Bi-national Corps Can Still
Pay Their Peace Dividend

By LTC Arnold H. Giesler, USA
 US Army Representative

At the end of the Cold War, the multinational corps was seen as the future NATO formation of choice. The NATO strategy articulated at the London Summit of 1990 and the Rome Summit of 1991 acknowledged the changed European security environment in the wake of German unification. This new NATO strategy, it was hoped, would allow members of the Alliance to cash in on a peace dividend. Burden-sharing was to be finally achieved by matching the strengths and weaknesses of the different allied armies through multinational corps.

A united Germany had a particular interest in multinational formations. Such formations were a way to reassure its neighbors of its benign intentions. For some years already, LANDJUT, a corps-level formation involving British, Danish, and German forces had served as a model of the multinational corps. Since the mid-1980's, Franco- German military cooperation revolved around the Franco-German Brigade. The next logical step was the formation of the EUROCORPS, to which French and German divisions in addition to the bi-national brigade were initially committed. The formation of a bi-national Dutch-German corps followed. The establishment of German-U.S. bi- national corps was, for Germany, a sensible next step toward the goal of reassuring neighbors.

In 1991, moreover, the Gulf War seemed to confirm that U.S.-led, multinational, high-intensity conventional operations would be the norm. In the summer following the war in Southwest Asian however, the breaking up of Yugoslavia gave the first indications that the future of war may be a little different. At the time, the United States viewed Yugoslavia as an opportunity for Europe to assume its role as an equal partner in its own security. Increasingly, though, that European opportunity became a European problem resulting in the United States taking the lead in trying to resolve the issue.

The U.S.-led negotiation of the Dayton accords led to the deployment of the Implementation Force, or IFOR. As time went, the implementation mission became one of stabilization and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was born. This implied long-term commitment to peace support operations in the Balkans changed many of the original planning assumptions for multinational corps, the most significant being the primacy of conventional, high-intensity operations. Operation Allied Force and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo seemed to confirm this changed assumption.

The two German-U.S. bi-national corps are grounded in a ministerial-level agreement signed in January 1993, almost three years before the deployment of IFOR. This ministerial agreement limited the operations and, consequently, the training of the bi-national corps to NATO Article V, Central Region scenarios. The two German-U.S. bi-national corps were to be Alliance Main Defense Forces, restricted to training for and the conduct of conventional, high-intensity operations in Germany.

The Implementing Arrangement (IA), signed in February 1993, is the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)-German Army Forces Command (GARFCOM) document that lays out the framework for achievement of the ministerial agreement goals. In the IA, for which the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) is the executive agent, the key issue is the establishment of the operational control (OPCON) command relationship over the exchange divisions. The Technical Arrangement (TA) is the corps- level agreement that outlines the agreed modalities for the execution of the bi-national corps. Signed by the V (US) Corps and II. (GE) Korps commanding generals in June 1994, the TA designates the exchange divisions. For the United States, that division is the 1st Armored Division. "Old Ironsides" now had three employment options: with V Corps, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and what now became known as II. (GE/US) Korps.

In December 1995, when IFOR deployed, V Corps deployed as the U.S. national support element. In part because of 1AD's habitual relationship with the ARRC, a British-led multinational corps, it was designated the major U.S. force contributor to the Implementation Force. The Bundeswehr (which encompasses Germany's air, land, and naval forces), due to the extent of its force reductions and domestic political concerns, was required to task organize what in essence was an ad hoc unit. Today, although one division is designated a mounting headquarters for the German SFOR contingent and one for the KFOR contingent, both are drawn from units throughout the entire army of approximately 340,000 troops. II. (GE/US) Korps alternates the responsibility for the organization, training, deployment, and redeployment of these contingents with two other German national and bi-national corps.

In four years of operations in the Balkans, little has changed in terms of their basic parameters. What these four years have consistently shown is that the planning assumptions for the bi-national corps are no longer valid. The conventional high- intensity threat is reduced. Conversely, there is a significant increase in the number of other than conventional missions. Also, during recent operations over Yugoslavia, we have seen the impact of technology and uneven technological development among the allies.

Force structure changes, the impact of which have been highlighted by operations in the Balkans, have simultaneously contributed to the changed bi-national corps parameters. The two U.S. divisions in Europe each have now two brigades with the third and its corresponding support and service support units stationed in Ft. Riley, Kansas. Many units of the Bundeswehr are effectively cadred, which results in longer mobilization timelines for German units than in the past. For current operations at brigade-level and above, the organization is ad hoc to a significant degree. Also, German corps have no corps troops which allow a corps commander to shape the battlefield.

Doctrinal changes have also occurred since the early- and mid-1990's. Civil military operations in the Bundeswehr used to focus almost exclusively on cooperation between civil and military authorities in Germany. Today, CIMIC is a response to domestic political exigencies in which the German army seeks to facilitate the speedy return of refugees to their country of origin. In the case of Bosnia- Herzegovina, for example, the army's civil-military operations assist in the construction of housing for returning refugees. The German army is also beginning to develop its own concept of deep operations. Though deep operations in the Bundeswehr differ slightly from what is understood in the U.S. Army, the concept is evolving in the absence of weapons systems and an information technology structure that can successfully support such operations. This represents a significant gap between doctrine and technological capability.

Perhaps the greatest difference that has become apparent between the two armies is that of perspective. The United States Army has a worldwide outlook, the focus of which can swiftly change from crisis to crisis around the globe. The European perspective of the German army has resulted in the retention of a force structure fundamentally designed for national territorial defense in a region no longer facing any great conventional threat. Overall, change in the Bundeswehr has been incremental. In each successive deployment to Cambodia, Somalia, and the Balkans, the role of the Bundeswehr has expanded. But, it has only done so gradually, incrementally, and only after much debate. One factor in the NATO debate over a ground invasion of in Kosovo is the fact that, for the time being, German security policy has reached the limits of change.

The vast degree of change in the post-Cold War world has left little room and few resources for pursuing the good intentions of the bi-national corps. Since the agreements described above were signed, only two exercises have been conducted involving the US/GE and GE/US corps. The first was EX ROYAL DAGGER in 1996, a Canadian-led exercise in which the 33rd Separate Infantry Brigade, Illinois National Guard, provided a U.S. force to test the II. (GE/US) Korps combined field standard operating procedure. After its return from its first deployment to Bosnia- Herzegovina, 1AD participated in the II. (GE/US) Korps EX STAUFER LION with a response cell. A third exercise was scheduled to take place in November 1999, but was cancelled. On the whole, then, efforts to pursue development of the two German- U.S. binational corps have been unsuccessful due not only to differences in doctrine and perspective but also because of the impact of current operations in the Balkans.

The future of the bi-national corps may be more promising if the changes that have occurred since 1993 are addressed in the applicable documents, beginning with the ministerial agreement. The new NATO strategy agreed at the Washington Summit last April can help. The broader spectrum of missions agreed to by the Alliance will provide a stronger German domestic political basis for changes in the Bundeswehr. New NATO missions will also allow the German army to better harmonize its perspective with that of the United States Army. Once those perspectives are better aligned, other doctrinal and force structure changes can also be addressed in the Implementing and Technical Arrangements.

NATO and, consequently, the member armies, should continue to plan for the worst case: Article V operations anywhere in its area. Planning for conventional, high- intensity operations should provide sufficient force structure for peace support, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations. Permitting the German-U.S. bi-national corps to train for and conduct other than conventional operations will result in an improved framework for the two corps. Harmonizing training along these lines, where possible, can reduce the number of training events for units of both nations. With time, deployment of integrated GE-U.S. bi-national formations for peace support operations may become practicable, thereby achieving the goal of meshing strengths and weaknesses among allies.

Revising agreements currently based on outdated assumptions will allow the two German-U.S. bi-national corps to reduce the burden of training for the myriad of missions post-Cold War NATO armies must be prepared to execute and can be tasked to conduct. The revision of the ministerial agreement and the Implementing and Technical Arrangements will further burden-sharing and better match strengths and weaknesses between the allies. Such a revision could earn the U.S. and German armies a little bit of the peace dividend hoped for almost a decade ago.

LTC Giesler is an armor officer currently serving as the V Corps LNO to II. (GE/US) Korps. He has served as an action officer on the U.S. Delegation to the Conventional Armed Forces negotiations, an arms control officer on the USAREUR staff and an exchange officer with the Belgian army in addition to various assignments with armored and divisional cavalry units.

2000, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org