as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan squabble over access to the lush Fergana valley region. A strong central government allows Uzbekistan to carefully control resources, and also provides for a strong and efficient military to counter competing claims.

In sum, the political situation in Uzbekistan seems to be largely driven by a process of reaction to real and perceived threats to the regime and the country. Although Tashkent's reactionary stance seems destined to aggravate the situation, both Islamic fundamentalists and the sometimes strained relations with neighboring states appear to be a legitimate cause of concern for the political stability of the country in the short to medium term.

Kyrgyzstan

President Askar Akaev is a careful observer of the West. From the beginning of Kyrgyzstan's independence, he has been careful to articulate his country's commitment to democracy and economic reform. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan's initial openness and rapid reforms led to descriptions of Kyrgyzstan as "the Switzerland of Central Asia," or the "Island of Democracy," in both the capital of Bishkek and in western capitals. The early result was solid political and financial support from the West, including loans totaling over US $1.8 billion according to the latest European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates. 38  However, while economic reforms continue, Akaev's commitment to political reform has visibly wavered. In fact, Freedom House's latest Nations in Transit report rates Kyrgyzstan less free today than in 1992.

The current political situation in Kyrgyzstan suggests several factors that might have contributed to this shift in the government's stance on democracy. The first of these, similar to Kazakhstan, is ethnic tensions. Ethnic Kyrgyz are a bare majority (52%) in Kyrgyzstan, with ethnic Russians making up 18%. Independence brought the familiar push to promote ethnic Kyrgyz, including the adoption of a language law and replacing Russians with Kyrgyz in high level administrative posts. 39  To stop the resulting out-migration of ethnic Russians, President Akaev, forced by economic realities, made major concessions to the Slavic population. That, however, only led to more demands on either side and increased protests by Kyrgyz nationalists. 40 

Another factor in Akaev's move towards autocracy is a growing threat of regionalism. Northern and Southern Kyrgyzstan are separated by the Tien Shen mountain range. This physical barrier has also resulted in a political division of the country between the rural, conservative, Islamic, and nationalistic southerners in the regions bordering the Fergana valley, and urban, Russified, and cosmopolitan northerners. Traditional clan affiliations also echo this division, further complicating attempts to rule the country. 41  Furthermore, UN studies demonstrate that the south has lagged behind the north in the areas of health, education, and standard of living which only fuels resentment of the regime. 42  As the 1995 parliamentary elections did not lead to necessary reforms and instead led to endless squabbles between northern and southern deputies, Akaev exploited the impasse to push through a referendum that expanded his own powers, including greater veto power and the power to disband government. 43  Western diplomats considered the move anti-democratic. Akaev, however, insists that such moves are necessary to continue progress with reforms and defeat entrenched communist interests. 44 

North-South divisions are also reflected in the growing Islamic fundamentalist movement, which is the final reason for Akaev's increasingly heavy handed tactics. Southern Kyrgyzstan borders on the Fergana valley, which has become the primary base for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Some of the most serious fighting has taken place in Southern Kyrgyzstan as the group has repeatedly attempted to enter Uzbekistan. 45  Increasingly, the group's rhetoric has shifted from anti-Uzbek to pan-Islamic and it has begun to recruit support in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Besides the obvious direct threat this poses to Akaev's militarily weak regime, Uzbekistan's president Karimov has accused Kyrgyzstan of not doing enough to fight the insurgents. This attitude takes on ominous overtones given the history of Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes in the Kyrgyz city of Osh in 1990, as well as Uzbekistan's increasing military dominance in Central Asia.

Once again, there are clear external factors that seem to play a role in Kyrgyzstan's march towards autocracy. Kyrgyzstan faces serious challenges to government from ethnic and nationalist factions, entrenched interests, long-standing tribal and regional divisions, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, and an increasingly bellicose and militarily powerful neighbor. Akaev's response to these challenges may be inappropriate or wrong, but it is clear that the challenges do exist and represent a danger not only to Akaev's government, but to the Kyrgyz state itself.

Conclusion

Given similar internal and external threats to the governments of these three Central Asian countries, the political leadership in each country sees autocracy as the most efficient method of reacting to these threats. In Central Asian politics, clan rivalries, ethnic tensions and nationalism, rural-urban splits, and a resurgent Islam all compete with a vague and mostly Western inspired image of democracy. Moreover, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are themselves products of their own and Soviet culture. Their own political instincts have simply not kept pace with changes on the ground. Psychologists have found that when confronted with a crisis, people tend to react by repeating what worked in the past. At the most basic level, that is what is happening now in Central Asia.

The countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan highlight how little we really understand about the transition process. How much of the autocratic direction of these countries is a response to political instability and the result of rational choices, and how much is caused by culture, religion, or other deep-rooted sociological and historical factors? Will a market economy provide a solution to the region's troubles, or must state intervention still play a large role? Did Western monetary aid and political advice ultimately help or hurt these countries? The answers, surely, can be found through further close study of the political developments in these three similar, yet different, countries.

Endnotes

1. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to Madeleine Albright, 7 April 2000. Included as appendix to Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on Democracy in the Central Asian Republics, 12 April 2000. Available from http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/house09.html; internet; accessed 14 May 2001.BACK

2. Freedom House Nations in Transit, available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2000/index.htm; internet; accessed 14 May 2001.BACK

3. Bruce Pannier, "Uzbekistan: Voters 'Choose' Incumbent President," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 January 2000, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2000/01/F.RU.000111133452.html; internet; accessed 5 May 2001.BACK

4. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Special Report, available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/enemies.html; internet; accessed 5 May 2001.BACK

5. Rafis Abazon, "The 1999 Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan," Electoral Studies, 20, No. 2, (2001): 316.BACK

6. Ibid.BACK

7. Roland Eggleston, "Kazakhstan: OSCE Concerned About Presidential Election," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 March 1999, available from http://www.rferl.org/bd/ka/magazine/default.asp; internet; accessed 7 May 2001.BACK

8. Abazon, 318-319.BACK

9. Ibid.BACK

10. A typical example of this criticism is "A Choice for Democracy," Washington Post, 1 May 2001, editorial.BACK

11. Paul Kubicek, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or cure?" Third World Quarterly, March 1998, via ProQuest [database on-line].BACK

12. Debra Javeline, "Suffering Without Protest in Kazakhstan," Central Asia Monitor, 3 (1998), available from http://data.fas.harvard.edu/~javeline/cam98.htm; internet; accessed 15 May 2001.BACK

13. Marie-Carin von Gumppenberg, "Kazachstans Regionen," Osteuropa, 51, no. 1 (2001): 37.BACK

14. Ibid.BACK

15. Charles Clover, "Kazakhstan's Slavs Feel the Squeeze," Financial Times (London), 23 November 1999, sec. World News, p. 14.BACK

16. Mark O'Neil, "Kazakhs Find No Easy Road to Reform," South China Morning Post, 15 June 1999.BACK

17. Charles Clover, "Still a Potent Symbol of Russian Imperialism: The Cossacks," Financial Times (London), 1 July 1999, sec. Survey-Kazakhstan, p. 4.BACK

18. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Kazakh Report, 23 November 1999, available from http://www.rferl.org/bd/ka/reports/archives/1999/11/231199.html; internet; accessed 6 May 2001.BACK

19. Bruce Pannier, "Kazakhstan: Convictions of Russian 'Separatists' Upset Relations," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 June 2000, available from http://www.rferl.org/bd/ka/magazine/default.asp; internet; accessed 6 May 2001.BACK

20.John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 113. BACK

21. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kazakhstan Investment Profile 2001, 14, available from http://www.ebrd.org/english/public/index.htm; internet; accessed 15 May 2001.BACK

22. Gumppenberg, "Kazachstans Regionen," 44.BACK

23. Ibid., 45.BACK

24. OSCE Election Reports, available from http://www.osce.org/odihr/elecrep-uzb.php3; internet; accessed 5 May 2001.BACK

25. Freedom House Nations in Transit 2000.BACK

26. Ibid.BACK

27. IMF Press Briefing Transcripts, 28 March 2001, available from http://www.imf.org/external/country/UZB/index.htm; internet; accessed 10 May 2001.BACK

28. Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 170-172.BACK

29. Paul A. Goble, "Breeding Islamic Fundamentalism: The Declining Prospects for Democracy in Post-Soviet Central Asia," Testimony before the International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 12 April 2000.BACK

30. Douglas Frantz, "Central Asia Braces to Fight Islamic Rebels," New York Times Online, 3 May 2001, available from http://www.nyt.com; internet; accessed 3 May 2001.BACK

31. Steve LeVine, "Critics Say Uzbekistan's Crackdown On Radicalism May Fuel the Fervor," Wall Street Journal, 3 May 2001, p. 1.BACK

32. The example that follows is taken from Gregory Gleason, "Conflict and Conflict Prevention in Central Asia: The Prospects for Early Warning," The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 24, No. 3 (1999).BACK

33. Susan Clark, "The Central Asian States: Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces," in Central Asia and the World, 191-192.BACK

34. Ahmed Rashid, "Central Asia crisis talks over Islamic 'invasion'," Daily Telegraph (London), 11 January 2001, p. 19.BACK

35. Barnett R. Rubin, "Tajikistan: From Soviet republic to Russian- Uzbek Protectorate," in Central Asia and the World, 214.BACK

36. Martin C. Spechler, "Uzbekistan: The Silk Road to Nowhere?" Contemporary Economic Policy, 18, No. 3 (July 2000): 297.BACK

37. Boris Rumer and Stanislav Zhukov, "Economic Integration in Central Asia: Problems and Prospects," in Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence, 112- 114.BACK

38. EBRD Kyrgyzstan Investment Profile, 2001, 7.BACK

39. Glenn, Soviet Legacy, 118.BACK

40. Ahmed Rashid, "The New Struggle in Central Asia: A Primer for the Baffled," World Policy Journal,17, No. 4 (Winter 2000/2001): 42.BACK

41. Glenn, Soviet Legacy, 116.BACK

42. United Nations National Human Development Report for the Kyrgyz Republic 1999, chapter 5. Available online at http://www.undp.kg/english/publications/nhdr1999/chapter_5.html; internet; accessed 13 May 2001.BACK

43. "Kyrgyzstan Government Resigns," Reuters, 27 February 1996.BACK

44. Robin Wright, "Nurturing a Fragile Democracy In Post-Communist Kyrgyzstan," Los Angeles Times, 7 September 1997, sec. Opinion, part M, p. 3. BACK

45. Patrick Cockburn, "Islamic Warriors Strike at Russia's Flanks," The Independent (London), 26 September 2000, sec. Foreign News, p. 12.BACK

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