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Greetings from the team at the FAOA Journal and welcome to our publication.

As I type this, I’m sitting on an airplane headed to Abu Dhabi for a conference or two and then out to a Central Asian country to be named later. As luck would have it, my seatmate is an old retired senior naval aviator. Pure serendipity. It made for an interesting journey. He has covered the globe as the head of two major Combatant Commands in times of great crisis and change. And it reminded me, as I reflect on his stories and wisdom, that we owe it to our civilian bosses and to the nation to give them our best advice and not shy away from the unvarnished truth. It takes guts and a bit of charm but your nation expects every FAO will do their duty. As our great leader, Kurt Marisa, President of FAOA, said recently at a FAO Luncheon, FAOs are expected to be political advisors, business development gurus, horse handlers and intelligence officers, all at the same time. Oh, and don’t forget, be able to speak the language. It is a big job.

Meanwhile, we are working hard to improve and upgrade the journal to make it intellectually stimulating and well formatted, as well as provide career guidance and support for the FAO community. One thing we can say with pride is that the caliber of the articles coming into our hands are terrific. And these articles are coming from FAO members like yourselves. Good work. But we need more. We want your book reviews and articles. We want your opinions. You are out there scattered across the globe on the frontlines working with friend and foe alike and we want to hear from you. We want your unvarnished opinion.

So in the future you will see some changes to the journal. We will start the Summer Journal with a recommended reading list for all FAOs. And we are going to break it up into categories; historical, political, and social. I’m kicking it off today with my recommendation, The Great Game, a book I think all FAOs ought to have in their library. The Great Game is a history of the struggle for influence in Central Asia between England and Russia in the 19th Century. John Blank wrote it and it is a great story and great study of the influence of FAOs, called political officers then, on policy and on the politics of Central Asia. It’s a history that resonates loudly today. It is a must read for all FAOs regardless of your region.

I hope you find this FAO Spring Quarter Journal an interesting read. Our editorial board lead by John Haseman has done a masterful job collecting articles they think will get your attention. And our web master, Graham Plaster, gets the award for hardest working member of the journal team. Graham’s the one that has to put this all together in a readable format and publish it. Not an easy task.

The FAO Association goal is to elevate the profile of our brother and sister FAOs out there and to let you know that you are not alone, although from career and service support standpoint, it sure must seem so. And with any luck, this journal will help to raise the FAO profile and if nothing else give you a great place to vet your ideas and to share your experiences. Best of luck out there and when you are back in Washington please try to hit one of our many luncheons or happy hour events to meet up with your fellow brothers and sisters from the FAO community. We had a great “de-brief” at O’Sullivan’s Pub right after the George Mason Civil Affairs roundtable. It was an opportunity to hear it from the “old hands” how it was in the days before running water, GPS and Starbucks. And yes, they spoke a lot of Russian.

Mike Dugan
Editor in Chief
FAO Association

CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS — FAOA is in need of additional volunteers to serve as Co-Chairman and / or members of several key committees including the Events Committee, Awards and Scholarships Committee, Membership and Sponsorship Committee, Outreach and Chapters Committee. Please contact Kurt Marisa directly to volunteer or with any other comments, questions, or suggestions: president@faoa.org or by phone at 703-853-0928
The Foreign Area Officer Association Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs

BY KURT MARISA, COLONEL USAF (RETIRED), PRESIDENT, FAOA

The FAOA Scholarship is given to an undergraduate applicant with the requisite academic and extracurricular achievements; that have a declared/established major in International Relations, International Affairs, Regional Studies, or Languages; with preference given to ROTC students or current or previous enlisted personnel. More information on the FAOA Scholarship and other MOAA Scholarships can be obtained at www.moaa.org. Through the MOAA Scholarship Fund, the FAOA Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs provides interest-free loans and grants to students (under age 24) who are children of former, currently serving, or retired commissioned or warrant officers (Regular, Reserve or Guard) and to children of currently serving or retired enlisted military personnel (Regular, Reserve or Guard), for up to 5 years of undergraduate education at an accredited two- or four-year college or university of their choice. The FAOA Scholarship provides an annual $5500 combination interest-free loan/grant. Recipients are required to maintain a 3.4 GPA and must send a letter of appreciation to the scholarship donor. Membership in MOAA (for officers) or, MOAA’s subsidiary for non-MOAA members, Voices for America’s Troops (for enlisted personnel), is required if your child is selected to receive Educational Assistance. The 2012-2013 recipient of the first Foreign Area Officer Association Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs was Matthew A. Robbins (see thank you note below), who will also be a special guest to the 2013 FAOA Black Tie Dinner. Donations to the FAOA Scholarship Fund can be made on-line at www.faoa.org under links “About FAOA” then “FAOA Scholarship Fund”.

Hello Colonel Marisa,

I am writing to thank you for your donation to the Military Officers Association of America, as the recipient of the Foreign Area Officer Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs scholarship, I am truly grateful for what you have made possible for me. I am currently a junior at Liberty University majoring in International Relations and double minorig in Government and Crisis Communications. With this degree, I hope to make a career of Crisis Management within our Federal Government or the United Nations focusing on how we can develop a better communications network between governments, local and federal in the event of a catastrophic event such as September 11th. Although I have a clear idea of what I want to do, I have begun looking into Graduate School as an alternative option to going directly into the work force. If this plan comes to fruition I hope to attend either Georgetown University or Oxford University studying International Relations.

As of right now, I am living in Washington, D.C. this semester and interning in Senator Mark Warner’s office. I am excited to be a part of the legislative process and know that I will gain unprecedented amounts of experience that will help shape me into a successful person within government.

Again, thank you very much for your support and donation to the MOAA Education Assistance program, with a family history of military service, I am grateful to see that the military community is actively assisting students like me in reaching our goals.

Sincerely,

Matthew Robbins
**From The Field:**

**Ankara, Turkey**

**BY COLONEL DAN DAGHER, USAF,**
**U.S. EMBASSY ANKARA**

I recently had the pleasure of accompanying Acting U.S. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, to a meeting with Turkey’s Undersecretary of Defense, Murad Bayar. We had a few minutes to talk, and I discovered she is a remarkable woman with a keen interest in how the military works out here. As the topic of the myriad of U.S. Government agencies in Turkey came up, she asked me for more specifics on the Office of Defense Cooperation...more specifically, what’s our mission?

When asked why we are here, I said, **“We build partnerships.”** That’s our mission.

Why are we here? Now this being my first month in Ankara, I was triggered to respond with some great ODC things like: Foreign Military Sales; intelligence cooperation; planning and accomplishing the training of Turkish military, government civilians, and security personnel in the U.S.; creating military-to-military agreements; political-military awareness; bilateral special operations training; designing military exercises; ensuring regional balance and security; and the outstanding support system that goes along with all those things I just listed. But those things are what we do and not really why we’re here.

When asked why we are here, I said, “We build partnerships.” That’s our mission.

We are 61 U.S. military and civilian personnel, and 18 Turkish local nationals, whose behaviors lead to building bridges between two nations. How we do it is simple, and easily understood by somebody accustomed to working with U.S. Embassy Commercial Service offices. We interact...we engage...we build networks with Turkish military and military-related government officials. Engaging and interacting is not too different from how our folks at the U.S. Commercial Service office build their partnership with Turkey, only the people we work with are military or government-military related. And so, many of these engagements with the Turkish military are what we would consider routine, yet it’s important to understand the value these interactions and engagements bring to why the ODC is here...building partnerships. These interactions and engagements, no matter how small, with Turkey’s military personnel at all ranks, will make long-term success happen. As a side note, all 79 of those ODC folks are here to build a partnership with Turkey...not just the Security Cooperation Directorate, JA, Agreements Directorate, or the Operation NOMAD SHADOW folks, but the Ankara Logistics Directorate as well. Some of us interact with Turkish military personnel on a daily basis, and some of us on a monthly basis, but each of us is here to build a partnership.

Colonel Dan Dagher, USAF, is the Director of Security Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. He is an Air Force pilot and Regional Affairs Specialist, with a Masters Degree in International Political Science (Middle East) from the Royal Defense College in Belgium. He attended DLI at both Washington DC and Monterey, and speaks Arabic and French.

Colonel Dagher’s input is the first in a series called “From The Field.” Your FAO Association Journal wants this to be a feature of every issue. We need your input! Send us short pieces like this. Tell us about a new adventure, an interesting travel experience on the job, or about an important visit -- anything to share with your fellow FAOs about your country, your job, your experience.

Thanks,
John Haseman
Editorial Board Chairman, FAOA Journal
Ms. Heidi Grant, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, was the guest speaker for the January 2013 FAO Association Luncheon at Fort McNair. Ms. Grant’s remarks addressed the role her office plays in reaching national security objectives through international partnerships around the world.

Ms. Grant’s opened her remarks with a tribute to the importance of the FAO/RAS community, saying: “It’s always a pleasure and an honor to speak with the true experts in the international affairs field. Many of you here have been or are currently Foreign Area Officers and Regional Affairs Specialists – an important service which provides valuable links to countries around the world. Your expertise and advice offers leaders like me the options we need to make informed decisions and support foreign policy.”

She outlined the role of the SAF/IA office mission: “My office leads U.S. Air Force efforts to enhance international cooperation, capability and capacity in order to support U.S. and partner nation’s national interests. Our vision incorporates the three Cs: Cooperation, Capability, and Capacity. Most vital in our Mission is our ability to maintain and build trust with existing and new partners.”

Ms. Grant explained that this mission is carried out through three primary focus areas. The first of those is relationships. “Military exchanges, training and education, exercises, air shows, and other programs and activities all help to strengthen our relationships. This, in turn, helps ensure access for both countries and strengthen coalitions. And the key element in any international relationship is the personal presence, particularly the FAO and the RAS.”

A second focus area is to develop international aviation capabilities and capacity. Foreign Military Sales is a very important tool used to accomplish this.

The third focus area is to build a global community of Airmen. “You’ve heard about our International Affairs Specialist program, which is an important part of that. SAF/IA has 1,342 international airmen working in over 100 countries and speaking more than 50 languages.”

SAF/IA serves as the U.S. Air Force’s arm to partner with others to deliver the right capabilities. This involves extensive coordination with several agencies from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as with U.S. Embassy country teams, Combatant Commands, USAF Component Commands, and industry. International Affairs Specialists - specifically RAS officers - assigned to these posts are an important part of this relationship-building process.

President Obama, at his Inauguration, underscored the importance of conflict prevention. This is a key part of SAF/IA’s mission. Global partnerships help to achieve this mission: “We can achieve more together than we can apart.” And, as Secretary Panetta stated, “It can’t be just the U.S.”. The scope of our global partnerships spans the world. There is not a single AOR where SAF/IA is not establishing, sustaining, or expanding partnerships.

SAF/IA manages a robust FMS operation. We partner with other Air Force FMS professionals, combatant commands, and embassies around the world to work more than 2,600 active cases worth more than $134 billion in 99 different countries. FMS is an investment in our global security. By training and equipping partner nations, we can leverage capabilities, attain access, and share the burden in times of conflict.

Ms. Grant touched on the issue of Defense Export Reform and the Future of FMS, both important topics for SAF/IA and our partners. She approached this topic by speaking in more detail about the core function of building capability and capability in partner nations. “SAF/IA facilitates partnerships that allow us to cooperate on national and global security objectives. Our mission is much more than FMS. It’s security cooperation, where we are working to build capabilities and capacity within partner nations, so that they can be more effective contributors to global security. FMS is the system we use to train and equip our partners so that we can meet these global security goals together. In fact, I like to describe FMS as the cornerstone of our relationships with partner nations.”

She emphasized that FMS is much more than selling weapons systems. Every case includes a thorough plan that incorporates cooperative training, logistics support, doctrine, and CONOPS development, as well as equipment sales and transfers. This process creates holistic capabilities and develops relationships that will pay dividends long into the future. It is because of this total package approach and the quality of the products that FMS cases have grown steadily since 2009 and will continue to do so.

Ms. Grant stated that “Our FAOs and RAS officers
who are serving in embassies around the world are on the front lines in their host countries—listening and learning from partners on a daily basis, and building enduring partnerships that will last well beyond their country assignments.” Since 2009, SAF/IA has conducted studies on support to Security Cooperation Organizations. The studies assessed effectiveness in organizing, training and equipping to deliver Combatant Commanders the right mix of security cooperation capabilities including personnel assigned to embassies, COCOMs, and partner agencies. The results of these studies have shown that officers assigned to embassies abroad are the personnel with the most direct influence on the security cooperation mission and long-term international partnerships. “This is not surprising when you think about it. As FAOs and RASs, you are the people who interact daily with our partners; you are the ones who execute capacity building and humanitarian assistance activities; and you have an enormous effect on regional political-military relations. Whether it’s through FMS or Security Cooperation activities, FAOs and RASs play a crucial role in building enduring international partnerships.”

Because this is such an important part of our mission, SAF/IA has placed a strong emphasis on identifying and rectifying issues with the selection, training, and support of the Air Force personnel filling our SCO billets around the world. This is an ongoing effort and we continue to make improvements to enhance our support to security cooperation.

Ms. Grant reminded the audience that in this time of financial uncertainty, international partnerships have become increasingly important. With budget cuts looming throughout the DOD, IFMS will increase significantly, as the U.S. looks to partner countries to share the cost and operational burden. By focusing our efforts, together we can, and will, overcome any fiscal challenges that befall us. FMS helps improve the capabilities of our partner nations so that they can be active participants in strengthening global security. This benefits not just the U.S., but the entire global community. Every country plays a role. The U.S. needs allies, and we collectively benefit from the strategic depth, enhanced information sharing, increased access and interoperability that result from these partnerships.

She used as an example of a great coalition effort the recent operation in Libya, which was led by NATO in March 2011. “What many outside of this room may not know is the role played by the United Arab Emirates. For most of the operation, they flew cutting edge F-16s out of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy. The UAE was able to contribute to this mission as a result of the long-term relationship that started with their purchase of F-16s more than 10 years ago.” Their capability benefitted from multiple personnel exchanges, training with the Air National Guard’s 162nd Fighter Wing in Tuscon, Arizona, and participation in Red Flag and Green Flag exercises. This is a perfect example of how partnering with other nations can result in an expanded pool of coalition partners ready willing and able to respond to a crisis and reducing the burden on U.S. forces. As this example shows, the acquisition of equipment is only one part of the big picture. It’s the training and military-to-military engagements that allow partners to be successful and to gain long-term benefit from the equipment they purchase.

A more recent example of cooperation she cited was the ongoing operations in Mali. The international community is providing invaluable support to France to confront extremists in Mali. Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, and the U.S. are all among the countries providing aircraft and other support to this French-led operation.

Ms. Grant listed several air force related capabilities that will be priorities in the next few years. Air refueling is a big one. While the Libya operation was a great coalition effort, the U.S. was needed to do almost all of the air refueling. Working with international partners to develop their own air-refueling capability would increase the overall coalition capabilities and reduce the burden on the U.S. in future operations. Additionally, expanding the airlift capabilities of partner nations, especially in developing countries, would improve their ability to rapidly respond to contingencies and provide more timely and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Airborne ISR is another capability that should be further developed with partner countries. The more countries that can contribute to ISR capabilities, the more the U.S. can expand intelligence information sharing between our close allies. “Specifically, I would like to see more of our allies cooperating with Remotely Piloted Aircraft, or RPAs. This is a touchy subject given the drone debates within our own government. We at SAF/IA can help to correct misperceptions among our allies by changing the way that we communicate the value of RPAs.”

Ms. Grant conceded that it is not possible to talk about FMS without mentioning export controls, which are a major challenge to the U.S. and our international partners. Export controls are, of course, necessary to ensure exports are consistent
with U.S. national security interests and to protect military information. However, these same controls that protect us also tend to slow down the process and at times cause complications and much frustration for our industry and international partners.

She is encouraged by the continued whole-of-government emphasis that is being focused in the area of Defense Export Reform. When fully implemented, the President’s Export Control Reform initiative will more easily facilitate the transfer of equipment and materiel to our partners. It will also improve the defense industry’s ability to support existing partners and sell appropriate goods and services to emerging markets. The goal of the ECR is to streamline the process by creating what is known as the four singles. This includes a new single control list, shared between the Departments of Commerce and Defense, which will raise "higher walls" around fewer truly critical technologies. It also includes a single U.S. government export control licensing, a single IT system to manage this process, and a single export control enforcement coordination center.

SAF/IA was responsible for the complete overhaul of two of the twenty categories of the United States Munitions List, which resulted in the removal of thousands of items. This effort represented a unique opportunity to shape the future of U.S. export controls by providing a more transparent catalogue of the national “crown jewels” that demand protection. For example, one of the items cut from the aircraft category of the USML was common rope lighting used to outline emergency exit doors of helicopters. This lighting, which you can buy at your local hardware store, is clearly not something that needs to be on our national list of protected items. The ECR effort has just begun, but I think these are exciting developments towards reforming our slow and unresponsive export control business.

SAF/IA has also implemented initiatives to improve responsiveness to our partners and industry. Our weapons baselines initiative streamlines disclosure and release processes within the Air Force and the defense industrial base. Partner nations now know within days whether or not they can be offered a certain weapon system or capability. This is a process that in the past took up to six months to provide a yes or no answer. These baselines provide a pre-coordinated position on export of weapons to select countries and expedite the disclosure and release process. Now, with these baselines in effect, we can provide an answer sooner, with a single pre-coordinated Air Force voice.

Weapons export baselines and the ECR are just two of many initiatives the DoD and the Air Force are undertaking to simplify the way partner nations and industry work with the Air Force. One of the best parts of this job is being able to partner with industry to help nations achieve new capabilities that were not possible before…to see the fruits of that combined effort. This would not be possible without the efforts of our personnel who are representing the U.S. in countries around the world.

“For those FAOs and RASs who are here today, you are our eyes and ears. You have the best understanding of what your partner nation needs and where they want to be several years from now.”

"For those FAOs and RASs who are here today, you are our eyes and ears. You have the best understanding of what your partner nation needs and where they want to be several years from now."
Military Partnership Program Detachment Strives to Advance the Navy’s Vision on Foreign Language and Culture

LCDR JOHN MIKOLS, U.S. NAVY
MPP UNIT 513, U.S. NAVAL FORCES EUROPE, U.S. NAVAL FORCES AFRICA, 6TH FLEET

“Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change.”


With the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the post 9/11 world, the U.S. military has had to overcome a number of strategic challenges in order to effectively adapt to unconventional and asymmetric adversaries. During the Cold War, the U.S. military was able to enjoy the relative “simplicity” of understanding the nature of only the Soviet Union in order to develop a strategy to defeat it in a potential global conflict. Now, the landscape has forced America and its allies to accept the challenge of engaging a vast number of adversaries, all of which may have different strategies to engage the U.S. The countless variety of cultures, customs, and foreign languages the Navy interacts with in the post 9/11 world greatly exceeds the level faced in the Cold War. Success on all levels of the battlefield will depend to a varying degree on skill sets in minority languages and absolute understanding of local cultures and customs.

As lessons learned from the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, a comprehensive understanding of these unconventional enemies can only be achieved through effective communication with local leaders, regional expertise, and proficiency in foreign languages.

Commander, Naval Forces AFRICA, Commander Naval Forces EUROPE, Commander 6th Fleet (CNA CNE C6F) Military Partnership Program (MPP) Detachment 513, located at the Naval Operational Support Center (NOSC) Chicago, has, since its inception, been able to provide Sixth Fleet with the flexibility to effectively communicate with allies throughout the Black Sea region in support of regional operations and joint training exercises. With a number of its members possessing proficient foreign language ability, DET 513 actively contributes to the development and improvement of Sixth Fleet’s competencies, thus improving the quality of the U.S. Navy’s foreign interactions and enabling more collaborative relationships with the regional allies.

As some of its current members can attest, maintaining a fluent foreign language ability has not only proven to be extremely valuable for basic communication, but it has allowed leadership from the U.S. Navy to understand the focus, emphasis, and passion that its foreign partners have for all aspects of a training exercise or operation. Commander Jure Kutlesa, who has been a member of DET 513 since 2005, has had the honor of being in this type of situation several times throughout his career.

Born and raised on the South Side of Chicago by immigrant parents of Croatian descent, Kutlesa learned to speak Croatian as his first language. Only through his exposure to American TV shows such as “Sesame Street,” “Mr. Rogers,” and grammar school did he eventually learn English. In fact, he quickly learned to speak English fluently while at school, but spoke Croatian with his family at home. After receiving his commission and wings as an NFO in the Navy, Commander Kutlesa’s first opportunity to use his Croatian language ability presented itself during the Yugoslav Wars in 1991. Then Commander of U.S. Navy Forces Europe, Admiral Michael Boorda, asked for volunteers with foreign language ability to assist with the American military effort in the conflict. After volunteering, Jure Kutlesa recalls that it was a tremendous sense of accomplishment to have such a large role in the support of the Allied strategic interests
during the conflict.

As a member of the Naval Reserve, the pilot-linguist has had even more opportunities to put his Croatian to effective use. Since 2006, CDR Kutlesa has traveled to Zagreb, Croatia, several times to support the Office of Defense Cooperation’s (ODC) efforts to build working relationships with the Croatian Navy. In different instances, CDR Kutlesa described the existing language barriers and how it prevented leadership on both sides from not only communicating effectively, but form emphasizing the focus required on different elements of an operation or training exercise. Once CDR Kutlesa began communicating in Croatian, leadership from the Croatian military was able to effectively steer the focus during meetings and planning sessions in which both navies were involved.

Perhaps one of his most rewarding moments in the Navy occurred in 2009, when Kutlesa was a participant of the Supreme Allied Commander EUROPE (SACEUR) Exercise JACKAL STONE, an international military event hosted by Croatia. As part of a Humanitarian Civic Assessment Project attached to the exercise, Jure Kutlesa traveled to a small Croatian town in order to help verify that a new freshwater pipeline that was designed to replace a war-damaged pipeline was installed correctly. Again, relying on his fluent Croatian ability and understanding of the local culture, the Naval Officer was able to effectively work with the city’s mayor and representatives from the Croatian Ministry of Defense to complete the mission.

Kutlesa has also pointed out that it’s not just the language, but the culture and customs that is absolutely vital to understand in order to get the job done safely and correctly. “If we don’t understand the culture, it’s difficult to make the operation happen,” he argues. He also believes that what makes DET 513 effective in its overall mission is personnel consistency. By having the same unit members repeating trips and working with the same foreign partners, solid foundations and relationships are built and are something to expand further operations on. Commander Kutlesa summarizes, “Relationships are the key. They bring down barriers and allow the mission to get done.”

Although several other members of DET 513 have stories that are similar to Jure Kutlesa’s, some of its newest members still believe that the unit and the Navy as a whole can further improve in treasuring foreign language ability and cultural understanding.

As one of the Navy’s first Active Duty Foreign Area Officers (FAO), Lieutenant Commander Liubov Russell, USN is in a unique position to offer insight on the tremendous impact these skills have, and how their importance will only grow in the future. Russell, who is originally from Bulgaria, credits one of her Baylor University professors, Dr. Loyal Gould, who had covered the Cold War as an Associated Press correspondent for 25 years, as an inspiration for her and many other foreign and military correspondents, to begin a career in International Journalism. After marrying her husband Charles, Liubov also decided to join the Navy and by 2000, had received her commission. Since then, Liubov has served as a Public Affairs, Foreign Affairs Officer and Combat Interpreter for the Navy in multiple countries, such as Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Ukraine, Japan, Afghanistan and now the United States.

Additionally, while stationed in Europe from 2003 -06, Russell worked as speechwriter for three U.S. Navy Admirals, a task she recalled as incredibly challenging, given that she was always adapting to three different personalities while trying properly to convey their focus. While Liubov’s language ability (which includes proficiencies or fluencies and numerous testing in Bulgarian, Russian, Ukrainian, Serbo-Croatian Macedonian, and Italian, has made her very valuable to the Navy’s overseas operations, she too firmly believes that a complete understanding of the local cultures is absolutely vital for mission success. A new State Department employee, Russell is confident that servicemen and women who have experience embracing foreign cultures and languages while operating for sustained periods of times overseas have some of the most transferrable skills in any work environment...

These skills, she is convinced, allow these individuals to adapt to different cultures more rapidly than those who have limited inter-cultural experience, thus allowing them to form relationships and build immediate working foundations with our international allies. According to her, the children of these families will also greatly benefit, and by being immersed in foreign societies they are well positioned to “become the new working class of a globalized society.”

While LCDR Russell has devoted her career to operating effectively with the Navy’s international allies, she also confident that there is room for improvement with regards to the way the Navy is approaching language and cultural development. For example, she believes that mastering a foreign language could take up to a decade, and is not just a matter of months or even few years. Even if the individual masters the language, it does by no means mean that the service member is ready to flawlessly live and operate in a foreign culture. Russell is convinced that occasionally we are “too campaign oriented.” with regard to language and cultural training - languages, important just a decade ago, are
suddenly not important at all. The officer-linguist firmly believes that the Navy must be willing to devote time and effort toward the long-term training of the sailors-diplomats using and promoting with similar benefits the talent of the Reserve Community (for example, currently, the Foreign Area Officer Active Component is the only Navy one without a corresponding Reserve Community). “Communication alone is not enough, cultural competency is just as important to connect,” she argues. As someone who has extensive experience operating in multi-national training exercises, Russell firmly believes that relationships are as much essential in a contemporary maritime environment, as the traditional warfare capabilities. Further, according to an officer who interpreted vital aircraft manuals in Afghanistan, we live in a time of interagency and multinational cooperation. “Building relationships with all participants is like building modern day bridges. Sometimes will be understood, sometimes – may be not... Our hopes are, and always will be, on the other side.”

With officers like Kutlesa and Russell, CNA CNE MPP DET 513 operates at the forward edge of the Navy’s vision of developing and utilizing individuals and talent who can master foreign languages, customs, and cultures. It is evident, that in the two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the threat of global terrorism, defeating our enemies requires nothing less than a complete understanding of the political, economic, and cultural environment in which we operate. DET 513, this relatively small, but agile and flexible reserve unit continues to put relationship building with international allies as a top priority.

As the unit currently expands its operations in the Baltic, Black, Caspian and Mediterranean seas, it will take with it the most common of all lessons learned: building effective relationships is absolutely vital to the safe and effective execution of any maritime mission.

Armenia...
Don’t Discount the Small Guy
MICHAEL S. MCCULLOUGH, LTC U.S. ARMY

Engaging through the lens of U.S. past experiences... “Who would have thought Kyrgyzstan would be so important 15 years ago.”

Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia

“Why should we (the U.S.) care about DoD engagement with Armenia?” The question is usually followed by a comment about the “power and influence” of the Armenian lobby in the U.S... I submit that there are several reasons to engage with this former Soviet Republic and that the investment would be considerably less and have a higher return than other countries in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The intent of this paper is to be a catalyst for discussion on how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) engages with a country that generally ranks low on engagement lists. Admittedly, all of the mini-chapters deserve much more elaboration but due to size constraints this document is merely to open the door on much further debate.

Neighbors and what they mean to Armenia and the U.S.

The first and foremost reason we should leverage more resources on Armenia is its relationship with its neighbors: Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey.

Azerbaijan & Regional Stability.
The frozen conflict over Nagorno Karabagh has been well publicized. A thaw of this conflict would undoubtedly draw many countries into the melee, whether due to Azerbaijan’s oil, Armenian Diaspora pressure (U.S., France and Russia), humanitarian aid, and Russia’s desire to be the primary powerbroker. Russia has shown its modus operandi in Ossetia; allowing Moscow to be the primary actor in the region via retaining troops in Armenia, or as potential peacekeepers between Azerbaijan and Armenia, would be counterproductive to everyone minus Russia. Therefore, it is logical to deduce that DoD policy should seek increased and a balanced approach towards Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Iran - Access and Influence.
Armenia has only two open borders - Georgia and Iran. One is a key U.S. partner and the other is a country of significant concern (Iran is mentioned 14 times in the 2010 National Security Strategy). Of note, during the Russian invasion of Georgia, Iran was the only country that provided energy relief after power was cut due to the conflict. Furthermore, having personally witnessed the flow of trade between Iran and Armenia, and the amount of Iranian visitors in Armenia it would seem reasonable for the U.S. to have a keen interest in having moderate or high level influence with key decision makers in Armenia. The Ministry of Defense is arguably
the most influential actor in the Armenian government, which places the U.S. DoD in a unique position to be the front-runner in U.S. policy facilitation. Additionally, it would make sense that if increased “Sanctions” against Iran is a course of action, then a critical trade route through Armenia would be seen as potential leverage. At a minimum, Armenia provides us proximity and access to populations of a country that we have very limited exposure to.

**Turkey- Stability and NATO Influence.**

There should be no doubt that a significant amount of authority in both Armenia and Turkey is derived from the respective Ministries of Defense which allows U.S. DoD engagement to be weighted heavier than in other countries. Using DOD policy influence and resources could facilitate greater communication and “trust building events” between Turkey and Armenia that could help open the region and gain Turkey more credibility in the Black Sea region. Recent events pertaining to the “Arab Spring” with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicate that Turkey is ready and willing to take a more assertive position in the world. More U.S. DOD engagement towards Turk/Armenian relations could also yield more momentum to the Azerbaijani/Armenian Peace process, as it is unlikely that Nagorno Karabagh will be settled without the direct involvement of Turkey.

**Mother Russia...More akin to Mommie Dearest**

This title is a tongue in cheek description based on a 1981 film about a loyal child and abusive mother that accurately portrays the relationship between Russia and Armenia. There is no doubt that Russia plays a significant role in Armenia. There are numerous examples of how Russia uses its energy resources to influence politics in its near-abroad. That, combined with its ability to purchase many firms, allows it to create havoc in any of its “allies’” economies. Complicating matters for Armenia are the approximately 4,000 soldiers in Gyumri (second largest city in Armenia) and Russia’s role in Armenian Air Defense. If peace prevails between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia would have to redeploy its troops, thus loosing influence and trade and business. If borders open between Armenia and Turkey, Russia loses again. One can argue that instability in this region is in Russia’s interest and not in the interest of the U.S.

**Proof Is in the Pudding:**

U.S. military success over the last 20 years has demonstrated the flexibility, adaptability and doctrinal agility of the U.S. and its allies. The exact opposite can be said about Russia. This is not lost on Russia’s Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members. As a former International Military Education and Training (IMET) account manager, it was common for me to hear from officers that had attended both U.S. and Russian training that the U.S. and other western countries provided far more current and higher quality training than did Russia. Additionally, former students have stated that Russia is no longer providing free officer training like the U.S. IMET program to Armenia. The change in Russian education funding policy and the disparity in training allows the U.S. to gain an advantage (if taken) in influencing the development of current and future leaders via education. One of the untold successes of U.S. military efforts in Armenia is the progress made in Defense Institution Building (DIB). Though Armenians tend to be more gradual in application, forward progress has been consistent. The civilianization of the Ministry of Defense, the engagement oriented attitude of the Armenian Minister of Defense and his staff, and the growing desire for greater U.S. military education speaks volumes about Armenian intentions.

The Logic of Balance and a Regional Approach

**Seeking A Regional Approach.**

The Caucasus is like a pond. Once a stone hits the water, the ripples will touch sides. The lack of regional engagement parity runs the risk of countering Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and regional stability objectives. The most obvious imbalance is the investment in Georgia. Though they are great contributors towards NATO missions in OIF and ISAF, I would submit that most countries with a pre-existing military with the level of investment that the U.S. has made in Georgia would contribute the same to ISAF or more...and likely not intentionally antagonize Russia.

You Might Not Know It But They Are There:

Armenia has contributed soldiers to Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Afghanistan with very little assistance from the U.S.. Armenia has also publicly announced that they will increase contributions to ISAF. The Germans were much more agile in their engagement and quickly incorporated the Armenian contribution to their ISAF forces.

**A Quick Tally:**

Kosovo Force (KFOR) ongoing since 2004 (Greece sponsored): Military observers focus on patrolling, monitoring the security and prevention of illegal trafficking and implementation of peace
agreements. Total deployed 610; most rotations consist of 35 soldiers; the last 3 rotations consisted of 70 soldiers.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 2005 to 2008 (Poland sponsored):
Primarily an EOD mission, 6 month deployments at FOBs Echo/Delta. Total deployed 360; rotations of 35 soldiers per deployment, typically.
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ongoing since 2010 (Germany sponsored): In conjunction with Germans in RC-North, Armenian Forces conduct fixed site security at Kunduz and Mazar-i-sharif in support of ISAF. Additional five soldiers are part of an OMLT. Total deployed 206; current rotations consist of 126 soldiers per deployment - next rotation is 1 DEC 2011.

Why is the U.S. not fostering these ambitions when it is well within our Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity guidelines?

Addressing a Myth: the Influence of the Armenia Diaspora Lobby in the U.S.
The Armenian American lobby is a term used to describe the loose coalition of groups and individuals who try to influence United States foreign policy in support of Armenia and its policies. There are some NATO and U.S. representatives that rank Armenian lobbyists as some of the most effective ethnic lobbyists in the United States, often comparing them to the Israeli-American lobby and the Cuban-American lobby. This belief is flawed and there is no statistical data that would support the assertion. Critics of the Armenian lobby claim that among its achievements are $90 million in aid annually for Armenia, the continuation of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (blocking certain kinds of aid to Azerbaijan), and support for official U.S. governmental recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1921. In reality, the U.S. has not recognized an Armenian Genocide, Section 907 has been waived on numerous occasions and U.S. cooperation efforts in Azerbaijan are much more significant than in Armenia. Though Armenia does receive a noteworthy amount of assistance, after checking the U.S. Census Bureau and Department of State databases it is clear that Armenia is far from a “top recipient.” The fact that there is a large USAID presence along with Peace Corps representatives in Armenia is driven by need. Reflecting on this information creates strong doubt that Armenia Lobbying efforts are not as big of a powerhouse as many would have us believe.

A Quick Quip on Democracy:
Although the number of Armenians in the U.S. is unknown, some sources suggest anywhere between 500,000 to 2,000,000. According to the census however, we do know that there were 202,708 Armenian speakers in the U.S. in the year 2000. Additionally, websites that track political donations such as opensecrets.org, don’t even list Armenian lobby contributions in the top 15, even when narrowing the influence to ethnic group specific contributions. To criticize a certain U.S. population that votes and uses the political representational system to forward their priorities is less of a criticism on that voting base and more of a critique on our form of democracy.

In Closing…
In closing, shrinking budgets, regional stability or lack thereof and a greater return on investment create a reasonable background to review our approach towards Armenia and countries like it. Due to Armenia’s location (neighbors), its willingness to contribute forces to international operations and its relationship with Russia should elevate its position in U.S. Theater Security Cooperation goals. Armenia and Russia will always have a special relationship due to Russia’s Armenian Diaspora population, shared Soviet history and the embedded Russia language. However, this should not be a reason to disengage but rather to engage Armenia. Additionally, However, Armenia is more than capable of managing multilateral relationships…the U.S. just has to be willing to accept that fact. Perhaps Armenia can be the country where U.S. and Russia can work together on shared engagement opportunities such as Crises Response exercises or military-to-military events. In the end, it’s not just about Armenia; it’s about engaging a country in a key part of the world. Who knows, perhaps Armenia will be the next Kyrgyzstan.

Lieutenant Colonel McCullough was the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Armenia from 2008-2010. He was included in the Defense Attaché Corps because the Attaché community in Yerevan was small and many other attaches had similar ODC responsibilities. He served two intelligence assignments at RAF Base Molesworth, including Caucasus Team Chief (2005-06) and Senior Analyst/Deputy Chief for Counter-Terrorism (2008).
Online Learning Available at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

By Dwayne Eldridge, Director of Online Learning, DISAM

The mission of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) is to provide professional education, research, and support to advance U.S. foreign policy through security assistance and cooperation. DISAM’s primary target audience includes U.S. government civilians, U.S. military, and defense industry personnel who work both in the continental U.S. and overseas. Additionally, DISAM provides training for our international customers and partners. DISAM has a growing online learning (or distance education/training) program designed to reach this large, globally based audience.

DISAM’s online learning program currently consists of four online courses which students may take and earn a certificate (Defense Acquisition Workforce members may also obtain continuous learning points or CLPs), and a number of learning guides and computer based training (CBT) modules that support other DISAM courses (resident or on-site) and/or provide those working in Security Cooperation with “just-in-time” training to support them in the performance of their duties.

The four certificate-providing online courses are the Security Cooperation Familiarization Online (SC-FAM-OL) course, the Security Cooperation Management Orientation Online (SCM-OC-OL) course, the International Programs Security Requirements Online (IPSR-OL) course and the Missile Technology Control Regime Online (MTCR-OL) course.

The SC-FAM-OL is DISAM’s entry-level course (in DISAM terms it is a level 1 course, and DISAM has four levels) designed to provide basic familiarization on Security Cooperation as conducted by the United States Government with many partner nations around the world. It is available to the general public, including Department of Defense contractors and personnel from international partner nations.

SCM-OC-OL is an orientation course (DISAM level 2) designed primarily for personnel who are new to the Security Cooperation (SC) field, or who perform security cooperation duties on a part-time basis. It provides an overview of the full range of security cooperation activities, to include legislation, policy, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, logistics, finance, training management and international programs security requirements. It is available for U.S. and international government personnel, and U.S. and international defense industry personnel. U.S. government employees are defined as U.S. civilians, U.S. military, Locally Employed Staff (LES) working in our embassies around the world, and support contractor equivalents.

IPSR-OL is a course which meets DoD Directive 5230.20 requirement that all Department of Defense (DoD) employees involved in international programs receive training in the security arrangements that protect sensitive and classified U.S. technology and other information. It is available to U.S. government employees (civilian and military) and U.S. defense industry personnel. Students must be U.S. persons as defined by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Section §120.15 and programmed for, or assigned to positions with responsibility for one or more international programs.

Finally, MTCR-OL is designed to train selected DoD personnel in recognizing and controlling the export of missiles/UAVs and related technologies that have the potential for use in the delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The regime and supporting documentation were designed to assist in the implementation of national export controls to monitor, control, and deny exportation of these critical technologies. U.S. government employees and U.S. industry personnel are eligible. U.S. government employees are defined as U.S. civilians, U.S. military, and support contractor equivalents. U.S. government and industry personnel should be programmed for or assigned to positions where oversight of missile-related technologies will be required. These personnel include those in program management offices, key service acquisition personnel, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), security assistance personnel responsible for foreign military sales cases, and U.S. contractors.

Additionally, DISAM has various Learning Guides and Computer Based Training (CBT) Modules that support other DISAM courses and/or provide the Security Cooperation Workforce with “just-in-time” training to support them in the performance of their duties. This online training currently includes six Learning Guides/CBTs.

The DIILS Human Rights learning guide provides insight into international human rights law as it
My Share of the Task: A Memoir, by General Stanley McChrystal

Reviewed by Major S. Dewayne White

With General Stanley McChrystal’s recent retirement, it was only a matter of time before his book hit the shelves. In his book, General McChrystal takes the reader through his life, beginning as a young “Army brat” and West Point cadet through present day. He clearly lays out his intent in the book’s forward, stating that he wants to weave the threads of history and leadership around a third – his life story. Keeping this in mind, it is clear that the long-time commander of what he refers to throughout the book as “Task Force 714” and the commander of all forces in Afghanistan meets his intent.

Overall, the book is, in a word, predictable. If the reader is looking for juicy tidbits and retaliation against wayward reporters or government leaders, the book disappoints. If, however, the reader is attempting to gain a better understanding of the events that shaped McChrystal as a leader and as a man, then it is worth the effort. His life is one of very interesting and serendipitous events, combined with hard work and sacrifice from both the General and his family. While the reader will certainly not walk away with any new gossip, it is impossible to read this book and not come away with more knowledge about the military, the Special Operations community, and General McChrystal himself.

To be perfectly honest, the seasoned military reader will likely have a difficult time getting through
parts of this book. Frankly, the basic military portions such as Airborne operations and Ranger school are overdone for those who have participated in these events or heard the stories of those who have. It is difficult to do more than skim over the pages where McCrystal describes in excruciating detail the coordination between two Jumpmasters conducting “actions in the aircraft,” for example. On the other hand, for the reader who is uninitiated in the world of the military, these early parts of the book shed some light on some aspects of the military lifestyle.

What is extremely interesting in the book is General McChrystal’s detailed explanation of the growth of the Special Operations community during his tenure as commander. While he uses terms such as “TF 714” and “TF Green” throughout the book due to his strict adherence to security requirements, he describes in great detail the building of the machine that would eventually take down some of the worst terrorists in history. He wraps all of this up in a neat package that centers on leaders and people solving real-world problems in a difficult environment without focusing on the drama and mystique that these organizations sometimes carry.

Following the section on Iraq, McChrystal takes the reader back for a short stint in D.C. before his selection to command again in Afghanistan. While the Afghanistan portion of the book was interesting, like the war it described, it was often confusing and seemed to weave in and out of various periods of history. Although again predictable, the book offers an interesting perspective on the General’s view of the war, the Afghan president, and the coalition.

Perhaps the most notable subject in the book is McChrystal’s view on leadership. Throughout the book, he invites the reader into the events that shaped him as a leader. Unfortunately, one of the greatest parts of McChrystal’s book is a portion that many readers will ignore. In his epilogue, the General spends several pages discussing, in a very conversational manner, his views on leadership. Written in an almost proverbial manner, it allows one to read and reflect on the lessons that McChrystal is trying to pass to future warriors: “Leaders are empathic. Leaders are genuine. Leaders walk a thin line between self-confidence and humility.” There are numerous golden nuggets in this short section for leaders at any level, and they absolutely should not be overlooked.

While at times the book overdoes details and is often difficult to follow, General McChrystal displays his ability to present the facts, walk the reader through his decision processes, and review both the good and bad points of them. He shows himself to be a consummate professional throughout the book, choosing to take the high ground on many issues in which he may have been justified to lash out. In the end, he clearly met his intent of lashing history and leadership together with his life. Because of this approach, the reader is able to learn about the history and life events that shaped General McChrystal’s life. More importantly, the reader has the opportunity to glean important lessons on leadership from one of America’s most accomplished Generals.

MAJ S. Dewayne White is a Eurasian FAO currently assigned to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). He holds an AA degree in Russian from Monterey Peninsula College, a BS in Liberal Arts from Excelsior College, and a MS in International Relations from Troy University. Originally enlisting in the Army in 1992 as a Russian linguist, MAJ White served as a Russian voice intercept operator, SOT-A Team member, and START/INF Treaty interpreter. After commissioning in the Infantry, MAJ White served in the 3d Infantry Division during the initial invasion of Iraq and in The Old Guard at Ft. Myer, VA. As a CPT, MAJ White transitioned to Military Intelligence, where he served as MI Detachment Commander at the SF Bn and SF Group levels. While in command of the Group MID, MAJ White also served as the Joint Intelligence Support Element OIC for the Combined and Joint Special Operations Task Force—Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) in Balad, Iraq. MAJ White taught Russian as an Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point before becoming a Eurasian FAO and being assigned to his current role at DTRA.
A Look at Qatar’s Rise to Power: Using Cultural Intelligence as Our Guide
BY SSGT (USAF) ADAM FURTADO

Qatar is a small, enigmatic state in the Arabian Gulf that has spent the better part of the last two decades attempting to make its mark on the world stage. As a leader in the international energy landscape, Qatar has parlayed its economic success with a recent foray into foreign policy. Without the political influence and history of other global leaders, Qatar has had to highlight its value in other ways. Qatari officials have proven to be successful domestic and international investors and have shown an aptitude for third-party conflict resolution.

Even more interesting than trying to figure out Qatar’s place in the global puzzle is seeing how its people have reflected its government. Native Qatari are a small in-group who are mostly well off but have no family history of wealth. The influx of affluence has been rapid and widespread, and the cultural development of the country has failed to follow suit at the same pace. The country’s capital of Doha boasts gaudy skyscrapers akin to the skylines of other wealthy South Asian cities like Dubai and Singapore. However, as one gets close to “downtown,” what is immediately noticeable is the vast emptiness between all of the buildings. Even with the constant construction and development, there are large lots of empty space throughout the city.

The Emir has put a premium on making Doha the cultural capital of the Middle East, but nobody let the residents in on the secret. He has flown in world-class chefs and art curators, only to have the lavish restaurants and art museums stand empty. Aside from the souqs, historic open-air markets operating for a few hours a day, downtown is hardly bustling with activity. The traffic throughout Doha rivals any major American city, but it remains unclear where everybody is going.

There is an eerie feeling of hollowness to Doha as if at some point in the future someone will raise the curtain and Qatar’s gig will be up. From the outside, Doha looks to be on the cusp of international prominence, and with Qatar’s increasing development it may very well be. However, from inside the country it is hard to see. The surprising selection of Qatar to host the 2022 World Cup is another example of the country’s effort to become relevant, yet it remains to be seen if its leaders will be able to maintain appearances when tens of thousands of people come rushing into the city for the first time. On the other hand, time may be just what Doha and the rest of Qatar need. Since things have happened so rapidly, it is possible that time will take its course and Qatar will eventually develop its own culture.

The connection among the culture of Qatar, its people, and its government is an important one when considering cultural intelligence. The Center of Advanced Defense Studies defines cultural intelligence as that which is established by understanding the cultural awareness of a country. One of the foremost leaders in the study of cultural intelligence, Brooks Peterson, breaks down cultural intelligence cultivation into five scales that can pinpoint the type of culture with which a country identifies. All groups of people fall somewhere on each of these scales, providing an organized view of a cultural intelligence assessment.

The first scale that Peterson identifies, equality vs. hierarchy, is one that compares the governance and social structure of a people. When looking at the first scale, one must first decide if he/she is looking at Qatar from an international perspective or in relation to its other Middle Eastern counterparts, as this will affect the outcome dramatically. The direct vs. indirect scale is a determination of the communicative characteristics of the group. Are the people willing to say how they feel, or are they more apt to tell people what they want to hear in an effort to avoid confrontation? The third scale, individual vs. group orientation, delves into in- and out-group dynamics and assesses whether people think as individuals or are more concerned with the progress of their entire group. In this scale, we see a large difference between Western countries and those in the Middle East. Fourth, the task vs. relationship scale discusses the attempted outcome of decisions. It investigates whether success in a particular situation outweighs the benefits of cultivating a relationship with one’s counterpart at the expense of that particular task. Finally, the last scale is the risk vs. caution scale, which identifies the aggressiveness, conservatism, and willingness to take chances that a country exhibits. This scale is where Qatar breaks away from its Middle Eastern equivalents. The use of Peterson’s scale is a valuable tool in organizing the cultural intelligence available to a particular country.

Equality vs. Hierarchy Scale

While it would come as no surprise where Qatar would fall on the equality vs. hierarchy scale
internationally, it is fairly progressive in a regional sense. With Saudi Arabia being the only country with which it shares a border, coming off as progressive is not a very impressive feat comparatively. However, Qatar has made strides to become a standard-bearer in the region on issues of equality. Providing equal treatment to citizens when one’s government is set up as a constitutional, hereditary monarchy is a difficult task for an Emir who is in a perpetual battle to maintain credibility as a leader in the Muslim world and his country as a relevant state internationally.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani is a pragmatic leader with great intentions for his nation. He came into power in a bloodless coup over his father in 1996 and has since been on a personal mission to cement Qatar’s role in the world.(4) While the foundation of that role is in the country’s vast supply of energy resources, the Emir has thrown his hat into the political arena as well in recent years. Al Thani has successfully navigated his country to an impractical point of civic contentment while maintaining a stranglehold on the political process. Despite multiple promises to the contrary, Qatars have yet to be given the right to vote in a meaningful election of any kind, (5) but they do not seem to mind.

In early 2011, as uprisings worked their way throughout the Middle East, Qatar’s people remained silent. It was not as if they did not have avenues to be heard (Qatar has Internet access and is home to the news network Al Jazeera); they just did not see the need. A Facebook group was created for a Qatari “Day of Rage” but nobody showed up.(4) The native Qatars, numbering just 225,000, receive an enormous number of benefits from their government: a stipend, free land, and interest-free loans, for starters.(6) When the Arab Spring reached Bahrain, Qatar’s geographical cousin to the north, the government in Doha increased the stipend paid to the Qatari people to suppress any thoughts of revolution. Who can blame them for not wanting change? This is hardly an oppressed people, comparatively speaking.

Even though the rest of the Middle East views Qatar as a progressive Muslim state, egalitarianism is not a term that best describes the country. Qataris fall firmly into their societal roles and rarely depart from them. Still employing a loose form of shariah law, gender discrimination is still par for the course. Though progress for women’s rights has been steady, led by the Emir’s second wife, Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missnud, men still hold extreme advantages. Women have limited opportunities to serve in leadership roles, except for those at the top of the hierarchical structure. For example, Sheikah Mozah is the Chairperson of the Qatar Foundation and has been a leader in education reform in the country. This has led to the development of Education City, a group of American universities that have set up campuses in Qatar. Traditional Muslim garb is still the norm(7) and women are rarely seen driving, though they can with the permission of the men in their family.

The Qatari social structure does not leave much room for flexibility. There are distinct avenues to success and they are laid out from an early age. Qataris are well taken care of by the government and are expected (and expect) to serve in leadership roles in all sectors as they come of age. It is not abnormal for Qatari men to study in the United States and return upon receiving their degree to a high-level position in the government or private sector.(8) Due to this process of grooming Qatars for leadership, a process the Emir calls “Qatarization,” it has been increasingly difficult for companies to fill low- and mid-level positions with Qatari nationals. Out of the 1.75 million people who reside in Qatar, only 225,000 are native Qataris—less than 8 percent—the rest being third country nationals.(6) The influx of expatriates is due to the inordinate number of well-paying jobs that Qataris will not fill. This trend is likely to continue as Qatar has the largest migration growth in the world, which led to it also having the highest population growth rate in the world.(9)

The United States Embassy in Qatar, as an example, is one of the only embassies in the world that does not employ a single host nation employee. It has had to fill regional economic and political expert positions with workers from Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and other Arab countries.(10) The low-paying positions are filled by skilled and unskilled laborers, mostly from Southeast Asian nations. The constant construction projects in Doha in preparation for the 2022 World Cup are being completed by mostly Nepalese, Filipino, and Indian laborers who are sponsored for a few years and are forced to live in appalling conditions in labor camps outside the city. Many of the camps are reported to have no access to running water and limited hygiene or food supplies. (11) The skilled labor living situation “is the worst part about this country,” according to one U.S. diplomat.(12) Neither these laborers nor third country nationals are afforded any right to vote or play a role in any democratic process even if they have been naturalized, which is rarely allowed. This is a major reason that the “people of Qatar” are considered especially content. The majority of residents are not represented in any of these statistics.

When the Japanese invented the artificial pearl, Qatar’s economy crashed in a dramatic fashion in the 1930s. It was not until energy resources were finally cultivated in the country that Qatar started to have a viable economy. The rapid growth has led to a sense of entitlement among the native population that has
been handed wealth and property for decades. Over 10 percent of native Qataris are millionaires (in USD), the third highest millionaire density rate in the world.(9) The Emir has had to answer critics on the viability of sustaining this type of growth and style of government. Qatar’s propensity for domestic and international investing has both raised its economic profile and ensured its viability for the foreseeable future. To the Emir’s credit, human rights violations notwithstanding, he has put Qatar in an enviable position.

**Direct vs. Indirect Scale**

An important indication of culture revolves around human interaction and communicative traits. Peterson’s *direct vs. indirect* scale “relates to the way people communicate and interact with one another.” Though the Middle East has become increasingly compartmentalized, cultural communicative characteristics do not seem to vary much throughout. The Arab culture is one of discretion, respect, and avoidance. Qatars, even more so than most in the region, are very reclusive. Hugh Eakin noted in his article “The Strange Power of Qatar” that he was never invited into a Qatari home in all his time in the country, (4) which is very uncharacteristic of the culture. This separatism is a deleterious result of Qatarization.

Respecting authority, status, and elders remains a big part of the culture in Qatar. All communication is centered on respect, whether in intra- or inter-cultural situations. A party from another culture is much more apt to get what it sets out for if it understands and respects the Qatars’ culture. Visitors can just as quickly squander opportunities if unaware of tradition and cultural traits.

Where Qatar breaks away from its regional counterparts is in its directness in regard to negotiation and conflict resolution. In the Arab culture, it is customary to avoid confrontation and take a passive approach to conflict. Qatar has broken this mold in its willingness to confront conflict and seek resolutions around the region. Conflict is necessary for change and Qatar has been the standard-bearer in international conflict resolution.

With hydrocarbon money pouring into Qatar, the country is set economically for the foreseeable future. The Emir has turned his focus to mediation and conflict resolution in an effort to build political influence. Qatar’s first major foray playing the third-party role was with Lebanon in an effort to avoid civil war in 2008. All Lebanese political factions were invited to Doha by the Emir to conduct talks. On May 21, the parties came to an accord, which became known as the Doha Agreement and ended 18 months of civil strife. (13) This was the first great mediation success for Qatar.

With the experience gained with Lebanon, Qatar and Al Thani offered their services in other conflicts. Qatar hosted peace talks in Doha between Sudanese rebel groups and the Sudan government in an effort to end the crisis in Darfur.(13) While a peace agreement was not signed, the basic parameters of the deal were agreed upon and later put into effect. Since then, the conflict renewed, but getting the two parties to the table for talks in the first place represented a solid foundation for future peace talks.

More recently, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar has had different reactions to crises around the region. In a surprisingly assertive move, Qatar offered monetary support,(14) military aircraft, and special forces personnel to the Libyan rebels in the effort to overthrow Moammar Gadhafi. It played such a large part in the revolution that the Qatari flag hung in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi after it was announced that Gadhafi was killed.

Qataris had the opposite reaction to the uprising in Bahrain, where they supported the reigning monarchy and offered no support to the Bahraini people. They have also made multiple attempts to negotiate, via the Gulf Cooperation Council, with Syrian oppressor Bashar Al Assad. The GCC and Al Assad have come to agreements on multiple occasions but Al Assad has backed out at the eleventh hour each time.(15) When asked if it would get involved with the election controversies in Iran, Qatar said it was better not to get involved because it was an “internal matter.”(15) Qatar certainly knows how to pick its spots.

This willingness to intervene is out of character for Middle Eastern states. While there is an element of hypocrisy and self-interest factored in, overall Qatar has to be given credit for playing peacemaker, or at least peace facilitator. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) stated, “Qatar...can’t continue to be an American ally on Monday that sends money to Hamas on Tuesday.” This active form of neutrality will inevitably lead to biases, though Qatar has avoided committing to any sides so far. “We are a peace loving nation; our aim is always to live in peace and do away with conflict...We do not take any sides in conflicts,” claimed Al Thani. (16) Peterson writes that a country more apt for a *direct* approach will “engage in conflict when necessary” and that seems to fit Qatar’s profile even if it does seem out of character in the Arab world.

**Individual vs. Group Orientation Scale**

Though status is highly important to Qataris, they very much identify within groups rather than with individualistic tendencies. When asked why Qataris felt no motivation to stand up to their government as the uprisings spread in 2011, a U.S. diplomat told me that all Qataris want “is to feel important.”(12) This need for international credibility is a direct reflection of the Emir. All decisions that are made are to benefit Qatar as a whole. The individualistic nature of the
West is not applicable.

When success comes, it will come to all Qatari. The government has ensured that all decisions are made for “future generations.” Qataris are not just investing for their own futures or those of their immediate families, but for the future of the country. This line of thinking is a bit easier to put into practice in a country roughly the size of Connecticut. Qatari group dynamics are interesting in that they strive for success in groups, but the groups are so closed off that each takes on an individualistic quality about it. Peterson describes the individual vs. group orientation scale as the “degree of importance that people give to being part of a group.” Qataris could fall anywhere across this scale depending on what size group is being discussed. Qataris individually are group-oriented people. Those small in-groups, however, are closed off to outsiders and they think "individually" for themselves. In the big picture, Qatar seeks credibility on the world stage and wishes to be a big part of the international community but is unwilling to latch on to firm alliances. Qatar and the Emir are extremely selective with their associations.

Task vs. Relationship

Peterson’s task vs. relationship scale fits well with the group dynamic scale as it also discusses the mentality of people when making decisions. With its newfound success, Qatar has developed into a forward-thinking country. This long-term approach to geopolitics and diplomacy puts an added emphasis on relationship building as opposed to a task-based approach. Most of the Middle East’s relationships are forged from a historical perspective; Qatar does not have a rich history to reach back to, but is determined to create those relationships now.

With the Emir’s focus on the “future generations” of his country, he has put added pressure on himself to ensure safety and viability. This focus is evident when considering the current ties that Qatar maintains with the United States and Iran. Qatar knows that a defense relationship with the U.S. is essential to maintaining order and ensuring the security of its borders. On the other end of the spectrum, an economic relationship with Iran is critical since the two countries share the North Gas Fields from which Qatar’s world-leading supply of Liquid Natural Gas comes.(9) If Qatar were a task-focused culture, it would have chosen a side in the current debate over Iran’s nuclear program and harmed either the security or economic vitality of the country. The Emir has decided that a firm “neutral” stance is what is needed to keep Qatar thriving.

Aside from relationships being important from a business sense, the Muslim culture places a high priority on loyalty. The Emir expects members of his cabinet to remain loyal to him and he returns the favor. Qataris are not out to make the “quick buck” if the cost is the loss of relationships that were developed with loyalty and trust. Whether that is due to contentment and a lack of further personal ambition or legitimate loyalty to the group’s goals is unclear, but it is very rare to see a Qatari look out for himself over others. This emphasis on relationship building and maintenance goes a long way toward gaining the international credibility that Qatar so desperately wants to achieve. This incessant desire to be a key cog in global affairs leads to Qatar’s insecurity regarding its reputation. Qatar unremittingly seeks to maintain the proper image of a peace-loving country that tiptoes the line of neutrality without misstep. When asked about a negative investment he made, the Emir answered, “The main thing we are defending is our reputation.”(16)

Risk vs. Caution

Traditionally, Middle Eastern countries are extremely conservative and risk-averse economically and politically. From an economic standpoint, Qatar is willing to take calculated risks for long-term benefits. Its leaders have a very deliberate plan and are focused on preparing the country for the future. During the rapid rise, Qatar was more willing to take on investment opportunities that could be termed “risky,” but as the nation’s wealth accumulates Qatar is starting to become more cautious. That is not to say the leaders have gotten any less aggressive with pursuing investment opportunities, but they are thinking about sustainment of their brand rather than quick capital growth.

Politically and culturally, Qatar has been willing to break the mold in many respects. Its willingness to embrace change has led to its becoming a powerful counterweight to the oppressor regimes in the region. Qatar has balanced the need for maintaining Islamic traditions while still being a progressive country with a willingness to advance even if it is looked down upon by its neighbors. It showed this willingness with the advent of Al Jazeera, with diplomatic ties to the United States and other Western powers, and with its courageous leap into the most difficult of conflicts and struggle for a resolution in Darfur and Lebanon.

While risk or caution may not be the best terms to describe Qatar’s gumption, according to the definitions that Peterson laid out Qatar once again would fall toward the middle of the scale. Qataris are cautious in that they “collect considerable information before making a decision” but risky in their willingness to “try and innovate ways of doing things.”(3) Qatar is in a class of its own in relation to the rest of the Middle East. The only border it shares
is with Saudi Arabia, for example. For years, Qatar has been seen as a nation under the ruling thumb of its large, conservative neighbor, but has recently made certain that this perception is rectified. Qatar’s ability and drive to seek advancement will keep it on the forefront even as the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East changes.

Peterson’s cultural intelligence scales give us a glimpse into who the Qatari people really are. While they are inscrutably difficult to assess, they are a direct reflection of their leadership. Qatar, like its people, is still figuring out how to adapt to its newfound success and notoriety. Qatar seems unwilling to make a firm decision on whether or not to throw its full arsenal of support behind one decision or the other and seems content with playing an aggressively neutral role in the region. It is unclear of its motivations beyond peace and prosperity. Former United States Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBron said of the country: “I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that ideological spectrum.”(15)

It is Qatar’s responsibility to protect its people and look out for their best interests. The Emir has done as good a job of securing his people’s future as any world leader in recent history. Qatar wants to package itself as a neutral, third party conflict resolver that loves peace and has no ulterior motives, but its recent foreign policy decisions have critics questioning its intentions. Qatar has no doubt showed that it is capable of getting good results from impossible situations and it should be commended for its mediation work in the region. Nevertheless, Qatar is a country that has its own interests at heart—just like all the other countries from which it claims to be different.

Notes:
Deployed to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, December 2011-June 2012.
Qataris (including women) have been able to vote for the Central Municipal Council. However, the council is generally powerless.
“Qatar,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), February 2012.
One will see Muslim women in Qatar in all types of clothing, but with the high number of immigrants it is hard to say how conservative the Qatari women are dressing.
“Private sector” is mostly state-owned.
I interned at U.S. Embassy Doha, Qatar, from February to May 2012.
Personal interview with State Department representative.
Qatar gave the Libyan rebels over $100 million, more than a dozen Mirage fighter jets, and “hundreds” of special forces troops.

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Drug Trafficking Sinks to New Levels

BY ANTHONY SCHEIDEL

Introduction

From the increase of drug trafficking in the 1970’s to the Miami Vice go-fast boat days of the 1980’s, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have implemented and adjusted numerous methods of smuggling illicit substances across international borders, constantly trying to stay one step ahead of international law enforcement activities in this game of cat-and-mouse. On a three-day trip ending July 18, 2008, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff met with Mexican security officials, and stated, “drug cartels are increasingly relying on the subs (self-propelled semi-submersibles, or SPSSs) to smuggle cocaine to the United States.” In 2008, U.S. officials stated that traffickers used the vessels to carry about 32 percent of the cocaine moved by water from South America to the U.S., However, this percentage seems low given that total SPSS transits in 2008 were up 326 percent to at least 75 from the previous years’ (2001-2007) transits totaling 23.

As there have been attempts in the past to employ fully-submersible vessels (submarines), in the near term, it appears that the traffickers will continue to improve upon the success they are enjoying following the introduction and implementation of the semi-submersibles. This is so in part because of the high risk and likelihood of compromise of a true submarine, due to the great length of time and space needed, as well as the complexity of building such a craft.

Why the Move to Submersibles?

The shift toward submersibles, more specifically SPSSs, occurred as the result of the elementary business principle of making the most return on the least amount of money invested. Factors that contributed to this shift were not only efficiency, but more importantly, the risk of seizure of their precious illicit cargo resulting in an undesirable zero-return on their investment.

Commercial cargo ship operations at first appear to be the most efficient means available to send large quantities of cocaine long distances. The traffickers know from experience, however, that the complexity of cargo ship operations and the relatively high number of individuals that need to be involved means more money spent on bribes, and less money in their pockets, making this method less desirable. It also significantly increases the potential for operational compromise by either someone accidentally intercepting communications, or by an informant or intelligence operation exposing the entire act.

Traditionally, commercial fishing vessels have been a logical choice for drug smugglers, as they have the capacity for large shipments, are well equipped with both communication and navigation devices, and require little or no renovation of the vessel that would give it away as a drug-laden craft. These vessels also have great range, as well as the ability to loiter at sea for long periods of time.

In the 1990s legal proceedings on the tuna-dolphin issue, investigations revealed that most of the tuna boat operations and canneries in Latin America had been bought by or launched by major drug cartels operating in the region. It also surfaced that the canning companies had been used extensively in associated money laundering operations.

Embargoes put in place by the United States and the European Union against the Latin American tuna industry are said to have been one of the greatest factors in the demise of this type of operation, based on the market decline in demand for their tuna and the fact that the traffickers’ activities were put under such scrutiny. The long travel time of these operations also increased the smugglers’ chances of being stopped, searched, and exposed. It has also been noted that an SPSS is capable of carrying five times more cocaine than in the common fishing vessel.

In more recent activity, and on a much smaller scale, Panga-style fishing boats have been in the spotlight, moving cocaine close to coastlines in the territorial waters of Central American countries.
These operations have declined due to the fact that they were obvious and apparent upon inspection by local authorities, who can readily see the large number of fuel drums and little, if any, fish located in the craft.

“Go-fast” boats have also played a major role in drug smuggling operations until recently. “In 2006, improved intelligence and radar detection from helicopters and cutters helped remove a record 256 metric tons of cocaine from what is estimated to have been more than a thousand metric tons that moved through the U.S. and Central and South American transit zones that year,” says New York Times contributing writer David Kushner. It is also reported that satellite technology exists to detect and expose go-fast boat operations, therefore decreasing the profit margin for these activities even further. Additionally, due to the inherent nature of go-fast boat operations and the risk of them flipping on choppy seas, approximately 50 percent of these craft sink, reducing the reliability rate to the point where other methods were given strong consideration.

According to DHS report OIG-09-27, “over 80 percent of the cocaine is moving through the Transit Zone via non-commercial maritime means.” With the decrease in other maritime transportation methods and DTOs constantly adjusting their strategies to ever-changing counterdrug tactics, this has pushed the traffickers towards other areas of lessened detectability and a greater percentage of successful transits.

The latest tool of the DTOs is the semi-submersible. Unlike submarines, these vessels do not dive underneath the waterline, but simply glide through the water with a freeboard (area exposed above the water’s surface), of approximately 18 inches. This gives them many stealth advantages without going into the difficult construction of a submarine, which entails very complex systems and highly skilled workers. These and others factors have made the semi-submersibles the tool of choice to transport cocaine.

**Background and Development**

Semi-submersible craft design became reality in France beginning in 1859, from the design concepts of French Vice Admiral Simon Bourgeois and naval constructor Charles Brun. Similar crafts were also used by the Confederates in the American Civil War to slip by northern blockades of southern ports, due to their virtual undetectability. The design of the modern SPSS began with the enclosure of the go-fast boat structure, which was then ballasted to ride extremely low in the water, making them less susceptible to detection and subsequent seizure. As this method began to prove itself as a highly profitable means of transportation, they began to incorporate joining the hulls of more than one go-fast structure to increase the amount of cocaine they could haul in a single trip. According to Captain Mario Rodriguez, Commander of Colombia’s Pacific Coast Guard, the first successful interdiction of a semi-submersible occurred off the Caribbean coast in 1993. “Early drug-sub experiments date back to the mid-1990s. In 1995, an émigré from the former Soviet Union was arrested in Miami after trying to broker the sale of an old Soviet sub from the Russian mafia to the Colombian cartels. In 2000, the Colombian police found Russian documents scattered in a warehouse in a suburb of Bogotá alongside a half-built, 100-foot-long submarine capable of carrying 200 tonnes of cocaine,” Kushner affirmed. These submarine building locations are easily compromised due to the lengthy construction time needed, the large area required for assembly, and the close proximity needed in relation to the sources with the construction site. This usually means construction will be in or near a large urban area, greatly increasing the risk of discovery.

This Russian connection has surfaced in relation to submarine construction, but has been noticed significantly in design characteristics of current SPSS construction, including twin, counter-rotating propellers. In an effort to adjust to tactics used by counterdrug and law enforcement agencies, traffickers began constructing the SPSSs with an all-fiberglass skin on a wood frame to better streamline the vessel, create less of a visible wake, and also to lower the radar signature by using the least dense materials available. In 2006, an unnamed Sri Lankan and Pakistani were credited with providing information for Colombian traffickers to build them cheaply from
readily available resources. With the high success rate and relatively low-cost investment needed to construct the vessels, they were looked at as disposable, one-way craft that could be scuttled upon reaching a rendezvous destination where the drugs were transferred at sea, in general, Mexican smugglers.

For a more rigid frame and survivability at sea, construction moved to a steel frame covered by the traditional fiberglass skin, but incorporating a lead shielding around the exposed upper area to reduce radar and infrared signatures.

**Forecast**

Only an estimated 14 percent of transits are stopped by authorities, said Kushner. “From a total of 23 operations using of semi-submersibles between 2001 and 2007, they increased to at least 75 in 2008. SPSS vessels carried an estimated 423 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in FY 2008, of which only 71 MT were removed (56.3 MT removed by the Coast Guard in eight operations). Because the SPSS’s are a relatively easy means of smuggling, they have displaced most other modes of drug trafficker maritime transportation.”

More semi-submersibles are getting spotted and intercepted, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) says it is focusing on intelligence over costly patrols in the traffickers’ operating areas. Although the DEA is scaling down patrol operations, new possibilities like the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) exist, and may become more integral not only in U.S. operations, but also by Latin American countries. This is a distinct possibility given the cost effectiveness, long loiter time, and possible use of remote laser infrared detection and ranging technology that could be used to detect SPSS vehicles from above. Sources at Joint Interagency Task Force-South have indicated that DTOs are already using unmanned methods to control, operate, and navigate these vessels. With an increased DEA emphasis on intelligence, the frequency of unmanned transits will most likely increase, to remove the human intelligence factor and the subsequent ability to “shake down” a suspect for more information.

Scuttling can be accomplished by remote servo action to avoid confiscation and compromise of the DTO’s evolving technology. There are indications that collaborators, including Americans and Russians with submarine knowledge, may have passed along data outlining the operational benefits of traversing completely below the surface in the thermocline region of the ocean. Besides the obvious fact of thwarting visual detection means by operating underwater, strategic use of the thermocline could also spoil sonar detection methods.

To effectively detect an underwater craft by means of sonar, the counter-smuggling craft must be operating at relatively the same depth of a trafficker’s submarine, or in the same area above, below, or within the thermocline. Detection outside of these parameters is deemed extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Research and intelligence efforts reveal that two fully-operational submarines have been discovered in the jungles on both sides of the Colombia-Ecuador border (the first in Ecuador in July 2010 and the second in the Nariño department of Colombia in February 2011). Both were reportedly seized before making their maiden voyages. If a cost comparison is looked at regarding return on their investments, a $2 million SPSS carrying 12 metric tons (the current max payload) of cocaine can make a wholesale return of $256 million and a retail return in the U.S. of $1.28 billion. A submarine has a quite higher initial investment of $20 million, but has the potential to carry 200 metric tons of cocaine, making a wholesale return of $4.268 billion, or a more impressive $21.34 billion in the U.S. retail market. There is clearly a much higher monetary benefit with submarines, but does it outweigh the current production efficiency and streamlined building methods of SPSS construction? Also, risk would be increased due to the centralization of transportation efforts. This goes against the modus operandi of sending numerous vessels with moderately sized cargoes, rather than putting all the eggs in one basket and jeopardizing the loss of substantially larger potential profit. This is further complicated with known ties of these DTOs to both Russian and Italian mafias, due to the fact that the U.S. dollar is currently facing a weak period, and these savvy investors are looking towards Europe and better return given a stronger Euro.

Although there has been some development and signs pointing towards increased use of submarines in the future, there have been recent discoveries that indicated heavier SPSS development with the use of steel frames, furthermore by placing zinc on the steel frame, a technique used by mariners in preventing the oxidation of metal. This technique is a sign of the traffickers using the SPSSs multiple times instead of scuttling them after a one-way trip. Lastly, indications point to an interest in increasing the size and range of SPSSs so that they could reach the coast of Western Africa or the Iberian Peninsula. However, due to the cost comparison, this may be just an intermediate fix until DTOs can reach a practical means of employing a fully submersible alternative.
Admiral James G. Stavridis, former commander of U.S. Southern Command, summed up best the more overlying security implication; “If drug cartels can ship up to 10 tons of cocaine in a semi-submersible, they can clearly ship or rent space to a terrorist organization for a weapon of mass destruction or a high-profile terrorist.”

**Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles**
- **Cost**: Up to $2 million (USD)
- **Dimensions**: 40-80 feet in length
- **Power plant(s)**: Single or twin 300-350 horsepower quiet diesel motors
- **Speed**: Up to 13 knots (15 mph)
- **Range**: Up to 2,500 nautical miles
- **Depth**: Ride just beneath the water’s surface, with approximately 18 inches of freeboard (exposed area above the waterline), necessary for ventilation/exhaust for both the crew and equipment operation)
- **Capacity**: Up to 12 metric tons of cocaine
- **Crew**: Typically 3-4 persons (a captain, a navigator, and 1-2 workers/engine mechanics)
- **Control**: Human or Remote
- **Availability**: Less than 90 days to complete construction, up to approximately 1 year (depending on materials utilized and the size/complexity of the craft)

Originally for one-time use, then scuttled; more recent information suggests possible multi-time use

**Submarines**
Little is known about the submarines used operationally by traffickers, but the following information has been released.
- **Cost**: $20 million (USD)
- **Length**: Approximately 100 feet
- **Depth**: More than 300 feet
- **Capacity**: Up to 200 metric tons
- **Availability**: Around 1 year to complete construction
- **Multiple-time use**
- **Fiberglass skin**: reduces radar return
- **Paint schemes**: ocean camouflage used to reduce visual detection
- **Hull design**: reduces visible wake
- **Low freeboard**: reduces radar return and visible wake
- **Lead shielding**: reduces radar and infrared returns
- **Exhaust cooling**: reduces infrared returns
- **Quiet diesel motors**: helps to elude active listening detection methods
- **Twin, counter-rotating propellers**: reduces visible wake
- **Operate in and around thermocline (metalimnion)**: reduces detection by sonar methods
- **Traverse under the surface**: provides virtual undetectability by overhead radar sources and visual means
- **Same relative size/shape of local marine mammals**: provides similar detection returns

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Book Review

The Zimmerman Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I by Thomas Boghardt

If you think you know what happened in regards to the Zimmerman Telegram, in which Germany incites Mexico to attack the United States, and the British sharing the intercepted document with America, you need to first read this book. Thomas Boghardt of the U.S. Army Center for Military History has written the definitive book on “The Zimmerman Telegram,” encompassing not only the biographies of the major American, British, German, and Mexican figures, but down to the encoding and decoding of the telegram and how it was intercepted. German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman attempted to get the Mexican government under President Carranza to attack the United States, thereby diverting America’s attention from supporting the alliance against the Central Powers in World War I. The telegram matters because it would be perhaps the single most important factor in America’s entry into World War I. Few Americans may know that Pancho Villa raided American towns in New Mexico, killing Americans, and a punitive expedition was sent in 1915.

There are many conspiracies centering on the telegram, much of it centers on it being a British fabrication designed to bring America into the war. This narrative came out soon after the telegram was made public, mainly by either pro-German, or anti-war activists in America. Their thesis would have had some credibility, were it not for Zimmerman admitting he was the author of the telegram and was unapologetic for doing so. Boghardt does a magnificent job detailing how President Woodrow Wilson unveiled the telegram before Congress and using the media. Wilson and his advisers preferred an unofficial lead to an official announcement that may call to question the authenticity of the document.

The book goes on to discuss various characters in the world of espionage and covert operations, and the method by which British intelligence spied on diplomatic codes to extract the telegram. From the minute details about the geo-strategic discussions between German leaders over how to maximize the use of unrestricted submarine warfare without getting the United States to side with the allies, the dilemma has the reader empathizing with Berlin’s solution: that since America plans to go to war if the Germans deploy the unrestricted submarine tactic, then it makes sense to make overtures to Mexico and explore the opening of a new front in the western hemisphere. The author does not neglect to mention that Germany in World War I has extensive programs to incite jihad against the British and French interests.
in the Middle East and Asia.

Boghardt ends with a discussion over what the British would do in World War II to recreate the events of the Zimmerman Telegram, going as far as creating a map of Nazi domination over areas of South America. Was this a fabrication? The delusions of a Nazi fanatic? or was it real? President Roosevelt would be forced to make a decision based on the map. I will leave it to you, to read the book.

CDR Aboul-Enein is author of “Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat,” and “Iraq in Turmoil,” both published by Naval Institute Press. He wishes to thank the National Defense University library for providing a quiet place to read and type this review.

Russia and Cyber-Terrorism
BY JAKE VILLAREAL

One of the Russian government’s key priorities, guiding its foreign policy, is a strong stance against terrorism; therefore it is no surprise that Moscow has been urging the world to step up the fight against cyber-terrorism as well. Just as it has banded together with other countries to fight physical terrorism, Russia’s future plans for the fight on cyber-terrorism center on cooperation with other powerful governments. A central aspect of Russia’s future foreign policy decisions will be the action it takes to protect its information and security from rival states and terrorist groups, and its involvement in the online frontier of the War on Terror. Dmitri Frolov, representative of the Information Security Center of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), writing in “Actual Problems of Legislative Provision of Fight Against Terrorism in the State Duma of the Russian Federation,” claims that nowadays, cyber-terrorism may cause significantly more damage than any usual explosive device.”

Russia’s primary focus regarding cyber terrorism should be to identify the greatest dangers and most vulnerable systems, and testing and developing means of defending themselves. An attack on the control systems of armed forces such as fighter planes or submarines would be devastating, and would render the hardware useless. There is no dedicated branch of government currently dedicated to protecting the government’s information systems against hackers.

Computers are protected by strong encryption methods and password protection, or a dedicated branch for cyber offense. However, after the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, the perpetrators could not be tracked down because they had hired botnets, armies of infected computers, to attack for them, but Russia remained a main suspect due to their rough relations with Estonia at the time. It would have been the first time a state has targeted another with cyber-attacks as an act of war. In the wake of these attacks, seven NATO nations established the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, a COE dedicated to expanding the cyber defense capabilities of its members. Although it is open to all NATO members, it has made itself open to establish cooperative relations with other nations. One of Russia’s top priorities in defending its information systems and establishing a cooperative relationship with NATO should be joining the organization and contributing to it.

Russia’s army is not the imposing threat it formerly was under the Soviet Union, and so perhaps the Russian government can contribute more to the War on Terror with its information agencies. Russia is rich in human capital and maintains the Soviet style of education, emphasizing math and science. “Programmist” is currently a very popular Russian college degree and their software industry is internationally competitive. The Cyber Crime culture is widespread in Russia due to large amounts of educated programmers with limited means of using their skills. In world programming competitions, Russians often take top places, and show the potential of the programmers in Russia. Unfortunately, this talent is being made available during a brain drain of the Russian population; 1.25 million Russians have emigrated in the last 10 years to find work abroad or to escape the political climate. It is becoming a trend for foreign companies to hire Russian programmers who work for less money, but produce the same quality of work. One way Russia can prevent that emigration of their valuable resources and stem the outsourcing that is hurting their economy is by encouraging other countries to increase taxes on businesses that outsource jobs, and to hire more Russia programmers to work in their growing security sector.

A key determinant of Russia’s modern foreign policy is the danger posed by cyber-terrorism and the need to cooperate with the international community to fight against it. Russia’s actions should now be aimed at encouraging other countries to adopt higher taxes for technology companies that outsource and to join the CCDCOE as the start of a security alliance with NATO.

Jake Villarreal is a student in California working at the Center for Cyber Warfare at the...
In-Region Training vs. On-the-Job Training

MAJOR NICHOLAS GREGOIRE

There are as many strategies for negotiating In-Region Training (IRT) as there are FAOs in the Army. I have so far benefitted greatly from advice freely given by FAOs that have operated in Africa for years. Defense Attachés have been willing if not eager to share their experience and recommendations because they graciously recognize IRT FAOs not merely as trainees, but as colleagues with whom they will cooperate on missions the rest of their careers.

Advice from senior FAOs, though abundant, lacks consistency. It ranges from “You should get all the tourist activities out of the way now because you’ll be busy later” to “Stick to the military exercises since you’ll likely start out as an OSC Chief.” This is entirely understandable since IRT in Africa is so individualistic that you will never find two officers that have conducted the same exercises, monitored the same elections, negotiated the same dodgy border crossing, et cetera. We also start out in very different operating environments with different responsibilities. In some locations there’s little to do but plan your next trip, while others are so overwhelming that FAOs struggle to find time to submit reports. I, like many of my counterparts, have benefitted from an extremely knowledgeable supportive community at my home station (Maputo, Mozambique) and have found the same in the dozen places I’ve visited throughout the continent. What follows is a summary of my experience and lessons learned over my first eight months of IRT.

Perhaps the single most fortunate and beneficial event was the timing of the Theater Army Security Cooperation Conference in Vicenza, Italy two months after arrival in Mozambique. Senior Defense Officials from all over Africa gathered to give presentations on their operating environments and projected engagement programs through the next two fiscal years. Sent on behalf of DAO Mozambique, I crammed during the weeks prior to the trip in order to represent my home office and hopefully make contacts for the year of travel to come. It was immediately apparent that a gathering of FAOs such as this was a unique opportunity. It was certainly an “Africa FAO 101” course. Thinking more selfishly, it was a huge “Job Fair.” This was where I made contacts and immediate travel plans to visit and work in support of ongoing missions that interested me most.

One problem that I have encountered during IRT is that I feel an urgency to visit as many countries as possible while I have the mandate (and funding) to do so. This comes at the cost of really getting inside of a mission to learn the practical, everyday details and relationships that define an operating environment. My colleagues and I started out with the same country visit plan: an hour with the SDO/DATT, Pol/Econ Officer, PAO and RSO, possibly one military engagement. After a few of

“I have learned that the difference between a country visit and staying long enough to contribute to the mission is access. ... Being gainfully employed and relied upon makes a huge difference. “
these it became clear to all that, although these are necessary steps, they are far from really gaining an understanding of a U.S. Mission. With dismay, I realized that a year just is not enough to get more than a glimpse of a couple dozen locations. I would have to sacrifice some in order to hopefully gain a more comprehensive understanding in others. That seemed to be a better use of my time that merely checking off countries on the scorecard. The simple formula “more time equals better understanding” is obvious, but the question became “how do I choose the most worthwhile mission?”

One of the several contacts I made at that first conference in Italy was the Security Cooperation Office (SCO) Chief for Uganda. Through a casual conversation over dinner, I became interested in the several ongoing U.S. missions in the region, in particular the Africa Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and asked how I could participate. He took me up on the offer immediately and blocked off a couple months during which I would act as the Deputy SCO Chief. It was that simple. Why? Because there is plenty of work to go around in Africa for an Army Major offering himself up for free labor.

Week One in Kampala was a blur of dawn to dusk fire hose orientation. This was due to the fact that most of the DoD personnel, to include the SDO/DATT and OSC Chief would be out of the country for Week Two. During that second week I briefed DoD operations to 60 members of the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) Senior Staff College during their visit to the U.S. Embassy, engaged with UPDF officers up to Brigadier General and represented the OSC while hosting a Congressional Delegation from the House Armed Services Committee. My immediate conclusion was that I was brought to Kampala to help with a particularly busy week. The following nine weeks proved that conclusion false as the incredibly high OPTEMPO remained steadfast with no signs of slowing down in the near future.

The most interesting part of being involved in the Mission to Uganda was to see behind the scenes of the U.S. efforts directly contributing to events on the ground in Mogadishu. During my time in Kampala, AMISOM forces took control of the Somali capital in its entirety and made the first push north outside of the city in pursuit of Al-Shabaab. From my vantage point,
of delegations traveling to study the operation, all of which contribute to the already daunting workload of the U.S. Mission.

AMISOM and OLT, though receiving massive support efforts by the U.S. Mission, do not account for the entirety of DoD activities in Uganda. There is also the enduring task of professionalization of the Ugandan military, placing emphasis on human rights training, enforcement, and application during domestic and peacekeeping operations. A security cooperation goal is to build their capacity and create a more capable force while conducting operations in a fashion more consistent with American military core values. The task of affecting a cultural change such as this is undertaken only through relentless engagement and exposure to the U.S. military. On average, there are 27 U.S. military-to-military engagement teams in Uganda per year, focusing on everything from Air Traffic Control Procedures to an Inspector General’s course. I witnessed, participated in, or coordinated six of these during my ten-week stay, which involved working with hundreds of UPDF officers and NCOs. The sizable IMET program, averaging over $600,000 per year, has also made a significant impact on the culture within the UPDF. The most senior officers of the UPDF, to include the Chief of Defense Forces, have all attended IMET funded courses in the U.S., where they were immersed in the culture of the U.S. military and have brought those lessons learned back to influence their army.

Even in what would be considered a prolonged stay for an IRT FAO, the full complement of DoD activities in Uganda is difficult to grasp. Could I have learned all of this passing through on a typical seven-day country visit? Yes and no. The facts of the current situation are simple enough on the surface. The reasons why operations are conducted as they are hinge on relationships and everyday details that would be lost to a casual passerby. It is important to remember that this year is In-Region Training and not explicitly On-the-Job Training. We are expected to get, in the broadest of terms, an overview of the continent and some practical regional experience. Remaining too long anywhere doing one specific job is contrary to the point of IRT. I would say, however, that finding a way to split the difference is what has worked best for me. One compliments the other and even while gainfully employed, I have found plenty of time to be a tourist.

I have learned that the difference between a country visit and staying long enough to contribute to the mission is access. We, IRT FAOs, are mostly just consumers. We consume time and resources from our sponsoring agencies while offering little in return as far as contribution to the Mission. Even in our home stations we remain somewhat outsiders as we come and go in varying intervals and it is sometimes difficult to fit in to the Mission’s community. Being gainfully employed and relied upon makes a huge difference. Mission members will feed you information constantly, under the assumption that, as a member of the team, you must be situational aware.

It is also worth noting that getting inside a Mission for a prolonged stay has a cascading effect. We are advised up front that the 48J community is small and IRT constantly reinforces that fact. Everyone we meet today knows everyone we met yesterday and will meet tomorrow. Just as that first conference led travel and TDY opportunities, working in various Embassies, has led to even more. When attempting to conduct a country visit, a FAO might receive a quick “Now’s not a good time” from a Defense Attaché Office. This is a common and entirely understandable response since, in most places in Sub-Saharan Africa, it really isn’t a good time. However, if you are offering to work in an OSC or on other military programs, suddenly you are not a burdensome visitor consuming time they don’t have for nothing more than your own edification. They know that you can be an extra set of hands and I have yet to find a place where that is not welcome.

Major Nicholas Gregoire graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2002 and the Basic Army Aviation Course in 2003. After several years serving in Germany as a Black Hawk Platoon Leader and Company Commander he deployed in 2008 to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He completed both French and Portuguese language courses prior to conducting IRT in Mozambique. 2011-2012. He is currently studying international relations at Yale University.
U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet
Culture and Language Center

The Air Force Culture and Language Center creates and executes language, region and cultural learning programs for Total Force Airmen, and provides the Service with the subject matter expertise required to institutionalize these efforts. The Center was founded at Air University in April 2006. In December 2007, the Center was made responsible for culture and language training, as well as education, across the entire Air Force. The AFCLC is part of the Spaatz Center for Officer Education at Maxwell Air Force Base.

Cross-Cultural Competence (3C)
Cross-culturally competent Airmen are able to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively act, to achieve the desired effect in a culturally complex environment. This outcome is achieved through the right mix of foreign language, regional and cultural learning.

Culture Branch
The AFCLC’s Culture Branch develops Airmen’s 3C across the entire continuum of learning. Educational efforts are guided by Air University’s Quality Enhancement Plan, and training efforts are integrated into the Air Force’s Expeditionary Skills program. The AFCLC also offers two distance learning courses, “Introduction to Culture,” and “Cross-Cultural Communication.” Both qualify enlisted Airmen for three semester hours of program elective credit through the Community College of the Air Force.

Region Branch
The AFCLC’s Region Branch provides expert regional knowledge to Airmen. Regions of focus are determined by the needs of the Air Force. This regional learning is delivered through a variety of media such as the Expeditionary Culture Field Guide (ECFG) series, Visual Expeditionary Skills Training (VEST) live-actor immersion films, Expeditionary Skills computer-based training modules, and classroom instruction for special missions such as the Air Advisor Academy and other training venues.

Language Division
The AFCLC’s Language Branch develops and sustains General Purpose Force Airmen’s foreign language skills through Professional Military Education familiarization courses at Air University, basic instruction in Expeditionary Skills Training and advanced initiatives like the Language Enabled Airman Program. LEAP is a career-spanning program that selects, develops and sustains Airmen’s foreign language and cultural capabilities. The objective of LEAP is cross-culturally competent leaders across all Air Force specialties with working level foreign language proficiency – leaders that can meet Air Force global mission requirements.

Negotiation Center of Excellence
The AFCLC has partnered with the Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence since 2008. The NCE provides education, training and research on negotiation to assist students in preparing and executing current and future missions. This learning is offered in Professional Military Education, Expeditionary Skills Training and at other Department of Defense venues. The NCE is co-located with AFCLC at Maxwell AFB.

For more information, e-mail afclc.outreach@us.af.mil or call 334-953-7729.
Over 130 Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) from across all military services descended upon the Weckerling Center at The Presidio of Monterey from June 11-15, 2012 for the inaugural Joint Foreign Area Officer Course, Phase I (JFAOC). The JFAOC, Phase I represents a significant step forward in the training of the FAO community—the course complements the joint capabilities of the FAO Corps and promotes networking and information sharing among members of the FAO community to better prepare newly accessed FAOs for the types of duties to which they may be assigned.

The JFAOC, Phase I replaces and builds upon its predecessor, the Army FAO Orientation Course (FAOOC). In the mid-1970s, the “Foreign Area Officer Course”, held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was approximately five months long. At that time, Army FAOs were divided into seven specialties based on skill-set rather than geographic region. Those specialties were: Security Assistance Officer (48A), Psychological Operations Officer (48B), Attaché (48C), Civil Affairs Officer (48D), Unconventional Warfare Officer (48E), Civil-Military Operations Officer (48F), and Politico-Military Affairs Officer (48G). All these specialties shared a common thread of “language proficiency and area orientation.” Over time, many of these specialties became independent functional areas, branches, or specialties within the special operations community. Other specialties, namely security assistance and attaché duty, became the purview of Department of Defense (DoD) agencies.

With these changes in FAO roles and responsibilities, the Army FAOOC gradually dwindled from that initial five-month course to just two days at The Presidio of Monterey, an insufficient amount of time to transition newly accessed officers from their basic branches into the FAO Corps. As a result, many Army FAOs arrived at their first in-country assignment under-prepared and unaware of the different roles, responsibilities, and interactions of DoD agencies and US governmental departments involved in the formulation and execution of foreign and defense policy. Additionally, these FAOs often had limited familiarization with security cooperation planning, counterintelligence awareness, non-governmental organization roles, and the Regional Centers’ missions.

Thus, a clear need arose not only to modify the FAOOC, but to re-model it to better reflect the current reality of the FAO program with emphasis on the indispensable role FAOs play in the joint environment.

Encompassing a full work week, the JFAOC corrected the deficiencies of its predecessor by providing new FAOs an overview of their expected roles and functions, the mission of various organizations and agencies they will typically work for, and how to effectively interact and liaise with relevant organizations and offices during their assignments. The course is divided into two parts: a service specific section lasting two days and a joint section lasting three. During the service specific time, the new FAOs saw how and where they fit into their individual services before seeing how and where they fit into the DoD as a whole. For example, Army attendees received a basic overview of the Army FAO Program, aptly titled “FAO 101”; a budgeting class; and briefings from Human Resources Command, the Army Student Detachment, and the 162d Infantry Brigade. Additionally, a series of round-robin sessions provided Army attendees an opportunity to learn more about the phases of the FAO training cycle—language, in-region training, and advanced civil schooling—and the practical details of living and working in a foreign country while fulfilling specific Army FAO roles. Furthermore, informal dinners for each geographic area of concentration offered them the ability to engage both their peers and the FAO Proponent Office regional managers in a low-pressure setting. As a result, the Army FAOs emerged from the branch-specific sessions with a much clearer idea of their future career path and what the Army demands of them as FAOs.

The following three days brought all the services’ participants together for joint-oriented training. Rousing welcoming remarks by Rear Admiral Jeffrey Lemmons, Director of the Inter-American Defense College, highlighted the growing-) importance of the FAO community to US foreign and defense policy. Briefed by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers, as well as civilian academic experts and retired ambassador James Moriarty, attendees received instruction on topics such as national security and related DoD documents, force protection and personal security, security cooperation and security assistance programs, strategic political-military assignments, cross-cultural negotiations, cross-cultural competence, etiquette, and an introduction to the US Department of State’s missions and the embassy country team’s place within the embassy environment. Service members also received classified briefings on various FAO-related topics, after which their spouses were welcomed for unclassified briefings.
Additionally, JFAOC attendees and their spouses attended a Wednesday evening social, affording them the opportunity to mingle, network, and adroitly navigate the challenges of eating buffalo wings in business casual attire. The inclusion of spouses for all sessions, with the exception of the classified briefings, is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the JFAOC’s curriculum. The life of a FAO, with its multiple overseas assignments, uniquely impacts not only the FAO, but his/her family as well; and often times spousal involvement is critical to the FAO’s success in his/her assignments.

With only one iteration of the JFAOC complete, it can be safely said that the course will continue to be refined and improved. The current effort is to align the timing of the course with language training to minimize the amount of language instruction officers will miss. In addition, work is being undertaken to develop both eight and ten day versions that may be implemented in the future. For the time being, however, the JFAOC will remain a five-day bi-annual course occurring in January and June.

The inaugural JFAOC vastly improves the quality of FAO training. Participation by FAOs from all the military services enables the establishment of a “joint” baseline, and bringing FAOs from all services together at the beginning of their FAO careers serves as an impetus for critical professional and social networking. Most importantly, the JFAOC equips young FAOs for success by providing them a comprehensive understanding of the roles and responsibilities they will be asked to assume in the future.

1. Foreign Area Officer Course 2-76


3. Ibid. 29

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The Battle of the Straw Men:
A Case for the Status Quo
BY COLONEL MICHAEL DONNOLY

BLUF: The Single Track System is working.

We finally have a career path in which a FAO can succeed...get promoted...envy of other services. Let's not screw this up, chasing ops dream, ok?

The case against single track FAOs is often presented as a comparison between two hypothetical FAOs. FAO Dualtracker deftly balanced has alternating infantry and FAO assignments, earning accolades and promotions in both branches. He led his Ranger Battalion in combat in both OIF and OEF, separated by a tour at the embassy in Beijing. His skill as a tactician is surpassed only by his skill as a linguist. Meanwhile, FAO Singletracker has spent the past fifteen years on the cocktail circuit in one Western European capital city after another. He long ago forgot which end of the rifle the bullet comes out of, but he definitely knows which fork to use for the third course, and has three sets of dress mess, just in case he spills French Wine on one and Champagne on another.

Given these two choices, which would you pick? Why, the FAO Dualtracker of course! Meanwhile, FAO Singletracker is an embarrassment to the Profession of Arms, a wannabe State Department diplomat. Yes, FAO Dualtracker is the clear choice, except for the inconvenient truth – he does not exist! Neither, for that matter, does FAO Singletracker. The real choice is between a fully trained, experienced regional expert with good career opportunities, and an officer who struggles to maintain proficiency in both branches...

Do other functional areas have this angst? Do ORSAs or IO officers obsess that they are single track? My informal, unscientific polling of my War College classmates suggest that they do not.

Arguments for Single Track System:
1. “Your (Host Nation) Counterpart Won’t Respect You”
   (mirror-imaging)
2. “Your U.S. Combat Arms Boss”
   (Somewhat true, but what about joint? And will he like you better just because you had 12 months of S3 time somewhere?)
3. “A FAO needs to know the weapons systems that he is selling”
4. “A FAO needs to be able to advise the host nation”
5. “Other countries don’t have dual-track FAOs”
6. Advise Ambassador

What does a single track system really look like? 12 months S3 time as a major, probably nothing as an LTC, because you are unlikely to get battalion command. We have lots of tacticians, few regional/cultural experts, and even fewer strategists. Tactics is a strength of the U.S. Army. Let’s focus on our weaknesses.

I write from the perspective of a U.S. Army 48E, acknowledging that all AOCs are different, and my experiences may not carry over to other AOCs, arguments may be less compelling.
Structuring the Foreign Area Officer Corps for the Future

BY COLONEL BENJAMIN D. CROCKETT

This article examines key dimensions of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) profession, from initial training to senior levels, with the goal of making recommendations to improve the structure and effectiveness of the FAO Corps in the future. Salient recommendations include maximizing value added in FAO training through less rigid, more practical and tailored programs, mandating secondary Areas of Concentration (AOC) for all Army FAOs, transitioning European specialist positions to region immaterial status (open to all FAOs), and highlighting flag officer positions systemically optimal for FAOs to include what would become the top FAO position in the military, the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Before considering changes in structure, it may be helpful to underscore the unique attributes of FAOs and why their skill sets are a high priority for the Department of Defense (DoD). FAOs are regional specialists, working primarily at the strategic level, who maximize the advancement of DoD interests and missions abroad, often as the sole service and/or DoD representatives in foreign countries. All FAO mission sets should support advancing U.S. Defense interests, whether working in positions of intelligence analyst, policy advisor, security cooperation officer, attaché, joint or service specific billets, etc. Some duties and skills overlap with other career fields such as strategists and intelligence officers, but two areas of expertise are unique to Foreign Area Officers: Security cooperation and national level (strategic) DoD representation abroad. While other missions, such as political-military reporting, intelligence analysis, theater level planning, etc., all support the higher objective of advancing DoD interests, they are not unique to FAOs. Managing security cooperation and conducting national level DoD representation abroad are inherently functions at the strategic level and can be best performed by FAOs.

How are we as a FAO Corps doing to prepare for success in the future? There have been important initiatives over the past several years that have improved or streamlined FAO structure, training, and capability. Perhaps most prominent among them has been the development of the Navy FAO program. The Navy’s decision to single track FAOs, fund broad based training, promote at competitive rates, and commit hundreds of officers to the career field has rapidly augmented the global capabilities and contributions of the FAO Corps. But while the Navy’s trajectory for FAO training is on the rise, the Army’s is on the decline.

Of greater concern than the principle of Army cutbacks has been the uniform and rigid methodology used. DoD requires relevant graduate degrees for FAOs but does not impose constraints on their length. The Army recently reduced almost all FAO graduate school opportunities to 12 months. This decision will have a negative long-term impact as some of the best regional studies graduate programs do not have 12 month curricula. We lose access to many of the best minds in international affairs when we use a machete rather than a scalpel to pare back training time. Many programs longer than 12 months afford the opportunity and time to research and write a high quality thesis that benefits both the FAOs own professional development and the knowledge base of DoD. These Army cutbacks are reflective of an overall approach to training that is too rigid and lockstep, particularly in the sequencing and length of the three pillars of training: Language study, In-Region Training (IRT), and graduate education.

The FAO Corps should pursue a more practical, flexible, and holistic approach to shaping FAO training. Rigid time lines and sequencing should be reconsidered in favor of tailored programs that maximize value added. The sequence and length of language training, IRT and graduate school should depend on several factors to include the FAO’s AOCs, year group, background, preferences, available funding, the potential timing of each phase of training, and common sense. Each service has a different approach to structuring and sequencing FAO training. The Navy has prudently borrowed much from the other services to rapidly build its new FAO program. But the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are all too reliant on the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), greatly limiting breadth of exposure. Several quality regional studies programs do not have 12 month curricula. We lose access to many of the best minds in international affairs when we use a machete rather than a scalpel to pare back training time. Many programs longer than 12 months afford the opportunity and time to research and write a high quality thesis that benefits both the FAOs own professional development and the knowledge base of DoD. These Army cutbacks are reflective of an overall approach to training that is too rigid and lockstep, particularly in the sequencing and length of the three pillars of training: Language study, In-Region Training (IRT), and graduate education.

The Army has already efficiently eliminated most long military courses within IRT. These courses, many close to a year in length, made the IRT experience country focused rather than region focused. But the Army should also consider experimenting with some IRT’s in the form of concentrated TDYs of several months as the other services have enacted, emphasizing the quality of each IRT day versus the total program length. Total value added per dollar is
the goal. IRT related housing, security and administrative costs are already exorbitant and climbing at some embassies relative to the costs of other pillars of training. These increasing costs require a reexamination of where the balance point is between funds expended and value gained in several IRT locations.

In some circumstances, combining two pillars of training at the same duty station will save training time, PCS related costs, and achieve training synergies without diminishing value. FAO training should begin with language study because some FAOs fail in their initially assigned languages and are reassigned to alternatives, potentially impacting their AOC and associated IRT and graduate studies. But the sequencing and location of IRT and graduate school should be flexible, as should the length of all three pillars. Some FAOs have conducted successful IRTs based at the DoD Africa regional center in Washington D.C., incorporating lengthy TDYs throughout Africa, and attending graduate school afterwards in the nation's capital. Co-location makes particular sense in terms of scheduling those Army FAOs that prefer to attend NPS to do so immediately after language training. The Army has overspent considerably for at least two decades sending some FAOs to Monterey twice for training, before and after IRT. In addition to unnecessary expense, these added relocations wasted the time of the affected FAOs and their families.

When there is a correlation between training expense and time invested, that correlation should be a consideration. But some high quality 16- or 17-month three semester graduate programs are no more expensive than 12-month programs at institutions of equivalent caliber. And longer graduate education makes particular sense for new FAOs with two AOCs. The key savings with 12-month graduate programs is training time. A mix of 12-month programs and longer programs will reduce average training time from eras past when a majority of programs were longer than 12 months. But flexibility towards graduate education and the other pillars of training will afford the FAO Corps greater diversity of thought, a deeper knowledge base, and broader exposure and access to the best minds in international affairs.

Turning from high quality training to high quality performance in assignments, the recent Army decision to assign new FAOs with a secondary AOC is certainly a step in the right direction. Many FAOs have previously served competently in two different AOCs, proving the validity of the concept. There have been a significant number of assignment shortfalls of high priority billets that could have been rectified in the past if officers simply had secondary AOCs. But the current plan will effectively grandfather in single AOCs most FAOs who are already fully qualified or have entered the training pipeline unless they volunteer for secondary AOCs. It will take until at least the year 2035 before all FAOs have secondary AOCs if the process is not modified.

A more practical approach is to accelerate and expand the assignment of secondary AOCs to ensure all Army FAOs have them, preferably no later than 2020. There are many methods that can make this happen. One method is to choose an arbitrary date for all FAOs or different dates by rank or year group. Under such a method, all FAOs could have secondary AOCs relatively soon. Another method would be to assign secondary AOCs to those selected for promotion. This process would take until close to 2020 to be complete, but it would certainly reinforce the standard of matching greater rank with greater responsibility.

The adoption of secondary AOCs may prove too challenging for the dual career track Air Force and Marine Corps FAO programs. The goal is to actually become proficient over time in the secondary AOC and not simply have a paper designation. Devoting roughly half their career to their basic branches, Air Force Regional Affairs Strategists and Marine Corps FAOs already are challenged to maintain their FAO skills for a single region. The single tracked Navy FAO program, based on much larger Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Areas of Responsibility (AOR), rather than the smaller Army AOCs, is in some ways ahead of the Army. A Navy FAO focused on Pacific Command's AOR specializes in the equivalent of multiple or components of multiple contiguous Army AOCs, as do European Command and Central Command Navy FAOs. Many Army FAOs know a considerable amount about one or more adjacent AOCs because they have served at GCCs or other organizations with large areas of responsibility or interest, have served at embassies in countries that border other AOCs, know languages that bridge multiple AOCs, etc. For example, a Middle East North African FAO who speaks Arabic and French will be able, in most circumstances, to much more easily adopt Sub-Saharan Africa as a secondary AOC than Southeast Asia. All relevant qualifications such as the primary AOC and also personal preference should be evaluated in determining secondary AOC designations.

But what would prevent a majority or plurality of Army FAOs from asking for Europe (the Army's 48C designation) as a secondary specialization? Many FAOs from a variety of AOCs possess knowledge of European languages, have worked closely with NATO partners, and have lived in Europe. A likely high preference for 48C illustrates another fundamental problem in the FAO structure, the continued existence
in 2013 of military officers spending their entire careers as "European Specialists." DoD released new strategic guidance in January 2012 that places greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, a continued emphasis on the Mideast, and less emphasis on Europe. The reason for FAOs preferring Europe has little to do with dynamism in the missions there: FAO assignments to Europe are all accompanied and enjoy a high quality of life. By comparison, the trend lines over the past decade for Africa, the Mideast, and South Asia are all becoming worse: Substantially more unaccompanied, hardship tours.

Finding officers among the greater FAO population who can understand and work with European cultures is relatively easy. And given the security assistance and attaché nature of the billets, FAOs will remain the best fit for the positions. European specialists generally do not know the low-density languages of Europe any more than FAOs from other AOCs do. Hence, it is no greater expense to retrain a French speaking FAO in Danish or Hungarian coming from a tour in Kinshasa than it is to train a French speaking FAO coming from an assignment in Paris. But odds are the FAO (and family) in the Congo will be far more professionally and personally motivated about the new tour in Copenhagen or Budapest. Alternatively, there would be no language expense to send the FAO from Kinshasa to an assignment in Paris where the officer, with his African experience, would have considerable street credibility with the French military.

But how best to transition all European FAO assignments to AOC immaterial FAO positions? A gradual approach could utilize two phases over a period of six or more years. The first phase, over roughly three years, would eliminate Europe or 48C as a primary AOC. No newly designated FAOs would receive it as either a primary or secondary AOC. FAOs previously designated as 48C's would take on another AOC as a primary designation and 48C would become their secondary AOC. The second phase of approximately three or four years would see the elimination of 48C as a secondary AOC and European billets opened to all FAOs no later than 2020 (Army positions would be recoded 48Z). While shorter alternatives could be considered, this two phased timeline would allow those European specialists in the current system many years and multiple assignments to make the complete transition to other AOCs.

Having started with a discussion of how to enhance the foundation of FAO careers, a more flexible and pragmatic approach to training, and then addressing arguably the greatest opportunity to transform and leverage the capabilities of Army FAOs in the future, universal specialization in secondary AOCs, this article will conclude with a brief discussion of where the most successful FAOs should serve at the end of their careers, as general officers. While there is an argument that the senior most FAO could serve as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, given the prominent roles that FAOs play in that organization both analytically and abroad, FAOs are not uniquely qualified for that position. FAOs are the indisputable, foremost experts in security cooperation, not intelligence. Therefore, it follows that DoD's top security cooperation official, the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, should be the senior FAO in the military. This three star position would be the logical culmination of the career of the best FAO, regardless of service.

There are many other flag officer positions that could benefit from FAO skill sets, and DoD has clear guidance for each service to develop a FAO path to general. Yet, FAOs will likely never reach significant numbers of general officers given overall constraints. What methodology should be used to designate a small number of positions? The two skill sets mentioned earlier where FAOs are unmatched, security cooperation and DoD representation abroad, are optimized in two sets of general officer positions: Key Senior Defense Official (SDO) assignments and GCC J5/DJ5 positions.

Given that SDO Moscow and SDO Beijing are frequently already filled by FAO flag officers, two or three additional SDO positions in other critical countries should be considered. For example, DoD routinely assigns generals who do not speak the language or have specialization in the region and culture to serve as SDO's in Arabic speaking countries. Just as they do in Russia or China, FAOs would make a significant difference as SDO's in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, particularly given those countries' enormous security cooperation programs. It would also make sense to systemically assign FAO generals to the J5 directorates of all GCC's except Northern Command. Each GCC should have a single one or two star FAO serving as J5 or DJ5 so that FAO leadership benefits all regions. The transition to universal secondary AOCs would ensure that FAO generals could easily transition from one regionally oriented one star position to a different regionally oriented two star position without any lessening of expertise. Any increase in FAO promotions to flag officer will be a long, hard fought endeavor. But focusing on strategic joint billets ideal for our skill sets risks less of a turf dispute than targeting service specific general officer positions (Army staff, etc). Ultimately, the best placed and most influential stewards of the FAO community will be FAO general officers. The more, the better.
Digital Diplomacy:
Cultivating Transnational Discourse in a
Globalized World
BY LT GRAHAM PLASTER, USNR

Hossein Derakhshan, aka “Hoder,” founder of the Iranian blog movement that came to be known as “Weblogistan,” is one of many in a global community who believe that new social media tools such as blogs, texts and tweets might someday facilitate a soft revolution in Iran and beyond. As a disenchanted Persian journalist, he left Iran in 2000 after the Khatami presidency failed to deliver promised freedom reforms. While working as a sports journalist in Canada, Hoder started the first Farsi blog which catalyzed a mushroom cloud of likeminded blogs in the years following. The trend caught the attention of Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Democracy, which mapped the Persian blogosphere using keywords to see whether the Persian zeitgeist could be graphed. At the end of the study questions still remained. Was Persian social media catalyst for change or merely catharsis? Unlike the US, where the Internet came more than five years before blog-like sites were available, the Internet was more or less introduced in Iran with blogs, leading to a rather different kind of usage of the Internet in Iran. Additionally, Iranians have a dominant art form, poetry. Poetry has evolved from formal to informal, encompassing all aspects of life including journalism, politics, history, medicine and religion. Poetry is a tool for encapsulating the essential human experience and sharing it. Blogs follow in this tradition, and it is therefore no surprise that the Berkman study revealed a large number of Persian poetry blogs. Some of these were certainly in the vein of Thomas Paine, but others were merely a slice of life.

Hoder believed that Persian blogs were like windows, bridges and cafes. As windows, they allowed outsiders to see in and insiders to see out. As bridges, they allowed for discourse between different ages, genders and cultures. As cafes, they created a social space for long form discourse across geographic space, solidifying a national identity for the next generation of the Persian diaspora, an identity which was larger than the borders of Iran and much older than the Islamic Republic.

Hoder was an idealist, and wanted to do more than blog. He visited Israel as a Canadian citizen in January 2006 in an attempt to start an online dialogue between Iranian and Israeli people. He then traveled to Tehran in 2008 where he was arrested, held without trial for two years and finally sentenced to 19½ years in prison on September 28, 2010.

In 2009, during the run up to the presidential election, some of Hoder’s ideals seemed to be manifesting in a powerful way with the widespread usage of Twitter and a global community in support of regime change in Iran. But political reality trumped social media idealism once again. Following Ahmadinejad’s re-election, the failed Green Movement retired to the sidelines to regroup and reconsider their options. One of the lessons learned was the power of images. If a picture is worth a thousand words, then the video of the innocent Persian woman, Neda, short through the neck by Iranian police, was real political power. This same concept played a large role during the Arab Spring, with the gripping images of Bouazizi’s self immolation going viral on Facebook and blogs across the Middle East. These images were part of what turned a social network into an activist community. Images drove action.

Certainly, this isn’t a new lesson. Propaganda, agitprop, intelligence and private enterprise have all used images in persuasive ways. But it bears reminding because Facebook is the number one image sharing platform on the internet, and Facebook is the natural evolution of the Blog form. Unless you are using a blog to host your photos and share your ideas, the likely social digital forum will be Facebook. LinkedIn has effectively claimed the digital turf for professional networking and Twitter has become a de facto news service (for those who know how to use it).

Digital diplomacy requires us to learn these environments and operate well in them. The answer cannot be non-engagement. Neither can it be blind optimism. Social media tools such as blogs, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc. are both catalyst for change and also catharsis for culture. Both functions are of deep interest to any foreign affairs professional.

Graham Plaster is the CEO of The Intelligence Community LLC, which operates the largest LinkedIn group for Intelligence professionals as well as www.TheIntelligenceCommunity.com. He has recently transitioned from active duty as a Foreign Area Officer handling UN Peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and North Africa. His honors include a personal request to serve as Aide de Camp to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and recognition as one of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy “Top 99 Leaders under 33”. He is co-author and editor for the 2x bestselling book, In the Shadow of Greatness,"which is on the official reading list for the Chief of Naval Operations.
LEAP Participant Represents U.S. Air Force in Indonesia & Helps Embassy Build Relationships

BY JODI L. JORDAN, AIR FORCE CULTURE AND LANGUAGE CENTER

"If you work hard, you never know where life will take you," said Captain Lia Radulovic during a live radio interview for Indonesian talk show "Morning Coffee" recently. These words held special resonance for Radulovic, a Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP) participant who was born into poverty in Jakarta 34 years ago. Her hard work led her from Indonesia, through college in the United States and to her current position as an Officer Training School instructor at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Captain Radulovic's recent visit to Indonesia marked an important milestone in her life, as she embraced the opportunity "to show the Indonesian people a real-world example of what America's all about," she said.

She returned to Indonesia as part of her participation in LEAP, a career-long language and culture learning program operated by the Air Force Culture and Language Center at Maxwell. Program participants attend online language training as well as Language Intensive Training Events every few years that immerse the participants in the language they study.

For Captain Radulovic, her LEAP training mission was to attend a language school in Jakarta. Soon after she arrived, she began putting her language skills to real-world use, helping the U.S. embassy there with a variety of translation duties.

It wasn't just translation that kept Radulovic busy during her month in Indonesia, however. According to Colonel Kevin Booth, the air attaché at the embassy, Radulovic's most important contribution was her inspiring story. When local media outlets learned of Radulovic's heritage and her accomplishments, she became a sought-after interview subject for television and radio.

"The most important work she did here was public outreach to Indonesian youth and women," Booth said. "Her example as an Indonesian-born woman who works her way through the U.S. university system, then joins the United States Air Force and becomes a successful officer and instructor at our OTS is compelling to any audience, but especially to young people here in Indonesia."

Captain Radulovic connected with Indonesian audiences through her personal experiences. She shared the reality of her upbringing, which was sometimes harsh in its austerity.

"I was a little girl, and I had just gotten my first pair of high-heeled shoes. I wore them to school, and I was so proud of them," she said. "On my way walking home from school, it started raining ... It flooded, and I was walking home in water up to my hips, but I held those shoes up above my head so they wouldn't be ruined. As I walked, I looked at the beautiful houses I passed, all behind high gated walls, and I thought, 'I bet those people don't have to walk home barefooted carrying their shoes!'"

Because of her opportunities in the Air Force, which recognizes the valuable contributions different cultures provide, Radulovic said she is able to see both sides of the scene today, while maintaining a foothold in each. As such, she is eager to share her experiences to demonstrate to others who share her background of the possibilities for improving their circumstances. "Now, I live in a 'gated community,'" said Radulovic. "I can show them that the opportunities are boundless."

Opportunity and diversity were recurring themes...
during Radulovic's media appearances, including a spot on a popular Indonesian talk show "Bukan Empat Mata." Radulovic said that she was not the stereotypical American that many in Indonesia would expect. Being of Javanese ethnicity (the largest ethnic group in Indonesia), Muslim and female, she said she was a living example of the diversity of the United States.

"We can tell people all day long, but until we show the diversity, it doesn't mean as much," she said.

Having the LEAP participants show, not just tell, the American story was invaluable to the U.S. embassy, according to Booth. "LEAP is a forward-looking program that invests in our Airmen and our future; we need Airmen who understand other nations and other cultures," he said. "These Airmen will provide the key to successful collaboration and partnerships with nations like Indonesia. Our nation and Air Force must continue to look forward and invest in capabilities that will enhance our ability to work closely with partner nations in the future. LEAP is wise investment, and LEAP Airmen are a key component to future engagement with partner nations."

This article released courtesy of Air Force Link and first appeared at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123342909

Ms. Jodi Jordan is a senior consultant with Booz Allen Hamilton. She works in the Outreach Branch of the Air Force Culture and Language Center, Maxwell Air Force Base. Ms. Jordan has worked in Air Force public affairs for more than 15 years, including active duty and civilian service. She holds a master's degree in International Relations from Troy University, and is accredited in public relations through the Public Relations Society of America.
defense and security missions. These forces include accelerating globalization and the growth and many impacts of information technology, the consequences of widespread debt and associated social and economic turmoil.

General Flynn also outlined a number of ongoing Defense initiatives based on the demands of accelerating change including enhanced integration across the IC, new approaches to defense analysis, and the up sizing of training, and the operationalization of intelligence. He articulated his Vision 20/20 priorities for DIA of which the top three were the standup of the Defense Clandestine Service, improving recruiting and retention, and the reshaping of Defense analysis to meet the needs of the emerging global environment, an environment characterized by non-traditional threats, non-military security challenges running the gamut from cyber security, terrorism, economic upheaval, and criminality as well as the traditional topics pertaining to war and peace. His assessments and comments aptly established a strategic framework in which the ensuing presentations could be assessed and compared to the broader objectives of both the IC and the foreign area communities of interest.

The Defense Attaché System and Security Cooperation Missions and Issues:

With the broad strategic assessment in hand the focus shifted to the Attaché System and an overview of the Attaché System “Forward.” RADM Bradley R. Gehrke, USN, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center and former Defense Attaché to China provided background and assessment of the Senior Defense Officer (SDO) and Defense Attaché. He provided details of his experience as a pioneer of the SDO concept and his assessment that the in progress program is being favorably met and reviewed everywhere it’s been tried.

Mr. Jeffrey Jore, Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO), DIA/DXA-5 Latin America Division, and RADM Douglas Venlet, Director of International Engagement, HQ Navy OPNAV N52 spoke next. Mr. Jore provided an overview of the evolving role of the DAS in Global intelligence coverage illustrated by Latin more regional focused assessment while Adm Venlet detailed his personal experiences as the first Navy SDO, life as the DATT in Russia, and an upbeat assessment of the SDO concept, in particular, and the Naval Foreign Area program.

Mr. Richard Anderson, from the newly minted Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) (a merger of the Defense Language and National Security Education offices within the DoD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness) highlighted recent work shaping FAO and Language Policies for the future. He detailed initiatives to provide minimum standards of language proficiency and cultural competency, as well as academic standards and regional experience.

Mr. Glenn Nordin, Foreign Language and Area Advisor, OUSD (I) addressed a host of the most pressing issues associated with Foreign Language Skills development and Area Knowledge requirements, including the need for greater focus on the most needed languages and enhancements to the current foreign language incentive programs that will emphasize and reward attainment and retention of...
high levels of target language proficiency.

The first day ended with a Service FAO Proponent Panel with representatives from each of the service FAO proponent offices, including Lt Col A. J. Werner, USAF, SAF/IA, IAS Branch Chief; LtCol Anthony C. Bolden, USMC (FAO/RAO/PEP); LTC Paul DeCecco, USA, Deputy Chief DAMO-SFF; and Capt (Sel) Elizabeth A. Thomas, USN, Chief. The panel was moderated by COL Humberto (Rod) Rodriguez, USA, DoD FAO Program Oversight, DLNSEO who led a discussion focused on the various service paths being taken toward common Defense goals in language, region, and cultural expertise. The wide range of perspectives highlighted the very different approaches being taken by each of the services, the differences in emphasis on Foreign Area expertise, the varying career management strategies, and the significant difference in Service experience in managing dedicated Foreign Area components.

On Day two, Col Kurt Marisa (USAF, Ret), Foreign Area Officer Association President reviewed the FAOA’s upcoming programs, including FAOA’s collaboration with DLNSCO in the building of a museum quality display in the Pentagon that will highlight, educate, and inform the public about the Foreign Area Officer mission and contribution to National Defense. The second day’s program brought further review of Day One’s themes and issues while emphasizing the COM’s perspective and introducing the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) and the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) State Partnership Program.

Key noting the day MajGen Richard Lake, USMC, Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT (NCS/CHMO) and Senior USMC FAO focused on the FAO role in global intelligence coverage and Defense partner engagement. The presentation was at the Secret precluding a more detailed exposition in this forum; however, Gen Lake made it clear that the thinking animating the development and implementation of the DCS is based on the objective need to engage directly with the foreign partner, in his language, and in his environment. Emphasizing this point he quipped that “virtual presence is actual absence”.

The morning’s programs included LTC Jason Weece, USA, Director, FAO Program Office, Defense Language Institute-Foreign, who provided an update and look into the future of DoD linguistic training; and Dr. Mark Ahles, Deputy Commandant and Dean of Academic Affairs, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), who gave an update on training the Security Cooperation workforce. Mr. Steve Chill, DOTMLPF Integrator, Human Terrain System (HTS) Program gave a detailed filled review of TRADOC’s human terrain and cultural intelligence. He was followed by Ambassador Asif Chaudhry, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who gave an outline of his personal experience serving the CNO as a political advisor.

The afternoon program featured a detailed presentation of the SDO/DATT & DAO/SCO cooperation and Integration policy and vision given by Mr. Roman Hrycaj, Col, USAF (Ret), OUSD(I) – HUMINT, and Mr. Paul Gendrolis, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Mr. James Howard, Joint FAO Program, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), provided insight and detail to the graduate-level and advanced Joint FAO Education and FAO web site.

The remainder of the program featured a look at the JCS support to Security Cooperation and COCOM’s presented by Brig Gen Maryanne Miller, USAF, JCS/Deputy Director for Partnership Strategy. Mr. Jack Dees, Chief, Security Cooperation Division (CCJ5-SC), USCENTCOM, provided further review of the role of security cooperation and the Attaché in CENTCOM’s engagement mission. The final presentation featured an exposition of the thinking behind and the approaches to the establishment of the DCS.
On Thursday, 11 April 2013, several FAOA historian and design committee reps from the FAO Heritage Display Committee met with the OSD Washington Headquarters Services Curator for OSD Historical Exhibits. Sponsored by the OSD Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO), this review will provide further guidance and consideration needed for the proposal to begin the final construction phase, which could begin anywhere from the next 3-6 months. FAOA leadership would like to thank all of those members who provided valuable feedback, photographs, and artifacts to be considered for use in the display. A special appreciation is also shared with the DIA History Office, the Eurasian Foreign Area Officer Program at the George C. Marshall Center, and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) for providing additional exhibit support. For additional information or questions, you can contact the FAO Heritage Display Committee via email at faohistory@gmail.com

FAO Heritage Display Co-Chairs
Mr. James (JB) Shelton
Mr. Jeff Hoffmann

Design updates:
www.antesfosse.com/FAO/index.html

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- Interactive screen with world map featuring FAOs in Action testimonials/photos and blurb
- Brushed metal 3D letters for Titles
- Translucent glass side panels with FAO history and bio of Joe Tullbane

Cabinet 1 concept

- Glass enclosed wall with artifacts
- Photos and bios outside the glass
- Background photo collage of key events mounted on box for cut-outs displaying artifacts
- Angled brushed panel

Cabinet 2 concept
The Foreign Area Officer Association Writing Awards Program

BY BRIAN HOBBS, LTC USAF (RET)
CHAIRMAN, FAO ASSOCIATION WRITING AWARDS COMMITTEE

The Foreign Area Officer Association Writing Awards Program officially began this year with five U.S. military War Colleges completing signed Memorandums of Agreement with FAOA - Marine Corps University, Naval War College, Air University, National Intelligence University, and Joint Forces Staff College. The goal of the FAOA writing awards program is to recognize student authors who have demonstrated outstanding academic research, strategic thought, and professional writing skills on significant international or political/military affairs topics in completion of their graduation requirements. There have been many high quality papers submitted for competition, some to be featured in the FAOA Journal and on our website. Winners receive a plaque or book commemorating their achievement at their graduation ceremonies and also receive a one-year FAOA membership. Winning papers this year included "Drone Wars: The Legal Framework for Remote Warfare" by Coast Guard Commander Mark Vlaun from the Marine Corps War College; "State Formation and Failure: PNG as an Incipient State" by Wing Commander Darren Goldie of the Royal Australian Air Force from Air University; "Aligning for Hemispheric Defense: Synchronizing USNORTHCOM and USOUTHCOM Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations" by U.S. Navy Captain Robert Allen, U.S. Navy Captain Mary Jackson, U.S. Army Colonel Janice King, and Captain Jorge Palacios of the Chilean Navy from the Joint Combined Warfighting School; and "Boom or Bust: Britain's Nuclear Deterrent beyond 2025" by Commander Tim Green of the Royal Navy from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School. We congratulate all the winners once again as well as recognize significant contributions by the selection committees and award administrators at each institution. They worked hard not only to select the winners from a very competitive group, but also diligently achieved agreements with FAOA earlier this year on joining with us in recognizing academic excellence in our field. We look forward to collaborating once again next year and sincerely appreciate everyone’s hard work, dedication and sacrifice. Thank you!!

The Foreign Area Officer Association Award for International Affairs presented by Kurt Marisa, President of FAOA at the Marine Corps War College to CDR Mark Vlaun, USCG, for the paper, "Drone Wars: The Legal Framework for Remote Warfare"

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The Foreign Area Officer Association Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters Award for International Affairs is presented to the student producing the best graduate thesis on a topic related to international affairs, area studies, regional issues, FAO policy, the Defense Attaché System, the learning of critical foreign languages, cultural intelligence, or a closely related subject area. The 2012 recipient is Ms Arielle Weber. Ms Weber could not attend graduation; accepting on her behalf is her thesis chair, Mr John Wahlquist.
Please join the FAOA Board of Governors for the Foreign Area Officer Association Annual Black Tie Banquet April 25th, 2013 REGISTER at FAOA.ORG Mixer starts at 6:00 PM and proceedings start at 7:00 PM Keynote Speaker: To Be Announced Location: The Army Navy Country Club, 1700 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA (Note: This is not the Army Navy Club in downtown Washington, DC) Attire: Black Tie – Tuxedo / Cocktail Attire and military personnel equivalent Featuring patriotic songs by the West Point Alumni Glee Club The event benefits the FAOA Scholarship Fund Open Bar

Joe Tullbane, at the 2012 FAOA Black Tie Dinner, receiving award in appreciation for his leadership and vision in founding the Foreign Area Officer Association
Call for Topics

The journal is actively seeking articles on the following topics: perspectives from family members on life overseas, lifestyle articles, transitioning from military to civilian life, book and product reviews, advice for new FAOs, recommendations to improve FAOA.