On the Brink in the Balkans: An Analysis of Russian Reactions







On the Brink in the Balkans: An Analysis of Russian Reactions
to NATO's Campaign Against Yugoslavia

By CPT Peter Huller

The crisis in Kosovo provoked a sharp reaction from the Russians last year, resulting in increasingly strained relations with NATO. Aspects of the Russian mindset, specifically the characteristics of nationalism, pride, historical perspective, security concerns, and a sense of sympathy for weaker nations, propelled Russia toward a rift with NATO over the bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. It is potentially dangerous to underestimate the effect of these character traits and their influence on Russian foreign policy and domestic opinion. Llewellyn Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow provided sage advice with the words, "Don't maneuver the Russian bear into a corner from which there is no escape; in such a position he can become vicious." 1 

The bottom line is that Russia feels betrayed by NATO. At the end of the Cold War, Russia agreed to allow German unification and let Eastern Europe take its own course. She further acceded to NATO's continued existence with the inclusion of Germany. The tradeoff was that NATO would agree not to take actions to upset the balance of power and threaten Russian national security. What had been viewed as a "strategic partnership" has now been severely (although hopefully not irreparably) damaged. Russia viewed this partnership, particularly where the United States was concerned, as a quid pro quo relationship where the West would assist the Russian Federation economically while Russia would provide necessary oversight in peacekeeping in their sphere of influence. Russia believed that NATO would have no need to intervene militarily in former Soviet republics or other areas in the "Near Abroad". NATO's actions in the Balkans violated this trust. Russians express a very real concern summed up by the slogan Segodnya Serbiya, zavtra Rossiya -- which means Today Serbia, tomorrow Russia. If NATO can justify military intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation like Yugoslavia, what would stop them from doing the same thing in Russia? Interestingly, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov had been enroute to the United States over the Atlantic Ocean when he received word that NATO bombings of Yugoslavia were imminent. He decided to turn back to Russia in mid-flight. This U-turn can be seen as a metaphor for the current state of relations between the United States and Russia. Moreover, Russia sees NATO's actions in the Balkans as an attempt to divide regional spheres of influence as NATO seeks to increase global hegemony. It is a divide and conquer mentality seeking to further an imbalance of power. Russia believes that if Yugoslavia capitulates to the West, this will be seen as a glaring example of Russian military weakness.

Russia's Response to NATO's intervention in Kosovo

From the beginning, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin cautioned NATO, and more specifically the United States, not to pursue an interventionist policy in Yugoslavia. When the NATO air campaign commenced, Yeltsin delivered a stinging speech breaking all ties with NATO and stirring up Russian nationalism. He claimed that NATO had violated Article 2 of the United Nations (UN) charter which states that the UN will not "intervene in any matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Yeltsin's vitriolic rhetoric consolidated nationalistic political opinion on his side, as well as public opinion. Approximately 90% of Russians exhibited anti-NATO/U.S. feelings, while only about 10% felt Russia should provide immediate military assistance to Yugoslavia. In effect, Russia found an emotionally significant issue to rally behind nationally. Dr. Edward Salazar, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, stated that "NATO has brought back an enemy" for Russia and Primakov described relations between Russia and the U.S. as the most tense in thirty years.

Not only did Russia consider NATO's actions to be a violation of the UN charter, it viewed the bombing campaign as a moral hypocrisy and rejection of the international rule of law. NATO charged that Milosevic was committing ethnic cleansing and genocide against ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo, that this was unacceptable, and that these actions bestowed a moral imperative on NATO to take action. Russia might have asked rhetorically, where was NATO's moral imperative when Croatia ethnically cleansed by some accounts approximately 850,000 Serbs from their homes? Where was the moral imperative when Turkey, a fellow NATO member, was killing tens of thousands of Kurds?

Yeltsin's raising of the specter of world war should NATO send in ground troops should be viewed by Westerners not so much as a threat of war as a manifestation of Russian character. That is, Yeltsin expressed an element of notorious Russian pessimism as well as extremism. Here was a national leader who at one point declared to the U.S., "We are not partners. We are allies." Now, in an extreme turnabout, he was predicting the doom and gloom of another world war. Yeltsin's bluster and tough talk are elements of the Bolshevik Code, a Soviet set of rules that has long guided the conduct of Soviet and Russian negotiators and politicians. Part of the code dictates that "all politics is a life-and-death struggle of who will dominate whom. Thus, who- whom (kto-kogo) -- the destruction of an enemy is necessary not only for victory but also for the survival of the party." 2  This Bolshevik Code, along with Russian pessimism and extremism, are among many Russian traits that the West must recognize and understand to deal effectively with Russia.

Following Yeltsin's speech, Russia deployed a destroyer to the Adriatic Sea and thousands of Russians volunteered to fight on Yugoslavia's behalf. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet was reportedly among those volunteers, showing the seriousness of Russian sentiment toward this action. Russia recalled its ambassador to Hungary after an aid convoy for Yugoslavia was delayed. However the most ominous threat was a thinly concealed reference to the use of nuclear weapons. "In a direct reference to the Kosovo crisis and a veiled allusion to Azerbaijan's relations with NATO, Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Aleksandr Blokhin warned on April 5 that, 'If NATO is not taking into account Russia, which has 2,500 nuclear warheads and fairly serious armed forces, then the bombings will create a dangerous precedent of permissiveness in relation to other, especially smaller countries. Those who seek to engage with NATO today must understand this.'" 3 

Russia denounced NATO's stated intention on April 24th to initiate an oil embargo against Yugoslavia, saying it would ignore attempts to shut down Milosevic's military machine by starving it of oil. Not surprisingly, Russia is one of Yugoslavia's main oil suppliers. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared that "according to international law, sanctions cannot be imposed unless they are approved by the UN Security Council. We will continue delivering oil in keeping with our international commitments." Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin's former Prime Minister and the Russian mediator in Kosovo, stated that NATO's actions "may slip toward a third world war, the final war." These were apocalyptic words indeed and indicative of the gravity with which Russia viewed the situation.

After NATO, with eventual help from Russia and Finnish President Akhtisaari, concluded a peace agreement with Milosevic, Russia wanted a piece of the action. Not content to be mere players, it sent a battalion of troops into Kosovo to take control of the airport in Pristina. This unit then denied access to NATO forces, metaphorically beating its chest in defiance. This was Russian extremism and irrationalism at its best and was in effect telling NATO and the world they were still a great power. This fierce display of Russian emotion was supported by all political factions within the country.

Diplomatically, Russia concurrently made unceasing attempts to coerce Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to return to the negotiating table. It was interesting that Yeltsin dispatched Chernomyrdin as his special envoy to the Kosovo situation, since Chernomyrdin was viewed as a liberal and liked by the West. Apparently, Yeltsin's goal was for Russia (and very likely Yeltsin himself) to be viewed as the savior in this crisis. As a result, Russia gained a measure of respect internationally as an honest broker capable of solving international crises while at the same time increasing the prospects of increased assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Meanwhile, Chernomyrdin, along with Akhtisaari, apparently persuaded Milosevic to accept NATO's terms for peace.

"History is not simply something that was. History is with us and in us."

--Yuri Trifonov 4 

To truly understand Russia's fierce opposition to NATO's intervention, one must understand the Russian mindset. To do this properly, one should begin by observing Russia from a historical perspective. Like many countries, it has been invaded numerous times and suffered many horrible tragedies at the hands of aggressors. These wounds have been indelibly stamped on the minds of the Russian people and are impossible to erase. "The painful experience of centuries of invasion has affected the Russian psyche, resulting in an obsession with security, which in turn produces an extreme habit of secrecy regarding defense matters and a belligerent attitude toward foreign countries." 5 

Obviously no one in Russia today personally experienced the harsh two-and-a-half century rule of the ruthless Mongol-Tatars. However, this era of slavocracy represents both embarrassment and a source of pride for Russians. It evokes embarrassment because Russian princes were forced to pay tribute to the Mongols while on their knees, while a sense of self-satisfaction comes from the eventual overthrow of the Golden Horde and a reclaiming of Russia. In another display of extremism, some Russians might liken NATO to the Khan-led invaders in that they fear a threat to their sovereignty from NATO expansion and the embrace of former allies like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The Mongols were ruthless and stripped the Russian people of their wealth, but they were unable to take away Russian pride and Russian land. These are things that modern Russians still hold in a vise-like grip and refuse to surrender to westerners.

The thousands lost to Napoleon's invasion in 1812 are another source of pride for the Russians as they stood up to yet another foreign power and survived to preserve their country for their children. The Siege of Leningrad and World War II, however, have not yet been relegated solely to books and encyclopedias. There are living, breathing sources of information on these sacred and glorious Russian victories.

And one would be hard pressed to find a Russian who did not have an ancestor who fought or died in The Great Patriotic War. Some estimates carry the Russian death toll at over 25 million, or approximately one in six Russians. While the cost in humanity was colossal, the Soviet Union lost more in industry and agriculture than any other allied country. The sacrifices made by the Russian people to build the infrastructure to meet the enormous demands of the five-year plans were seemingly for naught. Victory in World War II seems almost pyrrhic in retrospect. However, as with other threats to her existence, Russia repulsed the Nazi invaders who attempted to conquer them. For over 900 days Russians in Leningrad suffered untold privations and yet survived. Many survivors are alive now and share their experience with their children and grandchildren. Many recall as children having to serve as watchers on rooftops in Leningrad for incoming Nazi aircraft. Many, some of whom undoubtedly serve in the Russian government today, remember the sounds of the air raid sirens signaling a sense of sheer terror. This is part of why the Russians felt so resolutely against the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia. They were able to empathize completely with the Serbian citizens who had committed aggression against another sovereign state, but who lived in constant fear of NATO bombardment.

Russians believe that the territory in question rightfully belongs to the Serbs and defend their right to control it despite the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Further, Russians remember that these same Serbs stood so steadfastly against overwhelming odds in alliance with Russia and the Allied Powers against the Nazis. Like the Russians, the Serbs fought valiantly and repulsed the numerically superior Nazis. The Russians share this glorious military achievement with Yugoslavia and view it as a testament to the greatness of the Slavic peoples who have survived countless invasions on their homelands. This is a concept that is not easy for Americans to grasp simply by virtue of the fact that America has never faced a large-scale invasion of its sovereign territory. Therefore, we find a stark contrast evinced by the quote "America is about success, Russia about survival." 6 

In addition to these horrors and tragedies Russia has suffered from external influences, consider the plight of today's Russian who witnessed the end of certitude with the collapse of the USSR. The Soviet Union and communism are all that most Russians have known in their lifetime. No other country in this century has undergone such a fundamental and drastic shift in ideology, economy, or government. "Everything they took for granted -- economic security, the dictatorship of the Communist party and the control of the KGB, the predictability of life and the delivery of food by the enterprise that employs them, the stupefying cant of Marxism and safety in the streets, a yearly holiday in the Crimea and the Soviet Union as a superpower -- it's all disappeared." 7  These violent winds of change have given a people already suspicious of western motives even more cause for concern as their entire raison d'ˆtre has metamorphosed.

National security -- the major concern

Given the historical events described above, it is easy to understand Russia's preoccupation with national security. This obsession was an important factor in the role of Soviet ministerial organs, most notably the KGB, as Russia sought to protect itself from within as well as without. Following the Great Patriotic War, Russia surrounded itself with what westerners viewed as satellite states in order to further the expansion of Communism. While this concept may contain some truth, it is more accurate to view these "satellites" as a national security buffer zone, with the Warsaw Pact as the Soviet Union's answer to NATO. Russians have a distorted image of Americans as aggressors. This perception, however, is mirrored by an American image of Russians as aggressors as well. Yuri Bronfenbrenner has described this interesting dynamic as "a mirror image through twisted glass."

Now that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are no more, Russians wonder why NATO continues to exist. More importantly, Russians perceive a threat from NATO. According to former Prime Minister Primakov, "Intentions are transitory but power is enduring." 8  This perception of a threat is reinforced by the recent expansionism of NATO. Russia sees further erosion of her security buffer in the future with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania identified as potential NATO members. During the crisis in Kosovo, President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even met with Azerbaijani leadership to discuss future NATO membership. NATO insists that it is a defensive alliance interested only in assisting nations with economic and humanitarian reform. The fact that American oil companies are involved shows "the inseparability of economics and politico-military strategy in the region, [as] contracts worth $2 billion between Azerbaijan's state oil company SOCAR, Exxon, and Mobil for Caspian oilfield development are scheduled to be signed." 9  Perhaps this is the real reason for NATO interest in the region and understandably, a reason for Russian concern.

Viewed geographically it is easy to understand why Russia feels threatened. To better understand Russia's security concerns regarding NATO expansion, consider the following scenario. Suppose that the tables were turned, and it was the United States that lost the Cold War. NATO dissolves, yet the Soviet Union remains a superpower and the Warsaw Pact is still a viable entity. The Warsaw Pact assures the former United States that it bears no ill will and is not a threat. Then, the Warsaw Pact begins courting U.S. neighbors Canada and Mexico, eventually admitting them to the Warsaw Pact, despite U.S. objections. Picture the former U.S. now, with Warsaw Pact nations on its north and south borders. Would the U.S. not view this turn of events as threatening? While this scenario may seem unrealistic and even preposterous to Americans, surely the current state of affairs regarding NATO would have seemed unrealistic to the Soviets if someone predicted it in the 1950s.

Now place this issue in the context of NATO's actions against Yugoslavia. Russia has had problems with its republics since before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994 Russia went to war with Chechnya. Tensions continue to remain high in the contentious Caucasus region of the Russian Federation as Russia is again fighting in Chechnya. Russians want to be able to deal with the problems there as a sovereign nation and without NATO intervention. However, Russia feels that if NATO can intercede on behalf of a group in Yugoslavia, they can certainly do the same in Russia. This would violate Russia's sovereignty and severely harm her sense of nationalism and pride

Nationalism and Pride

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and current economic plight of the Russian Federation have dealt as severe a blow to Russian national pride as can be rendered. The Russians feel they have lost not only an empire, but also status and global influence as a preeminent superpower. They feel a reluctant dependence on the West to pull them out of their economic quagmire. This reality stings all the more as Russians viewed the West as the symbol of decadent capitalism, the bitter foe of the superior Soviet Communist Empire. he Soviet Union existed for almost 70 years as a multiethnic and multinational coalition of republics where Russians were barely the majority but clearly the leaders. However, Russia today is made up of over 80% ethnic Russians. This near-homogeneity of the population gives the country more of a nationalistic sense of pride than ever before.

Politically, the Russian ethnic majority provides an important political tool -- something I call "nationalistic opportunism." This instrument enables politicians to seize on nationalistic fervor during national crisis periods and use it for their own political gains. The reaction to Yugoslavia was an example of this nationalistic opportunism which some Russian politicians undoubtedly manipulated to preserve or gain seats in the recent parliamentary elections. At the same time, Russian politicians like Boris Yeltsin attempted to rally the nation behind him in an effort to gain concessions internationally as well.

Russia desires to be viewed on a par with the West despite its financial woes. However, Russia is still mistrustful of foreigners and fears dependence on another country. This concern manifests itself in Russia's protests against NATO enlargement, against U.S.-led peacekeeping missions, and against perceived threats in the Near Abroad where Russia wants to maintain its position as a great power. Originally centered in Kiev back in the 11th century, Russia traces its religious beginnings to the Greek Orthodox Church. They saw their religion as superior to Catholicism, which allowed for no egalitarianism as everyone paid homage to the Pope. However, once Constantinople fell in 1453, the Russian Orthodox church became a proud symbol of Russian national character. Isolated from Rome and Constantinople, both of which had failed, Russia saw itself as the third and final Rome, worthy of respect from the entire world. Many feel that Russia still views this elevated position as an obligation to the world. This messianic principle is what leads Russia to believe that she must be the cultural and strategic bridge linking Europe and Asia. "Messianism is still alive in Russia today, particularly among intellectuals on both the left and right who share a belief and pride in Russia as a great power with a special mission in the world." 10 

Russians believe that if big is beautiful, Russia must be the most beautiful nation in the world, spanning eleven time zones across almost 6,000 miles of territory or approximately one-eighth of the earth's landmass. Russian hegemony in the region, in their worldview, was never based on imperialism so much as territories gained through victories over invading forces.

In its relations with foreign nations, Russia typically will choose an enemy in a situation and focus attentions on demonizing this foe. In Yugoslavia, NATO was the enemy. However, Russia viewed the U.S. as the malefactor. Some might proffer that it was the German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia that catalyzed the breakup of Yugoslavia, yet Russia blames the U.S. for the eventual Balkan crisis. Russia bases this view on a long history of viewing the U.S. as an adversary, in part because of the competition that existed between the two nations and in part due to Russian perceptions of insults perpetrated.

While Russia received rebukes from the U.S. in the 19th century over trade issues, a more recent slight occurred in 1928 when the U.S. entered into the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed war. However, the U.S. chose not to include the Soviet Union in this agreement, a huge insult to the new Communist state. Since then there have been other foreign policy decisions by the U.S. that Russia has viewed as arrogant and offensive. These wounds to its pride run deep and are recalled bitterly as NATO/U.S. continues its "aggression" against Yugoslavia.

During the Carter Administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser, made a bold statement about the future of the Soviet Union. He wrote about dividing the Soviet Union into thirds, "of which the Western third should be integrated into the 'Atlanticist Europe,' the Eastern third fall into China's sphere of influence, while the middle would remain a 'political black hole'." 11  The Soviets claimed that this was not the idle ramblings of just one man but represented the true policy of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union. Russians have a long memory for perceived threats and insults such as above. The issues of security, sovereignty and survival - the "three S's" - are paramount in the Russian mindset and drive foreign policy. Therefore, it is no surprise that when NATO was created in April 1949, the Soviets felt threatened and saw fit to create the Warsaw Pact in response.

More recently, Russia was angered over U.S. sanctions resulting from the Iranian nuclear assistance affair in 1995. Russia was engaged in the sale of four light-water nuclear reactors to Iran for approximately one billion dollars. The U.S. attempted to persuade the Russians not to complete the sale, offering $250 million to cancel the deal because the U.S. felt these reactors would provide the Iranians with equipment necessary to develop nuclear weapons. To the Russians, this was a grossly arrogant intervention in their internal affairs and yet another wound to their national pride. Of course, Russia would not want to provide Iran with the means to become a nuclear power and therefore, a threat to Russia. But the U.S. did not give Russia credit for this knowledge.

In September 1995, NATO launched a bombing campaign against Bosnia that lasted two weeks. This clearly violated UN peacekeeping efforts but that was not the main issue of concern for the Russians. "The decision by the UN Secretariat to approve a secret memo abdicating authority over the use of air power over Bosnia, without consulting all the permanent members of the Security Council (of which Russia is a member) was tantamount, according to the chairman of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, Vladimir Lukin, of dividing the Security Council into first- and second-class members." 12  Of course Russia fixed blame primarily on the U.S. for this action.

Toward the end of 1998, the United States became increasingly frustrated with the Iraqi government over their lack of cooperation with UN chemical weapons facilities inspectors. Despite attempts by both the U.S. and Russia to coerce Iraq to cooperate, Iraq remained obstinate toward the UN inspectors despite threats of bombing by the U.S. When the U.S. made good on its threats, Russia was outraged. Not only was the U.S. attacking a sovereign nation but had done so without consulting the UN Security Council and, more importantly, Russia itself. Russia viewed this unilateral action as an egregious insult to her status as a great power and permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Finally, Russia felt that prior to commencing its current air war against Yugoslavia, NATO should have sought greater Russian assistance with the diplomatic effort to persuade Slobodan Milosevic to end his campaign against the Kosovo Albanians. Russia viewed this affront as NATO's way of discounting Russian diplomatic capabilities as well as distrust of Russian motives. Later, NATO was eager to have Viktor Chernomyrdin work to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table. NATO's air campaign was seen as a direct challenge to Russia's national security interests in that it showed republics like Azerbaijan and Georgia that if there is trouble, NATO would help. All of these attacks on Russian pride have left their mark and remain a reason why Russia is wary of NATO/U.S. in the current situation in the Balkans.

Protection of Slavic Brothers

Russia also contends that she must come to the aid of her Slavic brothers in Yugoslavia. The memory of the fierce opposition by Yugoslav armed forces during the Great Patriotic War remains with the Russians. Russians also share a religious affiliation with the "Lesser Slav Idea", by which all Slavic peoples are united with Russia and an acceptance of the Russian Orthodox Church. But was this a valid reason for opposing NATO actions in the Balkans? Russians are very emotional people and tend to defend a weaker nation against a stronger adversary. This emotionalism was part of the reason they opposed to U.S. air strikes against Iraq and part of the reason for their stance on NATO involvement in Yugoslavia. Russia respects the sovereignty of nations, especially when they are handling internal issues. This is not to say that Russians agreed with Milosevic's actions. (In fact, Russia shipped food to assist the Kosovo refugees at the outset of the bombing.) But they believed that each nation is entitled to deal with its own problems without intervention. This sentiment may have its roots in the Russian societal memory bank, dating back to the Tatar invasion.

The economic factor

Russia's economic problems are well known and widely documented. The government has worked diligently to find ways out of the current financial morass. Yet, the economy is a shambles and nobody but the IMF will give it a dime, and even the IMF has been hesitant, despite billions of dollars in loans. Therefore, Russia felt it had no carrot in front of it to motivate cooperation, but it had several reasons to be confrontational vis-…-vis the situation in Yugoslavia. First, confrontation is often a means for extracting economic concessions. By displaying a sense of outrage at NATO's actions, they could use that sentiment as leverage for future economic assistance in return for support in developing a peaceful solution -- truly a "peace dividend" for Russia. Second, in a country torn apart by struggles over a contracting economic pie, confrontation can create a psychological climate of solidarity against enemies and help to stabilize the political system. If people rally behind a nationalistic cause, they will worry less about political instability in the short term. Finally, in nations seeking to revive their economies, defense spending is a superb Keynesian tool, but one which needs the justification of tension. NATO did a superb job of unintentionally providing this tension, especially with the oil embargo against Yugoslavia. Russia does not want to be seen as an economic pawn, dependent on the U.S. and therefore will not modify foreign policy based on US wishes. However, they will push their policy as a means of extracting the assistance they need.

Political ramifications of the current policy

As alluded to earlier, it makes sense for Russian politicians to rattle the saber of nationalism for two reasons. First and foremost, no Russian politician wants to be seen as a dupe of the West. The worst accusation that can be made against a Russian politician is that he is surrendering Russian national interests to the West -- a charge that ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii has leveled at Boris Yeltsin in the past. Russian politicians know that their people respond to strong leadership. Bashing NATO with tough rhetoric was a way for Yeltsin to improve his political approval ratings with the Russian people. Whether Yeltsin had designs on running in the 2000 presidential election or not (the fact that the Russian Constitution limits a President to two consecutive terms notwithstanding), he still wanted his programs to move ahead and his chosen successor to be elected. Had Yeltsin not lashed out against NATO's aggression, his opponents would have vilified him as a weak president and he would have been finished. So, Yeltsin's policy toward NATO was a mechanism for political survival.

Potential Outcomes

Although Russia eventually helped bring peace in Yugoslavia, the event will affect future relations between Russia and NATO. If and when Russia resurfaces as a truly great power, the memory of NATO's slights toward her will be remembered with interesting potential consequences.
Russia, viewing NATO now as its most potent enemy, has reviewed and revised its military doctrine. Before, Russia was focused toward the south at surging Islamic fundamentalism and brewing insurgencies, but now the focus has shifted. Should the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, and/or Azerbaijan enter NATO Russia will have no choice but to view this as a potential threat and act accordingly. Also, the possibility of an alliance between Russia and China may have increased as a result of NATO conduct. The Chinese, furious over the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade as well as a rebuff by Washington toward entrance into the WTO coupled with American accusations of wholesale espionage against the nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos, may find solace in a greater partnership with Russia. While it may not be likely since both sides do not want to irreparably alienate the U.S., the chances for this alliance to develop have definitely increased.

Solving the problem

Russia must continue to cooperate toward the goal of bringing lasting peace to Yugoslavia. A difficult admission internally for the Russians would be that NATO just might be a social-democratic alliance more than a military/defensive one that poses a threat. Therefore it is in Russia's interests to assist NATO in any way possible. As stated earlier, if Russia can come away from this predicament as a guarantor of peace and a diplomatic power, the dividends will be worth the effort. On the other hand, NATO/U.S. may have been better served had they consulted with Russia from the outset and given them latitude to settle the issue in "their sphere of influence." NATO could have catered to Russia's ego and involved her in the process. Perhaps this is a lesson that NATO can learn in future conflicts in places like Transylvania where ethnic Hungarians are pushing for autonomy from Romania. The U.S. should recognize Russia's historical preoccupation with national security. By working to assuage her concerns the U.S. would achieve more success with the Russians through a better understanding AND acquiescence of the Russian national character and mindset.

Conclusion

To understand the Russian policy toward NATO's involvement in Yugoslavia, one must look beyond the obvious concepts of a need for economic resurgence and the theory of Pan-Slavism. The Russian national character is a major force in developing policy and fueling the attitude of her people. Russian history leads to an exaggerated, almost phobic, feeling of insecurity. While some may view Russian anxiety toward national security as irrational or a paranoia syndrome, this feeling is nonetheless real and must be countenanced. The feelings of betrayal by NATO compelled Russia to express outrage at the attacks on Yugoslavia. Through its expansion, NATO has contradicted agreements with Russia following the Cold War. Russia must consider the possibility future actions by NATO as they relate to potential Russian internal crises. Naturally, Russia will oppose any NATO aggression against a sovereign nation dealing with civil unrest.

Russian pride, messianism, pessimism, extremism and feelings of empathy for a weaker nation played a significant role in formulating policy and attitude toward the crisis in the Balkans. Russians feel that they are still a great power with much to offer. Feeling snubbed by NATO in the diplomatic process, Russia worked diligently to initiate a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia as a means of proving its role in world affairs. Ultimately, Russia wants recognition for its status internationally while at the same time she desires further economic assistance to get back on her feet financially. Politically, "nationalistic opportunism" provides a method for gaining prestige for the upcoming election. Therefore, the current Russian administration was obligated to oppose NATO's imperialist tactics in the name of its own interests and nationalist pride. As Winston Churchill once said, "Nations do not have allies, they have interests."

Endnotes

1. Richmond, Yale, "From Nyet to Da", Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, Maine, 1996, p. 156. BACK

2. Schecter, Jerrold L., "Russian Negotiating Behavior", United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 24. BACK

3. "NATO Presses Russia on Another Front", STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update, April 15, 1999, www.alert@stratfor.com

BACK

4. Cohen, Stephen F., "Rethinking the Soviet Experience", Oxford University Press, New York, 1985. BACK

5. Schecter, Jerrold L., "Russian Negotiating Behavior", United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 20. BACK

6. Richmond, Yale, "From Nyet to Da", Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, Maine, 1996, p. 126. BACK

7. Yergin, Daniel, "Russia 2010", Vintage Books, New York, 1995, p.7. BACK

8. Sokov, Nikolai, Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia: The Emerging New Posture, Monterey: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Working Paper No. 6, May 1998. BACK

9. "NATO Presses Russia on Another Front", STRATFOR's Global Intelligence Update, April 15, 1999, www.alert@stratfor.com.

BACK

10. Richmond, Yale, "From Nyet to Da", Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, Maine, 1996, p. 58. BACK

11. Sokov, Nikolai, Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia: The Emerging New Posture, Monterey: Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, Working Paper No. 6, May 1998. BACK

12. Petro, Nicolai N., "Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State", Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc, New York, 1997, p. 282.BACK

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