The Role of Military-to-Military Relationships in the Development
of a New Intelligence Architecture

Introduction

           Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, much attention has been paid to the failure by military leaders to discard their conventional, Cold War mentality. Along with thousands of analysts from the US intelligence community at large, most military intelligence professionals did not properly recognize the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait as the engagement of an enemy in a new and adverse area of operations. Many US intelligence personnel missed the opportunity to redevelop their focus, redefine their professional culture, and reorganize the intelligence community in preparation for new and unconventional threats. Ten years later, the intelligence community was caught unprepared, like the majority of American military leadership, and forced to reap the consequences of operating in a conventional warfare paradigm. Following the attacks of 2001, extensive efforts have been made to critically analyze recent US intelligence shortfalls and dutifully document the dire need for appropriate reform. Having determined what is wrong with the US intelligence community, policy and decision makers have also proceeded to tell administration officials and military leaders how to fix it. It is unfortunate however, that the ongoing global war on terror waits for no one. Although one does not deny the need for intelligence reform, changes and improvements to current US intelligence capabilities need to occur now.

           For purposes of this article, an intelligence architecture is defined as an organized intelligence apparatus, a structured environment in which intelligence disciplines, capabilities, and procedures are deployed in support of selected civilian and/or military requirements. The decision to anchor US intelligence architectures to technological means following the collapse of the Soviet Union stifled the expansion of the indigenous, tactical level intelligence capability that is needed today. According to Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau, "the military intelligence effort devoted to combating [Iraqi insurgency movements] has little in common with conventional intelligence operations in support of conventional maneuver war." ¹  Case studies of the civil war in El Salvador, the battle against insurgent forces in Colombia, the war in Iraq, and US combat operations in Afghanistan conducted in support of this article make it evident that conventional, top-down intelligence architectures, although capable of supporting the conventional fight, have fallen short against asymmetric threats. ²  In the following paragraphs, the need for a new intelligence architecture is defined and put forth based on the emergence of enemies that are proficient in unconventional tactics and operate in previously unknown battlespaces. In addition, the value of establishing new intelligence architectures by way of military-to-military relations is presented as one way to improve current and future intelligence efforts, support military operations, and further American foreign policy.

The Arenas of Current and Future Conflict

          It is very difficult, and some analysts say even impossible, to identify with certainty the type and variety of threats that will challenge the United States in the future. ³  However, it is certain that the manner in which US military and intelligence entities organize and plan for the challenges of the future will fail if decision makers prepare by reconstituting previous conventional battles. Areas of current and future conflict as they are described below, are meant only to provide a sample of the numerous environments and challenges that the US intelligence community is facing and will continue to face in the future. It is proposed that a general portrayal of current and future battlespaces and a subsequent discussion of how to build a new intelligence architecture is necessary to identify the procedures and protagonists needed to optimize US intelligence support in the future.

State and Non-State Sponsors of Terrorism

In the weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the administration of President George W. Bush made it clear that in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the existence of terrorist organizations was facilitated by the logistical, ideological, and financial support provided by willing state sponsors and allowed by countries incapable of eradicating terrorism within their borders. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism directly correlates the reduction of terrorist scope and capabilities to the need to locate and destroy foreign sanctuaries. ⁴  Therefore, within American policy efforts to "deny, defeat, diminish, and defend" against terrorism, the verb deny refers to US efforts to stop state sponsorship and terrorist sanctuaries on a global scale. However, US measures to halt state sponsorship currently revolve around largely military, financial, and political alliances with affected countries. Current American policies against state sponsorship are vulnerable because they do not engage citizens living among terrorist elements in sanctuary countries. The United States must go beyond an impersonal policy of financial payments and diplomatic rhetoric and focus on ways to empower the inhabitants of state sponsor territories to voluntarily reject their state's sponsorship of terror.

Home Grown Insurgencies

          In the words of RAND analyst Bruce Hoffman, the inability of US political and military planners to prepare for operations following the fall of Baghdad reflected "the [US] failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgencies, but also ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial traction and in turn momentum." ⁵  In addition to the demonstrated complexity and multi-dimensional aspects of an insurgency movement, the intelligence required to prepare for counterinsurgency situations must be collected using comprehensive intelligence architectures. According to General Rene Emilio Ponce, the defense minister at the height of the civil war in El Salvador (1979-1992), "90 percent of counterinsurgency is political, social, economic and ideological and only 10 percent military." ⁶  To date, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the US military's limited cultural awareness and its difficulty in containing a decentralized insurgent movement; facts that will undoubtedly encourage many US adversaries to develop or improve similar asymmetric capabilities. In order to defeat insurgencies in areas of future conflict, military intelligence assets must be operating on the ground long before the commencement of hostilities. The proactive development by intelligence professionals of the cultural, social, political, and military baselines determined critical in El Salvador but ignored in Iraq can not only identify the precursors of an insurgency, but also assist in the development of appropriate courses of action from the tactical to the strategic level.

Nation Building Abroad

           A review of the missions conducted by US forces in Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq can quickly illustrate the wide breadth of intelligence expertise and assistance necessary in any nation building effort. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, US forces and their respective intelligence units have been involved in missions to support humanitarian relief, assist in provincial reconstruction, establish civil affair programs and apprehend High Value Targets (HVTs). In an effort to receive and act on intelligence within hours of its collection, US forces have been stationed in Afghan villages for extended periods of time, thereby "becoming a more permanent, familiar presence." ⁷  Although efforts to establish a positive relationship with a native population take time and may not be completely intelligence dependent, parallel efforts to pursue dynamic military objectives within a nation building environment constantly demand the swift analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence. In Iraq, deployed US Marine units have also been positioning themselves among the population in their areas of operation whenever possible, in order to "live and work with the Iraqi Police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). ⁸  If current and future US nation building efforts are to continue, they must do so with the realization that human beings are key terrain and the conduits of transnational and transcultural issues. Likewise, intelligence professionals in current and future nation building environments must be ready to respond with both time and culturally sensitive analysis, and just as importantly, have the capability to fuse and disseminate the intelligence quickly and correctly.

The Maritime Threat

          US Navy initiatives to recognize and reduce vulnerabilities to US military units deployed overseas, along with the ongoing execution of maritime and leadership interdiction operations (MIO/LIO) at sea, require the fusion and timely dissemination of intelligence to multinational allies. Moreover, US personnel operating within this global maritime environment must now possess a knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews, and passengers that extends well beyond traditional maritime boundaries. ⁹  Intelligence efforts in this setting frequently depend on native language speakers, language interpreters and detailed, historical databases. US military and intelligence agencies operating in this maritime domain have been augmented through the extensive participation of coalition partners, resulting in an increased opportunity to cooperate and share intelligence in support of counter-terrorism, force protection, homeland security, freedom of navigation and counter-narcotic operations. From the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, embarked multinational forces have drawn on US and allied intelligence sources to impede the smuggling of oil from Iraq, deter the escape of terrorists from Afghanistan, and clear countless mines from the Arabian Gulf. ¹⁰  Today and in the future, afloat and ashore US intelligence support elements will be required to surmount technological and linguistic barriers to support a wide variety of maritime missions. These commitments will range from humanitarian, to law enforcement, to military operations and involve the defense of US personnel and property at home and abroad.

A Need for a New Intelligence Architecture

           Independent of time and geographical space, maritime and shore-based scenarios similar to the ones mentioned above must be counted upon to test the very limits of US intelligence capabilities. Therefore, as new adversaries rise to challenge the US military's way of war, intelligence professionals must find more efficient and effective ways of supporting a demanding operational tempo. During a time of unprecedented demands on the US intelligence community, conventional architectures will find it difficult to contend with increasingly complex intelligence requirements because national security no longer depends on stalking one enemy- the Soviet Union. With the return of decentralized enemies, the development of an intelligence architecture that fosters the production and dissemination of intelligence at the tactical level, where US forces are in contact with the enemy, instead of emphasizing support from distant and strategic-level intelligence factories is paramount. Furthermore, the deferral of bureaucratic intelligence requirements until after indigenous intelligence architectures are in place can allow US intelligence professionals to gain critical background knowledge and expertise prior to a demand for combat support.

          Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the United States with documented proof of the value of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the important balance that must be struck between HUMINT and technical intelligence means within current and future intelligence architectures. The continued dependence on a technology-based intelligence infrastructure is complicated by the sparse conditions of future areas of conflict and the need for long-term cultural, social, and religious immersion. According to Professor Kalev Sepp, a visit to Iraq in November of 2004 revealed the absence of American intelligence capabilities that acknowledged tribalism, transnational influences, and the multiple layers of an insurgent threat. ¹¹  In today's world, intelligence is mud [ground] to space. ¹²  Therefore, the US intelligence community must stop building detached intelligence architectures from space down to tactical units on the ground. In order for the US intelligence community to stop being reactive in a combat environment, it must develop an ability to consistently produce actionable intelligence from the battleground-up, disseminate it through the lowest and most appropriate authority possible, and support both military and political decision-makers.

           What would or should, this new "mud to space" intelligence architecture look like? The following section proposes a model for a new intelligence architecture in an effort to maintain the US intelligence community several steps ahead of future conflicts and more importantly, increase its ability to provide short and long term support to a wide variety of potential missions.

How to Build a New Intelligence Architecture

          Building a new intelligence architecture that can meet current and future threats goes beyond efforts to expand America's HUMINT capability, increase the number of US Army Special Forces, or reorganize the structure of the US intelligence community. Building a new intelligence architecture requires the development of a proactive and open-minded approach towards new areas of intelligence such as civil affairs, counterinsurgency methods, and information operations. The US intelligence community must develop intelligence architectures that reside within areas of future conflict to collaborate with competing multinational interests, nullify future threats and analyze, instead of report, events. The thorough social-political understanding necessary to produce intelligence overseas has been complicated by an ignorance of cultural issues, language barriers, a difficulty accessing the populace, and the lack of vetted intelligence sources. Based on a growing movement by the United States to mount an active defense against foreign enemies in the GWOT, areas of future conflict should be expected to offer similar or even greater cultural challenges.

           US intelligence architectures designed to fight emerging and prospective threats must be staffed and managed appropriately in order to produce useful intelligence. A need to fuse and disseminate specialized intelligence quickly while informing decision-makers at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, demands the participation of regional experts and coalition partners that possess the necessary cultural background and experience. In addition, new intelligence architectures must be:

- Tailored to support dynamic action within the United States or abroad simultaneously. The fluid organizational structure of current and future enemies demands that intelligence analysis compete with the 24-hour news cycle. Moreover, intelligence products must evolve and be refined continuously and quickly, upon an international stage. Intelligence products must be tailored to support broad as well as specific domestic and foreign policies, and defeat a transnational enemy that is no longer tied down by nationality or large orders of battle.

- Geared to perform target development and analysis with greater detail, on multiple levels, and in collaboration with different intelligence disciplines. Terrorists are currently operating in decentralized groups and their ability to move and operate within multiple territories and populated areas can create dynamic targets of opportunity in a matter of minutes. This type of elusive targeting will require the sharing of US intelligence with other countries to conduct and fuse information quickly, mitigate political concerns, and prevent unnecessary physical damage. - Aware that although timely and accurate intelligence is a necessary condition to defeat asymmetric threats, it is not a substitute for sound military planning that is based on known force capabilities instead of supposed enemy threats. In cases when military institutions may be inclined to fight unconventional enemies using attrition tactics that focus on internal administration, logistics, and operations, new intelligence architectures must recognize an enemy's unconventional capabilities and be prepared to support relational maneuver warfare which focuses on reconfiguring capabilities, manipulating social conditions, and exposing enemy weaknesses. ¹³ 

- Prepared to provide intelligence support that facilitates the efficient and effective use of special operations forces. In addition to providing the intelligence necessary to allow special operation forces to deceive and surprise the enemy, intelligence architectures must recognize that special operations are accomplished with the smallest number of personnel possible, and are dependent on thorough intelligence support to simplify mission tasks and objectives.

- Staffed with US personnel that are trained to disseminate intelligence products to foreign military and civilian entities and embrace the unconventional methods needed to fight terrorism. The US intelligence community can help improve the level of protection for US troops on the ground and increase the relevance of intelligence products by training to work with indigenous forces. These forces possess valuable cultural knowledge and can be supported with the intelligence needed to carry out critical civil affairs missions. Producing specific intelligence products to maintain the peace is now as important as producing the intelligence products needed to triumph in war.

- Capable of producing intelligence products that are accessible by not only US and allied forces, but also available to new, non-state customers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Future threats to national security will originate from multiple regions, failing states, and non-states because most of the people who threaten the American way of life plan, train, and operate in countries other than their own. Proper and timely dissemination of intelligence products to familiar coalition partners as well as unfamiliar governments will be essential.

          Based on an established need by the US intelligence community to redevelop its focus and introduce an intelligence architecture capable of fighting complicated and multinational threats, military-to-military relations between US and host nation personnel will be examined in the following section, and proposed as a key ingredient in future intelligence architectures. The analysis of US involvement in El Salvador, Colombia, Afghanistan and Iraq performed in support of this argument demonstrates that in time, military-to-military ties can provide US forces with the background and experience necessary to establish and maintain a superior intelligence architecture abroad.

One Solution: The Use of Military to Military Relations in a New Intelligence Architecture

           Without effective intelligence on current and future adversaries, the United States will have a difficult time recognizing the threats it is facing, and even less opportunities to focus the resources needed to combat and defeat the enemy. Readers should look no further than the US failure to build a coalition with the government of Sudan, based on the Sudanese offer to allow the extradition of Usama Bin Laden in 1996, as an example of the critical need by the US government and intelligence personnel to understand the language, history, politics, and culture of the area in which they work. ¹⁴  Therefore, having established the need for a new intelligence architecture based on diffuse threats and elusive enemies, the use of military-to-military relations is proposed as a way to guide the United States into enhanced intelligence efforts, important multilateral operations, and the empowerment of allies in the war against terrorism.

           Anyone considering the use of military-to-military relations as a vehicle to increased intelligence capabilities must first be warned. A review of available research reveals that these relationships, although capable of improving intelligence efforts, require a long-term investment of trained and experienced personnel, professional as well as personal patience, honesty, and rarely offer immediate gains. In El Salvador and Colombia, military-to-military relations, although initially difficult, proved to be fertile ground for the establishment of intelligence sharing agreements after several years. Moreover, these relations eventually supported US regional policy objectives and increased the counterinsurgency capabilities of the indigenous military forces. In Afghanistan, the participation of indigenous Northern Alliance forces provided the indigenous forces needed by US Special Operations Forces to conduct efficient ground maneuvers and call for well-directed fires against the enemy. ¹⁵ 

           Two years after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq remains an example of the consequences resulting from the absence of military relations between members of the US-led cooperative and compliant Iraqi forces. Instructions given by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to dissolve the Iraqi military infrastructure prevented US forces from fully incorporating newly trained Iraqi security forces into a comprehensive, long-term national security system. ¹⁶  Meanwhile, the unsupervised introduction of coalition forces into the Iraqi tribal balance of power after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime markedly upset native social-political patterns and irrevocably altered the security environment. ¹⁷  In the post-Saddam era, US forces have been able to develop and maintain military-to-military ties with experienced and trustworthy Iraqi military personnel with mixed results. Arguably, the absence of a military-to-military relationship in Iraq following the fall of Baghdad proved to be yet another lost opportunity for US forces in desperate need of greater situational awareness and better insight into complex social, political and tribal systems.

          Nonetheless, the Global War on Terrorism continues to be fought in socially and politically compromised countries similar to those found in the Middle East and Latin America, possessing inconsistent state, financial and military resources. Most of the countries in these regions are unprepared or incapable of effectively waging counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts, which under optimal circumstances, require extended periods of training and preparation. Proactive US efforts to seek out areas of future conflict in order to establish military-to-military relations can help US analysts identify key indicators of unrest, target the person or persons that threaten a peaceful way of life, and select appropriate courses of action prior to, or instead of, the onset of hostilities. Military-to military relations can help US forces in their need to expand their linguistic capabilities, develop necessary databases, and effectively participate with current and future coalition partners. Dedicated military ties in the form of an intelligence sharing agreement, a joint intelligence center, or an advisory program can help the US intelligence community establish local, ground to space intelligence networks that offer host nations increased intelligence capabilities in exchange for much needed regional expertise. In fact, the use of military to military relationships can guide the US intelligence community back to that overlooked but essential request to redevelop its focus.

Conclusion

          The enclosed recommendations may seem intuitive and may, in one way or another, be already in place. However, over two years after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, US news outlets continue to report that attacks against US troops deployed overseas occur on a daily basis. These terrorist acts should be seen as the successful culmination of the enemy's plans and therefore, demand the implementation of more effective means in order to stop them. In this age of globalization, events such as commodity smuggling, terror sponsorship, insurgency movements, and humanitarian catastrophes are not just a host nation or state problem. The development of new intelligence architectures and the use of military-to-military relations can enable partner nations, nullify future threats through the use of proactive instead of reactive efforts, and will do more than paint a visually pleasing picture of the area of operations; it will prevent the enemy from eventually defining the global battlespace.

^1.Grau, L.W. (2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis. Military Review, 43.BACK

^2. Asymmetric is defined by John T. Chenery, author of "Transnational Threats 101: Today's Asymmetric Battlefield," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, (Jul-Sep 1999):2, as "any unconventional or inexpensive method or means used to avoid [US] our strengths, and exploit our vulnerabilities." BACK

^3. This statement is based on the author's professional experiences during seven years of work in multiple strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence assignments. BACK

^4. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 11. BACK

^5. Hoffman, B. (2004). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 3. BACK

^6. Schwarz, B. C. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 22. BACK

^7. Hoffman, B. (2004). Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 8.BACK

^8. Ricks, T. E. "Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq: Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover from Army," Washington Post, 7 January, 2004. BACK

^9. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. "Hearing on Maritime Domain Awareness." 6 October 2004. Transcript on-line. Available from http://www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/10-06-04/10-06-04r; Internet; accessed 11 February 2005.BACK

^10. Lecture address by ADM. Walter F. Doran, Commander US Pacific Fleet, 9 September 2003, 18^th Asialink Conference, Melbourne, Australia. Transcript on-line. Available from http://www.cpf.navy.mil/speech/speeches/030909.html Internet; accessed 11 February 2005.BACK

^11. Kalev Sepp, interview with the author, Monterey, California, 12 January 2005. Dr. Sepp is currently a faculty member of the Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. BACK

^12. USAIC & FH, Six Things Every "2" Must Do, The Intelligence Officer's Battlebook: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned. 26 June 2003. Chapter 1, p.13.BACK

^13. Luttwak, E. (1983 December). Notes on Low- Intensity Warfare. Parameters, 336.BACK

^14. Gellman, B. (2001, October 3) U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Efforts To Capture Bin Laden or Have Him Killed; Sudan's Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No; [FINAL Edition], A1. Retrieved February 15, 2005, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/82945140.html. Grau, L.W. (2004 July-August). Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis. Military Review, 44. BACK

^15. Biddle, S. (2002). Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy. Strategic Studies Institute. Pennsylvania: US Army War College, viii.BACK

^16. McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned Tribal Policy, 20. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF. BACK

^17. McCallister, W.S. (2003 February). Integrated Security System: Requirement for a Well Reasoned Tribal Policy, 7. Paper forwarded by COL David S. Maxwell, USA, SF. BACK