NOTE: This is Part I of a three-part series entitled "Global Trends and Security Strategies." Part I discusses current global security threats and how the U.S. and the EU security strategies each address these threats. Part II of this series will discuss how and if the EU is capable of backing its security strategy with its defense forces, and specifically will discuss how, and if, the ESDP can accomplish this important task. Finally, Part III will focus on the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in contemporary Transatlantic security.
Introduction
The world in which we lived a mere 20 years ago is quickly becoming a faded memory. As democracy spreads and the world rapidly evolves into a global society, the type and nature of threats faced by the major states are congruently evolving. The Soviet Union and the spread of communism no longer present themselves as our primary threat. Determining what the emerging threats have been and currently are has been a lesson in adaptation. It is doubtful that anyone could have predicted the scale of the attacks on American soil by terrorists on 11 September 2001. Yet in the absence of a defined enemy, actions like this are what force us to re-evaluate what and where the threats are and the impact they could have on our national security.
Defining a security strategy in an evolving environment is no easy task. Too often it is the actions of the present and past that have determined our national security strategy and associated actions, while emergent indicators of the future are ignored. The attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is a prime example of how the indicators in the Pacific pointing to imminent threat against the United States were not adequately analyzed and the reality of the European theater, while not necessarily a realistically imminent threat, overshadowed those that were. Today's primary threats are as much of a concern to the Unites States as they are to Europe, or any part of the world. This paper will therefore analyze the security strategies of the United States and the European Union (herein used to represent the security interests of an inclusive Europe) with the goals, first, to determine if they adequately address the current and emerging threats, and second, to compare the manner by which they address the threats, and potential transatlantic policy and relationship implications.
This paper will argue that both security strategies do indeed address the threats currently perceived as the most dangerous and common not only to individual states, but globally as well. In addition, these threats are essentially consistent with those perceived by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in Mapping the Global Future. 1 Yet there are some potential gaps in addressing emerging future challenges. The paper proceeds by analyzing the emerging trends as defined by the NIC in their periodic reports on global trends with the intent of identifying the currently perceived threats and how they have evolved as such over the last decade. The paper then analyzes and compares the United States National Security Strategy (USNSS) 2 and the European Security Strategy (ESS). 3 The paper concludes by tying the two analyses together to determine where, if at all, in the USNSS or the ESS there might be inconsistencies in addressing the perceived threats as identified by the NIC.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism as the preeminent threat to global security, defining the new threats has become obscured. While the NIC Global Trends 2010 saw Russia as a viable player in global security threats, its focus was on three new key threats to global security: internal conflicts, failed states, and globalization. 5 The NIC identified six trends within these key threats.
The first trend is population growth. The analysis here was that an increase in population growth would put an increasing strain on social systems. The threat associated with such strains is that of instability in governments incapable of handling such strains. 6 This is a trend that has carried over through Global Trends 2015 7 and is defined in Mapping the Global Future as a threat to "good governance", a concept first introduced in Global Trends 2015 8 and further developed in Mapping the Global Future. 9 This trend is indeed correctly analyzed as a key aspect in global security that, if not addressed, could create instability and a desire from those adversely affected for retribution against the rich or desire for increasing their wealth via force.
Two additional threats, food and energy supplies, are also a function of population growth and similarly culminated in Mapping the Global Future under the auspices of good governance. 10 Per capita income increase and communications are two separate trends in Global Trends 2010 11 encompassed into one trend in Global Trends 2015, global economy and globalization. 12 The concerns with globalization are that as incomes rise across the globe via a global market facilitated by rapid communications, there will be those who are left behind for various reasons. This will inherently create a potential for instability as those pariahs seek recourse through force or other forms of action, resulting in strains on the ability of governments to cope with such challenges and subsequently impacting the international balance of power.
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A final key trend, that of future conflict, was identified in Global Trends 2015 and is the beginning of defining the current threats that have been evolving since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of unstable states and regions. Herein, the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), asymmetric threats (including terrorism) and regional instability are identified. 16 These same threats are similarly addressed in Mapping the Global Future as "pervasive insecurity." 17 It additionally identifies a key fact that the impacts of globalization contribute to the ability of states to govern, depending on how they are able to deal with the strains of globalization.
With the current rise in religious ideology and pervasive insecurity, coupled with globalization and the rise of Asian economies, the dominance of the United States in the global scene is indeed exposed to new and various threats that perhaps may not be addressable via military dominance. The manner and effectiveness by which the United addresses these issues in this new world will determine if it is able to retain its dominance, or if it becomes more integrated in global politics. Based on the USNSS, the United States assumes it retains its global dominance.
Analyzing the Security Strategies
The four big areas identified in the NIC's latest analysis, Mapping the Global Future, which are new global players, globalization, good governance and pervasive insecurity, are indeed incorporated into both the USNSS and the ESS. Yet to get a bigger picture on the strategies and their legitimacy in addressing these threats we now take a closer look.
The Evolution of the European Security Strategy
The evolution of the European Security Strategy from Thessaloniki 18 to the approved strategy indeed saw some significant changes. I believe a key change was the increased degree of reference to the European Union in the final version. This indicates a move to solidarity in the ESS; a vital move since the ESS is a document supporting the policy and actions of the EU and not simply the whole of Europe. This is also an indicator of the need for more EU solidarity and unity of effort following the invasion of Iraq, which acted to split the EU in strategic policy matters.
Another key change was the use of the word preventive in the ESS verses using pre- emption as in the Thessaloniki version. Pre-emption implies an imminent threat, whereas preventive may not indicate as such. Prevention carries implications of the entire spectrum of problem solving, from social and political to culture and economics. Hence, the EU essentially assumes a more inclusive role in international security. I also believe the use of preventive instead of pre-emption was an attempt by the EU to define its strategy positions as separate from those in the USNSS and its demonstrated actions in Iraq that were commonly referred to as pre-emptive. That debate depends on one's interpretation of the threat of WMD and is beyond the scope of this brief analysis. Yet, by attempting to define its differing strategic views, the EU may have semantically set itself up for a more inclusive and active role often setting itself apart from the United States.
The United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy
The USNSS and the ESS are indeed quite similar in many ways. Most importantly, both interpret global threats in a relatively similar manner. While the EU focuses slightly more on soft threats, the difference is really not that significant. What is indeed significant is the means by which each security strategy seeks to achieve its strategic goals. While the EU is focused on international institutions, the rule of law, diplomacy, aid and other soft power methods, the United States is focused on its dominant global role, especially in economic and military terms. Why so different? Reasons for this could be debated, but the key point is that this creates friction with the USNSS methods of acting in the best interest of United States national security. This means using whatever means is most effective at achieving the strategic goals. As the most powerful nation in the world in most, if not every, aspect, the United States typically reverts to the method seen as the greatest threat to its enemies - military power. This is a distinctly realist approach. Yet this does not limit the United States to simply military force. It is just as dedicated to using soft power; in fact it may be more dedicated to soft power following the political turmoil of the Iraq invasion. Only time will tell where that will go. Yet the key issue is the United States' willingness to use force and the EU abhorrence to the same. What one should take as a point of caution is the dominance of the United States as a global player, and the direction in which this dominance is heading. It appears it could be weakening as the EU gains strength, as Asia grows in power and the United States continues to isolate itself in global military actions.
Detailed Comparison
Strategic Objectives. The objectives of both security strategies are essentially the same. Both seek to promote stability through the spread of democracy and good governance. In so doing, both strategies promote early intervention. Yet the type of intervention is not defined by the ESS in the same detail that it is in the USNSS. This is a reflection of the different approaches to international relations. After centuries of warfare, Europe significantly adjusted its approach to security after World War II, focusing more on international institutions and liberalism instead of militarism. However, due to its position as the dominant actor in global politics, the United States' approach is a realist approach that seeks to use its dominance to further its goals. In conjunction with its realist approach, the United States leaves its options open for cooperation with other states, leaving an outlet in its security strategy to act alone if necessary.
Threat Perception. Where the USNSS and the ESS are essentially consistent with each other is in defining the perceived threats, defined by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future as pervasive insecurity. However, there are key points that signify the United States' self- recognition as the dominant global actor. The first is that the USNSS is more specific in defining regional threats. Is so doing, it takes on a more global aspect, which is a reflection of the terrorism threat that raised its ugly head following the attacks on 11 September 2001. In the ESS, the focus is more of a peripheral approach, looking predominantly to the immediate threats at and permeating through its borders. Additionally, the ESS focuses more on soft threats that could have a more subtle impact on national security (e.g. health and environment).
Capabilities. The manner by which the United States and Europe intend to address the threats is where the two security strategies diverge the most. The reason for this is perhaps due to the United States' military dominance. Its military dominance is not something that evolved with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. It came about as other militaries broke apart or weakened while the Untied States maintained a relative status quo with its military investments and expenditures. Yet the form of its military dominance is perhaps not the most adept at dealing with the current threats. Fighting terrorism and building stable democracies is not accomplished with mechanized forces, yet the United States, until recently, continued to focus on these same forces to meet its objectives. 19 This has led to strategic and political failure in Somalia and turned Kosovo into a prolonged and expensive operation that vaguely met the initial United Nations' objectives. The EU, on the other hand, is focusing on reforming its forces to be more flexible and able to react to regional and limited global threats. Its challenge, however, is in funding such reform and doing so in an integrated manner within the EU. Until the EU is able to meets its defense force objectives, it will need to rely on NATO via the Berlin Plus agreement to meet its security needs that require the deployment of military forces.
Where the United States needs to focus is on more efficiently training its forces for the missions it is currently and has been carrying out over the last decade. More clearly defining military roles in Phase IV operations, their political role and implications, and training military forces in the tactics, techniques and procedures required for such operations should be the direction of reform within the military forces of the United States.
International Cooperation. A key point of divergence between the USNSS and the ESS is their policy on when to intervene. The USNSS retains its right, as it where, to act when and how it deems necessary in order to address threats to national security. Its use of the term pre-emption has been a key point of controversy for transatlantic relations. However, pre-emption is based on action against an imminent threat. Yet since the EU saw the United States' pre-emptive action against Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as a threat to global stability, it has defined early intervention in a different manner. The ESS uses the term preventive. While the intent of the EU is to use soft power and diplomacy instead of the threat of force, the term preventive is vague and can even refer to a more inclusive action. In addition, the type of preventive action is not defined. The key point, therefore, is that both the EU and the United States will act when and how it deems necessary. The EU will focus on diplomacy and soft power while the United States will use its dominant global position to achieve its goals.
Another key difference is the reliance on international institutions. Bother the USNSS and the ESS acknowledge the need for such institutions, but the confidence each has in these institutions is quite different. The United States, for example, supports the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other such institutions at varying degrees of confidence. However, it retains its right to act unilaterally, building coalitions of the willing to address the threats. The EU, on the other hand, relies predominantly on these international organizations. I would argue that this difference is not only a function of Europe's shift from realism to liberalism following the Second World War, but also due to its generally weaker position militarily compared to the United States.
This position, however, could be evolving to one that is more comprehensive and capable of meeting the unique challenges of European security. This evolution is via a European-internal international institution -- the EU. If the EU Constitution is passed, it will create a European Defense Agency that has the potential to fully unite Europe in its defense efforts. 20 In order to effectively apply its security strategy, this is exactly what the EU needs. Yet, the United States is only hesitantly supporting the EU's efforts in building its defense institutions. Reasons for this may be the NATO relationship through which the United States has exerted its political influence on Europe for the past 60 years and sees an EU defense institution as a threat to its influence. Whatever the reasons, the evolution of the EU's defense institutions will influence not only the transatlantic relationship, but also how it addresses its threats.
Policy Implications. While the threats identified by both the USNSS and the ESS are relatively the same, the manner by which each intends to address the threats will drive not only national policy, but foreign policy as well. A key point about policy is that the USNSS is more explicit in defining its actions. These give clear guidance as to the direction that the policies of the United States will take in addressing threats. The ESS on the other hand is quite vague and open for interpretation. This is perhaps logical when one considers the political environment of the EU. The ESS must be able to accommodate 25 states. This follows as to why the EU must rely on diplomacy -- it must in order to reach a political consensus. However, the EU's vagueness will create challenges in developing policy to address its threats. While the EU does indeed acknowledge the use of international organizations as a key forum through which to deal with threats, the specific manner will still need to be clarified. This will end up involving a diplomatic process that could take time and cause rifts not only within the EU, but transatlantically as well. This was evident in its handling of the Iraq situation that ended up splitting not only opinions within the EU, but also in subsequent actions of each state. While the United States will also have to clearly define the specifics of its actions, these actions will not rely on the diplomatic process when opposition and differing opinions threaten to derail or delay the achievement of its goals and addressing the threats.
A last aspect for policy is the use of international aid. While the Malthusian decline, a function of globalization, is indeed an issue affecting national security, the ESS does not address associated actions. However, the EU is quite proactive in providing support. The EU just needs to incorporate its actions into its security strategy. Conversely, USNSS addresses Malthusian decline in detail, yet it is clearly not its priority. The key thing to remember here is that when aid is given in whatever form, the recipients must be held accountable for their actions for reform in all aspects: political, economic, social, etc. If this is done, growth is more likely to occur. If not, complacency takes over as states simply wait for the next round of aid and subsidies. The EU and the United States cannot afford to provide support without political and economic returns from the recipient states. If recipient states are not held accountable, then the donors are simply supporting weak states and sustaining a volatile political and economic environment of potential instability.
Conclusion: Incongruities and Policy Implications
The United States is clearly the dominant force in the world today, not only in military power, but also in political influence and economic prowess. Its security strategy is consistent with its dominant position and its ability to influence the global security environment. Its dominant role since the end of the Cold War has set the United States up as a key actor in providing global stability. The EU, on the other hand, assumes the role as political advocate by relying on diplomacy and international institutions to secure peace in a global environment.
Both the United States and the EU have evolved over the last decade just as the security environment has evolved. Yet both have been slow to acknowledge the emerging threats and developing capabilities to address the threats. It was not until the aftermath of Bosnia and Kosovo that the EU legitimately focused on its own security. Developing the ESS is a major and positive first step. The second will be to fully develop its own integrated and fully functioning defense institutions that will provide the capabilities with which to achieve its security strategy goals and objectives. For the United States, it took the attacks on 11 September 2001 to divert its focus away from a Cold War enemy to one of primarily asymmetrical threats. The key point to draw from this is that both the United States and the EU have focused too much on the evolution of the past and on what the present situation is to define its direction. By the time capabilities have been established to address the "present" threats, the security environment has changed. This is why the NIC's research is essential. It helps to define the threats. While the NIC did indeed identify the potential for asymmetrical threats as early as 1997, the United States was stuck in a Cold War mentality that caught it off guard. While the current security strategies of the United States and the EU are on track for the current threats, one can only wonder if they are adequate for the future. It is hard to say as the future is never clear. Yet there is one key inconsistency that I argue as a significant point of concern, and it relates directly to the NIC's addressing the new global players and globalization.
A misperception inconsistent with current trends and not adequately addressed in Mapping the Global Future 21 is that the United States will remain the dominant actor in all aspects of global relations. Yet, current indicators could be painting a picture quite different from that in Mapping the Global Future. In a recent article from Agence France Presse, current trends show a declining competitiveness in technology from the United States. 22 Coupled with the Indian "brain drain," the United States could be seeing its decline in technological and hence economic supremacy. 23 Militarily, the United States may have to face competition with China who recently announced a 16 percent increase in defense spending -- something that could increase even more as its economy continues to grow at a rapid pace. 24 While the United States will remain militarily dominant, it could weaken in other areas that are key in a global world. With the growth of Asian economies, it is quite possible that India, China, or other countries could eventually surpass the United States in technological and/or economic dominance. While the impact this could have on its dominant role in global politics and economy is very difficult to near impossible to predict, I would argue that there are two key factors that, should they occur, the United States' attitude of dominance could lead it down a road of vulnerability. The first is the rise of the new global powers in Asia that could weaken the United States' global economic dominance. Couple this with the EU emphasis on diplomacy, the United States could find itself isolated as it continues to focus on unilateralism. This could lead to setting the conditions where adversaries are able to unite in their efforts to thwart United States' military dominance. This could mean that the USNSS's emphasis on unilateral action could be misplaced. It should be noted, however, that even if the United States' position of global dominance is weakened, it will still remain a major player in global politics.
In order for the United States to remain dominant and avoid a position of compromising envy, it should rely more on diplomacy and more fully integrate itself into international institutions. It should also focus on retaining the competitive edge and look to more fully integrate its technology sharing with those states rapidly progressing. The bottom line is that the United States should still speak softly and carry a big stick, with the soft speaking referring to global diplomacy and its big stick referring its military dominance and its associated potentials for action when well-essayed diplomacy fails.
1. Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, December 2004), available on line at http://www.odci.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html, accessed 14 January 2005.BACK
2. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.BACK
3. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 8 December 2003.BACK
4. For an illustrative analysis of evolving threats, refer to Appendix A: Threat Evolution Over the Last DecadeBACK
5. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010, November 1997, page 3, available at http://www.odci.gov/nic/special_globaltrends2010.html, accessed 18 January 2005.BACK
6. Global Trends 2010, page 4.BACK
7. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernmenl Experts, (December 2000), page 8, available on line at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/globaltrends2015/globaltrends2015.pdf, accessed 6 January 2005.BACK
9. Mapping the Global Future, page 73.BACK
11. Global Trends 2010, pages 4-5.BACK
12. Global Trends 2015, page 10.BACK
13. Global Trends 2010, page 6.BACK
14. Global Trends 2015, pages 9-10.BACK
15. Mapping the Global Future, page 9.BACK
16. Global Trends 2015, pages 11-12.BACK
17. Mapping the Global Future, pages 14-15.BACK
18. Solana, Javier, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003.BACK
19. The ongoing U.S. Army and Defense Transformation is addressing this issue directly. A comprehensive document outlining the U.S. Army Transformation, entitled "United States Army 2004 Transformation Roadmap," published in July 2004, can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/documents/. BACK
20. Even without passing, which after the French and Dutch "No" votes is a possibility, efforts in the defense realm are developing and will mostly likely continue to develop.BACK
21. This concern is only mentioned in passing on page 112 and not fully analyzed for further policy implications.BACK
22. "As High-Tech Exports Drop, US Warned It Could Lose Competitive Edge," Agence France Presse, 17 February 2005. Accessed 26 February 2005 on line at LexisNexis Academic at http://80-web.lexis- nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=54cc3d71cc47ae9c2c43d42775dea511&_docnum=28&wchp=dGLbVtb- zSkVA&_md5=271d01ab980fbf88033e7ddc481dec75. BACK
23. "America's Brain Drain May Prove To Be India's Gain: Report," Nationwide International News, 16 February 2005. Accessed 26 February 2005 on line at LexisNexis Academic at http://80-web.lexis- nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=54cc3d71cc47ae9c2c43d42775dea511&_docnum=41&wchp=dGLbVtb- zSkVA&_md5=57301a7908ffb0c38e96f1d2b7f265a1. BACK
24. From a BBC Radio report on 3 March 2005.BACK