"It is paradoxical that Bosnia &Herzegovina is the only country in which Bosnians and Herzegovinians do not live, but Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. There is no America without Americans; France without the French; similarly there will be no Bosnia & Herzegovina without Bosnians and Herzegovinians."Survey respondent, Sarajevo, June 2004
Introduction
Bosnia has received little attention of late in the media. It certainly has been overshadowed by the Global War on Terrorism and the endless stories emanating from Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless events are transpiring in Bosnia that merit closer scrutiny and analysis. Two recent events of note are the July 2004 re-opening of the Stari Most Bridge in Mostar and the turnover of NATO's SFOR mission to EUFOR last November. 1 Indeed both are heralded to echo the success and merits of military intervention in the Bosnian civil war and, in the case of the bridge, to symbolize achieving ethnic reconciliation and rapprochement. Moreover Bosnia, and to a lesser degree Kosovo, are bandied about by some as military and political templates that should be applied to Iraq's recovery. 2 However, is Bosnia a success story? Do the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, the constituent people of Bosnia, view their identity and the state in a similar manner? Based on my recent dissertation field research, the answer would be no. Bosnia should not be considered an example of success unless the international community intends on maintaining a political and military presence as occupiers, of a nominally sovereign state, for decades to come.
Field Research and Summertime in Bosnia
From late May through June of 2004 I traveled Bosnia collecting information and data to support my dissertation research. A portion of my fieldwork consisted of conducting a four page questionnaire survey. The data presented in this article is a small portion thereof. Nonetheless it illuminates the current nationalist and political situation in post-war Bosnia.
Figure one highlights the municipalities in which survey questionnaires were distributed and collected.
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The surveys were administered to 216 people in numerous municipalities across Bosnia. 3 The following table is based on the responses in the demographic section on the last page of the survey.
| Rep. Srpska | Federation | BiH | |
| Male | 65 | 69 | 134 |
| Female | 42 | 40 | 82 |
| Total | 107 | 109 | 216 |
| Bosnian | 4 | 32 | 36 |
| Bosniak | 13 | 39 | 52 |
| Croat | 5 | 24 | 29 |
| Serb | 83 | 9 | 92 |
| No answer | 2 | 5 | 7 |
Based on limited access to certain regions in Bosnia (especially eastern Republika Srpska) and sparse population information, the survey cannot be considered truly representative of Bosnia and academically, the findings must be limited to the sampled population and regions. However, the results are well worth noting and may lead to a stronger understanding of the antagonisms that remain in Bosnia.
The portion of the survey presented in this article address:
- How the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), as a major component of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) and the national and political landscape affect views on national territory and Bosnia's future.
- How Bosnia's people perceive the IEBL and therefore the DPA.
- Is the Kosovo situation impacting Bosnia's people and state future?
- Do the people see themselves as Bosnian or as members of another group?
The survey also obtained limited demographic data on the population sampled and I incorporate this information into the understandings of a Bosnian identity.
Gauging the Sentiments of the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs -- the Survey
A fundamental element of my research centers upon the IEBL and the degree to which the different ethnic groups perceive its function within Bosnia. The IEBL, being the most tangible aspect of the DPA, is therefore also an excellent gauge of Bosniak, Croat and Serb sentiment towards the DPA itself. The survey's first four statements directly engage the respondent's position towards the IEBL (as viewed from the Republika Srpska or Federation viewpoint), the notion of removing the IEBL and the entities, the creation of a strong central government in Sarajevo, and finally, whether or not renewed conflict is possible. The fifth statement gauges sentiment on the ramifications of Kosovo independence on Bosnia's two entity arrangement. The actual survey statements are in the figure titles below.
The last survey statement refers to how the people of Bosnia identified themselves ethnically before the war. This answer coupled with how they identify themselves today can further add to the understanding of the development a truly state centered Bosnian identity. In addition to theses statements, I have incorporated interview information and anecdotal insight into the following discussion which will help to illuminate and better understand responses to the survey.
Attitudes Towards the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Bosnian Statehood
Survey findings indicate that the Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and those who identify themselves as Bosnian, differ significantly and measurably in their responses. The answers of those who identified themselves as Bosnian and Bosniak were quite similar. Given that 12 of the 18 Bosnians were surveyed in Bosniak majority areas of the Federation, there is a strong likelihood that they too are Muslim. Of the other six Bosnians, five came from Muslim majority towns in Republika Srpska. Given the extent of population transfers and development of mono-ethnic regions since the war it is fairly certain that those who define themselves as Bosnian are Muslim. Moreover as noted in many books written on the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the overwhelming number of those who declared themselves as Bosnian are indeed Muslim. 4 The similar responses of the Bosnians and Bosniaks in the survey questionnaires coupled with numerous interviews tend to buttress this assertion.
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Statement number three was intended to evoke a greater response building upon the differences that arose in responses to statements one and two. The great majority (>77%) of Serbs were in disagreement with the dissolution of the entities and the IEBL. Opposite them, the Bosnian/Bosniaks were absolutely in favor of such an action, with >97% Bosnians and >93% Bosniaks overwhelmingly in agreement. Of note in 1997, 91% of Serbs opposed a united Bosnian state, whereas 98% of Muslims supported it. 5 It appears that current positions have changed relatively little in those intervening seven years.
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Statement number five continues to build upon the earlier statements and the notion of Bosnia's future status as a state. Realizing that the Serbs of Bosnia sought to remain within Yugoslavia and not be a part of an independent Bosnia this statement's results infer that the Serbs (almost ten years after the war) do not feel an allegiance to an independent Bosnia. Greater than 81% of the Serb respondents believe that the Republika Srpska has the right to secede if Kosovo becomes independent. This finding is supported by other surveys conducted in the Republika Srpska in which >70% of Serbs desire independence from Bosnia. 7 As in the other statement responses the Bosnians and Bosniaks responded in an opposite manner. Greater than 83% of the Bosnians and >84% Bosniaks disagreed. Once again, the differences in the Croat response were determined by location.
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Another result of the survey and interviews indicated that many Croats desire a third entity, to be on equal footing with the Serb entity and their own Muslim dominated entity. One couple in Drvar added questions to my survey. In the comments section they wrote the following, "Question 5. Are you for the introduction of a third entity: Yes." Moreover a total of five of the questionnaires had comments indicating that there should be a third entity for the Croats.
The Notion of a Bosnian Identity
Statement number six of the survey is revealing in the sense that the ideal of having been Yugoslav is not equally shared by all ethnic groups in Bosnia. Of course being only nine years after the war, its effects have impacted how the people reinterpret their past in the light of today. But it does illustrate that there is a residual fondness for the past. Every single person that I spoke to stated that their lives were much better in the "old Yugoslavia." Given the ravages of the war and Bosnia's current economic woes, indeed the former Yugoslavia may be remembered as the "good old days." Moreover most wished that the war had never occurred and that they should go back to a Yugoslavia. Those most brutalized by the war also acknowledged that the "good old days" were long gone and could never be recreated.
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The data also suggests that the Croats and Serbs do not identify themselves as Bosnian in prewar Bosnia. Again this is opposite to the Bosniak/Bosnian responses which do, to some degree, choose Bosnian as a prewar ethnic identity.
Concluding Remarks and Observations
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The survey highlights significant differences between Bosnia's national groups and suggests that a common Bosnian-state centered identity is overridden by Croat, Muslim or Serb national identity and group membership. Moreover, it is the Bosnian Muslims that have assumed the label of Bosnian, inferring further separation of this community from its Croat and Serb neighbors. In looking at the future of a Bosnian state the survey indicates that significant disparity exists and again it is based on nationality. Threatened changes to the Dayton Peace Accords and its entity arrangement and the events in Kosovo could forewarn renewed conflict and should not be overlooked. Bosnia's future is far from secure and, although much has been accomplished in the last nine years, the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from certain.
1. See "Bosnia bridge rises again," [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 3172597.stm] and "Mostar Bridge Reopens," [http://setimes/features/2004/07/040727- BETH-001]. BACK
2. See "Kosovo a model for U.S. in Iraq," NYT, Page 1, Nov. 15 and "Clinton's Kosovo failures," [http://www.washingtontimes.com/op- ed/20041128-111716-4021r.htm]. BACK
3. The survey's first five statements are closed-end and utilize a Likert rating scale which is typically used to form the basis of aggregated opinions or attitude rating scales. Using a Likert scale also made translation of the questionnaire into Bosnian (or Serbo-Croatian) easier and allowed for analysis by statistical techniques. Realizing that an indifferent attitude could prevail as an outcome, five categories of responses made sense and an odd number of categories were used. The usage of "strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, strongly disagree" as the verbal stimuli in the response categories better reflected the level of intensity the respondents felt when answering the statements. The the polar aspect of these rating scales best reflects the opposite meanings to these groups -- therefore the results are less problematic to interpret. BACK
4. see Bringa, Tone. "Islam and the Quest for in post- Communist Bosnia and Herzegovina," Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. Ed. Maya Shatzmiller. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2002, 24-34, also Burg, Steven and Paul Shoup. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, and Honig, Jan W. and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. BACK
5. See Bose, Sumantra. Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. New York: Oxford UP, 2002. BACK
6. I must note that it is quite possible that the statement written in several parts could have contributed to the high "unsure" response rate. Some respondents could have agreed with "the IEBL and entities should be dissolved" but may have been in disagreement with the "strong government and state based in Sarajevo" portion of the statement. BACK
7."About 70 per cent of Serbs want independence -- pollster," Onasa news agency web site, Sarajevo, in English 4 Nov 04. BACK