LEVERAGING THE NATIONAL GUARD’S STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN THE REBALANCE TOWARD ASIA

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN CHINA

BOOK REVIEWS: CHUCK HAGEL & ROBERT KAPLAN
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Front Cover Image: Cairo Graffiti, Tahrir Square, November 2011

Layout and design: Graham Plaster
Dear FAO Association Members,

I’d also like to provide an update on some of the FAOA programs and activities since the last FAO Journal President’s Letter. First of all, I would like to thank you for your support and membership in the FAOA, your professional association for FAOs, Defense Attachés, Security Cooperation personnel, and other defense linguists and international affairs specialists. We currently have over 800 full members, double the number in 2010, as well as another 800 individuals on our events and updates email list. Secondly, I would like to welcome our new FAOA Board of Governors (BOG) members, Jeff Hoffman, USAFR (ret.), and John Krause, USMC (ret.). In addition to being the FAOA Historian and Co-Chairman of the FAO Heritage Display and Hall of Fame Committee, Jeff will also assume the important FAOA BOG position and duties of Treasurer. We should be appreciative for Jeff’s hard work and support of the FAO Association. I would also like to welcome Federico Schiavo as the new Assistant Webmaster. Federico will be lending his able assistance to our Webmaster, Graham Plaster, who also serves as Secretary and Assistant Journal Editor. FAOA has had some fantastic events this year. In addition to our very successful and well-attended Annual FAOA Black Tie Dinner at the Army Navy Country Club which featured the Deputy Director of DIA, Mr. David Shedd as special guest, we have had two very interesting FAOA Distinguished Speaker Luncheons featuring Ms. Heidi Grant, SAF International Affairs, who spoke on "Defense Export Reform and the Future of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)" Colonel John O. Holm, Commandant of the USAF Air Advisor Academy (AAA) and Major Scott McLearn of the USA’s 162nd Infantry Brigade speaking on “Building Partnership Capacity through Foreign Military Advising: the Ground and Air Perspectives". Links to these presentations can be found on the FAOA website. We also had a very interesting “FAOs on Tap Happy Hour” with a special focus topic on the National Language Service Corps (NLSC) and co-sponsored a 1-Day Civil Affairs Roundtable on Foreign Area Engagement Team with the Reserve Officer Association and George Mason University. I would like to again thank our corporate sponsors for these special events who helped make them possible: Oak Grove Technologies, X Corp Solutions, JTG, Advanced Intelligence Solutions, York Consulting, Intelitrac, Blue Force, Saliency Federal Solutions, Peduzzi Associates, Masy Group, and CUBIC. We have an equally interesting agenda of events for the fall, starting with a “FAOs on Tap Happy Hour” on Thursday 19 September. Details are on the FAOA website and will be emailed out shortly. FAOA just completed the second year of its Outstanding Research and Writing Awards Program. You will find an article about this program in this edition as well as find many of the award winning papers in this and future Journal issues. Congratulations to our award winners from Air University, Naval War College, Marine Corps University, National Intelligence University, and Joint Forces Staff College. The FAO Heritage Display at the Pentagon, being done in collaboration with the DoD FAO Program Manager, the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO), is now proceeding at a rapid pace and the installation should begin this fall. Thank you to the outstanding work of the FAOA Heritage Display Committee. I hope you like the new look to the FAO Journal of International Affair, which is ably produced and published by our Editorial Group, Mike Dugan, Graham Plaster, and John Haseman and his Editorial Content Board. I hope you enjoy this summer edition. Lastly, I wanted to mention that the FAOA BOG has proposed an update to the current Association Charter, last updated in 2009, to take into account and address the many new programs and activities, the growing membership and corporate sponsorship, and complexity of the organization. You will be receiving more information on this in the fall and have the opportunity to review and vote on the proposed Charter changes. Again, thank you for your support and interest in the FAO Association and please let me know any comments, questions, or suggestions.

Very Respectfully,

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Social Media and Open-Source Intelligence Resources for the Modern Foreign Area Officer

BY MAJOR DANIEL B. SHEETS, U.S. AIR FORCE

The geopolitical environment in which we operate in is increasingly complex. The human factor is often the most important and most difficult factor to accurately gauge. It has always presented particular problems for anyone tasked to make accurate assessments. This factor is a standard unknown variable in the equation of making assessments. The increase in geopolitical complexity stems from two distinct reasons, the first being the drastic improvements in social communication methods and platforms. The very basis of how people communicate with each other is diametrically different than how it has been for thousands of years. Second, the increase in the availability of these improved social communication methods, both in terms of accessibility and infrastructure, such as bandwidth capabilities. Perhaps the most difficult problem set, is now even more difficult and complex. How can the modern foreign area officer (FAO) create the analytic advantage when trying to understand an entire populace?

Exploiting and analyzing publicly available information may be that answer. However, considering the vast amounts of open source information, the task of breaking down and filtering all of the information is a daunting task. When thousands of people are transmitting information online, how do you know who to listen to? How do you know what is credible open-source intelligence (OSINT)? How can you discern the valuable information from the rest of the noise created by social media participants? There are many tools that allow the FAO to quickly aggregate, depict, and analyze information. This information presents the FAO with a clearer picture of what the local populace really thinks and feels about any topic that crosses their minds.

Traditional journalism and information publication is centered on the gatekeeper model, where information is heavily filtered by some sort of editor or gatekeeper before it is subsequently published for public consumption. The past 15 years have ushered the advent of social media. Subsequently, the entire model of how information is published and consumed has been turned upside-down. With social media, information is published in copious amounts, typically with very little preemptive filtration by the author. The filtration of this large amount of information is a byproduct of its wide and uninhibited publication. As information is re-tweeted, blogged, shared, liked, and linked-to, it is digitally filtered for the next consumer of that information. The unimportant or uninteresting information is culled from the rest of what has been published. Even though information is rarely removed from the Internet, it is disregarded by the masses to

IN A VERY SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME, SOCIAL MEDIA CONTRIBUTED TO MAKING POSSIBLE WHAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS THOUGHT WAS IMPOSSIBLE. A STABLE EGYPT HAD BEEN TURNED INSIDE-OUT
the point that the effect is the same as if it had been deleted.

There are numerous ways the FAO can leverage social media and other OSINT tools that can supplement additional classified options, if those are available. This article describes a number of tools that the FAO can use in most regions of the world to increase understanding of current events and population sentiments. It will provide a cursory overview of how to use these social media exploitation tools. It is encouraged to explore these websites, since the full potential of these websites far exceeds what can be explained in this brief article. Furthermore, this article is by no means a comprehensive list of all available social media and OSINT resources. Lastly, while most of these websites have worldwide applicability, not every website listed below has direct applications for every region or FAO.

What’s Everybody Saying?

There are great ways to tap into a number of social media platforms in order to find out what the general market-penetration is of particular ideas with relation to current events in specific regions. While many of the available social media aggregation websites offer similar services, there are unique differences among them that can be further used to fuse the picture of the operating environment.

www.socialmention.com

Social Mention allows you to receive statistics on the prevalence of different topics around the Internet and on social media platforms. Once a search has been conducted, you may bound the search with a specific time period if you would like to see historical reporting. Doing a search will give you a list of the most recent postings from a number of social media platforms, like Twitter and Facebook. Social Mention also displays more detailed information, such as the strength, sentiment, passion, and reach of the topic you searched. This is essentially the market penetration of your search criteria. When I performed a simple search of the term, “kurd” there was a sentiment rating of 16:1. This is to say that for every 16 positive or neutral posts regarding my search term of “kurd,” there was one negative post. However, the sentiment rating can be misleading seeing as how the digital method that rates the sentiment of each post may not always be accurate, thus skewing the ratio. The passion percentage will show how often a user is likely to post about that same topic multiple times. This website will also display the top sources, platforms, and users where the posts regarding your searched term originated, as well as the top hash tags that are associated with your search.

www.icerocket.com

IceRocket will not provide you with as much analytic or market penetration information, but does offer a few advantages over Social Mention. This website operates under the same concept of being able to search a term, but with IceRocket, you may search different social media platforms separately or collectively. The three individual search options are blogs, Twitter, and Facebook. This site will also allow you to decide which languages to filter the results by. This is particularly important when trying to filter out information that might not be originating from your region of interest. Another great feature is being able to graphically view the results of your search. A search of only blog posts that referred to “Nicolas Maduro,” resulted in the graph shown. While basic, such a graph can quickly show the peaks of when people were “publishing” information about your search term. This can narrow down the search by showing when most of the buzz about your topic was occurring. Conducting the same search on their Twitter search shows an average of 28.1 tweets per minute about Nicolas Maduro at the time the search was performed. If the local population of your region or country finds a topic that important, should you?

www.topsy.com

What if you wanted to compare the amounts of online publication of multiple topics or terms simultaneously? Topsy is the premier tool available to aggregate multiple social platforms into numerous analytic
products. It allows the user to compare multiple search terms to view the amount of online publication of up to three search terms. After performing your search, Topsy will list some of the top articles related to your search criteria. Similar to IceRocket, you have the option of also searching different social media platforms separately. A simple search using the terms, “Egypt,” “Syria,” and “Turkey” showed that there was significantly more internet buzz regarding Syria, but that towards the end of the month of April 2013, there was a sharp increase in posts involving “Turkey,” while the posts about Syria dropped significantly. There are however, limitations to Topsy. When performing a social analytics search, you are limited to only searching information going back to the last month. Additionally, there is some lag time before information has been indexed in the Topsy database. Topsy is a very simple-to-use resource that offers great versatility to analyze and compare recent information.

www.addictomatic.com

For those who prefer to have all of the information laid before them, not too different than what you would see on a typical online news site, Addictomatic provides you such a layout. Addictomatic displays your search information in an aesthetically pleasing dashboard that integrates numerous social media platforms like Youtube, Twitter, Flickr, and Wordpress in one single location. The downside is that this site does not provide any analysis of the information, just merely displays the information from multiple sources. Addictomatic is a very good place for you to start your social media analysis before you decide which of the above websites will best suit your research. Perhaps the best aspect of this site is the option for customizing the dashboard. There are 25 different platforms that you can choose from in order to create your display. This website is similar in principle to the mobile phone app Pulse News, where you can create a customized feed of select news sources, thus building your preferences and performing your own filtration automatically. There is a default dashboard for a user who has not set their dashboard preferences. You are presented with a standard search bar. Once you perform your search, the results are presented in this default dashboard. This aggregation resource allows a greater degree of freedom when trying to gain a general consensus on a particular topic from multiple places on the web simultaneously.

Where the Action Happens

www.crowdmap.com

Have you ever wondered where different events are occurring within your region? Or have you been tasked with mapping out where particular events have happened in the past? Crowd mapping is a way to view a snapshot of where the crowds literally have been or what crowds of people are doing or saying. It can also go beyond physical crowds and provide you with where the virtual crowds are. At Crowdmap, you can enter your search criteria, which generally brings up a list of recent, and for the most part up-to-date maps that have been created by other users. This site offers products that have been built off of crowd sourcing information across multiple platforms, including SMS (text messages), twitter, and email. You can select which map you would like to view based on the title of the map. For example, when I searched “China,” a list of maps popped up that contained a map titled “China Strikes: Mapping Labor Unrest in
China.” You can further bound your search with specific timeframes. The map that is shown can also be toggled just like a map in Google Maps would be, thus allowing you to pan around the map as well as zoom in and out. The right side of the screen will display the metadata of what types of information contributed to the creation of the map. This tool allows you to see the fusion of multiple types of reporting or incidents. FAOs may track anything from commercial production for a particular type of industry to civil unrest in a county.

The Internet of the Past

There may be times when searching politically sensitive websites may be prohibited, strongly discouraged or outright impossible. Some government or business networks may have particular sites blocked from being viewed. Archive.org is an archival database that allows you to search and view a particular website that may not currently exist. It is as if the Internet was saved at a particular point in time and saved in an archive. Once you have input the website you want to view and selected the “Take Me Back” button, a timeline and calendar will appear. The timeline will show, in bar graph form, the amount of archival “snapshots” that have been taken over the years. Once the year has been selected, you may then choose a month, day, and in some cases, which snapshot for that particular day. An archival search for the official website of HAMAS resulted in numerous snapshots going back to 2010. The below image was taken from September 7, 2011. Many websites have archived pages that go back much further. While the database is large, there is no guarantee that a particular website or timeframe has been archived. This archive allows the FAO the ability to perform historical research to put particular websites in historical context by viewing a depiction of what that website looked like at a specific time in the past. Furthermore, many websites will track the locations as well as the IP addresses of the visitors to their website. By viewing the archived page, the operators of the website that you want to view will never know that you viewed an archived snapshot of their website. This way your viewing of their website is not tracked nor recorded. Perhaps the greatest benefit of this database is being able to view defunct websites.

Tools to Topple a Regime

The recent Arab Awakening has shed a lot of light on the role that social media can play during internal unrest or turmoil. Despite the fact that only a very small amount of Egyptians actually had Twitter accounts during the last 18 days of Hosni Mubarak’s reign over Egypt, the regime-change has been inaccurately labeled as the “Twitter Revolution.” In a very short amount of time, social media contributed to making possible what the vast majority of U.S. intelligence analysts thought was impossible. A stable Egypt had been turned inside out. To think that this type of upheaval cannot happen in your region is naïve and is an analytic roadblock.

The Arab Awakening has been a case study for many regimes to study and dissect the effects that social media can play on a population. This can be further exacerbated when the population is discontent with the government. There is little doubt that regimes have learned lessons on how to contain any potential unrest from what they have vicariously experienced through some of these already replaced regimes. Iran has shown their willingness to further censor and reduce Internet access during times that the regime feels that they are threatened. Additionally, there are potential users of social media during times of unrest who fear reprise or punishment from the
government for their part in the unrest. There are now tools available to citizens and netizens alike to coordinate actions, disseminate pictures and audio files, and maintain plausible deniability in their involvement.

This tool is called Splinternet, a mobile phone app that is available for all Android-powered devices. This app is completely anonymous, unblockable, and untraceable. Splinternet does not rely on 3G, 4G, Wi-Fi, or any type of server to transmit data among its users. Instead, this app transmits information using Bluetooth technology, therefore cannot be traced or blocked using conventional methods, even when the Internet within the country has been shut down. All of the data is transmitted from point-to-point and stored locally on the device. What this means is that there are no cell towers needed for this app to function. The downside of this is that this app cannot transmit information over long distances. In order to transmit information, the devices must sync to each other in order to open that conduit of information sharing.

In order to maintain a person’s plausible deniability in any potentially illegal activities, there is an instant kill-switch that wipes all data associated with Splinternet from the user’s device. And since there are no user profiles either, all data and transmissions are completely anonymous. This app creates an unblockable Twitter. The users also are the filters and editors of the potentially large amounts of information. Each user has the option of deciding which Splinternet messages to pass and which ones to delete. The user can also upload pictures and audio files to the Internet once they have normal Internet connectivity. If a message has been deleted it will therefore not be passed on to the next user when the syncing process between two devices occurs.

While Splinternet might not have much applicability to the typical FAO, it is important to be cognizant of the types of tools of insurrection that are available to the public. Android-powered devices are spreading throughout the world, as such; these types of tools will only become more prevalent and capable. Bluetooth technology will continue to increase in capability, thus further expanding its ability to reach more users quickly. This could be the social media platform that fuels the next regime change in your region.

**Implications for the Foreign Area Officer**

Properly integrating available social media exploitation and OSINT analytical resources is critical to being able to fully understand the geopolitical environment in a technology-driven society. While the information available on these resources can be valuable, they should serve as a supplement to, and not a replacement of, other types of intelligence sources and methods. Social media will continue to be an important tool for the FAO, as it can be a metric of the pulse of a country. No other venue currently exists that allows the FAO to rapidly and anonymously survey large amounts of a populace at any given time on the subject of their choosing. These tools and resources will continue to evolve as technology that supports them improves and the hunger to publish and consume information grows. Integrating these resources will help the FAO sift through the trivial information and find the true pearls of great price within all of the social media noise. The modern FAO must be able to adapt to the level of technology available to the people within their region. Antiquated techniques should be supplanted with more accurate and timely methods. Leveraging these available resources and capabilities will further enhance the level of information the modern FAO has at their fingertips. Being technologically and social media savvy are vital for the modern FAO to be successful in a geopolitical environment that can change with just one tweet.

**About the Author:**

Captain Daniel Sheets is a U.S. Air Force all-source intelligence analyst and currently assigned to United States Central Command as a counterterrorism analyst. He has previously served in a variety of analytical capacities supporting F-16 CGs. Captain Sheets has deployed to the Republic of Korea. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Journalism with an emphasis in Public Relations and dual minors in Mandarin Chinese and Aerospace Studies from Utah State University, a Master’s degree in Intelligence Studies from American Military University, and is currently pursuing a Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence also from American Military University. Captain Sheets’ research has been focused on Pashtunwali’s effects on counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. He has also spent close to three years studying, working, deployed to, and living in various countries of the Asia Pacific region. Captain Sheets hopes to serve the U.S. and the FAO community as an Olmsted Scholar and eventual FAO.
Introduction

The twenty-first century is widely regarded to be the century of genocide. With the passage of the landmark Genocide Convention in 1948, the United Nations (UN) established that the systematic killing of innocent civilians was a crime so unjust and barbaric that it was deemed to be “a crime against humanity.” Yet, even as the international community promised to never again allow the mass extermination of human beings in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities against Jews, it has occurred time and time again. The slaughter of innocents in Rwanda in 1994 and the ethnic cleansing by the Milosevic regime in the Balkans during the 1990s are examples of the absence of American leadership, and a failure of international will, to prevent genocide. More specifically, U.S. military leaders—haunted by the disastrous result of involving American troops in Somalia in 1993—failed to provide viable, timely options to civilian policymakers for Rwanda.

That is not to say that the United States did not have in place policies to deal with genocidal regimes. The Clinton Administration imposed a set of diplomatic and economic sanctions against both the Hutu leadership in Rwanda and the Milosevic regime after each conflict had begun. However, these sanctions had little effect to deter the leadership of both countries and instead only persuaded the perpetrators to halt the atrocities temporarily. While the United States viewed the pause in violence as positive indicators of the willingness of perpetrators to negotiate or even cease genocidal activities, the perpetrators viewed the pause as an opportunity to deceive the West and gather strength for subsequent slaughter. In Rwanda, the Arusha Peace Agreement brokered with U.S. assistance in 1993 indicated that the United States remained more focused on traditional diplomacy, despite previously failed efforts, rather than providing American troops for peacekeeping in Rwanda. In Serbia’s case, the stalling tactics seemed to have worked, as President Clinton rewarded Slobodan Milosevic’s participation in the Dayton Accords by suspending economic sanctions. The message was clear: perpetrators, such as Hutu extremists and the Milosevic regime, did not need to be afraid of U.S. involvement in stopping their extermination efforts, since America had already indicated by its inaction that perpetrators would not be challenged, even during the worst of crimes.

This paper will argue that genocide prevention will be most successful when the U.S. military conducts deterrent activities that target the perpetrators’ capabilities and decision-making process to conduct genocide. Deterrent activities will be most effective in the shaping and deterrence phases of a military
plan, given that it is in those phases where prevention lies. Permissive activities, such as UN peacekeeping efforts under Chapter VI authorization or diplomatic demarches, lack the credible threat of military force and are therefore ineffective, since the activities do not signal to perpetrators that their actions will have serious consequences. As one political scientist noted, the “simple signaling of world interest is not sufficient to deter a regime bent on eliminating a domestic group.” Without deterring genocide perpetrators by showing that diplomacy will be backed by a credible threat of military force, perpetrators will simply seek to gain operational pauses — either through prolonged engagement in peace talks or verbal commitments to cease the violence — to deceive the international community into believing its efforts at peace are sincere. In reality, as history has shown, perpetrators will instead seek an opportune moment to finish their objective of systematic killing.

Since this paper is not about whether or not genocide should be considered a vital U.S. national security interest, a few assumptions must be laid out first: the Intelligence Community has designated a particular conflict as potentially genocidal; the President has declared the resolution of a particular conflict as vital to national interests; and, the President is prepared to take unilateral or multilateral action to prevent genocide. For as long as the United States has intervened to stop genocide, the efforts have fallen much too short and have not limited further loss of life or given regimes reason to seriously consider the repercussions of further destructive acts. This paper will first discuss the reasons behind the importance of targeting the perpetrators’ capabilities and decision-making process to conduct genocide. It will then explore the means available to the U.S. military for deterring perpetrators and conclude by offering recommendations that are important for the U.S. military’s efforts to prevent genocide.

**Targeting the Perpetrators**

Understanding the perpetrators’ decision-making process is key to genocide prevention. As Matthew Krain notes in his study on genocide and leadership, “Genocides...are by definition policy choices made by the perpetrator.” This suggests that the perpetrators’ decisions could be influenced by the actions — or inaction — of the international community. Determining who the decision-makers are is crucial for potential military efforts to deter perpetrators from conducting genocide. Knowing who to direct military efforts towards is important since the perpetrators will have to be targeted in a plan’s shaping and deterrence phases, where genocide prevention will be most effective.

Of course, this is no easy task. Some will argue that perpetrators exist at every level of conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical. However, one can make the case that the perpetrators who need to be deterred lie primarily in the strategic level. While some genocide acts may initially appear “rogue” or be viewed as disconnected from a greater command and control organization, genocides are by their definition a large-scale organized and intentional act — a strategic effort. That is, the senior leadership of a country has made the political decision to engage in a systematic slaughter of its own citizens. For example, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was not a decentralized and uncoordinated effort, despite initial appearances as such. Rwandan army chief Augustin Bizimungu, a Hutu extremist, retained control of the forces at all levels that were involved in the killings, including the affiliated militias. According to the indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Bizimungu “organized, ordered and participated” in the genocide. This included training militia youth members as early as 1992 in executing the Tutsi population. Genocides are planned, intentional, and well coordinated.

The powerful combination of diplomacy backed by military might would likely be the most effective in deterring perpetrators. Genocides in the past several decades have demonstrated that perpetrators on a murderous path understand the realpolitik nature of international relations — the importance of national interest in a country’s decision to act — and are therefore not easily deterred by international diplomatic efforts that lack a credible threat of military force. Perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans were undeterred in slaughtering innocents because international action lacked credibility and resolve. While both cases involved UN-sanctioned peacekeeping efforts, these interventions did nothing to challenge the ability of perpetrators to carry out the attacks. For example, in Rwanda, as Belgian troops pulled out of the UN peacekeeping mission after ten of their comrades were brutally killed by Hutu extremists, UN officials on the ground realized that the remaining contingent of African forces would be unable to stop the extermination with their inferior and shoddy resources — “bare-assed,” in the words of the UN mission commander. And, so the slaughter continued. In Srebrenica, the UN peacekeeping force stood by helplessly, due to constraining Chapter VI authorities, as troops under Milosevic’s orders breached the UN-designated safe zones to march Muslim men and boys in the thousands to their executions.

Not all will agree with a military plan that is focused primarily on deterring perpetrators rather than support to victim groups. American officials at varying times have believed that supporting victim groups would be most effective, since potential provision of materiel and funding could help inspire victims to act in their own protection. However, history has shown that aiding victims of genocide is relatively ineffective as the primacy of international effort. Victim groups, with the exception of a small, armed contingent and its leadership, tend to comply or be passive rather than confront the state’s discriminatory policies and those carrying out the policies — despite evidence of atrocities. Reasons for this may include the belief that the international community will eventually intervene or
that perpetrators target only the elite or powerful members, rather than the whole, of a victim group who are the most likely to challenge a perpetrator’s regime stability. Quite simply, in these situations, the evidence presented to victim groups did not reach a level of believability to indicate that they — the common member — would also be targeted by perpetrators until the reality presented itself, in which case it often was too late to act.

Several examples of this phenomenon exist. During Nazi efforts at exterminating Jews in Germany and Poland, local Jewish populations failed to believe that the horrid tales of extermination by gas chambers and concentration camps were true; some believed the tales were so grotesquely out of the norm from reality that those telling of these experiences were deranged or mentally ill. Similarly in Cambodia, most Americans and even some Cambodians failed to believe the stories recounted by refugees of the horrors inflicted by the Khmer Rouge that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of rural villagers. However, in cases where communities chose to believe stories of atrocities and local governments leapt to action to support and defend victim groups, atrocities were prevented. In Italy and Bulgaria during World War II, Jewish populations and local town authorities actively opposed Nazi efforts seeking to make scapegoats out of Jews, having heard already of the horrors in concentration camps. Due to the significant protests and united resistance, Italian and Bulgarian Jews survived in large numbers despite their governments’ strategic alliance with Nazi Germany.

Another reason why a victim-focused prevention effort is less preferable than military intervention is because it would do nothing to coerce or influence those in power to cease the extreme, discriminatory policies that often are the prelude to genocide. In fact, it may have the opposite effect of emboldening perpetrators to speed along to the extermination phase of genocide. Aiding victim groups could increase the perpetrators’ perception — real or imagined — that their regime is being challenged, leading to harsher tactics against victim groups in an effort to discourage them from working with the international community. As one political scientist noted, “Perpetrators of state-sponsored mass murder choose to use the most severe and inhuman tactic” despite other policy options available to perpetrators who feel their regime is threatened.

The practical aspect of aiding victims also poses difficulties for supporting victim groups. The location of various victim populations throughout a country may make international aid to victims a challenging logistical endeavor. For example, during deliberations among U.S. national security officials over how best to create protected zones for refugees in Rwanda’s borders, U.S. officials acknowledged that most of the vulnerable Tutsi population would be unable to reach those zones. Given the challenges identified above in implementing a victim-focused military plan, the only option available that could prove sufficient in preventing genocide is a military effort focused on deterring perpetrators. The next section of this paper will highlight the capabilities that the military could employ in combination with diplomacy towards such an effort.

Targeting the Capabilities

To deter perpetrators and truly affect their decision making process, their capabilities to carry out genocide must be challenged. A “boots on the ground” approach, while one possibility, is not necessarily the most prudent or effective course of action. Given the unique circumstances of each genocide, any action taken to challenge the capabilities of a perpetrator would have to be tailored. The prevention side of a U.S. military plan consists of creative efforts that range in levels of intensity: from softer influence efforts through pre-existing programs, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), to much more coercive actions, such as preemptively jamming an adversary’s communications infrastructure when indications and warning (I&W) of genocide suggest a regime will take such a path.

As stated previously, one of the key efforts in genocide prevention will be targeting the intentions of regime leaders and influencing their decision to undertake a genocidal path. To do so, challenging a regime’s military institutions and the perceived security such institutions provide to perpetrators could prove to be among the most effective means of influencing their decision calculus. For instance, if perpetrators are uncertain about the loyalty of institutions supposedly subordinate to their (often unchecked) power, they might think twice about initiating a strategic act without knowing completely whether or not subordinate institutions support that act.

One institution that will likely play a key role in the decision making process is military. Security cooperation, particularly IMET, can be an effective means to challenge a perpetrator’s reliance on the military. The Theater Security Cooperation Plan, in which security cooperation activities are developed and implemented, would ensure that diplomatic and military efforts are coordinated at the Country Team level in U.S. Embassies abroad. The range of IMET opportunities include professional military education and exchanges with U.S. military schools, such as the war colleges and regional academic centers (such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies); two-week orientation tours to provide overviews of U.S. military doctrine, facilities and operations; and, military training, such as flight or language training. The broad-range of activities provide the United States with flexibility in tailoring its approach to militaries from countries with genocidal regimes. For example, the U.S. military could establish a course of study focused on genocide prevention with lectures on international norms and legal conventions pertaining to human rights.

IMET opportunities would need to be open to all
elements of a foreign country’s security sector, including the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, since the multiple levels of perpetrators at the tactical level include “ordinary individuals who have long filled certain roles,” such as soldiers and law enforcement personnel. Each security sector may also have differing levels of influence with its government, making a comprehensive approach more preferable than a limited one. U.S. IMET programs are open to international military and civilian officials, making it possible for almost any element—military or civilian—of a foreign security sector to attend.

Critics may argue that IMET would prove to be of little utility in ultimately preventing genocide from occurring since armed forces simply follow orders no matter the perceived morality of such an order. However, IMET training could highlight through lectures and training the repercussions that foreign soldiers face if they participate in human rights violations, including genocide. International law training would be a component of such training for soldiers from genocidal-prone countries. And, as historic examples have shown, the power of understanding potential repercussions is not to be understated. Using the Italy and Bulgaria examples once again, soldiers who were originally ordered to round up Jews resisted doing so because they questioned whether or not they would succeed in carrying out directed violent acts with impunity.

The IMET approach would not be a short-term one. Indeed, it may be the most long-term of the options presented in this paper, since the objective is to identify and foster future foreign military leaders. The most practical candidate pool to draw from would be mid-level officers with potentially bright careers—the “rising stars” of a foreign military. The level of the officer and his or her future career potential are important considerations because subordinates often look upon senior military leaders as the authority for carrying out genocidal acts. As Amnesty International noted in a report on the Argentine junta in 1980, Argentine senior officers signed the release forms for subordinate soldiers to carry out kidnappings and torture. Those forms allowed soldiers to feel absolved of any responsibility for the acts they were ordered to commit. Thus, if future senior military leaders are aware of the repercussions of carrying out crimes against humanity, they may prohibit the order from being carried out or, at a minimum, raise objections to the leadership.

The ultimate goal of IMET efforts aimed at preventing genocide is, of course, to make members of the armed forces think twice about following an order they know to be a crime against humanity. IMET training should note that the systematic killing of fellow citizens is not on par with an attack on a foreign country in a declared war. The two are different in the eyes of international law, and IMET training would hopefully highlight that difference. The resistance of an order by members of the armed forces—typically a genocidal regime’s most likely source of protection—would make the perpetrators question the loyalty of the military institution. This would impose a potentially substantive cost to a perpetrators’ desire to commit genocide, since a decision to continue along a genocidal path would require them to protect against both a potential inscription by their own armed forces and intervention by a foreign military.

Another form of military activity that could assist in deterring perpetrators is use of electronic warfare to degrade a perpetrators’ ability to communicate with subordinates or incite hatred. Genocidal regimes have throughout history relied on the use of technology to transmit orders to the general public or encourage sympathizers to act against victim groups. Jamie Metzl, a State Department official during the Clinton Administration, notes that the radio specifically has “proven a remarkably powerful and versatile tool” in inciting racial hatred in Nazi Germany, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Both Samantha Power, former Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on President Obama’s National Security Staff, and Lieutenant General Dallaire, chief of the UN Mission in Rwanda in 1994, have written extensively about the use of the semiprivate Rwandan radio station, Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collins (RTLM), by Hutu extremists to incite violence. Immediately following the April 1994 plane crash of the Rwandan President, General Bizimungu ordered the broadcast of names of “enemies,” who were then identified, tracked and slaughtered by Hutu soldiers and militias.

Degrading perpetrators’ ability to communicate with subordinates and other participants of genocide could slow down the systematic nature of the slaughter. While killings will likely continue at random, they would likely not be in as large numbers as under an organized system. The disruption and subsequent confusion caused by a degraded communications environment between the leadership and subordinates could cause perpetrators to order a halt to the killings— as best they can given no communications—until an alternative solution could be developed. Any disconnect between the leadership and its armed forces would surely cause perpetrators to worry about their institutional as well as personal security.

However, the legal implications for the United States of carrying out preemptive electronic warfare for offensive purposes, such as jamming of radio communications or computer network attack, would make the U.S. military’s decision to employ such means heavily scrutinized by the international community and American policy makers. While largely a political decision that would have to be made by the civilian leadership, the military should nonetheless present such options to decision makers. This did not occur in 1994, as Hutu extremists continued to use RTLM to urge the murder of Tutsi and moderate Hutus. There were deliberations within the Pentagon about the desirability of employing the EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft, but military leaders ultimately cited costs (“approximately $8500 per flight hour”) and international law as reason not to employ this resource, ac-
According to one declassified Pentagon memo from May 1994. Even short-term employment of Commando Solo could have helped save some lives and, most importantly, indicated to the regime that its activities were not without consequence and that the United States was prepared to employ military measures. Douglas Peifer, a professor at the U.S. Air War College, surmised that using Commando Solo could have succeeded in deterring the murderers.

Additionally, surveillance drones — the tool used by the military and CIA with resounding success in the Global War on Terrorism — could be used successfully in genocide prevention. These assets were not available for consideration in the 1990s during Rwanda and the Balkans, but they are available to today’s military commander. Perpetrators would be aware that their actions are being “watched” and recorded, which could result in implicating material usable in criminal proceedings in the International Criminal Court to hold them accountable. Furthermore, video footage could be used by the U.S. military for information operations purposes, such as releasing footage to regional news organizations and in social media.

Another military option available to planners would be employment of coercive airpower, such as establishing a no-fly zone or use of kinetic or non-kinetic operational fires, such as flying an AC-130 gunship over a perpetrator’s headquarters building to make the U.S. military presence known. Of course, any of these options would likely require a Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution or U.S. political will to conduct unilateral action. However, airpower’s effect in deterring perpetrators could be great. It would be one of the forms of military intervention that would indicate to perpetrators that the international community, particularly the United States, would not sit idly by as they prepared to kill their own citizens. Improved precision guidance weapons and employment of modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets (particularly drones), have resulted in decreased collateral damage.

To be effective, however, rules of engagement (ROE) would need to allow forces to target kinetically the perpetrators and their affiliates. In Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya in 2011, the U.S.-led effort to employ coercive airpower, including AC-130 gunships, prevented Libyan tanks and artillery units from threatening civilians. This succeeded because the ROE allowed assets to attack ground-based enemy targets. A no-fly zone can also have a deterrent effect if the ROE allow for attacking enemy assets. Operation NORTHERN WATCH, a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone, succeeded in deterring Saddam from killing Kurds in northern Iraq. Without proper ROE, however, employment of airpower could be perceived as permissive by the perpetrators, given that their most effective killing force — the ground force and militias — would not be directly threatened. While Operation DENY FLIGHT, a no-fly zone in Bosnia, resulted in a NATO victory by denying Milosevic the ability to use airpower, the limited ROE did not allow for the targeting of ground-based Serb paramilitary troops, thus doing little to “prevent the worst of the abuses of the conflict, including the 1995 Srebrenica massacre.” At the heart of this issue is deterring the perpetrator, and coercive airpower with permissible ROE would demonstrate the willingness of the U.S. military to impose costs on the perpetrators’ capability to kill civilians.

**Recommendations**

The discussion above of potential military measures that could be undertaken to prevent genocide would require significant amounts of preparatory work in order for them to be successful. Such preparation could be initiated by Pentagon leadership, given the responsibility of military leaders to present civilian decision makers, including the President of the United States, with a range of options for preventing genocide and, specifically, deterring perpetrators and challenging their capabilities. A recent study by the National Security Council, directed by President Obama, generally acknowledged shortcomings in military preparation for genocide prevention and tasked the Defense Department with identifying ways to prevent genocide. The proposals below seek to specify what actions could be taken by the military to prepare.

First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense should incorporate the prevention of genocide into the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). Currently, halting genocide is identified as one of the many priorities. But, halting and preventing are two different activities that would require different sets of military tools. By including prevention into the GEF, military leaders, particularly geographic combatant commanders (GCC), would be required to begin formulating plans that focus on prevention. These plans would likely be within a GCC Theater Campaign Plan. Preventive activities are not new to the military; the missile defense community already conducts preventive activities to target ballistic missiles “left of the kill chain”, such as interception in the boost phase. Genocide prevention would employ a similar approach and target perpetrators as early as possible once intelligence indicators suggest the potential for genocide exists.

Of course, focusing on genocide prevention would require GCCs to also incorporate a more inter-agency perspective on this issue, since any coercive military activity would be done in conjunction with diplomatic efforts. Also, given the legal complexities and requirements for UN authorization for any potential preemptive military coercive activity such as radio jamming, GCCs and staff would have to work closely with Staff Judge Advocates, other Pentagon lawyers and the State Department legal advisor to ensure that all parties involved are aware of important issues of the activity, including: what authorization the military is asking for; what capabilities exist; and, which capabilities would likely be employed under
what scenario. The earlier these issues are addressed, the more prepared the U.S. military would be in undertaking activities to prevent genocide. As the case in Rwanda showed, unforeseen issues such as cost and security in deploying a potentially effective asset like Commando Solo could be a barrier to U.S. involvement.

Second, U.S. intelligence collection efforts in discerning the intentions and motivations of leaders — potential perpetrators — in genocide-prone countries should be enhanced. Military commanders and the Combatant Command Directors of Intelligence will need to be cognizant of the intentions of potential adversaries, particularly from an I&W perspective. Quite frankly, intelligence efforts in this area are lacking, as the Genocide Prevention Task Force indicated in its report recommendations. The U.S. military has a wide array of intelligence assets at its disposal for this purpose. In particular, three national intelligence agencies — Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency — all fall under the Defense Department and are designated as combat support agencies.

While these three agencies will mostly be preoccupied with national intelligence priorities, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, who is dual-hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, should advocate with civilian intelligence officials to devote greater resources to genocide prevention. In particular, DIA’s newly established Defense Clandestine Service should coordinate with the CIA in collecting against genocide-specific intelligence requirements — particularly since DIA has a wider-range of access to foreign military officials than does the CIA, in many genocide-prone countries, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the military will likely play a significant role in either dissuading their leaders from initiating genocide or, in a worst case scenario, be participants in it. Intelligence gained from contact with these officers could be used in identifying the plans and intentions of foreign governments, as well as identify future military rising stars that could be influenced by IMET programs.

Finally, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) should form a standing Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) designated for genocide prevention. The JSOTF need not be unnecessarily large — in fact, a smaller JSOTF would facilitate easier interagency coordination and unity of effort. Special operations forces (SOF) could conduct many of the activities designated above, from jamming to psychological operations. Given that the JSOTF would be a standing task force, SOCOM can focus a small group of SOF on genocide prevention or peace enforcement as primary missions, while still being able to conduct other SOCOM-directed missions. Such a program could be similar to the U.S. Army’s Foreign Area Officer program, which trains a select group of officers to become immersed in a particular region of the world and gives different assignments to the officers throughout their careers within their regional specialty.

Conclusion

Over the past decades, as genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans have demonstrated, perpetrators have led their followers to believe that their murderous acts would be without consequence. In some cases, such as Milosevic’s support for Serb paramilitary atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, international diplomatic efforts failed to deter from committing systematic mass murder because there was no sense of credible military repercussion. Much of the failure in responding to these genocides can be attributed to unwillingness by political leaders to take action. The Clinton administration, for example, never once assembled the principals committee of the National Security Council to convene for policy discussions on Rwanda during the three-month genocide. Similarly, military leaders are not entirely blameless since they sought to present only a limited set of options to the Commander-in-Chief — options that were shaped by the military’s prior involvement in Somalia, a much different conflict in scope and background than Rwanda.

To prevent future genocides, the military should focus its planning on deterring perpetrators by imposing costs on their policy choices. Deterrence will seek to show perpetrators that the U.S. military will act in cases where diplomacy fails and should primarily involve challenging the perpetrators’ capabilities. Deterrence objectives include creating a seam between the leadership and its military institution, affecting the perpetrators’ command and control by disrupting the capability to communicate with subordinates, and employing coercive airpower with permissible ROE to target the perpetrators’ most likely killing tool — the ground-based attackers, including the armed forces and militias.

Finally, military planners must lay the groundwork for inculcating the prevention aspect into military doctrine and policies. These include ensuring unity of effort throughout the military by incorporating genocide prevention into the GEF and providing GCCs with the authority and responsibility to proceed in planning for genocide prevention. Given the significant role that I&W will play in a GCC’s ability to plan accordingly, U.S. collection efforts by intelligence-focused combat support agencies must be prioritized. Additionally, SOCOM can organize, train and equip a small cadre of special operators to specialize in genocide prevention. Doing so would allow the military to maintain specialists familiar with the legal, policy and military means available to present as options to GCCs for genocide prevention.

None of these capabilities or recommendations will be certain to successfully prevent genocide. However, careful early consideration of these military means will allow military leaders to provide realistic and comprehensive options to civilian policymakers in hopes of preventing the future mass murder of innocents.
LEVERAGING THE NATIONAL GUARD’S STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES’ REBALANCE TOWARD ASIA

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Abstract

China’s rise over the past decade has corresponded with the decline of the United States in the liberal international system, both economically, and after two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, diplomatically. From the 2010 National Security Strategy to the 2011 National Military Strategy, the highest levels of national power within the United States recognize the importance of foraging and strengthening new and existing alliances. A critical component of the November 2011-announced “rebalance” to Asia is the insistence that partner nations shoulder a larger portion of their security burden in the future. The challenge for American diplomats, in and out of uniform, is to reassure our allies in the Asia-Pacific region without emboldening them toward confrontation with China. Likewise, American diplomacy should not irresponsibly challenge China’s inevitable ascent within the region.

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), with a robust 20-year track record of cementing regional alliances, is a low-cost, high-yield initiative that should be expanded in PACOM, particularly during this period of resource constraints. The SPP establishes enduring theatre security cooperation relationships by pairing state Air and Army National Guard (NG) troops with partner nation counterparts. Utilizing an innovative and small footprint methodology, the SPP targets repetitive engagements, between two to three times per year, to establish partnerships of trust and reciprocity that simply cannot be achieved on a larger scale, or within the active duty military, where leadership swap-outs are routine. In an almost “under the radar” fashion, SPP relationships hedge against uncertainty by laying soft power steps that can lead to a hard power path if required in the future.

Introduction

“Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think.” Attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, this imperative captures the essence of 2013’s newly inaugurated second term presidency. On the heels of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, confronted with partisan polarity in the Congress, and having narrowly averted the fiscal cliff, the United States is in a strategic pause between yesterday’s threats and tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. Put succinctly, in the current budget environment, we can either choose to do less with less, or we can seek to do more of what we are doing now, differently. In this increasingly fragmented and chaotic environment, American grand strategy must match diminishing means to rapidly shifting ends. Meanwhile, China’s rise to regional superpower status will occupy a considerable portion of U.S. strategic thinking for decades to come.

In the face of a rising China, the U.S. should expand its alliance portfolio in Asia, but do so in the least provocative manner possible. Cooperation and robust alliance engagement allow the United States to burden share its security costs in a fiscally constrained environment without threatening its legitimacy either at home or abroad. Another way of characterizing this cooperation is to say that the United States is “rebalancing” to Asia. But what does rebalancing look like and how much does it cost? What tools exist in America’s foreign policy toolkit to pursue this rebalance? The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) has a 20-year history of cementing alliances between America and partner nations for pennies on the dollar. Especially when viewed through a budget crisis lens, the SPP should be vastly expanded in the Pacific to signal to our Asian allies that the United States is committed to both peace and prosperity for all within the region.

China’s Rise

Written in 2005, Zheng Bijan’s Foreign Affairs article titled “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status” identifies concerns that continue to resonate in 2013. He states, “China’s rapid development has attracted worldwide attention in recent years. The implications of various aspects of China’s rise, from its expanding influence and military muscle to its growing demand for energy supplies, are being heatedly debated in the international community as well as within China. Correctly understanding China’s achievements and its path toward greater development is thus crucial.”

From a purely realist view of international relations, the numbers are staggering. China’s annual defense spending has been estimated to increase by double digits for the last twenty years, from $30 billion annually in 2000 to approximately $120 billion in 2010, and is projected to eclipse America’s defense budget by 2035. The threat is that China, armed with an anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capability could “use pinpoint ground attack and anti-ship missiles, a
growing fleet of modern submarines and cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable another nation’s military assets from afar.”

It has been 20+ years since the United States has had its military supremacy challenged. Hawks, alarmed by two decades worth of rapid growth, argue that China’s intentions are sufficiently vague as to warrant immediate confrontation. More convinced that it is hardly unnatural for a rising power to aspire to have armed forces that reflect its growing economic clout,” doves caution restraint. In between is a mix of “military strength with diplomatic subtlety” that simultaneously recognizes China’s regional ascendance and protects America’s national interests abroad.

**U.S. Rebalance to Asia**

The Obama administration has pursued this middle option of mixing military strength with diplomacy by rebalancing toward Asia. Thus far, however, the rebalance has been lacking in substance. President Obama formalized America’s pivot toward Asia in a November 2011 address to the Australian parliament. Suggesting a strategic window of opportunity, President Obama reflected, “after a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton followed suit in a November 2011 Foreign Policy article that outlined “six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.”

Seven months later, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to “play a larger role in this [Asia-Pacific] region over the decades to come.” Additionally, he expressed America’s desire to “work closely with all of the nations of this region to confront common challenges and to promote peace, prosperity, and security for all nations in the Asia-Pacific region.” Secretary Panetta also dispelled the notion that America’s rebalance to Asia amounts to a challenge to China: “I reject that view entirely.”

Though synchronized initially, criticism of the rebalance to Asia is clear: rhetoric has not been matched by substantive action. Skeptics of the rebalance warn that the U.S. must be careful not to over-promise, especially in the midst of historic budget cuts. The SPP is a tangible solution to help fill the gap between policy platitudes and quantitative measurements of U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

**Importance of Cementing Regional Alliances**

The rebalance to Asia will hinge on the United States’ ability to deftly champion a mainstay of international relations — the creation and support of alliances — in President Obama’s second term. “An alliance,” as Stephen Walt tells us, “is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states.” The open question is how the U.S. can best go about securing such commitments in a challenging diplomatic and fiscal environment? The SPP, while appealing to our nation’s highest level strategic documents, holds great promise in this regard.

The heart of the SPP — building and keeping alliances over decades — is consistent with U.S. national strategy. The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), under the purview of former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, highlighted the importance of “deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian agencies and organizations.” The review went on to reinforce this notion: “Sustaining existing alliances and creating new partnerships are central elements of U.S. security strategy. The United States cannot sustain a stable international system alone.”

President Obama, in the introduction to his May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), further established this foundation when stating that “we will be steadfast in strengthening those old alliances that have served us so well, while modernizing them to meet the challenges of a new century. As influence extends to more countries and capitals, we will build new and deeper partnerships in every region, and strengthen international standards and institutions.”

The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) echoes themes broadly identified in the 2010 NSS. Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could have been speaking about the SPP in particular when he stated “the changing security environment requires the Joint Force to deepen security relationships with our allies and create opportunities for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors.” Addressing Asia and the broader Pacific region, the NMS notes, “...Asia’s security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states.”

The SPP, especially by expanding into Asia, is an “off-the-shelf” remedy to the suggestions prescribed by the QDR, NSS, and NMS. By leveraging the hard and soft power of the United States in the international system, the SPP should look to its next 20 years of engagement activity with optimism. Consider the following remarks from a leading political scientist: “In international politics, no agency or institution guarantees security and prosperity. The United States should find it heartening, however, that its position in the world and the most important causes of security cooperation among states combine to favor it. These conclusions do not mean that U.S. alliances are indestructible, but that isolationism is preferable, or that Western defense capabilities could not be improved. What they do mean is that the United States could hardly ask for much more.” Stephen Walt’s observations from 1987 apply to the United States as much today as
they did at the peak of the Cold War: threats abound, alliances cannot be taken for granted, and countries around the world still favor a relationship with the United States.

The United States must capitalize on these potentially ephemeral realities to explore new security partnerships, but without emboldening existing and future allies to the point where they become unduly provocative toward China. Shrewd diplomacy will be vital in striking this balance. Walt, in December 2012, restated this delicate equilibrium. “Alliances will be central to America’s Asia policy. The United States is a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but our ability to operate in other theatres— including Asia— depends on support from allies. Furthermore, given that our main strategic goal in Asia is to maintain a regional balance of power, supporting key allies is an inescapable element of our entire approach.” Under the scrutiny of intense fiscal pressure, however, yesterday’s model of vast sums of foreign and military aid is untenable.

The Obama administration, while signaling to China and surrounding nations that cementing regional alliances is a crucial component of the rebalance toward Asia, concedes that budgetary limitations will both shape and constrain future security commitments. Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in a November 2012 address to the Air War College, highlighted the reality of fiscal limitations on America’s future foreign policy. “The growing multitude of security demands means that it is in the interests of the United States to encourage others to shoulder more of the costs and responsibilities of global security. This makes U.S. security cooperation an increasingly critical component of U.S. engagement.” He went on to say: “At a time when the U.S. government is looking for cost-effective ways to achieve its strategic objectives at home and abroad, security cooperation with allies and partners is an increasingly important national security priority. As Secretary Clinton noted recently, ‘building coalitions for common action is becoming both more complicated and more crucial.’” Driven principally by fiscal limitations, the United States must count on its allies to share a higher proportion of the security burden going forward.

**National Guard State Partnership Program**

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is a cost-effective, threat-based model of theatre security cooperation where unexpected benefits and the value of trust built over time have been recognized by the highest levels of leadership within the military. The program is more than theoretical; it boasts an impressive 20-year history.

The SPP is a “robust proof of concept” of enduring security cooperation relationships with U.S. friends and allies across the world. The program is managed by the National Guard Bureau and executed by the State Adjutant Generals, all in support of Combatant Commander theatre security cooperation objectives and Ambassador Country Plans. The SPP, dating to 1993 after the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe, today boasts partnerships with 65 nations across six geographic Combatant Command areas of responsibility (AORs), including one partnership in NORTHCOM, five in CENTCOM, seven in PACOM, eight in AFRICOM, and 22 each in both SOUTHCOM and EUCOM. The SPP’s value to American national interests lies not in the success of its expansion across AORs over the past two decades— albeit indicative of increasing numbers of countries desiring to partner with U.S. National Guard forces— but as a cost effective foundation of cooperation within a security environment where threats are often vague and ambiguous.

**SPP — The Threat Drives the Solution**

The threats to America’s national interests can be broadly categorized into “three long-term challenges: misgovernance and violent extremism in the Middle East, the rise of Asia, and the economic and information revolutions of globalization.” A decade of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that conventional military forces, large and expensive, cannot alone address violent extremism. With respect to the rise of Asia and globalization, a large U.S. troop presence would likely encourage regional partners to take a free ride off the U.S. security umbrella. It is in this uncertain environment that a light-weight, innovative, small footprint, cost-effective solution such as the SPP minimizes the free rider problem and does less to provoke China.

SPP engagement activities facilitate cooperation in a non-threatening, low-density environment. Rather than intimidate with a squadron of F-16s or a battalion of Marines, the SPP targets engagement opportunities for between two and ten U.S. personnel to visit a partner nation two to three times a year. Start-up costs are minimal for National Guard forces, consisting only of travel expenses, and are negligible for host nation partners. From the foreign partner perspective, near-term expectation levels are low, which allows a relationship to get off the ground. Trust and credibility are further advanced when a contingent of foreign partners are invited to the United States to tour National Guard facilities, equipment, and personnel in a home state. This reassuring environment allows discourse to flow in two directions and, ultimately, permits National Guard forces to hear what is on the partner nation’s mind and what capacities they wish to develop. Not even embassy staffs, which rotate every few years, can boast this type of continuity.

**SPP — A Model of Trust**

The SPP, rejecting a “theatre security cooperation in a box” mentality, acknowledges that relationships and trust take time to develop. A mature SPP relationship can be understood as a multi-year phenomenon. During the first year of a security partnership, the formal, ice-breaking handshake is like any other cordial
Dempsey went on to say that "scribing today dispense violence is at an evolutionary high. Framed the threat as a paradox where threats and restrained defense budgets. General Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the threat as a paradox where "although human violence is at an evolutionary low, the capability to dispense violence is at an evolutionary high." Describing today's budgetary environment, General Dempsey went on to say that "the State Partnership Program will compete very favorably. . . I think it is a modest investment for a pretty substantial return." Admiral James A. Winnefeld, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically drew attention to the SPP as a mechanism consistent with the rebalance strategy: "It's [SPP] a very high-leverage program where individual states will partner with another nation in Europe or Africa or Asia. . . . it's proven to be a very, very valuable high-leverage tool for us. . . so we plan to build on things like that to help us on these innovative approaches to other parts of the world." The nation's two highest ranking military members both recognize the SPP's proven track record of forging alliances with vital partner nations.

**SPP — Unexpected Benefits**

The more robust and mature SPP relationships have produced benefits well outside the partner nation's borders, to include combat deployments where SPP partners are serving beside each other. For example, 27 SPP partner countries have deployed to either Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), including concurrent deployment of 14 separate SPP forces. As of September 2012, 20 SPP partners had 8,517 troops deployed to Afghanistan. Slovenia, an original member of OEF, has since co-deployed with Colorado National Guardsmen three separate times. The Illinois National Guard deploys an 18-man Bilateral Embedded Support Team (BEST) to Afghanistan with each Polish rotation, a deployment relationship that spans back to 2003. Mongolia has deployed to OIF/OEF nine times since 2003, but a stipulation of their participation has been deployment with their Alaska National Guard counterparts. The qualitative underpinnings of the SPP, years in the making, are now achieving quantitative effects.

The National Guard citizen-soldier — part-time civilian and part-time warrior — lends credibility to partner nation exchanges. Although the American military resume can be impressive, it is ironically civilian capacities that often interest partners most. Guardsmen with law enforcement, legal, medical, and scientific civilian occupations, connect abroad in a surprisingly natural fashion. Furthermore, even if an engagement team is missing expertise desired by the host nation, Guardsmen are regularly successful in leveraging civilian relationships back home to fill the need, as we shall soon see.

**SPP Role in the Rebalance to Asia**

The SPP is a proven model of alliance building poised to assume increased strategic relevance if it internally rebalances toward Asia as part of President Obama’s November 2011 foreign policy adjustment. In fact, the SPP is a mature capacity primed to demonstrate its value at a time when it is most needed. The program provides unique professional engagement opportunities for NG soldiers and airmen, increases Department of Defense and Department of State collaboration through the American embassy, fulfills

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combatant commander theatre security objectives, and reassures partner nations of our intentions — all at a cost of approximately $13.5M for fiscal year 2012, across 65 countries. But is the SPP, with only 10% of its engagements in the PACOM AOR, currently aligned with the intent of America’s re-balance?

The current composition of the SPP in Asia suggests room for expansion, even after formal bilateral relationships with countries such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand are taken into account. The seven existing SPP partnerships in Asia, critical to the United States’ influence in the region, should be complemented in the near future by new alliances, some of which have already expressed interest in the program. Future partner possibilities in Asia include Sri Lanka, recently emerged from a civil war; Myanmar, visited by President Obama soon after his re-election in November 2012; Malaysia; island states such as Tonga, which coincidentally has troops deployed to Afghanistan; and Papua New Guinea. Hawaii’s established relationship with Indonesia, a country with the world’s fourth largest population of almost 249 million people, 86% of which are Muslim, should likewise expand to reflect its strategic importance.

**SPP Case Study: Oregon’s Partnerships with Bangladesh and Vietnam**

Oregon’s participation in the SPP, dating to 2008 with Bangladesh and recently expanded to include Vietnam in 2012, is a compelling case study that highlights the reciprocal value of the program. Colonel Mark Crosby, the Oregon SPP Director, has made 13 trips to Asia since 2008 — nine to Bangladesh and four to Vietnam. Colonel Crosby’s full-time civilian occupation is the Port of Portland’s chief of public safety and security. His 2009 visit to Bangladesh included a stop in the nation’s capital, Dhaka, to discuss shipping and disaster management, and travel to Chittagong, Bangladesh’s main seaport, where port security was discussed along with a U.S. Coast Guard delegation port tour. Colonel Crosby’s testimony after four years’ participation in the SPP is that the National Guard, where approximately 80% of its members maintain civilian occupations, is best positioned to conduct theatre security engagements. NG members leverage their civilian expertise from areas such as emergency medical care, firefighting, law enforcement, hazardous materials spill response, airport and seaport security, and water purification — all functions performed by civilian first responders to emergencies in the U.S.

Oregon’s partnership with Bangladesh exemplifies how mil-to-mil relations can expand to include a broader whole-of-government approach. Repetitive contact affords opportunity to listen to what is important to the partner nation and continuity ensures that ideas can be seen to fruition. This dialogue encourages the relationship to flourish outside the exclusive realm of mil-to-mil engagements.

Over the course of routine interactions during an SPP visit, Colonel Crosby became aware of community policing deficiencies in Bangladesh. He then leveraged civilian relationships in Portland, Oregon to connect the Portland Police Bureau to U.S. law enforcement representatives in the Embassy, who linked them with their Bangladeshi counterparts. The result is a successful, multi-dimensional partnership established through the SPP that includes Portland police officers, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and the Bangladesh National Police. Approximately 43 Portland officers representing 16 divisions, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), have traveled to Bangladesh to teach and model community policing efforts. Who, apart from the SPP, could imagine the U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh, Dan Mozena, addressing Portland police officers in Portland, Oregon to encourage this relationship?

The SPP is truly a conduit to assist in growing the face of America’s engagement activity beyond the standard, military presentation.

Oregon’s 27 November 2012 SPP pact signing with Vietnam is a model of how future SPP relationships should be cultivated. Ironically, this three-year “dating” relationship between Oregon and Vietnam was formalized into an SPP relationship even as the United States made preparations to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam War. Oregon’s relationship with Vietnam overcame historic suspicions through engagement activities that included two to six NG members visiting Vietnam for one to two weeks at a time. What a large and sporadic active duty Air Force or Army presence could not achieve, the SPP accomplished by demonstrating a genuine and enduring desire to partner.

The SPP required very little of Vietnamese officials during its “courting relationship,” when Vietnamese officers visited Oregon National Guard personnel statewide to observe capabilities. Informal conversations revealed that Oregon’s Adjutant General, Major General Raymond F. Rees, and Vietnam’s Lieutenant General Tran Quang Khue, vice chairman of the National Committee for Search and Rescue, fought opposite one another on a DMZ battlefield in 1968. General Rees was subsequently invited to tour General Khue’s hometown in November 2011, and, in November 2012, they visited the 1968 battlefield.

These are priceless developments that only time and trust can produce. A once unlikely relationship between former enemies is now a formalized State Partnership Program, one where Oregon Guardsmen will interact with their Vietnamese counterparts to address mutual disaster management interests such as search and rescue, hazardous materials management, mass casualty medical training, and the inci-
dent command system. If a cold-start decision had been forced upon Vietnam three years ago without the opportunity for interaction and trust-building, the answer may very well have been “no.”

It is widely believed by officials at the US Embassy that the Vietnamese government viewed a formal relationship with the National Guard much more palatable than one with U.S. active duty forces because it would be viewed as less aggressive in eyes of the Chinese. Oregon’s partnership with Vietnam demonstrates the four-fold reality of the SPP: the program is successful in forging new alliances, our partner is presumably reassured by this new arrangement, they will be increasingly positioned to provide for more of their own security based on expertise gained from the partnership, and perhaps most importantly, this will all occur below the threshold of China’s attention.

Recommendation
Funding is the primary barrier to expanding the SPP further into Asia. Combatant Commanders in NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM are unlikely to agree to fewer SPP engagements in their AORs in order to increase PACOM partnerships. Meanwhile, fiscal realities in the Pentagon put pressure on all budgets to trend downward, much less increase. While both the NGB and Combatant Commanders seek to formalize increased funding for SPP engagements via the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), the long-term perspective of the SPP necessitates initiating relationships immediately.

One viable option to increase SPP relationships in PACOM is to leverage funding from PACOM’s Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) fund, controlled by Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Dipping into the APRI at a relatively minor level to fund the SPP is consistent with Admiral Locklear’s most important line of effort: “... My number one priority is to ensure that we have properly reassured our allies and that we have properly defended our own homeland and we will position our assets necessary to do that.”

Admiral Locklear’s understanding of the 21st century security environment perhaps best summarizes the importance of funding the SPP: “In this extremely diverse and complex environment that must rely on a patchwork quilt of security relationships to ensure relative peace, can we, together, create an Indo-Pacific security environment that is resilient enough to withstand shocks and aftershocks that will occur in this complex environment, all the while maintaining relative peace and stability?”

If Admiral Locklear’s 30 November 2012 meeting with General Frank J. Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to discuss the SPP is any indication, expansion of the SPP into the PACOM AOR is a low-cost, high-yield priority trending in a positive direction.

Conclusion
The United States must commit to long-term alliance building as part of a broader acknowledgement of China’s ascendency. The nature of the rebalance — whether viewed either pessimistically as a reaction to a threat, or optimistically as an opportunity to expand our regional alliances — will be interpreted as less threatening to China if characterized by programs such as the SPP. The stakes are high, and American foreign policy must remain engaged, especially when budgets are low, intentions uncertain, and internal skepticism rampant.

“Beleaguered by headlines about the inexorable rise of China, setbacks in Afghanistan, the weakness of the Pakistani state, the Iranian nuclear challenge, the continuing danger of terrorist attack, the fragility of the international financial system, and the complex threats posed by climate change, leaders in Washington might be forgiven for believing that America’s moment has passed, and that the best the United States can hope for is to play defense in ‘someone else’s century.’ They would be mistaken.”

The SPP confronts such disbelief by prioritizing longevity over convenience, quality over quantity, listening over speaking, and mutual cooperation over unilateral mandate. The ensuing leverage afforded to both parties serves as a hedge for uncertain times. For such a small investment, who wouldn’t want such an inexpensive insurance policy?

Biography
Lt Col Brian K. Bergeron is a U.S. Air Force aviator assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science, and the University of Southern California in 1997 with a Masters of Science in Systems Management. After 12 years of active duty service, he has served the past six and a half years in the Air National Guard in the state of Oregon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
For a version of this paper with full bibliography, visit www.FAOA.org
REVIEW:
Chuck Hagel’s
America: The Next Chapter
BY MR. STUART RUFFIN

After declining to run for re-election in 2008 and amid strong speculation of a
forthcoming bid for executive office, Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel penned
America: Our Next Chapter. In it he presents his take on the United States’ role in world
affairs, both as it is and as it should be. While intended as a precursor to his presidential campaign, the book
gains new significance thanks to Mr. Hagel’s recent appointment as Secretary of Defense. The book pro-
vides an effective means for understanding how the head of the United State’s oldest and largest govern-
ment agency sees the world and America’s role in it.

The author spends the majority of his time discuss-
ing international relations and U.S. foreign policy,
which he argues is outdated, encumbered by Cold War
thinking, and unsuitable for our globally interconnect-
ed world. In sum, Mr. Hagel finds that America needs
to reintroduce herself to the world as a leader of the
"global community of nations" through diplomatic and
economic engagement on every level. A veteran him-
self, Mr. Hagel discusses war and armed conflict at
length, specifically focusing on how we might better
avoid it. He suggests that the military suffers from
over-commitment around the world, a misaligned
force structure, and a military industrial complex that
permeates the nation’s economic and political arenas.
He recommends that the nation restructure its military
assets and provides a broad vision for this restructur-
ing that is of particular interest to anyone working
with or for the Department of Defense (DoD).

While Secretary Hagel is credited by many for his
straight-talking approach to politics, readers should
temper their expectations and understand that the au-
thor’s presidential aspirations likely affected how he
presented a number of topics. This seems particularly
true in the unusually large extent to which he empha-
sizes global cooperation in American foreign policy.
Mr. Hagel advocates increasing America’s commit-
tment to international consensus-building institutions and
seeks to improve or reestablish relationships with
traditional adversaries including Russia and Iran. In
fact, the author’s ubiquitous advocacy of diplomacy
and international trade gives the impression that he
may be better suited to lead the State Department than
the Department of Defense.

Mr. Hagel’s intensely personal writing style, inclu-
sion of numerous life-lessons, and prolonged discus-
sion of “the faces on his Mount Rushmore,” make it
clear that the book is much more about "Chuck
Hagel's next step” than about “America's next chap-
ter.” Instead of exploring topics in great detail, the
author includes numerous personal vignettes that re-
count his international experience and establish his
credibility as a statesman. Thus, those expecting a
direct discussion of DoD priorities or clear prescrip-
tions for the future will be somewhat disappointed.
Readers would do well to remember that the value of
the book comes from the insight that it provides into
the man at the head of the DoD and not in its discus-
sion of the subject matter. With this expectation, they
will find this to be an interesting and insightful book
that is well worth the time it takes to read.

Stuart Ruffin currently leads the international initi-
ative at the North Carolina Military Foundation; an
economic development group led by some of the na-
tion’s most distinguished military retirees and es-
teeed corporate citizens. He holds a Master’s degree
in International Studies from North Carolina State
University (NCSU), where he wrote his capstone on
the role of the Egyptian state in economic develop-
ment. He also completed his undergraduate course-
work at NCSU, earning a B.A. in Political Science
with a concentration in international politics and mi-
 nors in Middle Eastern Studies and Economics.
REVIEW:
Robert Kaplan's
The Revenge of Geography
BY MAJ DAN SINGLETON

On the surface, Robert Kaplan's The Revenge of Geography is the foil to Thomas Friedman's The World is Flat and the current trend of emphasizing technological advances in transportation and communication often at the expense of long-term geopolitical experience. Rather than making geography irrelevant, Kaplan believes these technological developments are resulting in the "steady filling up of space" to the point where military capabilities and economic interests butt right up against each other. Space becomes more valuable, thus making geography even more critical. But at a deeper level, Kaplan's latest tome is a defense of realism, geography being, in his words, "the most blunt, uncomfortable, and deterministic of truths."

Wary of being accused of fatalism, he clarifies at the beginning that geography does not negate the free choices of individual players, but it informs and restrains their choices, thus becoming the dominant factor in international relations over the centuries. Kaplan's realism here is largely descriptive rather than normative. That is to say, apart from his mea culpa on having supporting regime change in Iraq, Kaplan is much less concerned in this book with how states should act. He is rather laying out the case for how they typically do act, and that is in their own interests, which are in large part determined by geographical realities.

As examples, he points to Germany and Russia, land powers largely undefended by mountain ranges. Their need to be constantly on guard to defend themselves from attack, he argues, has led to their historically aggressive foreign policies. Indefensible borders especially affected the psychology of Russia. To the fact that Russia is a far older country than Germany and suffered from Mongol invasions over hundreds of years, Kaplan adds that she is economically disadvantaged by having no immediate outlets to the open sea and thus seeks to expand in search of such outlets. Thawing ice in the Arctic may present Russia with such an opportunity, but these routes draw interest from as far away as Beijing, providing Kaplan with another example of the world becoming smaller and geography more critical.

Besides the Arctic, Kaplan identifies numerous key pivot areas and states to watch based on their geographical significance, both physical and human. The Central Asian steppes came up in the chapters on Russia and on China, both because military threats to these countries have historically come from that region and because it now represents a major resource base for which they are each competing. In addition to the pivot areas he identifies, Kaplan expects that trends like individualism and transnationalism will cause even more faultlines to develop in the world, predicting that "smaller regions will emerge in bolder lines."

Water appears as a frequent theme in Kaplan's discussions as he invokes Admiral Alfred Mahan on the importance of sea power and observes how China and India are taking his lessons to heart in the development of their respective naval capabilities. Kaplan predicts water will also play a major role in the Middle East in the coming decades as populations increase while the water supply decreases and as Turkey's role in the region becomes more significant in light of its control of the rivers which provide the water needs of Iraq and Syria.

The Revenge of Geography will especially interest those readers with interests anywhere in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Little attention is given to sub-Saharan Africa other than the observation that it is underdeveloped because its rivers are largely unnavigable. Kaplan also passes over the geography of the western hemisphere, apart from a notable plea to redirect our attention to Mexico, which he contends has been woefully neglected by American political thinkers. "While we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes in Eurasia," he writes, "we are curiously passive about what is happening to a country with which we share a long land border, that verges on disorder, and whose population is close to double that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined."

This is a book worth reading, not only because it analyzes the physical features and resources that are likely to lead to international conflict within the next century, but also because Kaplan examines the issues from the points of view of the states most directly involved and warns us that they are likely to act according to their national interests as they perceive them and not according to the international altruism that idealists have advanced in recent years.
INFO PAPER: The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)

"JUSTITIA PER ORBEM TERRARUM" JUSTICE FOR ALL THE EARTH.

Established in 1993, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) is the lead defense security cooperation resource for professional legal education, training for international military and related civilians globally. Its staff of 30 supports U.S. foreign policy and security policy with courses, seminars, and workshops focused on human rights, international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict.

Operations

DIILS plans and conducts legal education and training programs in support of priorities and objectives prescribed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). The Institute helps countries set up or change their military justice system; build accountability and transparency into existing legal structures; explain international human rights law and humanitarian standards; or share legal lessons learned from deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq with units preparing to deploy. Its programs foster equitable and accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, human rights, and democratic rule of law. These activities build partner nation legal capacity, enhance the knowledge and skills of participants, and build positive relationships and mutual trust with U.S. partners and allies across the globe.

Area of Operations

DIILS accomplishes its mission in three settings: resident programs at its institute in Newport, Rhode Island (U.S.), tailored mobile programs delivered worldwide, and programs delivered at other U.S. locations, such as Washington, DC and New York City. Mobile programs primarily focus on addressing contemporary legal challenges in nations where the U.S. Government has a strategic interest in enhancing the rule of law and democracy. Recent mobile programs include work with all six geographic combatant commands.

Curriculum

The Institute takes a multi-year, multi-phased approach to its educational mission and incorporates innovative and interactive teaching methods. For example, using an audience response system, instructors obtain real-time, accurate feedback on achievement of learning objectives, and participants see results displayed instantly and anonymously. Training modules are created by DIILS’ curriculum department and focus in 10 topic areas. While outlining the scope of the problem globally, training modules often use the U.S. military response to problems as a model for adaptation by other militaries. The curriculum department staff regularly consults with the GCCs to determine the evolution of core issues. They take this information and adapt their mobile and resident curriculums to best reflect realities on the ground.

DIILS Core Competencies

- Proven expertise in international human rights law, law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law, comparative military justice, anti-corruption and combating international financial crimes, legal aspects of combating terrorism and legal aspects of peace support and stability operations.
- Sustained capability to conduct near-term and sustained legal engagement on the basis of assessing international partner legal capacity, and through education and training activities in the United States and designated partner nations, to include those that may present physical, logistical and fiscal challenges.
- Renowned expertise in military-related rule of law curriculum development that recognizes and respects cultural sensitivities and encourages diversity of opinion.

The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) 10 Curriculum Topic Areas:

- Operational Law
- Human Rights
- Peacekeeping
- Domestic Operations
- Border Security
- Maritime Law Enforcement
- Combating Terrorism
- Combating Corruption
- Developing a Professional Military
- Military Justice

Headquarters Location:
Naval Station Newport,
441 Elliot Avenue
Newport, RI 02841-1531, USA

Results

Between 1993 and 2011, DIILS conducted 1,200 mobile programs, engaged 118 countries and trained over 37,000 individuals. In FY2011, it provided more than 130 of these seminars globally, in addition to 10 Resident Courses offered to foreign military officers and civilians at its home base in Newport, RI.

Efforts to train military jurists in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are resulting in convictions of military personnel accused of sexual assault and in-
creased protection of civilians. This is particularly remarkable considering that “before DIILS, the principle of command responsibility did not exist in the FARDC” - United Nations advisor in eastern Congo, March 2011.

Courses tailored to units deploying to Afghanistan benefit coalition operations by highlighting the impact of national caveats to rules of engagement before the units deploy, allowing them to adjust before the unit deploys, enhancing coalition effectiveness, avoiding potential accusations of human rights violations, and increasing coalition compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law standards. DIILS programs even gave deploying units in one country the confidence to engage targets, knowing that the civilian justice system at home would no longer prosecute legitimate acts of war.

Aside from building partner nation capacity, DIILS programs improve perceptions of the United States abroad. Participants attending DIILS resident courses consistently report that they came away from the experience with an increased appreciation of American values, history, culture, and people. They also have a better understanding of U.S. laws and policies based on fact, rather than hearsay. As these officers rise through the ranks, a potential outcome is that it will become more difficult for their peers to make unfounded or erroneous allegations against the U.S. when DIILS alumni are there with first-hand factual knowledge.

After over twenty years of operations, DIILS programs remain effective and economical, with over 77% of the budget allocated to program costs. The Institute is the sole provider of congressionally mandated human rights and international humanitarian law seminars for units receiving U.S. assistance under the Global Train and Equip Program. DIILS remains committed to providing Justice for all the Earth in support of U.S. Foreign Policy around the world.

*MARDC - Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Note: All information and graphics use in this article come from the DIILS Annual Report (2010-2011), website (www.diils.org), and/or Facebook page.

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**Minding the Gaps**

**Major Chris Jones, USAF**

What do the following statements have in common? Ernest Hemingway, a novelist and short-story writer who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1954, famously said ‘all thinking men are atheists.’ American icon George Washington said ‘It is impossible to rightly govern a nation without God and the Bible.’ The amazing Helen Keller said ‘All the world is full of suffering. It is also full of overcoming. I can see, and that is why I can be happy, in what you call the dark, but which to me is golden. I can see a God-made world, not a man-made world.’

While seemingly unrelated at a glance, these respective quotes on intellect, government, and theodicy have this in common: Each one reflects the worldview of the speaker: unspoken presuppositions that define how each individual viewed their world.

A recent immersion experience in several European countries was a reminder of both the nearness and distance in worldview between American statesmen living and working in Europe, and our European friends and colleagues. Generally, Americans tend to view Europeans as more “like” them than people from other parts of the world. In some ways, such a notion is understandable and justifiable, particularly in Western Europe: English is widely spoken, cultural and social parallels are numerous, and the economic, political, and strategic cooperation between the U.S. and European nations both bilaterally and through international organizations such as NATO bear witness to complementary interests and values in many social, cultural, and political areas.

However, one quickly discovers in the course of interaction with European friends and colleagues that value gaps remain, despite such social, cultural, and political ‘nearness.’ Of course, one does not need to look outside of the U.S. to find value differences between individuals or groups, but in the context of international relations, such differences extend to issues of corporate national history, language, culture, and society in ways that may not be immediately obvious to the non-national.

It is of significant importance, then, that the statesman possesses an intellectual framework for understanding how national identity and history shape unseen and often unspoken assumptions and presuppositions about the world. In other words, each national and cultural context has unique factors that influence and shape the worldview of its populace. For the individual engaged in international relations, the challenge is twofold: First, to understand the unique worldview-shaping factors of a given international context, and second, to understand how the resulting attitudes are congruent or divergent with his or her own worldview presuppositions, thereby contributing to improved
mutual understanding and more effective engagement. To begin, one should define the term in question - what exactly is a worldview? A worldview is a way of viewing or interpreting all of reality. It is an interpretive framework through which or by which one makes sense out of the data of life and the world. There are a number of ways this can be illustrated; one might imagine the analogy of a pair of glasses with colored lenses. If one looks at the same object through yellow-colored glasses, he or she will see it as yellow; while another looking at the same object through blue glasses will see it as blue. It is the difference in worldview that causes people to often see the same objective facts in a very different way. For example, an orthodox Jewish individual might interpret the exodus of Israel from Egypt as a case of divine intervention. A naturalist, on the other hand, would likely view the same event as an anomaly, that is, as an unusual natural event. Both could affirm the narrative as factually true and yet come to entirely different conclusions concerning what the narrative means because of different worldviews. Therefore, worldviews make a world of difference, even in how one understands the same objective fact.

The analogy of glasses, however, has its limits. First, worldview glasses are never removed. They are the enduring lenses by which one interprets everything he sees. American philosopher and theologian Norman Geisler notes ‘the worldview is...the integrating center of one’s entire personality.’ [Worlds Apart: A Handbook on Worldviews]. Second, one not only reads (interprets) through his worldview glasses, one also lives by means of them; because it includes within it value indicators or principles by which one makes value judgments. Third, a worldview is a more dynamic and flexible entity than are ordinary glass lenses, and capable of undergoing changes. Like a living organism, it is capable of changing yet, in most cases, it remains substantially the same. In practice, an adopted worldview change is often referred to as a conversion or a paradigm shift.

With a working definition of a worldview in mind, let us examine the workings of a worldview. To appropriate an analogy from theater, one might compare the effect worldview to a scrim. For those unfamiliar with the term, a scrim is a special type of theater stage curtain with unique properties. When lit from the front, a scrim appears opaque and reflects the scene upon the fabric – the ocean, a city, a living room, a park. When lit from behind, however, a scrim appears transparent, and the viewer can see what is behind it. To use another illustration, one might compare a worldview to modern and ancient understandings of vision: For modern humans, biology explains the process of vision: our eyes reflect visible stimuli, which are then interpreted through a series of electric signals to the brain. The ancients’ concept of sight, however, was a bit different. They assumed that seeing began in the heart, and then emanated like beams from the eyes. These two perspectives are complementary and helpful in describing the function of a worldview. Physical seeing is a matter of taking in objective stimuli, but the stimuli are then shaped according to our worldview.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) illustrated the idea another way, recognizing that the mind could not function as an empty container that simply receives data from the outside, concluding that the ‘stuff’ of knowledge comes through the senses, but the ‘shape’ of it comes from the mind. In other words, people see the same things differently. Therefore, the character of seeing is dependent upon the character of the individual. Our worldview, then, is our scrim - When lit from the front, the eyes of our head take in the objective stimuli of our world. But when lit from behind, the eyes of our individual character, the scrim becomes transparent, and the worldview that shapes the stimuli behind it can be seen.

The role of understanding one another’s worldview in international engagement cannot be overemphasized: Many areas of debate and discourse in political and social circles have worldview differences at their root. Within the tremendous diversity of human culture, language, politics, and social constructs, one thing is common among all people: Every person processes reality through their own worldview, which informs their interpretation of the world around them. Ethicist Simon Blackburn writes:

[Our worldview] determines what we find acceptable or unacceptable, admirable or contemptible. It determines our conception of when things are going well and when they are going badly. It determines our conception of what is due to us, and what is due from us, as we relate to others. It shapes our emotional responses, determining what is a cause of pride or shame, or anger or gratitude, or what can be forgiven and what cannot.

- Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics

One need not look far to see the effect of national worldview influences on thinking about current issues. For example, the Pew Research Center recently published a study citing U.S. use of military force, the role of religion in U.S. society and politics, and American individualism as issues that highlight the “values gap” between Americans and Europeans [Richard Wike, “Anti-Americanism Down in Europe, but a Values Gap Persists,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project].

Looking beyond the bar graphs of various opinion polls, one can see the effect of national worldview influences on any of the aforementioned issues. Consider, for example, U.S. use of force against terrorist targets with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), currently a key element of President Obama’s foreign policy. Despite President Obama’s re-election in the U.S. and his continued popularity in Europe, his UAS engagement policy is notably unpopular in Europe, despite an overall favorable view of anti-terrorist ac-
NEWS FROM THE FIELD: MAINTAINING FAO SKILLS IN RETIREMENT  BY JOE DAVES, COLONEL U.S. ARMY, RETIRED

I retired in 2003 after serving my last four-plus years as the U.S. Defense and Army Attaché in Jakarta. I have kept up my language skills, mostly reading, not so much speaking, although my wife and I have been back to Indonesia. I stay in touch with Indonesian friends and am in a large email group that includes many senior officers and ministers. I have been working on a three volume history of the Indonesian Army for several years, kind of as a hobby, which I hope to finish up and self-publish this year.

I recently accepted a short-notice consulting job to provide language refresher and area studies training for two Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Indonesian linguists. It was a challenge to function in Indonesian for six hours a day for a month. My language skills improved along with the students.

(Continued on page 36)
CHALLENGES TO PRC SECURITY:
LACK OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE COOPERATION

BY COLONEL ANDREW TORELLI, USAF

Introduction

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is a rising power in the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. To ensure its future status as a regional power, the PRC needs to be aware of and prepared for several enduring security challenges. This paper analyses one key strategic security challenge facing the PRC over the next decade; the lack of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to combat transnational threats. This paper will argue that although China’s military modernization includes efforts to expand its ISR capabilities and capacity, its inability to share ISR information through regional cooperation and partnerships is an obstruction to the development of collective regional security and a shared perspective on common security challenges. As a result, the PRC’s ISR apparatus is most likely not adequately focused on transnational security issues and as such cannot answer fundamental questions about these threats or the environments they operate within. As such, PRC leadership at best has marginal situational awareness on how these threats impact their interests. This paper will discuss the PRC’s future security environment, ISR capabilities, causes for their lack of robust ISR cooperation and transparency, and where their ISR weight of effort is focused.

PRC’s Future Security Environment

The PRC faces a very complex and rapidly changing future security environment, in which highly capable and diversified transnational threats will likely continue to challenge their national interests. Vulnerable PRC national interests include a large number of nationals living abroad, freedom of movement of energy and commercial products, and dispersed economic, financial, and trading markets throughout the Asia-Pacific. According to a PLA Senior Colonel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transnational threats are one of the PRC’s primary concerns. In the PRC’s 2010 defense white paper, they stated, ‘Security threats posed by such global challenges as terrorism … and transnational crime are on the rise’. These threats are diverse, usually dispersed, and decentralized in a highly complex environment. They include piracy, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation, and separatism and terrorism espoused by radical ideologies. As a result, transnational ISR issues tend to be amorphous, fluid, and hidden; emerging suddenly and developing rapidly. In addition, it takes a greater volume of information to characterize these threats, especially from a cultural context. As a result, accurate, timely, and actionable ISR information demands a collaborative and multidisciplinary analysis with a broad range of producers and consumers. In contrast, although the PRC recognizes that the international security environment has become more complex, their ability to characterize and combat these threats is constrained because they prefer to deal with issues on a bilateral basis; whereas, transnational threats are common to many Asia-Pacific countries, to include the PRC, and require a regional response. In addition, they have competing interests with neighboring countries over territorial disputes, which hinders the PRC’s willingness to share ISR information because of longstanding distrust created by the Century of Humiliation.

PRC ISR Capabilities

PRC ISR capabilities are modest in the Asia-Pacific region and focused on threats to their sovereignty due to their insular nature. These capabilities could contribute a great deal to understanding and combating transnational threats if the PRC cooperated, coordinated, and shared ISR resources. In regards to human intelligence, there are military attaches at PRC embassies throughout the world, and the Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters oversees not only military human intelligence, but also open source intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In addition, the PLA’s Third Department reportedly maintains the most extensive signals intelligence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region through air and ground-based ISR networks with a range of approximately 200 nautical miles from its borders. The PRC SIGINT architecture includes ‘several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems, airborne systems, and a limited satellite collection capability’. These capabilities were reportedly enhanced over the past decade. In addition, the PRC may
have spaceborne ISR assets with sensors such as synthetic aperture radar for all weather, day/night monitoring; electronic intelligence sensors; and mid-high resolution electro-optical satellites. The PRC may have also begun receiving commercially developed imagery and training; and ground processing of satellite derived ISR is also reported to be rapidly developing. Furthermore, aerial reconnaissance includes photographic and electronics intelligence (ELINT) activities. However, there is recognition within the PRC that ISR capabilities need further improvement.

Although the PRC has modest ISR capabilities it is likely many of their assets are still antiquated and not interoperable among its military services. Such interoperability is an essential component of advanced military power. Vice Admiral (Retired) David J. Dorsett, stated ‘China lacks some basic components of advanced military power…integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability’. In addition, Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin and senior military leadership recognized the PLA’s limitations in ISR: ‘At present, our army still lags far behind armed forces of developed countries in the West in terms of weapons or equipment, intelligence or reconnaissance’.

Lack of Robust ISR Cooperation

The PRC does not have an adequate ISR partnership architecture in place to understand diverse transnational threats operating in varied geographic or cultural environments within the Asia-Pacific region. The PRC is reluctant to use regional cooperative approaches in resolving transnational security issues and prefers bilateral vice multilateral solutions. In the past several years, the PRC has established ‘bilateral dialogues and confidence-building measures,’ but it is doubtful that these partnerships include robust ISR sharing arrangements. Understandably, ISR information needs to be protected to prevent disclosure of sensitive sources and methods. However, it also needs to be shared with partner nations and allies, because multinational operations against complex threats in complex environments are becoming the norm for military operations, making ISR cooperation with allies and coalition partners increasingly important. For example, the U.S. has made it policy to strengthen and expand current partnerships, and establish new partnerships. As a result, its alliances and ISR cooperative efforts have benefited the Asia-Pacific region combat transnational threats. Countries that could benefit mutually with the PRC include ASEAN, NATO, and Northeast Asian countries.

In contrast, there are only a limited number of situations of PRC ISR cooperation reported and it is likely these are limited to intelligence sharing. For example, PRC PLAN ISR sharing capabilities in support of anti-piracy missions are constrained to email exchanges with partner nations. According to the 2010 PRC white paper, ‘Chinese escort fleets have established mechanisms for regular intelligence exchange and sharing with relevant countries and organizations.’ In addition, ‘China has joined international regimes such as the UN liaison group’ meeting on Somali pirates, and the international conference on ‘intelligence sharing and conflict prevention’ escort cooperation’. The PRC also recognizes the importance of counter-terrorism and wants closer intelligence cooperation against cross-border terrorism. The strongest area of PRC cooperation is in law enforcement. China has entered into 70 memorandums of agreement and cooperative agreements with 40 countries. As these examples highlight, the PLA may have intelligence valuable to other regional partners and in turn may require intelligence from other regional partners to properly characterize transnational threats. However, due to the lack of published documentation, territorial disputes with neighbor countries, and insular nature, it is assessed that the PRC lacks strong military intelligence sharing and cooperation policies with regional partners beyond limited ongoing efforts in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism. As a result, collective security opportunities may be lost especially if dynamic transnational threats out-stretch or overload PRC ISR capabilities and capacity in the region. Consequently, the PRC’s ISR architecture will unlikely provide adequate battlespace awareness to its senior policy and decision makers, and the PRC will not be able to act dynamically with partner nations to achieve mutually supporting military objectives to negate these threats.

Lack of Transparency

The PRC also lacks adequate policies to promote ISR cooperation and partner activities to combat transnational threats. Unlike the United States who advocates new and strengthened ISR relationships within its National Intelligence Strategy, the PRC lacks transparency on its ISR cooperation policies. It has not articulated or codified its equivalent to the U.S. National Intelligence Strategy or Defense Intelligence Strategy. As a result, the PRC is sending mixed signals to its neighboring countries regarding its intentions, or how it wants to work with them to achieve mutual objectives in national security. Although the PRC may talk positive about regional security cooper-

**Although China is modernizing its military to include expanding its ISR capabilities and capacity, cultural and policy barriers are inhibiting the PRC to share ISR information through regional cooperation and partnerships.**
ation, they remain hesitant in expanding ISR cooperation, and regional countries still remain cautious of the PRC’s intent because of their lack of transparency and assertiveness on territorial disputes. This is contrary to the PRC’s stated goals in their 2010 white paper: ‘In the face of shared opportunities and common challenges, China maintains its commitment to the new security concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.’ Instead, the lack of transparency has likely fomented ongoing mistrust with its neighbors that could lead to misunderstanding and possible conflict. The PRC’s lack of ISR collaboration is an obstacle to understanding diverse threats operating in the region, whereas the complexity of 21st Century conflict emphasizes the need for cooperative intelligence efforts.

The PRC’s opaque policies prevent it from using one of the most valuable aspects of ISR: the ability to share it with partners and allies to obtain access, expertise, and perspective required to achieve battlespace awareness. The PRC is missing the opportunity to build broader influence and international cooperation on mutually supporting objectives by sharing ISR information on time-sensitive threats, providing greater insights into issues that can be easily misinterpreted, and facilitate joint or combined operations against common adversaries. Furthermore, without this transparency, the PRC has avoided taking a key leadership role on building Asian-Pacific ISR partnerships to enhance the region’s capability and capacity via cooperative means on common security challenges. As a result, they have less agility to respond to current and future transnational security challenges.

**PRC ISR Weight of Effort**

The PRC is concerned about internal stability and its sovereignty. As a result, the PRC may not be ready at this time to increase ISR cooperation within the region because its weight of effort is likely focused on internal security to ensure that security forces can contain separatist unrest, political demonstrations, and dissent against Party leadership. PLA intelligence units have an internal security mission to gather electronic and other intelligence regarding protestors and their organizers. An internal police manual calls for close coordination and cooperation with ‘State Security and Military (jundui) and other political legal departments’ on intelligence exchanges. The PLA also indicated a concern there is a lack of communication infrastructure to facilitate horizontal and vertical intelligence sharing in support of its frontier security mission. These examples indicate the PRC is willing to devote significant military ISR resources on internal security to handle domestic unrest at the cost of combating transnational threats.

Another reason the PRC may not want to commit to multi-lateral intelligence cooperation is its focus on perceived threats from regional forces, such as the U.S. and Japan, which it still perceives as hostile. A preponderance of the PRC’s ISR capabilities are likely focused on locating, tracking, and targeting these perceived threats. For example, PRC military development has deployed ‘thirty military and dual-use intelligence satellites, a strong weather capability, OTH [Over-The-Horizon] radars…and a large number of ISR-capable ships, submarines, and aircraft’ … ‘capable of targeting U.S. assets in theater’. The focus of the PLA on these ‘high-end’ threats comes at the cost of collecting against transnational threats. Lastly, additional reasons why the PRC may not want a more robust intelligence sharing arrangement with regional partners are that it wants to protect its sources, methods, and accessibility of information and does not trust others to do so; and it does not want to compromise its strategic intentions to any neighboring country due to its insular culture.

**Conclusion**

This paper argued that one key strategic security challenge facing the PRC over the next decade is the lack of ISR to combat transnational threats. Although China is modernizing its military to include expanding its ISR capabilities and capacity, cultural and policy barriers are inhibiting the PRC to share ISR information through regional cooperation and partnerships. As a consequence, the PRC is obstructing the development of collective regional security and shared perspective on common security challenges because it is focused on internal stability and territorial disputes, and remains insular. Maintaining the status quo is not an acceptable option since the PRC has ISR capabilities and information that would be beneficial to the region in combating transnational threats in a complex environment. Likewise, regional neighbours have ISR capabilities and information that would mutually benefit the PRC in this area of concern. The PRC has the opportunity to share accurate, timely, and actionable ISR information with regional partnerships against common complex transnational issues in a complex environment that demand a collaborative and multidisciplinary analysis from all sources of information. The PRC’s nascent efforts to share ISR information in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism could and should be used as a springboard to expand this effort to counter broader external transnational issues. However, the PRC will need to work actively with other countries to promote increased transparency through increased ISR partnerships and confidence building efforts such as reducing tensions over territorial disputes.

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Holistic Integration of Mil-to-Mil Engagement: Doing Better with Less
BY COLONEL DAVID M. BENNETT, U.S. ARMY

Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) strive to epitomize the “soldier-diplomat” qualities of the FAO ethos. At the same time, most Army FAOs have internalized certain habits picked up during their command and staff time in operational units. These habits are typical of the Type A, combat arms officer, characterized by working longer, harder, and striving to accomplish more in a short amount of time:

“If soldiers in my unit march 10 miles with a 40-pound ruck, then as leader I should march further and carry more weight to show my dedication. Or maybe my unit should execute more marches than our sister units so that we can distinguish ourselves.”

“If my predecessor came in at 0700 and worked until 1930 while producing so many products per week, I should come in even earlier and depart later than she did, and produce more products, to show our office’s improvement.”

Such an attitude is admirable for a mid-level leader, but might not necessarily be the right approach for a FAO down range. In a profession dominated by Type A personalities and incentivized by the short-term Officer Evaluation Report (OER), suggesting that “less is better” is considered anathema to the driven Army officer. But the FAO should consider all courses of action, and when it comes to military-to-military (MTM) events, less usually is better.

In a seminal scene from the movie “Jerry Maguire,” the title character has a late-night epiphany, and writes, “Suddenly it was all clear. The answer was fewer clients, less money, caring for them, caring for ourselves.”

Within days this honesty, clarity, and a resulting new mission statement earned him a downsizing at the hands of his less-than-amused management.

Acknowledging that we live in a cynical world, I intend to show that exactly such an approach can be a smarter way of doing business for the Foreign Area Officer (FAO). This paper will show how doing less, but doing it in a smarter, more integrated way that favors long-term results, is a better course of action for MTM events.

MTM events in Europe include exchanges paid for by Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) through the post-Soviet Partnership for Peace (PiP) program. They are usually information exchanges designed to familiarize our new Partner Nations (PNs) with U.S. military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). PN militaries can decide whether they would like to pursue a new capability based on U.S. matériel, training, and best practices. If a PN shows interest in a capability presented during an MTM exchange, the PN can pursue the capability through other Security Cooperation (SC) tools. These tools include training or matériel acquisition that a PN can purchase under Foreign Military Sales (FMS), or receive under grant through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), as well as training and education it can receive under International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. Joint exercises can also be selected to ensure the PN is adequately trained on the new capability and solidify the relationship between the PN and the U.S.

A few years ago, my position at U.S. Army Central’s (ARCENT’s) Civil and International Military Affairs, Central and South Asia branch, allowed me to get a close-up view of how MTM events are planned and executed. Our branch officers sponsored, planned and executed scores of exchanges with our Central Asian PNs each year. Interestingly, these MTM events tended to grow in number each year, but justification for this growth was debatable. Our PNs were not necessarily gaining any new capabilities, and as the number of MTM events increased, several shortcomings with the program became clear.

For example, WIF-funded MTM events are forbidden by law from serving to provide training. Ironically, PNs tend to value any ancillary training they can get out of an MTM event above all else, which lends itself to a legalistic conflict of intent. MTM event funding also tends to be stove-piped in terms of planning and budgeting. MTM program event planners tend to regard their own events as projects unto themselves, rather than one tool in a kit bag that includes much more robust and appropriate SC tools for acquiring a significant new capability. At our higher headquarters’ MTM planning conferences, other SC tools typically were not mentioned at all, opening the door for a disjointed approach in which SC tools did not nest together or apply to common objectives. The greatest irony is that MTM events tend to be planned and executed in a vacuum, and yet, on their own, MTM events cannot lead to any lasting or meaningful PN capability. Their role is to serve as an opening conversation-starter for other SC tools that are actually designed to deliver a capability.

Despite these drawbacks, the culture among my ARCENT desk officers was one in which MTM event growth was a source of pride. It was one of the few ways that short-term “progress” could be demonstrated on the annual OER. Since coordinating and executing quality MTM events was hard, generating more such events must be a good thing, desk officers reasoned. Not surprisingly, the number of ARCENT-sponsored events with our Central Asian countries consistently grew each year. They increased to a point that our branch was having difficulty ensuring quality execution. A manageable number of events was roughly one per month, three every two months, at most. But in some cases, our events grew to three or four times that number — clear evidence of quantifiable accomplish-
ment, from an OER bullet point of view. While this approach seemed to serve desk officers well in the short term, it did not contribute to optimal engagement with our PNs in the long term.

I left that job having learned a lot, but frustrated at my inability to change our office’s cultural mindset. As luck would have it, I became Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in one of ARCENT’s Central Asian countries a couple years later. By now MTM events for the country, including not just ARCENT’s, but those of all sponsoring proponents, had grown to nearly 150 per year. Army officers were clearly not the only Type-A personalities susceptible to “more is better” thinking. Our office was now expected to help plan, coordinate, facilitate travel for, execute, and analyze the effects of roughly three events every work week!

Our Ministry of Defense (MOD) counterparts in the department responsible for international cooperation quietly suffered under “event fatigue,” wary of disappointing their American counterparts. They were clearly overwhelmed with U.S. MTM events, though they never would admit it. From their perspective, we were just one PN of many for whose events their office was responsible. Yet as happens in most Central Asian militaries, our hosts had sensed how important these ballooning events seemed to their American counterparts, so their natural politeness made them reluctant to say anything negative on the matter. Fortunately for them, they were not alone in their frustration. From our point of view too, it was virtually impossible to facilitate all of these events to ensure quality execution, much less satisfactory movement along a program’s Line of Effort (LOE) towards a desired end state.

Rather than blindly execute all these events, or even increase their numbers, our office decided we should conduct a thorough analysis of all the events on the calendar to determine their status. What were the LOEs, goals, objectives and end states of each program? Was PN interest strongly enough that our department responsible for international cooperation quietly suffered under "event fatigue," wary of disappointing their American counterparts. They were clearly overwhelmed with U.S. MTM events, though they never would admit it. From their perspective, we were just one PN of many for whose events their office was responsible. Yet as happens in most Central Asian militaries, our hosts had sensed how important these ballooning events seemed to their American counterparts, so their natural politeness made them reluctant to say anything negative on the matter. Fortunately for them, they were not alone in their frustration. From our point of view too, it was virtually impossible to facilitate all of these events to ensure quality execution, much less satisfactory movement along a program’s Line of Effort (LOE) towards a desired end state.

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Rather than blindly execute all these events, or even increase their numbers, our office decided we should conduct a thorough analysis of all the events on the calendar to determine their status. What were the LOEs, goals, objectives and end states of each program? Was PN interest strong enough that our counterparts had designated an officer point of contact (POC) for each LOE? Was a new capability that did not exist before part of the plan? Were the stated objectives of the LOE more specific than just “improve X”? A former colleague and Regional Affairs Specialist (RAS = Air Force FAO), Colonel Michael McCarthy, used to point out that strategic objectives must be mutual, and that FAOs need to work to find the strategic “sweet spot” that ensures PN buy-in for a line of effort. After reading through dozens of event descriptions whose objectives proclaimed “improve the capabilities of unit X,” I decided COL McCarthy’s explanation of what made an objective worthwhile warranted further expansion. Ideally, objectives should not only be mutual, but also achievable, measurable, and, most elusive of all, meaningful. Event objectives that were Mutual, Achievable, Measurable and Meaningful, or “MAMM,” were very hard to find in our MTM plan. Our office’s Locally Employed Staff (LES) admitted that the events they had been conducting for years amounted to iterative, “self-licking ice cream cones.” Conversations on each program followed a familiar pattern:

“What’s the background with these mountaineering events?”

“Well, each year a squad of our experts visits their mountain battalion for an information exchange.”

“Well, our (U.S.) guys share information with them about the latest mountaineering techniques.”

“Right, but what new capability is that leading to? Are they going to establish a schoolhouse? Would they like our help developing a curriculum? Are they going to buy any of our equipment or incorporate any of our training techniques? What is the desired end state?”

“I’m not sure about all that, but I do know that these events are important.”

“Are they? Why?”

“Our proponent has executed these events for years, which fosters a good relationship.”

“So let’s see… a squad of our guys meets with a squad of their same guys each year; we have no desired end state, goals or objectives other than ‘improve mountaineering,’ our PN has no plans to open any IMET or FMS cases that will lead to a MAMM objective, and both sides are content with this?”

“Correct.”

Armed with this information, we next met with our counterparts at MOD for a frank discussion about the MTM program of events. We explained that MTM exchanges were not supposed to be an end unto themselves, but rather an introduction to set the stage for meaningful capacity development via other tools. The outcome of these familiarization events was supposed to lead to much more than just personal and institutional relationships among the visiting units. Both sides needed to agree on a MAMM objective; a goal that actually improved their military’s capacity in a
specific, mutually beneficial way; a goal that could be measured objectively; a goal that was more significant and meaningful than simply “let’s improve.” The mil-to-mil event itself was supposed to be the opening salvo in this line of effort; a precursor to other programs that should not be repeated blindly for years on end.

Our PN colleagues were initially shocked that we were having this discussion, but did not take long to warm to the news that it would be okay to reduce the number of events we had agreed to execute. They even admitted that many lines of effort were not MAMM for them at all; their side had only agreed to continue the program because they sensed our desire to continue conducting the exchanges. For example, several LOEs addressed fundamental ways the U.S. conducts basic military functions, such as Logistics, Military Police, Personnel, and Public Affairs. These events had already occurred for several years, but had never progressed beyond the “information exchange” level. Some honest broker talk was in order.

“So, I see that over the last four years, we have presented many exchanges addressing how we conduct Logistics, Military Police, etc. What do you think? Would you like our help developing a new capability in any of these areas based on what you’ve seen?”

“Frankly... we are not empowered to change our Soviet-established approach to these functions... at least not at this time. The exchanges were interesting, but as far as a desire to change how we conduct such processes... those decisions are still years away.”

“Then would it be okay if we put these events on hold for now?”

“Yes, absolutely!”

By carefully re-examining not just individual events, but their underlying purposes, we achieved several beneficial results.

We decreased the number of events significantly, making both ourselves and our PN counterparts happy by curing much of the event fatigue

We shifted the now-lighter load on our LES from event management to program analysis

We saved U.S. taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars annually

We ended up with a much closer and more meaningful mil-to-mil relationship that would actually lead to concrete new capabilities.

The new objectives we established with our hosts were truly MAMM, and if an objective or nested event proved deficient in any MAMM area, we agreed not to pursue it. The number of lines of effort may have decreased, but the surviving LOEs were much more compelling and of higher quality. By shedding programs that both sides sensed were not leading anywhere meaningful, we freed ourselves to focus qualitatively on programs that did.

Instead of twenty LOEs out of sync and with no link to FMF or IMET, we wound up with six to ten LOEs that we could carefully integrate with FMF, IMET, and other SC tools. Each LOE represented the entire kit bag of a Security Assistance Officer’s arsenal. Consequently, the new LOEs received higher-level attention, dedicated POCs, and the event quality improved greatly.

The best news was that, unlike in the movie, no pink slips were waiting in our office the following week. Communicating up, down, and sideways from the outset was critical. We had to convince not only our Defense Attaché’s Office, but also our COCOM headquarters and all the event-sponsoring proponents to ensure we were on the same page. Each had to agree or at least acknowledge the new direction for MTM events, even if it meant their offices might make fewer trips to Central Asia.

Fortunately, our immediate boss, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), was completely on board. He not only had vast experience as a former OMC Chief and possessed plenty of common sense, but he had come to the same conclusions about MTM TTPs on his own. Moreover, he had watched one of his capacity-building programs take nearly a decade to come to fruition, only culminating years after he had left. Therefore, he knew the value of establishing meaningful objectives, integrating SC tools to achieve them, and understood that the process took time. With his advocacy, many event proponents even began to adopt a more holistic approach to their mi-to-mil exchange programs on their own, leading to more coordinated and meaningful capacity development with other countries in our area of responsibility.

The jury is still out on how much benefit there is to having fewer, more focused MAMM objectives with better nested and integrated events, but the prognosis is promising. Our PN colleagues felt so good about our new bi-lateral direction, they agreed to apply their own national funds towards several new lines of effort. This was a huge coup, since it was the first time any Central Asian country had ever volunteered to self-fund Security Cooperation with the U.S. This mutual ownership led to an immediately visible increase in pride over our new bilateral relationship, as both sides pointed to a Strategic Partnership rather than the hackneyed transactional relationship dominated by “what can you give us?”

In our case, it really did turn out that the right answer was fewer events, less money being spent, in order to cooperate with our partners better, while still taking care of our own objectives. Given the current environment of shrinking SC resources, this “less is better” model might warrant consideration in other assistance areas as well.

Colonel Dave Bennett grew up in Moses Lake,
Foreign Area Officer: Strategic Assets for Future Success of U.S. Forces

By Major Donald Kim

In an interview with American Forces Press Service of 2012, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) declared that “The opportunity that exists in the Asia-Pacific for us is to deploy small groups or individuals into unfamiliar circumstances with new partners, new cultures, new complexities, and encourage leaders -- and actually require them -- to confront them… So they continue to grow. And to the extent that they continue to grow, they will be prepared for this uncertain future that we continue to talk about.” Using the CJCS’s words as my guide, I volunteered to be a part of exercise Iron Fist. Iron Fist is a combined U.S.-Japanese exercise hosted by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) headquarters in Camp Pendleton, California. As a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), I was able to leverage my language proficiency, deep understanding of Japanese culture, and political/military knowledge, and serve as the linguist and advisor to the U.S. Marines and Japanese military personnel. It was the FAO training model that prepared me to serve successfully in such a challenging position. Using the FAO training model as a guide, I will highlight the benefits of professional military training, language training at Defense Language Institute, and In-Country Training.

Professional Military Training

As a former Infantry officer, I maximized my professional military training experience in operational field and staff experiences during the joint exercise. Furthermore, having graduate school training helped me to analyze and think critically in making professional decisions in dealing with the Japanese and U.S. personnel at Camp Pendleton.

Bilateral Aspects of Iron Fist.

Exercise Iron Fist is an annually scheduled U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercise hosted by 1st MEF. It is a simulation-driven joint-bilateral amphibious assault exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps and the JGSDF. The purpose of Iron Fist is to improve bilateral amphibious readiness, which concentrates on a combined, command post and field training exercise with U.S. and JGSDF focusing on the interoperability, military relations, and small unit skills to conduct operations across the Pacific. As the biggest bilateral exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps and the JGSDF in the United States, the 13th MEF hosted the 7th iteration of the exercise series at Camp Pendleton, California from 22 January to 15 February 2013.

This exercise is designed to promote cooperation between the two militaries and enhance U.S.-Japanese combat readiness and interoperability while sharing training, cultural exchanges and improving partnership readiness in the Northeast Asia region. Approximately 2,000 U.S. Marines and sailors and 250 JSDF personnel participated this year. Furthermore, sailors from the USS Pearl Harbor and the USS Boxer also participated in Exercise Iron Fist. As the higher command for participating U.S. forces in the joint and combined command post and amphibious assault exercise, 1st MEF focused on improving its ability to defend Japan and maintain regional security.

Iron Fist

JGSDF and JMSDF personnel from the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Fuji Training Center acted as temporary staff and evaluation teams. About half of them had already attended one or more of previous Iron Fist exercises and said continuous interaction with U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had improved the quality of the bilateral training. Many Marines and Navy personnel learned a tremendous amount about JGSDF tactical planning and differences in work ethics. After I talked to other JGSDF staff officers, I heard the JGSDF was a little more prepared and improved in their communication and coordination with U.S. counterparts compared to previous years. I also ran into one of my former classmates and one of the JGSDF Command and General Staff College (CGSC) instructors at the Iron Fist staff exercise. These encounters reminded me once again that relationships FAOs build in the foreign militaries enhance U.S.-Japanese relations.

My take on the planning process between JGSDF and U.S. Marines was that both sides benefited from detailed, co-opted, working groups to understand combined operations in a real combat scenario. Operations, intelligence, and logistics senior operations officers from Marine units played important roles in planning and interacting with their JGSDF counterparts. JGSDF and Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) primary staff officers (who were mostly field grade) desired to develop a comprehensive mission plan and conduct more frequent meetings with U.S. Navy air coordinators and Marine intelligence, operations, and logistics officers.

Dawn Blitz Bilateral Planning

Dawn Blitz 2013 is a joint-combined-coalition exercise that concentrates on Amphibious Task Force planning and executing Naval Task Force operations in a large scale amphibious assault. In June 2013, JGSDF
Western Army Infantry Regiment participated in the exercise for the first time, to conduct offensive operations with its JMSDF naval vessel support. While participating in the planning process, I found great learning value in observing the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps air space and logistics plan, working group briefs, and coordination between JSDF and U.S. military officers. As an interpreter, I served as initial coordinator for the JGSDF and 1st MEU. Throughout the planning process, the JSDF made several attempts to place their schedule above ours. The U.S. Marine officers and civilian contractors responded to these challenges and negotiated tactfully. Additionally, I found it educational to observe the joint levels of communication among the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, JGSDF, and JMSDF. Listening to seasoned U.S. military leaders and contracted civilian trainers discuss key events, issues, and future task challenges gave me a lot of insight into the complexity of joint-ally relationships.

Understanding the depth of joint and foreign military operations gave me a new perspective on higher levels of planning, coordination, and interaction. Since I am an Army FAO, personally witnessing how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps dealt with multi-agency operations was beneficial and enlightening. No doubt, this opportunity promotes U.S. Army FAOs’ knowledge and experience in linguist and planning support during regular duty assignments to see both U.S. and Japanese military staff functions and capabilities.

Ostensibly, the U.S. Marine-Navy simulation center planned efficiently for the 2013 Dawn Blitz training. Working groups worked well providing war game, analysis, significant issues, key tasks, and coalition coordination for ensuring maritime-air control. JGSDF and JMSDF planning staffs from Western Army JGSDF and the Japanese Ministry of Defense were involved in training, coordinating, and educating their U.S. Marine and Navy counterparts on a regular basis in preparation for Dawn Blitz, which was the first time ever for JGSDF-JMSDF live fire operations with 84 mm anti-armor rocket, 120 mm mortar, AH-64 close air support, and naval gun fire from JMSDF destroyers.

Focusing on the first ever joint-combined Dawn Blitz exercise was one of the main tasks for JGSDF planners and coordinators from the Japanese Ministry of Defense. A field grade officer from the JGSDF staffs claimed the impact of the Chinese and North Korean threats highlighted the strategic importance of joint-combined operations in Japan. Places such as the Senkaku (also called by Chinese as Diaoyu) Islands are all in the concerns of JGSDF counter-prevention and potential enemy strategy estimates.

**Defense Language Institute (DLI) and In-Country-Training (ICT)**

My language training from the DLI contributed to successful communication with the Japanese officers from the JGSDF and JMSDF. There is no doubt that our FAOs’ primary strength is an ability to communicate in a foreign language to build trust and credibility. One of the most important phases of my FAO training was the ICT, which exposed me to a realistic environment of a country I need to be aware of. My enrollment at the JGSDF CGSC enlightened me to realize the strategic and national importance of understanding foreign military organizations and their personnel to close a gap between two or more nations.

**Culture and Language.**

As I expected, numerous U.S. military and contracted civilian interpreters and English speaking JSDF personnel provided linguistic support for the exercise. During the first loading operation for vehicles and personnel into transport ships, I was the only U.S. Army officer, and I interpreted for JGSDF, U.S. Navy corpsmen, and U.S. marines. Frankly, I felt my Japanese study at the Defense Language Institute and attendance at JGSDF CGSC during In-Country-Training paid off tremendously. In my role I demonstrated my commitment to understanding Japanese perspectives and questions, which aided me in achieving successful military to military relationships. However, I was a little concerned that I might misinterpret or misguide when personnel wanted to convey specific meanings. As I interpreted more, I felt more comfortable, efficient, and confident.

The JGSDF Western Army brought a temporary staff team to support the Iron Fist bilateral staff exercise. JGSDF created all the staff functions to deal with U.S. military staff systems for Iron Fist. Additionally, both military forces must teach their major staffs and commanders mutual tactical doctrine. Willingness to understand each other’s doctrine would help assure success in any future bilateral exercises between the United States and Japan. Despite the lack of specialized skills and experienced personnel that the United States provided, the JGSDF personnel worked well with their designated counterparts. I was impressed with the JGSDF logistics and operations officers’ meticulous coordination.

I was able to see that JGSDF’s still-growing operational staff members were willing to share information and estimates. Cultural differences and interpretation of meetings and translation of documents played a major role in enhancing bilateral player cell operations, especially among those who were participating in a bilateral exercise with foreign counterparts for the first time.

Prior to Operation Iron Fist, I understood the roles of FAOs to advise and assist senior commanding officers and primary staff officers to understand the strategic and diplomatic values of U.S.-Japan bilateral training exercises. U.S. military units can conduct and encourage basic language and cultural training for both military personnel and civilians; however, we should educate both Japanese and Americans about lessons learned prior to the next exercise. Continuous
cultural exchanges that demonstrate U.S. and Japanese customs will promote awareness, respect, and consideration for each other.

All the U.S. Marine, Navy, and JGSDF special staff members must educate themselves with the Iron Fist exercise planning process and review previous exercises lessons learned. Although the Western Army prepared itself with trained English linguists from all over its region and Intelligence School, language and cultural factors contributed to a successful bilateral training, as I had seen before during a Yamasakura exercise in Japan. Yamasakura is a combined military exercise between Japan and the U.S. The exercise mainly focuses on defending Japan from an enemy attack.

In Conclusion: A Final Thought.

There is no question this exercise proves the strength of our close, long-standing relationship with Japan and the JSDF. Short regional exercises like Iron Fist provide valuable training opportunities for U.S. marines, airman, and sailors. We gain more not only through our own training, but also by working with our allies and improving their capabilities. As we prepare to change the Department of Defense focus to Asia and also to security between the U.S. and Japan, I truly felt the Iron Fist exercise showed how we are looking to the future and continuing to deepen our strong ties of mutual support and friendship to deter other foreign threats in the Northeast Asia region.

Additionally, I understood the strategic and diplomatic effects of conducting U.S.-Japan bilateral training for both nations to improve military relations and become organizationally aware of each other's strengths and weaknesses. As FAOs, it is critical that we use our language skills to communicate and interact, but we also must use our operational and tactical military skills to build credibility and improve relationships with other foreign military personnel. In my case, I had an opportunity to compare my lessons learned from the JGSDF CGSC and my experience in Yamasakura (US-JGSDF CPX) and Ulchi Focus Lens (previous US-ROK CPX, now called as Ulfhei Freedom Guardian).

One of the benefits from Iron Fist is meeting other Foreign Area Officers. Meeting Marine FAOs from Japan and learning about their joint experiences was especially invaluable, and these joint-combined experiences were one of the most important benefits for the Naval Postgraduate School in the United States. All of the discussions and new information about other branches of service were intriguing and helpful for me to understand both the political and military perspectives outside of my current job as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. Once again, I realize professional military experiences in graduate school and basic branch, ICT, and DLI are essential and critical functions for FAOs’ careers.

During the exercise, I saw that JGSDF personnel drew benefits from planning and executing operations that modeled actual combat. The JGSDF side wanted to focus on more self-reliant training objectives in Iron Fist for future planning and operation of bilateral exercises revolutionizing JGSDF and JMSDF collaboration in offensive operations. In contrast to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iron Fist and Dawn Blitz are rare opportunities in today's U.S. military that add value in the training arena and provide a venue for a joint headquarters to practice amphibious landings in a supported exercise with a multi-lateral treaty partner using a scenario against more conventional enemy threats. For a U.S. Army FAO, this type of training experience was priceless and helped me to learn how to be a dynamic military diplomat and operator who can consider the various perspectives of our joint and combined operations and provide well-analyzed recommendations to the chain of command.

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The two MARSOC linguists had completed full nine-month Bahasa Indonesia language course at Defense Language Institute in June 2012. They are the only two Indonesian linguists at MARSOC headquarters. Neither had an opportunity to use or practice language skills during assigned duties. Neither had traveled to the region. Both had done little self-study during the past ten months and their language competence deteriorated.

MARSOC has a new language lab, which was recently transferred from Okinawa and is still being set up. The classroom has a computerized audio-visual system that includes several Indonesian language resources, all at basic skill level. For this course, I downloaded and stored electronic files on USB thumb drives, and then uploaded them for classes in the language lab.

The instruction emphasized steady improvement in student reading, writing, speaking and translating skills. I employed written and multimedia presentations, tailored to each student. More complicated materials were introduced as the course progressed. Instruction alternated conversational, translation and listening exercises to retain student attention and interest.

Area studies were integrated into the daily instruction – including cultural orientation and in-depth discussion about current events, security issues, separatist and Islamic extremism problems, and Indonesia's military organization and history. Special attention was paid to unique security-related organization, terminology and abbreviations. I assigned area familiarization materials in English and Indonesian for independent study. Students showed a

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The Tragedy of the Air Force FAO

BY GREG PECE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF (RETIRED)

On a hot and humid June morning in 2011, I found myself listening to a CD that featured an overly articulate couple discussing dinner options in French. As my commute was enlivened by the endless debate over the merits of le poisson versus le poulet, I was motivated by the same stale carrot that had been dangled over the last three years: the nominal amount of bonus money proffered by some level of testing success, the desire to maintain a respectable level of language testing competency, and the secret, embarrassing acknowledgement that I kind of liked learning French.

One might have inferred that Finance’s willingness to continue to pay me to maintain my French was the sign of the Air Force’s dedication to its recently invigorated version of its FAO program. Was it now time to start popping the champagne in celebration? Apparently our nation’s Defense Attaché Offices and analytic/policy staffs are soon to be manned with Air Force experts on par with their Army counterparts—regional specialists and linguists, familiar with the local geographies, peoples, cultures, and significant internal dynamics, who are able to make things happen with a quick phone call to highly-placed military counterparts. Or, perhaps not. I suspected the more likely reason was a continued dysfunction that has been part and parcel of the Air Force program throughout its lifespan.

Indeed, it suddenly struck me on this morning that I hadn’t been solicited in the previous three years for any real input or expertise related to my identification as a FAO. I had never encountered the opportunity for a TDY that took advantage of my experiences, let alone an assignment needing a Sub-Saharan Africa specialist, in a “must fill” sort of way. In fact there seemed to be no prospect of using my French expertise, limited as it was. There wasn’t even a conceivable possibility that my experiences of working in Africa would ever bear fruit. While I dutifully completed a State Department sponsored Sub-Saharan Africa seminar in order to fulfill some metric of vague continuity requirements, I mostly felt as if were interacting with a void with regard to the management of my secondary Air Force specialty as a FAO. As I rightly suspected, I would fly the line as a squadron pilot through to retirement without ever using another word of French or identifying Togo on a map.

While the formalization of the FAO program seems to have moved in the right direction, this murky Air Force project has a long history of not only lacking support, but also coherence and organization.

The Air Force’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program can only be termed a tragedy. Otherwise known as the Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) specialty, falling under the slightly more intuitively named International Affairs Specialist (IAS) program umbrella, it has been and remains an entity in transition, existing at the precipice of renewal, forever in a state of maturing into a functional entity. It is a project situated in a dialectical tension between institutionally expressed ideals and the grounded reality of the program in practice operating under administrative imperatives.

Is tragedy too strong a word to describe the state of this program? Perhaps, but it seems all too applicable. I borrow this usage from academia, or more specifically from David Rieci’s The Tragedy of Political Science. In this work, Ricci argued that political science had failed its original charter: instead of providing the civic “mental furniture” upon which a citizen could rely throughout life, or even some level of predictive capability, it had become a marginalized discipline of little value. The imperatives of “publish or perish” and professional tenure, as well as a need to become “scientifc”, had reduced the field to a network of overspecialized and irrelevant discourses. In a similar manner, the imperatives of Air Force bureaucracy have resulted in an Air Force FAO program that struggles to become relevant and functional, even as the rhetoric from leadership has offered unvarnished support at multiple and well-publicized moments in the past. Worse yet, it seems that current practice will continue to relegate the career field to a mostly peripheral position within the larger force and personnel structures. Perhaps, in the end, none of this matters. But it is worthy of some discussion given the resources, time and rhetoric deployed by the Air Force at this program, particularly over the past 10-15 years.

It is perhaps symptomatic of the state of the FAO program that no one even has a clear idea of what an Air Force FAO officer is called. It is not uncommon to see Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS), again the Air Force version of FAO, incorrectly identified by the more intuitively sounding “Regional Affairs Specialist”, something that does not exist in nature. In fact, the spring 2013 FAOA journal, reporting on the January 2013 FAOA luncheon, quotes the guest speaker, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, as directing her talk to “Foreign Area Officers and Regional Affairs Specialists”, indicating that either the putative head of the program deployed this common malapropism, or the writer of the article committed understandable error in mishearing the phrase, translating it into something more logical. I am not being judgmental here. The terminology has become so arcane that I likely would have made the same mistake.

Indeed, the recasting of FAO as RAS, under the larger umbrella of a functional designation called “International Affairs Specialist” (IAS), has only caused confusion, usually exacerbated when trying to communicate with someone outside the Air Force.
Muddying the waters even further is that fact that some animal called Political Affairs Specialist (PAS) is also a specialty technically under IAS tent; in simple terms it is a more general political-military expert and clearly not an analogue of the FAO program of other services. Many Department of State employees, having interacted with army attaches and FAOs-in-training, understand, at least superficially, the meaning and context of “FAO”. It is unlikely that IAS, RAS and PAS will ever have any name recognition to anyone who is not intimately familiar with the community within the Air Force, let alone someone outside the Air Force or DOD.

The Army example

The U.S. Army FAO program is mostly populated by skilled professionals highly seasoned in their regions of expertise and often proficient in a relevant regional language. Their professional development concerns take place within the context of a single-track paradigm born of a dual-track approach. Many Army FAOs have known both systems, and at the time of my embassy tours, Army FAOs could quickly relate stories of careers destroyed or buoyed by the Army’s varied attempts at improving and changing the system. Not surprisingly, the Army FAOs that I knew were unanimous in their support of the single-track model. They perceived the dual track system as supporting a negatively skewed distribution of promotion success—likely to provide a cluster of careers finishing at the lower end of the spectrum (i.e. MAJ, LTC), while allowing the occasional FAO to climb to the highest ranks of general officer. The single-track model, on the other hand, “smoothes” the data to centralize the distribution curve of rank, allowing a greater number of FAOs to end their careers solidly at the O-5 to O-6 level. From a self-interested careerist standpoint, the only apparent downside to this model is that the true fast-burners may find making general officer impossible unless they avoid the program altogether, or merely do a touch-and-go, returning to the mainstream Army to then continue the climb up the corporate ladder. The Army FAOs with whom I worked at my embassy postings, and whom I encountered on the road, were mostly regional “hands” in the classic sense. They were well connected to the local scene and on close speaking and socializing terms with both top level of host-nation military leadership and time-in-grade peers encountered through various opportunities over the years. In-country IDE is one example where many army FAOs became familiar with future power brokers as junior O-4s. In many, if not most cases, their language skills were impressive; while many of us struggled to gain competency once we finished with DLI and headed out into the system, most army FAOs had already been through various iterations of immersion. The single-track approach arguably contributed a large amount to this professional competencies.

A range of Air Force expertise

By contrast, the Air Force sample that I encountered in my two assignments was comprised of both FAOs and non-FAOs assigned to attaché billets, exhibiting a diverse range of language skills and regional education and knowledge. In most cases, attachés were learning on the go, with the level of regional studies and language based more on the unpredictable nature of the timing of assignments into DIA than on any coherent plan.

Through my travels with our offices’ C-12 aircraft in my two embassy assignments, I and the other pilot-attachés managed to observe a large sample of people and offices in action. While we encountered indisputably “great” examples of Air Force attachés, the variation was indeed great. The variation was even more glaring in the cases of some Air Force O-6s relegated to an AIRA or DATT/AIRA posting by the Air Force Personnel Command’s “Colonel’s Group”. Many senior officers, well past the 20-year point but for the first time experiencing anything outside the operational mainstream air force, found the job an odd fit at best. At worst, they sometimes came across as bit lost and confused by the role, or merely took advantage of the position to manage a bulky personal agenda.

On the other hand, there were obvious signs of outlying greatness. An Air Force O-5 DATT/AIRA I supported in some work in Africa demonstrated himself to be one of the most effective attachés we ran across in our travels. He employed our office’s C-12 quite extensively to support an aggressive and ambitious travel schedule. Not technically a RAS until he finished his tour, he nonetheless excelled in spite of the lack of training. This anecdotal experience highlights what many of us have most likely encountered in our careers: while FAO training, as well as a multitude of regionally-focused experiences, does act as an important starting foundation for a job in this line of work, ultimately it cannot replace hiring the right person or act as a substitute for competence.

A Dual Track Air Force

If we are looking to create well developed, “international airmen”, why not look to the Army for instituting a system, the single-track approach that seems to work after going through much trial and error? I am sure that this is a question pondered by many Air Force RAS officers even now as they complete training and head out into the field and staff.

As the first newly minted Air Force Regional Affairs Strategists, trained in a methodology similar to that of the Army—language training, an area studies degree, and some form of In-Country Training (ICT) -head out into the system, perhaps we will soon be able to track the careers of a prototypical Air Force FAO. Promotions, billets, impacts, and relevance can be assessed; data taken, results analyzed. At the time of a DOD-wide FAO survey in 2011, the official SAF/IAPA IAS website already touted higher promotion rates for IAS officers, yet the data was (and is) pre-
sumably limited. In fact, I would argue, this so-called “higher rate” is more likely correlative and not causal, based instead on the calculus used to select new IAS candidates in the first place, or people who had been inclined to pursue the IAS career track. This issue is a subject for further research and discussion in its own right. Obviously promotion is only one metric, but it is a “bottom line” deliverable that can be assessed—a gauge of how much the Air Force actually appreciates this line of work within the larger organization. In order to truly assess the program, a more qualitative, person-by-person and assignment-by-assignment assessment would be needed to obtain a feel of the efficacy of different approaches. Again, it seems that the Army has already gone through this drill, tried a variety of paths, and made up its mind.

The Air Force position and a lack of debate

In a 2012 issue of the FAOA journal that addressed the dual/single track debate, a representative from the Air Force FAO (IAS) parent agency, Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA), wrote an article describing the Air Force IAS latest manifestation and progress. While the Air Force FAO program, per se, has been in existence since the 90s, the recent changes that took place as of 2005, as the contributor pointed out, were the latest measures to breathe life into a program that has been on “life support” since its inception. The piece presented gave a brief history of the genesis of the Air Force FAO (IAS/RAS) program, and a somewhat specious justification for the dual-track approach. Of note in that same FAOA issue that ostensibly focused on the dual/single track debate was the distinct lack of contributions critically assessing the Air Force’s program. In general, there seems to be little discourse critically taking stock of the state and health of the Air Force program, other than the periodic submission by staff officers involved in the program (but not necessarily FAOs themselves), criticizing the “old” system as they present an argument for the “new way” of doing business.

Still, there are some voices being heard, and there may be more. A commentary in the Armed Forces Journal by Captain John Wright (Spring 2012), critiquing not just the FAO program but also the entire Air Force project of engagement with language skills writ large, is a positive addition to this vacuum. Given the rather extensive commentary by Army FAOs over the years, perhaps we can look forward to an increased volume of feedback from the Air Force FAO/attaché corps in order to truly judge the efficacy of the various attempts to produce airmen with what is the stated goal of “cross-cultural competence.”

I do not pretend to have any inside knowledge or understandings of the calculus made by the Air Force on this matter. Nonetheless, I can guess. While it would take this discussion in a completely different direction and is beyond the scope of the narrative here, a further probing of the Air Force personnel system of classification and assignments may indicate a system less accepting of a single-track approach than perhaps the Army structure. Moreover, this problem could simply revolve around the ever present need to keep pilots involved in the flying business. The Air Force remains a pilot-centric service, and the system (read: rated assignments branch) often shows a great reluctance in allowing pilots to leave the cockpit, even for one staff assignment, let alone a permanent transition at the 8-10 year mark. I suspect there may even be some regulatory guidance supporting this barrier. While obviously not all RASs are pilots, nor should they be, it is not surprising that the personnel system’s most problematic model is the one that must deal with the additional burden of this specialized profession that not only informs an individual’s specific career, but the identity of the Air Force itself. Materially this issue may in practice be articulated in flying gates and issues of pay, which could quickly lead to a decision to become a RAS being one of economics, as a potential pilot/RAS may have to forgo a considerable sum of money over a career if rules are not altered. In short, it could become a calculus of money, for both the service and the individual, to the detriment of the program.

A Single Track Pitch

This logically leads to a pitch for the single-track approach. Based on my personal experience and that of a small number of other RAS officers, there has existed little to no active management while we are in our “non-FAO” assignments. In my final four years back in the operational air force, there were sporadic emails from headquarters regarding language opportunities as well as requirements for continuation training. At one point there was a rather stringent requirement for some amount of continuity training, to include a recurrent oral language examination, in addition to the DLPT. To those in non-RAS positions, to which dual-tracked officers must periodically return, these mandates reveal themselves to be a continuation of the “do it yourself” mentality that defined the Air Force program from its earliest days. For example, to someone approaching the 15 to 18-year point of a career, finding time to pursue individualized language studies and/or TDYs in support of regional language sustainment, in addition to home and work pressures, may in most cases be a bridge too far. In short, because the Air Force has demanded of itself a dual track approach for ideological reasons, it must then deal with the implications of this policy, with the burden falling on the RAS officer and not the agency.

Additionally, there does not seem to be a clear channel of communication between a DOD/Air Force agency/customer/unit who may be in need of a regional expert and the RAS who may be working in some other capacity or assignment. In theory, the SAF/IA “handler” would be a good conduit, but in practice this does not seem to exist. This lack may partially be due to the fact that there does not seem to be centralized “handler” for a respective region’s RAS officers. As a Sub-Saharan Africa RAS, while there were various
administrative managers for the International Affairs Specialist program more generally, I could not point to a specific personnel-ist or desk-officer that was a main POC and conduit for Sub-Saharan Africa RAS issues. A position like this would seem to be a logical extension of the program, and almost essential in a system that demands the dual-track paradigm.

My opinion is that the single-track model affords the best options if the Air Force’s desired end state is the creation of the most highly qualified regional experts. It is hard to understand why the Air Force management takes such a stubborn approach in regard to a similarly structured problem that the Army has dealt with, and putatively solved, with a radically different solution. Indeed, in the 2012 FAOA Journal that focused on the dual/single-track argument, Major Jason Nicholson, an experienced Army Sub-Saharan Africa FAO, provides a compelling history of how the Army’s dual-track system failed, leading the program to its current single-track solution. In short, a dual-track approach not only resulted in (for the Army) lower selection rates for promotion and school, but also individuals with skill sets that could be termed, as Major Nicholson quotes it, “jack of all trades, and master of none.” Others have also written compelling arguments for the single-track approach. My take-away is that the arguments for single-track solutions are based on lessons painfully learned, while those promoting the dual-track solution are at best doctrinaire, promoting a philosophy or theory not backed by the realities of life or experiences in the field.

A Contrarian View

Is there hope for the Air Force FAO program? Perhaps. I am of the belief that anything can work to some degree, and as amorphous as this program and any program within the DOD actually are, there are always numerous ways to assess a program.

Nonetheless, I believe there are better ways to do business. At the end of my career, I have taken a more contrarian position. It is my estimation that the dual or single-track discussions ignore the bigger more fundamental problems and corresponding solutions. To be clear: I think that the Air Force RAS (FAO) program should cease to exist altogether. It is obvious that the program is not working efficiently or comfortably, and it may be too difficult a system to square comfortably within the larger Air Force structure.

Leadership has continually approached the concept of the “international airman” as akin to an exercise program that should be started, a New Year’s resolution made at midnight or perhaps cutting out carbs and desserts. It all sounds good in theory, but in practice it becomes too much trouble to do in “real life” (i.e., within organizational constraints and imperatives of the Air Force structure): the rubber never hits the road. Maybe it is time to compromise and lower our standards in terms of the program’s formalization yet retain goal of focused operational competency. On a more fundamental level, we need to assess critically (particularly in these times of limited resources) whether the Air Force really needs such a capability. In terms of officer development, the same issues with which the Army struggles remain, and are magnified by the pilot-centric nature of the Air Force.

I suggest that we select and then train with focus, a focus that would allow the Air Force to create highly skilled international airmen without the respective downsides symptomatic to the dual or single-track approaches. In other words, perhaps there is a way that avoids a member either losing relevance within his or her service or becoming a “jack of all trades, master of none”.

Second, I suggest a system where training and education would be focused and at the same time be relevant to the specific country to which an attaché or analyst is going to be assigned (as opposed to an entire region). For an attaché, this preparation would then lead to extensive in-country experience that could later be exploited on staff, and then perhaps generalized to a more regional approach. For example, if you have a country that has an air force composed primarily of helicopters, then a helicopter pilot may not be the worst fit in the world for this job; train that officer in the language, the culture and history of that country before sending him or her to that posting. This individual could then follow up with a short staff tour at a MAJCOM as a desk analyst before returning to the regular Air Force. After interacting with many foreign attachés during my assignments, I suspect that this is the approach taken by many of our partner nations and others. While the argument presented here could be a departure point for a discussion of the more general need of the FAO program service-wide, this is a question far beyond the scope of my consideration.

Given the nature of the questions posed by the 2011 DOD survey on the FAO program that seemed out of touch with any issues beyond Army-centric concerns, and my observations of the Air Force’s management of the program, I fear that both the DOD and Air Force will continue to “problem solve” the issues related to FAO management that would be better served by a critical analysis of the program more generally.

The Author

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BIRDS OF A FEATHER?
The Curious Case of U.S. – Polish Military Partnership and Defense Reform

BY MICHAEL S. HRECZKOSIJ, MAJOR, USAF

DISCLAIMER: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICY OR POSITION OF THE US GOVERNMENT OR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-303, IT IS NOT COPYRIGHTED, BUT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. EDITOR’S NOTE THIS THESIS IS A WINNER OF THE FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARD AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE. WE ARE PROUD TO PUBLISH THIS OUTSTANDING PAPER. BECAUSE OF PRINTING CONSTRAINTS, THE FAO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IS NOT ABLE TO SHOW FOOTNOTES AND ENDNOTES. TO SHOW THE AUTHOR’S ATTRIBUTIONS WE HAVE SHOWN THEM IN PARENTHESES ( ). THE AUTHOR PROVIDED ALL SUCH RESEARCH REFERENCES TO THE JOURNAL, AND A COMPLETE VERSION OF THE THESIS, WITH ALL REFERENCES, IS AVAILABLE AT WWW.FAOA.ORG

Introduction and Thesis
In 1989, the house of cards called communism collapsed in Central Europe. Regimes and political parties that had endured nearly unopposed for 40 years suddenly ceased to be. Much like William Cowper Brann’s socialites of the 1890s, these “sartorial kings and pseudo-queens have strutted their brief hour on the stage, disappearing at daybreak like foul night-birds or an unclean dream...” (1) Standing in the ruins of this precipitous demise were the leaders of the democratic rebellious factions, who were now charged with putting their countries back together again. In the decades since, there has been much academic work published on the marvelous transformation of communist political and economic enterprises into liberal democracies with market economies. However, another remarkable revolution has taken place that scarcely is appreciated or recognized: the successful transformations of communist-era militaries from instruments of control and repression into sources of national pride and stability. In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of communism, most governments in the region realized that security and stability lay with the west, specifically with the United States, the European Community (later the European Union), and NATO. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union set the roulette wheel of alliances in Europe spinning, and for most of the former Warsaw Pact nations, the ball landed on NATO. Thus began a complicated struggle to modernize and transform Soviet-dominated militaries into entities that NATO would consider viable enough in order to extend its defensive umbrella. This change was neither automatic nor simple. It took the concentrated effort of the civilian governments and the military leadership, in conjunction with NATO and American influence, to mold what would become (they hoped) modern effective defensive forces.

This essay seeks to deepen understanding of how military transformation is influenced by active partnerships, through a comprehensive analysis of the Polish armed forces between 1990 and the present. While Poland would have surely modernized in any case, the main argument presented is that the United States’ partnership with Poland was primarily influential on the direction of reform and modernization, which also strengthened the international bonds of friendship and cooperation. Initially, the security situation over the past two decades within Central Europe is reviewed, especially as it relates to changes in the armed forces. The evolution of civil-military relations and force modernization over two decades will be discussed. The next section will review the efforts by the United States to assist Poland throughout this timeframe. Finally, this essay will discuss the actual impact of the United States on this process as way of illuminating the value of security assistance in general.

Evolution of the Polish Security Situation
Between 1990 and 1992, the newly democratic Republic of Poland was in a very difficult position. The German Democratic Republic to the west imploded and then reunified with West Germany. To the east, the USSR came apart at the seams, even as it maintained two armored divisions on Polish soil. Czechoslovakia to the south was undergoing its “velvet divorce.” In the 1990, Poland had several security questions that needed to be solved. Would reunified Germany recognize the Oder-Neisse border? Would the Soviets contest the withdrawal of their troops from Poland? What would the threat be from the former Soviet Republics Belarus and Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR, especially regarding Polish territory that was ceded to Ukraine after World War II? These were dangerous times indeed, and Poland saw threats to its sovereignty from every direction. In 1990 the MoND (Ministry of National Defense) issued the 1990 Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland. Due to the rapidly changing security situation, unfortunately it was “invalid the moment it was enacted,” primarily because it was premised on the existence of the defunct Warsaw Pact.(2) The
most significant aspect of the 1990 Defense Doctrine was that it stated that Poland considered no country as its enemy, distancing itself from its adversarial communist past.(3) During this time Poland pursued robust political and diplomatic solutions to its immediate security problems. Between 1990 and 1992, Poland signed significant treaties with Germany, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Soviet Union. The border between Germany and Poland was a potential issue of consternation. The Oder-Neisse line had been established in 1945 as the demarcation between the post-war Soviet German Sector and Poland. Although previously both West and East Germany had separately recognized the border as legitimate, West Germany had insisted that no border would be considered final until after unification. Fortunately, in late 1990, Warsaw and Berlin were able to sign a Border Treaty with almost no fireworks on either side. In one fell swoop they had settled an issue that had been a source of instability between Poland and Germany since Freidrick the Great partitioned Poland in the 17th century. The following year, in 1991, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia formed what was known as the Visegrad Group (named after the town in Hungary where the accord was signed (4). The Visegrad Group offered its members a rapid official pivot away from the Warsaw Pact and towards the west, although its members were quick to reassure the Soviet Union that the Group was not a threat. (5) In 1992 Poland also entered into treaties of cooperation and friendly relations with Ukraine and Belarus.

The issue of Soviet troops on Polish soil proved to be a bit of a “sticky wicket.” The calls for Soviet troops to leave Poland began almost immediately after Solidarity gained control of the government. However, the vagaries of the still extant Warsaw Treaty and the intransigence of Moscow mitigated a quick resolution to the issue. Moscow initially tried to pressure Warsaw into signing heavy-handed bilateral “agreements” that included demands of remuneration for the cost of troop withdrawal. Felicitously, by 1992 the new Russian government relented and a treaty was signed to normalize Russian-Poland relations and withdraw all Russian forces.(6)

Diplomacy had resolved the most immediate security threats by 1992. Amazingly, Poland had negotiated its way into the best security situation it had experienced in over three hundred years! Seeking to solidify these diplomatic gains in the near future, in 1992 the MoND published the Assumptions of the Polish Security Policy. This would be the foundational document that established the principles of Polish security thinking for the next eight years. In this document Poland continued to see the main security threat vector coming from the east. Whether because of immigration or restriction of trade, Poland semi-officially recognized that Russia was a potential adversary and competitor in Central Europe. Unfortunately it had inherited a military that was created wholly for one purpose: to serve the strategic needs of the Soviet Union. The Polish Armed Forces (Wojsko Polskie or WP) in 1992 was a “legacy force”, heavily mechanized, and designed to support a Soviet attack on Western Europe.(7) Previously in Warsaw Pact exercises, the role of the WP was purely offensive; there had been little doctrine or training in defensive maneuvers, especially in the east. Warsaw recognized that it needed to restructure the military and reduce its size and scope to something it could both use and also afford. The 1992 Assumptions recognized the potential threat due to this downsizing, and set forth the goal of eventual NATO membership. (8)

Initially Poland found that its desire to join NATO was not necessarily reciprocated as strongly by the United States and the West. Some in Poland saw their accession to NATO as automatic, owed to them after suffering from decades of communism.(9) Unfortunately, the NATO allies were hesitant. There was a vigorous debate on whether NATO should expand at all or conversely, if it should even continue absent the Soviet threat. However by 1993 the United States was in favor of expansion and NATO set about the business of adding new members. In 1994 NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which allowed any European nation to enter into a bilateral cooperation agreement with NATO.(10) While membership in PfP was (and continues to be) open to all, for all practical purposes it has been used as a vetting tool for potential new members. Poland was one of the first nations to join PfP in 1994, along with twenty two other nations (including the other members of the Visegrad Group).(11) Eleven of the twelve PfP nations that eventually joined NATO were 1994 signatories. (The lone outlier is Croatia, a nation that did not exist independently at the time.) By 1997, NATO formally extended an invitation to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance. Two years later, in 1999 the three nations completed the necessary legal mechanisms and officially joined NATO as full partners. It was the fruition of the goals of the 1992 Assumptions, and marked the end of the first phase of Poland’s security transformation.

Between 1999 and 2003, Poland found its security complicated by threats it couldn’t have imagined a decade before. Just weeks after Poland’s accession, NATO embarked upon a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia. Operation Allied Force would prove to be a test for NATO’s newest members. While Poland had previously friendly relations with Serbia, it enthusiastically threw in its lot with NATO. Politically, Poland was vociferous in its support of NATO’s right to intercede with force in the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo by Serbia.(13) While it was not able to provide combat aircraft for the operation, it did allow NATO unrestricted use of its airports, and later contributed ground forces that participated in KFOR. Operation Allied Force was an abrupt reminder that the NATO Poland joined was not the same NATO they aspired to in 1992. NATO had transformed from a purely defensive Article V alliance, into the guaran-
tor of peace in stability within Europe. For Poland, Kosovo offered a chance to prove its mettle to NATO. Others, however, saw ominous portents for Poland. As early as 2000, academics began to worry that Poland was attempting to “punch above its weight in NATO.”(14) Unfortunately, the calls for caution would be quickly drowned out by the acts of September 11.

In late 2001, the United States was attacked by the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Poland, along with the rest of Europe, was shocked and immediately stood ready to assist. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, followed by the invasion of Iraq in 2003, represented an evolution of security threats that Poland could not have foreseen. In 1999, Poland envisioned a world order that was stable and secure, where there was no expectation of major combat operations. In 2000, Poland issued an updated Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, wherein major security challenges included participation in peacekeeping operations, strengthening the alliance, and military cooperation.(15) Terrorism received only a passing mention. (16) However, Poland was not alone in this line of thinking. The National Security Strategy of the United States for the year 2000 included terrorism within a spectrum of transnational criminal activities, handled by law enforcement and diplomatic channels.(17)

In the aftermath of 9/11, Poland began to envision its security solutions more in terms of its relationship with the United States versus Europe. This “drift towards atlanticism” had many roots, but the result was clear.(18) By 2003 Poland was ready to stand by the United States, even as other European powers found themselves opposed to American policies. In 2003 Poland also released a new National Security Strategy, which listed international terrorism, failed states, and weapons of mass destruction as the new global threats. With the release of this new strategy, the pivot towards the United States was complete. Over the next eight years, however, an incipient sense of feeling taken advantage would lead to a gradual easing of this preference.

From 2003 until nearly the present day, the Polish armed forces experienced an era of operational overreach. First and foremost, Poland joined the United States in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. After initially deploying 200 troops, Poland’s contribution quickly grew to 2500 troops plus some special forces. (19) Poland was given a division level command in the south of Iraq, overseeing the operations of seventeen nations. Poland also joined with ISAF in 2003, sending forces to Afghanistan in increasing amounts corresponding with force reductions in Iraq, peaking at about 2500 in 2011. While Iraq and Afghanistan represented the focus of the WP, Poland also maintained forces in support of a multitude of other regional operations, including KFOR, IFOR, EUFOR, Chad, EUFOR Congo, and the EUFOR Althea mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In short, since 2003 the Polish Armed Forces have taken a very active and proactive role in participating in coalition operations. A notable exception however was Poland’s refusal to participate in operations against Libya during 2011, which is discussed later.

Poland has seen its relationship with the United States wane somewhat over the past eight years while regional threats seemed to be re-emerging.(20) In 2004, the relationship was so strong that the Polish President stated during a lecture at Wroclaw University, “[Poland] must have excellent relations with America...I am convinced that, without the United States, Europe is, for the time being, incapable of assuring itself security.” [emphasis added](21) As an extension of this policy, Poland saw its role in supporting the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan as key to its identity as a “reliable partner.”(22) Since 2003 however, from the Polish point of view, this support has not been adequately rewarded.(23) While the United States has assisted Poland with military aid programs, the cancellation of a planned missile defense shield in 2009 was handled politically indelicately.(24) Additionally there have been significant problems with some of the equipment modernization programs the United States provided to Poland, such as the F-16 and C-130 aircraft. Some Polish military leadership began speaking out, claiming that the United States was “...pursuing a narrow, self-serving agenda” engaging in a global strategy, incompatible with Polish capabilities or military tradition.(25) Furthermore, operations overseas have hindered modernization, leaving Poland further behind in its efforts to transform the armed forces.(26)

While the period since 2003 has been marked by high levels of cooperation between Washington and Warsaw, the Poles focus has recently begun to turn inward again. Libya provides an excellent example of where U.S. and Polish interests failed to converge. It is unclear from open source documentation whether Poland’s refusal to participate in combat operations over Libya was due to political opposition to the operation or a lack of capability to join the mission. Poland officially stated that their refusal to conduct combat operations was due to the fact that Libya was not within Poland’s national interests, and furthermore the operation did not lie within the regime of Article V of the NATO treaty.(27) However, other commentaries at the time suggest that Poland recognized its overreach: “After a brief and premature foray into the league of superpowers, we have come back to our place in the ranks,” stated the editorial of a leading Polish periodical.28 This same commentary also notes that in 2011 Poland’s F-16s were not capable of performing air attack missions, nor could the country bear the costs of the operation.(29) Poland did, however, offer to assist with future stabilization efforts in Libya.

Poland’s current (post Iraq) Defense Strategy, released in 2009, still mentions terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as threats, but now primarily states, “Counteracting threats to energy security and a potential weakening of bonds linking the European
and transatlantic communities are priorities....”(30)
The strategy declares conditions for national security and lists NATO, the EU, the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy),(31) and the EDA (European Defense Agency), before it discusses the significant bilateral relationship between Poland and the United States. This is not to say that Poland has taken a policy stance against the United States, but perhaps it demonstrates that the foreign policy of Poland more accurately reflects the complex security problems in Central Europe.

Civil-Military Reformation
In 1990 Poland inherited a legacy communist military, with illusory civilian (or even Polish) control, designed to maintain the power of the Warsaw and Moscow regimes. One of the first tasks that faced the Solidarity government was to de-communize and de-politicize the military, to affirm the control of the civilian government, and to reorganize the MoND and the General Staff. This final step was particularly important, as it was a key requirement for NATO accession, and yet the most vexing over time. These tasks were simple in concept yet in some cases very difficult to execute.

Reforms proceeded at a quick pace initially, and then slowed down as the democratic political process brought about different successive governments. The first order of business was to eliminate the Main Political Department (GZP), and the thousands of “political officers” posted throughout the WP. Their function had been to ensure the military’s subordination to Moscow as well as propagandize the Polish soldiers into good communists. Following the abolition of the GZP, laws were passed banning membership in any political party by a military officer. Next was the reform and restructuring of the military counter-intelligence service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna or WSI), which was basically an intelligence channel direct to Moscow. The WSW was abolished, and in its place were two new agencies: the Military Information Service (Wojskowe Ślązby Informacyjne, or WSI) and its civilian counterpart, the Office of State Protection (Urzęd Ochrony Państwa or UOP). After the military had been effectively de-communized, reform moved into the strengthening of civilian oversight.

Under communism the defense minister had always been a military officer, and the ministry was mostly uniformed. In 1990 two civilian deputy ministers were appointed, followed by a civilian minister in 1991. In 1992 the “Small Constitution” was approved, but it had only vague language regarding how the President and Prime Minister would share authority over the military. The ministry was split into two organizations – the civilian MoND and the military General Staff. Unfortunately the “Small Constitution” left unclear who the General Staff worked for: the Defense Minister or the President. Two incidents illuminate the initial problems between the President, the MoND, and the General Staff: the so-called “Parys” and “Drawsko” affairs.

In 1991 Jan Parys was appointed as the first civilian defense minister in post-communist Poland. His rocky two year tenure would leave an indelible mark on the senior military leadership of the WP.(32) In 1992, amidst the national debate regarding the Small Constitution, the Silesian Military District commander General Wilecki had a confidential meeting with the National Security Director Milewski, a close advisor and representative of the President. Furious, Minister Parys alleged that at this meeting Milewski conveyed an offer from the President to appoint Wilecki as chief of the General Staff; in exchange Wilecki would publically support affirming the control of the General Staff by the President. Parys publically accused the President of illegally intervening in Defense Ministry affairs, and also accused the General Staff of participating in political games.(33) In short order, Parys was sacked by the Prime Minister, General Wilecki was appointed chief of the General Staff, the ensuing investigation acquitted the President, and, within two months, the government collapsed and the Prime Minister resigned.(34) The entire episode would henceforth create the belief within Polish senior officers that “civilian oversight equaled political infighting and was a damaging intrusion....”(35)

This issue arose again in 1994 in what became known as the “Drawsko” affair. The Parliament and Presidency were by then controlled by different political parties and an election was approaching. At the Drawsko Academy, President Walesa convened a meeting of the senior generals in the WP. At the official dinner, the President called for a vote by the officers on whether to dismiss the current Defense Minister, who was present at the dinner! Embarrassingly, the officers supported his dismissal overwhelmingly. (36) The act was later condemned by the political leadership on all sides and resulted in the 1995 bill that specified the control and subordination of the General Staff by the Minister of Defense. The President’s authority over the General Staff was henceforth limited to wartime only. This bill was enshrined in the Large Constitution passed in 1997, which endures to this day.(37) Another troubling area was the lack of civilian control and oversight of the WSI. The WSI had been created in the aftermath of the disestablishment of the Soviet era counter-intelligence bureau WSW. In many ways it represented the last bastion of military independence from civilian control. The major debate was, as always, in regards to who controlled the WSI, the General Staff or the MoND. In 1992, the WSI had been retained by the General Staff during the reorganization, which the MoND resented as a lone area which the civilians had no oversight. In 1996 the Sejm voted to enact a new “Law on the Defense Ministry,” which forced the WSI to be subordinated to the MoND, much to the consternation of the Chief of the General
The early 1990s was a period of not just rapid personnel reductions, but one in which the most modern equipment was rendered unusable in short order. While it was hoped that the reductions in personnel would free up funds for modernization of the force, the reality was that real budgets for capital investment fell until 1994, after which they slowly began to increase again. Between 1992 and 1999, the priority for scarce budget zlotys became procuring equipment that was NATO interoperable.

After joining NATO in 1999, Poland was required to continue its modernization. The confusion stemming from the “Small Constitution” and the power sharing arrangements between the President and Minister of Defense ultimately led to a lack of consistent funding for multi-year modernization programs. After a decade of half-hearted attempts to upgrade the force, in 2000 Poland launched the “Programme of Restructuring and Technical Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland 2001-2006.” It established minimums for defense expenditures and directed the increase of the share of the budget on military equipment from 8.3% to 23% by 2006. The five
year modernization program successfully brought real modernization to the armed forces. In 2009 the Ministry launched a new 10-year program aimed at completing the transition between vintage Soviet equipment to fully modern and interoperable gear. This program committed over 10 years approximately PLN30 billion ($10.5 billion) for new equipment, as well as PLN28 billion ($9.8 billion) on upgrades to existing systems.

The Air Force has benefited from the most significant amount of modernization. First and foremost was the acquisition of forty eight F-16s. This purchase was funded through the Foreign Military Sales program, to the tune of $3.8 billion. The deal was unique in that the funds were first directly loaned from the US treasury to Poland, who in turn then paid Lockheed Martin for the aircraft. The F-16 program included not just the aircraft, but also a logistics, maintenance, munitions, and training package to ensure the long term sustainability of the program. The Air Force also increased its inventory of Mig-29s fighter aircraft. In order to develop a self-sustainment capability abroad, the Air Force purchased eleven C-295 aircraft. The U.S. Air Force also donated five C-130E theater airlift aircraft, although Poland was responsible for paying for the training of the aircrew as well as maintenance and logistical support. Unfortunately the C-130 plan suffered from lengthy delivery delays, as well as low initial mission readiness rates due to mechanical issues with the older aircraft. In order to assist the Polish AF, the USAF leased two C-130s to use as a stop-gap during the delivery period. In the meantime, the USAF made a serious effort to bolster the Polish C-130 program by conducting numerous joint training exercises for aircrew and maintainers. Unfortunately the perception was that the US had given Poland junk aircraft in lieu of a substantial investment, and the entire ordeal left some at the MoND questioning the earnestness of US defense policy.

Poland also participated with NATO in two separate programs to increase its strategic airlift capability; an aircraft-sharing program with three C-17s shared among twelve nations, based out of Hungary, and a shared aircraft charter utilizing leased An-124s that can be accessed by fourteen participating nations. Finally it should be noted that the Polish Air Force also acquired a fleet of M-28 light aircraft and W-3 helicopters, both of which are entirely Polish-produced. The Polish Land Forces still continue to use large amounts of Soviet equipment, but they have been able to modernize a portion of their force. Because of the dramatic cuts in manpower, the Land Forces were forced to reorganize. The Army was reduced from nine divisions in 1989, to three divisions by the end of 2011. There are also five independent brigades stationed throughout the country. The T-55 Soviet tank was completely removed from service, and the T-72 is in the process of being mothballed and placed into storage. As a replacement, Poland utilizes a newer tank, the PT-91, which draws heavily on elements of the T-72 but is a significant upgrade. The PT-91 is completely domestically built. In addition, in 2003 Germany sold Poland 136 surplus Leopard 2A4 tanks (at scrap prices) to round out its armor corps.

Besides modernizing the tank corps, the Polish Army has moved to replace the Soviet BMP-1 armored personnel carrier with the new KTO Rosomak. The KTO is a Polish adaptation of the Finnish Patria AMV, which is built for design export to be customized by recipient nations. While some BMP-1s remain in the inventory, the KTO is slated to completely replace them by 2018, with over 800 expected to be delivered. Finally, the United States Army leased to Poland forty MRAP Cougars, to be used by the Polish ISAF contingent.

The Polish Navy has suffered from the least amount of modernization since 1990, and the situation currently is quite tragic. Like the mechanization of the land forces, under the Warsaw Pact the Polish Navy was a specialized force. The main wartime task for the navy was to be an amphibious assault against Denmark to open a northern front in Europe; thus the Polish fleet in the 1980’s was dominated with a large inventory of amphibious assault ships. After a short period of divesting many of its older Soviet warships, it has had to make the best of it with a few donated ships. The last entirely new ship Poland received from a shipyard was in 1994, the mine-sweeping ship ORP Wilczyze. The United States, through a program known as the Excess Defense Articles process, donated two Oliver Hazard Perry class missile frigates in 2000 and 2002, the ORP General Kazimierz Pulaski and the ORP Tadeusz Kościuszko respectively. Additionally, between 2002 and 2004 Norway donated to Poland five Komen class submarines, which allowed Poland to retire its expensive and obsolete Soviet Foxtrot class submarines.

The Polish Navy continues to operate a single Kilo class submarine. Of the five Komen submarines, one was permanently removed from sea service, to be used for training of new submariners as well as a source of spare parts for the remaining boats. The Navy’s small aviation branch was, and continues to be, almost purely coastal, consisting of An-28 patrol light aircraft and a mix of some rotary aircraft. With the addition of the Perry class frigates, Poland had for the first time two ship-borne helicopters to augment its shore based aviation branch.

The modernization of the navy has, at times, seemed like a comedy of errors. As an example, in 2001 the Defense Ministry announced an ambitious project for the Navy, in which they would acquire seven modern Gowron-class corvettes at a cost of PLN250 million ($88 million) each, to be built in the Gdynia Naval Shipyard. The program was then delayed by the Sejm’s inability to adequately fund construction. In 2002, just a year later, the ministry cut the order from seven ships to two. By 2009 only a single hull had been cast, and the projected cost per warship had ballooned to PLN1.6 billion ($560 million), a six-fold increase.
In 2011 the Gydnia Naval Shipyard declared bankruptcy after it realized it would never turn a profit on its linchpin contract, bringing construction to a halt. In February 2012, the Prime Minister announced the entire program would be scrapped, after having spent hundreds of millions of zlotys for naught. This places the current Polish navy in dire straights. They figuratively had placed all their eggs in this basket. Even the donated frigates have turned out to be a bit of a white elephant. The frigates were originally commissioned in the early 1980s and have been very expensive to operate on an annual basis. These ships were outdated even prior to being given to the Poles, and many of the onboard systems were either degraded or non-functional upon delivery. The United States has offered to refurbish and upgrade the frigates, to the tune of PLN500 million. However, along with the cancellation of the corvette program, the defense ministry in February 2012 announced they could not afford to refurbish or even continue to operate the frigates. Even the donated submarines will likely be stricken and sold for parts. The likely outlook for the Navy is the loss of its blue water capability and a dependence on a shore based coastal defense.

The United States and Poland

The United States and Poland have historical ties that date from the Revolutionary War. During the war Polish Generals Kazimierz Pułaski and Tadeusz Kościuszko came to the newly independent American colonies to assist General Washington. Unfortunately, shortly after the end of the American Revolutionary war, Poland was partitioned in 1795 by the great European powers and would remain off the map for over a century. The Treaty of Versailles restored the state of Poland in 1919, and positive relations between Poland and the United States resumed. After the German invasion and then subsequent Russian counter-invasion of Poland during the Second World War, the United States continued to support and recognize the Polish government-in-exile. However, in 1945, recognizing that the Soviets occupied the Polish state with no intention of withdrawal, the United States formally recognized the installed communist government in Warsaw. This effectively put to an end most positive ties between Poland and the United States for the next forty years. It should be noted that the United States provided economic and food aid to Poland from 1956 until 1989. Of course, since 1989, the relationship between the United States and Poland has been extremely close.

The U.S. government has an entire host of programs and policies designed to assist developing nations, most of which are outside the scope of this essay. Within the Department of Defense, partner nation security sector reform and security force assistance programs have become a major element of national security. The major programs that the Department of Defense uses are FMS (foreign military sales), FMFP (foreign military finance program, i.e. loans and grants), and IMET (international military education and training). At the military to military level, the geographic component commands engage in bilateral and multilateral theater joint exercises, participate in personnel exchange programs (PEP), deploy joint persistent advisory teams (JPATs), as well as coordinate for the use of the National Guard State Partner Program, and joint combined exchange training (JCETs – for Special Forces only). Additionally, since 2001 the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created new programs intended to fund training and equipping of foreign forces that are actively deploying to those campaigns.

In the realm of defense reform and modernization, the United States has been generally supportive of Poland, both diplomatically though NATO and militarily through direct assistance programs. There is a very close working relationship between the U.S. military and the Wojsko Polskie. Poland has been a recipient of all of the aforementioned aid programs in some capacity since 1991.

The IMET program has been used in Poland to foster senior level engagement with their United States counterparts, in addition to providing technical training and professional military education to junior officers. In 1991 the United States provided approximately $350,000 in IMET funds. By 2000, IMET funding levels would be around $1.6 million annually, with approximately 750 “students” total trained in some capacity. Within ten years that would almost double again, with an average annual IMET allocation of $2.2 million and a total of 1,642 “students” trained over two decades.

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Poland received money from the FMFP program in two modes – loans and grants.
The funds have been typically disbursed in grant form, with two exceptions. Poland then in turn used these funds to purchase defense articles, training, and services from the United States. Overall Poland has received nearly $390 million in FMF grants from the United States. Poland also took two loans through the FMF program. In 1998 Poland borrowed $100 million via the Central Europe Defense Loan program, and then again in 2003 Poland was granted a loan of almost $3.8 billion, directly tied to the F-16 acquisition. See Figure 1 for a year by year comparison of IMET and FMF funds.

Poland has used this funding very aggressively through purchases made via the FMS program. The most significant FMS case has been the purchase of forty eight F-16 aircraft as well as the ensuing training and logistical support. However there have been other purchases outside of the F-16 program. Since 1991, excepting the F-16 purchase, there have been about $600 million in FMS sales, averaging around $40 million per year. See Figure 2 for FMS spending since 1993. (Note the year 2003 was deleted from the graph to avoid skewing.) The United States also provided smaller amounts funding from a variety of sources, such as the Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program and the International Armaments Cooperation program. Finally the Department of Defense, through the Excess Defense Articles program, donated two Perry class frigates and five C-130E aircraft.

At the military to military level, the United States and Poland participated in a host of annual exercises and exchanges every year. Poland has taken part in EUCOM and NATO joint training exercises, to include Immediate Response, Jackal Stone, Baltic Operations, and Combined Endeavor. Poland also participated in direct bilateral exercises with the United States from all branches of the military. One particular area of note for bilateral engagement is the State Partnership Program of the United States National Guard. The American state of Illinois has been strategically partnered with Poland, and Illinois National Guard and Air National Guard units have routinely trained in Poland with their counterparts since 1993. National Guardsmen trained with Polish Land Forces in effective peace-keeping operations and non-commissioned officer development. Aircrews from the Illinois Air National Guard formed the initial cadre of instructors for Poland’s new F-16 squadrons, and also assisted with the introducing the C-130 aircraft into the fleet. The State Partnership Program does not have a maritime component.

**Analysis of US Influence**

It is difficult to assess with certainty exactly what the impact of the United States has been as a partner in Poland’s modernization. America’s influence can be analyzed along two separate lines: diplomatic and military. Prior to 2003, the most significant influence on Poland’s modernization was the desire to join NATO and then participate as an active member. The United States, as one of the lead nations in NATO, used its political influence in the early 1990s to convince both Europe and Russia that enlargement did not pose a threat to the delicate security situation. After NATO finally committed to expansion, it was the requirements for proper civil-military relationships, finalized border treaties, and the need for interoperability that drove Poland’s reforms until 2003. However, after Poland committed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, then modernization took a turn towards current operations. Poland’s choice to strategically ally with the US over Europe drove the tempo of operations over the past eight years, and thus influenced the focus of modernization. The wars were primarily light infantry land operations, with a requirement for air support for logistics. It is not surprising then that Poland moved to strengthen its land and air forces, to the detriment of the navy. In this way it can be seen that, through its diplomatic ties, the United States was at least somewhat influential in the direction and tempo of the overall Polish defense reformation process.

When it comes to direct military influence, the United States had a significant impact on the modernization of the Polish armed forces, especially in the area of equipment. The F-16s, the C-130s, and the Perry class frigates provided a boost in Poland’s military capacity. However, each of these programs had its own issues. The F-16 was chosen over the Swedish Gripen and the French Mirage 2000, for reasons that appeared to be politically rather than economically motivated. Furthermore, the more than $6 billion in offsets promised by Lockheed Martin failed to materialize fully, creating a sense that the deal was more favorable for the United States aviation industry than for Poland’s security. The C-130s and the frigates were both quite old prior to delivery to Poland, and the...
maintenance burden coupled with the lack of modern capability have caused the Ministry quite a bit of consternation. It is far more difficult to ascertain the impact of the IMET program and the joint military training the two countries have conducted over the past twenty years. While over 1600 students have received some training through the IMET program, and hundreds more have benefited from participating in U.S. or NATO exercises, measuring this effect is difficult at best.

An alternate method analysis would be to consider the negative proof. What would Poland look like if the United States had taken a Polish-neutral stance? What if the United States had not provided any of the FMF or IMET funding, nor enabled the F-16s, C-130s, or the Perry class frigates? While it is impossible to state definitively, it is likely that Poland would have modernized anyhow, but with a more distinctively European flair. NATO, through the Security Investment Program, has actually provided more average year over year annual funding to Poland that the United States’ FMF program and IMET combined. In either case, total foreign military aid has averaged only 2-3% of the capital investment fund of the MoND, not including 2003 with the F-16 loan.68 Poland’s modernization has been almost completely self-financed.

Without U.S. pressure, Poland would have most likely selected the Saab Gripen instead of the F-16, as the two aircraft were considered nearly identical in capability and lifetime cost during the bidding process.(69) While Poland would not have its C-130s, it would have most likely continued to increase the inventory of its EADS C-295 aircraft (after purchasing eleven in 2001). There does not appear to have been a viable alternative to the frigates, but considering that Poland is in the process of eliminating these ships, the long term impact is basically nil.

Finally, while there is no evidence that Poland’s decision to participate in the Iraq invasion was tied to the US aid programs, it is not inconceivable that a Poland more isolated from the United States could have chosen to align with France and Germany. If Poland had not participated in Iraq, it would have had significantly more funds available to modernize further. However, participation has provided almost 15,000 Polish troops with actual combat experience.

However, it must be noted that the analysis of the impact of military aid demonstrated that the scope of financial assistance was itself relatively insignificant, and that the hardware upgrades from the United States could have been offset from other sources. The lesson that emerges here is that even though the Polish armed forces would have surely modernized without the United States, the true measure of the partnership has been in determining the direction of modernization and reform, and the strengthening of those international bonds of friendship and cooperation. From this perspective, the Polish-U.S. partnership has been a success.

While the Polish-American relationship is certainly geo-politically unique, there are lessons regarding how partnerships influence security sector reform and defense transformations in general. All states, regardless of their size or character, seek to maximize their security through the most efficient use of resources, which usually implies military partnerships. However, the willingness of a small state to enter into a military partnership does not signal an abdication of its pursuit of national interests, nor imply an inability to improve itself in situ. Oftentimes, within the Department of Defense, security sector reform is seen as a linear process, in which arms and training are transferred to a readily absorptive partner, who then reciprocates by capably doing missions in lieu of American forces. When the partners fail to meet this unsaid standard, the partnership is seen as ineffective. This approach to “building partnership capacity” is short sighted and leads to improper measures of effect. Unlike traditional military combat operations, which tend to be linear task-goal oriented, security force assistance is a cyclical effort, marked by slow evolution towards mutually agreed upon end states. Direct military assistance should be seen as a mutually reinforcing behavior that reflects an overall strategic relationship. While each geographic component command may have specific targets and goals for a particular nation to meet, the success of any individual program or training event should be judged primarily on its ability to reinforce the national-level relationship. The funding for such assistance events and programs should not be tied to short term developments, which tend to winnow the scope of effect from the strategic to the tactical level.

Poland is an excellent example of a successful military and strategic partnership. Even though there are several programs that could individually be judged as failures, when taken together and coupled with the strategic diplomatic relationship, each program has done its job of strengthening the ties between the United States and Poland, as well as influencing the scope and direction of defense reform and modernization. For it is the relationship itself that is the goal, not the speed of reform; thus, based on this measure of effectiveness, the US-Polish partnership has been remarkable in its own right. Poland and the United States have truly become “birds of a feather” indeed.

Conclusion

The reforms in Poland’s defense sector have been comprehensive and wide reaching, and clearly the United States has taken an active role in assisting Poland in both the diplomatic as well as the direct military avenues. The backing of the United States was critical to spurring the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and Poland has enjoyed a special bilateral relationship with the United States as well, especially since 2003. This strategic partnership has fostered direct military assistance, ranging from training, loans and grants, and donation of military hardware. The militaries of Poland and the United States have trained and fought together, to the mutual benefit of both.
Cultural Background to a Looming Iranian Terror Threat

BY: ENSIGN NATHAN A. SAWYER, USN

President Obama’s first state visit to Israel this March has emphasized where our two nation’s policies align and where they diverge. While reassuring the international community that “all options are on the table,” the Obama administration believes that “there is still time” for diplomatic efforts to discourage Iran from producing a nuclear weapon. The Israeli leadership feels the matter is more urgent. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported as recently as August 2012 that Iran has continued to make progress with its uranium enrichment and is suspected of researching nuclear explosive technology. Israeli leaders, meanwhile, are growing far more anxious about the Iranian threat and their declarations that they will take unilateral action against Iran, if necessary, appear increasingly credible. As former White House adviser on Iran Dennis Ross explained in a recent editorial, “Iran is rapidly approaching the moment when the depth, breadth and hardening of its multiple nuclear facilities would produce a ‘zone of immunity’ in which an Israeli military strike would lose its effectiveness.” In the coming months Israel may be compelled to take action, which could have significant repercussions for U.S. military personnel worldwide if Iran chooses to use terrorism to punish the United States for the attack.

The regime’s strategic culture reinforces its inclination to use the threat of terrorism to support its strategic goal of deterring its enemies. Borrowing Willis Stanley’s definition from his monograph, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, strategic culture is “that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives, that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.” It can also be thought of as the traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and used by a society in the service of its political goals. When considering the basis behind the regime’s state sponsorship of terror and its willingness to risk retaliation by militarily superior enemies it is important to keep in mind that the leadership in Tehran is anxious about an impending conventional attack on its nuclear facilities. Iranian military leaders have warned that they could target as many as 32 U.S. bases in the region if this occurred.

Inciting terror operations could be considered a rational retaliation for or even a preventative measure against an attack on Iran. The regime may feel there is little left to lose as their nuclear program is impeded by sanctions, sabotage, and assassinations of its scientists. The deputy chief of the general staff of the Iranian armed forces, Gen Seyyed Mas'ud Jazayeri, has stated that they are “discussing the punishment of the organizers and actual perpetrators…” and that “the enemies of the Iranian nation, especially America, England [as published] and the Zionist regime should answer for their actions.”

In addition, Iran has devoted significant effort to developing its capabilities to use terrorism. The U.S. State Department lists Iran among the foremost sponsors of terrorism around the world. Over the last thirty years, the regime in Tehran has created numerous militant and terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Islamic Jihad, and supported others, such as HAMAS and militant groups in Iraq. These groups have then served as surrogate forces using terrorism and other forms of violence to advance Iranian interests abroad. The regime could use these terror networks as well as their own operatives to launch attacks on U.S. military personnel, civilians, oil facilities, and Persian Gulf shipping. The most recent example is the Islamic Republic’s training of a Syrian militia, the Jaysh al-Shaab or “Army of the People,” to help defend Iran’s embattled ally, Bashar al-Assad.

Although Iran prefers to use proxy organizations to conduct its terror plots, the Iranian conspiracy in 2011 to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States and attack the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington D.C. shows that the regime, which had not been accused of an assassination attempt for over a decade, has become more willing to take risks to try to counter the international pressure imposed through crippling sanctions and the perceived threats from Israeli and Saudi adversaries. Recent evidence of the Iranian threat the violent opposition of regime-supported militants to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The breadth of the regime’s involvement in Iraq is illustrated in the State Department Terrorism Report for 2011, which lists such Shia militant groups as Asa’ib al-Haq, Promised Day Brigade, and Kata’ib Hizballah [translates to Party of God] as receiving material support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). Lebanese Hizballah has also taken part in training Iraqi insurgents in both Lebanon and Iran, using their experience from attacks against Israeli soldiers to teach the insurgents how to construct sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and conduct kidnappings and tactical operations.

Admiral Michael Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in 2011 in front of the Senate Arms Services Committee that Iran has provided large amounts of rocket-propelled explosives to Shia militias. In his statement Mullen referred to June 2011, when more U.S. soldiers were killed in action than in any other month in the previous two years. He claimed that, with the use of forensics, U.S.
officials were able to trace the weapons used in these killings back to Iran. In regards to Iranian involvement, the same is true for coalition forces in Afghanistan. The same State Department report maintains that the IRGC continues to supply munitions to the Taliban and other militant groups while also conducting “training of Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire.” The regime retains influence with these terrorist proxies and can encourage action against U.S. forces in these countries, as well as many others in the middle east, should the need arise.

Victimization and Terrorism as the Weaker Power’s Weapon

The current Iranian regime’s support for terrorist groups is drawn partly from a cultural feeling of victimization and loss. Throughout its modern history, Iran has been subjugated by foreign powers and the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was presented to the people as an antidote to “westoxication,” or the harmful effects of foreign influence on Iranian values. This, in turn, contributed to the development of a conspiratorial mindset among Iranians. They see nearly every United States and coalition operation in the Middle East as an attempt to instigate regime change. Finally, the Islamic Republic’s support of terror organizations, both Sunni and Shia, stems from their extreme religious and revolutionary ideology. It is the Supreme Leader’s sincere belief that the fate of the entire Um-mah [Islamic Community] has fallen upon the regime. It is therefore Iran’s duty to take action on behalf of oppressed Muslims everywhere.

For Iran’s current leadership, acts of terrorism against U.S. forces offer a relatively low risk deterrence. Regime officials are very aware that their strategic goals far outweigh the capabilities of the regime’s conventional forces. Any Iranian misconceptions regarding the Artesth (regular armed forces) or IRGC strength were put to rest when they witnessed the ease with which the American military defeated Iraqi defense forces in early 2003. Iraq had long been considered a military rival of Iran. Along with sea denial in the Strait of Hormuz, which would block the shipment of forty percent of the world’s oil, acts of terror through Iran’s well established proxies are a likely response to any U.S. or Israeli action against the regime. Terrorism has become the weaker power’s weapon.

Iranians have a long memory and there is a multitude of events throughout history to justify their belief that the West is in collusion to bring about an end to the regime. Dating back to their initial contact with the West in the modern era, Iranians have been struggling to fend off western ambitions for regional dominance. The British and Russians, for example, in the 19th century split Iran into two spheres of influence. Iranian leaders were able to avoid colonization only by employing asymmetric tactics and diplomacy to play one nation off of the other. Western powers continued to dominate the country during the Second World War, replacing Iran’s monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi, with his son Mohammad when the former chose to abdicate rather than rule under the constraints of foreign influence. In 1953, the U.S. led a successful coup, overthrowing the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeg in order to remove opposition to western prerogatives in the country.

The current Iranian leadership has taken a consistently adversarial stance towards the West. One particularly controversial grievance that Tehran has brought against the United States is that the Washington overlooked Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (which the regime calls “the Imposed War,” believing the West encouraged Iraq to attack Iran) and continued to support the Iraqi dictator both financially and militarily.

Conspiratorial Mindset: Role of Distrust

The perceived Western effort to overthrow the regime affects every decision made by the Islamic Republic’s leadership. The regime views the two U.S.-led wars of the last decade, located on both Iran’s western and eastern border, as well as U.S. involvement in Libya and outspoken support of Syrian rebel groups as a plot to surround Iran and weaken its influence in the region. Iranian leaders have moved to restore their “traditional way” by supporting militant groups in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as providing arms and training to Syrian security forces in an effort to prevent Assad’s downfall.

The regime views U.S. condemnation of this support as yet another western affront and a double standard. They counter that the military ceasefire the U.S. government signed with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime dissident group that supported Saddam Hussein with the use of terror tactics during the Iranian invasion of Iraq, is evidence that the MEK is in fact a surrogate of the United States. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s current leader, has said that “the agreement shows terrorism is bad if terrorists are not American servants, but if terrorists become American servants, then they are not bad.”

The regime is aware of its conventional military’s inadequacy and Iranian leaders know they must rely on paramilitary operations. Because regime survival is the “embodiment of Islam’s authority on earth,” Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the concept of Maslahat [roughly translated as “expediency in the public interest”) to allow Iranian policy to stray from some of the traditional doctrines of Islam when the survival of the revolution is concerned. This doctrine would allow for the use of deceit and subversion to preserve the regime. It has been extended to justify the IRGC’s support of terror groups that engage in torture and mass murder. The Supreme Leader created an Expediency Council in 1988 to assist him in discerning “the interests of regime about when the supremacy of raison d’état would overrule the tenets of Islam.”
Ideology: Strongest Influence Behind Terrorism

The strongest influence behind Iranian support for terror is their religious and revolutionary ideology, because it is built upon both their cultural feelings of victimization and their conspiratorial mindset. The founder of the current Iranian regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomenei, led a revolution based on national pride as a way to end the oppression and subjugation that Iran suffered at the hands of the west. This is where the regime draws its legitimacy. The founding leadership used Shia Islam’s established clerical caste and general acceptance of an absolute ruler to sustain the revolution. According to this ideology “Iran and Shia Islam are one in the same.” Because of this conclusion, preserving and exporting the revolution becomes the most critical religious mandate.

Iran began supporting terrorist proxy forces immediately after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in part because the regime saw itself on the defensive against hostile neighbors manipulated by foreign superpowers. The new regime immediately began making efforts to export the revolution through like-minded groups as a means to undermine enemies and protect Iran. Iranian Leaders did not make any effort to hide their intent to subvert “corrupt” and “illegitimate” Gulf State leaders such as Saddam in Iraq or the Al Saud family in Saudi Arabia. When the Iranians pushed into Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. intervened. In order to protect Gulf shipping from Iranian attacks, the U.S. and Iran fought several engagements in what has become known as the Tanker War. The U.S. wanted to rein in the regime’s dangerous rogue behavior and force Tehran to comply with standard international norms.

The State Department’s report on international terrorist activity singles out the IRGC as the Islamic Republic’s principal means of supporting terrorism. The IRGC was one of the regime’s earliest institutions and formed by Khomeini himself in 1979. The Revolution’s leader gave the Guard the duty of protecting the regime against internal and domestic threats and exporting abroad the revolution that had been so successful in Iran. To accomplish the latter, Iranian leaders created a new branch of the IRGC called Qods [Jerusalem] Force in 1990 to take responsibility for all of Iran’s covert action overseas. At its founding, the Qods Force (QF) was given a broad directive that does not impose any geographic restraints and also “means it operates largely parallel to Iran’s foreign policy making bureaucracy, operating under the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s direct supervision.” QF actions are shadowed in secrecy guaranteeing deniability but are believed to be behind numerous armed attacks on coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In January of 2012 the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, addressed concerns that Iran may attempt to conduct terror operations within the United States itself in his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee. As further evidence of a resurgence of Iranian covert activity, India has reported that the QF was responsible for an attack on an Israeli diplomat in Delhi in February 2012. They are also believed to be responsible for bombings in Bulgaria, Thailand, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and Kenya last year alone.

Iran uses terrorism as a tool to promote its interests with regard to Israel, maintaining a degree of deniability to avoid retribution. The official position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that they do not actively seek to aggravate the peace settlement with the Palestinians but they believe the process is weighed in Israel’s favor and cannot yield an acceptable result. This stance might protect Iran from a military reprisal, but U.S. officials have used the substantial evidence of Iranian interference as a justification for current sanctions. The IRGC and Iranian Shia clerics were instrumental in the original establishment of Lebanese Hizballah, bringing together multiple militia groups and indoctrinating them with “Khomeinist ideology.” In line with Iran’s strategic ambitions of spreading Shia Islam, the IRGC succeeded in creating a powerful proxy that proclaims its loyalty to the Supreme Leader.

Conclusion

As tensions build between Iran and the west, U.S. forces in the Middle East must be aware of the resurgence of regime-sponsored terrorism. In concurrence with Iran’s strategic culture, the regime’s strategy of deterrence is based on what is referred to as their “strategic triad” which consists of “the threat to close the Persian Gulf oil export routes, missile or air attacks against high-value targets in the region, and worldwide terrorism.” Recent activity in Gaza and Syria, as well as broad evidence that past terrorism has proven a useful tool, suggest that Iran will fight on a number of fronts. The IRGC provides the bulk of the weaponry used against Israel by Palestinian groups, including some of the missiles and rockets that were recently fired into Israel. The deputy secretary-general of the PIJ has admitted that “the weapons in the hands of the Palestinian resistance are Iranian from the bullet to the missiles and their production plants.” The impressive success of Israel’s Iron Dome missile defenses and similar systems in many other Gulf States have diminished one leg of the Islamic Republic’s strategic triad and undermined Iran’s ability to respond in the case of an attack by U.S. or Israeli forces. This makes it even more likely that the regime will rely on unconventional tactics should it decides military force is needed.
LTG Vernon “Dick” A. Walters

Lieutenant General (LTG) Vernon “Dick” A. Walters - a bluff, jovial, astonishingly talented man died in Florida on 10 February 2002 at the age of 85. Walters’ multifaceted professional life included several interrelated careers. Beginning as an enlisted private, he was a fast-rising military officer; a respected intelligence expert; a savvy US ambassador; a globe-trotting presidential envoy; and an accomplished author. Walters was also a gifted linguist and translator, talents that played an important role in his rise to prominence - all characteristics of a veteran FAO had the program been established during this time. His friends knew him as a highly entertaining mimic and raconteur. Vernon Walters was born in New York City on 3 January 1917. His father was a British immigrant and insurance salesman. From age 6, young Vernon lived in Britain and France with his family. At 16, he returned to the United States and worked for his father as an insurance claims adjuster and investigator. The future general’s formal education beyond elementary school consisted entirely of a few years at Stonyhurst College, a 400-year-old Jesuit secondary school in Lancashire, England. He did not attend a university; however he did spend two years in Paris getting a liberal education in labor, economics, banking, and finance prior to working with W. Averell Harriman who was appointed by President Harry Truman to head the Marshall Plan organization. Among LTG Vernon Walter’s most remarkable achievements were mastering some six West European languages, later becoming fluent in Chinese and Russian.

Military and Civilian Achievements: Walters joined the Army in 1941 and was soon commissioned. His first tour was with the FBI Division 5, led by former members of the British Intelligence and Special Operations Executive. In this assignment, Lieutenant Walters served in Africa and Italy during World War II, earning medals for distinguished military and intelligence achievements. His linguistic skills helped him obtain prized post-war assignments as an aide and interpreter for several Presidents:

He was at President Truman’s side as an interpreter in key meetings with America’s Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin American allies.

He accompanied the President to the Pacific in the early 1950s, serving as a key aide in Truman’s unsuccessful effort to reach a reconciliation with an insubordinate General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. In Europe in the 1950s, Walters served President Eisenhower and other top US officials as a translator and aide at a series of NATO summit conferences. He also worked in Paris at Marshall Plan headquarters and helped set up the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). He was with then-Vice President Nixon in 1958 when an anti-American crowd stoned their car in Caracas, Venezuela. His simultaneous translation of a speech by Nixon in France prompted President Charles de Gaulle to say to the U.S. President, “Nixon, you gave a magnificent speech, but your interpreter was eloquent.”

Diplomat and Special Envoy: In the 1960s, Colonel Walters served as a US military attaché in Italy (1960-1962), Brazil (1962-1967, returning after his first U.S. Army Attaché posting from 1945-1948), and France (1967-1972). Two decades later he was a high-profile U.S. Ambassador to the UN (1985-1988) and then to the Federal Republic of Germany (1989-1991). He also served as a roving ambassador, performing sensitive diplomatic missions that included talks in Cuba, Syria, and elsewhere. He was sent to Morocco to meet discreetly with PLO officials and warn them against any repetition of the 1973 murders of two American diplomats in the region (serendipitously, in a much earlier visit to Morocco, he had given a ride on a tank to a young boy who later became King Hassan II). While serving as a military attaché in Paris, Walters played a role in secret peace talks with North Vietnam. He arranged to "smuggle" National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger into France for secret meetings with a senior North Vietnamese official, and then smuggle him out again. He accomplished this by borrowing a private airplane from an old friend, French President Georges Pompidou.

Senior Intelligence Official: President Nixon appointed LTG Walters as the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) in 1972. During his time as DDCI until military retirement in 1976, he worked
closely with four successive Directors as the Agency - and the nation - confronted such major international developments as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the subsequent oil crisis, the turbulent end of the Vietnam conflict, and the Chilean military coup against the Allende government. According to a close colleague, LTG Walters also "averted a looming catastrophe" for the CIA in connection with the Watergate scandal:

Despite numerous importuning’s from on high, Walters] flatly refused to...cast a cloak of "national security" over the guilty parties. At the critical moment, he... refused to involve the Agency, and bluntly informed the highest levels of the executive [branch] that further insistence from that quarter would result in his immediate resignation. And the rest is history.

LTG Walters himself reflected on those challenging days in his 1978 autobiography, Silent Missions:

I told [President Nixon’s White House counsel] that on the day I went to work at the CIA I had hung on the wall of my office a color photograph showing the view through the window of my home in Florida... When people asked me what it was, I told them [this] was what was waiting [for me] if anyone squeezed me too hard.

"AN HONEST PATRIOT OF ENORMOUS TALENT, HIS WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY RICH LIFE OF SERVICE TO COUNTRY AND HUMANITY. A NATURAL LEADER; HE ROSE TO EXCELLENCE IN EVERY PROFESSION HE ENTERED—SOLDIER, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIPLOMAT."

- GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FEBRUARY 2002

During the 1990s, when he was no longer a public servant, retired LTG and Ambassador Walters worked as a business consultant and was active on the lecture circuit. He wrote another notable book, The Mighty and the Meek (published in 2001), which profiled famous people with whom he had worked during his eventful life.

This biographical tribute was crafted by Henry R. Appelbaum, an editor at the Center for the Study of Intelligence. He drew on a conversation he had with Gen. Walters in 2001; the recollections of an associate of Walters; a debriefing after one of the General’s sensitive diplomatic missions in the 1980s; and open-source US government and media reports. Other sources: 18 February 2002 Obituary (The Guardian), personal accounts from a farewell address transcript he addressed on 8 June 1976, and Conference Proceedings prepared by DIA’s Joint Military Intelligence College titled, “Vernon A. Walters: Pathfinder of the Intelligence Profession, 3 Jun 2004.

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WA and is a 1988 West Point graduate. He is an Air Defense Artillery officer and Eurasian FAO. He holds a Master’s Degree in Slavic Linguistics from the University of Washington, and served as a Russian instructor at West Point. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001, Dave deployed to the Kyrgyz Republic, where he served as U.S. Embassy Bishkek’s first permanent Security Assistance Officer. He deployed to Baghdad, and then served as Chief, Central and South Asia (CASA) Branch, 3rd Army/U.S. Army Central (ARCENT).

In 2008 Dave was reassigned to the Pentagon and served as the J-5 Country Desk Officer for Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey. In 2009 he volunteered for a one-year deployment to Afghanistan, where he served in the Communication Fusion Cell of the Strategic Communications directorate, at International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) HQs. His most recent tour of duty was as Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Astana, Kazakhstan. He is now assigned at DTRA as a New START Treaty Inspection Team Chief.

COL Bennett is scheduled to become SDO/DATT in Armenia in 2014.

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keen interest in this part of the training and completed the course with a much-improved historical-cultural-geographic awareness. The two-student class size was a definite plus, allowing individualized attention. Six hours of class time, with a lunch break, is about maximum saturation for the students – and the instructor! Students worked as a team, helping each other in class and studying together at night, a de facto immersion situation. They used Google Translate on their smart phones as a de facto dictionary throughout the training (Ain’t technology great). Progress was informally evaluated during training. I enjoyed the time with the two bright, young, highly motivated marines. They made significant progress while I refreshed my own somewhat rusty speaking skills. I will be better prepared if invited to do this again.
Upcoming Events

Thursday, 19 September 2013
“FAOs on Tap” Networking Happy Hour
Rock Bottom Restaurant and Brewery, Arlington (Ballston), VA
Event will feature special guest speaker and book signing with Fred Harrison, manager of the CNortonNet and author of the Philip Bergen espionage thriller series. The CNortonNet is the leading employment matching, networking, and business development association for executive management, intelligence, and information technology professionals.

Thursday, 10 October 2013
Coalition Interoperability Breakfast Event (Speaker and Panel)
Army Navy Country Club, Arlington, VA
Sponsored by the Coalition Institute in coordination with The Foreign Area Officer Association. Event will feature invited senior leaders and members of the foreign defense attaché corps in Washington and a TBD guest speaker.

Friday, 18 October 2013
Civil Affairs Roundtable XIX: Military Support to Peacebuilding
George Mason University Arlington Campus
Founders Hall auditorium, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA
Sponsored by George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program and Reserve Officers Association in coordination with The Foreign Area Officer Association and United Nations Association of the USA – National Capital Area

Friday, 1 November 2013
Civil-Military Symposium: Military Support to Conflict Prevention and Annual Civil Affairs Association Banquet
Intercontinental Hotel, Tampa, FL
Sponsored by the Civil Affairs Association, Foreign Area Officer Association, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Coalition Institute, and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).

Thursday, 21 November 2013
FAOA Distinguished Speaker Luncheon
Ft. McNair Officer’s Club, Washington, DC
Invited speaker: RADM Joseph W. Rixey, new Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

News

From the Foreign Area Officer Association of Monterey (FAOAM)

The Joint FAO Course Phase I, which is conducted by Army FAO Proponent and DLI, continues to improve with each biannual iteration. To demonstrate its support for the training of new FAOs, the FAOA hosted a continental breakfast for the officers on one of the days of the course in June 2013. The FAOs not only gained exposure to an entirely unique facet of a military career during the course, but the FAOA presence also ensured that young FAOs gained awareness of the FAO network of support that will extend throughout their careers and beyond.

On 1 August, the Defense Language Institute FAO Program Office and the Naval Postgraduate School Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI) co-sponsored a reception for international officers attending the current Defense Resources Management Course. Over 150 U.S. and foreign officers, spouses, and faculty participated in the reception, which was held on the Quarterdeck of Herrmann Hall at NPS. Countries represented in the DRMI course included Colombia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan. COL Dino Pick, DLI Commandant and a Middle East/North Africa FAO, delivered remarks to the assembled crowd. The event was mutually beneficial to the U.S. FAOs and the DRMI international officers, because the international officers experienced hospitality from their American counterparts, and the FAOs had the opportunity to practice their developing language skills and improve the cultural knowledge.

On 22 August, the FAO Program Office and DRMI will conduct a similar reception for the next Defense Resource Management Course, which will include officers from Denmark, Germany, Italy, Mongolia, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tonga, and Ukraine.
FAO Association  
PO Box 295  
Mount Vernon, VA. 22121

Call for Topics
The journal is actively seeking articles on the following topics: perspectives from family members on life overseas, lifestyle articles, transitioning from military to civilian life, book and product reviews, advice for new FAOs, recommendations to improve FAOA.