North Korea: Sounding the Alarm

LTG Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Retired

North Korea represents the greatest threat extant to stability in Asia and to United States interests. It is a very different matter from that posed by other current antagonists. Its weapons with mass effects capability, is a fait accompli.

North Korea has since 1953 continued the state of War that existed at the official ending of direct conflict in the Korean War. There have been periods of real tension and real albeit very limited conflict throughout this fifty-year period, and there have been periods of hope and potential progress. But, over this period there has also been a remarkable set of continuities: An intransigent and undependable leadership; a consistent willingness to maintain their military at some level of relative parity with South Korea no matter the cost; a penchant to engage in hostile Sta-linist-era rhetoric and some very risky threatening activities, and concurrently to meet and discuss reasonable options with some fair-minded interlocutors without changing their essentially hostile position; and a constant effort to produce weapons that create the perception that challenging them directly is too costly. This set of strategic vectors seem to the Western mind too unstable to have been designed deliberately, although they may actually be elements of a grand strategy in the North's context. However these vectors came to be, they have been "successful," a concept that may have to be redefined in the broader context of North Korea's very broad failures, culturally, societally, economically, and politically, in preserving the dismal North Korean regime against all odds.

Led now, ostensibly, by the enigmatic Kim Jong-Il, North Korea's government is composed of the military and the ruling elite, such as they are, in that very narrow portion of the society that reaps the benefit of the efforts of the larger mass of people who work and survive on the barest of margins. It is not clear that Kim is in full control, nor is it entirely clear that there are any alternatives to his stated role as central and supreme leader. It is not just the President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that is hard to define it is the entire nation. The nickname, the Hermit Kingdom, certainly has applied to North Korea during that nation's history.

Today we are faced with this blend of aggravating continuity and dangerous uncertainty in the context of our confrontation with Iraq, the ongoing war against terrorism, and numerous other requirements and commitments around the world. Indeed, it seems that the North Koreans have carefully chosen this period of US extension and complex engagement to threaten and pressure the United States and South Korea -- this during a period when it seemed that South Korea was moving away from their traditional relationship with the US toward some greater form of accommodation and agreement with the North. Thus the actions of North Korea to restart some portion of their nuclear energy and nuclear byproduct production capability, to abrogate treaties and agreements, to become a nearly declared member of the nuclear club, and concurrently to engage in foolhardy military gestures like firing missiles and engaging in threatening air maneuvers, seems illogical, even irrational, until one recalls the actions of the North Koreans over time.

They seem, if nothing else, to be masters of faulty brinkmanship with exceptionally bad timing, repeatedly engaging in one act or another to heighten tensions, to display their undependability, and to raise the specter of war. Why?

The answer to that question is perhaps best found in the sociopolitical culture of the North. They are a small and arguably disadvantaged and broken nation on a big and generally progressive planet, engaging in global political interaction whenever they can, and putting forth their peculiar position in whatever way garners the attention of the global community. They are among those nations of the world that seek respect but absent some form of radical antic do not receive it. But they can hardly be ignored. They are dangerous in ways that demand some real attention.

They have some nuclear weapons capability and some other forms of weapons with mass effects -- chemical, biological, and radiological -- and it would be a huge mistake to underestimate the importance of those capabilities. No country on earth has put more of their capability underground, a feature that makes taking offensive action to them hard. They have a formidable conventional capability that, in the very short time and space dimensions of the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian context, is very worrisome. The leading edge of the first artillery round or ground-to-ground missile fired in War on the Peninsula, when it impacts in the large urban zone that Seoul presents, would also be felt in Tokyo, in Jakarta, in Delhi, in Rome, in London, in New York, in Rio and in Perth. The economic marvel that South Korea represents would produce an effect across the globe if it were destabilized or destroyed. The mere presence of so many people so close to potential conflict -- the band of large population represented by Seoul -- Inchon and environs of perhaps 15 million people within easy range of North Korea's attack capabilities -- constitutes a condition that demands focused attention. And, there is the leading edge "tripwire," involvement by the United States, the uncertainty of China, Russia's potential to be affected, and the historic and very real complexity of Japan, among others, to consider. There is no other place in the world where big power interests converge so clearly.

Suppose for a moment that we arrive at a point where the threat posed by North Korea is "unacceptable." Think of it in terms similar to the place we have come to with Iraq. We decide that we must act in order to forestall an even worse problem if we allow this condition to persist and to evolve. What next? Korea, all of it, and the surrounding countries, constitute an entirely different set of geo-political circumstances, and a much different cultural context than we have encountered in the Middle East. Where are the safe havens from which to stage and launch? Where are the sympathetic neighbors that will support us? What time line can we depend on to prepare? What sort of opponent would they be? What real propensity do they have to use weapons with mass effects? And, what is their timeline for action? These and many other questions weigh heavily on our leaders and our military and intelligence organizations.

A few things seem clear. China must step forward at some point and moderate North Korean's volatility. Russia can also play an important role in calming the North. South Korea and Japan must hold firm to the values and goals that have prevented most aggression in the past. The UN must have far greater clarity and sense of purpose than they have displayed recently. The United States must have the strongest resolve of all to maintain an appropriate stance regarding North Korea -- strong, dependable, unwavering, believable. All of this together might help but none of it will solve the basic problem.

The problem is at our doorstep. The proliferation of unacceptable capabilities has occurred. The North is once again rattling its real sabers, probably in search of that elusive respect. But, how do we know? This may be the prototypical example of the 20th Century's legacy of uncertainty that we are now faced with in the early part of this new century. We can hope and pray for some enlightened change that will dilute this threat bfor now we are faced with the certainty and the immediacy of a fifty-year old problem that is worsening by the day.

The real questions are: What can be done to minimize and control the North's nuclear and other weapons with mass effects capabilities, or to remove their nuclear capability outright? What constitutes an unacceptable condition? What actions are we willing to take? When? And more. These questions all contain a clear set of policy decisions and all portend a threat to global stability far greater than that posed by a belligerent proliferating Iraq. Only one thing seems certain: This problem will not get better if we simply ignore it.

The author, LTG Patrick M. Hughes, US Army, Retired, has served in Korea.

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North Korea and Iraq: An alternative view

Captain Jin Pak

There are a growing number of people who assert that the current crisis in NK highlights the weakness of a preemptive force strategy as outlined in President Bush's recently published National Security Strategy. The labeling of NK and Iraq as part of an "axis of evil" seems to demand that the US should apply the same preemptive force doctrine in both situations. Yet, the Bush Administration repeatedly declares that it will not consider military force in the NK case. This has naturally opened the doors to critics claiming that the Administration's policy is hypocritical and should be changed.

I argue the opposite. President Bush never asserted that preemptive force is a policy for all situations. Like any policy --foreign or domestic-- certain conditions are required for success. In this case, a policy of threatening military force to secure verifiable disarmament is most appro- priate in situations in which the threat of force is credible.

Many factors determine whether or not threat of force is credible. They include but are not limited to:

1) The level of domestic support --among the public and the elite-- the US has for actually carrying it out.

2) The probability of military success -- which is determined by the readiness, effectiveness, and transportability of the US military as compared to the effectiveness and readiness of the military of the country receiving the threat.

When these conditions are met, threat of forces is prudent and effective. The strongest counter-argument to this view, is that a country can be deterred from pursuing WMD without threat of preemptive force. After all, if such a strategy was reliable, this policy is unwise for both cases, NK and Iraq. However, a closer look at the two scenarios reveal that policies without the backing of credible force are ineffective.

US policy for deterring NK from pursuing nuclear weapons incorporated many elements including sanctions, a significant number of US troops guarding the DMZ, intense international pressure, notably including China and Russia, and various international agreements. These include the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, the 1992 Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, and the 1994 Agreed Framework. Despite all this, NK continued its WMD program.

Not only did this strategy fail to deter NK, it also rewarded it. In 1991, NK received the US commitment to remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea as a condition for signing the IAEA agreement. Additionally, it received numerous commitments in the 1994 Agreed Framework that included eventual normalized relations with the US, two light water reactors, and annual fuel shipments. It also kept the plutonium it already extracted from its reactor in Yongban --enough to make multiple nuclear weapons in a few months assuming it hasn't done so already. Most importantly, NK continued its WMD program in secret for the next eight years until this past October when it officially admitted that it had an active program.

Why did deterrence fail? After all, the US did employ threat of force to get NK willing to negotiate thereby making the 1994 Agreed Framework possible. Yet, it ultimately did not deter NK from continuing its program. I submit that this is because President Kim Jong Il deemed that preemptive US military action was not credible. This thinking was present in 1994 as evidenced by NK's aggressive bargaining during deliberations leading to the Agreed Framework, and continues now as evidenced by the official announcement of NK's active nuclear weapons program.

NK doubted the credibility of US preemptive force, because the two conditions mentioned above were not met. While the US public would support a military response to a North Korean invasion, due to the 37,000 US soldiers that would bear the brunt of it, it is questionable whether the public would support a preemptive attack on NK. Furthermore, the probability of success for such an operation is also obscure since it could trigger a North Korean attack across the DMZ endangering untold numbers of American soldiers, South Koreans, and even Japanese. This would make the potential cost of such a preemptive action outweigh any temporary benefit.

The Iraq case exposes similar weaknesses when trying to deter without credible threat of force. Despite 16 UN Security Council resolutions, a comprehensive set of sanctions, the proximity of US troops, and intense international pressure, the containment strategy appears to have benefited Saddam Hussein more than the international community. Why did containment fail?

Containment is infeasible on geographic terms alone. Iraq has a border over 3,600 km long and shares it with six different countries: Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. According to a May 2002 report, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that Iraq smuggles up to 110,000 barrels of oil per day through Jordan, up to 250,000 barrels per day through Syria, and up to 80,000 barrels per day through Turkey. Iraq also diverts some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support its military and WMD programs instead. If allies such as Turkey and Jordan cannot effectively seal their borders, how can containment work?

Despite the practical obstacles of effective containment mentioned above, the most significant reason that it failed to deter Saddam is--similar to the NK case--the lack of credible force. Like his NK counterpart, Saddam Hussein prudently doubted the credibility of a US preemptive military action, up until September 11th. Prior to that day, he deemed that US domestic support -- among the public and policy elite-- for an Iraq invasion was not high despite strong probability of military success. Now, with fully two out of every three Americans supporting military action -- albeit through a multilateral approach-- both conditions determining credible threat of force are met.

In the cases of NK and Iraq, both leaders perceived that they faced a deterrence strategy without the backing of credible threat of force. This ultimately did not work, and both countries continued its programs. Thus, credible threat of force may serve as the deciding factor when trying to deter a country that has a strong desire for WMD capability.

The way the Administration is handling the current NK crisis implies that the President fully understands that this policy --like any other-- is dependent on certain conditions for success. In the NK situation, those conditions are not satisfied. In the case with Iraq, the conditions are now met, but only while public support remains high. It is not hypocritical that the President uses the threat of force on one country and not the other. Rather, it is prudent decision making.

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