The Philippines is a key location in the expanding global War on Terror. In April 2005, for example, Joseph Mussomeli, United States Embassy chargé d'affaires, stated that the southern Philippines may become the next Afghanistan because of the continued presence of terrorists. He also indicate that Mindanao is almost the new Mecca' for terrorism. More broadly, the Philippines is viewed as a keystone within Southeast Asia, a region described as the Second Front' in the War on Terror.
The place' of the Philippines in the War on Terror, however, and, relatedly, the war in Iraq, has been controversial to say the least. Initially a stalwart supporter of the Coalition of the Willing, the Philippine government surprised many when it acquiesced to the demands of insurgents in Iraq. The decision of Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in July 2004 to pull-out the Filipino peace-keeping contingent in light of the abduction of contract worker Angelo de la Cruz shocked and angered many officials throughout the world. Ruth Urry, assistant information officer of the United States was dismayed by the action, saying "This decision sends the wrong signal." 1 U.S. State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher explained that "We think that withdrawal sends the wrong signal and that it is important for the people to stand up to terrorists and now allow them to change our behavior." 2 In Australia, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer branded the Macapagal-Arroyo administration's decision as "marshmallowlike." 3
What contributed to the Philippines turn-of-course regarding the situation in Iraq? Why did the Philippines agree to withdraw its forces from Iraq after the abduction of de la Cruz? This brief paper is both a summary and an extension of my previous work. 4 My guiding questions are simple: How are we to interpret the Philippines' participation in global affairs? What are the motivating factors behind the foreign policy of the Philippines? I maintain that many accounts of the Philippines' foreign policy fail to adequately consider some of the more salient elements, namely overseas employment and religion. This paper raises these issues in an attempt to broaden the discussion of the Philippines' participation in the Coalition of the Willing.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Macapagal- Arroyo brings an interesting mix of beliefs and backgrounds to her presidency. Born April 5, 1947, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is the daughter of former Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal and Eva Macaraeg Macapagal. She attended high school at the Assumption Convent (1960-1964) and later earned a bachelor's degree in commerce and economics from Assumption College. Afterwards, she received a master's degree in economics from Ateneo de Manila University (1978) and a doctorate in economics from the University of the Philippines (1985). This training, in part, accounts for her neoliberal outlook in policy matters.
Professionally, Macapagal-Arroyo has held various academic and political positions, including professorships at Ateneo de Manila, Assumption College, and the University of the Philippines. She also served as assistant secretary in the Department of Trade and Industry (1987-1989) and later as undersecretary (1989-1992).
In 1992 Macapagal-Arroyo was elected to the Senate; she was reelected in 1995, receiving the highest number of votes ever by any politician in Philippine electoral history. She considered running for president in 1998 but ultimately agreed to run for vice president. In the Philippines, the president and vice president are elected separately by direct popular vote.
Macapagal- Arroyo won the vice presidency, being elected opposite President Joseph Estrada. A former film star turned politician, Estrada's presidency was plagued with charges of corruption. Impeachment proceedings began and Estrada was forced to step down. At this point Macapagal-Arroyo assumed, in January 2001, the presidency of the Philippines.
The presidential administration of Macapagal-Arroyo was borne of political manuevering and internal factions. After the Philippine Supreme Court unanimously supported her assumption of the presidency, for example, thousands of Estrada supporters stormed the presidential palace. Macapagal-Arroyo was compelled to declare a state of rebellion'. It is not surprising, therefore, that she has pursued a policy of solidarity and reconciliation in an effort the reunite the Philippines. However, these objectives are also part of her Catholic faith. She has noted on numerous occasions that she is carrying out God's will in her work. In December 2002 she discerned that it was God's will to not run for president in 2004; later, in October of 2003, she reversed her decision, stating that she was responding to God's will, that it was her duty to lead the Filipino people.
Macapagal- Arroyo brings a political fundamentalism to Philippine foreign policy. After taking office she repeatedly indicated that she would stress her government's adherence to Catholic dictums. Macapagal-Arroyo met on several occasions with Pope John Paul II; it was not uncommon for reverends or bishops to attend special cabinet meetings. Consequently, Macapagal-Arroyo's foreign policy was to be based on adherence to a strict reading of the Bible and the doctrines of the Catholic church. Four elements, based by a Catholic vision of peace, underscored her geopolitics: human rights, development, solidarity, and world order.
In short, Macapagal-Arroyo brings to her administration a neoliberal political fundamentalism. Her moral politics are infused with a strong element of economic globalization. Her representation of globalization, however, is theological: an underlying, unrelenting force that drives nations and their economies forward. In her presidency, she has advocated a neoliberal position in her quest to eliminate poverty; this approach, however, must be morally informed.
Foreign Policy Realities of the Philippines
President Macapagal-Arroyo has detailed her foreign policy perspective in numerous speeches. On July 12, 2001, for example, Macapagal-Arroyo, in her speech delivered on the 103rd Foundation Day of the Department of Foreign Affairs, outlined eight policies or realities' that she urged the department to advance. The first reality was that China, Japan, and the US would retain a determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of Asia. She spoke in support of a "blossoming" of Philippine-US relations that are "responsive to the new realities of globalization and the conjunction of democracy and the market." Her second reality was to situate Philippine foreign policy more firmly with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It would be through the Philippines' commitment to ASEAN, Macapagal-Arroyo surmised, that the country would achieve global competitiveness toward attaining sustainable growth and development. Her third reality was to form stronger bilateral relations with Islamic countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others. A fourth reality was to promote greater multilateral and interregional cooperation within East Asia, while a fifth reality was to protect the national territory of the Philippines. The sixth and seventh realities addressed investment and tourism, respectively; combined, these addressed specific means of promoting economic growth and development within the Philippines. Lastly, Macapagal-Arroyo announced her eighth reality: the assertion that overseas Filipinos would continue to play a critical role in the country's economic and social stability. 5 The Salience of Overseas Employment
Within the Philippines, overseas employment has assumed monumental proportions. In 2004 alone the Philippines deployed 933,588 overseas contract workers (OCWs) to over 200 countries and territories. These workers remitted approximately US$8.5 billion. Within the first three months alone of 2005 Filipino OCWs have remitted US$2.3 billion, an increase of 17 percent from the previous year. Proportionately, remittances from migrant workers have sustained the Philippines' fragile economy. In aggregate terms, for example, the amount of earnings contributed to the gross national product by remittances from 1975 to 1994--a sum totaling US$18 billion--was approximately four times larger than the total foreign direct investment for the same period. 6
As expressed in Macapagal-Arroyo's eighth reality, overseas employment is a crucial element in the Philippines' foreign policy. Moreover, it was the expected financial gain from a participation in the rebuilding of Iraq that motivated the Philippine government during the months leading to the war in Iraq. Ultimately, on April 14, 2003, as US Pentagon officials declared a cessation of major combat operations in Iraq, Macapagal-Arroyo signed Executive Orders 194 and 195. With the first order, the president approved the formation of a public-private sector task force to coordinate Philippine participation in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. The second order established an additional task force to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq. The Philippine government, through the reconstruction task force, hoped to garner substantial labor contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq. This would be accomplished through contractual arrangements with American and other (mostly Kuwaiti) construction firms, such as Kellogg, Brown & Root and Bechtel. Officials in the Philippines anticipated future deployments of between 30,000 and 100,000 contract workers to Iraq. In a combination of Catholicism and neoliberalism, Macapagal-Arroyo viewed the War on Terror as an opportunity to confront poverty in the Philippines through the export of labor. Overseas employment as foreign policy would thus eliminate two interrelated problems: poverty and, by extension, terrorism. This could be accomplished through the peaceful promotion of Iraqi development through solidarity and humanitarian intervention.
The windfall of contract work to Iraq never materialized. In part, certain officials, including the president, were reluctant to deploy sizeable numbers of workers to Iraq until conditions stabilized. Increased insurgent attacks foreclosed the possibility of mass deployments. Between April 2003 and July 2004, however, despite the bombings and assassinations in Iraq, thousands of Filipinos did enter the country to facilitate reconstruction projects. The majority of Philippine contract workers were employed on U.S. military installations. 7
With the abduction of de la Cruz in July 2004, however, Macapagal-Arroyo worked to suspend the deployment of laborers to Iraq. She issued a series of bans, barring the deployment of Filipinos to the country. Critics of both Macapagal-Arroyo and the ban on deployment contend that the Philippines stands to lose over US$100 million in remittances. Economically, therefore, the decisions of the Philippine president regarding overseas employment and Iraq do not appear to make sense. What else accounts for her actions?
Separatist Movements and Armed Insurgencies
Three Islamic separatist groups are active in the Philippines. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), established in 1968; the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), established in 1977; and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), established in the 1990s. Similar in demands for sovereign Islamic state, but throughout long histories, have agreed to increased autonomy. On-again, off-again peace negotiations, truces, and settlements. All have been active throughout Mindanao, the largest island of the southern Philippines. Also in more periperhal islands... The ASG has been linked to al Qaeda. Both the MILF and MNFL have distanced themselves from the ASG.
Apart from Islamic separatist groups, a number of revolutionary movements have emerged in the Philippines. The most salient group, for current purposes, is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP), founded in 1968. Maoist in its ideology, the CCP has maintained a guerrilla campaign to overthrow the Philippine government. The CCP is supported by its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA). Operationally, the NPA primarily targets local politicians, judges, government informers, as well as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). According to officials of the Philippine government, the CPP-NPA maintains 107 guerrilla fronts nationwide. Geographically, they are most active throughout Luzon, the Visayas, and parts of Mindanao.
Recently, there have been allegations of ties between the CCP and the MILF. Spokespersons for the MILF, however, have denied these charges, noting only that any alliance between the two groups was demarcate spheres of operation, to prevent them from accidentally fighting with each other in their respective campaigns against the government.
Combined, the Philippine president is beset with internal conflicts. These, not surprisingly, have influenced her foreign policy, both positively and negatively. The Macapagal-Arroyo administration has assumed--or hoped--that overseas employment will contribute directly to the reduction of poverty in the Philippines generally, and Mindanao specifically. Also, through its humanitarian work in the reconstruction of Iraq, the administration believed that it would appear sympathetic to Muslim Filipinos. On the negative side, however, the decisions of Macapagal-Arroyo could lead to greater instability. During the de la Cruz incident, for example, the NPA announced that it would lead moves to overthrow the president if de la Cruz was killed. These warnings came amid tense settlement talks with both the CCP and the MILF. The response of Macapagal-Arroyo to domestic insurgents and separatists, moreover, were (and still are) related to an even more immediate threat, namely that of a military coup.
Threats and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
On July 27, 2003, approximately three hundred junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a coup in an attempt to depose Macapagal-Arroyo. And although the mutineers surrendered within 24 hours, the attempt has continued to haunt the present administration. Throughout their trial, the mutineers maintained that the attempt was a spontaneous act prompted by corruption in government and poor management of the military. However, subsequent fact-finding commissions concluded that the mutiny was part of a larger conspiracy to seize power from the government and to restore the ousted Estrada to the presidency.
The 2003 mutiny reveals significant cracks in the Philippine power structure. It is also an indication that the AFP does not share the same philosophy as that of the presidency. As discussed below, the AFP stands to gain from a strong relationship with the U.S. Moreover, unlike Macapagal-Arroyo, the AFP, in general, is not supportive of reconciliation with the various separatist groups and insurgents. &n bsp;
Domestic threats to the presidency remain. Throughout the early part of 2005 there have been numerous rumors of further military coups against Macapagal-Arroyo. Most recently, as the Philippines' prepared to celebrate the 107th anniversary of independence on June 12, threats of anti-government protests and calls for the ouster of Macapagal- Arroyo were widespread. 8
The Strains of US-Philippine Relations
As indicated in Macapagal-Arroyo's first reality, relations with the United States, in particular, are extremely salient to the political and economic course of events in the Philippines. In part, this relates to the legacies of American colonialism and neocolonialism in the archipelago. Historically, there has developed a patron-client style relationship between Filipino and American politicians, a relationship Anthony Woodiwiss terms mendicant patriarchalism. Patriarchalism refers to a "familialist discourse that, regardless of the institutional context, both assumes the naturalness of inequalities in the social relations between people and justifies these by reference to the respect due to a benevolent father or father-figure." Mendicant means begging', and has been used in the Philippine literature to denote the debased form of patriarchalist practice that has become the established mode of exercising power within the society--political leaders, before and after independence in 1946, begged Americans for favors so that the former could in turn respond to the Philippine populace who were begging for favors. 9 I argue that the Philippine government's acquiescence to U.S. foreign policy, as well as its rush to be identified as a member of the Coalition of the Willing, may partially be understood through the lens of mendicant patriarchalism. Through its support of the Bush Administration, certain politicians and military sectors stood to gain considerably through either influence and recognition (e.g., being seen as friends of the Americans) or through monies and supplies. In May 2003, for example, Macapagal-Arroyo made a state visit to the United States. At that time, the U.S. elevated the Philippines' status to a full-fledged partner in the war on terrorism. Bush also disclosed plans to classify the country as a major non-NATO ally', a designation that would make it easier for the Philippine government to acquire military equipment. Additionally, the U.S. promised to provide thirty helicopters to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 10
The establishment of strong ties with the U.S. carries risk, both domestically and internationally. Within the Philippines, anti-government forces, such as the NPA and MILF are opposed to the close ties between the Philippines and the United States. Moreover, opposition leaders, such as former Estrada supporters, accuse Macapagal- Arroyo as being a puppet' of the United States. Throughout 2003, for example, she was routinely charged with selling-out the sovereignty of the Philippines.
Internationally, the Philippine government has been attempting to maintain more cordial relations with Islamic states, both near (e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia) and far (Saudi Arabia). In part, these bilateral arrangements are seen as a way of fomenting peace and stability in the southern Philippines. Additionally, however, these relations benefit the continued export of labor to oil-rich Middle Eastern states. Stronger Philippine-U.S. relations may strain these connections, particular if substantial anti-American sentiment develops in these Islamic states. Indeed, by aligning itself as part of America's Coalition of the Willing, the Philippine government finds itself at risk of alienating itself from its Muslim neighbors. This perception accounts for Macapagal-Arroyo's participation at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). 11
Concluding Observations
The Philippines was a strong supporter of the Coalition of the Willing. However, the abduction of Angelo de la Cruz caused Macapagal-Arroyo to apparently waver in her commitment. Despite the warnings of neighboring countries (i.e., Australia and Singapore) and the United States, the Philippine president negotiated with the insurgents and secured the release of de la Cruz. The interpretation of her decision is complex. On one hand, she stands to alienate the thousands of Filipino workers who planned to obtain employment in Iraq. Likewise, her apparent soft' stance on terrorism does not strengthen her position vis-a- vis the AFP. Additionally, her decisions have weakened her position with other governments, including the United States, Australia, and Singapore. Arguably, she may stand to gain in her negotiations with the CCP, the MNLF, and the MILF. However, I do not believe that this is the catalyst behind her actions. Rather, I suggest, at this point, that her decisions to withdraw troops, ban deployments to Iraq, and secure the release of de la Cruz were consistent with a Catholic vision of peace. Her decision was not political in a realist sense, but instead religious. If this is the case, religious ideology must be more intimately incorporated into political analyses that is generally done.
As indicated above, rumors of coups remain. Moreover, critics have continued to challenge the presidential imposed ban of worker-deployment to Iraq. And abductions have continued. Most significant is that of Roberto Tarongoy. On November 1, 2004, Tarongoy--with five co-workers--was abducted at the Baghdad office of their firm, the Saudi Arabia Trading and Contracting Company. Tarongoy remains in captivity, along with an American, Roy Hallums. The militants initially demanded the withdrawal of all Filipino contract workers from Iraq and the cessation of logistics and security support by the Philippines to US forces in Iraq. These demands were coupled with a US$10 million ransom in exchange for Tarongoy's release. Ironically, Tarongoy was in Iraq after violating the deployment ban.
Currently, approximately 6,000 Filipinos are employed in the country, mostly as sub-contracted workers on US military bases. Consequently, overseas employment will continue to influence Philippine foreign policy and, specifically, decisions that affect the Philippines' participation in the War on Terror and the continued reconstruction of Iraq.
1. Corpuz, Jowie, "Pullout Dismays US, Other Allies", Manila Times, July 15, 2004, www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/jul/15/yehey/top_stories/20040715top2.html (August 4, 2004).BACK
2. Kaufman, Karl, "Ricciardone: US, RP Remain Alllies," Manila Times, July 16, 2004, www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/jul/16/yehey/top_stories/20040716top3.html (July 16, 2004).BACK
3. Corpuz, Jowie, "Singapore Joins RP Bashers; DFA mum," Manila Times, August 4, 2004, www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/aug/04/yehey/top_stories/20040804top2.html (August 3, 2004).BACK
4. Tyner, James A. 2005. Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. In this book I examine the interconnections of international relations, transnational labor migration, military conflict, theology, and terrorism. I concentrate specifically on the decisions surrounding the Philippines' participation in the War on Terror and the reconstruction of Iraq. Special attention is devoted to the events surrounding the capture and release of Filipino worker Angelo de la Cruz.BACK
5. Office of the President, "PGMA's Speech during the 103rd Foundation Day of the Department of Foreign Affairs," July 12, 2001, www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/speech-2001july12.htm (August 9, 2004).BACK
6. Gonzalez, Juan L. 1998. Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 73-75; see also Tyner, James A. 2004. Made in the Philippines: Gendered Discourses and the Making of Migrants. London: Routledge.BACK
7. For a more complete discussion, see Tyner, Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War.BACK
8. Military on full alert in Philippines capital amid coup rumours," Channel News Asia, June 9, 2005, www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/151842/1/.html (June 9, 2005).BACK
9. Woodiwiss, Anthony. 1998. Globalisation, Human Rights, and Labour Law in Pacific Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2, 102.BACK
10. Ma. Theresa Torres, "Bush OK's Stronger RP-US Military Ties," Manila Times, May 21, 2003, www.manilatimes.net/national/2003/may/21/top_stories/20030521top1.html (March 26, 2004).BACK
11. Established in 1969 in response to a call for Islamic solidarity by the late Saudi king Faisal I n Abdullaziz, the OIC has a goal of strengthening cooperation among Islamic states in various political, economic, social, and cultural endeavors. With a current membership of 57 states, the OIC has as its aims, the promotion of international peace and security founded on the basis of justice; the protection of holy places of Islam; and the support of the Palestinian peoples. The attendance of Macapagal-Arroyo in 2003 was the first time in the thirty-four year history of the OIC that a Philippine president had been invited. Symbolically, and materially, her visit was important to the on-going peace process of the southern Philippines, the establishment of regional alliances with neighboring Asian states, and as a sign of Asian solidarity. As such it addressed both Macapagal-Arroyo's Catholic beliefs as well as three of her eight realities of foreign policy.BACK