Asian Regional Reviews

"Formosa Betrayed" By George Kerr, US Navy Civil Affairs Officer / Foreign Area Officer to Republic of China, c.1945.

Reviewed by Jeff Geer

Read the Book Online: http://serv.formosa.org/betrayed

Following the official surrender of Imperialist Japan on the USS Missouri in September 1945, the ensuing choatic weeks following the taking of the Japanese troop surrender in East Asia were being significantly compounded by the Soviet looting of factories in the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo in Northeast China. In the power vacuum left by the Japanese military surrender and the late Soviet entrance into the Far East theatre, the Chinese Communist Party was able to broadly widen their growing peasant revolution with Comrade Stalin's blessings during the looming turmoil of Chinese civil war.

On October 25, 1945, George Kerr, US Naval Attaché to China (ROC) was flown from the KMT wartime capitol of Chongqing to the Japanese colony of Formosa. The Japanese colonial administrators, having their seat of government in Taipei, had been preparing for the formal surrender of the island territory since early September. Prior to late October, however, no Allied troops arriving in Formosa had been duly authorized to deal with the Japanese government on behalf of the US Commander-in-Chief, until the belated arrival of George Kerr and the ROC entourage.

George Kerr was the son of a missionary family whom grew up to speak both Chinese and Japanese during his youth in the Far East. Later he joined the US Navy Reserve where he was trained in Military Civil Affairs and edited volumes of CA regulations. He edited and compiled a voluminous naval area study which was a sheer encyclopedia of economic and cultural knowledge about Formosa during the war in the Pacific. This task had been done in order to aid the American occupation of Formosa and other Japanese territorial dependencies upon the eventual surrender of Tokyo. The corrupt KMT officials of the ROC soon discovered this American gift of 1200 pages embodying the area studies of Formosa, paid for by the US taxpayer, to be far more informative and more extensive than anything ever published in the Chinese language on the topic of Formosa. In fact, it literally became their blue print for very efficiently looting the Japanese industrial base of Formosa which was completely unparalleled in comparison to anything existing on the China mainland at the time.

On October 25, 1945, "Governor" Chen Yi of the ROC paraded into Taipei proclaiming that Chinese liberation of Formosans had occurred and the official retrocession of the Taiwan territory to China had been achieved on that very inauspicious day. However, in the Chinese translation of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender of Formosa, the ROC retrocession or "reoccupation" of Taiwan, failed to note the joint occupational role of the USA. It was US Naval Attaché George Kerr whom took note of this illegal seizure and major discrepancy by the ROC. Thus he had the lawful role of the US inserted into the English translation which is also the more authoritative version in the event of international dispute.

Under the Laws of War, the hostile occupation of Formosa had unceremoniously begun under the joint authority of the ROC/USA. While the ROC officials began looting the prosperous island of its economic treasures prior to this day in October, the Japanese surrender being signed had not yet ended this joint, foreign occupation of Formosa. In deed, it had only just legally started on paper and the occupational status would remain a point of contention between the Allies even long after the Korean War.

The Japanese government eventually signed a formal peace treaty in September 1952 and it came into legal effect with the ratification of the US Senate on April 28, 1952. It is extremely noteworthy that the Senate ratification process of the peace treaty was also concurrently conducted under the international laws of warfare with the USA being the paramount commanding authority of the Allied Powers and "principal occupational authority" of Formosa. As the "undetermined" cession of Formosa and the immediately adjacent Pescadores Islands came under Article 2 cession of the Japanese dependencies, the joint occupational authority of these island areas did not cease. This SFPT cession also included the former US Trust Territory of the Pacific. While the USA and UK signed the treaty, neither the Republic of China nor People's Republic of China were ever allowed to sign the multilateral treaty of 49 signatories. To this day, the laws of occupation have made the ROC on Taiwan as the continuing defacto government of Taiwan without any legitimate sovereign claims under peace treaty. The SFPT intentionally designates China (ROC) as a subjugated administering authority of the Allied Powers. This limbo status of Taiwan territory under the SFPT was the most enduring legal treaty status of the George Kerr's "joint occupation" of 1945. This Kerr policy legacy has been indefinitely continuing on long after he had left the military service in 1945 to join the US foreign service. It is also the constitutional legacy of the SFPT cession by which he most lawfully left the people of Taiwan in "limbo" and such is still the bane of the China policy for today's American policy makers as the "strategic ambiguity" of Taiwan status.

To better understand the role of civil affair regulations like FM 27-10 Laws of Land Warfare and the Taiwan cession of San Francisco Peace Treaty, one will find George Kerr's "Formosa Betrayed" to become indispensable to fulfilling what the US Constitution expects from us. Such duties are not a footnote of history as treaties are the supreme law of the land for the legal framework of Shanghai Communiqués and Taiwan Relations Act. Par. 353 and 354 of FM 27-10 will clearly explain the "limbo cession" of SFPT, and then US Naval Attache George Kerr's authoritative narration of historic events places these pieces of the policy framework puzzle into their correct context of the laws of customary warfare.

Your final military analysis might startle you as FAOs much like George Kerr. Such closer examinations of FM 27-10 will better explain the aggressive posturing of the People's Liberation Army over our "illegal intrusions" into the international airspace of the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea as well as the increasing frequency of the Chinese naval encrouchments upon those "unclaimed" Spratly Island cessions of the SFPT.

Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. By Leon V. Sigal. Pages 322. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998. Price $47.50, hardbound.

Review by Major James M. Minnich, Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer

Dr. Leon V. Sigal, a career professor of thirty years, has published several literary works in the field of international relations and US foreign policy. In addition to Sigal's achievements in the academia, he has worked with the State Department as both an International Affairs Fellow (1979) and as a Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (1980-81).

Leon Sigal, in his book Disarming Strangers, provides an authoritative account of the events surrounding the 1994 Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). The Agreed Framework is a policy instrument designed to eliminate North Korea's developing nuclear weapons program. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, Sigal does more than deliver the details of the issues centering on the signing of this agreement; he uncovers how the American aversion to cooperation, nearly led the world into a second Korean War. Sigal's thesis is that the US too often attempts to achieve policy ends through coercion rather than cooperation, and as a result the US unnecessarily provokes confrontation instead of ameliorating crises.

Specifically, Sigal compares the Bush and early Clinton Administrations' inability to alter North Korea's nuclear weapons program through the use of verbal intimidation, economic sanctions, and the show of military force, with the success that was eventually achieved following cooperative bilateral negotiations. Additionally, Sigal recognizes the necessity of the US to serve as lead nation for many international crises; however, he caveats that with a responsibility to work multilaterally, thereby permitting other regional actors a voice within their neighborhood.

In a final comparison, Sigal reminds the reader that in the past, negotiations have proved successful in eliminating nuclear weapons proliferation in at least eight other countries -- South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Certainly it would be premature to declare the Agreed Framework successful. In fact eight years since its signing, offensive acts and verbal threats continue to slow its progress, whereby today, completion of the Agreement has been delayed by no less than seven years. Whereas many of these problems could be worked out through close association, the US has held North Korea at arm length, and consequently, not one high-level talk has taken place since the initiation of the Framework. In Sigal's closing remarks, he reminds us that among US vital interests, resolving issues of proliferation are paramount; and while this proliferation issue is well in the working, other problems are certain to arise. And if the US is to successfully resolve these crises, we must forego our persistent attitude of "criminalizing proliferation and demonizing so-called rogue states," in favor of a policy of positive engagement and negotiation.

To date, seven other authors have written books about North Korea's efforts to build nuclear weapons and US efforts to eliminate these programs. I have read each book, and while each is different, Sigal's thesis is well supported by facts, interviews and experiences. The reading flows and is easily digested. I recommend Sigal's Disarming Strangersfor both students of international relations and government officials vested with the responsibilities of international diplomacy.

The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. By Zalmay Khalilzad, et al. Pages 260. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. Price $20, paperback.

Review by Major James M. Minnich, Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer

Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, former director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Project Air Force, serves as President Bush's newly appointed Special Assistant and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues. Dr. Khalilzad has over twenty-years of combined experience in academia and national policy formulation.

The United States and Asia, a futures book, vividly analyzes the political environment of Asia and how it will effect the United States national interests. Considering the economic miracles of Asia during the last two decades, and the stabilizing role that the United States military provides to the region, Khalilzad, et al. suggest that a continued US involvement in the region is consistent with both our current and future national interests.

Specifically, Dr. Khalilzad, et al. advises that long-term national interests require the United States to directly intervene in Asia in order to achieve three necessary objectives (1) the prevention of a regional hegemon; (2) the maintenance of regional stability; and (3) the management of Asia's transformation.

Concurrently, Khalilzad, et al. recommend a detailed four-part strategy that will facilitate the attainment of these three objectives. First, the United States, where possible, should transform bilateral security alliances into multilateral security alliances. These alliances could then work to both strengthen and preserve Asia's security environment. Second, the United States should foster an effective regional balance of power in order to check any future aspirations of regional hegemony by China, India or Russia. Third, the United States, to preempt any miscalculated assumptions by potential adversaries, should forcefully articulate and manifest its regional interests. Finally, the United States should advocate the creation of a security forum for the entire Asian region.

Among the authors' critical analyses are their assertions that the enduring ability of the United States to continue its policy of forward-deployed military forces, in Japan and South Korea, is waning. Consequently, based on the technical operating capabilities of current and future United States Air Force fighter aircraft, the authors' suggest establishing United States military airfields in both the Philippines and Vietnam, locations that will permit the US to better influence its foreign policies in both Taiwan and throughout the South China Sea.

This book, both thought provocative and easily assimilated, would greatly benefit both the political-military analyst and the intuitive reader seeking a broad exposure to the security environment of Asia. Finally, without reservation, I strongly recommend The United States and Asia: Towards a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture for all regional policymakers.

2001, Foreign Area Officer Association
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