Introduction
General Yusuf Afifi served as an infantry battalion commander in the 1967 Six Day War and rose to command the 19th Infantry Division in the 1973 Yom- Kippur War. He is among those generals in the Egyptian army who rose through competence. He authored Abtal Firqah 19, Muqatilun fawq Al-Adah/ Heroes of the 19th Division, Extraordinary Warriors published in 1990 (Cairo: Dar- Al-Safwa Printers). American military planners will benefit from the writings and discussions of an Egyptian general who craved field command, and who gives an honest tactical perspective of the Six-Day and Yom-Kippur Wars. He is also an Egyptian general who articulates an honest passion for the Egyptian solider, reading his memoirs I am reminded of General Omar Bradley in World War II. Finally, General Afifi's views provide a thorough grounding in the tactics, strategy and events of the Arab- Israeli conflict. However, it is important to read Afifi's work along with other Arab generals, as well as Israeli and western sources.
The Man
General Afifi, graduated from the Egyptian military academy in 1948, and cultivated his field experience. In 1948, he commanded the Sudanese contingent in the first Arab-Israeli War and returned with them to Sudan commanding the unit until 1950. From 1966-1967, after serving a tour as a staff officer in the Yemen War in 1963, he commanded the 12th Infantry Battalion seeing action in the Sinai in 1967. His unit was one of the few infantry formations to withdraw in an orderly fashion and with their commander, while other units scrambled back to Egypt in disarray. Afifi would serve as Chief of Staff to the 10th Infantry Division in the Yemen War (1963), Chief of Staff of the Republican Guard (1965), he would command troops in the 1967 War, and then serve as Chief of Staff of the 4th Infantry Division. In addition, he served in 1971 as Chief of Training of the Egyptian 2nd Army before assuming command of the 19th Infantry Division from 1972 to 1974. In 1978, he became Commander of the Egyptian 3rd Army. His book pulls together all these experiences to discuss his lessons learned from the 1967 and 1973 War.
Understanding Al-Naksah (The Catastrophe): The 1967 War Afifi describes his analysis of the 1967 War as painful as a minefield, filled with contradictions and controversies discussed among Egyptian military thinkers and historians. He writes that it is impossible to understand the 1973 War without delving into the 1967 War however painful the analysis maybe. He says the Egyptian solider of 1967 was wronged and not served well by the planners and generals of that war. Afifi writes from first-hand experience in the field as commander of the 12th Infantry Battalion. He says that infantry forces in the Sinai were not given freedom of movement and were literally moved around like chess pieces. Battalions were ordered to a position and given orders to take the defensive on this sector and then ordered to withdraw without reason. He found it insane that field commanders could not move towards better positions that reconnaissance experts could plainly see.
As commander of the 12th Infantry Battalion, Afifi was given orders to move his forces into the Sinai as part of the 4th Infantry Division on the evening of 17/18 May 1967. The order was given without preparation, coordination with other units and the only thing told to Afifi, when he asked his superiors, was this would be a military demonstration. In 20 days, his unit would cross from Kuntilla to El-Arish to designated part of the Northern Sinai known as Kilometer 161. Upon arrival he was ordered to move to another position the next day. Afifi writes that he was embarrassed by the incessant questions from his unit on what the objective or mission was? He was angry at his superiors for not giving him a clearly defined mission or plan. To get his unit occupied he had them dig defensive trenches to get their mind off the fact there was no assignment out in the desert. It became apparent there was no plan and he ordered his men to take a defensive position around Al-Qusaymah/Al-Husna to serve as protective barrier for units ahead of him that are forming the first line of defense. Afifi took a rare gamble and gathered situational awareness and took the initiative without orders.
Afifi describes the reasons for the 1967 defeat as follows:
- Destruction of the Egyptian Air Forces, an excuse: The Israelis decimated the Egyptian Air Force in hours in an aerial blitzkrieg. Afifi dismisses Israeli air dominance, arguing that Egyptian forces had closed in on Israeli units and when infantry closes then aerial dominance becomes of little use. The mission should've been to close in on Israeli units as a means of self- preservation not retreat.
- Chaotic Withdrawal of Egyptian Forces: Afifi writes that Egyptian units entered the Sinai chaotically and without a mission and withdrew just as chaotically. This chaos multiplied losses in equipment and military hardware.
- At the Battalion Level: Reserve units arriving from Egypt's major urban centers came to the Sinai in their civilian clothes, without water, food, weapons or ammunition. Afifi had no choice but to distribute his ammo, water and food to these poor souls degrading his unit's effectiveness. Many left home and into trucks bound for the Sinai.
- The Yemen War, an excuse: Afifi writes the Yemen War (1962- 1967) was a political decision in which the Egyptian armed forces paid a heavy price for. He however stops short of blaming the Yemen War for the 1967 defeat. The Yemen War was not the cause of the 1967 defeat, except that it reinforced Egyptian incompetence in training only at the battalion level to deal with the insurgency in Yemen.
Withdrawal from the Sinai
The book contains one chapter devoted to the first-hand description Afifi gives of the withdrawal of Egyptian units in the 1967 War. Afifi writes that he received the order to abandon his position and withdraw to the west side of the Suez Canal the night of 7/8 June, the order was simply withdraw to the western side of the canal to Ismailiah. He would conduct an orderly withdrawal despite the chaos around him and the fact several unit commanders left their troops in the Sinai to the make their way back without their commanding officers. Afifi led his troops back to Ismailiah arriving in the 9th of June under heavy Israeli air and artillery assault. He takes pride that out of 900 troops assigned him only 17 were killed in the 12th Infantry Battalion. Afifi believes the headquarters in Cairo and Ismailiah were completely disengaged from field commanders. In January 1967 he was asked to reconnoiter the southern tip of Sinai around Sharm-El-Sheikh and Ras-Nasrani yet a totally new division was sent to that sector and were not given the report prepared by the 4th Infantry Division, Afifi's chain of command that ordered the reconnaissance.
Views of the 19th Infantry Division During the 1973 War
Afifi contrasts the planning and leadership of the 1967 War and 1973 War. Afifi's infantry division was assigned to attack three Israeli positions labeled by Egyptians as 146 through 149. This extended from Port Tawfik and Ayun Musa located north of the Gulf of Suez. Afifi concentrates his book on what the basic infantryman saw and felt during the crossing on October 6, 1973. After dispensing with the emotionalism, he writes that it would be several hours before a gap was created along the Bar-Lev line using pressurized water cannons. The mud created made it difficult for infantry to wade through and his unit ended up creating a human ladder in which his entire division crossed into the Bar-Lev Line. It would be 26 hours later that Egyptian armored units would reinforce his particular unit and the initial assault was hand-to-hand fighting in trenches behind the Bar-Lev Line along with using anti-tank Malotka rockets and RPGs against Israeli armor. There is none of the romance found in many Egyptian accounts of the Battle for the Suez Canal, but real descriptions of securing the bridgehead and dealing with mines and barbed wire so follow-on forces from the Egyptian 3rd Army would flow through into the Sinai. Afifi's book is the first to describe in detail the hardened Israeli bunkers behind the Bar-Lev Line and the efforts by Egyptian engineers and infantry to penetrate those bunkers and to carry on hand-to-hand fighting. He describes the bunkers as being under the Bar- Lev Line and having chambers 5,000 square meters and pathways enough for tank and truck movement. It would take under a week before the bunkers behind the Bar-Lev were secured and every Israeli solider captured or killed. Even if War Minister Ismail Ali wanted to develop the attack to the Gidi, Mitla and Khatmiyah passes beyond the protection of Egyptian anti-air missiles, the Bar-Lev was not secure at least in Afifi's sector until D+7 days. Luckily for the Egyptians, the Israelis had not adequately reinforced the Bar-Lev Line. By some accounts between 500-800 Israeli troops, faced an initial Egyptian assault of 32,000.
The 19th Infantry upon securing the Bar-Lev Line was to work in tandem with Saaqa (Commando) units to pave the way for the 2nd (Mechanized), 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions heading to secure the 23 kilometer stretch of road towards the Mitla Pass. As these forces did not extend beyond the 15 kilometer protective shield of Egyptian anti-air defenses. The 19th Infantry was to attack and harass Israeli units along the coastal road in the northern Sinai. This led to the 19th Infantry Division seeing combat at the lip of Port Tawfik, Ayun Musa, Haud Al- Dars and the infamous Chinese Farm tank engagement, the biggest tank battle after the Battle of Kursk in World War II.
Conclusion
Afifi goes through the heroism and men lost and statistics of tanks, artillery even helicopters destroyed by his 19th Infantry Division. It also recounts his frustration at the entrapment of the Egyptian Third Army and ways in which soldiers kept alive as negotiations for a cease-fire ensured.
Each Egyptian battalion and brigade has a room designated for its battle honors. While serving in Exercise Bright Star 99, I had the honor of spending a half-day with the 13th Egyptian Commando Battalion inside their specially designated honors room, there the Commanding Officer showed me and several naval Seabees his unit's history sharing stories of the Yemen War to the 1973 War. I recommend FAOs serving in Egypt and encountering Egyptian battalion formations share this experience as a means of bonding and good old fashioned swapping of solider stories.
LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a frequent contributor to the FAO Journal and currently serves as Director for Egypt and North Africa at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and advisor on Islamic militant ideology. As General Afifi's book is in Arabic, it represents LCDR Aboul- Enein's understanding and analysis of the material any errors or omissions are his own. LCDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thank the Georgetown University and Pentagon Librarians for making General Afifi's memoirs available for study and analysis.