In no other time in American history has there been an opportunity to shape the course of where United States grand strategy will go in the 21st century. During the Clinton Administration, it appeared America was using almost eight years to come to terms that it was the only remaining superpower. Currently the United States is putting elements of its national power in a variety of ways that has given an impetus to the question what should the United States with its economic, military and political dominance? A series of scholars convened in 2002 at the Virginia Military Institute to answer those questions and engage in a serious debate over the international way ahead for the United States. The Obligation of Empire: United States' Grand Strategy for a New Century edited by James J. Hentz (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 240 pages, 2006) features a collection of nine essays that introduces readers to the major positions taken after 9-11 over the direction America should take as the only superpower. It is also a book that debates the concept of American Grand Strategy in the post-9/11 world. In many ways, we are very far from having a clearly articulated grand strategy as we had during the Cold War such as containment of the former Soviet Union. This book and the national security debate are attempting to define the threat and the grand strategy the United States should pursue.
James Hentz, associate professor at the Virginia Military Institute, begins with an overview of the book and the 2002 seminar which defined four lines of argument among academics. These are neo-isolationism (we should not get entangled in conflicts that are outside our vital national interests), selective engagement (we are the dominant power but should limit our reach), cooperative security (we are not and should not act as an imperial country), and primacy (we are a superpower and should conduct an expansive and extensive foreign policy). The chapter by Doug Brandow, a fellow at the Cato Institute, argues that the United States should return to a foreign and military policy befitting a republic and not an empire, heeding the advice of John Quincy Adams that the United States should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. He feels this is the best way to preserve America's independence and freedom. Of course, with each point of view one can agree or disagree, but for those with a passion for America's national security it is important to read not only the views you tend to agree with but also those you vehemently disagree with as well. One argument against Brandow, is that the interconnectivity of the globe makes it impossible for the United States to remain neutral or uninvolved in regional crises that could undermine a region and thereby create the chaotic and ungoverned conditions from where terrorists thrive.
Clifford Kiracofe, a former instructor at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and adjunct professor at the Virginia Military Institute, makes a cogent argument for selective engagement. This proposes that the United States take a hard realist stance in dealing with international crises. But as readers will discover there are varying opinions as what constitutes selective engagement, and the chapter does not factor in the constitutional powers of the President in committing forces in the short-term that would lead to further commitments in the long-term. In essence, what constitutes selective engagement is determined initially by the President and then later sustained by Congress.
Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, argues that the United States should not resist rising regional powers and instead America's grand strategy should focus on working with Europe and East Asia to promote collective management of crises. The United States, this chapter opines, should shape the development of emerging regional powers like India, and the European Union. The book continues with a regional assessment of challenges from South Africa, and Asia to the Middle East and Europe. There are some hard questions posed on the utility of NATO and the maintenance and financing of Cold War institutions in a post-Cold War world now defined by 9-11. If you enjoyed Strategy and Policy at the war college, you will enjoy reading this book.
Colonel Kenneth Allard, U.S. Army (Ret) is a well-known military commentator in news networks, who wrote a book on U.S. Army operations in Somalia and consulted in a PBS documentary on America's first combat experience with Somali warlord, the late Mohammed Farah Aidid. Before retirement Allard was Dean of the National War College and earned a reputation as an unconventional military thinker. His latest book Warheads: Cable News Network and the Fog of War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 176 pages) combines humor, wisdom, the role of cable news in war to provide readers a thought provoking book on the American military of the 21st century. He opens with an observation that 1.4 million American soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors are charged with protecting 300 Million American citizens. This statistic translates into an American public that has become increasingly separated from the challenges American arms has had to face in the 21st century. He calls this the Great Divide in which most Americans are introduced to the military through cable news, and that part of the downfall of Rome was a citizenry that became too bored, too preoccupied and too lethargic to send their children to defend the outposts of the Roman Empire. Allard argued that the string of retired generals, colonels and officers who permeate MSNBC, FOX and CNN is due to an American public that needs a person to articulate the complexity of war, weapons systems and operations to American audiences. The author cites Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Yossi Ben- Hanan, a hero of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, who told Allard that the difference between Israel and the United States, is that in the United States the Army is you, but in Israel it is us. This leads to pondering of the citizen-soldier concepts, the draft and the volunteer armed forces, causing a review of the pros and cons between them in 21st century American arms.
The book contains chapters that delve into what news networks look for in analyzing conflict for a wider audience and of course the ever creative quest for ratings which can lead media networks to some tasteless and abhorrent actions. These chapters are important because future conflict will see media embedded with units and interacting frequently with more junior officers and enlisted personnel. Allard's book contains humor, history, and food for thought about the future of America's armed forces. Examples include his concern about the obsession of technology to replace and or downsize the number of American troops. He argues that today's conflicts demand persons on the ground, and that stability operations cannot be achieved with advances in technology only but with a robust presence. On Iraq, he quotes T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) who informed his seniors that it would be better to have the Arab (tribes) undertake a task incompletely, than to have the British complete the same task to perfection, after all it is there war, he went on to say. Warheads has something for the military planners, Foreign Area Officer, Public Affairs Officer and other military specialties.
Editor's Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is currently stationed in Washington DC as a Counter-Terrorism Analyst. He previously served as Director for North Africa and Egypt as well as Advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2002-2006. He is a fully qualified Middle East Foreign Area Officer and prolific writer of reviews and essays on the Middle East and Islamist Radicalism.