The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program:
How well do the Services support CINCPAC?

by Major Thomas L. Sands, Jr., USA

Abstract

Defense Secretary William Perry mandated in 1996 that all services sustain formal FAO programs. As we begin 2002, five years hardly allows an adequate period for overall assessment of the Services' programs; but it would be useful to provide feedback and evaluate progress toward longer range goals. Pacific Command provides a demanding case of diverse cultures, languages, economic conditions, political systems, and points of strategic importance within the largest of Unified Command Areas of Responsibility, putting FAO programs supporting PACOM into positions dealing with some of the world's delicate and intricate problems. While the Services adequately train and prepare officers to be foreign area specialists, each Service's own FAO utilization and management of FAO billets limits support to the geographic Unified Combatant Commanders. This study examines the PACOM case.

Advance study of areas, to include travel and interaction with people, both civilian and military, assuages the friction of arrival in remote theaters like Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam. Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are the United States military Services' knowledge repository on international affairs, gaining practical insight during peacetime to avert or abbreviate war by understanding the nature of both friendly and potential enemy nations abroad.

Preface

Keyword searches on various internet search engines reveal little information on Foreign Area Officers. FAOs within the Services have muted heralding in the public affairs arena, and common reactions from career officers indicate a prevailing attitude that discourages non-FAOs from entering the program if they seek long- term advancement and promotion. Lack of scholarly material, with notable exceptions like William Dowdy's Expeditionary Diplomacy paper for the Airpower Research Institute, further substantiates the lack of public knowledge on the importance of FAOs in today's expeditionary Services. Ironically, the same officers at the junior level who hear counsel against serving as FAOs echo that mentorship as they progress, and someday arrive at the CINC level looking for regional experts to analyze threats abroad and provide insight into regional issues. Service culture bias is as big an impediment to developing effective FAO programs as possibly any constraint of time, money, or opportunity.

From the overall joint view, the Foreign Area Officer Association maintains an excellent web site with information on all the Services and the Army Reserve FAO programs. Their growing voice deserves amplification across the Services to recruit quality FAOs and enhance information flow on what FAOs do around the world in a variety of capacities. Each Service has departments that train, educate, manage, and assign FAOs. I am indebted to these Proponent Offices as institutions that publicize and increase awareness through internet web sites, mailings, and messages to the fleet, air wings, and soldiers at large. Finally, in particular, I must acknowledge from the Air Force Proponent Office, Major Diane Ficke and Captain Joseph E. Pilkus, III; from the Army Proponent, Major Glen Grady; From the Marine Corps, Major Pat Carroll; and from the Navy, Lieutenant Tim Craddock. Additional thanks to Army FAOs in the field, Major John Dacey and Major Heino Klinck, who provided added depth and perspective to my early research efforts regarding FAO support to PACOM based on their experiences. They are true Strategic Scouts, the future Soldier-Statesmen who will help guide our military and our nation through geo-political minefields.

Introduction

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States' economic and military targets shocked most people around the world. The foe acted with deliberate and calculated intention, catching his victims unaware. In the aftermath, businesses in Washington D.C. had trouble meeting demand for maps of Afghanistan and surrounding countries, minimally stocked and previously not a popular area of focus. Suddenly the region was of utmost concern, with many officials and lay persons showing great interest in it. This sudden spike in demand for knowledge of obscure regions was not the first, nor will it be the last. In 1993, few knew where Somalia or Mogadishu were until after an early October battle altered US foreign policy in executing a humanitarian mission. Prior to 1990, most people were unfamiliar with Kuwait or what geo-strategic impacts an Iraqi invasion would have. When media publicized the 1983 attack on Grenada, the scramble for maps and people who knew something about the area was likewise a poignant example of ignorance that required an event of sizable proportions to catapult the unknown onto the front pages.

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are the United States military Services' answer to the peacetime preparation that would minimize these scrambles for expertise. Rather than making up for lost time after an event like 11 September occurs, proactive familiarization and practical knowledge of regions is integral to the strategic preparation that has operational impacts. "In this era of multinational operations and complex threats involving ethnic, religious, and cultural strife, regional expertise, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communications skills have never been more important to the U.S. military." 1  The thesis of this paper is that, while the Services adequately train and prepare officers to be foreign area specialists, the Services' own FAO management of FAO assets and billets leads to less than optimum support to the geographic Unified Combatant Commanders.

This situation results from particular Service cultures and represents general flaws in their respective resource management systems, notwithstanding the excellent work that the FAO Proponent detailers and assignments officers do within their various Services. This paper will examine who FAOs are, why the Services need FAOs, how the Services obtain FAOs, and how well the Services meet the requirements for trained and capable FAOs needed by the geographic Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCs). It will show in conclusion that billet management by the Services must improve. The analysis will focus on Pacific Command (PACOM), using examples from the Commander In Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) operational AOR. The conclusions reached in this paper pertain, within varying degrees, to all of the geographic "CINC-doms." Confronting the problems and taking corrective action will result in more "bang for the buck" in all the FAO programs.

Who are these FAOs?

To describe what FAOs provide to CINCPAC, recent examples of Army, Marine Corps, Navy and the Air Force FAOs in action will both recount historical developments and illustrate the types of future results Services expect from these regional experts. These accounts will span the breadth and depth of who FAOs are, what they do, how they operate, the education they require, and the service they render to the CINC and their respective Services, at every echelon of command.

In November 1998, the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) held ministerial meetings and a leaders' summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 2  Formally assigned as the US Army student in the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College, Major John Dacey provided support to the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in coordinating the arrivals and departures of the American delegation attending this event. He provided translation services, tour guide services, synchronization support, transportation, and additional duties as required in his position as Flight Logistics Commander, assisting the State Department officials, the US military's Security Assistance Officer, and the Government Service Office that handled immigration, customs, hotel arrangements, and welcome briefs. 3  In the spirit of jointness, Major Dacey exercised a supervisory relationship over two Air Force captains, an Air Force Staff Sergeant, and a Navy Chief Warrant Officer 4  to ensure such distinguished visitors as the President and Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the US Trade Representative, and the Secretary of Agriculture accomplished their missions at the conference. Interacting with national leaders, local nationals, and members of all Services are a normal part of a FAO's job.

In June 2000, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) initiated the concept of a functional liaison team that draws Marines from within the units and gathers officers and enlisted together into a working group called a Marine Liaison Element (MLE) 5 . Realizing the critical importance of regional knowledge, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that the MLE "provide the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and Marine Component Commanders with military, regional, cultural and linguistic expertise." 6  These marines are not the rejects from other units with nothing better to do. Rather, they are technically and tactically proficient in their own specialties, outstanding representatives to foreign allies, and accountable to a formal MLE chain of command with a USMC colonel at the top. Maintaining basic skills, these select marines must also attain knowledge of the local customs, political situations, attitudes, and military capabilities of the various regions to which the I MEF may deploy at a moment's notice. "The MLE has a good balance of foreign area officers, international relations officers, forward air controllers and forward observers including artillerymen, linguists and communicators capable of providing critical liaison for Joint Task Forces in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement roles." 7  The officer corps provides the leadership; but all levels must attain increased levels of proficiency and expertise, dealing with current trends in missions unified commands continue to ask marines to accomplish.

In a FAO Journal article in September 2000, Lieutenant Chap Godbey, Combat Systems Officer aboard USS Kamehameha (SSN-642), reviewed his efforts to exercise FAO skills while conducting operational training between US Navy submariners and their Republic of Korea (ROK) counterparts. 8  Although relatively new in the FAO business, with less than five years since the first call for officers to join the corps of regional experts, the US Navy provides a bilateral military training event demonstrating that FAOs need not be relegated to embassy duties or become staff officers in the joint arena. Naval FAOs can see the open ocean, breathe salty air, get their feet wet, and still perform duties as FAOs. Chap Godbey's emphasis in the mission was to increase mutual understanding and interoperability between the two allies, a solid goal to convince the US Navy of the value of enhancing the existing bonds between the ROK Navy (ROKN) and the US Navy. 9  Finding the benefit for the ROKN to alter the status quo was easier, emphasizing a higher level of training proficiency for the Korean submariners. Lieutenant Godbey exercised diplomacy within his own Service and among participants of the international training opportunity, and thereby established a precedent upon which future interaction will build, and probably be taken for granted.

The US Air Force, like the Navy, has recently initiated a formal FAO program; and to this end it demonstrates an academic emphasis on its Proponent web site, posting scholarly works that FAOs have produced in conjunction with their schooling and duties within the operational Air Force. Representing graduate level writings, these efforts range from topics on China-Taiwan reunification to a analysis of how the Republic of the Philippines manages security issues in the South China Sea. 10  Relevant to the discussion in this paper is the dual-use that the Air Force gains with its FAOs. First, Captain Ares, author of the article on Philippines security issues, works as an intelligence officer assigned to Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and second he is a FAO with a regional focus in the Asia Pacific. In the latter capacity, the Air Force dispatched him for a month- long special project to research readiness and doctrine issues for the Armed Forces of the Philippines regarding defense against territorial aggression. 11  The Air Force maximized its benefits from this officer through this dual-use role, a topic of later discussion in this paper, gaining intelligence and insight into an ally's handling of international security threats as well as increased regional knowledge for an officer who may later find himself in an Air Expeditionary Force deployed to the Philippines or Southeast Asia.

Why do we need FAOs?

Although the Army and the Marine Corps have had formal FAO programs for decades, the other Services' experience with similar programs has been desultory. In 1996 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry directed all US Services to begin training foreign area officers. 12  As the examples above illustrate, FAOs provide an overseas presence and represent US government policies of engagement, providing a degree of assured access while integrating with other overseas US Government agencies. Embassy country teams-- Foreign Service Officers from the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), among others, as well as Marine Security Detachments-- provide a toe-hold for US interests in even the most austere embassies in countries with limited access. In the Army, many FAOs serve in Security Assistance Office (SAO) billets and Defense Attaché Office (DAO) assignments, part of a peacetime presence "with allies and friends to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability, support the development of indigenous counterdrug law enforcement capabilities and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies." 13  The overseas presence is all the more necessary with the draw-down of the 1990s and the CONUS-based expeditionary force the US military has developed. Specially trained regional affairs officers, culturally sensitive, politically aware, schooled in economic analysis, with solid military backgrounds, provide input as human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. They are in a unique position to make "relevant observations [that] add to our larger geo-political understanding of potential areas for instability or threats to our national interests and help select our optimal avenue of response; diplomatic, economic, or military." 14  Through enhanced and developed programs of training and education, FAOs can gain academic knowledge that, when applied in the field, becomes meaningful and clear. Additionally, the international relations programs in which each FAO earns his or her master's degree expose the FAO to peers and instructors who have experience within nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Because "combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations," 15  FAOs provide vital expertise and should have the competence to broker these sometimes antagonistic relationships to accomplish missions. While the military ought not get bogged down with missions detrimental to the primary focus of the armed forces, the trend indicates increased numbers of missions on the humanitarian, peace keeping, and peace enforcement end of the spectrum of conflict in order to protect American interests at home and abroad. Since the military is "less effective in solving non-military problems rooted in religious, cultural, or ethnic enmities," 16  and the burden of peacemaking is on statesmen, FAOs provide the logical link as the military's representation in "partnership with the US State Department, its close relations to the armed forces of countries around the world, and a growing familiarity with the international relief community." 17  General Shelton also assessed that these partnerships "have helped the United States conduct its foreign policy efficiently and have contributed to the success of the military's operations." 18  FAOs have demonstrated their competence and value in diverse missions, combining knowledge of political-military situations with cultural awareness and language abilities to promote US interests abroad.

How do we get FAOs?

The Army FAO program provides a longstanding tradition of trained regional experts, a foundation and model from which other Services adjust to meet their own needs. Accordingly, the Army FAO program focuses on small adjustments to keep officers competitive with mainstream combat arms peers, with an index of success being strong representation among selectees to colonel 19  and availability for posting in Defense Attaché Offices abroad. The Navy FAO program, established in 1997, has allocated additional seats at the Naval Postgraduate School for officers requiring education in regional affairs, maximizing training dollars and use of in-house resources to meet demands of expansion. 20  The small group of Marines who work in the FAO and Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) programs has likewise expanded; additionally the Marine Corps has instituted a program of mentorship and professional development under the Secretary of the Navy's FAO Mentoring Program initiative to bolster vision and promotion potential of participating officers. 21  The Air Force has likewise oriented on recruiting and training FAOs in support of "the evolving Expeditionary Air Force concept," increasing language training opportunities for interested officers. 22  Common threads are woven throughout the Services: language training and education, field training and experience in the regions, and maintaining officer competencies to make them competitive for promotion. Critical to the military realizing an equitable return on its substantial investments in FAOs is the promotion and retention of these regional experts.

The standard program in the Army and Marine Corps FAO systems takes senior captains or junior majors from company command or staff officer positions in battalions and brigades and requires two to five years to create a "fully qualified FAO." Depending on previous skill and/or demonstrated potential, the Defense Language Institute offers courses from 47 to 63 weeks in duration, to train officers to sufficient levels of proficiency in reading, listening, and speaking. The results manifest themselves in practical application during a follow-on tour in the region, with heavy emphasis on travel and possibly assignment to a foreign staff college using the target language. The Army rounds out initial FAO training at a wide range of civilian institutions appropriate for the particular region, culminating in a master's degree in a variety of international relations disciplines. Marine Corps FAOs, as a rule, earn master's degrees in Regional Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. 23  The basic intent in both Services is to have officers with a high degree of both practical and academic knowledge of the area, tools with which they can become "regional experts."

The initial training period is merely an investment, with little return for the active forces. Given the expense in both real dollars as well as the opportunity cost of lengthy training time, the utilization tour is part of the payback FAOs make to their respective Services. The typical utilization is on a regional CINC's staff or appropriate Service staff supporting a regional CINC. In PACOM, the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) has a strong complement of trained FAOs who provide input to the Army commander and the CINCPAC with staff planning, coordination, and exercises. Additional utilization is possible with tours in the Pentagon as regional analysts or in the Defense Intelligence Agency with similar tasks. Finally, some officers return to their basic branches of service, developing core competencies and, as the Army calls it, "re-greening." These officers provide a link to the tactical world that publicizes and encourages potential candidates to serve as FAOs while offering FAO skills at the troop level. Time served in tactical units also provides depth of skill and credibility when interacting with foreign militaries in future postings as attachés, Security Assistance Officers, or military advisory group FAOs, preventing criticism that they are only staff officers, out of touch with the current state of military affairs at the user level.

How well are the Services recruiting, training, and managing FAOs?

Given the length of training required to produce a fully trained Army or Marine FAO, with language school, graduate school, and in-country training, the time elapsed since the 1997 mandate from Secretary Perry is barely enough to provide a fair assessment of how all the Services will meet the CINC's needs ten years from now. However, as a snapshot in time, the current overall state shows the two ground Services with established FAO programs filling billets on the PACOM, US Army Pacific (USARPAC) and US Marine Force Pacific (USMARFORPAC) staffs. 24  The Navy has made headway in this realm and has a dozen billets on the PACOM staff, having developed staff positions with specially-coded FAO designation. 25  The Air Force has no FAO-coded positions on operational staffs in PACOM; and, according to (USAF) Captain Joseph Pilkus, the Air Force FAO proponent office has a current task to rework staff billets to accommodate USAF FAOs on the PACOM staff. 26  When given the opportunity, FAOs commonly integrate with the intelligence community and provide enhanced support to CINCPAC on a daily basis. The following example serves two purposes, (1) to illustrate how FAOs support by virtue of their training and (2) how the Services use FAOs even in billets not necessarily coded for FAOs. In Hawaii, the case of Major John Dacey exemplifies how he was assigned to the PACOM J2 against an Army Military Intelligence billet, specifically as HUMINT Operations Officer. 27  Once the J2 found out Major Dacey was a qualified Army FAO, he was sent to Joint Intelligence Pacific (JICPAC) section to do "FAO" work, and has been relied upon by successive J2s as the in-house Southeast Asia specialist. Furthermore the current J2 created his own personal analysis cell in the directorate and put Major Dacey in charge using both his analyst and FAO skills. As with the dual-use in the Air Force, this assignment puts him into a situation where he is working on FAO matters every day, even though it was not his original assignment. 28  This arrangement displays the strength of the FAO programs. FAOs provide enhanced perspectives on international issues because of their education and training. Additionally, the contacts they have made in their respective regions, countries, embassies, and counterpart militaries serve them in subsequent units to which they are assigned. Services in effect add to the number of FAO assignments when they assign a FAO in his or her basic community, especially when that basic community, like intelligence, has a natural affinity for FAO capabilities. This dual assignment capability, while enhancing certain officers' value to the force, unfortunately does not have such a good symbiotic relationship with other communities like the combat arms branches in the Army.

This lattermost situation brings up the negative perception of rating chains and senior leaders who do not understand the value and skills FAOs bring with them. From their perspective, while the Service invests time and money into training the FAO, officers who do not choose additional specialties remain in the operational force and work in positions critical to accomplishing their Services' missions. Subsequently, the FAO with several years of school and training reports, rather than operational fitness reports, compares unfavorably with his mainstream counterpart. Even an exceptional FAO with strong OERs must be able to represent his or her work to the board in a manner that allows accomplishments to be evaluated in the same light as the work of non- FAO peers. Without careful education of the senior leadership that writes efficiency reports, in addition to the leadership that reads and selects for promotion based on those reports, the FAO programs are at great risk of falling short of their full potential.

How do we get better FAO support?

The Services must dedicate resources to maintain a nucleus of officers competent in and capable of interacting within the regional context. "Specifically, foreign-language/area skills must be developed--over the long haul, not overnight--as necessary tools for the Total Force." 29  While different commands (SOCOM, for example) have non-FAO officers with regional and language expertise, the FAO programs represent the holistic approach to development of officers from diverse communities into regional specialists through deliberate, planned systems of education. In the sense of the aforementioned long haul, it is still too soon to judge the USAF and USN programs: more time is necessary to assess the effectiveness of their performance and utilization. However, as a checkpoint for them, and an admonition to all Services, this paper is long overdue. Additionally, with the Navy and Air Force programs in their infancy, implementing safeguards and sound policies now will prevent the need for radical change or frustrated assessments in 10-15 years. Learning from the Army and Marine Corps development of effective FAO programs, the Air Force and Navy should capitalize on the experiences of others and quickly exploit the experiences of the more established programs in terms of quality, quantity, and -- most important-- wise management policies.

The following are specific recommendations regarding Services' implementation and management of FAO programs:

- First, and foremost, the Services must institute officer management techniques to recruit, train, educate, and utilize FAOs at all levels of command in a wide variety of FAO-coded positions. The professional development systems need to promote, not penalize, these officers who bring formidable expertise in their respective areas.

- Second, and in conjunction with the professional development system working to help FAO career progression, the Services must raise awareness and educate leadership at all echelons about the value of FAOs and the urgent need for effective husbanding of these assets

- Finally, non-FAO assignments must benefit FAOs to the maximum extent to retain perishable language skills and expand their knowledge base in areas of expertise.

The remainder of this section will expand on these three recommendations in more depth.

Individual Services must meet their own needs, but perhaps the Army situation can provide a model for input in deciding how best to go about developing FAOs. In 1996 the Army revamped its officer personnel management and instituted Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) XXI. This system sought to meet the needs of the combat and combat support branches like armor, infantry, and engineers, while also acknowledging the need for functional areas like psychological operations, public affairs, and FAO specialists. The tension among the branches and functional areas over officer manpower manifested itself in the promotion rates of officers selected to O-5, O-6 and beyond. Prior to OPMS XXI, officers with additional specialties like FAO had to balance time in their basic branches, like aviation, and time in their FAO assignments. Realizing the perishable skills that languages represent, particularly difficult, low-density languages of Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, OPMS XXI sought to allow officers to decide as senior O-3s to "stay FAO" and avoid the difficulty of simultaneously maintaining two vital competencies. By restructuring competitive categories for promotion and "grouping interrelated branches and functional areas into officer management categories called 'career fields,'" 30  promotion board equity measures sought to count officers against either their basic branch or their functional area, but not both. The additional injection of promotion floors 31  to establish minimum numbers of necessary FAOs, for example, retained officers who might otherwise have found themselves not selected for promotion in favor of officers working in basic branches. This lattermost circumstance is one that the Air Force and Navy must closely monitor in order to protect the investments they make in these specialized officers. 32  Significant advantages accrue in primary career fields that benefit from the depth that FAOs provide, such as the previously noted combination of an intelligence officer who additionally is a FAO. However, no better FAO development occurs than working in specialty jobs that provide opportunities to integrate language skills, interpersonal skills, analysis abilities, regional travel, and networking on a frequent basis.

The early decision of both the Navy and Air Force mirrors the Marine Corps and early personnel management techniques that the Army used in the officer assignment business. The positive side to such a method is that more officers can participate in the FAO program without fear of losing the basic competencies they developed over the first decade of their careers. This is both good for the career and good for his knowledge and professional competence in future jobs abroad when the officer represents his Service and the US military in front of US and foreign civilians, government officials, and military personnel. However, the difficulty of maintaining parity with non-FAO peers, in terms of proficiency reports used for promotion and evaluation for advancement, emerges as a stumbling block to recruiting quality officers to the FAO program. The Army sought to educate senior ranking officers on fair judgment of the FAO files at promotion boards with the implementation of OPMS XXI.

This education process must seek not only to educate promotion board members but also the commanders who write the efficiency reports, recommend or deny officers for the FAO programs, and mentor their subordinates. Peer opinions and uneducated advice add to the difficulty of recruiting and retaining FAOs, as common perceptions are that such a specialty takes one out of the mainstream and makes the officer less competitive for promotion or command opportunities. 33  This myopic view hamstrings the programs by limiting the talent available, and consequently fails to support operational needs of the military. Ultimately, the same commanders and officers who, as mentors, discouraged junior officers from serving as FAOs will find themselves less capable at the higher echelons because they lack quality FAO support. A major aspect of gaining better FAO support is to overcome Service culture biases. Senior leadership presumably has the cerebral knowledge that Services need FAOs, but the parallel to environmental management and waste disposal's "Good, but not in my back yard," applies. They think FAOs are great, just as long as they are officers other than the superstars who have a future commanding Infantry Battalions, as though these futures were mutually exclusive. Contrariwise, FAOs can--and do--command battalions.

Drawing from the Marine Corps, a final recommendation for better FAO support is to utilize FAOs in positions where the incumbents can continue to hone their FAO skills while working in their basic specialty. FAOs are most useful when they stay current; and, to maintain proficiency, they need to be out in the field, using their foreign languages, learning about both their regions of specialty and their own parent Services. "While it takes longer to acquire minimal competence in a language than to train for most military occupations, there is less opportunity for, and less emphasis placed on, the maintenance of the more expensive skill." 34  Maintenance of foreign languages requires repetition over extended periods of time, otherwise the ability to communicate quickly deteriorates. Language ability represents a large proportion of the FAO's value in dealing with indigenous peoples; therefore, Services must seek to keep FAOs in their region of focus. Contacts with such environments are growing with the increase in short-term deployments for training, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and participation in United Nations missions. Using a simple solution to bridging the gap between the fleet marine force and FAO staff tours, the Marine Corps recognizes the investment in its International Affairs Officers (IAOs), of which FAOs are a component, and "will assign those IAOs who return to duty with the operating forces after training or between utilization tours to commands that are operationally oriented toward their regions of expertise." 35  To the maximum extent possible, officers will go to billets that would have a high probability of operating in their areas, thus maximizing FAO utilization and reaping benefits on multiple levels. Without such accommodation, Services will ultimately incur additional re- training with added costs and extended time in training when the time comes to employ the FAO in a more language-intensive billet.

Conclusion

The early stages of any institution, agency, or organization are the most critical to development, as the Air Force and Navy programs are finding. In their early stage, the nascent Air Force and Navy FAO program managers must exercise extreme care to establish solid training arrangements and professional development techniques. FAO Proponent bureaus in each Service must work hard to find favorable sponsorship within all echelons of command; or, as retired Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes advocated, a "champion," who will speak on behalf of FAOs. Without one, General Hughes fears that "the harm won't be noticed until you are needed, and then it will be too late." 36  Educating senior leadership on writing fitness reports, evaluating files, and retaining deserving FAOs who represent a significant investment and capability should prevent this situation from occurring.

In order to keep the ranks of the FAOs fully and competently manned, there is the critical need to identify officers with talent to learn foreign language; if they are not already multi-lingual, ensure they are retainable and likely to earn promotion(s), and sell their indispensable value to the Services. Developing good FAOs from the outset takes commitments of time, money, and personnel, as well as effective screening that takes into account Service objectives and personnel needs. Looking at what has worked and what has failed in the Army and Marine Corps programs will indicate to the Air Force and Navy potential options to meet these needs.

Finally, the regional CINC must become the guardian and bedrock of effective FAO utilization. The needs of the regional commands and the capabilities of regionally focused Foreign Area Officers provide a natural juncture to fulfill the ultimate joint mission to uphold US policy and global interests. The Asia-Pacific region, as with the other combatant commands, requires commitment from all involved. The careful stewardship of investments in language-capable officers, regionally focused, and educated in international affairs, combined with practical employment in the international arena, will render invaluable dividends to our nation's successful expeditionary forces of the future.

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Endnotes

1. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000. BACK

2. John Dacey, "FAO ICT APEC OJT," F.A.O. Journal, Volume IV, Number 1 (March 1999): 12. BACK

3. Ibid. BACK

4. Ibid. BACK

5. Melinda M. Weathers, "I MEF: bridging cultural, linguistic and stylistic divides," Marine Corps News, 14 July 2000 [4 January 2002]. BACK

6. Ibid. BACK

7. Ibid. BACK

8. Chap Godbey, "Coalition-Building at Sea: USN-ROK Interaction," F.A.O. Journal, Volume V, Number 3 (September 2000): 19. BACK

9. Godbey. BACK

10. Access USAF FAO main page at http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/ to find the "ASAP Reports" link under the "Area Studies Program" section on the main page. BACK

11. Luis M. Ares, "The Philippines and its Spratly Islands Dilemma: Underscoring the Need for Doctrinal Change within the Armed Forces of the Philippines," United States Air Force International Airmen Division Foreign Area Officer Branch web site, [10 January 2002]. BACK

12. Linda D. Kozaryn, "Exotic Lands Lure Military Experts," American Forces Information Service News Articles, (12 August 1998): 2. BACK

13. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000: 16. BACK

14. Ibid. BACK

15. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), .I-7 BACK

16. Henry H. Shelton, "From the Chairman: The US Military and Foreign Policy," Harvard International Review, Volume XX, Number 1 (Winter 1997/1998): 77. BACK

17. Ibid. BACK

18. Ibid. BACK

19. Mark Volk, "News From the Army FAO Proponent Office," Foreign Area Officer Association Service/Proponent News, March 2001. (30 November 2001). BACK

20. Chuck Livingston, "Navy FAO Notes," Foreign Area Officer Association Service/Proponent News, March 2000. (30 November 2001). BACK

21. Pat Carroll, "Marine Corps FAO Notes." Foreign Area Officer Association Service/Proponent News, March 2001. < http://www.faoa.org/service/ usmc301.html > (30 November 2001). BACK

22. Joseph E.Pilkus, III, "USAF FAO Notes," Foreign Area Officer Association Service/Proponent News. September 2000. (30 November 2001). BACK

23. Pat J. Carroll, "The International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) (Formerly the Foreign Area Officer (FAO)/International Relations Officer Program)," MCO 1520.11E (3 May 2001): Encl 1, 3. BACK

24. See Appendix A, US Army PACOM Assignments, and Appendix B, US Marine Corps Billets BACK

25. Email from US Navy Lieutenant Tim Craddock, placement officer, USN FAO program to author, 11 January 2001. See Appendix C, US Navy PACOM Assignments. BACK

26. Joseph E. Pilkus, III, USAF FAO Proponent Office, telephone conversation with author, 7 January 2002. BACK

27. John Dacey, "RE: FAO help." [E-mail to Thomas Sands ] 9 January 2002. BACK

28. Ibid. BACK

29. Gunther A. Mueller and Carl Daubach, "Global Skills: Vital Components of Global Engagement," Airpower Journal, (Summer 1998): 68. BACK

30. Department of the Army, "What is OPMS XXI?" Undated Pamphlet distributed to all officers in 1997: 5. BACK

31. Ibid. BACK

32. William L. Dowdy, Expeditionary Diplomacy: POL-MIL Facilitation of AEF Deployments, Airpower Research Institute Paper 2001-02 (June 2001): 13. This paper brings up several USAF recommendations. BACK

33. David O. Smith, "Why Not FAO Generals?" F.A.O. Journal, Volume V, Number 2 (June 2000): 1. BACK

34. Kurt E. Muller, quoted in Mueller and Daubach: 66. BACK

35. Pat Carroll, MCO 1520.11E (3 May 2001): 4. BACK

36. Patrick M. Hughes, "Needed: A Champion for the FAO Community," F.A.O. Journal, Volume IV, Number 4 (December 1999): 5. BACK

2004, Foreign Area Officer Association
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