European Regional Reviews

This book provides a detailed account of the diplomatic maneuvering of inter-war Czechoslovakia, particularly during the tumultuous 1930s. As can be expected, it therefore likewise highlights the dominant role that Edvard Benes played in the formulation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, first as the Foreign Minister of the infant state, and after 1935 as its President.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, one of his major objectives is to dispel the myth that the Czechoslovak government, and Benes in particular, were but a "passive object" who's fate was simply the foregone result of actions taken by the European great powers during the numerous Czechoslovak-German crises of the 1930s. (Lukes, v) Tied to this, he also seeks to demonstrate that the Kremlin too played a much more vital role in these crises than the solely "marginal" one which most historians have attributed to it. (Lukes, v) In order to highlight the "hitherto neglected Czechoslovak and Soviet perspectives" (Lukes, v) the author thus primarily drew upon original primary sources only recently made available in official archives in Prague, and to a lesser extent, in Moscow. (Lukes, viii)

The author consistently reinforces a favorable picture of Benes throughout the book, staying true to his original portrayal of Benes as a self-made man, radiating self-confidence, and admired for his "intellect, toughness of character, and limitless capacity for work." (Lukes, 5) Lukes also goes to great lengths to demonstrate how both President Masaryk and Benes were anything but "passive objects" on the world stage, and he asserts that on the contrary they were painfully aware of the imposing security challenges that stood before Czechoslovakia and took active steps to counter them. We see this in Benes' numerous attempts to supplement his inadequate 1925 Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France with one also involving the Soviet Union. Lukes identifies the basic premise of this foreign policy strategy as Benes' original conviction that only a "concerted effort of all the major European countries and America" could hope to secure the peaceful development of post-war Europe, and that the ideological gap between the West and Stalin's Soviet Union could be breached by the development of "commercial ties." (Lukes, 12) As the increasing threat posed by Hitler's Germany destroyed Benes' utopian dream of a harmonious Europe, throughout the 1930s he then actively sought to "compensate for the German threat by bringing Moscow westward and giving it a real presence on the scales of power in Europe." (Lukes, 38)

Just how active his role was is clearly demonstrated by Lukes, as we see how at Benes' "prompting" the Soviet Union was invited to join the League of Nations in September 1934, thanks in no small part to his "real influence in the League." (Lukes, 39) Having achieved this feat, Benes then took advantage of the ensuing Franco-Soviet rapprochement and the December 1934 Franco-Soviet Geneva Protocol. In a "daring diplomatic maneuver," Benes informed the Soviets that Czechoslovakia would also be bound by the protocol, which with Soviet complicity thus turned "a bilateral arrangement into a de facto trilateral one." (Lukes, 44)

Likewise, immediately following the May 1935 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Benes ardently pursued a parallel Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty since France was too concerned with German and Polish sensibilities to sign a trilateral one. His efforts bore fruit only fourteen days after the Franco-Soviet Treaty had been signed, and Benes successfully secured a second Mutual Assistance treaty--this time with the Soviet Union, although its assistance was conditional upon that of France being committed as well. (Lukes, 50)

Although Lukes' coverage of Benes is mostly favorable, he offers a somewhat objective treatment of his existing weaknesses as well (although he tends to understate some of them.) One such weakness is Benes' occasional anxiousness, which caused him to "make mistakes; typically, he talked too much." (Lukes, 51) The damage this caused him could best be seen when he visited the Soviet Union, and where "his apparent enthusiasm for all things Soviet further stigmatized Benes as an ally of Stalin." (Lukes, 51) As a consequence, due to the ongoing crisis over the Sudetenland and "Benes's diplomatic endeavors in Moscow, Czechoslovakia came to represent a liability to Western democracies." (Lukes, 85)

Another major weakness Lukes reveals is Benes' "uncharismatic personality" and his tendency to "lecture at great length to experienced foreign diplomats who soon resented being treated as students of international affairs." (Lukes, 56) This particularly took its toll on his British colleagues who came to develop a strong personal dislike of Benes. (Lukes, 56) Seeing the pivotal role Great Britain would later play in sacrificing Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler, Benes' unfortunate trait seems all the more relevant.

The author also asserts that the Soviet role in shaping the outcome of the Czechoslovak- German crisis over the Sudetenland in the 1930s was more than just "marginal." We see this in the May 1938 decision by Benes to order partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army. Based upon his new sources, the author speculates that key parts of the intelligence that Prague received on the alleged German troop build-up on the border were in fact nothing other than a Soviet attempt at a "deliberate deception" operation aimed at provoking a war between the West and Hitler. (Lukes 153) Although the facts to support this thesis are admittedly incomplete, Lukes does paint a realistic scenario.

More importantly, it was at Czechoslovakia's critical hour of need that the Soviet Union performed perhaps the most important role of the crisis. After being deserted by France and Great Britain at the September 1938 Munich Conference, Lukes' sources reveal that it was the lack of any definitive answer on Soviet commitment to stand by Czechoslovakia that finally compelled Benes to capitulate to the Munich Diktat. (Lukes, 257)

Thus, we see that the author fulfilled the two tasks he set before himself quite successfully. The book is of great value to European FAOs looking to improve their historical knowledge of the region in that it does indeed reveal Benes' diplomacy as much more dynamic and full of initiative than he may have been credited with. We also uncover that the Soviet Union was much more than just an actor sitting on the sidelines throughout the conflict, although there remain some loose ends as to proven Soviet responsibility for the May 1938 deception operation. Finally, in addition to fulfilling these two goals, I find that the book also has a third key value, albeit more nebulous. For the novice historian, the detail and precision with which it portrays the intense pressure to which Great Britain and France subjected democratic Czechoslovakia in order to appease Hitler is an eye opener. The book reveals appeasement not only as the faulty policy we all know it to be, but furthermore as a gross injustice to the Czechoslovak peoples--one that we all need to learn from.

Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History.New York: Harper Perennial, 1999. Pp. 492

This book provides a relatively detailed overview of the history of the current-day Serbian province of Kosovo, beginning with the arrival of Slavic tribes on the borders of the Byzantine Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries AD, and concluding with the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the summer of 1997 as a response to the Serbian clampdown on the province. In doing so, the book also traces the interrelations between the ethnic Serb and Albanian peoples inhabiting the province and their evolution over the ages. As any account of this topic was bound to do, it also challenges some of the nationalist rhetoric that has been emanating from both sides.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, his major objective in this book is "anti-myth." (Malcolm, i) One of the first such historical myths he sets out to dispel is that of who were the first inhabitants of Kosovo, and the presumed historical claim to the territory that goes along with it. Malcolm asserts that following their settlement in the Rascia area in the seventh century AD, "the Serbian expansion into Kosovo began in earnest only in the late twelfth century." (Malcolm, 26) As for the Albanians, Malcolm's intricate ethno-linguistic research seems to indicate that Albanians trace their heritage to the ancient Illyrians, and that proto-Albanians were therefore most likely living in present-day Kosovo long before the Serbs. (Malcolm, 40) However, despite this concession to the Albanians, Malcolm also highlights his findings cased upon primary source documents that, contrary to the Albanian claim, there was not yet an ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo in the medieval Serb Kingdom. (Malcolm, 55) That being said, however, the Serbian claim that there were no Albanians at all in Kosovo until the seventeenth century can also be ruled out. (Malcolm, 140)

Malcolm also sheds much light on the mythical 1690 "great migration" of the Serbs and their patriarch out of Kosovo on the heels of the retreating Austrians, and the alleged resulting flood of Albanians into this vacuum. His research into several primary sources and resulting analysis reveals that the fleeing Serbs numbered only some 30,000-40,000, including in that count Serbs fleeing from areas other than Kosovo as well, thus well short of the half million figure advanced by Serbs. (Malcolm, 161) Malcolm doesn't date the establishment of an ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo until the mid-nineteenth century. (Malcolm, 196) He then proposes that Albanians gradually became a majority not due to migration but primarily due to local growth, thanks to what today ranks as the highest birth rate in Europe. (Malcolm, 332)

Another myth that Malcolm seeks to disprove is that the present day conflict in Kosovo is simply the predestined result of resurfacing "ancient ethnic hatreds." (Malcolm, xxvii) Instead, Malcolm paints a picture of two peoples living in peaceful coexistence for several centuries, indeed sometimes cooperating against a common threat. Instead he blames modern Politicians for amplifying their differences and stirring-up prejudices. For example, Malcolm's research on the1389 Battle of Kosovo finds evidence of Albanians taking part in the battle on both sides. (Malcolm, 62-64) Likewise, during both the 1689 and the 1737Austrian invasions he asserts that both Serbs and Albanians flocked to the Austrian side against their Ottoman overlords. (Malcolm, 148, 168)

The first real deterioration of the relations between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians came from the mass expulsions of Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro in 1877-8. (Malcolm, 228) The 50,000 or so of these so called Muhaxhirs who consequentially resettled in Kosovo brought with them a strong hostility towards the Orthodox Serbs, which in turn caused 60,000 Serbs to emigrate from Kosovo. (Malcolm, 229-230) Malcolm also points to the effect of the Serbian state's policies following the conquest of Kosovo in 1912, and again as it reasserted control in 1918. These anti-Albanian policies (intended to encourage them to emigrate to Albania or Turkey), and the associated "large-scale program of colonization" by ethnic Serbs, also did much to breed enmity between these two peoples. (Malcolm, 269, 280) Albanian expulsions of tens of thousands of Serbs (primarily colonists) during the World War Two years further deepened the divide. (Malcolm, 305) Yet Malcolm claims the point of no return was only reached by the "Ethnic Cleansing" policies of Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" in the 1990s, which followed the highly unpopular 1989 amendments he orchestrated which ended the generous provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution and reduced Kosovo's autonomy to a "mere token." (Malcolm, 341-344)

Malcolm also asserts that it was only in the nineteenth century that Serbian nationalists transformed the "folk-poetic tradition" of the medieval battle of Kosovo as some sort of historically self-defining "national ideology" with religious overtones. (Malcolm, 58, 79) Malcolm clearly shows that the actual 1389 battle itself was by no means a decisive Turkish victory that sealed the fate of the medieval Serbian empire, nor was it immediately followed by Ottoman rule. Instead, his detailed analysis of numerous primary source documents reveals that although in the end the Turks held the field, the battle was really more of a draw as they immediately returned to Anatolia and Serbian self-rule persisted for another seventy years. (Malcolm, 76) Kosovo is also not the "Jerusalem" of the Serbs. (xxxi) The first seat of the Autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219 was in Zica in central Serbia, and only after Tatars burned it down at the end of the thirteenth century did it move to Pec in Western Kosovo. (Malcolm, 45-46)

Malcolm also points out that Tsar Dusan's medieval Serbian Empire's origins were in the Rascia area the Serbs settled in the early seventh century AD, and not in Kosovo. (Malcolm, 24) The medieval Serbian state's de-facto capital, for its part, was also never in Kosovo. It was initially in Ras (in Rascia proper) and later moved to Skopje (present day Macedonia) in the mid-thirteenth century. (Malcolm, 50) Thus the myth of Kosovo as the "cradle of the Serbs," or as their "Jerusalem," is dismissed by Malcolm as historically quite incorrect. On the other hand, Malcolm demonstrates that the nineteenth century Albanian independence movement traces its roots to Kosovo and the Albanian League's efforts to establish a self-administering unified Albanian vilayet. (Malcolm, 217) It was here that the League's short-lived 1880 de facto government was established in Prizren, until the Ottomans crushed it in 1881. (Malcolm, 227)

In conclusion, Malcolm's work does provide many useful insights into the nature of the present day conflict of great use to the modern European FAO. The broad scope and spectrum of sources which he uses to support his findings does him great credit. The only flaw that I can detect is his understatement of the symbolic importance of Kosovo to the Serbs. While the facts indeed support his conclusions that Kosovo really wasn't much of a "cradle" of any kind in Serbian history, nonetheless people have a remarkable ability to persistently hold on to myths over generations. Thus, factual or not factual, the myths surrounding Kosovo will for long outweigh Malcolm's mere "facts" in the eyes of everyday Serbs--much like the Alamo in the eyes of Texans.