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The Air National Guard International Affairs Specialist Program
Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals,

I have had the pleasure of working behind the scenes for the last four years on the Board for FAOA. For the past two issues of our quarterly journal I have done the layout and worked with our publisher to finalize the issues. With this issue I am very proud to announce that the Board has recognized me as the Editor in Chief. Our Editorial Board, chaired by John Haseman, continues to review every article submission and ensure that we meet the high standards of a peer reviewed journal. My part is to take the approved articles and put together the final product. Thanks so much to all of you who contribute great content and make this an outstanding publication. We couldn’t do it without you. Please continue to submit your articles to editor@faoa.org and the Editorial Board will review it.

This issue includes several of FAOA’s Academic Research and Writing Awards winners. FAOA President, Kurt Marisa, attended the Air University, Marine Corps University, NIU, and JFSC graduations this year to present awards. The Naval War College award was presented by BG Michael Byrnes, USA (ret.), a FAOA member and local resident of Rhode Island.

We congratulate all the winners and recognize all the hard work by the selection committees and award administrators at each institution. **This year’s award winners included Air University:** Air War College (AWC): Colonel Chee Mun Chew, Republic of Singapore Air Force, for his paper titled "China's Perspectives on the Major Island Disputes in the East and South China Seas: Implications for the US's Strategic Rebalance Towards Asia". Colonel Chew’s paper was also selected for the overall AWC Commandant's Award for outstanding paper. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC): Mr. Brian Gold, on-line Masters program student stationed at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, for his paper titled: “At the Crossroads of History: Viability of a Palestinian State: A Primer for the American Policymaker.” **Naval War College:** Naval Command and Staff College (NCSC): Mr. Edgar P. Tam, for his paper entitled, “The Fear to Attack: Leveraging U.S. Military Might to Deter Perpetrators and Prevent Genocide.” **Marine Corps University:** Marine Corps War College: LtCol Seth Folsom, USMC, for his paper "Why Can't We Win? Pitfalls in Modern U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations" Marine Corps Command and Staff College: Major Simon R. Westlake, British Royal Marines, for his paper entitle “Water as the Future Clash of Civilizations: A Fresh Conceptual Approach to the Global Trinity?” **National Intelligence University:** TSgt Melissa Radniecki, USAF, for her thesis entitled "Three of a Kind or Working on a Full House? North Korean Power Distribution Under the Third Kim" (thesis classified S//NF)

In other news, OSD approved final production proofs for the FAO Heritage Pentagon Exhibit on 26 Nov 2013. Left to right: Mr. Al Jones, program manager for the FAO project / Curator for OSD Historical Exhibits and Mr. David Edwards, Senior Representative from FAO exhibit’s OSD sponsor organization, the Defense Language National Security Education Office (DLNSEO).

Finally, as many of you already know from our email, long time FAO Colonel Bill Wetzel, USA Retired, and spouse Judy went to New York for the weekend on 25/26 Oct. Regrettably, Bill had a heart attack at their hotel late that Friday night and was treated at St. Luke's Hospital in Manhattan until 6 Dec when he was transferred to Walter Reed/Bethesda. He had a bit of a rough time at first but family and friends are optimistic and appreciative of all the concern expressed by friends and colleagues. They and Bill continue to need your encouragement, thoughts and prayers. Those who would like to send a card or note can find contact info on the FAOA Website.

Sincerely,
Graham Plaster
Editor in Chief
FAO Association Journal

@FAOAssociation (Twitter)  www.linkedin.com/in/grahamplaster
In June 2013 the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) and Department of State Training Advisor in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were brainstorming on how to better synchronize current and planned activities in the DRC. The result was the creation of “Lion Rouge.” Lion Rouge is the compilation of preplanned State Department Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) programs with remaining (unexecuted) military to military (mil-to-mil) events or funding at one location and concentrated during a specific time period. The outcome was a highly successful use of security assistance resources, a platform to demonstrate partnership capacity, and a venue that drew the attention of national press. In summary, Lion Rouge delivered an “exercise like event” at a significantly reduced cost and furthered the capacity of the U.S. Ambassador and Combat Command (COCOM) commander to leverage security assistance.

**Background**

The U.S. government provides a substantial level of engagement with the DRC via PKO funded programs. Examples of the PKO funded programs in the DRC are: the provision of a State Department Training Advisor, a U.S. Government Technical Monitor, train the trainer activities, civil military operations training, rule of law/ethics training (Defense Institute for International Legal Studies- DIILS), military agriculture programs (Borlaug Institute), the Company Leadership Course and Senior Officer Leadership Course. These programs have been conducted throughout the country with a high success rate, but they have not received much attention inside or outside of the Congo due to the immensity of the country and the wide dispersion of the activities.

The COCOM facilitated mil-to-mil program has suffered through similar challenges. Mil-to-mil events (generally a week long exchange) had taken place throughout the country on a variety of topics ranging from chaplainry, medicine, military intelligence, and tactics. Some events were better linked to policy and COCOM country objectives than others, but regardless, the U.S. had received little attention for the effort. The lack of USG security cooperation awareness in the past has prevented the U.S. Ambassador or the COCOM Commander from leveraging security cooperation.

**Lion Rouge**

Lion Rouge is a solution to the aforementioned challenges. Lion Rouge (originally called September Surge) was a 26 day event that focused PKO funded activities, mil-to-mil program-
ming, and other OSC resources in one location (Kitona Airbase, Bas Congo). The location selected is one of three major host country training areas, and is strategically located at the convergence of the Congo River and the Atlantic Ocean. The DRC has recently approved Security Sector Reform goals that outline the desire to professionalize their force by improving their military education institutions.

Air Base Kitona (BAKI) offers a diverse platform for engagement, as it is home to the Infantry School, NCO School, Artillery School, Nursing School, a learning hospital, a large airfield, and a nearby Naval Academy at Banana. Executed in the month of September during new recruit training (3,000 soldiers), the State/OSC team organized the following events based on available end of fiscal year resources: Legal training, ethics training, laboratory assessment via the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Research (PEPFAR) program manager, civil-military operations training (3 weeks long), airfield defense, nursing school engagement, female FARDC soldier sensing session, medical journal donation (courtesy of “Medical Libraries”) and vector analysis for the base.

To further enhance the event, a name was dedicated – “Lion Rouge”, a guidon was created, opening and closing ceremonies were executed, host city civil leaders were engaged, the U.S. Embassy facilitated a “Face Book Campaign”, the Deputy Chief of Mission hosted a reception after the closing ceremony, and the team conducted a press conference during the event.

By the conclusion of Lion Rouge, over 200 officers and soldiers were exposed to U.S. engagement over a 26 day period. During this period, Lion Rouge facilitated 105 PKO and 56 mil-to-mil contact days. Remarkably, the unprojected FY funding for this event was under $20k. This kind of medium cost/high impact event may compliment other exercises like the Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE). USARAF conducted MEDRETE at the same location with eight medical specialists over a ten day period at a cost $135,000. The average cost for the most recent COCOM regional exercise “Central Accord” (CA) execution was over $750,000 for two weeks, (total CA cost including IPCs was greater than $4 million). All of these events have been extremely valuable on the continent, however an event like “Lion Rouge” can compliment these pre-existing programs with little additional cost.

The enormous amount of positive feedback at the conclusion of the event indicates that the Lion Rouge concept has taken diverse, smaller activities and created a means to deliver high impact engagement that empowers U.S. efforts and addresses host country SSR requirements.

**Follow Up**

The goal for FY14 is to conduct a Lion Rouge II with a longer planning cycle. With a larger planning window the U.S. Country Team has more time to gain feedback from the partner nation and DoD can better plan and allocate mil-to-mil events. Additionally, other State Department and COCOM programs can be linked, such as humanitarian assistance, establishing an “American Corners”, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) training for the police, for example. Additionally, coordinating with other major international partners and organizations such as the French Mentors at BAKI, MONUSCO and EUSEC can further enhance the international communities’ DRC SSR assistance goals. If Country Team and COCOM approved, Lion Rouge at BAKI could grow into a multilateral event as well. Earlier planning and communication will also enable the host country to better plan, participate, and take greater ownership of the process. If determined to be a reoccurring event, Lion Rouge complexi-

SHAPE Team Discussing Air Captain (Dr) Hess (right) conducting Defense considerations “joint consult” at Kitona Air Base Hospital
THE USE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC SECURITY STRATEGIES

By Cory M. Peterson, Col (S), USAF

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Abstract
Much has been written about the who and how of special operations. To date very little more than a paragraph has been devoted to what special operations are and how they fit into a nation’s grand strategy; not only during times of war but during those periods between the wars. This paper was written with the mindset of taking a fresh look at the employment of special operations forces (SOF) at the political level of warfare in a time when financial austerity comes to the forefront of policymakers’ decisions.

In the 26 years since the stand-up of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) global threats have morphed. The world has evolved from a bipolar conflict characterized by the Cold War through what may be the end of major conventional operations such as Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Today it continues to evolve into an even more uncertain and complex state of radicalized extremist threats.

SOF has the unique capability of operating in a pre-crisis capacity to enhance regional security by working with allies and partners, in less obvious ways, to enhance regional partnerships. It can act as a preventative mechanism that helps build the community of nations and create a more stable and thus, prosperous, world. This paper sets the strategic context for future operations, defines the domain of special operations, and provides recommendations for the operational employment and education and guidance needed to achieve a security-enhancing situation. It is only by taking a fresh look at a collective image of what special operations are that they can be
used for the maximum effect in support of America’s national security strategy.

**Introduction**

“The only way human beings can win a war is to prevent it.”

- General George Marshall, USA

Hollywood shaped the world’s perception of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) when the blockbuster movie *Rambo* first hit the screens in 1982. In it, a Special Forces veteran, back from Vietnam, single-handedly takes on a small town police force. More recently, Sony’s *SOCOM 4* and Activision’s *Modern Warfare* series of video games have transported gamers into the world of SOF on daring missions to save humanity from rogue states and international terrorists. While each is entertaining, special operations offer America more than tactical-level entertainment. Special operations, at the strategic-level, have much more to offer.

As the U.S. military re-orient and restructures itself to address the emerging expected and unexpected challenges of the 21st century, military leaders must also refocus the employment of SOF to shape the complex, politically-dominated environment which America will likely face in the coming decades. Operating primarily in the political domain of warfare, SOF should expand its capacity to enable friendly nations to combat regional threats; at the same time it must maintain its current capability to conduct precision strategic strikes. Both of these elements of special operations are necessary to reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming involved in major combat operations.

As Admiral William McRaven, the current commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) states, “the direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our nation faces today.” He goes on to state that the indirect approach of empowering host nation forces is essential to changing the strategic environment.

**The Strategic Context**

The United States met the 21st century involved in conflict. Before the end of 2001, the nation was embroiled in operations in Afghanistan in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the U.S. In the years that followed, those operations expanded to the Philippines, Iraq, the African Trans-Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. Globalization, or the continued connecting of markets, communication, and technology, pulls the underdeveloped world forward at an unaccustomed and uncomfortable pace. Regional terrorist organizations have leveraged the power of the internet to collaborate and morph into transnational actors.

The 2012 Arab Spring revolution, which has affected Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, among others, is changing the political landscape of the Middle East. Demands for energy and natural resources continue to grow as a cause of conflict between under-resourced populations. The 2010 National Security Strategy provides a concise summary of the 21st century security environment. America will be challenged with “combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease.” These challenges surmount those that can be dealt with through military actions alone.

**Special Operations Force Employment**

How should U.S. SOF be employed to best support our nation’s security strategy? In order to answer that question a common definition of strategy must be developed. There are many sources to draw from to define the concept of strategy. Carl von Clausewitz, in *On War*, defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the object of war”. It should be noted that Clausewitz was focused on a militarily kinetic definition of strategy, as would be expected during the early 19th century. The military, in his day, was used to fight battles; Napoleon’s Grande Armée did not perform humanitarian relief operations nor engage in counter-nuclear proliferation operations. In Clausewitz’s time, armies fought armies. This fact shaped Clausewitz’s definition of strategy to the point where it is not well suited for use in this paper.

Another, more contemporary author, Sir B. H. Liddell Hart stated in 1967 that strategy was “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” This definition is somewhat better as it allows for the use of any military means to achieve policy objectives. What is missing in Liddell Hart’s definition, as is in the definition proposed by Clausewitz, is the concept of a plan; this is where a strategy can fail. One might take the Phase 5 planning in Iraq as an example of having a strategy, but not effectively turning that strategy into a plan for all to follow.

The limitation of using a classically oriented military definition is that each was developed to support the work for which written. A more inclusive definition, based on modern language and thought, is contained in the current Oxford Dictionary. This source defines strategy as “a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim. [emphasis added]” Here the Oxford definition shows strength; for a strategy to be effective it must be able to be comprehensively communicated in the form of a plan for all to follow. For the purpose of this paper, combining the three above thoughts, military strategy is defined as a plan of action, using military means, to

*(Continued on page 24)*
The Importance Of Foreign Language & Culture Training: Should SOF Increase Training Opportunities for this Crucial Combat Skill?

By Major Dieter A. Waldvogel, USAF
Major Brion Youtz, USA
Commander Eric Laser, USN

In The Art of War, Sun Tzu highlights one key principle of warfare: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt.” The question remains, however, how well do we really know our current enemies? Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan and Guantanamo prisoner, recently spoke about his opinions regarding America’s “myopic understanding of Afghanistan,” wondering, “How long has America been in Afghanistan? …and, how much do Americans know about its people? Do they understand its culture, its tribes, and its population? I am afraid they know very little.” This paper examines the importance of foreign language (FL) and cultural education and training in support of Special Operation Force (SOF) missions as well as the shortfalls in FL and culture training in today’s force. Finally, we discuss opportunities for the development of additional training opportunities for SOF operators.

Over the past decade, commanders at all levels have learned the critical value of incorporating an understanding of political, cultural and language differences into military operations. The lessons learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrate that the future of irregular warfare — counterinsurgency, stability operations, and non-warfighting activities — will require U.S. forces to work alongside multinational allies and among local populations to accomplish military and diplomatic objectives; objectives ranging from building partnerships in counterterrorism operations to providing humanitarian assistance. Success in these population-centric operations requires a level of cultural competence and language proficiency that, unfortunately, is not prevalent in today’s U.S. armed forces. As the tip of the spear forces, SOF in particular will continue to be at the forefront of population-centric operations playing the role of “warrior-diplomats.” Dr. Malvesti describes this SOF “diplomatic” role as one that “privileges the use of cross-cultural engagement skills for influencing, training, and conducting operations with indigenous populations and foreign forces.”

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept states “the joint force will need patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people to build the local relationships and partnerships essential to conducting future operations” (pg. 1). Experts in counterinsurgency operations argue that there is a strong relationship between cultural understanding and the ability to predict enemy’s behavior on the ground; a critical skill for today’s SOF operators.

Today, roughly 255,000 out of the 1.3 million U.S. military personnel find themselves deployed in 156 countries around the world. Included in these numbers are over 12,000 SOF and SOF support personnel deployed in more than 75 countries. It is clear that our military leaders can no longer afford to neglect the FL training and regional acculturation needs of our deployable forces in general and SOF in particular.

In 2009, then USSOCOM Commander, Admiral Eric Olson, mandated a dramatic increase in SOF language training, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC). Admiral Olson’s guidance was to “maintain a basic level of linguistic ability appropriate for a globally employed force, while achieving a high-level of skill by a relatively small number of people in language specific to regions of current and certain future employment.” According to Admiral Olson’s mandate, SOF operators should not rely solely on interpreters whose dependability and effectiveness may depend on the interpreter’s English fluency, intelligence, ability to translate accurately, reliability and personal loyalty.

Fortunately, since 9-11, the DOD has also responded with an increased commitment to language and acculturation training for the armed forces. According to a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report:

“The Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken a number of steps over the past several years to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, including designating Senior Language Authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and other DOD components; developing a governance structure; updating policies; and publishing the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap — the primary document that DOD has used to guide its efforts to date” (pg 4).

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also directs DOD leaders to continue to improve professional military education by developing FL, regional, and cultural expertise in our military forces. In addition, Joint Publication 3-0 states: “Language skills, regional knowledge, and cultural awareness enable effective joint operations… Deployed joint forces must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native popula-
tions, local and national government officials, and coalition partners” (pg III-19).

Despite these recent efforts by the DOD to increase opportunities for language education and acculturation training for all our servicemen and woman, the government, as well as civilian institutions, lacks the infrastructure to support this need. A recent report by the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee concluded that “our (civilian) educational system does not place a priority on, and lacks the infrastructure to support, the widespread teaching of FL, not to mention the less commonly taught languages needed by today’s (military) force[s].” While the further context clarifies that “our educational system” is the civilian education system, it also continues to argue that the lack of emphasis on language education deprives the services of linguistically trained personnel.

The same argument can be made regarding the U.S. military education system: that professional military education (PME) does not place a priority on, and lacks the infrastructure to support, the widespread teaching of FL and culture, and more importantly, PME lacks the infrastructure and emphasis to sustain language and cultural proficiency. Unfortunately, for a large majority of U.S. SOF personnel, language and culture training is provided only as part of the initial SOF training and qualification process. With the exception of a limited number of SOF operators, any additional language and cultural expertise is gained through direct immersion in the field or by individual effort, and not from formal training provided by DOD-sponsored education programs.

There is no shortage of DOD guidance directing all services and joint commands to develop additional FL and acculturation training opportunities for military forces. However, today’s fiscal reality and operations tempo present a major challenge to the DOD’s aim of promoting training opportunities on a broad scale. FL and cultural expertise programs, including advanced degrees in regional studies, often involve a two to three year commitment. Yet completion of these programs offer marginal career advancement opportunities in traditional SOF career paths and thus tends to become a lower priority. This must change. LTC David Jewell points out that the military drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing in-garrison time offer an excellent opportunity to introduce additional cultural and language education into fundamental and routine Army training. The same can be said for the other services as military forces return from the war and dwell time increases.

Current state of SOF foreign language and acculturation training

Current FL and culture training programs conducted by the Navy’s Special Warfare Center (NSWCEN) and the Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), while deemed critically essential, have extended the already extreme-ly demanding pipeline of a U.S. special operations trainee. The USAJFKSWCS basic program consists of 18 to 24 weeks of classroom-based language training. Languages are broken into two categories based on their degree of difficulty. Military personnel assigned to a Category I or II language are enrolled in an 18-week language program, while those assigned to a more difficult Category III or IV language attend 24 weeks of language training.

Students focus on mastering 33 critical tasks while developing cultural and socio-linguistic competency at a very basic 1/1 level as measured by the Two-Skill Oral Proficiency Interview (TSOPI). The U.S. Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) describes 1/1 speaking skills as a FL speaker who is “able to satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversations on familiar topics. A native speaker must often use slowed speech, repetition, paraphrase, or a combination of these to be understood by this individual.” Soldiers who demonstrate a high level of language aptitude may be selected to attend an intermediate or advanced course consisting of up to 30 additional weeks of training, including six weeks of training on culture and regional studies. Graduates of the advanced program will demonstrate a rating of 3/3/3 for listening, reading and speaking.

Based on Admiral Olsen’s direction, students at the Navy’s SEAL and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman (SWCC) programs now attend a concentrated 12-week language course aimed at getting Navy operators communicating at a very basic 1/1 level of proficiency as well. Currently, there is no Navy-sponsored advanced language or regional training for SOF operators. However, a few veteran operators are offered the opportunity to acquire additional training at various universities.

Another limiting factor the services are facing in today’s austere fiscal environment is the cost of language and culture training and education. The price tag varies per service and per school, but the most accurate estimate given by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center is $131,000 per student, including overhead costs. The average cost per student for a graduate degree in foreign languages is $25,200 not including overhead costs.

Potential alternatives and way ahead

As stated by Linda Robinson, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in her 2011 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “the nature of evolving challenges ahead will require the U.S. to use SOF in a more proactive role, developing partnerships with foreign militaries around the world.” Inherent to this refocus (and stated earlier in this paper) is that SOF needs to readdress the language and cultural training that has declined over the past decade. A quick and superficial look at the drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest that

(Continued on page 53)
Refining the Navy FAO Community

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER KEVIN A. SELF,
U.S. NAVY

Introduction

The Navy inaugurated the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program in 2006, fulfilling the 2005 Department of Defense (DoD) mandate to establish a cadre of international engagement professionals. Since then, USN FAO leadership has expended great amounts of time and energy developing the program from words on paper to a concrete group of officers with the requisite qualifications. At the same time, a tremendous level of effort has gone toward educating the Navy about the new FAO community and seeking to identify the proper billets that best utilize FAO capabilities and expertise. As part of the process to “sell” the FAO community, leadership has largely emphasized its value based on one of six strategic imperatives found in the 2007 Maritime Strategy – Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships with more International Partners.

Indeed the Maritime Strategy’s strategic imperative speaks to the Navy FAO mission, but it does not completely define it. In fact, there exists no formal document that explicitly states the Navy FAO mission. This is problematic, as FAOs try both to execute their daily duties and to prove their usefulness to the service. Equally lacking is any formal document providing direction to FAOs on exactly what their duties entail and how to carry out those duties. Although the US defense establishment has been engaging with international partners since its inception, there is surprisingly little written guidance on how to form military alliances successfully.

Perhaps issuance of such guidance is not feasible, given that fostering relationships with partner nation militaries is a nebulous precept at best, requiring varied and distinct approaches that are impossible to capture in a single document. The methods used to engage with Country X may be completely different than those used with Country Y, due to various political, economic, and cultural factors. Yet, while the endeavor to seek foreign allies is nothing new, only in the last seven years has DoD mandated that the services establish a cadre of officers specifically for this purpose, stressing the importance of engaging with international partners, and also ostensibly creating the expectation that the process by which engagement is accomplished is somehow improved. It stands to reason, then, that the FAO community should develop guidance for FAOs, providing clear direction on their mission along with a pragmatic methodology on how best to execute that mission. Unfortunately, with internal focus on building the FAO corps and external efforts at identifying FAO billets, little time has remained for the community to develop any sort of guiding document.

In a first attempt to fill that void, this article postulates a FAO mission statement, as well as presents a theoretical framework on how to execute that mission. Despite the varied methodologies and practices in international relations, if one strips away the political, economic, and cultural differences, there are fundamental “building blocks” or levels of engagement that must be accomplished with all partner nations. These core building blocks are the key to fulfilling the FAO mission, but before examining them in more detail, the FAO mission must first be defined.

What is the FAO Mission?

To define the FAO mission, the logical place to start is by referencing the documents that created the FAO program. Department of Defense Directive 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs, mandated that the Military Departments develop a corps of FAOs with the capabilities necessary to “facilitate close and continuous military-diplomatic interaction with foreign governments and, in particular, with their defense and military establishments, which is essential to developing and maintaining constructive mutually supportive, bilateral and multilateral military activities and relationships across the range of operations.”

DoDD 1315.17 was followed a year later by OPNAVINST 1301.10B, Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program, which promulgated policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the management of the Navy FAO program. As such, the OPNAV Instruction focused mainly on the actions necessary to establish the program, only providing one generic sentence on the purpose. “The goal of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is to produce a cadre of officers with the skills required to manage and analyze political-military activities overseas.”

Recognizing the inadequate definition provided in OPNAVINST 1301.10B, the subsequent release of SECNAVINST 1301.7, Department of the Navy Foreign Area Officer Programs, provided more fidelity to the program.

“FAOs provide critical war fighting capabilities, including professional military skills, and proficiency and understanding of language, regional expertise and culture (LREC), to influence plans and operations, build and strengthen international partnerships, and serve as key enablers for joint, maritime, and expeditionary forces.”

The SECNAV Instruction also fairly specifically identifies the billets FAOs serve in.

“FAOs shall be the primary nominees from within the DON to serve in Service, Joint, and Interagency assignments that involve significant interaction with foreign governments and their militaries, foreign na-
tionals, foreign entities, and or international organizations; provide regional expertise from the political, military, and strategic perspective for planning and executing operations; observe and report on international military issues; serve in liaison, attaché and or military-diplomat, and representational roles to other nations; and oversee security assistance.”

With such a wide range of assignments, daily duties will vary markedly depending on the billet and region/country assigned. For example, a staff job as a Political-Military Desk Officer for Region X accomplishes daily duties quite distinct from, say, a Navy Section Chief in a Security Cooperation Office in Country Y. Not only do the daily duties differ, but USG strategic objectives will vary between countries and regions, making it all the more important that the overall FAO mission is well defined. Therefore, applying the above guidance along with a dose of practical knowledge, the following mission statement is proposed:

Foreign Area Officers execute USG strategic, operational, and tactical guidance in the international arena by fostering bilateral and multilateral relationships with partner nation militaries to achieve desired end states.

How do FAOs Execute their Mission?

There are many USG documents that provide guidance to DoD for international engagement. The White House, Congress, and DoD all publish various strategies and guiding documents that emphasize the need to foster security partnerships with foreign nations/militaries. While USG strategic goals vary by country and region and daily FAO responsibilities differ from billet to billet, every FAO should, in some way, be accomplishing the FAO mission by executing the provided guidance with the intent of achieving the desired end states prescribed therein.

In practice, particularly relevant to those working in direct contact with partner nation militaries, FAOs will generally find themselves thrust into the center of a large number of engagements orchestrated by DoD, DoS, and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. Carrying out the day-to-day tasks necessary to complete these activities can easily consume every minute of every workday. The analysis required to ensure the planned activities are readily achievable as well as effectively working toward the desired strategic end state can often be lost in the shuffle.

In this regard, this article proposes a universal framework for fostering cooperative relationships. There are seven proposed “building blocks” that must be completed in order to establish and sustain a partnership capable of achieving a desired end state. These building blocks – Political Will, Military Will and Ability, Planning, Capacity Building, Combined Exercise, Combined Operations/Responses, and Alliance – are graphically represented in the Security Cooperation Pyramid (Figure 1). Theoretically, the seven building blocks must be completed sequentially in order arrive at the desired end state most effectively and efficiently. For example, it would be folly to engage in capacity building with a foreign navy intending to reach an end state that the partner nation has shown no political will to attain.

In practice, however, the building blocks are accomplished simultaneously, whereby analysis of political will is occurring at the same time as planning for a combined exercise, say. However, of utmost importance is that failure to ensure that each building block is adequately addressed will likely result in failure to reach the desired end state, or achieving the end state at a much greater cost. While the universal building blocks depicted represent the overarching framework to establish an enduring partnership with a foreign military successfully, within each level lies the multitude of “tools” FAOs use to build the relationship. The following paragraphs provide further detail on each of the seven building blocks.

Security Cooperation Pyramid Building Blocks: Political Will

The first step in fostering bilateral and multilat-

(Continued on page 29)
Completing the Model for Foreign Area Officer Regional Affairs Strategist Training and Education

BY COL MARK CHAKWIN, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

More Foreign Area Officers and Regional Affairs Strategists (FAO/RAS) are serving in policy, intelligence and operational assignments worldwide than ever before. Defense leaders depend heavily on FAO/RAS to help them identify, understand and deal with current and emerging security challenges. As today’s FAO/RAS mature in progressively senior assignments, they are assuming leading roles in nurturing existing partnerships and in developing new defense contacts.

These FAO/RAS have been carefully selected and trained in foreign language, in-country orientations, and even in graduate studies at relevant programs. Those designated for attaché duty attended the Joint Military Attaché course (JMAS). While those selected for Security Cooperation assignments matriculated at Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) courses. Many have attended Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME2) at Norfolk; but at that point, the official preparation and sustainment for these leading FAO/RAS stopped.

FAO/RAS officers do share in traditional professional military education (PME) opportunities like Intermediate Level Education (ILE/War College), the already-mentioned JPME2, or even the Senior Service Colleges. In addition, there are foreign language training and sustainment initiatives currently available and in development. However, the FAO/RAS specialty has no official training step to sustain professional knowledge and skills at the advanced level.

Some will opine that FAO/RAS are trained well enough already. Others may warn that FAO/RAS are not academics, but this article is no endorsement of "l'éducation pour l'éducation." Instead, it underscores that senior FAO/RAS, perhaps the most influential demographic in the FAO/RAS field, have neither methods to assess their essential professional knowledge, nor means to sustain, or advance, that knowledge beyond the entry level.

This might not seem significant, but it is. FAO/RAS, and senior FAO/RAS in particular, are relied upon for their mastery of three distinct professional knowledge domains [see Figure 1]. However, these knowledge domains are complex, nuanced and, most significant for FAO/RAS, they change. FAO/RAS must use this professional knowledge to grasp dynamic, often non-sequential, developments in target countries (regions). Their understanding must span from tactical to strategic, and from the personal to the societal. At the same time, they must comprehend current U.S. goals and appreciate their U.S. senior leadership’s focus. It is imperative that FAO/RAS know how to relate their knowledge to that focus. Put another way, FAO/RAS are expected to operate and deliver at the top of the Bloom taxonomy pyramid. This can’t happen without constant attention to both knowledge and professional skills. Without a periodic ‘knowledge reset,’ the effectiveness of the FAO/RAS diminishes.

Of course, senior FAO/RAS are effective. When faced with “adapt or fail situations,” they do all they can. Unfortunately, they do this on their own, because of the hole in their professional training model. Their “home sustainments” typically are constrained by current duty demands, experience, and by resource availability. The current FAO/RAS standard training model is missing an important step. Indeed, if history’s record of disastrous foreign policy blunders is considered, it is not only an important step – it is essential.

This is not a novel observation. It has been considered and shuffled between the “too hard” and “too expensive” action boxes by a variety of otherwise results-focused leaders. Fortunately, a solution was developed and tested by the Department of Defense proponent for the Foreign Area Officer specialty, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness [OSD (P&R)].

This journal already has published much on the solution, the Joint FAO program. It was crafted by OSD (P&R)’s Defense Language Office (DLO) (now part of the Defense Language and National Security Education Office/
DLNSEO), and implemented by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in late 2008. NPS shaped an effective solution, and in doing so also delivered a unique tool called FAOweb. FAOweb supports the program’s courses, but it also has become a vanguard in molding and promoting a joint FAO/RAS culture.

Feedback from Joint FAO program participants and stakeholders has been overwhelmingly positive. The program’s success has confirmed that a concise program to sustain and advance vital skills is practical and effective. The next step is transition into the Services’ FAO/RAS professional lifecycle model.

Understanding what senior FAO/RAS need and why is complicated, but crafting a transition for the pilot program is even more complicated. Any change will affect many stakeholders, including DLNSEO, the Services, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands and their Regional Centers, Defense Agencies, NPS, DLI and even PME institutions. All are invested in, and may provide a piece of, the solution. Presenting even an overview of the feasible options here would fill an entire article.

The “final” solution is in the hands of DLNSEO and the Services, but they will need the support of many, if not most, other stakeholders. However, starting transition now to capitalize on the DLNSEO–NPS success is possible and sound. Essential FAO/RAS professional sustainment is no longer caught between the too hard, or too costly inboxes.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mark Chakwin retired from the Army as a Colonel in 2011. As a FAO he has served as DATT Hanoi (2005–2008) and in ODC overseas, and in policy and Intelligence assignments in CO-NUS and at USPACOM. He was the U.S. Army FAO Chair at the Navy Postgraduate School when the Joint FAO program was developed there.

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**ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGE DOMAINS**

FAO/RAS rely on a wide range of knowledge and leadership skills in their work. But to provide effective support to senior leaders in operational, policy or intelligence positions, they must master three types of sensitive, short-lived professional knowledge:

#1. **Expert knowledge of the target country’s culture, current national objectives and foreign policy goals.**
Human nature will never change, but even the best knowledge of a target nation has a short shelf life. Security goals for nation states, or non-state actors, are never static. More importantly, the means they use to achieve goals evolve as well. Internal phenomena and external developments create pressures that mask or alter a nation’s decision-making and complicate FAO/RAS analysis. “Getting it right” requires a current and deep understanding of what is going on in the target and why.

#2. **Expert knowledge of current U.S. goals for the target country (region), and of the means available to reach those goals.**
U.S. government policy goals and priorities evolve, or shift more frequently than most realize, and FAO/RAS must keep current and understand them. However, that is not enough. FAO/RAS also need a canny appreciation of all tools available for the policy making or intelligence producing effort. This includes a clear personal awareness of the acceptable limits to taking action.

#3. **Expert knowledge of the genuine decision-making processes, both there and here.**
FAO/RAS in remote postings with great responsibility, or in senior positions at home, will fail if they do not understand how foreign counterparts operate internally and how they make decisions. So, too, FAO/RAS must not ignore how U.S. stakeholders work and win inside Defense, the Interagency and with Congress. In short, know the politics of the target country and for all your stakeholders back (at) home. If this knowledge is missing or even out of date, FAO/RAS simply can’t be effective.
The FAO Association and the Coalition Institute jointly hosted the International Military Interoperability Summit at the Army Navy Country Club on 10 October 2013. The guest speaker, Major General Eric Vollmecke, was followed by a senior FAO panel including Brigadier General John Adams, U.S. Army (Retired), Colonel Eric Larson, U.S. Army, and Captain Rob Palm, U.S. Navy. Defense Attachés from the Washington, D.C. diplomatic community were guests of honor at this annual international military summit, which discussed the best means for enhancing international military interoperability during coalition operations.

General Vollmecke is the Air National Guard (ANG) Assistant to the Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe/Africa, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He leads the deployment and integration of National Guard forces to support both wartime planning and direct support to ongoing operations throughout both theaters (96 Countries) and directs the Air National Guard support to the State Partnership Program. He presented his warfighter’s perspective as Deputy Commanding General during Operation JUNIPER MICRON, which took place in January 2013 in Mali.

General Vollmecke just concluded an extended active duty tour as the Deputy Commanding General for the Mali operation, in which U.S. forces have been in a support role to French ground forces. Additionally, he led U.S. initiatives to train West African forces for the U.N. peacekeeping mission that began there on 1 July 2013.

General Vollmecke provided a summary of the Operation JUNIPER MICRON timeline, a description of the warring factions, and the success of the coalition operation led by the French military operation known as Operation SERVAL. During that operation, the U.S. military was called upon to provide three major areas of support: Aerial refueling, Strategic airlift, & Airborne ISR.

General Vollmecke’s presentation was complemented by the senior FAO panel commenting on the critical role of foreign area officers in the planning and execution of successful past, present, and future coalition operations. The panel was led by Brigadier General John Adams, U.S. Army (Retired). General Adams is the President of Guardian Six Consulting LLC. He retired from the U.S. Army in September 2007. His extensive Army FAO career culminated in his final military assignment as Deputy United States Military Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium. He worked with military representatives of NATO and Partnership for Peace member nations to develop defense and military policy recommendations for the political authorities of the Alliance. The Committee is the highest military authority of NATO, Brigadier General Adams opened his comments with the observation that a FAO must have the following expertise:

-- Firm background in operations
-- Excellent country and language skills
-- Interagency and NGO capabilities

General Adams emphasized the critical role of a...
“We are able to go to war and conduct combined operations because we have coalition partners, and we take units and contribute capabilities to accomplish those missions...we have partners because they contribute capability. In the future, foreign area officers need to spend more time learning the capability of our partners so they can effectively advise their commanders.”

General Adams was followed by Colonel Eric Larson, Chief, Strategic Leadership Division at Headquarters Department of the Army Plans and Policy, the service proponent for the active and reserve foreign area officers. COL Larson indicated that foreign area officers are often the first step in the creation of a coalition, when the diplomatic and defense attaché communities consider political and policy limitations in order to provide selective support in core functional areas.

Captain Rob Palm offered his Navy FAO perspective as the former Naval Attaché to Israel and the future Defense Attaché to Greece when he indicated that, for FAOs, “persistence is critical within regional areas to help shorten the gaps in security assistance, especially when a crisis occurs.”

All speakers converged on the common theme that the key element of success for any coalition operation is the concerted implementation of national core competencies. For example, General Vollmecke noted that while the U.S. was called upon to provide airlift, aerial refueling, and airborne ISR, the French forces were unmatched in their expertise of the human terrain and senior African military leadership relationships developed over a persistent presence in the region.

This regional expertise was in striking contrast to the U.S. forces. All of the senior French officers had already completed multiple assignments in Africa and the coalition was quickly created due to key relationships fostered during those tours of duty. Conversely, General Vollmecke estimated only 5% of the U.S. leadership had any past experience with Africa. Of those, half were U.S. FAOs.

Most notably, General Vollmecke bestowed his greatest compliments upon the proficiency of the African military leaders of the African led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), created by the United Nations in December 2012, and those of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), formed in April 2013. He praised the seasoned peacekeeping leadership expertise of Ghana Army Brigadier General Akwa and other regional military leaders, supported by the tremendous bravery and tactical expertise of their ground forces.

General Vollmecke stated that, with the global decrease in military budgets, the Mali operation will likely represent a model for successful U.S. participation in future regional engagements where the situation in Mali, or a similar event, are beyond the strength of one country, but within the strength of a region.

General Vollmecke emphasized the greatest areas for improvement in future regional coalition operations were logistics and C4ISR. Airlift capabilities were a critical key to success of the operation; however, rotary wing tactical airlift will be a critical need for future operations, since movement of materiel and personnel via ground channels was often hampered by rough terrain and limited IED route clearance.

Quite a bit of discussion focused on the need for cost effective and interoperable C4ISR. General Vollmecke felt the JSTARS assets assigned to the mission provided critical intelligence data to the commanders on the ground. However, there were many more areas for future enhancements in the areas of:

-- Collaborative planning
-- Common Operational Picture (COP)
-- Shared situational awareness
-- Tactical ISR with processing tools
-- Tactical airborne ISR
FACT SHEET: READING FOR CHINA FAO/RAS

The Defense Language Institute (DLI) Foreign Language Center has published a professional language text designed from the bottom up specifically for China Foreign Area Officers/Regional Affairs Strategist (FAO/RAS) at all levels of experience and Chinese language skills. The new volumes (a main book and appendix) focus on the actual professional terms, grammar and language situations that China FAO/RAS will encounter today in practically any of their operational assignments.

The content is unclassified and based on FAO/RAS comment from the field. The book covers relevant geopolitical issues, current and emerging “hotspots,” bilateral issues, disaster relief, cyber and space issues, and uses authentic material (including videos). Topics are presented in both short-form (简体字) and long-form (繁体字) characters and include English translations. China Basic Course FAO/RAS students will receive this material as part of their studies, but any China FAO/RAS may request a copy of from DLI by writing to: The Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center Curriculum/Faculty Development Presidio of Monterey, CA 93944-5006. The volumes to request are: “Chinese Basic Course for Foreign Area Officer & Regional Affairs Strategists” (text and the appendices volumes, September 2012).
Water Scarcity and Future Conflict

By Major Simon R. Westlake, Royal Marines

Disclaimer
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Royal Marines, or any other U.S. or U.K. government department or agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

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Executive Summary
Whilst the ideological conflicts of the last decade have been necessary, they have also served as a delay to full consideration of some of the alternative threats. Western powers need to reconsider the post-Cold War pre-occupation with ideological threats, and consider the requirement and significant implications for water scarcity to become a basis for future commitment of military force within the context of environment-based security architectures.

Western powers have effectively been focused on ideological threats in the period since the Second World War, with this ideological focus reinforced through the necessary conflicts of the last decade. Meanwhile, wide popular acceptance of theories such as Samuel P. Huntington’s proposed “Clash of Civilizations” has acted as a distraction from other potential threats to security. There has consequently been little open discussion of the potential requirement to use a military force for a purpose that, rather than dealing with an ideological threat, will need to address conflict within an environmental context. Amongst the environmental threats water scarcity is already a reality for many and is increasingly becoming a security risk that cannot be ignored.

A significant quantity of international work has been undertaken to address water scarcity, and this work continues. However, experience has demonstrated that this work continues to be technologically and conceptually challenging, slow in delivering progress, uneven in its achievements, and politically complex to address. In the meantime, the impact of water scarcity continues to be exacerbated by the multiple pressures created by an increasing global population, urbanization, industrialization, and climate change. That poverty, displacement, deprivation, social breakdown, and criminality, amongst many other issues, are caused by water scarcity is proven; that such factors provoke conflict is acknowledged. However, whilst the international community is clearly applying its efforts to mitigate the effects, evidence indicates that water scarcity will become increasingly critical before the required progress may be delivered; the potential for conflict is a likely result.

Conclusion
The international community must consider the potential for future conflict within an environmental context, in a shift from the ideological focus of recent years. As such, in parallel to the continued delivery of "soft effects" to address water scarcity impacts, the requirement to use military force to ensure future water security should be considered. In doing so, it becomes evident that an environment-based security architecture may be required to address the requirements for military force to be utilized effectively. Such a move will require a re-adjustment of understanding, commitment, and force readiness. Primarily though, it will require the creation of a willingness within the Trinity of the government, the military, and the people to potentially use military
force to ensure another nation’s water security; a readiness to use force in the name of humanity, rather than necessarily in the pursuit of clear national security objectives.

Preface

There has been a necessary pre-occupation with ideological threats in the period since the Second World War. Consequently there has been little open discussion of the potential requirement to use a military force that, rather than dealing with an ideological threat, addresses conflict within an environmental context, with no direct threat necessarily posed to the homeland. There is significant precedence of potential and actual conflict where water resources have been a factor, particularly in the Jordan and Nile River basins. Consideration of the example presented by the Nile River Basin highlights the potential for conflict in an area other than the more obvious Euphrates-Tigris or Jordan River Basins. When considered in conjunction with global water scarcity issues and wider energy resource constraints, which are of great significance to the developed world and increasingly the developing world, there is considerable potential for conflict throughout the world, over the diminishing critical resource, water.

These are actual factors with real impact that threaten the very survival of individuals and potentially states. This differs significantly from Samuel P. Huntington’s popularized conceptual “Clash of Civilizations” based on culture, which ignores the more practical causes of conflict such as territory, poverty, population migration/growth, and resources. Fundamentally, all groups require access to resources to ensure survival, and in an age of diminishing resources no state or group will likely commit socio-economic or actual suicide where force remains an option.

Therefore, the requirement exists for the international community to consider the use of military intervention in support of the range of other ongoing activities to ensure water security, as a predominant threat to security in the global operating environment of the future. This may require action to prevent or intervene in inter or more likely intra-state conflict arising over or provoked by water scarcity. The questions that remain are whether the military has evolved to a point where it is able to lead this debate and whether western society is capable of taking the required conceptual step to consider and successfully undertake such action in a divergence from the conceptual ideological focus of the last decade’s necessary conflicts?

I close this preface with full acknowledgement of the guidance and encouragement provided by Professor Matthew Flynn and Dr. Edward Erickson of the Command and Staff College Faculty. Both have provided valuable assistance in developing my understanding of the significance of water within the operating environment, and in supporting my analysis of the implications for Western society in addressing the potential threats to be presented by water scarcity.

Introduction

In 1993 Samuel P. Huntington proposed a new post-Cold War, multi-polar, global context where distinctions between peoples would no longer be based upon ideology, economics, or politics, “but rather... their culture or civilization”. Huntington considered that conflict was more likely to result from the differences between those major civilizations perceived to have emerged in the post-Cold War world, rather than other particular causal factors. However, as NATO begins to withdraw from Afghanistan consideration of this conflict and its predecessors provide evidence of causal factors based upon ideology, the balance of power, and resource access, amongst other reasons, rather than civilization or culture especially. Whilst Huntington’s theory provided a convenient concept by which to rationalize a number of the post-Cold War experiences, it has perhaps missed the fundamental point. There are other pre-existing, proven, and increasingly significant causal factors that will motivate individuals, groups, and even states towards conflict that are rooted in issues even more fundamental than perceptions of culture or civilization: environmental issues rooted in human security and survival. Some of these factors will become of critical relevance in the coming years, ahead of Huntington’s “civilizations”.

Consider global resources, particularly water: already in crisis in certain regions; a factor within conflict past and present; and potentially an increasingly significant factor within intra-state conflict, failed states, and inter-state conflict of the future. This requires the government, the military, and the people (in the context of Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity and the “tendencies” of policy, probability, and passion that shape the conduct of war) to review the post-Cold War period, and particularly the last decade’s pre-occupation with ideological threats, and consider the requirement and significant implications for water scarcity to become the basis for a future commitment of military force; as the mechanism through which to provide water security across the global community into the future. As to the associated significance of such a re-balance, this would reflect a great shift within the thinking, understanding, and relationship within the Trinity if it were possible to re-assess the threat, the use of the military, and the approach to conflict, especially if done so on a global basis.

Ideological Conflict: The Legacy of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”

Whilst Huntington considered that power and wealth remained key elements determining national objectives, rather than ideology or economic-based systems it would be the “clash of civilizations” that would dominate global politics and conflict in the Post-Cold War period. In defining a number of civilizations he argued that their cultural basis would become the pre-eminent factor in their future interactions. In (Continued on page 32)
Voices of Oman: A Different Mid-East Story (An Oral History of the Omani Renaissance) by Charles J. Olson
Reviewed by Jeffrey D. Vordermark, COL, US Army (Retired)

Charles Olson, Ph.D., is a Professor Emeritus with the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Midwestern States University in Wichita Falls, Texas. He has maintained a long-term interest in the Sultanate of Oman. The oral histories captured in “Voices of Oman”, produced with the support of the Omani Ministry of Information, provide unique insights into the social, economic, and institutional changes in the progressive Arab country of Oman since Sultan Qaboos bin Said came to power in 1970. By presenting the personal stories of fifteen Omani citizens from all walks of life, this book addresses both the old and “new” Oman following what is termed the Omani Renaissance, the nation’s most significant modern-day development.

Voices of Oman is a quick read and yet provides a timely snapshot of some of the national and social impacts of change in the Arab region. Because of the direct and unvarnished stories presented, it paints a clear and relevant picture of what is important to Omanis today. At a time when social change, radical Islam, and other more sensational topics about the Middle East flood Western media, this work cuts through any editorializing and presents a picture difficult to obtain without first-hand experience. As such it represents a valuable resource for anyone desiring a better understanding of Oman and its peoples.

A reader expecting to find an analytical guide to help understand these raw stories will be disappointed. One is left to form his or her own conclusions about the impact of the renaissance. These oral histories do, however, introduce common themes that are relevant today in the face of Arab Spring events elsewhere in the region. The new Sultan’s arrival heralded an era of positive change in terms of education, public services (especially medical care and the expansion of businesses aided by a rapidly developing infrastructure), and job growth that served to stabilize Omani families. The importance and power of education, institutional and infrastructure improvements, development of a proud Omani national identity, the positive role of government, and empowerment of women are all recurring themes. As one of the interviewees points out, “Education is the tool for everybody in a developed culture,” highlighting that it is the rapid improvements in educational opportunities for all Omanis that will serve as the signature achievement of Sultan Qaboos’ reign.

This last reflects why this collection of interviews is noteworthy. The book offers a unique opportunity to learn about the most life-changing and important events in the lives of some rather ordinary Omanis in their own words. One can gain the pulse of Oman and better understand the people by thoughtfully reflecting on the content of the interviews. Thus one arrives at perhaps the real strength of the book. It allows the reader to contextualize raw perspectives and by doing so better understand the country, people, and culture without benefit of a visit. If anything this provides the necessary point of departure for discussion with others, be they Omani, regional citizens, or historians.

This collection of concise, cogent, and compelling stories deserves a place in the library of anyone seeking to understand the impact of rapid development in the country. It is a unique and valuable contribution to the understanding of ongoing social change in the Arab world, and provides a timely resource for anyone interested in understanding the peoples and dynamics in this corner of the Middle East.

About the reviewer
Jeffrey D. Vordermark, COL, US Army (Retired), is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His 27-year active duty career included six tours in the Middle East as a Foreign Area Officer.
FAO PIONEER SPOTLIGHT:
General (U.S. Army Ret.) James Alward Van Fleet

By the end of World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, regarded Van Fleet as one of the "greatest fighting" soldiers in his command.

General (U.S. Army retired) James Alward Van Fleet was born in Coytesville, New Jersey, March 19, 1892, and raised in Florida. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915, and was commissioned as a second lieutenant of infantry. The following year he participated in the Mexican border campaign of 1916-1917.

During World War I he commanded a machine-gun battalion in the 6th Division and saw action in the Gerardmer sector and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In the interwar period, Van Fleet endured the round of peacetime assignments: teaching military science at Kansas State Agricultural College, South Dakota State College and the University of Florida; he was a student and an instructor at the Infantry School; a unit instructor of the organized reserve at San Diego, California; commanded a battalion in the 42nd Infantry Regiment in Panama, served with the 5th Infantry Regiment at Fort Williams, Maine, commanded a battalion in the 29th Infantry Regiment; and, beginning in February 1941, with the rank of colonel, commanded the 8th Infantry Regiment.

Unlike his contemporaries, America's entry into World War II did not bring Van Fleet rapid promotion to general rank or high command. When Van Fleet had been at the Infantry School, George C. Marshall, then assistant commandant in charge of the academic department, had confused him with someone else who had a similar name and was a well-known alcoholic. Consequently, as Marshall's importance in the Army grew in the 1930s, culminating in his appointment as chief of staff in 1939, Van Fleet's career progression suffered. He was not selected either for the Command and General Staff College or the Army War College. The pattern continued after Pearl Harbor, so that in 1944, Van Fleet was still commanding the 8th Infantry with the rank of colonel. On D-Day he led the 8th Infantry, part of the 4th Division, ashore at Utah beach, Normandy, and several weeks later in the capture of Cherbourg, France.

In these actions, Van Fleet displayed courage under fire and demonstrated that he was a driving leader who got things done. Thereafter, with the confusion about his identity finally "cleared up" to Marshall's satisfaction, Van Fleet's rise was spectacular.

Syngman Rhee, the first President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and first President of South Korea & Gen. James Van Fleet, while visiting an ROK troop training camp. (Photo by Michael Rougier//Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)
Promoted to the rank of brigadier general, Van Fleet was assistant commander of the 2nd Division during the St. Lo breakout and the capture of Brest, France, and commanded the 4th Division during the Siegfried Line Campaign and the 90th Division during the operation to capture Metz, France, and the Battle of the Bulge.

In March 1945, Van Fleet, now holding the rank of major general, assumed command of the III Corps, leading it through the American First Army’s encirclement of the Ruhr pocket in Germany and the American Third Army’s drive into Austria.

The Foundations of U.S. Security Assistance
Immediately following the war, Van Fleet held several commands in the United States, and in 1947 he was transferred to the European Command in Frankfurt, Germany. In February 1948, he was appointed director of the joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Athens, Greece, with the responsibility for advising the Greek government in its struggle against Communist insurgents. Soon after, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and named a member of the Greek National Defense Council. During the next two years Van Fleet struggled to turn the Greek Army into an effective fighting force, overseeing its training, organization and operations. Backed by massive American aid and assisted by the faulty tactics of the insurgents and the decision of Marshal Josip Tito of Yugoslavia to close the Yugoslav-Greek border through which the insurgents were supplied, the Greek Army, in a personal triumph for Van Fleet, had completely routed the Communists by the end of 1949.

After duty as commander of the Second Army in the United States, Van Fleet was sent to Korea in April 1951, to command the American Eighth Army as the replacement for General Matthew B. Ridgway, who had succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Far East commander. The Eighth Army was more or less straddling the 38th Parallel. Van Fleet arrived just as the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans were preparing to launch their single greatest military effort of the Korean War. In a fierce battle that lasted from April 22-29, he skillfully withdrew the Eighth Army’s front line, shifted the IX and X Corps to prevent an enemy breakthrough to Seoul, and inflicted 70,000 casualties on the enemy.

Following the rebuff of another Communist attack in May, Van Fleet took the offensive and inflicted 200,000 casualties on the Communists in a drive north of the 38th Parallel to the Iron Triangle area of North Korea. There Ridgway concluded that a deeper advance into North Korea would be too costly, and had Van Fleet construct fortifications on the "Kansas" and "Wyoming" lines while the United Nations (UN) Command pursued cease-fire talks.

In August 1951, Van Fleet, promoted to full general, launched a limited offensive in eastern Korea after truce talks had stalled; and after two months of bitter fighting, he seized Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge. He followed up this offensive with another limited offensive in central Korea in October. Van Fleet’s offensives inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists but at a high cost in UN casualties as well. When truce talks resumed, Ridgway in November 1951, ordered Van Fleet to cease offensive action and emphasize an active defense of the existing front line.

General James Van Fleet, then chief of the military mission in Greece and Greek General Papadopoulos getting a cup of coffee at an observatory in mountain Vitsi. Words from a personal note given to General Van Fleet written in Greek follow:

Στο γραφείο αμυντικής συνεργασίας, την συνέχεια της ενδόξου Αμερικανικής Αποστολής και του αρχηγού της στρατηγού Τζεϊμς Βαν Φλητ του σωτήρα της ελλάδος από τα νύχια του αιμοβόρου κομουνισμού.

English translation: To the Office of Defense Cooperation, continuity of the glorious American Mission (JUSMAG) and the Chief General James Van Fleet the savior of Greece from the clutches of the bloodthirsty communists.
The Father of South Korea’s Army

During 1952, Van Fleet chafed under the restrictions placed on him by the Truman administration's commitment to a limited war strategy in Korea. Seeing no point in fighting battles for the same hills and concerned about the combat readiness of his army, he produced plans for a major offensive. By constantly working to keep the Eighth Army at peak fighting efficiency, he maintained it as an effective and reliable force capable of delivering devastating blows against the Communists. Van Fleet likewise worked to revitalize the South Korean Army. He started new training programs and pressed for its expansion to prepare it for offensive action. In the process he made it into a formidable fighting force and was recognized by the South Koreans as the "father" of their army. To the chagrin of many of his colleagues, Van Fleet also strongly identified with the authoritarian government of South Korean President Syngman Rhee and its opposition to the truce talks and the repatriation of prisoners and its desire to unify Korea militarily.

Grieving over the loss of his son, an Air Force pilot who was shot down while on a mission over North Korea in 1952, and embittered by the strategy of limited war in Korea followed by the Truman administration and then by Eisenhower's administration, Van Fleet relinquished his command of the Eighth Army in February 1953, and two months later retired from the Army.

In 1954, Van Fleet served as Eisenhower's special ambassador to the Far East, and in 1961-1962, he was a consultant on guerrilla warfare for the office of the secretary of the Army. Quiet, self-assured, Van Fleet stands out for his record as a combat commander and for his achievements in Greece and Korea.


Van Fleet and Eisenhower in Washington D.C.

achieve political ends. Utilizing this definition of strategy leads to defining the domain in which special operations can be employed.

Historically, each of the service components has attempted to define in which environment their particular capabilities are most effective. MG Billy Mitchell, whom some might argue is the father of the modern U.S. Air Force, defined airpower as “the ability to do something in or through the air.” This simple and succinct description provided focus and direction to a fledgling Army Air Corps by defining the domain in which airmen would operate, separate and distinct from soldiers on the ground and sailors on the sea. From Mitchell’s short statement one can clearly see the purpose for advancing the development of aircraft. With the inclusion of space and cyberspace in the Air Force’s definition of its roles and responsibilities, the domain expands but remains focused on the complementary capabilities.

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, naval historian and theorist, claimed to have coined the term sea power. This concept was derived from his years of naval service and teaching at the Naval War College. Though not directly defined by Mahan, his writings indicate that he understood sea power meant both command of the sea through naval superiority and privileged access to foreign commercial markets which a world class Navy provided. One can clearly show the rise and fall of the great navies of the world and the relative impact of sea power on their nations' economies.

Land power, as defined by the U.S. Army’s FM 3-0 Operations is “the ability--by threat, force, or occupation--to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.” The focus of land power is to compel an enemy to do the nation’s will or to deploy to an environment for the purpose of creating stability. Land power is primarily a tool utilized when an international crisis occurs, with the application ranging from conventional-regular warfare and counterinsurgency to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

**SOF Power**

Special operations forces have the potential for great strategic utility, but political leaders and strategists must understand how to realize that potential.

- Colin S. Gray

Understanding the strategic utility of special operations requires defining the domain in which special operations are most effectively employed and thus what power they, as a component, hold. Unlike air power, sea power and land power, little work has been done to define the separate and distinct domain for SOF. This lack of a collective definition may be attributed to the fact that each of the services contributes functionally oriented forces to USSOCOM’s warfighting capability.

During the summer of 2011, USSOCOM’s Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) held the first SOF power workshop. Representatives of the command’s service components met to attempt to understand and define the domain of special operations or as they termed it “SOF Power.” While an official definition was not adopted, there was agreement for the need of a description of SOF power. The original SOCOM Pub 1, written in 1996, stated “Special operations encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions that are focused on strategic or operational objectives.”

Clausewitz stated that “war is a true political instrument.” If, therefore, the purpose of a special operation is to achieve a strategic-level objective, and the strategic-level of warfare is an extension of politics, then the domain in which special operations are most effective is not a physical domain such as the land, sea, or air, but instead an intangible one—the political domain. SOF power is, then, the ability to execute tactical actions that create a strategic or political effect. The greatest of these contributions is when SOF is utilized to influence the pre-crisis decision-making processes of the enemy leadership. This aspect will be discussed, in detail, later in the paper.

If one accepts that the domain of special operations is in the political realm, then the current joint definition of special operations must be modified to focus the force’s employment. JP 3-05, Special Operations defines a special operation as “requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politi-
cally sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.” This definition has a very kinetic slant, most obviously shown in the line “often conducted in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments [emphasis added].” This doctrinal definition shapes how SOF and conventional force (CF) leaders view the employment of special operations and it is not particularly applicable with respect to shaping operations prior to or post-conflict. At the very minimum the doctrinal definition should be amended to replace politically sensitive environments with the phrase politically significant environments to focus planners on working in areas where SOF can have strategic political effects.

To contrast the U.S. definition of special operations with a more broadly written definition, it is useful to look at the NATO definition. AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, states that special operations are “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment.” This SOF definition is broader and does not focus on kinetic operations. However, it fails to describe the impact of special operations or the effects special operations should create. Defining special operations as in the above two documents is like defining a football game as having offense, defense, and special teams, but omitting the intent of the game—to put points on the scoreboard and win. A better definition of special operations is “activities which result in political and strategic-level effects. Special operations are conducted by highly trained and educated operators due to the significant, primarily political, risk of mission failure or exposure.” This proposed definition better defines an effect that military planners should attempt to achieve rather than simply defining the particular roles and missions SOF performs. These roles will shift and adjust as the future operating environment morphs and new political and strategic challenges emerge. How then should a special operations force, focused on achieving political and strategic results, be utilized to achieve the greatest effect? To determine this one must examine the existing political-level strategy documents.

The two main sources of unclassified political guidance on security are the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the January 2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. There are a number of key points in each of these documents that lead to a special operations strategy tied to political effects and long-term international order. While making it clear that the U.S. must complete the war in Afghanistan, the NSS dedicates a major section to the idea of enhancing international order as a catalyst for international security. The NSS emphasizes working with the international community to combat future threats. “No one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor dictate its terms to the world.” Likewise, the NSS goes on to state that “our mutual interests must be underpinned by bilateral, multilateral, and global strategies that address underlying sources of insecurity and build new spheres of cooperation.” Stated later in the document is the need to build cooperation with 21st century influential nations and specifically invest in regional capabilities for security.

The more recently published Priorities for 21st Century Defense echoes many of the same themes; the United States must work “with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.” What becomes clear after analyzing both documents is, in order to create a stable security environment in the 21st century, the United States military must be prepared to operate during precrisis (Phase Zero) periods, alongside regional partners and power-states to prevent conflict rather than waiting until after a crisis breaks out and it enters a reactionary posture. How then might SOF best contribute to U.S. national security? Gen Charles Wald, in “The Phase Zero Campaign,” noted that engaging a population prior to a crisis was traditionally non-doctrinal for the military. Wald points out there were traditionally only four phases of a military campaign; the first of these being “deter”. Deterrence theory is widely discussed and debated but generally equates to using military power to prevent an enemy from acting. The
problem with military planning that does not address a situation until the deterrence is required is that it fails to address the underlying political and security challenges in a threatening region. If political and security issues can be addressed before they become a threat to U.S. interests, a stable, non-threatening, environment can be created. Joint doctrine was modified for this reason and campaign planning now begins with Phase Zero “shape” actions. The challenge is “In many instances, Phase Zero involves execution of a broad national strategy where Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead agency.” Special operations planners should be looking to Phase Zero, though, as an opportunity for “developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense.”

By shaping national and regional security in a pre-crisis environment SOF are capable of setting the stage to enable our partners to deal with localized, radical extremist organizations before they have a chance to network and expand into regional and global threats. This is where SOF should focus their efforts in support of America’s NSS – working with others to help keep local security threats local. “Working by, with, or through genuine alliances and local partnerships wherever possible – would probably be much more successful than a policy of direct U.S. intervention.” This conclusion is drawn from evidence that overt operations by the U.S. inside a sovereign state harm the legitimacy of the indigenous government, which appears to be strong-armed by the U.S.

Though his model is focused specifically on the Al Qaeda (AQ) extremist organization, it is useful from the vantage point of how networked terrorist organizations might develop and spread their influence within a nation or region. Dr. Kilcullen uses the analogy of a disease to communicate his theory on how insurgent or terrorist organizations expand. It begins as a localized threat. When outside forces intervene the “disease” grows based on the local population’s rejection of the “occupying” force. Special operations forces have the unique capability to act as an immunization to control the disease if they are employed (to continue the analogy) as a preventative inoculation. The below model builds on Dr. Kilcullen’s work by adding a SOF “injection” and modifies the now positive effects.

One might argue that this inoculation is something any force could perform and is not solely a SOF mission. The counter-argument is SOF “inoculations” normally take place in foreign nations where the presence of conventional U.S. forces feeds the adversary’s disinformation efforts, or the enemy’s use of propaganda to show America as acting imperially. By using small, discrete teams, SOF works with local security forces while avoiding the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force. This unobtrusive employment methodology supports the second half of the paper’s proposed definition of special operations “the significant, primarily political, risk of mission failure or exposure.” When the U.S. needs to work in regions of the world where the presence of a large U.S. military footprint is not acceptable, SOF can help professionalize the local security forces and make the environment unwelcome to radicalized actors. To the counterpoint, the use of SOF in a more obvious manner, in regions where the U.S. desires to show influence, provides a cost-effective manner of “showing the flag.”

The logical question to ask is where should SOF be employed, prior to an infection occurring, to provide the most effective support to the National Security Strategy? Books could be filled debating the answer to this question; however, there are some indicators that can provide an initial vector for consideration. Insurgent movements are most successful where there are disenfranchised populations of military age males who hold little hope for a prospering society. The former commander of USSOCOM, Admiral Eric Olson, used to speak about special operations focusing on the world’s unlit spaces while referencing a photograph of the earth taken from space at night.

Admiral Olson’s view was that peace and stability
are generally focused along the northern swath of the lit globe and that SOF should operate in the areas of darkness between the lights. While this is a catchy analysis (and perhaps in the most general sense true) it leaves a large portion of the world to be influenced by a relatively small force. The following graph, developed by Nadja Makarova Victor & Jesse Ausubel in 2004, shows the amount of energy resources needed by the globe to have an equivalency in terms of consumption to be on par with the United States. In it blue represents areas where power consumption (based on 2004 population data) is closest to the U.S. while white moving to red are where there are severe discrepancies between power needs and population size. If one holds to the argument that disenfranchised populations are the spawning ground for unrest, then this graph is more useful than the original night lights graph.

In it, the red locations indicate where potential flashpoints may occur as overpopulation taxes the waning resources and conflict may arise. It highlights locations of resource-constrained population centers where pre-crisis, shaping efforts could be focused or where planners may see potential threat bleed-over from larger energy deficient nations such as India and China. Using this type of a tool, SOCOM planners can target friendly security force development in locations where future threats to regional security could arise. This is not to state that small teams of SOF could solve major political challenges with nations like China, but it does show the potential for security force development work with many nations in the Pacific region. Enabling those nations to combat security related dilemmas on their own would reduce reliance on major U.S. force deployments.

The next question to ask is does this approach to operations work? While it is typically difficult to prove a negative or to find concrete examples of preventative operations that negated the need for a conventional military operation, some do exist. One notable example is Plan Colombia; the U.S.-backed plan to fight narco-terrorism at the turn of the century. “Over the course of a decade...a few hundred U.S. special operators were able to strengthen ...security forces and ...stabilize regions important to U.S. interests.”

The government of Colombia had been fighting a decades-long war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) since the mid 1960s. Due to the lack of effective security being provided by the central government, local land owners began to organize and form independent self defense forces that ultimately joined together to create the right-wing United Self Defense Forces of Colombia. In their battles for control of territory and security, each of these three organizations turned to narco-trafficking and kidnapping for ransom as methods of funding their efforts. Throughout the final decades of the 20th century, Colombia was a hotbed for drugs and violence punctuated by the operations of Pablo Emilio Escobar, the drug lord in charge of the infamous Medellin Cartel. Following limited success in counter-narcotic operations during the early 1990s, President William Clinton launched the Plan Colombia policy, which called for SOF to “build and train a large and capable Colombian special operations command and a highly proficient special police unit.” Each element of USSOCOM contributed to the success of Plan Colombia. A concerted effort made in Colombia by small special operations units from each of the services, even while major combat operations were ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan, has not gone unnoticed. The forces trained by US SOF are now capable of full spectrum special operations. Since 2001 the production of cocaine in Colombia is down by 72 percent. The guerrilla organizations mentioned above have stopped their kidnapping for ransom campaign and, as of 24 November 2012, the peace talks between the FARC and the government of Colombia are off to a good start. What makes this special operation an even bigger success is that not only have the Colombian SOF effectively secured the environment in preparation for the peace process, but
they are now helping to train security forces in every Central American nation except Nicaragua. This train-the-trainer approach by SOF is now helping to create a stable Central America with nations able to protect their own security without a major investment by U.S. forces.

Plan Colombia is not a “one off” success story, Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, the Georgia Train and Equip Program, America’s frameworking of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) and the partnering of SOCEUR and Romanian special forces in ISAF are all based on working with allies and partners to spread security through special operations capability. “At the very heart of our work at the NSHQ is the underlying principle of working together to build an enduring human network dedicated to enhancing security through increased special operations capacity and capability.” Each of these examples is indicative of special operations having effects that resonate at the political-level as nations work together, through SOF, for shared security interests.

What Makes SOF Special?

One would rightly recognize that conventional forces also align their actions in support of American security strategies. What then, makes SOF special in this regard? The answers lie both in the organizational makeup and employment methodologies of SOF. Special operations are most successful when employed in a low-profile manner. This characteristic, unlike conventional force operations, allows the US to employ SOF in regions where outside assistance may be politically unpopular or where the presence of American military may not be appreciated. The sheer number of nations in which SOF have ongoing deployments and operations, with a lack of corresponding media or public outcry is indicative that SOF have been capable of operating without exciting undue attention to their actions. Were the same true of major conventional forces, the media would be covered with outrages of global American imperialism.

The second characteristic of SOF, which makes them, more appealing than conventional forces for employment during shaping operations, is the way in which special operations are executed. Planning for special operations, in the case of sustained employment, is generally driven by a bottom-up approach. Consequently, once deployed into a situation and given clear commander’s intent and a mission statement, tactical operations are generally proposed and planned by the lowest echelon of command. This is a double-edged sword in regards to unity of effort. First, provided there is a comprehensive understanding of the effect that the organization is trying to achieve, tactical units are best able to assess (based on their first-hand knowledge) what needs to be done to achieve success. Second, and more negatively, if there is not a well communicated goal, tactical units’ efforts may not be as synchronized as they should be.

Applying this notion in regard to strategic security assistance, provided a well-communicated effect is transmitted across the force, tactical units have the ability to tailor their training focus to best support the overall goals of the NSS. The challenge is ensuring that every echelon of command down to the smallest team understands how their pieces fit in to the global synchronization. This also requires that special operators are exposed to an understanding of national security strategies at a point in their careers earlier than their conventional counterparts. This is because it is very likely that the senior special operator in a country could be a captain (mid-level officer) supported by an extremely experienced NCO or warrant officer. Such an arrangement would be unprecedented in a conventional force and is the reason for the second half of this paper’s proposed definition, of special operations; “…conducted by highly trained and educated operators due to the significant, primarily political, risk in the event of mission failure or exposure.”

Recommendations

Recommendations

Doctrine

The joint arena is defined by written doctrine. For this reason, USSOCOM should lobby to have the definition of special operations updated in doctrine to the one proposed in this paper.

Special operations are those activities that result in political and strategic-level effects. Special operations are conducted by highly trained and educated operators due to the significant, primarily political, risk of mission failure or exposure.

Further discussion of the tasks associated with special operations is acceptable, but it should be clear that SOF are most effective when operating in the political and strategic level of warfare and, due to the nature of that reality, the operators need education commensurate with that level of conduct.

Guidance

The 2010 National Security Strategy and the January 2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense lay out political objectives for the U.S. These strategies are translated down through the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy into concepts and goals for America’s armed forces. In order to best translate these political and strategic-level engagement plans into a plan for support (remembering that SOF generally operate in a bottom-up construct), USSOCOM needs to publish a strategic-level engagement plan for the theater special operations components directly tied to the objectives of the national strategies, each time they are updated. This is even more important as USSOCOM moves towards greater influence through the Geographic Combatant Commanders Theater Special Operations Commands synchronizing global efforts.

Education

USSOCOM, through Joint Special Operations University, should develop a program of instruction focused on tactical-level officers and NCOs educating them on the afore recommended strategic engagement plan. Due to the inherent bottom-up approach of many SOF plans, USSOCOM must strive to ensure
that each tactical engagement supports the strategic plan and that the commander’s intent is understood at the lowest echelons of force. The term “strategic corporal” has become synonymous with the thought that the actions of a single individual, if improperly executed, may have strategic effects. There is, however, a positive side to the concept of a strategic corporal. When every special operator understands why he or she is on a particular mission (during peacetime or wartime), they act as a sensor for force multiplication opportunities. Likewise, if they are fully aware of the image they are portraying as a model for behavior (on and off the battlefield/duty), they subliminally professionalize a partnered security force operator by acting as a positive role-model and representative of the United States military.

Prioritization
In conjunction with elements from the U.S. Department of State, USSOCOM should develop a prioritized listing of security force units identified and vetted for development. Across the globe, not every nation’s civil/national police and military perform the same functions. In some nations internal counterterrorism units are part of the military where in others they are federal law enforcement. SOF must possess a comprehensive picture of security force actors and prioritize them for development based on their unit’s contribution to regional security. Because this is not a decision to be made in isolation, USSOCOM must work with other elements of the U.S. government to effectively compile this list.

Conclusion
The United States has entered a period of fiscal austerity, which will force the DOD to address how it can most effectively utilize each of its elements of power to ensure national security. The cost of going to war continues to rise and, therefore, the U.S. should be very leery about investing its national treasure in conflicts where its own national security is not directly threatened. Instead, we must work with like-minded Allies, regional powerbrokers and friendly nations to enable them to best counter local and regional threats. U.S. SOF possess a unique capability to operate in a low visibility profile in politically charged situations. This capability, though, has not been globally coordinated by USSOCOM, nor has the concept of how a regional security force training campaign might lead to stability and U.S. national security. In order to be successful in countering the threat to global stability and security brought by radical extremists, the DOD must move beyond clandestine raids. Only by working before a crisis occurs to develop partner forces capable of professional employment to counter national and regional threats to stability will America be successful in ensuring its national security.

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Notes
The full version with citations will be made available at www.FAOA.org
ational-level military objectives. These operational-level objectives are further refined into tactical objectives by the security cooperation organization (SCO) in each country. However, finite resources and regional priorities mandate the degree and focus of engagement with each partner nation, thus serving as the limiting factors to DoD’s ability to engage. In addition, DoD must seek approval from DoS for engagement, potentially inhibiting interaction even further. The agreed upon areas for DoD engagement with a partner nation is visually depicted by the overlap of the DoS and DoD circles in Figure 2.

Once the willingness and ability of the partner nation military to engage is factored in, the area of overlap between DoD and DoS is divided even further, thus representing the approved areas for engagement that both DoD and the partner nation have the willingness and ability to pursue (overlap of circles constituting area 1). There may be areas where both DoD and DoS desire engagement that is not possible from the partner nation perspective (area 2). Additionally, there may be areas where both DoD and PN are willing and able to engage, however it falls outside of DoS desires (area 3). There also may be areas where DoS wants more engagement with partner nation military, but DoD is unable (area 4). Finally, the partner nation is a sovereign state with various objectives of its own, many of which will not align with USG objectives (area 5). In all cases, determining the partner nation’s military will and ability requires a number of frank discussions to gain a shared understanding of what each partner brings to bear in any joint effort.

Planning
The best way to reach any objective is to have a good plan. As mentioned, USG publishes a number of documents providing guidance on security cooperation. One issue with the USG planning process is that only indirect input from the partner nations is considered in the planning process, usually gathered by DoD personnel during direct contact. This methodology must be reversed so that once analysis of political will and military willability is completed, all parties come together to develop a plan designed to reach the agreed-upon end state. The plan can be as formalized as a memorandum of agreement or as basic as a series of action items developed during a working group. Open and frequent communication is critical during the planning phase, with common forms of communication including high-, mid-, and low-level exchanges in the form of distinguished visitor (DV) visits, conferences, staff talks, or working groups. Whatever the structure, a well-laid out plan will include detailed information of exactly how each partner will participate at the next two levels of the Security Cooperation Pyramid – capacity building and combined exercises – to achieve the objective.

Capacity Building
The capacity building phase of the Security Cooperation Pyramid is one area for which FAOs receive formal training. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides multiple weeks of detailed training on DoD security assistance programs like Foreign Military Sales, (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Traditional Commander’s Activities (TCA), and others. These “tools” will be used in varying degrees when partnering with a nation. The planning accomplished in the previous building block is critical to ensuring that security assistance is targeted at the right units and personnel. Capacity building efforts can be evaluated and measured in various ways. One of the best methods of testing the effectiveness of capacity building efforts is through combined exercises.

Combined Exercises
Combined exercises with partner nations will be coordinated through the geographic combatant commands. There are many different types of exercises with various areas of focus. Some maritime exercises will focus on larger, blue-water navies, while others will be tailored to smaller forces. It is critical that FAOs provide inputs on which exercises best evaluate capacity building efforts to guarantee that lines of effort are correctly focused and indicate where improvements can be made. Combined exercises are critical to developing the interoperability required to conduct combined operations and/or responses.

Combined Operations/Responses
Combined operations/responses can cover a variety of scenarios, to include armed conflict, counter terrorism activities, anti-piracy, combating transnational organized crime (CTOC), humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) efforts, and peacekeeping
support operations (PSO). Very little planning may occur prior to these events, providing even greater fidelity on interoperability and capacity levels to conduct combined missions. The successful conduct of these operations will indicate how closely the partnership is to reaching a mutually beneficial alliance.

Alliance

An alliance, to whatever degree it entails, is the ultimate goal of any partnership with a foreign military – it is why the USG embarks upon any security cooperation endeavor. The extent of the alliance will depend on the desired end state/s and may or may not be formalized in writing. It will also depend, in large part, on the capacity and capability of the partner nation. Depending on the country, a FAO will be focused at different levels of the Security Cooperation Pyramid. More often than not a FAO can do a whole tour overseas without seeing the relationship reach its pinnacle. In those cases, FAOs can take satisfaction in knowing that the proper analysis, preparation, and execution is occurring to ensure the objective is clear and the path is true.

A KEY INDICATOR FOR POLITICAL WILL, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, IS BUDGET EXPENDITURES

Conclusion

The Navy FAO community is in its infancy. Significant progress has been made since its inception seven years ago. The community is nearing its full strength of 300 officers in assignments all over the world. Although the community is new, the FAO mission is as old as the Navy. Previously, line and staff officers fulfilled the mission while on ‘sabbatical’ from their normal career paths. However, the lack of a community of international engagement professionals meant that the mission was never truly defined and the processes by which the mission was accomplished never fully refined. The FAO community now has the opportunity to define its mission and standardize, formally, the techniques utilized to form cooperative relationships with international partners.

To accomplish this will require a tremendous amount of effort. The community must first agree on and publish a mission statement, followed by promulgating doctrinal guidance on how to fulfill that mission. The mission statement and the framework of the Security Cooperation Pyramid presented here are only one FAO’s opinion on how to start this process. At best, the Security Cooperation Pyramid provides the basic levels of engagement needed to form a partnership capable of achieving the desired USG strategic objectives. Within those basic levels of engagement, however, lie a multitude tools that a FAO can utilize to accomplish the mission.

Some might argue that capturing on paper everything FAOs do is impossible, that there is simply too much political, economic, and cultural variation in the world to allow for the development of any sort of universal guidance. For example, FAOs in neighboring countries might find themselves tackling identical problem sets in two completely different ways. At the same time, FAOs on opposite ends of the globe could be engaging with their host nation counterparts in a very similar fashion, even if the strategic objectives are different. But, despite all the differences among our partner nations, one variable remains constant, and that is the fact that establishing and maintaining a cooperative relationship with a foreign military requires a substantial investment of USG monies.

FAOs, as foreign engagement specialists with the distinct mission of shaping international partnerships, must be experts at their trade in order to guarantee that USG monies are being targeted to maximize return on investment. As such, FAOs would be doing the Navy and the American public a disservice if they did not refine how the community executes its vital national security mission.

About the Author

Lieutenant Commander Kevin A. Self is currently posted as the Deputy Navy Section Chief, U.S. Embassy Santiago, Chile. LCDR Self graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1996 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. In July 2000 he received his commission from Officer Candidates School with follow-on orders to flight training in Pensacola, FL. He is a navy aviator. He deployed twice to Bagram, Afghanistan, flying in 116 combat missions in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. He then attended the Naval Postgraduate School and received his master’s degree in National Security Affairs (Western Hemisphere). He next served as the Theater Security Cooperation Desk Officer – NORTHCOM AOR at U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.

During his tour at Fleet Forces Command, he was re-designated as a Foreign Area Officer. He studied Spanish at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Monterey, CA. Prior to his assignment in Chile he served as the Navy Section Chief, U.S. Military Group Honduras.
citing such examples as the support provided to the Bosnians by Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, and the re-unification of Germany, he argued that the unifying forces of cultural similarities would overcome ideology or “historical circumstance”, bringing like cultures together. Whilst identifying this unifying force, however, he also identified natural “cultural fault lines” between the peoples of different civilizations.

Based upon differences between history, language, culture, tradition, and religion, the cultural differences were considered more difficult to resolve than those of a more reconcilable political or economic nature. He also proposed that the increasing interactions resulting from globalization invigorated “differences and animosities”, whilst social and economic developments weakened identities of both the individual and state. Predominantly based upon cultural and religious similarities the resultant unification could only lead to conflicting interests, beliefs, and activities between the founding civilizations thereby creating a destabilizing effect.

Francis Fukuyama was one academic amongst a number who proposed an alternative theory for the post-Cold War paradigm, which he perceived to have “consecrated the victory of liberalism” over communism, thereby presenting an unchallenged ideology for the future. The New York Times’ Thomas Friedman focused on economic globalization in “The One Big Thing”, whilst Robert Kaplan centered on population excess. Huntington’s theory was a counter to these, presenting a less optimistic perspective than Fukuyama particularly, and one perhaps mirrored by world events in the years following publication. These years did not reflect the emergence of one relatively harmonious world, which Huntington considered “too divorced from reality to be a useful guide to the post-Cold War world”.

On reflection, it is understandable that Huntington’s proposal gained such prominence in both academic analysis and popular discussion. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the bipolar paradigm through which the world sought to comprehend conflict, yet it was not clear what was to follow this period of chiefly ideological conflict. The academic world sought to explain and predict this altered environment; would it be a uni-polar world dominated by the USA, or a multi-polar paradigm with new, emergent centers of power and influence?

The “clash of civilizations” concept provided a relatively straightforward context that fulfilled each of the cognitive, practical, and aesthetic schemas that Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challemand argue people need to orient the world in which they live. Huntington conveniently enabled people to comprehend attacks such as 9/11, particularly given their associated symbolism, which acted as a credible catalyst for wide acceptance of Huntington’s theory. Indeed, publication and acceptance of Huntington’s theory peaked after 9/11, as people sought to rationalize a previously unimaginable terrorist attack that seemed to presage a new world.

Huntington refers to a range of historical cases, including the 1956 Suez Crisis and 1990 Gulf War as particular examples of continued “conflict along the fault line” between the West and Islam. However, both more readily reflect military action taken to maintain the balance of power, with strong economic undertones, rather than action taken for cultural or religious reasons. Whilst limited low-level clashes based on race, religion, or ethnicity issues will undoubtedly continue to occur and the requirement to combat terrorism will remain, are such clashes likely to be of the nature and at the level proposed by Huntington?

The military action undertaken since the 9/11 attacks has been used in many quarters to validate Huntington’s hypothesis, being described by some as a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam. However, this has not become a fully accepted view with a number of commentators having readily expressed doubt. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed described the theory as “shrouded in ambiguities”, whilst Paul Wolfowitz, when US Deputy Secretary of Defense, described reality as “less a clash of civilizations...than a...misunderstanding between the Muslim and Western worlds” and much more optimistic than Huntington’s prediction. Significantly, Al Qaeda’s perceived desire to create a “clash of civilizations” has not been matched by a Western or Christian desire; a desire to eradicate terrorism, but not Islam. Equally, there has been no demonstration of a unified Muslim intent to enter into conflict against the West or Christianity.

In fact, the post-9/11 military experience has essentially been one of ideological conflict in which the military has been required to fight for perceptions and imaginations: for peoples’ cognitive, practical, and aesthetic schemas. Huntington argued that such ideological conflict would be replaced by a “clash of civilizations”, but this has not been the case. Ideological conflict has remained, albeit in contesting an adversary that is no longer communism.

Water: A Mainstream Issue?

Huntington’s work has had wide reach and appeal, whilst the literature on environment and in turn water scarcity is not as developed or mainstream as it may have been, had there not been such an ideological distraction. Indeed the environment appeared to figure as merely a fringe issue during the 2012 US Presidential campaign, perhaps demonstrating the limited reach of this issue in contrast to others in which there may be greater awareness, or national self-interest.

Even so, some important voices have sought to promote the topic. For example, in 1984 Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson considered the risk of conflict in the Middle East, noting that should water management be ineffective “several international conflicts over water may erupt in the region.” Thomas Homer-Dixon
has engaged in a lengthy consideration of the relationship between environmental scarcity and security, commenting that environmental scarcity “will further inflame the competition between groups and societies,” and that “policymakers will have less and less capacity to [prevent] serious social disruption, including conflict”. Arun P. Elhance noted significant hurdles to cooperation and warned of the “potential dangers of escalating demands”, but also reflected on encouraging signs for progress. Elsewhere, Anne H. Ehrlich, Dr Peter Gleick, Ken Conca, and Aaron Wolf amongst others have debated hydro-politics, environmental and resource issues, and the history of (and potential for) conflict.

As recently as March 2013, via his directorship of the Pacific Institute Dr Peter Gleick has continued to promote global understanding of the relationship between “water, climate, and security” with lectures at both King’s College and the University of Cambridge in the UK, and a scheduled appearance at the 150th annual meeting of the US National Academy in Washington, DC in April 2013. The United Nations, meanwhile, has continued its decades of work to address water scarcity, with extensive discussion of the ongoing threat of conflict over water.

The remainder of this paper has therefore considered a range of academic assessments as cited above, whilst also analyzing a number of organizations’ material, including UNESCO, the wider UN, World Health Organization, World Bank, and Nile Basin Initiative. Consideration has been given to other non-government organizations, such as the Pacific Institute, Global Water Forum, and International Rivers; public commentary; and official publications and statements. The UN material consulted has been particularly significant, comprising the last decade’s progressive work, from the International Year of Freshwater 2003 to the World Water Development Report 2012; this last document comprises some 800 pages of material concerning the water situation across the globe, and the work conducted in an effort to mitigate the lack of access to freshwater and associated water scarcity. However, this paper seeks to engage in an aspect of the debate not necessarily discussed in the wide variety of sources analyzed.

Within the last three years both former Secretary of State Clinton and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen publically commented on the potential threats presented to security by resource and water scarcity. The USMC Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) 2011 edition of Flashpoints considered water as a specific factor within analysis of the risk of conflict across 158 countries. Additionally, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the United Kingdom National Security Strategy have each publically commented on water scarcity and security. As such, water as a threat to security has recently begun to shift from being a long-standing academic (and technical and management) subject towards a position as a political and military consideration.

Still, the debate remains skewed, and any suggestion that water scarcity is a key element in environmental factors shaping national security policy fails to make the main point as presented in this paper. This paper argues that such a focus requires a re-evaluation of the nature of warfare, in that national security threats will leave state borders a distant second in terms of the analysis needed to face a looming, global crisis that presents a fundamental threat to human security. As a result, from the western mind-set, Clausewitzian thinking of a relationship between the military, government, and populace comes under scrutiny since the military and security services appear to be picking up the academic debate to currently lead within the domestic debate, perhaps dragging the civilian body with it. This presents a great divergence from the past: a reshaping of the Trinity or at least a military-led reconceptualization of this important interaction. In sum, what had been military license, and a possible threat to the state, is now its foremost defender in leading on a neglected issue, but one that can no longer be ignored.

Therefore, the primary issue is that a western, albeit necessary, pre-occupation with ideological conflict, and willingness to view Huntington’s popularized theory of a “clash of civilizations” as a reality have risked over-looking greater, more fundamental challenges, which threaten stability and security, thereby introducing significant risk of potential conflict. As such, resource and particularly water scarcity has only recently gained prominence in official considerations of developing threats, therefore almost certainly delaying appropriate analysis of the required responses to such threats, and the associated implications for western society.

The Fundamental Challenge

Current global demographic growth has been unequalled in human history, with population growing from under 3 billion in 1950 to an estimated 7 billion in 2012, with estimates of 8.5 billion by 2025, rising to 9 billion by 2050. Significantly, 95% of the growth has occurred in the developing world, accompanied by increased urbanization, industrialization, and globalization. Notably, approximately one quarter of the world’s population currently lives in poverty. Despite notable reductions in overall poverty rates, the reduction can almost exclusively be attributed to China; the developing world demonstrates comparatively marginal reductions.

Meanwhile, the developed and developing worlds have become increasingly resource dependent. The increasing demand has been “sharply evident in Asia and the Pacific Rim” reflecting the industrialization and economic growth rates in those regions; China has seen significant growth, and an almost insatiable increase in appetite for resources. Global energy use has
increased “some 20-fold” in the last century and is expected to rise by a further 50% by 2035, whilst evidence mounts of dwindling reserves with energy resources and water becoming increasingly scarce. Indeed, the world has never faced a comparable situation of “impenetrable limits [and] absolute deficiencies of land and energy.”

The world is also experiencing increased agricultural constraints resulting from the expanding population and associated trends of urbanization and industrialization. Globally, population growth, dwindling land resources, energy requirements, environmental constraints, and water scarcity are impacting simultaneously and unlike ever before, without an existing spare capacity to exploit. Commentators increasingly refer to resource scarcity as a “precondition” for and likely source of future conflict.

Scarcity, which can be defined as a diminishing resource and/or growing pressure on the supply available from an increase in demand, could arise from a depleted or degraded resource, which could result from population growth or greater per capita consumption, or through the unequal distribution of the resource. These circumstances, which are increasingly evident across the range of global resource issues, impact upon each of the three key areas of individual, national, and international security. This is of particular significance, as any individual unable to provide for his needs will likely seek to address identified deficiencies through other means; where this is related to the resources required for basic human security this may result in displacement, but could also lead to an individual employing any means to ensure survival. Groups of people within a state, or a state itself could react in a similar manner where survival is actually or just perceived to be in question, particularly when required resources are available elsewhere, or when access to those resources is denied by another group or state.

Essential Africa: A Foreign Area Officer Reading List
BY MAJOR JOSEPH GUIDO, U.S. ARMY

Reading lists about Africa and African Affairs already exist: the new U.S. Africa Command has a reading list, many university programs have Africa-focused reading lists, not-to-mention the various reading lists from the Army Chief of Staff, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the military profession. These lists, however, do not capture the spirit and the soul central to understanding Africa and her people. However, African works have been largely overlooked; for example, the American Modern Library Board published the “100 great English books of the 20th Century.” Only three of these hundred titles were written by African-Americans and none were penned by Africans, despite Africa being home to three Nobel Laureates: the Nigerian Wole Soyinka, the Egyptian existentialist Naguib Mahfouz, and the South African activist Nadine Gordimer. In response, world-renowned African academic Professor Ali Mazrui has also compiled and published a list of “Africa’s 100 best books of the 20th Century” which sharply contrasts with the growing myriad of survey books on Africa which are readily available and oftentimes politically charged.

The following ten books capture several essential elements of Africa which are likely to be expected of a Foreign Area Officer, or anyone with a deeper interest in Africa, to understand. To grasp the essence of Africa requires one to hear the story of Africa, to listen carefully to the voices telling the story, and to seek comprehension of the context from which those voices speak. Thus, my selections are weighted towards work striving to make that voice heard and to tell the story of Africa and Africans as clearly and candidly as possible. Experiencing Africa first-hand is exciting, dynamic, colorful, humorous, and memorable; reading about it should be no less.

African Autobiography.
Memoirs of an Arabian Princess from Zanzibar is actually a translation of the original edition printed in 1886 from Berlin, Germany. Emily Ruete, née Sayyida Salme Princess of Zanzibar and Oman, was a daughter of the Sultan of Oman who lived and ruled from Zanzibar in the latter half of the 19th century. Ruete’s autobiography, written when she was a widow in Germany, is the only account by a woman who actually lived in a harem during this period. This memoir, therefore, sheds light upon the day-to-day life of an Arabian harem as well as providing intimate details of Zanzibar at the zenith of its influence as the focal point of a network of lucrative slave and ivory trade and spice production during the “Scramble for Africa.” It is a fascinating and frank look at pre-colonial East Africa by a Muslim woman born and raised on the enigmatic African island of Zanzibar. Deneyes Reitz’s first-person account of the second Boer War, Commando: A Boer Journal of the Anglo-Boer War, may have more direct military significance and application to Foreign Area Officers. Commando is an excellent primary-source for those who wish to learn more about the first use of concentration camps and the origin of the British Commandos, or small-units specializing in guerrilla warfare and direct action, part of the legacy of U.S. Special
Operations Forces. Finally, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, by Nelson Mandela, is an incredible story of sacrifice and hardship and an essential addition to any Africa collection. Wilfred Thesiger is an archetype of the 19th century adventure-explorer and true officer-gentlemen in African regalia. The London Times review best summarizes The Life of My Choice and the extraordinary man who wrote it as a “vast, sprawling, chronicle of adventures: a huge, barabous, magnificent book.” He was born in a mud hut in Addis Ababa, the capitol of Ethiopia, and was a personal friend of the last African “king of kings” Ras Tafari (Emperor Haile Selassie). Thesiger graduated from Eton and Oxford, worked for the Royal Geographic Society as an explorer of uncharted territories in Southern Sudan, served as key member of the early British Special Air Service in the Sahara Desert, and was a commander under General Orde Wingate in the liberation of Ethiopia during World War II. Thesiger, who spoke several indigenous languages and later served in the British administration in the Middle East, intimately understood the contrasts between the Western and African ways of life. Despite his Western education, it was in the African bush traveling with the hunters and traders of indigenous tribes where Thesiger felt most at home. Another example of this genre is Colonel Sir Hugh Boughstead’s The Wind of Morning. Colonel Boughstead, another extraordinary Brit and contemporary of Thesiger, “jumped ship” from the Royal Navy to fight in World War I with the South African Army, fought with Denkin against the Red Army in the Russian steppes, won the Royal Army boxing championship (lightweight) and represented the UK in the Olympics, climbed Mount Everest with the Shipton expedition, and worked with the Long Range Desert Group (SAS) in North Africa and later General Orde Wingate, like Thesiger, to defeat the Italians in Ethiopia during World War II. Other interesting autobiographical works include Margaret Lawrence’s memoir of Somaliland New Wind in a Dry Land (reprinted under the title The Prophet’s Camel Bell), R.V.C. Bodley’s Wind in the Sahara, Kenneth Bradley’s The Diary of a District Officer, Christopher Harwich’s Red Dust: Memories of the Uganda Police 1936-1955, and Issak Dinesen’s Letters from Africa 1914-1931 which was the basis for her book Out of Africa published under her true name, Karen Blixen, and the inspiration for the film of the same title. Elspeth Huxley has also written several enchanting books about her experiences in Kenya to include The Flame Trees of Thika, Out in the Midday Sun, and White Man’s Country. Woman adventurer Beryl Markham spent her childhood playing with native Maruni children and apprenticing with her father as a trainer and breeder of racehorses in Kenya. In the 1930s, she became an African bush pilot and later became the first person to fly solo across the Atlantic from east to west, writing about her experiences in her memoirs West With The Night. Although not autobiographical, Christina Lamb’s The Africa House: The True Story of an English Gentleman and his African Dream is a story so incredible it is hard to believe it is non-fiction. The French also lay claim to several great African adventurers, such as Henry de Monfreid who recounts his experiences in Hashish: A Smugglers Tale and Adventures of a Red Sea Smuggler and Secrets of the Red Sea; for the francophone, there are many more untranslated works from de Monfreid and other French explorers.

**African Fiction.** Things Fall Apart is regarded as a cornerstone African novel and Chinua Achebe is one of the first African writers to receive international acclaim. This story by Africa’s most famous novelist and poet juxtaposes two intertwined stories: Nigerian folklore and traditional beliefs vis-à-vis the culture clash from European missionaries living in a small Nigerian village. The subtitle of Achebe’s book was originally “The story of a strong man,” and like any great fiction, rings socially adroit and timeless. The field of African Fiction is transforming into a literary cavalcade as the world seeks to learn more about Africa and African writers, thinkers, and poets mature. The Pickup: A Novel by the prolific, award-winning South African novelist Nadine Gordimer is a compelling and modern look at inter-cultural relations and an informative narrative about South Africa’s racial divides. The feminist writer Ama Ata Aidoo has written Changes: A Love Story, which examines the role of a modern, professional Ghanaian woman who leaves her husband after conflict and rape. The novel portrays attitudes of African society as well as provides commentary on women’s problems and is seen as a feminist centerpiece in African literature. Somali-born Nuruddin Farah wrote Maps, the first volume in a trilogy which follows the maturation of an orphaned boy who ultimately must choose between betraying his mother-figure and betraying his mother country. A exceptionally lucid work translated from French, The Sand Child by Tahar Ben Jelloun. Ben Jelloun spins an Arabian-nights inspired tale about a Moroccan girl who is raised as a boy by her father in an attempt to save her

**THE UNITED STATES IS INCREASINGLY BECOMING INVOLVED IN AFRICA, AND MANY NEW TO THE MOST DIVERSE OF THE CONTINENTS OFTEN INQUIRE WHAT SHOULD BE READ TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE OFTEN ENIGMATIC PEOPLE AND PLACES OF AFRICA**
and her family from slavery and poverty. As she matures, however, she explores her true identity and struggles to live as a traditional Islamic woman. Myth, Literature and the African World by the Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, although non-fiction, is an informative essay of the cultural and literary strands in Africa which influence and shape African literature, written by one of Africa’s most famous writer and critic and perhaps inspired by the leitmotif of Things Fall Apart. Heart of Darkness is the definitive fiction to read about Africa, specifically the Congo. Based upon Joseph Conrad’s actual experiences working as a steamboat captain who sailed up the Congo to Stanleyville (present day Kisangani) in the late 19th century, Heart of Darkness is an incredible story about Western intervention and influence in Colonial Africa, the human condition, and true literature. A “must read” for any Africanist, the Norton Critical Edition (3rd) edited by Robert Kimbrough is probably the best for its extensive notes and additional readings. To learn more about the historical setting of Heart of Darkness, King Leopold’s Ghost, A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa by Adam Hochschild makes a good reading companion and British journalist Michela Wrong draws from Conrad’s work and her own experiences at the end of Zaire during the final days of Mobutu In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo. Another famous title in the genre of Africa Fiction is Ernest Hemmingway’s The Snows of Kilimanjaro. It is important to note that both Conrad and Hemmingway fundamentally write about experience in Africa with significant detachment. Africa serves as a stage for these writers to explore the nature of humanity, vice and virtue, and identity rather than observe and understand Africa.

Africa Travelogue.

Paul Theroux writes using the dynamic, fast-paced, and wry humor of modern journalists, which could be more precisely characterized as “post-modern travelogue.” Dark Star Safari was written for a curious American audience looking for political commentary of people and events in exotic, far-off lands. This new genre draws upon the work of great journalists such as Ryszard Kapuściński but possesses a distinctly American texture that can be seen in much earlier American travel guides like Inside Africa by John Gunter. Paul Theroux’s work, much like that of Robert D. Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, is far-reaching but fun and highly quotable. Such literature typifies the journalistic talent to travel far and wide, find and meet key individuals, and report facts with flair and a penchant for political commentary. “Post-modern travelogue” contrasts with modernist travelogue such as Graham Greene’s Journey Without Maps, a tale of his incredible trek across Liberia by foot in the early 1930’s, or late modernist travelogue such as Shiva Naipaul’s North of South, an intensely humorous albeit highly critical tale of travel through East Africa in the early 1970’s. Tim Butcher’s Chasing the Devil: On Foot through Africa’s Killing Fields, inspired in part by Graham Greene’s Journey Without Maps, could perhaps be an example of revisionist travelogue as it draws upon earlier work and contrasts the different periods through a post-modern lens. Victorian travelogues from the great Africa explorers of old include the indefatigable and gifted Sir Richard Francis Burton’s First Footsteps in East Africa and the much-acclaimed but controversial publications of the prolific Sir Henry Morton Stanley such as Through The Dark Continent. For contextual clues, the most balanced recent study of Sir Richard Burton is probably The Devil Drives: The Life of Sir Richard Burton by Fawn M. Brodie. A delightful travelogue of the first recorded trip across the Saharan desert by foot was written by Michael Asher in his account Two Against The Sahara. I do not wish to exclude the masterful stories of the well-travelled Cold War Polish journalist to Africa, Ryszard Kapuściński. Translated works by Kapuściński include The Shadow of the Sun, Ebony, Another Day of Life, The Emperor, and The Other. Finally, there is a brilliant, difficult-to-find, yet exceedingly eccentric Victorian British travelogue by Charles Doughty entitled Travels in Arabia Deserta. The epoch and social status of the author, along with the intended audience, greatly influenced the writing style and Doughty’s conclusions and judgments. Although challenging to read, and actually about Arab peoples outside Africa, Arabia Derserta is insightful to understand the later work, motives, and explorations of Africa by Europeans.

Africa Arabica.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom is T.E. Lawrence’s alluring memoir of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire and the basis for the film Lawrence of Arabia. Seven Pillars of Wisdom offers candid insights about Arab society and paradigms. Whether viewed as military history, adventure biography, historical memoir, or Islamic anthropological study, Seven Pillars of Wisdom is considered one of the classics of 20th century Middle Eastern studies in English, and a significant work for understanding the rise of “guerilla,” “modern,” or “revolutionary” warfare, particularly in the Middle East. An African book in this genre is Tippu Tip: The Story of his Career in Zanzibar and Central Africa by Dr. Heinrich Brode, a translation from his German biography of Tippu Tip. Tippu Tip was a half-Arab native son of Zanzibar and Africa’s most notorious slave-trader. This book is valuable as a source regarding the African slave trade in the 19th century and as an account of a distinctly African blend of Islam and traditional African beliefs. A Spirit of Tolerance: The Inspiring Life of Tierno Bokar by Amadou Hampaté Ba, is a study about an Islamic spiritual leader and teacher from another corner of Africa, the Sahara, in the early 20th century. Fouad Ajami’s book The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation’s Odyssey is a readable and contemporary book regarding
Middle Eastern politics and foreign affairs. For a more academic and methodical approach to Arab and Islamic cultural issues, specifically regarding terrorism, see Q uintan Wiktorowicz’s Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Other interesting titles about the Arab world include a modernist female perspective in The Letters of Gertrude Bell: An Extraordi nary Record of the Arab World and the observations of Sir Wilfred Thesiger in Arabian Sands and Across the Empty Quarter.

**War in Africa.**
William Thom, a 35 year veteran Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) military intelligence analyst who specialized in Africa, recently published African Wars as a compilation from his time working as an analyst for the DIA. He specifically discusses 17 conflicts ranging from post-colonial strife in Rhodesia to the infamous Rwanda genocide to present day problems in the Horn of Africa. While African Wars does not detail the life of a historical figure such as Thesiger or the interesting travels and observations of Theroux, it does provide an insider view of the DIA, U.S. policy making, and the American point of view regarding modern historical events in Africa. African Wars, published in 2010, is a necessary addition to the Foreign Area Officer’s collection because of its focus on the U.S. defense intelligence community and its historical relevance. For other reading regarding wars in Africa, Thomas Odom’s Leavenworth Paper #14, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964–1965, and Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaïre in 1978, both available from Combat Studies Institute, are excellent monographs of intervention operations in Central Africa. Congo Mercenary by Mike Hoare is a gripping, violent account by the mercenary commander hired by the Congolese government to support the nascent Congolese army during the civil wars in East Congo soon after independence. Michael Barnett gives a fascinating and important first-person account of the Rwandan genocide from the vantage point of the UN military mission in Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Roger Trinquier, based upon his experiences in Indochina as well as Algeria, wrote Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency available in English translation from Combat Studies Institute. Merchant of Death, by Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, is a fairly recent journalist account of one of the real-life figures in the contemporary Great Game in Africa, Viktor Bout, and the inspiration for the fictional Hollywood film Lords of War. Significant military studies outside of Africa but valuable due to their application to African affairs include Robert Taber’s War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, Martin Van Creveld’s recent The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, From the Marne to Iraq, Jurgen Brauer’s War and Nature: The Environmental Consequences of War in a Globalized World offers an alternative look about the impacts of warfare on the environment. The provocative Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict by Michael T. Klare posits that future conflicts will focus on competition to gain access to natural resources. Arthur Ferrill’s The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great and Victor Davis Hanson’s The Western Way of War, challenge our conceptualization of war, while Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry by P.W. Singer explores the history and implications of contracting defense and security services—increasingly prevalent today, particularly in the developing world.

**Development in Africa.**
Zambian-born Oxford graduate and former World Bank consultant Dambisa Moyo details how aid and assistance is often diverted to corrupt and ineffective governments while hurting local economies and indigenous markets. In his work, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa, Moyo advocates the use of a different investment policy for Africa that has worked in developing economies like Argentina and Brazil. For understanding foreign assistance in Africa and offering a pragmatic approach to the future, Dead Aid is without parallel. A more provocative and less prescriptive book regarding foreign assistance is Michael Maren’s The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity. Maren’s critical analysis of Western, specifically American, aid programs in the developing world calls for further study into the impact and effectiveness of foreign assistance programs. Michael Maren, a career aid worker who began as a Peace Corps volunteer, then USAID contractor, speaks from years of experience in some of Africa’s toughest conflicts, including Ethiopia and Somalia. His introduction summarizes his conclusion regarding the impact of foreign assistance in Africa: “the Africa I know today is in much worse shape than it was when I first arrived.” A similar and equally critical overview of humanitarian assistance in Africa is an older, but oft-cited book by Graham Hancock entitled Lords of Poverty. Several other important titles on the subject of development and assistance in Africa include The White Man’s Bur den: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good by William Easterly and the far-reaching The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It by Paul Collier. The innovative, grassroots Italian economist Ernesto Sirolli details one successful method of enabling local entrepreneurs in his monograph Ripples from the Zambezi: Passion, Entrepreneurship, and the Rebirth of Local Economies. Swiss economist and lecturer Gilbert Rist, in his groundbreaking study of the concept and practice of development, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, clinically outlines the history of assistance and “how we got here” regarding foreign aid and development. For an academic but defense-focused study on the aspects of military influences regarding development, see Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne’s Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms Production, and Arms Trade in Developing Countries.
**Science in Africa.**

Dian Fossey and Jane Goodall remain the undisputed champions of deep African wilderness science. Dian Fossey brought the plight of wildlife and natural resource conservation in Equatorial Africa into the homes of every American. Her best-selling book, *Gorillas in the Mist*, became the film of the same title. Dian Fossey’s work combined Jane Goodall’s in titles such as *Through A Window*, offers interesting insight into the social lives and structures of our closest relatives in the animal kingdom. Dian Fossey’s controversial murder in her mountain hut outside the village of Goma in East Congo underscores the social tension, violence, corruption, and desperation found in the Congo today — and highlights the destruction of indigenous peoples and natural habitats, to include the systematic poaching of Africa’s great animals into extinction. *Origins Reconsidered: In Search of What Makes Us Human* is a well-crafted book by Africa’s most eminent paleoanthropologist and mentor to Dian Fossey and Jane Goodall, Richard Leakey, in concert with fellow researcher Roger Lewin. *Origins Reconsidered* offers profound insight into the impetus behind African hominid research. Perhaps of greater weight to the FAO than the anthropological research and African setting, however, is what can be learned about the origins of warfare and human conflict from our closest animal relatives. To move beyond “chimp wars” as recorded in detail by Jane Goodall and learn more about the theories regarding the genesis of human violence and its relationship to modern war and contemporary conflict, see Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson’s *Demonic Males*, *Apes and the Origins of Human Violence*, Victor Davis Hanson’s *The Western Way of War*, and Martin Van Creveld’s *The Culture of War*. These works, in my opinion, beg the question “What is War” and offer interesting insights into the profession of arms and the origins of warfare, particularly concerning the underdeveloped, tribal, and violent regions in Africa.

**Survival in Africa.**

Yes – it’s a true title. How to Shit Around the World: The Art of Staying Clean and Healthy While Traveling, by Dr. Jane Wilson-Howarth, is the bible for overland travel across Africa. Although lacking great literary significance, Dr. Wilson-Howarth’s book is fun and absolutely necessary for anyone headed into the bush. This can particularly apply to pampered family members or guests! The runner-up in the survival category is *Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What It Means for the World* by the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo. Although *Winner Take All*, Moyo’s recent analysis of the contemporary commodities market and China’s quest for natural resources, belies a national economic survival of the fittest struggle in Africa. *Prospero and Caliban* is a fascinating examination of social identity in Africa and Mannoni’s controversial “dependency complex” theory. *Prospero and Caliban* does not concern survival in the sense of the physical self, but the struggle for cultural identity and cultural survival.

This was the first book to challenge the traditional approaches to studying indigenous African societies by Western scientists and remains unparalleled in its highly critical and pointed analysis. In this same vein, *Climate of Fear: The Quest for Dignity in a Dehumanized World*, a series of lectures given by Nigerian Nobelist Wole Soyinka, searches to understand the African identity and the conflict between power and freedom, the meaning of human dignity, and the motivation behind unthinkable and often unspeakable acts of violence. Finally, the biographical *A Prisoner of the Khaleefah: Twelve Years’ Captivity at Omdurman*, is the incredible true story of the English citizen Charles Neufeld who lived in captivity in Khartoum for twelve years under the Islamist government of the Mahdi. His heroic account of perseverance and survival served in-part as the inspiration for dozens of works, to include the film Khartoum and more recently the fictional film based upon the novel of the same name, *The Four Feathers*. 

**About the Author**

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OFF BALANCE: The United States Policy Pivot to the Asia Pacific

CDR Craig Hill
LTC Christopher Holmes
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During her November 2010 remarks to the East West Institute, in justifying an American pivot to the Asia-Pacific, Secretary of State Clinton identified several trends that “point to Asia”: half the world’s population; several of the largest and fastest-growing economies; some of the world’s busiest ports and shipping lanes; and several challenges that make Asia significant: military buildups, proliferation of nuclear weapons, natural disasters, and greenhouse gas emissions. Taking each of her points (excluding natural disaster and greenhouse gas emissions), this paper will demonstrate that while these trends and challenges are significant to American foreign policy through the 21st century, when placed in a global context, they fail to overshadow the challenges faced throughout the remainder of the world.

World Population

Considering the projected growth of the world population and potential impacts to economies, resources, food, weather, and social structures, it is no wonder that population was first among considerations for an Asia-Pacific pivot. Half the world’s population is impressive; however, it is important to place world population in context to better understand relevance to global security. When viewed from a global perspective, two factors stand out that contradict the importance of “nearly half the world’s population” in the Asia-Pacific region, 1) population growth and 2) the conditions under which those populations live. These factors are much more compelling but seem to have been ignored.

The projected growth and dynamics of the world population through the year 2100 suggest that the Asia-Pacific region will lose its significance from a population perspective. The United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision found that in 2011, 60% of the world population lived on the Asian continent, with 37% residing in China and India alone. The next eight largest populations combined accounted for only 22% of the world population. However, the forecast to 2100, indicates the size and distribution of population shifting away from the Asia-Pacific region.

If the United Nations’ projections are accurate, by 2100, the population of the world will reach 10.1 billion, up from 7 billion in 2011. There appears to be a significant redistribution of the population. While the percent of total population living in Asia drops from 60% to 45%, the percent of the population living in Africa increases from 14% to 35%. Additionally, the landscape of the top ten most populous countries changes drastically as Russia, Japan, and Bangladesh fall out of the top ten and are replaced by the Philippines, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Among those who were in the top ten in 2011, only the United States and Nigeria experience significant growth. Japan, China, Brazil, and the Russian Federation all experience significant decreases in population sizes. Thus, as the world’s population grows from 7 billion to 10.1 billion people and the larger populations decrease or stagnate, the true concern should be where the additional 3.1 billion people go. This is where the potential resides for both growth of markets and human capital, as well as conflict over resources and pandemic health crises.

Discussion so far has been of Asia as a whole, including the Middle East. It is important to note that the focus of the United States’ pivot is toward the Asia-Pacific, not Asia as a whole, and away from the Middle East, significantly impacting how the U.S. aligns its strategic vision. A closer look at The 2010 Revision data reveals that while Asia is declining to 45% of the world population, the Middle East is generally increasing. By 2100, The 2010 Revision projects that population in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen will more than triple, with Iraq increasing population by nearly 350%. Only Iran is projected to decrease in population. As the U.S. shifts its focus away from the Mid-
dle East and toward the Asia-Pacific, by 2100, less than half the world population will reside in the Asia-Pacific region, invalidating Secretary Clinton’s population concern, at least from a long-term strategic perspective.

Population growth through the remainder of this century is not in the Asia-Pacific but in many of the more troubled parts of the world. The argument that numbers of people should drive U.S. foreign policy, or the investment of precious resources to the Asia-Pacific region, is over emphasized when one considers the people who make up these populations and the conditions in which they live.

The 2012 Failed States Index, a product of Fund for Peace, paints a harrowing picture of failed and failing states around the world. Before exploring this data, though, it should be noted that the Failed States Index has its shortcomings. Unlike the United Nations’ World Populations Prospects, the Failed States Index does not provide any projections, only a snapshot in time and it is subject to significant perturbations from discrete events. The 2011 earthquake that struck Japan resulted in a significant increase in Japan’s relative score, earning Japan the number two spot among the Top 10 Most Worsened 2011-2012, as a result of the pressure placed on the population and the government’s ability to respond. However, these shortcomings are offset by historical trend data and the wide spectrum of data that is analyzed to develop scores and rankings. By looking at Social, Economic, Political and Military indicators, the Failed States Index identifies pressures that are pushing states toward the brink of failure and provides early indications of potential conflict.

Among the top 30 nations on the 2012 Failed States Index, only two are Asia-Pacific nations as defined by the U.S. State Department. These two countries, North Korea (22nd) and Timor-Leste (28th), are both located in the lower (better) third of that list. Broadening the sample to the worst 50 nations, only three additional Asia-Pacific nations are added: Cambodia (37th); Solomon Islands (47th); and Laos (48th). Of the remainder of the top 50, 30 are in Africa and seven are in the Middle East. The remainder is sprinkled throughout southern and central Asia with Haiti being the sole outlier. Referring back to the projections of population growth from the World Population Prospects, it is clear that over the next century, global population increases will occur in what today are considered failed and failing states. These results are echoed in the Center for International Development and Conflict Management’s Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger. While narrower in focus, the Ledger provides an assessment of a country’s estimated risk of major bouts of political instability or armed conflict. The 2012 Ledger identifies two concentrations of high or highest risk nations in Africa and southern Asia.

While population was used as a justification for a “pivot” away from the Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific, the arguments are both short sighted and one dimensional. While the current size of the population of the Asia-Pacific region draws attention, the future growth of global population, specifically in Africa and the Middle East, demands attention. When combined with an assessment of the environment in which this growth is going to occur, a foreign policy that values stability cannot focus attention and resources on the relatively stable Asia-Pacific region at the expense of Africa and the Middle East.

Economy

In the November 2010 speech, Secretary Clinton made substantial reference to the interdependence of the Chinese and American economies for stability. In fact, this economic connection extends far beyond the relationships of these two superpowers, and may be underscored by that of the current crisis and stability of the European Union (EU). Major concerns and future consequences include the United States’ strategic shift from other critical areas of the world, such as Europe and Middle East, and the potential impacts a ‘pivot’ strategy would have in the Asia-Pacific. The perception of the United States’ actions supporting this strategic shift may heavily influence the reactions of nations in each of these regions.

Europe /Middle East - The European Union economy is critical to stability of the world economy, and a failed EU would be a devastating setback to the World Economy recovery efforts currently underway. America’s strategic military shift from Europe and the Middle East, combined with projected population shifts, has exacerbated the European economic crisis.

At the local level, reduction of forces in order to support the pivot is impacting European economies today. For the last 67 years many EU countries, particularly Germany, have become increasingly reliant on American support to stabilize their local economies.

The administration’s plan for continued support with rotational force is comprised of ‘geo-bachelor’ soldiers that will not bring the same economic stability of a resident force. For example, force restructuring of half the U.S. Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) out of German cities, like Grafenwoehr, resulted in the closure of the base, loss of 2,400 German jobs, and an annual impact of roughly $676 million. European businesses that rely on local American customers for 50% of their business will close, adding to an already overall dismal economic situation.

At the regional level, the pivot has significant economic impacts. While the United States begins its European drawdown it is also reducing its monetary support to NATO, impacting NATO’s budgetary requirements estimated at €32 billion through 2013. As a result, there are initial indications of a struggle between Germany and France for leadership of EU forces. The removal of U.S. forces from Europe, combined with the military drawdown in Iraq and Afghan-

(Continued on page 48)
WHY CAN’T WE WIN? Pitfalls in Modern U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL SETH W.B. FOLSOM

Abstract
As the Afghanistan war finally draws to a close and a lean economic era approaches, salient learning points from modern U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns must be examined. Significant questions face senior U.S. military leaders and policymakers. Is victory in counterinsurgency possible? Are policies supporting counterinsurgency efforts effective? In an unstable world where irregular characteristics increasingly define armed conflicts, military force alone is insufficient to ensure success. Indeed, despite innumerable battlefield victories, modern American policy execution and major military expeditions abroad point to the hazards of future counterinsurgency operations where the United States is the lead actor. Major policy pitfalls repeatedly have sabotaged American counterinsurgency campaigns, and strategic risk accompanies any U.S. decision to commit substantial resources to foreign counterinsurgency operations.

Moving forward, the United States must develop policies that emphasize regional engagement and building partner capacity with legitimate host nation governments. Additionally, national security policies must not neglect preparations to counter existential threats to the homeland. Insurgencies cannot be “wished away,” but the manner in which future administrations choose to prosecute them must be considered if the United States ever hopes to triumph clearly against irregular forces.

Part I – Policy Pitfalls in U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations

“Therefore it is said that one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so.”
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Wars are expensive, both in blood and treasure. But despite its ability to absorb the fiscal impact of protracted campaigns, the United States has proven consistently that it cannot “get it right” in modern counterinsurgency operations. Major policy missteps, including a U.S. inability to isolate insurgencies and positively influence host nation governments, have combined with a lack of political and societal will to commit to extended struggles. Ultimately the United States has muddled through each conflict until its final, ignominious conclusion.

Case study analyses of previous insurgencies underscore the obstacles that have bedeviled the United States in its modern counterinsurgency efforts. In a 1964 examination of the 1948-1960 British Malaysia campaign, then-U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer presciently highlighted several differences between that conflict and the approaching one in Vietnam. First, he noted, the Malayan borders were controllable, a factor necessary to contain the insurgency. Second, the British military took command in Malaya.

Third, the counterinsurgency effort lasted twelve years – a significant commitment for British forces.1 A broader 2010 RAND study, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers, evaluated the thirty most recent counterinsurgency campaigns worldwide. Among the study’s key findings were two critical factors that mirrored the aspects of Lemnitzer’s Malaya analysis.

As the U.S. military prepares for tomorrow’s challenges, policymakers must tackle difficult questions about future employment of the force. Is victory in counterinsurgency possible? Are policies supporting counterinsurgency efforts effective? In an unstable world where irregular characteristics increasingly define armed conflicts, military force alone no longer is sufficient to ensure success. Indeed, despite innumerable battlefield victories, modern American policy execution and major military expeditions abroad point to the hazards of future counterinsurgency operations where the United States is the lead actor. Major policy pitfalls repeatedly have sabotaged American counterinsurgency campaigns, and strategic risk accompanies any U.S. decision to commit substantial resources to foreign counterinsurgency operations.

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described above. Successful counterinsurgency strategies, the study found, “ensure the positive involvement of the host-nation government” and pressure the host-nation for reform if the “government or its structure and practices do not comport with good counterinsurgency] practices.” Additionally, one key determinant of insurgent victory was the idea that “tangible support trumps popular support,” i.e. “the ability of insurgents to replenish and obtain personnel, materiel, financing, intelligence, and sanctuary (tangible support) perfectly predicts success or failure.” The key points derived from both analyses – the requirement to isolate insurgents and positively influence host nation governments – and the deleterious effects associated with protracted conflicts haunted American efforts not only in Vietnam, but also in Afghanistan and Iraq as well.

Chief among modern U.S. counterinsurgency errors has been the chronic inability to isolate insurgencies. Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam’s western neighbors, became impenetrable sanctuaries for enemy forces and their support networks along the infamous Ho Chi Minh trail. Despite numerous attempts to halt enemy operations along the trail, by 1966 infiltrating fighters numbered between 55,300 and 86,000. Infiltrations peaked at approximately 200,000 during the 1968 Tet Offensive. But the United States could not neutralize the trail. Even the 1970 U.S. invasion of Cambodia failed to alter radically North Vietnamese operations there. “In their two months in Cambodia,” recalled Frances Fitzgerald in *Fire in the Lake*. “The U.S. troops destroyed thousands of tons of North Vietnamese equipment and supplies, but they killed very few enemy troops.” American military success was limited, disrupting the North Vietnamese efforts only briefly. Ironically, the Cambodian incursion drew sharp domestic criticism. The American public, which by 1970 desired a swift termination of the war, would not stand for the invasion of another country by American troops” to shorten the conflict.

Like the North Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia, insurgent elements confronting the Americans in Iraq found shelter in sanctuaries within both Syria and Iran. By 2007 Syria had become one of the most significant sanctuaries for insurgents. The Syrian government, too, relied heavily on the cross-border support of a range of militant groups, including the Shi’i Hezbollah, to George Washington. The Shi’a militia, too, relied heavily on the cross-border flow of Iranian weapons, money, and training support. By 2007 U.S. leaders in Iraq had determined conclusively that the Shi’a insurgency was receiving a variety of munitions from Iran. Elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards force further aided the Shi’a fighters in the planning effort to attack and kill American service members. No effective policy solution to contend with the crossboundary insurgent support ever surfaced, and Iranian-supplied weapons continued to inflict American casualties in Iraq until the final U.S. withdrawal in 2011.

Insurgent sanctuary woes in Afghanistan closely mirrored the American experience in Vietnam. Since the Taliban’s 2001 rout the growing insurgency maintained what Rajiv Chandrasekaran dubbed an “industrial-size sanctuary” inside Pakistan. Unlike Cambodia forty years earlier, an American invasion of Pakistan – a critical U.S. enabler and partner – was off the table. The decision not to chase enemy fighters was, according to Bing West, a strategic U.S. blunder. There was never a serious policy discussion about pursuing and destroying the enemy, noted West, and “by halting on a ridge in the middle of nowhere, [the United States] legitimized Pakistan as a sanctuary.”

The Pakistani government, meanwhile, accepted generous amounts of aid and allowed targeting and air strikes by U.S. drones while simultaneously providing safe harbor for enemy fighters inside its territory. Seth Jones, writing in *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, further noted that assistance from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency strengthened the insurgency’s capabilities and explained its recovery in the years following the Taliban’s 2002 defeat. Public statements by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, further muddied the sanctuary dilemma. Identifying the unresolved safe havens issue as an historic problem, Mullen likewise described the Haqqani terror network as a “strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency” responsible for numerous attacks against International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel in Afghanistan.

Indeed, by 2012 a senior Obama administration official admitted that the United States had not done enough to address the problem of Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. However, he added that the Pakistani government, too, did not believe it had done enough to neutralize the safe havens. The issue, the official noted, had become one of “Pakistan’s insistence that the United States respect [Pakistan’s] sovereignty versus a “U.S. insistence that Pakistan accept its responsibility as a sovereign nation to address the problem” of the sanctuaries and lawlessness within its borders. Although early U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine contained in the Marine Corps’ 1940 *Small Wars Manual* advocated the “assumption of control of executive agencies,” such a strategy is easier said than done. In a modern, thoroughly-connected world the notion of establishing a military ruling authority or a martial law declaration “to complete control of the principal agencies of the native government” carries substantial risk and runs counter to the American goal of encouraging democratic institutions. More appropriate for the modern operating environment is the necessity to positively influence host nation governments – an action the United States consistently has
been unable to achieve in its counterinsurgency-campaigns. Accordingly, the U.S. inability to affect positive change in the Vietnamese, Afghan, and Iraqi governments was a critical lapse in each conflict.

Initially described as “the Winston Churchill of Asia” by Lyndon Johnson and “one of the great figures of the twentieth century,”18 Ngo Dinh Diem appeared to be the perfect leader for South Vietnam. But gradually his regime’s corruption and brutality “[tore] apart the fabric of Vietnamese society more effectively than the Communists had ever been able to do.”19 Any leverage or control over South Vietnam’s government dissipated following Diem’s 1963 assassination. The American refusal to involve itself more deeply in the South Vietnamese government’s management and affairs contributed to the organizational chaos that ensued following Diem’s death. Thus began a period in which, as Fitzgerald remarked, bad leadership was replaced by “no leadership at all.”20

Subsequent South Vietnamese leaders seemed either intractable, or, as in the case of Nguyen Cao Ky, so American and genuinely un-Vietnamese that he “seemed to Westerners the most likable, if not the [man] most fit for the job of government.”21 Ky’s Americanized persona distanced him from the Vietnamese people at a time when they needed a strong leader – and the United States needed a strong partner – capable of promoting true national identity within South Vietnam. The irony is that such a leader may have more forcefully resisted U.S. influence, as would later be the case with Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai. Regardless, Ky’s successor, Nguyen Van Thieu, fared little better. Allegations of corruption, political suppression, and nepotism persisted throughout his administration.22

As law and order collapsed in Baghdad in April 2003, the U.S. military command in Iraq refused to declare martial law and assume control of the host-nation executive agencies. The presence of women and children and the accompanying potential for civilian deaths solidified the decision to suppress a martial law order.23 And while the refusal to implement martial law may have saved the United States from immediate international condemnation, the intransigence and dysfunctional character of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) perhaps proved to be more damaging in the long run. Created to serve as an interim government, the CPA lost its post invasion momentum in 2003 following the Iraqi military’s dismissal and the initiation of the de-Ba’athification program – actions ordered by the CPA itself.24 Despite its designation as an occupying authority and its own directive to “exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq” for an undefined transitional period,” the CPA did not embrace fully its responsibility as Iraq’s governing authority.25 Critics assailed the CPA’s ineffectiveness, absence, and self-imposed isolation.26 Troubled relationships with the Iraqi government leadership plagued the United States.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki suffered from a checkered reputation among senior U.S. policymakers, and by 2007 Congressional leaders began calling for his dismissal. Citing his divisiveness and inability to act as a “unifying figure” amid the political and sectarian chaos ravaging his country, al-Maliki’s U.S. opponents viewed him as an ineffectual, largely incompetent leader that was unable to distance himself from Iraq’s prominent religious and sectarian figures. But al-Maliki publicly enjoyed the full support of President Bush, who remarked, "It's not up to the politicians in Washington, D.C., to say whether he will remain in his position."27

Bush’s public support of al-Maliki resembled the U.S. partnership with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who presided as Afghanistan’s president for the American conflict’s duration. As the war grew more onerous, so, too, did the U.S. relationship with Karzai. Re-elected in 2004 in an overwhelming victory, Karzai won the presidency once more in 2009 in an election widely viewed as fraudulent.28 By 2009 the Obama administration no longer viewed Karzai as an effective or reliable partner. Despite repeated allegations of corruption, nepotism, and unabashed saber-rattling, Karzai continued to govern unpredictably. With no genuine U.S. interference he seemed immune to demands for effective government administration. Even direct pleas by President Obama for Karzai to curb the corruption associated with his presidency did little to change the Afghan leader’s behavior.29

Perhaps the most concerning historical U.S. pitfall has been the American impatience and lack of determination to commit resources for the extended periods that typify counterinsurgencies. If, as Clausewitz implies, war is “a collision of two or more wills,”30 then the prospect of generational struggles like counterinsurgencies may prove to be too much for the four-year political cycle of the American Executive Branch, if not too much for the American spirit.

The 2006 Counterinsurgency manual’s authors understood clearly that insurgencies are “protracted in nature,” and often require more than a decade to achieve desired outcomes.31 More importantly, “At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical.”32 To be sure, the responsibility to justify the significant national commitment associated with counterinsurgencies falls squarely on the shoulders of U.S. policymakers.

As the Vietnam War escalated, so, too, did popular American resentment. By 1968 the Tet Offensive – widely viewed as a tactical U.S. victory but a strategic defeat – became the point at which the American public finally believed the war was unwinnable. However, in the period immediately following Tet tangible signs persisted that the struggle still could be won. But as Fitzgerald noted, only one “real” question remained – “whether these changes made any fundamental differences to the war.”33 And while General William Westmoreland sought to exploit the offen-
sive’s success by widening the war, the opportunity never came. After Tet the American public lost its taste for the struggle in Indochina, and President Johnson acknowledged that Vietnam not only had defined his presidency, but had destroyed it as well.34

In Afghanistan and Iraq the American public and policymakers demonstrated a comparable lack of will to “stay the course” as the American campaigns there stretched beyond a decade. Time, according to Dr. James Lacey, was not on the Americans’ side in either conflict.

“By 2006, the generals knew how to win… all they required was the resources to do so and the time,” noted Lacey. “Instead, from 2008 on, resources began to dwindle, and commanders were told to start heading for the exits.”35

By 2009 the American command in Afghanistan reported that the tide had turned in the insurgency’s favor. Faced with a choice to either commit additional U.S. forces or “lose the war,” President Obama directed a 30,000-strong troop surge into southern Afghanistan in 2010.

However, Obama simultaneously announced that the surge forces would withdraw within two years, and the United States would “begin the transfer of [its] forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.”36 Critics lambasted Obama’s pronouncement as a self-imposed limitation. George Will noted that “having a deadline makes the incentive for the Taliban to reconcile minimal,”37 while other criticisms from conservative commentators attacked Obama’s strategy as a toothless effort.

Charles Krauthammer scoffed at the announcement by noting the president’s declaration “in the next sentence” that surge forces would begin withdrawing the following year.38 Even General David Petraeus, then commanding the U.S. Central Command, appeared to provide only lukewarm public support for the timetable.39

Worse, perhaps, for the Afghanistan mission was the perceived American indifference to the escalation, and by 2012 the majority of the American public no longer supported the war. One poll reported that sixty-nine percent of Americans thought the United States should no longer be involved in Afghanistan. Twenty-seven percent thought the war had been a success, and only seventeen percent believed the United States should remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014.40 The war’s unpopularity and an overwhelming sense of national exhaustion contributed to Obama directing a policy shift from counterinsurgency to one of stabilizing the fledgling Afghan government and neutralizing al Qaeda in Afghanistan.41 The American appetite for fighting the insurgency had evaporated, and even at the government’s highest level there finally appeared the realization that counterinsurgency might not be a viable course of action.

Iraq may be the exception for American endurance vis-à-vis counterinsurgency campaigns. Despite years of public resentment and opposition, the United States not only stayed the course, but also achieved an eventual victory. After nearly a decade the final U.S. withdrawal in 2011 left in its wake a democratically-elected government, a moderately capable Iraqi security force, and a country generally more stable than it had been at the insurgency’s 2003 genesis. Perhaps more important, however, was the final achievement of the war’s aims: preventing Saddam Hussein from employing weapons of mass destruction; ceasing the Hussein regime’s support for international terrorism; preventing future aggression against other regional countries; and ending human rights abuses against the Iraqi people.42 It is questionable, however, whether the quest to terminate human rights abuses was in fact achieved. To this day activist organizations such as Amnesty International cite the Iraqi government as deficient in upholding its responsibility to protect human rights.43

A decade may be the limit of American patience in counterinsurgency campaigns, perhaps less if future forays mirror the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Both conflicts suffered from U.S. policymakers and military leaders not identifying quickly enough their transformation from conventional clashes into fights against insurgencies.44 Clausewitz foretold this point in On War, noting that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”45

General Petraeus likely understood well Clausewitz’s maxim during the 2003 Iraq invasion when he remarked, “Tell me how this ends.” His understanding that the Iraqi campaign was veering in a direction different from what U.S. policymakers had envisioned perhaps explains why Clausewitz’s quote figures so prominently in Counterinsurgency. Petraeus’ foresight is admirable, for the future key to American will to persist in counterinsurgencies may be its leaders’ ability to identify earlier when a conflict makes the turn to another kind of war.

Part II – Future Policy Considerations

“When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, neighboring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act.” - Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Engaging as the lead actor in foreign counterinsurgency operations carries several policy implications for U.S. military and government leaders. Indeed, the strategic risks posed by future U.S. decisions to conduct counterinsurgency or stability operations may outweigh the immediate hazards associated with protracted campaigns and the persistent inability to succeed clearly.

Despite the American military’s embrace of the (Continued on page 51)
Seizing Opportunities and Addressing Challenges: The US-Vietnamese Strategic Rapport

By Collin S. Roach

In October of 2012, the USS George Washington patrolled the waters of South East Asia in an apparent show of power and support to U.S. allies in the Pacific. The aircraft carrier visited U.S. partners in the region such as the Philippines, and thereafter docked off the coast of Vietnam. Several senior Vietnamese military and civilian defense officials were flown onto the aircraft carrier for a tour of the vessel and a meet and greet of U.S. military and civilian defense officials. This was the USS George Washington’s third visit off the Vietnamese coast since 2011. The Executive Officer of the carrier stated that the U.S.’s message was clear: Washington was partnering “…with all nations with the intention to work together to provide maritime security for the world.”

Recently, the emergence of an increasingly close strategic bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Vietnam has been the subject of attention by observers and analysts focused on regional currents and global developments. Scholars, analysts, and observers now speak of current defense relations as if they are on the cusp of major transformation and as though they have taken on a trajectory putting it on a path that mirrors the development of existing U.S. bilateral relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The premise of most such analyses is, as one Washington Post article stated, “…Vietnam is growing increasingly close to the United States,” and that a strategic partnership is emerging based on increasingly regular discussions between U.S. and Vietnamese military and government officials.

These discussions and analyses identify the People’s Republic of China as the driving force behind this apparent emergent critical partnership between Washington and Hanoi. The concerns and observations are warranted and are perhaps spurred by recent maritime incidents and developments in an increasingly volatile Asia-Pacific, friction between the PRC and its South East Asian nations neighbors over disputed claims to the South China Sea as well as the U.S.’s recent announcement of a strategic foreign policy shift that places focus on the Asia-Pacific region.

Issues and incidents concerning territorial disputes between the PRC and its SEA neighbors continue to occur on a more frequent basis. China, Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan all lay claim to territories and sea boundaries within the south island sea chain. The disputes are increasingly a potential source of conflict and provide some ammunition for those who argue that Vietnam and the U.S. are developing their relationship based on the above strategic calculations. They primarily contend that Vietnam, in its relationship with the U.S., is hedging against a rising China. A 2011 annual report to the U.S. Congress by the Department of Defense on military and security developments involving the PRC provides additional support for this line of thought. The report noted, “some regional actors fear China’s growing military and economic weight is beginning to produce a more assertive posture in the maritime domain.” Consequently, many argue that Washington has adjusted its foreign policy focus towards the Asia-Pacific.

While an argument can be made to support this strategic analysis, observers have failed to take into account that there are other variables at play in this calculus, such as a sense of shared responsibility and strategic vision between Washington and Hanoi for the region. For example, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue operations, maritime and border security, law enforcement, nonproliferation, and military engagements are some key components of the developing relationship. Most noteworthy is Vietnam’s assessment of its current and future role as geographic neighbor on the PRC’s strategic periphery.

Therefore, there are other variables that explain the increasingly active U.S.-Vietnamese relationship beyond the widely shared view that Vietnam is seeking a closer embrace of strategic possibilities in the relationship with Washington as a means of hedging against a perceived rising PRC exercise of power in the region. In fact, Vietnam watchers should observe that Hanoi is fully cognizant of its strategic position vis-à-vis a rising PRC and policy shift in Washington, and has in effect been leveraging potential returns from both sides in an Asymmetric Security Landscape: Vietnam may be seeking a strategic relationship with the United States to hedge against the perceived emergence of a rising and an increasingly aggressive PRC, but it is also maximizing its interests while cognizant of its asymmetric position and relationship with the PRC. Experts will point to realist balance of power politics to help explain the phenomena of a rising PRC and a reactant U.S.-Vietnam to this strategic challenge. But in fact, Vietnam and the U.S. have acted in a way that diverges from the current trajectory suggested by traditional balance of power analysts, as both nations jointly seize opportunities and address challenges.

Close analysis demonstrates the real world materialization of Hanoi’s foreign policy objectives, as
outlined in its 2009 Defense White Paper, within the context of the evolving U.S.-Vietnamese defense relationship. Hanoi has utilized its ASEAN membership to secure U.S. as well as international support for its sovereignty claims of the Paracel Islands and the Spratlys. It secured U.S. cooperation and support for maritime initiatives and natural disaster challenges in its neighborhood. It gained commitment from Washington for assistance with its civilian nuclear energy challenges. Finally, we have seen a keen Vietnamese leadership looking out for the interests of its defense establishment by sending students to U.S. defense universities, thereby assuring that they receive quality education that may potentially yield strategic returns as Hanoi looks to develop its military to face twenty-first century security challenges.

These important developments were all accomplished by a Vietnam that is acutely cognizant of the geographic asymmetric relationship with respect to the PRC. While the disparity in capacities between both states is significant it may not necessarily lead to conflict. This dichotomy creates a systemic difference in perception. Vietnam has “done well” in this asymmetric framework because it perceived this asymmetry as normal and has been able to maximize its interests within these constraints.

The critical lesson here is that a zero sum analysis is not always applicable to great power strategic assessments. As is the case with the U.S.-PRC-Vietnamese geo-political makeup, the strategic intentions of the weaker state are also important and must be monitored. Another important observation is that Vietnamese officials appear not only to be comfortable with the current level of the bilateral relationship and the pace at which it is progressing, but Hanoi has also demonstrated an enviable ability to balance its relationship with the U.S. and the PRC absent any breakthrough strategic alliances or armed conflict. It has also managed to avoid angering both sides, thus demonstrating its mastery of this asymmetric arrangement. What remains to be seen is whether or not continued moves by Beijing to act on sovereignty claims of the Spratlys and Paracels will interrupt this strategic balance, and how Hanoi will react to these potential provocations. The consistent argument by many is that in East Asia, there is a budding strategic alliance made even more savory and complex by the storied volatile past of the potential alliance members. A flurry of joint military activities, cooperative diplomatic accords of mutual interests, and visits and exchanges of defense officials continue to contribute to this argument. Looming in the background of this developing partnership and what many argue is the fuel for its energy, is a PRC flexing its muscle in the Pacific, as it grows in military and economic strength. The argument will appear to make sense in terms of theories and explanations offered by traditional balance of power theorists. On the other hand, one can observe a Vietnamese leadership acting outside of this traditional balance of power political interplay by extracting more and maximizing potential returns from the budding alliance.

For Vietnam watchers, the question is where does this emerging bilateral relationship go from here? Some have discussed the possibility of elevating the current relationship to “strategic alliance.” But this assessment or projection may be premature. Issues of concern still remain between Washington and Hanoi. For example, the U.S. would still like to see significant improvements in Hanoi’s human rights record and is concerned by the implications of continued steps by the Vietnamese government to clamp down on freedom of speech exercised by individuals within the country. The recovery of the remains of U.S. service members killed during the war also remains an issue for Washington. For Vietnam, resolution and compensation for the use and effects of the harmful Agent Orange bio-chemical during the war is also a sticking point. In the interim, as the U.S. pivots to the Pacific, as China advances in Asia, and as Vietnam assesses its strategic aspirations, there is one thing that will remain constant: Analysts will observe that all three actors continue to seize opportunities and address challenges in an unpredictable and increasingly volatile Asia-Pacific.

About the Author
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The Air National Guard International Affairs Specialist Program

BY MAJOR KEITH MURPHY, AIR NATIONAL GUARD, U.S. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

As of 27 September 2013, the Air National Guard (ANG) officially stood up an International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program by certifying its first fully qualified Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) officer. Three more ANG RAS officers were certified in October through the SAF/IA Direct Utilization Board. The ANG is now in compliance with Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Office (FAO) Programs, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1315.20, Management of Department of Defense (DoD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-109, International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program.

The requirements of DoDI 1315.20 are clear, “ensure that Service policy and programs for the Reserve Component FAOs result in the accession, training, utilization and retention of RC FAOs sufficient to support DoD Missions”; and AFI 16-109, “the Air Force International Affairs Specialist Program…applies to active component Air Force and Air Reserve Component (ARC) Personnel.” It’s been eight years since the DoD required the Services to establish Reserve Component FAO programs that are the same or equal as those in the active components. Subsequently, the Air Force reinvigorated its FAO program to include the ARC, which includes both the ANG and the Air Force Reserves. The ANG created a program that meets the Air Force and Dept of Defense criteria. A RAS officer is a FAO in the Air Force.

The requirements to become a RAS officer in the ANG are identical to the Air Force requirement, with one nuance; civilian experience. To become an active duty RAS officer, 6-months (preferably one year) of experience in the country/region of specialty, involving significant interaction with host nation nationals, is required. The Air Force recognizes that members of the ARC bring a wealth of experience, and further allows applicable civilian experience in the country or region of specialty to meet the requirement. ARC members have unique civilian experiences and interaction with foreign nationals not common with active component members of the Air Force. A civilian resume describing all interaction with host nation nationals is recommended when applying to the SAF/IA Direct Utilization Board.

The Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs office holds periodic Direct Utilization Boards to certify RAS officers from the ARC. Direct Utilization denotes that a member of the ARC possesses all qualifications required in AFI 16-109 prior to a board convening to become a RAS. This means that the ANG does not deliberately develop RAS officers by sending them to school for an International Relations degree, language, or an in-country immersion. For further information on RAS Officer requirements, see the SAF/IA – International Airmen Division page on the Air Force Portal.

The Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, Director of Policy (SAF/IAP) is the Functional Manager for the IAS Secondary Career Field. The ANG/A1 is the Career Field Manager for the IAS Program in the ANG and on 12 June 2013, appointed ANG/A3X as the Functional Area Manager (FAM) for the RAS 16F career field in the ANG.

In addition to the RAS career field, the Air Force created the Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) 16P career field. PAS officers are certified after attending Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) with the PAS Track, the Naval Postgraduate School masters program, or the USAF foreign policy advisor (POLAD) internship. For the ANG, the only current way to gain the PAS designation is to attend ACSC in-residence with the additional PAS Track courses. ANG officers with prior academic experience in the other programs are encouraged to apply for the PAS designation during the next SAF/IA Direct Utilization Board.

Like the Air Force, the 16F and 16P career fields are secondary Air Force Specialty Codes—RAS/PAS officers will maintain their primary specialty. Further, there are currently no RAS/PAS positions in the ANG; however, ANG RAS/PAS officers can fill active duty 16F/16P billets.

The ANG IAS Program is brand new, with 4 certified RAS officers. The road ahead is to increase the cadre of International Airmen in the ANG, and most importantly, to use the RAS/PAS officers in active duty Air Force billets. The requirement of DoDI 1315.20 is to utilize Reserve Component FAOs to support DoD missions. The requirement of DoDI 1315.20 is to utilize Reserve Component FAOs to support DoD missions. The requirement of DoDI 1315.20 is to utilize Reserve Component FAOs to support DoD missions. The requirement of DoDI 1315.20 is to utilize Reserve Component FAOs to support DoD missions. The requirement of DoDI 1315.20 is to utilize Reserve Component FAOs to support DoD missions.

IF YOU’RE INTERESTED IN BEING PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMUNITY AND JOIN AN ELITE GROUP OF OFFICERS, SUBMIT YOUR APPLICATION FOR THE NEXT SAF/IA DIRECT UTILIZATION BOARD SCHEDULED FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2014.
istan, have created a perception among Europeans that the United States is moving toward a policy of isolationism.

Asia-Pacific - The United States and China share the unofficial status of “superficial friendship.” Several presidential administrations have struggled to implement coherent economic policies to address trade imbalances with China while “successfully” employing a military-centric strategy to support foreign policy objectives in other parts of the globe. Lessons from recent history have proven this ‘military-centric shift’ to be an imprudent strategy and may lead to undesired effects. The strategic plan following the division of the German state and movement of forces in 1945, called for a significant retention of forces in Western Europe. Tensions developed as a result of the perceived threat of U.S. force presence, and were further agitated by the formation of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Russia countered with the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact) in 1955, subsequent to West Germany’s integration into NATO.

The next four decades tested the United States/NATO and Russia/Warsaw Pact in an ‘economic battle’ eclipsed by a massive arms race. The United States and China are already challenged by a ‘limited arms race’. The principal threat resulting from a military shift to the region is the possibility of a Cold War with China. The pivot, led by a visible shift of military forces to the Asia-Pacific region, risks the perception that a military strategy will be the centerpiece of what should be a broader foreign policy. In addition, Russia is again a participant in the strategic shift and has already maneuvered forces on their eastern border as a response.

Ports and Shipping Lanes
The maritime domain has long been indispensable in maintaining trade. In today’s complex and interdependent global economy, the seas are more important than ever. With eight of the top 10 busiest container ports in the Asia-Pacific region and six of those in China, the region is strategically attractive. However, these ports are located in established markets with stable societies, where security is all but assured. By contrast, ports that support the global petroleum industry and those that serve developing markets, where security and stability are questionable, have greater potential to impact the world economy. These “riskier” ports and the economies that they support should be the focus of American resources, not those in the Asia-Pacific.

While shipping lanes represent significant potential to America’s economy, shipping lanes alone should not define foreign policy or national strategy. Rather, priority should be given based on the strategic value of the products moving along those lanes and the relative safety in which those goods are transported. Several points in the world’s shipping lanes are considered choke points where sea routes are compressed into narrow traffic lanes with limited movement. These choke points are vulnerable to being blocked or closed due to actions of nation-states, piracy, or impact by a major accident or natural disaster; these problems could, in turn, significantly reduce cargo transport rates, restrict access to resources such as oil, and may even threaten or close some limited-access ports to sea-based trade. Seven choke points are commonly viewed as critical to maritime transport: the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandab, the Bosporus, the Panama Canal, the Danish Straits, and the Strait of Malacca.

While The Strait of Malacca is extremely important to the Asia-Pacific region and, by extension, the world, until the world can significantly reduce its dependence on Middle East oil, the Strait of Hormuz will continue to top the list of vital chokepoints; 17 billion barrels of oil transit the strait daily, so the cost to the global economy of losing oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz would be immeasurable. Oil prices spiked 3.4% in 2006 as the result of a failed attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing facility. The attack never breached the outer defenses of the facility but placed at risk a third of the daily production that flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Not only would the closing of the Strait of Hormuz have catastrophic effects on the world markets, the instability of the region caused by both state and non-state actors, who both recognize the value of the Strait and have threatened access to the Strait, makes an attack more probable. This threat is magnified by the events of the Arab Spring. By contrast, the Strait of Malacca is important but it lacks the profound threat as well as the globally significant throughput of the Strait of Hormuz. Now is the wrong time to focus efforts and resources away from the stability and security of the Arabian Gulf region into the Asia-Pacific region.

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Secretary of State Clinton identifies nuclear weapons proliferation as one of the major challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that demands U.S. foreign policy attention. Nuclear proliferation or non-proliferation concerns were identified 25 times in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy and 8 times in the 2011 National Military Strategy. There is no doubt that proliferation of nuclear weapons is a significant threat to the national security of the United States. But is the Asia-Pacific region the locus for this threat?

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) bans any transfer of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons related materials to non-state actors including terrorist organizations; however, non-state actors could still obtain access to material through nations that employ inadequate materials security or by deliberate transfer. While the focal point of U.S. terror-network interest is al-Qaeda and related
networks, other terrorist organizations may also try to obtain nuclear or other NBC materials. Compared to most nation-states, terrorist organizations would have fewer reservations about using nuclear materials or weapons against the United States.

The Asia-Pacific region includes two nuclear states, China and North Korea. China is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); North Korea had been a non-nuclear member, but later announced its withdrawal from the treaty and that it possessed nuclear weapons. Since it tested a nuclear weapon in 2009, it has been under UN sanction for treaty violations and proliferation efforts. While a threat to several stable neighbors, North Korea does not pose the threat for proliferation or use that is seen in other parts of the world, specifically the Middle East and southern Asia.

In southern Asia, India and Pakistan signed the treaty but have tested and confirmed possession of nuclear weapons. India garnered international support for their civilian nuclear power program under waiver as a non-NPT member by acceding to international inspections. Pakistan, however, has been less open about their nuclear program and has both a record of proliferation as well as support to extremist groups. Considered by many to be a wildcard among nations, Pakistan provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Libya through the efforts of their head nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. Additionally, Pakistan is well known for its manipulation and use of extremist groups as proxies to achieve political gains against enemies. While the United States has partnered closely with Pakistan to fight the Global War on Terrorism, Pakistan’s long record of deceit, support to extremists, and proliferation makes it a much greater threat to security of the United States and the world community. This threat is amplified as Pakistan loses revenue as a result of NATO’s pending withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In the Middle East, two nations, Israel and Iran, are of significant concern. Israel did not sign the NPT but is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. Israel will neither confirm nor deny any capabilities. However, the threat of proliferation from Israel is limited. By contrast, Iran is an NPT member, but is under UN sanction and significant international pressure to stop their uranium enrichment for nuclear weapon development. Like Pakistan, Iran has a long history of both material and rhetorical support to extremist groups. Iran’s challenge of the existence of Israel and sponsorship of terrorism coupled with their development of nuclear weapons and increased missile capabilities makes them the most significant threat. If nuclear proliferation is truly the threat to the United States that the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy declare, then a responsible foreign policy would not be focused on the Asia-Pacific but rather the Middle East and southern Asia.

Other Geo-Political Concerns

Secretary Clinton’s goal in her November speech was to identify trends and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that justify a shift. This approach provides only one side of the strategic discussion that needs to occur. Taking this approach, she ignores several strategic concerns that do need to be accounted for in contemplating a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region.

Europe – Ongoing geo-political challenges suggest that now is not the time to divert U.S. attention and resources to the Asia Pacific region. Individually, none of these demand U.S. focused attention or resources; however, as a whole, they represent ongoing crises that will claim U.S. attention due to their potential threats to global stability. For example, many areas of Europe have seen an alarming rise in nationalist parties as a result of a combination of the ongoing economic crisis, rising migration, and the perception of the American disengagement from Europe and the Middle East. These are the same circumstances that allowed for a young Adolf Hitler to rise to power following World War I, and the same ideology that has recently been embraced by one rising nationalist party in the Ukraine.

Eurasia -- In Eurasia, Russia faces many challenges that will not only impact Russia but also significantly impact the European Union, which already struggles with their own economic crisis. Faced with significant changes in demographics, failing infrastructure, and a flawed economic model, Russia continues to struggle to find its place in the international order. These challenges have not, however, prevented Russia from taking heavy handed action against its neighbors to demonstrate that it remains a regional power. Following expansion of NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence, a Russia eager to prove its relevance in the post Cold War world and eager to challenge U.S. influence becomes a very dangerous actor.

Middle East/North Africa - The political impacts of the Arab Spring continue to ripple throughout friendly and not-so-friendly Muslim states worldwide. Viewed by some as the beginning of democratization of the Muslim world, and perceived as the solution to years of instability, poor governance, and neglect of populations, the Arab Spring also comes with significant challenges. The Arab Spring has not necessarily brought democracy. On the contrary, Morocco, Jordan, and the Kingdom of Bahrain remain liberalized autocracies who implemented social change to protect regimes. Libya and Egypt appear to have weathered the storm; however, the fractured state of rebellion continues to be a challenge to reaching the hoped-for end states. In Egypt, the military remains the dominant part of the governing apparatus. Conflict continues in both Syria and Yemen.
While relatively strong government structures in Assad’s Syria suggest that institutions can restore normal governance under another regime, the fractured state of the rebellion suggests that no single party will be able to consolidate power and develop a truly democratic government. In Yemen, a rebellion that is able to consolidate power will inherit weak institutions at best. The Arab Spring is far from over and the potential outcomes too varied; the impact that allies such as Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are experiencing as a result of it suggest that the United States cannot afford to shift its focus away from these events in the near future.

Prospects for Afghanistan are bleak. Internally, without significant change in trajectory, a shaky government will emerge buried in debt and dependent on international donors for the funds to operate an as-yet undeveloped government and immature security mechanism. Externally, threats abound. Pakistan, with a track record of using Afghanistan to generate and nurture extremists and no longer benefiting from the large sums of money necessary to support the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan is, at best, a wildcard, but more likely a destabilizer.

The U.S. must remain profoundly engaged with these nations and support the changes they are going through. Without that support and mentorship, the region will continue to see a drop in democratization from a high of 43% in the early 70’s to the current percentage of 24% in 2011. Again, the perception of U.S. isolationism, may be adding to the overall instability within the region.

Conclusion

During her November 2010 remarks to the East West Institute, Secretary of State Clinton justified a United States policy pivot to the Asia-Pacific based on trends in population, economies, and ports and shipping lanes, and challenges in military buildups, proliferation of nuclear weapons, natural disasters, and greenhouse gas emissions. All of these trends and challenges should be considered in developing United States foreign policy; however, by exploring these trends and challenges in depth, it is clear that while they affect the Asia-Pacific region, the pivot away from Europe and the Middle East is the wrong strategy at the wrong time.

Not only are the premises upon which the pivot is justified flawed, the United States’ strategic ‘pivot’ away from these areas has added to the perception of isolationism fostered by its movement of forces and compounded by the issues of a deepening economic crises, especially in Europe. The world economic crisis has required many nations throughout Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa to rethink their own national strategies.

These crises, complicated by population shifts and ethnic migrations, have contributed to the rise of nationalism. Ignoring the aspects of the rise of nationalism, the economic conditions, and ethnic migrations concerns that led to World War II is setting the conditions for a repeat. There have already been examples of this in Bosnia in the mid-90’s, and more recently in Syria. In addition, the end of the bipolar Cold War world has influenced nationalistic nuclear ambitions and opportunities for nuclear proliferation.

Finally, the bulk of the world’s commerce moves through ports in China. The protection of movement...
of goods through these stable ports, which are already secured by China, should not be a major influence in the development and implementation of a military strategy. The remaining commerce, including bulk goods and oil transport, travels via sea lanes spanning the globe.

The absence of a clear national strategy and the utilization of a misplaced military strategy to prioritize the Asia-Pacific have the potential to start a Cold War with China. The Asia-Pacific region is economically stable. This pivot in military strategy is not supported by an enduring and comprehensive national strategy for the region, therefore it is the wrong strategy at the wrong time, leaving the ‘United States Policy Pivot to Asia-Pacific – Off Balance.’

(Continued from page 44) Small Wars Manual and Counterinsurgency, U.S. DoD guidance in the shadow of the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts indicates a tangential policy shift. Most notably, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) states that in the future, fiscally-constrained environment the United States will “wherever possible... develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve [national] security objectives.” The DSG further explains an underlying theme of “low-cost / low-impact” operations by noting the agility required of the future force.

With the recent experiences fresh in their memories, U.S. policymakers appear reluctant to draft guidance that predicts substantial overseas commitments. This is understandable and appropriate, given the time and resources consumed by the conflicts of the last decade. Yet while the DSG insists that “U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,” it provides one important caveat: “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The implication is clear: While the American military can expect a significant force reduction, it must still sustain counterinsurgency skills as a core competency. But the notion that the United States can involve itself in limited counterinsurgencies is wishful thinking. Simply put, limited counterinsurgencies do not exist, nor can they be waged on the cheap. The manpower requirement alone for counterinsurgencies is staggering, requiring troop densities as high as twenty to twenty-five counterinsurgents for every 1,000 inhabitants. Such heavy troop requirements represent a commitment the 2012 DSG seeks to avoid.

For the Department of Defense, counterinsurgency campaigns are strategic distractions to its ability to plan for and execute global contingency operations. Such campaigns similarly divert national leaders responsible for the stewardship of the other instruments of national power.

The quagmires into which counterinsurgencies inevitably devolve sidetrack policymakers, politicians, and diplomats, especially when intervention in such conflicts results from hubris or naiveté. Excoriating the singularly American tendency to “act as the policeman for all of Southeast Asia,” Senator J. William Fulbright in 1966 observed that “An excessive preoccupation with foreign relations over a long period of time... is a drain on the power that gave rise to it, because it diverts a nation from the sources of its strength, which are its domestic life.”

Meanwhile, the Vietnam War mired more than 550,000 U.S. troops in Southeast Asia while the United States struggled to contain the Soviet Union in a global Cold War. Decades later, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2008 theaters included nearly 190,000 personnel.

Throughout those two conflicts the U.S. military struggled to fulfill its myriad, worldwide commitments.

Counterinsurgency campaigns similarly distract from the ability to conduct regional engagement and build partner capacity – the two efforts most likely to succeed in thwarting future insurgencies. Engagement and security cooperation operations – programs and actions pursuable by all elements of national power – potentially can forge lasting partner relationships and strengthen American standing worldwide. A continued U.S. insistence to take the lead is a perilous course that absolves foreign partners of their responsibility to appropriately address regional crises. As Senator Fulbright cautioned, “By taking on foreign responsibilities for which it is ill-equipped, America not only strains her resources but encourages other nations to neglect their responsibilities, which neglect of course can only lead to added burdens for the United States.”

But strategies centered on engagement and partner capacity are insufficient. When dealing with foreign partners the United States must pursue policies that promote “insurgency prevention.” Such policies, which can be promoted both before foreign hostilities begin and during a conflict’s opening stages, would focus on bolstering host nation government legitimacy, rule of law, and engagement with the very opposition groups that could blossom into an insurgent base. Insurgency prevention necessitates action and involvement by American diplomats and policymakers in places where conflict may not yet overtly exist. The prerequisite for such a strategy is host nation governments committed to legitimate governance.

The 2010 RAND study bluntly echo this, recommending, “The United States should think twice before choosing to help governments that will not help
The role of the United States as the “city upon a hill” where “the eyes of all people are upon it”55 is a heavy burden, and continued involvement in protracted campaigns in the name of promoting freedom and democracy risks a reduction in U.S. global credibility. And, despite the fact that the United States never assumed governmental control in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it never managed to shake the stigma of an occupying power. Future forays into the counterinsurgency morass likely will mirror the past. In such cases the United States – despite being founded on principles of freedom, democracy and justice – may be doomed to continue forward as the country everyone loves to hate.

Conclusion

“He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious.” - Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The United States military possesses the capability and capacity to triumph in counterinsurgency operations. To be sure, the American inability to win clearly in past counterinsurgency campaigns has not been a matter of military competence, but rather one of policy missteps and a lack of national will. The same may well apply in the conduct of future counterinsurgency ventures. By the time the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq had reached their tipping points the U.S. military arguably was already on the path to success. But the pressing realities of policy missteps and political and societal exhaustion combined to create a trio of campaigns that have been maligned as mismanaged fiascos at best. At worst, they represent outright failures of national policy.

Although it is naïve to expect that the United States will never again embark on a counterinsurgency operation abroad, the difficult lessons from its modern campaigns – if heeded and applied appropriately – will create a better prepared and more informed future cadre of American military leaders and national security policymakers. After all, training for and executing counterinsurgency operations is as much about professional military education as it is about the force’s core capabilities and competencies.

As the global leader the United States must continue to pursue policies that promote freedom and democracy abroad. But that should not compel the United States always to assume responsibility as the lead actor, especially in conflicts where host nations are unwilling to demonstrate the commitment necessary to prevail. Policies that promote regional engagement and partnership – policies designed to build partner capacity – can effectively develop regional solutions to regional problems. As Walter Pincus argued in 2013, “The lead for using combat troops, ‘boots on the ground,’ should be taken by those whose vital interests are directly involved – starting with the host government. Next should be neighboring countries.”56

Equally important, engagement that leads to regional actors properly addressing neighboring conflicts obviates the risk of U.S. entanglement in unpopular and unmanageable wars. Political risk accompanies this policy, which has been derided by opponents as an approach that advocates “leading from behind.”57 But such a strategy need not always involve the deployment abroad of substantial numbers of conventional military forces. A counterterrorism and foreign military training and advisory strategy – with its comparatively smaller footprint – designed to support the administrations of legitimate host nation governments is one example of how to implement such a policy. The alternative – the American insistence to always lead or simply “go it alone” – likely will fail without measures that address past strategic errors in counterinsurgency operations.

Finally, as U.S. policymakers eye the future, they must continue to pursue policies designed to counter threats that truly jeopardize American national security. The 2010 RAND study crisply articulates this, noting that “loss in such a conflict [against a peer or near-peer competitor] could be unbearably costly for the nation.”58 The risk of such a confrontation still exists. China’s continuing rise, renewed Russian commitments to bolster its armed forces, persistent North Korean saber-rattling, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions – each represents a disastrous scenario should an unprepared United States be compelled to engage militarily.

Accordingly, the wholesale commitment of American military might should be reserved for foreign conflicts that present the greatest risk for regional destabilization or truly threaten vital U.S. national interests. Engaging in counterinsurgency campaigns is a costly, strategically distracting enterprise. The American missteps of the last forty years must not be ignored.

Instead, the lessons learned from these conflicts point to a new way ahead for the United States in a world that is fractured and more dangerous than ever.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Seth Folsom is a South Asia Foreign Area Officer. While in India he attended the United Nations Military Observers Course and the Indian Army’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School. From 2006 to 2009 he was assigned to the 1st Marine Division staff, where he served as G-3 Training Officer and Operations Deputy. In 2008 he deployed to al Anbar Province, Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as Team Leader, Military Transition Team 0733. His advisor team was embedded with 3rd Battalion, 28th Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division. From 2009 to 2011 he was assigned to Plans, Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters Marine Corps, where he served as the International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator. From 2011 to 2012 he commanded 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment. During this period he deployed to Sangin Dis-
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(Continued from page 10)

this task should be more achievable. The ongoing SOF commitment to Afghanistan, rebalance to the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR), and the worldwide demand for deployment of smaller forces as directed by the 2010 QDR will continue to compete for finite training time of SOF. As such, the following recommendations are made in an effort to maximize FL and acculturation training for SOF and to gain efficiencies.

First, experts in the field of FL education and second language acquisition argue that not everyone has the same aptitude for language learning, and there is ample evidence that FL aptitude can be tested. The Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) test, developed by the Defense Language Institute and used to test SOF operators and FBI agents, has proven to be a reliable predictor of language learning aptitude. Currently, the DLAB is being used mainly as one of the entry-level qualification tests for Special Operations candidates. However, in many cases, not much consideration of DLAB scores is taken when determining language selection and placement. Identifying those SOF operators with higher aptitudes for learning a FL may help SOF save time and money by selecting the language-learning “superstars” and assigning them to the more complex and difficult languages such as Category III and IV languages. Those with lower DLAB scores should be placed into Category I or II languages in accordance with the Defense Language Institute’s general catalog.

Second, the SOCOM Commander must serve as a "language evangelist" and overcome or bypass existing service resistance or reluctance as identified in the 2010 GAO review of the services’ 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap implementation. What the services haven’t done, the SOCOM Commander must. In this role he must advocate and demand that SOF move beyond simple FL proficiency for small teams to "Language & Culture Phase 0 Shaping Operations" which will truly set the conditions for FL and culture awareness exploitation. FL training should not be considered "individual professional development and self-study" as reference in DA PAM 600-3 2010, it should be considered a requisite combat skill for SOF operators.

This will also have the tertiary effect of warding off any competing interests amongst general purpose forces, primarily the Army, which is moving to "regionally aligned forces." These forces and the DOD in general would benefit tremendously from specialized language, regional expertise and cultural training in preparation for support of operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. So both in mission and in training, these forces will attempt to replicate and at best complement SOF operations, activities and actions while competing for some of the same resources. The opportunity therein lies for SOF to get ahead of the curve while the services are overcoming their inertia and refocus.

Lastly, sustainment of language and cultural skills is crucial. It is commonly accepted that much like basic rifle marksmanship or other combat skills, language skills mastered in entry-level training or pre-deployment will degrade and perish quickly. The only way to be certain that we are improving the proficiency levels of our linguists is through more structured sustainment training. How can SOCOM overcome this challenge? Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet but a quick study of what other commands and agencies that require language capabilities are doing can shed some light. Military personnel assigned to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), for example, have access to established pipelines, procedures, requirements, funding, and field organizations which enable sustainment of their language and culture skills. Additionally, they have access to quality language training prior to deployment and sustainment training at station.

While we are not proposing that SOCOM adopt the Foreign Area Officer program, there are some lessons to be observed and learned. As previously mentioned, a culture change is required and the infrastructure needs to be developed within PME. Simply monetizing incentives is not sufficient enough. In some cases, there may be no-cost solutions to be exploited. Every SOF officer attends PME or even the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at some point in their careers. These officers should be required to take a language and culture training as part of their electives; whether it is with live instruction or a no-cost technical solution such as Special Operations Forces Teletraining System (SOFTS).

The other advantage of either live or computer-
based training is that sustainment hours can be tracked. Annual training guidance often stresses language sustainment training and may even place a metric on the annual hours required, but this is all too often the first point of negotiation when there are “higher” or competing training requirements. FL and culture training is relegated to the “individual training and development” category, reminiscent of the broad abscission attitude within the Army Service Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management pamphlet DA 600-3.

SOF can no longer afford for language training to be an afterthought or the first point of acquiescence. The force will likely be reluctant at first, but with the right incentives (assignment preferences, command billets, and promotions), SOF operators will see the benefits of improving the critical language and regional skills needed to develop personally and professionally. Language skills, as well as cultural and regional expertise must be recognized and sustained with parity to other combat skills and required or rewarded through future assignments and promotion opportunities.

Conclusion
While it appears that the operational tempo of our SOF is drawing down, history tells us that it is merely a matter of time before the call will come again. As they wait for the call, it is clear that we must take advantage of any down time to raise the level of language and cultural proficiency of our front-line “warrior-diplomats”. A well planned and properly funded combination of incentives, tracking mechanisms, and advanced training opportunities as discussed previously will lay the foundation for a future SOF cadre armed with not only the military skills but the language and cultural skills needed to conduct any operation in any region. As President Obama stated, “…in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand.”

Team Biographies
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