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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that promotes understanding between U.S. regional and international affairs specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS and MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association.

Membership information may be obtained primarily on the FAOA website: www.faoa.org or by mail at FAOA, P.O. Box 295, Mt. Vernon, VA 22121
The email address is: secretary@faoa.org

Office subscriptions are also available

See the insert within the Journal for details.

SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should e-mail articles to editor@faoa.org. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met. Further information of submissions, format requirements and assistance can be found on the FAOA website.

WEB SITE: www.faoa.org

ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a private organization. We rely on the membership to update their mailing addresses on a regular basis. E-mail address changes to secretary@faoa.org.

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Cover art courtesy of Mr. Devin K. Nelson, Photographer
Dear FAO Association members,

As the current FAOA Board of Governors (BOG), winds down its 3-year term, as called for in the FAOA Charter, we are preparing to hold new BOG elections in August 2012. Our election committee, headed by BOG member John Haseman, has sent communications on this and is currently taking nominations for through 31 July 2012. FAOA is in need of enthusiastic and qualified volunteers to serve on the BOG, as several officer positions and seats will be opening. As the election approaches, I would like to provide an update to the membership on the many successes of the current BOG in building the Association into the premier organization for advocating for the FAO field within the U.S. military and government; providing social, sustainment, and networking opportunities for current, new, and retired FAOs and associates; and mentoring and developing new FAOs.

First of all, our Annual FAO Black Tie Banquet was again a big success with over 200 in attendance to hear James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence and to meet old and new colleague in the historic charm of the Old Clubhouse of the Army Navy Country Club (ANCC) before its demolition in summer 2012. Thanks to those who took the time to respond to our on-line survey for the FAOA Dinner—we received over 30 respondents who all provided great feedback to help us with planning for the 2013 FAOA Black Tie Formal Banquet, which will be held in at the new ANCC Clubhouse at a date to be announced. We also hope to see as many members as possible at our next event on 21 June—back by popular demand, the “FAOA on Tap” Happy Hour at Sines Irish Pub at Pentagon Row. Details and registration for the event are at www.faoa.org.

Our FAOA Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Coyt Hargus, has put together another excellent journal this quarter, which unfortunately will be his last, as he is preparing to attend Senior Developmental Education at the War College. Coyt and his editorial board have continued to raise the bar with each new edition. We will greatly miss having Coyt at the helm of the FAO Journal, and on behalf of the FAOA BOG and membership, would like to profusely thank him for the outstanding work he has done taking the Journal to the level of a highly-subscribed, “peer reviewed” professional trade journal. In fact, we are now being contacted by publication sponsor organizations that would like to promote and offer the FAO Journal to a wider domestic and international individual and institutional subscriber base.

I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight a few other ongoing FAOA special programs and supporting committees. The FAOA Writing and Research Awards program has been enthusiastically received by the Professional Military Education and National Defense institutes. Currently, we have MOAs and active award programs with Air University, Marine Corps University, Naval War College, Joint Forces Staff College, and the National Intelligence University; and continue to pursue Award programs with Army War College, National Defense University, and Naval Post-Graduate School. Award winning and other worthy student papers will be published in special editions of “International Affairs.” I would like to thank Jonathon Sachar for serving as Chairman of the Awards Committee.

We also had an enthusiastic response to our membership call for volunteers for the FAO Heritage Display Committee at the Pentagon. FAOA is collaborating with the DoD FAO Program Manager, the Defense Language and National Security Education Office, on this long overdue project recognizing the history, development, and contributions of Joint service FAO programs and individuals. James Shelton and Jeff Hoffmann are serving as co-chairman of the Display Committee.

In early 2012, FAOA will co-sponsor a fantastic FAO-related conference together with the National Military Intelligence Agency (NMIA), with the working title: “Partner Engagement and Global Coverage under the New Defense Plan: FAOs, Security Cooperation, and the Defense Attaché System.” David Lovato has volunteered to head the FAOA Conference Committee working with the NMIA on this event.

Lastly, the FAOA Scholarship for Excellence in International Affairs, through the Military Officer’s Association of America (MOAA), is well underway. Our first scholarship winner will be announced in July prior to the start of the 2012/2013 academic year. We continue to solicit and accept donations to the FAOA Scholarship Fund.

I have been proud and pleased to serve as the President of the Association, and have strived to make FAOA relevant and advantageous to your job, profession, career and social networking. Please contact me with any comments, questions, or suggestions at president@faoa.org or by phone at 703-853-0928.

Very Respectfully,
Kurt M. Marisa
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
The Foreign Area Officers Association (FAOA) Charter calls for election of Board of Governors members every three years, in the month of August. Accordingly, the current Board has set the election for the period 15-31 August. Voting will be on-line, at the FAOA website (www.faoa.org).

This is a formal and official call for nominations to the FAOA Board of Governors. Nominations will be open from now until 31 July. This will allow time to format the on-line voting section on the website and give members sufficient time to evaluate the various candidates.

The FAOA Board of Governors consists of nine voting members. Self-nomination by members is permissible and encouraged. Of course, members may also nominate another member, with their concurrence. The five officer positions on the Board: President, Vice-President, Secretary/Webmaster, Treasurer, and Managing Editor are selected by the nine voting Board members. Additionally, per the charter, the FAO Proponent chiefs from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force are offered non-voting “ex-officio” membership on the Board of Governors, based on their position and not subject to election.

There are no formal requirements or qualifications for Board members. Although not required, nominees normally should be, or have been, a military Foreign Area Officer, Regional Affairs Strategist, Political Affairs Specialist, Attaché, Security Cooperation Officer, or other military service occupational designation with a geographic specialty. Ideally, the Board will consist of a mix of active duty, reserve, retired, and/or former FAOs; all should have a strong desire to serve the organization and its membership. Residence in the National Capital Area (NCA) is desirable for the practical needs of managing the many FAOA activities and projects, but not required – several members of the current board reside outside the NCA.

Nominations should include the nominee’s name and a short biographical sketch that will be part of the on-line ballot. The nominee’s biographical sketch should include as a minimum the nominee’s FAO, or equivalent background and status (active duty, reserve component, retired, former FAO, or international affairs professional); region(s) of specialization, and a summary of applicable FAO and/or international affairs assignments and experience. Additional skills that would be helpful to the Board should also be mentioned (eg, editorial experience, financial or legal qualifications).

Nominations should be made by e-mail to the Chairman of the FAOA Election Committee, COL (Ret) John Haseman, at jhaseman@earthlink.net. He is responsible to review and format the nominees’ biographical sketches to approximately the same length and to forward them to the webmaster for posting on the website.

The FAOA Board of Governors is active in many programs and projects, including publication of the FAOA Journal, International Affairs. Prospective Board members should anticipate actively participating as a chairperson or member of several working committees including Events; Awards and Scholarships; Membership; and Sponsorship, Donations, and Advertising. Of note, there is a critical need for a qualified and interested Board member to serve as Managing Editor for International Affairs as the current editor is resigning because of his reassignment to attend the Air War College.

The current Board has reinvigorated the FAOA through a plethora of activities and events, including the immensely successful Annual Black Tie Dinner, the distinguished speaker luncheon series featuring important guest speakers in the foreign affairs and intelligence communities, and the popular “FAOs On Tap” informal gatherings. Accomplishments also include establishing writing award programs at most service and joint war colleges, starting a scholarship program, beginning a coordinated effort to establish a FAO Heritage Display and Hall of Fame in the Pentagon, and dramatically improving the size, content, and format of the FAOA Journal, International Affairs. The members of the next Board should be prepared to support and sustain these programs as well as continue efforts to expand and support other initiatives of importance to the FAO community.

Three members of the current Board have been nominated for re-election. Their biographies are available at the Board of Governors section of the website. The membership owes a vote of gratitude and thanks to Board members who have chosen not to run for re-election because of PCS reassignments, new jobs, and family priorities. This also means that the FAOA Board urges interested members to nominate themselves or other qualified members for the next Board of Governors to serve from October 2012 to October 2015.

Association members with questions or comments concerning the election and Board of Governors tasks and responsibilities are welcome to contact John Haseman by e-mail (jhaseman@earthlink.net).
2012 - The Year of the Election

By: Brent D. Sadler, Commander, US Navy (FAO)

**BLUF:** This is the year of the Dragon, and it looks to be an exciting one with an unusual alignment of elections and leadership transitions. For the first time since the end of the cold War, no Northeast Asian power in a single year is free from a leadership change. Expectations are that domestic politics will heat up and in turn fan passions in neighbors across the region; a region known for surging nationalism and well known armed flashpoints both jeopardizing U.S. interests. For these and domestic reasons, clearly articulating U.S. interests as in recent announcements regarding Air-Sea Battle concept, New Defense Strategic Guidelines and the Pivot East is prudent. However, because such initiatives have dire consequences for the region, they will certainly be contentious domestic issues as the region’s nations go through an unusual number of leadership competitions and transitions.

**Key Points:**

The mid December death of Kim Jong-Il and the rushed succession of his inexperienced, unproven son Kim Jong-Eun has added a palpable tension in N.E. Asia – South Korea put its military on heightened alert at the time. Thankfully, the regime’s sensitivities during succession climaxed with only a failed missile launch and poisonous rhetoric as the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-Sung’s birth on 19 April passed. Yet, the regime remains hard pressed to convince anyone that the much touted and promised “prosperous” state has been delivered; even in the best of circumstances for North Korea this would be quite a feat. Due to the rushed nature of succession so close to a critical national event and failures to date, the regime remains likely to use proven methods of embellishing its strength. Such moves can also demonstrate unquestioned control over the population (provocative weapons tests, cross border attacks, assassination), and such provocations are more likely in the face of weakening regime support by a fragmented elite cadre and increasingly disillusioned populous – consider the tens of thousands of North Korean economic and political refugees hiding across the border in China.

Taiwan’s 14 January elections could be the first, hopefully not the only, positive indication for stability and continuation of the status quo. President Ma’s re-election has been warmly received, and perceived, as a vote for stability and the status quo by the mainland. In the near term, don’t expect much progress in cross strait relations. Following the leadership transition in Beijing things may heat up quickly as Beijing seeks payback for past support of Ma’s candidacy. The consensus among cross straits experts is that Beijing will push for favorable resolution of the remaining thorny political issues. Based on Ma’s campaign rhetoric and domestic political dynamics, it is likely Beijing leaders will be disappointed with what Ma delivers in the coming years.

Russia’s 4 March presidential elections came on the heels of nationwide protests over national legislative election vote rigging in December; protests that sporadically continue to this day. Nonetheless, with no “real” candidate capable of challenging him, Putin was re-elected representing a growing nationalism and authoritarianism. However, the damage caused his legitimacy by recent legislative elections and a reliance on nationalism may constrain his political room for making any grand gestures in relations with Japan over disputed territories in the Kuril Islands. A nationalistic drive to regain influence in Russia’s near-abroad may escalate tensions with the PRC over influence in Central Asia. Expect Russia to frustrate the West as well, and expect backsliding on talks regarding North Korea, Iran and Syria sanctions as nationalism and old animosities become more pronounced. Strategically, Russia could be attempting to offer a third way separate from the U.S. and the PRC – it remains an unattractive offer to most.

Sadly Japan’s government remains mired in a nasty domestic political conundrum. Scandals and weak leadership have prevented a strong government from being formed for any significant length of time the past several years. It was expected that Prime Minister Noda would call for
general elections in March depending on the success of legislation raising the consumption tax to as much as 10%. The possibility of early general elections, not required unless the lower house is dissolved before August 2013. This could be good news for U.S. security and policy makers as there is political consensus in Japan regarding regional security issues, notably how to confront a rising China and anti-piracy efforts. Despite some recent forward movement in negotiations, expect Futenma and base realignment to challenge the premise and stymie efforts to grow the alliance in new robust ways in the near future. Successes in Operation Tomodachi during the Fukushima crisis have not yet translated into tangible advances in base realignment.

Behind the scene PRC leadership transitions are already underway, and if past precedents prove correct, these are to conclude with the Party Congress in October. Expected are significant generational changes in the two most powerful governing bodies; the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Military Committee (CMC). Younger, untested by war/revolution, leaders are expected to take the majority in these consensus driven bodies. Key to watch is to what extent Navy or Air Force leaders move up in the CMC; it is likely for the first time an Air Force or Navy officer will become the vice chairman of the CMC. Though the fallout of the Bo Xilai scandal on these leadership transitions remains unknown. It is likely this scandal and the recent confrontation with the Philippines in Scarborough Shoal may heighten the possibility of more aggressive PLA behavior in the near term. Recent comments by General Ma Xiaotian that represented an approved revision to Deng’s long standing “24 Characters” dictum of “keep a low profile and achieve something,” additionally point towards a more active Chinese security policy.

On the heels of Beijing’s leadership succession will be the culmination of a contentious Presidential election here in the U.S. Confronting the China Challenge and ensuing scrutiny of Air-Sea Battle, defense budgets, and the Pivot East may have unexpected and a negative impact on relations in the region over the near term, especially if rhetoric is not seen as matching actions (this is widely suspected of being the case in the region). The distraction and rhetoric coming out of this election may confound positive dialog and achievements regarding maritime security at this September’s APEC meeting in Vladivostok, Russia and future ASEAN and East Asia Summits which have become the President’s primary vehicles for engaging the region. This would be unfortunate and would represent a missed opportunity to further solidify regional consensus regarding maritime security.

Assuming no hanging chads, the final election of the year is set to occur in Seoul on 19 December. The incumbent GNP party favors a harder line regarding North Korea and a close security alliance with the U.S. Unfortunately the GNP looks to loose coming elections due to scandals, but also for the poor response to the CHEONAN sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. This is hard medicine for a party that had promised security and came into power intending to be tough on North Korea. Also not good for the GNP, this year’s election is set to be decided by the “486” generation (born in the sixties, college

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**Journal Submissions - Writing Guide**

*Your Journal needs your submissions … interesting items of all lengths.*

When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication, please email them as WORD documents, single spaced, single paragraphs in Arial 11.

Insert any graphics, maps and pictures within the text at the appropriate location. Within the same email attach separate copies of each image, and a short “About the author” bio including a personal photo. Photos, maps and graphics add interest to articles and are highly encouraged.

Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed, so include critical references within the text body.

Key data adding understanding, interest and flavor to your article can be added as text boxes.

All submissions are subject to minor editing for format, brevity and grammar as required.

Email submissions to editor@FAOA.org
in the 80’s and in their 40’s). The 486’ers have consistently supported a conciliatory stance regarding North Korea while freezing out the U.S. in favor of closer ties to China. Don’t expect a return to the low witnessed during President Roh’s tenure (2003-2008) in U.S.-ROK relations, but any moves to further isolate or expand sanctions on North Korea seem remote.

Assessment:

In short this year of elections will bring nationalistic sentiments to the fore, driving leaders either seeking to establish legitimacy (North Korea, PRC) or getting elected to stake out confrontational or reactionary positions. From the South China Sea to the Sea of Okhotsk there are readily available maritime disputes in which tensions have and can again violently flare providing fodder to a contentious year of domestic politics. Vigilance is always required, and this year even more high level engagement above last year’s Presidential and Secretarial visits to the region are called for. Regardless, in what is shaping up to be a politically charged regional atmosphere, direct and tempered public pronouncements regarding the aim of Air-Sea Battle and intentions regarding the Pivot East are warranted – of course statements backed up with tangible actions would be most effective.

Hidden within these risks is an opportunity. New leadership represents new voices and new constituencies that can be fostered in a positive way. But this requires persistent and transparent engagement before issues of U.S. concern become charged domestic issues in the region. Doing this requires a viable presence in the region that can remain ready to engage the region in a balanced and transparent manner. This is not an argument for deploying additional Carrier Strike Groups, but rather using forces already in the region in a more visible and cooperative manner; more open multilateral exercises with imbedded media, port visits, joint anti-piracy and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercises (HA/DR). More scrutiny is certain of U.S. activities in the region, so better now to make it visible and start shaping the public perception it is clearly a positive for the region both at home and abroad. As our own presidential election draws nearer, attempting such a strategy will become less likely to succeed.

An Agenda for 2012:

So what exactly does all this mean for the operators of naval policy and those at the working end of our naval arsenal? With an eye towards sparking conversation and eliciting ideas, I list several actions Navy may consider. The following list is in no way exhaustive and there certainly could be better ideas than those listed:

Basing Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) overseas in Singapore is a terrific idea but will only marginally address potential presence gaps in the Western Pacific. It is a great idea because LCS overseas basing signals (assuming political and budgetary challenges are overcome) a commitment to the region when many allies are unsure of U.S. staying power in the Asia-Pacific. The message to the Chinese is clear; more aggressive behavior has elicited calls by regional powers (Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam) to invite a more permanent U.S. presence. While the LCS itself may not counter a growing PLAN capability, these ships are representative of a much larger force that would respond should U.S. presence be challenged. LCS moves to Singapore represent a limited improvement of U.S. offensive capabilities in the area, and so signals U.S. intention to defend the status quo and seek a peaceful resolution to South China Sea disputes. For similar reasons these ships should be aggressively based overseas and sold to partner nations with an eye to improving interoperability with those navies. In an election year defense budgets will loom large, and there will be detractors to such a basing plan. However, overseas sales of LCS variants and the smaller Patrol Craft (PC) could blunt some domestic deficit concerns with the promise of jobs at home. Yet, economic arguments alone are not going to carry the day, and a public case must be made regarding the cost effectiveness and operational flexibility overseas basing LCS

The views expressed throughout the journal do not necessarily reflect official policy nor do they imply a position for the DoD or any other US Government agency.
provides – such an argument need not jeopardize Navy’s other budget goals. In much the same way, recent announcement of basing marines in Darwin, Australia is more a signal of commitment and less a bolstering of capability to counter aggressive acts in the South China Sea. Without naval lift readily available or an associated air wing to employ these marines so far from the flashpoints in the South China Sea (Darwin to Spratly Islands approximately 1700 miles), the act remains largely a political one. Nonetheless, having marines in Australia is good in bolstering the Australian alliance and provides a jumping off point for expanding maritime force interoperability across a range of contingencies in the region – HA/DR. Should our political leadership seek to respond militarily to contests over possession of islets in the South China Sea, then there is good reason to expand the marines’ presence in the region – and basing in the Philippines seems like a good idea the longer base re-alignment bogs down in Japan. However, to date national leadership has been less clear on its intentions of using marines in the South China Sea. Clearly articulating the role of the Marines in the South China Sea would alleviate some Chinese concerns regarding the unintended consequences such U.S. moves could have in emboldening Vietnamese adventurism.

Expand naval exercises with the Vietnamese in the hope of bolstering their interoperability with U.S. forces. The goal is really to improve information sharing and maritime domain awareness. To mitigate fears in Beijing that this could encourage the Vietnamese to challenge the Chinese militarily similar exercises should be extended to Malaysia as well as the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Such exercises should be executed in a way that clearly communicates U.S. devotion to free and unfettered access to international waters. Nonetheless, it remains unlikely that the PLAN would participate in any such exercise. Exercises should be conducted in international waters along vital South China Sea shipping lanes, practicing maritime interdiction skills that would be useful in anti-piracy or countering illicit trade. Importantly, such exercises would improve interoperability and the ability of the Vietnamese maritime forces in patrolling their waters, while not appearing to answer Vietnamese desires for a partner in arms against the Chinese. Again, similar exercises should be offered to the PLAN and could help further establish a de facto code of conduct on the waters of the South China Sea. In the end, professional maritime forces operating under a practiced code of conduct will lessen chances for conflict while assisting all parties to the dispute towards equitable arbitration.

In the meantime, until the Philippines can credibly patrol its waters China will continue to encroach. The U.S. Navy (USN) should seek to sustain its presence in and near the Philippine littorals through a mutually agreed formula that allows some expansion of the U.S. footprint there – one option would be hosting U.S. forces on existing Philippine bases such as Cavite. This presence should be augmented with favorable sales of similarly built U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and USN Typhoon patrol craft. Such sales can help expand the Philippines’ contribution to maritime awareness and gradually reduce the need for a persistent USN presence there while not being a direct threat to Chinese naval forces in the region. In order for the Philippines to be a responsible regional maritime player, its needs help to build the capacity required of it to police its waters and contribute to countering illicit trade and terrorist activities.

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**Voice Your Views**

The Journal strives to publish a variety of opinions, views, observations and analysis from tactical to strategic. We encourage you to express your voice by submitting articles, book reviews and Op-Ed pieces. Letters to the editor with both opposing and supporting the views of those expressed in published articles are encouraged. Submit your writings by either going to your association’s website at www.FAOA.org website, or via email.

e-mail@faoa.org
Lastly, with the Russian Pacific submarine force showing tentative signs of re-emerging, the persistent threat from North Korean midget submarines, and an advancing Chinese submarine force argues for a greatly expanded coordinated anti-submarine network amongst allies Japan and the Republic of Korea. Much as Japan expanded its maritime patrol capabilities to help confront the Soviet Pacific threat of the late 70’s and 80’s, today’s multi-facet submarine threat argues for an even more robust alliance framework in Northeast Asia. The hub and spoke approach to Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) in the region should be updated. Priority should be given to expanding tri-lateral anti-submarine coordination, involving the planning of and greater sharing of information from the Yellow Sea through the Sea of Japan to the North Pacific. In Korea, such defensive and maritime domain awareness efforts could find public support in the face of continued threats from North Korean naval forces and frequent, provocative Chinese fishing ship intrusions into South Korean waters. While the navies of Japan and South Korea have been gradually moving to closer coordination, truly realizing a tri-lateral ASW effort in the region will require overcoming historical animosities and U.S. concerns for sharing sensitive information. Only by improving the operational efficiency of U.S. and allied ASW assets in region can the rising submarine threat and growing need for sea domain awareness be met. A similar argument can be made for a region-wide BMD system that ties allies together in a distributed network of sensors and weapons – reducing the cost to any one nation while improving sensing capabilities and the probability of success in the engagement. Making such arguments now and to our allies in the region will set the context of the inevitable debate that will rage during their own national elections.

Conclusion:

This year of elections and leadership succession will likely give rise to rhetoric which antagonizes tensions in the Asia-Pacific and could magnify otherwise minor incidents. At one extreme is the risk of armed clashes, but a more likely outcome is backsliding on efforts to pressure the North Korean regime and Iran on their nuclear programs or stalling on free trade agreements. In a region for which U.S. policy is seen as being maritime, the Navy has a prominent position in keeping the tenor of regional military relations on balance. To this end, being aware and sensitive to the dynamics of the region’s domestic politics is important but not a panacea. Chinese A2/AD threats are a real danger to the U.S. and our regional partners requiring the sustained development of capabilities and alliances able to defeat such threats.

As a Pacific power, the U.S. has rightful claim to being involved in disputes that affect stability and freedom of navigation in the region. At the same time, only through consistent engagement and pressure can Chinese claims be brought in line with the international consensus of UNCLOS and customary law. A cooperative approach in the South China Sea could undercut more aggressive and confrontational voices buoyed by nationalistic fervor in Beijing from reaching higher leadership in the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Military Commission. This year’s remarkable turnover in regional leadership is an opportunity to shape the coming years’ security dynamic and should be seized. Making clear U.S. interests in the region both in pronouncements and the deployment of naval forces during 2012 will have larger than ordinary influence on building a community of like minded maritime nations in which mutual benefit can be gained.

About the Authors ...

CDR Brent Sadler recently reported to the Pacific Command working with various strategic focus groups. Prior to this, he was part of CNO’s Strategic Action Group advising on the Asia Pacific issues. His writing has been recognized by the Navy League of the U.S. for research on maritime strategy (“Naval Statecraft”) and National Defense University’s Presidential award (“A.I. Goes to War!”). Prior to becoming a FAO, he spent 18 years as submarine officer during which time he also was an Olmsted Scholar to Japan. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the U.S.-Japan Leader Program.
Greetings from Monterey!

The Monterey Peninsula, located on California’s central coast, continues to serve as a hub for many Department of Defense joint FAO education and training activities. Each year, scores of new FAOs from all four Services come to Monterey to study at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language School (DLIFLC). While at Monterey, FAO students can take advantage of the many extracurricular activities offered in town, such as the World Affairs Council of Monterey Bay or The Panetta Institute for Public Policy, which organize a series of lectures and discussions that focus on a broad range of political, economic, and military issues.

FAO students also have opportunities to interact with the many distinguished visitors who visit NPS and DLIFLC on a regular basis. In the last several months, FAO students have participated in informal sessions with former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan LTG (Retired) Karl W. Eikenberry, Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond T. Odierno, Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command VADM Robert S. Harward, and the Director of the Intelligence Headquarters for U.S. European Command RDML Norman R. Hayes. Many of these activities were organized by LTC Jason Weece, an NPS student and President of the FAO Association of Monterey.

So that all FAOs in Monterey can benefit from the many activities that are underway at both NPS and DLIFLC, the senior FAOs on the Peninsula have established an informal working group for the purpose of sharing information and seeking to create additional synergy between NPS and DLIFLC.

The group consists of:

- COL Danial Pick, USA (Middle East FAO), Commandant, DLIFLC
- COL Robert Paddock, USA (Middle East FAO), Director, FAO Program Office, DLIFLC
- COL Gary Espinas, USA (Eurasia FAO), U.S. Army FAO Chair, NPS
- CDR Bernie Wang, USN (Asia FAO), Military Associate Dean, School of International Graduate Studies, NPS
- LTC Jason Weece, USA (Middle East FAO), President, FAO Association of Monterey, NPS
- Professor Tristan Mabry, Executive Director, Joint FAO Program, NPS
- Lt Col (Retired) Robert Lucius, USMC (Southeast Asia FAO), FAO Course Operations Manager, NPS
- LTC (Retired) James Howard, USA (Middle East FAO), Director, FAO Web, NPS

Among our many upcoming activities, a couple of highlights are a planned visit to NPS by GEN Manfred Lange (Germany), Chief of Staff for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the inaugural Joint FAO Course Phase One, to be conducted at DLIFLC, from 11 thru 15 June.

We have a vibrant and energetic FAO community in Monterey and we take very seriously our commitment to providing the highest quality training and education for our new FAOs. We look forward to keeping you informed about our activities!
In January 2012, the President and Secretary of Defense announced that the United States will “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” as part of a new defense strategy. This comes as more than a decade’s worth of combat operations in the Middle East slowly winds down. Furthermore, while the US has expended vast resources since 9/11 and now faces significant financial challenges, China’s power has been rising. This changing situation leads to many important questions. Can China actually surpass the US in terms of relative power? What would China do if it did? What are the potential points of friction with China? Finally (and probably most important), will China function as a “status quo” power, or a “revisionist” power? Some pundits warn that China is secretly plotting to destroy the US, while others argue China is not dangerous and that the US should soften its position towards China to prevent an unnecessary arms race. Neither of these two extremes is correct. The former smacks of neo-McCarthyism that sees evil intent behind every Chinese action, while the latter is naive, expecting benevolence when there are no grounds for such belief. Instead, those wondering how China will behave in the future should embrace the fact that states inherently look after their own self interests above all else (à la the Realist theory of international relations (IR)) and consequently, China will follow suit. That means we can expect harmony between the US and China when interests align and conflict when they do not. Realism also helps bring clarity to Chinese behavior that sometimes falls in line with current international norms, while other times moves contrary to them. Before discussing IR theory though, it is important first address some of the questions posed above.

CHINA: THE NEXT WORLD POWER?

China has certainly seen stunning growth for the past three decades. So impressive is its development that two strategic alarms have been sounded – one relating to China’s hard-power (military might) and the other to its soft-power (ability to influence). The alarm over hard-power warns that China will one day overtake the US as the world’s largest economy. When it does, China will have more resources to devote towards defense objectives, thus making it an even more powerful rival to the US that may even be able to surpass the US in terms of military might. If China did become the world’s premier superpower, this event would constitute a monumental shift in the world balance of power. The second alarm warns that if China can demonstrate it is a better role model for third world economies to emulate than Western democracy (due to recent economic performance), then Western countries will have a harder time pursuing their foreign policy goals as their ideas are seen in a less positive light. This would possibly mark the beginning of the end for liberal democracy’s primacy in world affairs, especially if struggling infant democracies switched to a more centrally managed form of government. Furthermore, assuming Democratic Peace Theory is correct, then the chances for state-on-state conflict would also rise. Fortunately for those who are concerned about China’s power, it is not a foregone conclusion that China’s increasing soft-power or hard-power will create unmanageable security risks.

Democratic Peace Theory arises from the observation that democracies do not fight one another and hence the more democracies there are, the less likely conflict will be.

China’s economic and military growth has been truly stunning, but a dose of reality is needed in addition to healthy concern. China may not actually pass the US in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It will if the trend lines continue, but China also has some negative trends working against it that may alter that outcome. Domestic inflationary pressure has been mounting for years. Rising food prices may increase internal stability problems which are already a significant concern for the Communist Party. Addition-
ally, wage increases, combined with the decreased demand for Chinese exports due to global economic downturn, will certainly cut into profit margins and growth of China’s overall economy. Like the saying goes, past performance does not guarantee future returns. China’s population is also aging significantly, which will impact its economic output in the long run. A recent RAND study (Dusk, Dawn, and High Noon: Demographic Tends Forecast Next Phases, for China, India, and the United States) argues that if China does not pass the US economically by 2050, its demographic changes may prevent that from occurring at all.

Even if China’s GDP did surpass the US by 2050, it is not clear if, when, or where China would challenge the US militarily. The US is projected to be able to maintain significant conventional deterrence capabilities for many years (even with the current fiscal austerity) which would make the use of military force a dangerous course of action for China. Furthermore, geopolitical changes may alter certain classic areas of tension. Consider Taiwan as one example. Although the military buildup across from Taiwan continues, the cross-strait dynamic has also changed as trade and other exchanges have increased since the Kuomintang came back to power in Taiwan in 2008. If the relationship continues in a positive direction, then China may not want to take the island by force, even if it could, because the cost-benefit analysis continues to change over time. Furthermore, reaching beyond the realm of the known to predict definitive distant futures is dangerous. It can lead to an overreaction in the near-term and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nevertheless, the US military should track China’s military developments and have a plan to deter China from using those capabilities in an aggressive manner. In the event deterrence fails and US interests are at stake, then the US must also be prepared to defeat those capabilities.

In addition to improving its military capabilities, China is also increasing its soft-power. This will certainly improve China’s global influence, but the greater concern is that Chinese authoritarian capitalism might provide a viable alternative to democracy for developing states. A legitimate alternative to democracy could precipitate a rollback of the democratization process that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. This is only significant concern though if the sole path to long-term US national security is the continued spread of democracy, which is not the case. History demonstrates that democracy promotion is not a panacea and it may not even secure US national security interests since democratic processes sometimes yield unpredictable results. For example, democratic elections brought Hitler to power in 1933 and Hamas to power in the Gaza strip, neither of which aligned well with US security concerns. Democratization processes have also failed to produce stability in Iraq leaving its long-term alignment with US interests in question. Furthermore, the US has several staunch allies that are not democratic, and some that only became democratic over the long term (i.e. South Korea). In summary, although promoting liberal democracy remains a solid long-term strategy, a slowing or reversal of the democratization movement does not necessarily equate to an immediate national security risk, assuming we can continue building partnership based on mutual interests.

THE BIG RISK

China’s growing power warrants vigilance but, the biggest concern is whether or not China will be a status quo or revisionist power. The current international system is one where nation-states have primacy over multinational, commercial and non-governmental entities; where bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiations are the primary means for dealing with crises and differences in policies; where global trade is seen as beneficial to economic growth and society as a whole; and where international institutions and treaties define the norms of behavior and taboos that states generally follow. An attempt by China to significantly alter this system rather than seeking to sustain it would have global implications.

In Deferring Democracy, Catharin Dalpino argues there are times that the best thing for democracy in the long run is to defer democracy in the short run.
The importance of the international system is often underappreciated, but it provides important stability, as well as predictability on state action. Given those benefits, would China seek to significantly alter that system if it reaches a position of regional hegemony? Would it launch wars of conquest violating the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors to resurrect some sort of ancient Middle Kingdom? Would it begin breaking with the accepted international norms of behavior and embrace the taboos? Even if China did become the lone superpower in place of the US, it is not clear if it would follow such a radically different course of action, and there are several indications that it would not. China’s behavior thus far does not reflect that of a revisionist state. It is not like Nazi Germany on a great conquest for Lebensraum, it is not the USSR exporting international communism, and it is not even modern day Iran or North Korea which are pariah states bucking the international system. China also enjoys a special position within the current system. As a sovereign state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it sits at the pinnacle of that system. It is an influential member of many of the world’s key international institutions, wields considerable influence in affairs around the globe, and is integral to negotiations on global issues, like the Six Party Talks on North Korea. Any effort by China to radically alter that system would put its current status, and all the benefits that entails, at considerable risk. Indeed, since Deng Xiaoping, China has far taken a more pragmatic approach than the Soviets of yesteryear or Iranians of today. Furthermore, China partners with foreign governments based on mutual self-interest rather than on ideological grounds. Naturally, this current pragmatic path could change as China’s power grows, but there are few indicators to that affect at this time.

China’s relatively restrained behavior and acceptance of today’s international system leads to two hypotheses on what it will do with additional power and how other states ought to respond. The first one suggests that since China’s rise has taken place by leveraging the benefits of the existing international system, it also has strong incentive to ensure that system continues. From this perspective there is little to be greatly concerned about when discussing China and matters of security. A less rosy alternative is that China will take a Machiavellian approach: it will follow the norms of internationally accepted behavior as long as they meet its needs, but will violate those norms when it is in China’s best interests, and when it has enough power to get away with those violations. The first hypothesis fits within the scope of the IR theory of neoliberal institutionalism, while the latter is shaped by the realist theory of IR.

BACK TO REALITY

I will not debate the merits of the various IR theories here, due to space and because several other authors have covered that many times over. However, I will say that as a grand theory for explaining IR, I find realism the most compelling due to its parsimony and broad application. That said, contributions from other systems of thought are worth understanding especially for explaining situations that seem to run contrary to realist thinking. With that bias in mind, here are...
the facts that are basic to a realist discussion on China and what can therefore be expected from China. China is a growing power – both militarily and economically. It is strong externally and able to fend off external invasion (who wants another land war in Asia?). But it is weak internally, with domestic troubles including economic fragility, ethnic strife, and lingering border issues. China has also demonstrated an ability to have influence around the globe, but still lacks the ability to project significant hard-power. China is pragmatic and will deal with almost anyone. Finally, its foreign policy is not constrained by things like human rights concerns as Western democracies often are.

Realism would therefore expect China to simply seek its own self interests, namely security. And indeed, its foreign policy has reflected realpolitik instead of being principle based. As a growing power with internal weakness, China can be expected to bristle when other states try to influence its domestic issues. It can also be expected that it will be protective of the power it has gained and will attempt to consolidate that power in the long run. In the Asia-Pacific region, it will seek to gain friends and allies to counterbalance the influence of the US. Globally, China perceives that inequities arose from the monocentric system since the end of the Cold War, and hence will work to return to a multi-polar system where it can have more influence. In many cases it will do this by leveraging its current position in key international institutions (UN, IMF, WTO, etc.). China will behave as a responsible world power when beneficial, but when necessary, it will take advantage of, and manipulate, the international system to achieve its foreign policy ends. Nevertheless, it will not seek to overthrow that system.

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONCERNS:

Beyond accepting the pragmatic realist prescription of how China may behave in general, it is also beneficial to understand specific issues that may evoke strong responses. Outside the traditional regional flashpoints (Taiwan, North Korea, South China Sea), three areas stand out as potential sources of confrontation with Western powers. First are issues over sovereignty. Although China generally works within the international system, it has consistently resisted international trends that infringe upon its perception of national sovereignty. These include regional self-determination (i.e. Kosovo and Montenegro), humanitarian intervention, and the recent external support by some Western and Middle East countries for opposition groups during the Arab Awakening. Chinese leadership views these actions as threatening to the concept of national sovereignty and are strongly resistant to any international effort that may set further precedent in that direction. Some of this position is certainly attributable to a lack of confidence in its own internal stability.

The second area of potential conflict is over economics and resources. Several aspects of China’s economic development are of concern to Western powers. As a growing power, China needs resource markets to feed its expanding economy which has led to a quest for natural resources. And similar to the years just prior to WWI, this has led to a growing international economic battle for access to resources (energy and rare-earth metals are currently two important examples). China has slowly developed a neo-mercantilist policy by building a network of raw material suppliers (many times to the exclusion of others nations), controlling its currency to promote a positive balance of trade, and acquiring vast foreign reserves. Furthermore, in some cases China has also exported massive numbers of weapons in exchange for access to resources. These weapons have actually fueled conflict in parts of the third world. Access to resources, fair trade policies, and weapons proliferation could form a nexus of tension between China and the West as unresolved economic issues can be linked to other issues creating a storm of colliding events. When linked to broader issues, these economic problems may even serve as a catalyst for more drastic responses than would be expected if handled separately.

When looking at economic issues, it is also important to take into consideration China’s domestic conditions. Since the legitimacy of the
Chinese Communist Party is largely tied to its long-term economic performance, it is not likely to passively accept any action by Western powers that would directly jeopardize that position. Furthermore, even if the West was careful in handling these matters, China may use the international economics for its own domestic objectives if it needs to create a crisis to divert public attention away from internal challenges.

The final area for potential conflict is the changing strategic positions in the region. The US is building its power base by building closer partnerships with other regional states at the same time that China’s power is growing. The significance of this changing strategic dynamic cannot be overstated. For the second half of the twentieth century the strategic situation between the US and China was relatively static. The US had a huge lead in terms of military might and although the US had close partnership with many of China’s neighbors, there were also some that were unfriendly toward the US, which gave China space to maneuver. Today, regional cooperation is changing in favor of America. Long-standing animosity toward the US by some of China’s neighbors is fading. For example, US-Vietnamese relations have improved considerably since the end of the Cold War and even a traditional Chinese ally, Burma, is turning towards the US as evidenced by Secretary Clinton’s recent visit there. As a result of these US moves, China feels increasingly surrounded today. At the same time though, China is closing the military gap, particularly on the technology front. This dynamic is likely to color most negotiations and developments in the region. Furthermore, as long as the relative strategic positions of the two powers remain in flux, the potential for strategic miscalculations will also rise.

THE NEXT STEP FOR IR GURUS, CHINA FOLLOWERS, AND ETC.

So what is next? What should we being studying in light of the growing importance of Asia and the Pacific. We should start by taking all the books on counter-insurgency, terrorism, jihadism, Islamism, and that Arabic dictionary (which you never fully got around to reading anyway), and put them back on the shelf. We’ll certainly need those again, now it is time to dust off some old school books on IR theory. It is time to start looking at concepts of deterrence (preventing action), compellance (compelling action), balance of power, balance of threat, game theory, and the various subsets of realism. Just as we all learned about the differences between Shias, Sunnis, Wahhabists, Salafists, and Alawites, it is now time to start looking at the differences between balance of power and balance of threat, and between pursuit of power (à la Hans Morgenthau) and pursuit of security (à la Kenneth Waltz). We must also look at how the Cold War ended and the importance of soft power in bringing about democracy in Eastern Europe and the lessons that holds for our foreign policy and public diplomacy in Asia. Next, it is time to start studying Asia and its complex mosaic of ancient cultures. We also must not let our emotions or fears of a Chinese conspiracy cloud our judgment. If China is as self-serving and pragmatic as it seems (realism expects this from all states), then it will be far more rational than terrorists who blow themselves up in the name of Allah. Finally, we must approach this study with the utmost seriousness because there is even more at stake. The loss of life can reach the millions when two great powers find themselves locked in armed conflict.

About the Author …

Lt Col Donald Brunk is the Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commander of Air Combat Command. He is a career intelligence officer currently serving as an Air Force Political Affairs Specialist (PAS). Lt Col Brunk holds Bachelor’s Degrees from the USAF Academy in Military History and Humanities. He has a Master’s in International Relations from Wright State University and a Master’s in National Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School.
The Road to Becoming an Air Force China FAO
By: Mr. Ken Allen, Civilian, USAF

The Air Force, like the Army, has an extensive requirement for qualified officers to fill China pol-mil, intelligence analyst, and attaché positions. Unlike the U.S. Army, which has had a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program for decades, until recently the U.S. Air Force (USAF) did not have a formalized FAO program to deliberately develop officers to fill these positions. However, the USAF’s International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program is now building a cadre of China regional experts with the foundational skills needed to fill key positions that include the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), Air Attaché (AIRA), or Assistant Air Attaché (A/AIRA) billets in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as China country desk officers in the Air Staff, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Headquarters, US Pacific Command, and Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces. Specifically, under DODD 1315.17, “Military Department FAO Programs,” the Services are tasked to “Develop, resource, and sustain FAO programs designed to develop, retain, motivate, and promote a cadre of officers to meet present and future Defense needs, including service in combined headquarters or standing Joint Task Forces.”

The purpose of this article is to provide a personal perspective on how USAF officers who are considering serving or have been selected to serve as an IAS or as a military attaché in the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Beijing, China, can prepare themselves for the assignment. It also discusses post-IAS/attaché assignments and post-military China-related careers. Although this is my personal perspective, I coordinated the article with over 25 China specialists from all the services, including attachés and FAOs, and have incorporated their suggestions.

IAS Program

The April 2012 issue of this journal had an excellent article by Kathleen Tilbrook from SAF/IAPA on the USAF’s new IAS Program, which is divided into Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS) and Pol-Mil Affairs Strategists (PAS). While there are several differences between the two programs, one of the biggest differences is that the RAS program is regionally focused and requires language skills and the PAS program is broadly pol-mil focused and does not require language skills. Furthermore, RAS officers are dual-tracked and alternate assignments between RAS and their core Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), while officers in the PAS program generally serve one career-broadening PAS tour and then return to their core AFSC.

As one former DATT pointed out during correspondence, “I believe operational credibility goes a long way into being a successful attaché. Not everyone needs to be an operator, but the way the IAS is structured to emphasize the importance of having a core AFSC is important.” Yet another respondent noted that, in order to deal not only with the Chinese but the entire military attaché corps, every attaché needs to understand how the U.S. military is organized, operates, and trains and to understand the key aspects of the United States’ China policy. As such, the IAS program helps prepare them for this.

History of USAF Attachés in Beijing

This section provides information about USAF officers who have served or are currently serving in the position of DATT, AIRA, or A/AIRA in DAO Beijing since the office opened in August 1979. Of note, only one officer has served as a deliberately developed RAS, but several officers served as de facto China FAOs for several years. The three names in Table 1 followed by a * served concurrently as the Defense Attaché and Air Attaché.

DAO Beijing Background

When DAO Beijing opened in August 1979, Colonel Bill Gilliland (USA) and Colonel William Webb (USAF) transferred from their positions in the Defense Liaison Office (DLO) in Hong Kong to DAO Beijing. Colonel Gilliland became the first of 16 DATTs, and concurrently served as the Army Attaché (ARMA). Colonel Webb became the AIRA. One year later, Colonel Gilliland departed and Colonel Webb became the first of 15 O-7s DATTs. Of note, only a few DAOs in the world have an O-7 DATT.

From 1979 to 1994, with only a couple of exceptions, the DATT position rotated among the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with the DATT serving concurrently as the service attaché. Since DAO Beijing opened in 1979, the number of attachés increased from three to the current eleven. In 1994, the DATT ceased to serve concurrently as the service attaché. From 1979
to 1994, the standard tour of duty was two years, but some attachés extended early for a third year. Starting in 1994, however, DATTs continued to serve for only two years, while the tour for all other attachés was extended to three years.

**USAF Defense Attachés**

As shown in Table 1, DAO Beijing has had five USAF DATTs, each with a different background. Table 2 shows where they received their commission, what graduate degree(s) they received, their specialty, and some comments about their career.

Unlike the Army, where all six DATTs were FAOs, only one USAF DATT had studied any Chinese and could be considered a long-time China FAO before being selected as the DATT. General Stilwell began his career as an enlisted Korean linguist and then attended the U.S. Air Force Academy (USafa). After graduating with a degree in Asian History, he attended the University of Hawaii, earning a Master’s degree in Asian Studies and Chinese language in 1986. General Webb, who had already served as an A/AIRA in Ethiopia, received his language training in Taiwan after being selected as the AIRLO to Hong Kong. General Garrison is the only non-pilot to serve as the DATT. So far, while some of the Army DATTs have attained two and three stars, General Jodice is the only USAF DATT to be promoted beyond brigadier general. He came to SAF/IA as the 2-star Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs following his tour as DATT, which is a great follow-on from an Air Force international affairs perspective. As a lieutenant general, he is currently Commander, Allied Air Component Command Headquarters and Commander, 16th Air Expeditionary Task Force, USAFE, Izmir, Turkey.

The AIRAs and A/AIRAs have come from a varied educational background, including USAFA and the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC).
as well as enlisted personnel who already had their degree from a civilian university and then attended Officer Training School (OTS). For example, I served as an enlisted Chinese and Russian linguist, while Danny Lever served as an enlisted security police-man and his wife was from Taiwan, so his spoken Chinese was outstanding.

**AIRAs**

As shown in Table 1, a total of 13 officers have been the AIRA in DAO Beijing, including three officers who served concurrently as the DATT/AIRA.

Whereas all ARMAs have been FAOs, only four USAF AIRAs (Webb, Mitchell, Bean, and Lanzit) could be considered China FAOs prior to being selected based on their previous language training and assignments. One other AIRA (Wolf) served as a Russian FAO and A/AIRA in Moscow before his assignment in Beijing, and has since become a well-known China FAO in the private sector. The remaining seven AIRAs served as pilots (fighter, bomber, or transport) or intelligence officers throughout their career. With only one exception, all of the AIRAs have been colonels.

Upon completing their tours, some AIRAs moved on to assignments dealing with Asia and attaché-related issues. For example, two moved back to SAF/IA to run the USAF Attaché and IAS Program, while two others became AIRAs in Australia and Burma. In addition, several retired attachés were brought back into the system to serve as de facto attachés at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) until the mid 2000s, when active duty officers began filling those billets.

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**A/AIRAs**

To date, 20 officers have served as A/AIRAs with the rank of captain to lieutenant colonel. Although the first two A/AIRAs served alone, a second billet was added in 1988 as a result of the increased military relationship and the beginning of the F-8II Peace Pearl Foreign Military Sales (FMS) project. Even though the Peace Pearl Project was cancelled following the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen military crackdown, the number of billets has remained at two.

Their backgrounds cover a wide spectrum of specialties and assignments. Of the 20 A/AIRAs, about half could be considered China FAOs before they were selected based on their Chinese language capability even though they did not necessarily serve in billets that dealt directly with China. The remaining officers served in various specialties, including as pilots and intelligence officers. Of the 20 A/AIRAs, only two became the AIRA: Kevin Lanzit, who was a USAFA graduate and F-15 pilot, returned to Beijing nine years later as the AIRA, and John Robinson elevated from A/AIRA to AIRA when an inbound colonel was reassigned. Meanwhile, Cole Shepherd served in consecutive assignments as an Assistant Attaché in Hong Kong, Beijing, and then Taiwan.

Several of the A/AIRAs returned to a billet where they continued to focus on China until they retired. For example, Mark Stokes served as team chief and senior country director for the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In addition, Ray Truong became the A/AIRA in DAO Tokyo and is destined to become an AIRA somewhere at some point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATT</th>
<th>Commissioning Program</th>
<th>Graduate Degree</th>
<th>Specialty</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garrison</td>
<td>AFROTC</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Served as ACC Director of Intel after leaving Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jodice</td>
<td>AFROTC</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>F-111, F-15E pilot with 3,500 hours</td>
<td>Received his second and third star.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stilwell</td>
<td>USAFA</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>F-4, F-16 pilot with 3,000+ hours</td>
<td>Unofficial China FAO since USAFA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: DATT Background — Air Attachés and Assistant Air Attachés
Reserve China FAOs and A/AIRAs

According to Colonel (Select) Barry Savage, who is an Assistant Professor of Chinese at USAFA, “In contrast to the AIRAs and A/AIRAs who have served in Beijing over the years, virtually all reserve A/AIRAs were former USAF intelligence officers and China FAOs who could read and speak Mandarin quite fluently, and provided the DAO offices in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taipei with significant language and cultural insight and experience.” For example, he noted that he has traveled to China over 70 times and has worked with the embassy in Beijing closely each year since 1987. He also identified Colonel Bill Heaton and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Grimley as two extremely talented reserve attachés who served in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taipei from roughly 1992-2005.

Finally, reserve attaché Lieutenant Colonel Rusty Shughart, who has been a China specialist for over three decades and one of my mentors, has written several valuable studies on China and has also been actively involved in developing the language program.

What Does It Take To Become a China RAS and/or Attaché?

In this section, I discuss only RAS, because PAS officers do not have the language background and serve only one tour with a focus on pol-mil issues. This is not to say, however, that they could not learn the language once they were selected as an attaché. But in the meantime, they are limited to learning about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) by reading only what someone else has translated from original Chinese sources. I would like to add, however, that I have known three Air Force officers who left active duty as junior officers and are currently serving in the reserves. Each one of them has become an outstanding China military analyst, even though they do not read or speak Chinese.

In my opinion, there are three criteria for becoming a good China RAS and/or attaché. First is a working knowledge of the Chinese language—specifically military terminology for the PLA and PLAAF. One of the primary reasons for this is that, if you do not speak or read Chinese well, then Chinese you meet will try to explain the PLA using U.S. military terminology and concepts. For example, instead of using PLAAF terms such as air divisions, brigades, and regiments, they will translate them as wings, groups, and squadrons so the USAF officer will feel comfortable. The problem is that the PLAAF does not organize, train, or operate its air units the same way the USAF does. In terms of Chinese language capability, the most important aspects for the long term and daily use is reading, followed by listening so you can understand what someone is actually saying, then speaking and writing (typing). In many cases, it is best to use a combination of Chinese and English. When in doubt, ask them to write down the key terms, but you have to know how to read them later.

Second is understanding how the PLA and PLAAF are organized. Specifically, all PLA officers and organizations, including naval vessels, are organized based on a 15-grade structure. Whereas the USAF officer corps has 10 grades and 10 equivalent ranks, the PLA has 15 grades and 10 ranks, such that each grade has two ranks and some ranks, such as major general, can be assigned to up to four grades. Furthermore, the 15-grade structure defines the PLA’s command and control (vertical) and coordination (horizontal) structure at every level. As a result, if you do not understand this basic grade system and are not able to discuss it in Chinese, then they will discuss everything in terms of equivalent U.S. ranks, which will most likely lead to a lack of understanding of their system. Furthermore, RAS officers and attachés need to have a basic understanding in Chinese of not just the PLAAF, but all three of the PLA’s services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and Second Artillery, which is an independent branch.

Third is understanding the ten pillars of the PLAAF, which is an expanded version of the U.S. military’s DOTMLPF and includes organizational structure, leadership, doctrine, officer corps, enlisted force,

Quotable Quote …

“Things turnout best for the people who make the best out of the way things turn out.”
- A recent fortune cookie
cadet education and training, unit training, logistics and maintenance, quality of life, and foreign relations. Normally, the USAF tends to focus on weapons and equipment, order of battle, and training, but knowing how the other pillars fit together helps with an overall understanding of the PLA and PLAAF. It also provides for a good foundation when interacting with the PLAAF during military exchanges.

**Studying Chinese as a Means not an End**

Historically, USAF China FAOs have learned Chinese in one of four basic ways. First, they are a native speaker, but they must still learn military terminology and concepts. Second, they have studied Chinese at USAFA, where there are now more than 100 students in the four-year Chinese language program; however, they must keep up with the language once they graduate or it will disappear. Third, they attend the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey for about one year, where they learn not only conversational Chinese but also military terminology and concepts. Some of these students then attend the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, where they receive a master’s degree from the Department of National Security Affairs. According to correspondence with Alice Miller, who is one of the best China analysts around, the China IAS take all four of her China-related courses, which help them prepare for their future assignments. Fourth, once an officer who does not have any Chinese language background is selected as an attaché, they receive from about six to twelve months of Chinese language training in Washington DC in a one-on-one relationship with a native speaker; however, in my opinion, there is little focus on military terminology or concepts and their speaking and reading ability is still not high.

Although RAS and attaché designate immerse themselves in studying the language, they must keep in mind that the language is only a tool to do their job. As a result, they must balance this out by spending an equal amount of time understanding what is going on in China, including domestic and international politics, international relations, economics and trade, and military and national security issues. The value of studying in Washington versus Monterey is that it is possible to attend frequent conferences and other venues to listen to and meet experts in each of these areas.

One USAF reserve China specialist wrote, “You place a lot of emphasis on language skills. I agree that’s very important, but your article suggests that people lacking solid language skills are relegated to having nothing but the most simplistic conversations with the PLA. I think that may be true if someone knows nothing about the PLA, but I don’t think it’s true for others who have been observing the PLA for years and can ask questions through an interpreter.”

Yet another long-time USAF reserve China specialist wrote, “With regard to language capability to be a FAO, I think it is important for the reasons you stated. I have trouble imagining how you could do that job without the language capability.”

**Source Material**

In order to begin understanding China’s military, USAF China RAS/PAS should begin by reading as much open source material as they can on this subject. The foundation books on the PLA Ground Forces, Navy, and Air Force are as follows: (Note: The NASIC and ONI publications are available in PDF online.)

- *China’s Navy 2007 and A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics* (2009) by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The FAOA Foreign Policy Luncheon Program offers International Affairs professionals with the opportunity to hear key national-level leaders and strategic thinkers as they provide their views about developments impacting the Services, DoD and US national security. They are intended to drive the collective conversation on key topics, and aid in the development of International Affairs professionals. They also offer the opportunity to network and sustain critical relationships within our community.

Future events are already being planned now. To recommend key speakers/topics, or to get schedule information just go to www.FAOA.org.

FAOA members can receive periodic updates and event announcements via news emails and alerts by registering online.
- People’s Liberation Army Air Force 2010 by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
- The Ten Pillars of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force: An Assessment by Kenneth Allen (Jamestown Foundation, April 2011)
- Understanding China’s Political System by Susan Lawrence

IAS should also subscribe online to Taiwan Security Research (TSR), Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Stanford University Hoover Center’s China Leadership Monitor (CLM), and CSIS Pacific Forum’s PacNet Newsletter. All of these can be received free by e-mail.

In addition, I recommend that IAS subscribe to at least the following PLA periodicals. Even though PAS do not read Chinese, the photos tell a continuing story.

- China Air Force, which is published monthly
- National Defense, which is published monthly
- PLA Pictorial, which is published twice a month

Over the past 20 years, two annual PLA conferences have been held. One conference is currently co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Within a year of the conference, they publish a book covering all of the material. A list of the books, all of which are available in PDF on the web, can be found on the web site www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/year.cfm.

The past six books are shown below:
- Learning By Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (2012)
- Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (2011)
- The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (2010)
- Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan (2009)
- The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military (2008)
- Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (2007)

The second conference is co-hosted by the Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) in Taiwan, RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and the U.S. National Defense University (NDU). However, only a few books have been published following the conference. For example, Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security was published by CEIP in 2007 and contained the best presentations from the previous three conferences. NDU will soon publish The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, which is based on the 2010 conference in Taipei.

Until about ten years ago, very little information was available in Chinese or English about the PLA. However, given the increasing amount of books, periodicals, and online material published by the PLA, almost all of the material in the publications noted above comes from original Chinese sources, and a large proportion of the material is written by China FAOs and/or former attachés. As with the PLA,
however, the vast majority of the FAOs/attachés who write the articles are Army officers. Unfortunately, only a few USAF FAOs/attachés are frequent authors on the PLA.

Besides reading what others have written in English, RAS need to acquire Chinese-language books and periodicals published by the PLA and begin doing their own research to become familiar with the terminology and concepts.

**Promotion and Post-Military Careers**

The new Air Force IAS program is being implemented to specifically address officer development and career management issues that have arisen in the past and the early track record appears promising. For the past three years promotion rates to field grade ranks for IAS officers have consistently exceeded the Air Force-wide promotion rates. If this trend continues, it will confirm that the Air Force has successfully addressed career management challenges that have long hampered the career development of its attachés and others serving in IAS billets.

I always point out to young China IAS that being a China specialist is a 24/7 job and that they must also think about what they are going to do the day after they get out of the Air Force, whether it is prior to or after their 20-year point. They need to begin planning for that day several years in advance, so that they do their best while serving in the military and while preparing themselves to do well in their next careers.

There are basically five career paths for China IAS after they leave the military as shown below: First is to work for a non-profit federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), such as CNA, RAND, or IDA or a non-profit think tank, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Heritage Foundation, Brookings, or the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Second is to move into civilian or military academia, including one of the war colleges or National Defense University.

Third is to double-dip in a government position by becoming a policymaker, intelligence analyst, or desk officer.

Fourth is to work for a civilian company, including the defense industry and companies doing business in China. For example, when General Reynolds retired in 1990, he served as Raytheon’s Vice President for International Technology. In 1994, he moved to Beijing where he became President of Raytheon China Company for several years. Several former USAF and Army FAOs and attachés have worked for defense contractors in Taiwan.

Fifth is as a consultant. For example, after retiring from the USAF, Colonel Larry Mitchell served twice as a de facto DATT at AIT for almost ten years and had his own consulting business that provided services to the USG and various companies.

In some cases, USAF China FAOs/attachés have gone down more than one path. For example, Dr. Eden Woon, who received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Washington before becoming the first A/AIRA, returned to the Pentagon to serve in the OJCS/J-5, and then was a desk officer in OSD/ISA/China for a few years. After retiring as a colonel in 1994, he was the Executive Director of the Seattle-based Washington State China Relations Council until 1997. He then moved to Hong Kong to become the CEO of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce until 2006. After that, he was a senior leader in various companies, such as Starbucks in Shanghai. He recently became the Vice-President for Institutional Advancement in the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Regardless of which path you take, employers take into account your military record, practical experience, and education level. As a result, you should begin doing research on personnel who already hold the positions you aspire to and see what their background is. In the end, however, the job you find will most likely be because of someone you know from the military rather than finding the opening in a want ads column. This is one reason it is important to become members of associations such as FAOA and to attend China-related conferences.

Finally, it is common for retired China specialists to change jobs several times after they retire, but they continue to keep in contact with others in the field.

**Conclusions**

Being a China IAS is a full time job, whether you are in the military or have left it. Basically, the number of people outside government who are involved in analyzing and writing on China’s military is quite
small and everyone knows each other. Furthermore, a large proportion of the people outside government who write consistently on the PLA are former military FAOs, attachés, or civilians who have been doing this for a long time. As a result, you need to start trying to get articles published while you are in the military. For example, several U.S. Army active duty FAOs and attachés have written articles for this journal, while former and serving Navy attachés from Beijing and Hong Kong have had articles published in naval journals. By doing this, they have laid the foundation to continue their post-military career in the China field.

Finally, it is my hope that the USAF IAS Program will groom RAS/PAS to eventually fill most, if not all, of the future A/AIRA, AIRA, and SDO/DATT billets in Beijing, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This is not meant to take away from the outstanding job of previous and current non-China IAS attachés in Beijing, but it is a statement about how much further up the ladder IAS attachés will be the first day they step into their attaché job. To help accomplish this, I would like to work with the USAF IAS Program to continue mentoring younger RAS/PAS and attaché designates as they work their way through the system.

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About the Author …

Ken Allen is a Senior China Analyst with DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, where he focuses on China’s military organizational structure, personnel, education, training, and foreign relations with particular emphasis on the PLA Air Force. During 21 years in the U.S. Air Force (1971-1992), he served as an enlisted Chinese and Russian linguist and intelligence officer with tours in Taiwan (6987th Security Group and DAO Taipei), Berlin (6912th ESG), Japan (5th Air Force), PACAF Headquarters, China, and Washington DC (Instructor, DIA’s Joint Military Attaché School). From 1987-1989, he served as the Assistant Air Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, where he received the individual Exceptional Collector of the Year Award for 1988 and the Unit Exceptional Collector of the Year Award for 1989. He was inducted into DIA’s Defense Attaché Hall of Fame in 1997. He has a B.A. degree from the University of California at Davis and the University of Maryland and a M.A. degree from Boston University. He has written numerous monographs, book chapters, and journal articles on the PLA and PLAAF. Since 2003, he has chaired a monthly training session for all U.S. military attaché designates to China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

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Announcement and Recognition: The FAO journal’s Editorial Board

One of the professionalization improvements made to the FAO journal is the creation of an Editorial Board. The Editorial Board not only assists the Managing Editor in the screening, edition and selection process for content, but they serve the academically critical role of elevating your journal to the status of a “peer reviewed” professional publication.

Board coordination on journal submissions is conducted via email because board members are scattered around the world with varied global assignments. Board members represent varied International Affairs backgrounds, and service assignments represent all services — Active, civilian, reserve and retired.

Current Editorial Board members are:

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With my appreciation, Coyt

Mr. Coyt D. Hargus  
Editor-in-Chief, FAOJ  
FAOA, Board of Governors
Training Support Opportunity for former Defense Attachés and FAOs
Special Operations Unconventional Warfare Exercise

DynCorp International is seeking former Defense Attachés to participate in an Unconventional Warfare exercise for the Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Training Detachment (JRTC SOTD), Fort Polk, Louisiana in August and October 2012. Salary (1099) plus expenses. A SECRET level security clearance required.

The JRTC-SOTD exercise will support the training of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) consisting of two Advanced Operating Bases and up to 12 Special Forces Operational Detachments-Alpha conducting Unconventional Warfare. The exercise is designed to cover tasks from phase 1 (Preparation) to phase 7 (Transition) and will focus on both coordinating and employment of all elements of a resistance in both urban and rural environments.

JRTC SOTD wants to include several former Defense Attachés (to act in the role of DATTs), former station chiefs, and former ambassadors in the exercise.

About DynCorp International: DynCorp International is a global government services provider in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, delivering support solutions for defense, diplomacy, and international development. DI operates major programs in logistics, platform support, contingency operations, and training and mentoring to reinforce security, community stability, and the rule of law.

Contact: William Imbrie, Senior Director for International Programs, DynCorp International 703-462-7152 or william.imbrie@dyn-intl.com

French Attache’ Awarded US Airborne Wings

On 05 NOV 2011, French Military Attaché, COL Brice Houdet (previously commanded the Airborne Regiment of the Foreign Legion), earned his American jump wings during a jump with 20th SFG (A) jump onto Aegis DZ (Aberdeen Proving Ground). HQDA coordinated COL Houdet’s participation in the jump and MAJ Jim Shaw (48C, HQDA country desk officer, and graduate of the French Army Staff College) jumped with COL Houdet.

Quotable Quote …

“The power of a man’s mind I directly proportional to the quantity of coffee he drinks.”
- Sir James Mackintosh

Share your quotes with the editor … editor@faoa.org
As we observe the very public debate on whether to make war on Iran in our free and open press, the parallels during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq are striking. However, there is one glaring difference this time around. In 2002/2003, America was easily led to war out of fear; hastily, under false pretenses, and without consideration of all the consequences of our actions. The horror of 9/11 was still painfully fresh in the collective American memory. Today, however, the emotional state of our nation today is somewhat calmer. One can hearken back to Clausewitz and his references to the “trinity” of people/army/government and how they interrelate in aspects of war. In that respect, US public opinion and emotion is a vital determining factor on whether this nation gets behind a war. It is this single focal point that should not be forgotten in the coming months as the rhetoric is bound to reach a fevered pitch.

The open discussion of the pros and cons of an attack is a healthy part of our democracy. The Iran debate pits the hawks in both Israel and America, against those who seem to understand a bit better what a massive undertaking such a war would be and the sheer firestorm it would cause in an already volatile region. By examining the facts and challenging prevailing assumptions, we can determine if those that are clamoring for war have actually engaged in the critical analysis mandatory for such an endeavor.

First, examine the oft-quoted threat by Iran to “wipe Israel off the map.” It certainly sounds menacing and it is hard to argue that a country with such vitriolic bluster is a responsible actor. Surely the international community would be against such a country possessing the ability to build a nuclear weapon. However, upon deeper inspection and research, the actual quote cited above was mistranslated from Farsi. What Iranian President Ahmadinejad actually said in his now infamous 2006 speech was more akin to “redrawing the lines of the map” of the Middle East. This is far less ominous-sounding and also has a basis in the historical context of the tensions in the region, given that most of those tensions stem from the vestiges of British/French/Ottoman imperialism.

Next, most can agree that Iran’s nuclear program is not totally transparent and enough evidence exists to suggest that there is an active and covert weaponization program. Add the fact that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism that espouses violence to address political disputes coupled with the severe trust deficit that exists between the West and Iran, and we have the basis for potential conflict.

However, a country’s nuclear program is such that any nation can build the capability to go from power generation, which is a completely acceptable course of action within the framework of international norms and controls (namely the IAEA and the NPT), to weaponization (which is not an acceptable COA by international standards) relatively easily. The gray area resides with intent. Putting red lines on certain milestones and talking in terms of black and white when this conundrum can clearly NOT be couched in such terms can lead to strategic miscalculations and unintended consequences.

Then there is the flawed assumption that if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb, it would attack Israel to purge the earth of the “Zionist Satan.” But they must know that such an act would trigger the utter destruction of Iran in a counter-attack. Our own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and more recently Chief of Israel’s military LTG Benny Gantz have stated that they believed the leadership in Tehran, for all its posturing, was a “rational actor.” Inviting obliteration would not fit the mold of a rational actor. No matter how fervently the ayatollahs and mullahs come across
as “true believers,” I would be hard pressed to believe that they would sacrifice their presently-held and very real earthly power for the potential heavenly glory of Allah.

We also hear that Iran might give the technology to terrorists who would be far less rational than a state actor and more apt to actually use a nuclear weapon. But why would Iran spend all that time and money to hand such a symbol of national pride to a proxy or stranger or irrational actor? In the event of an attack, the return address for the response would still be Tehran, justified or not.

Additionally, our national discourse seems to have completely missed one very glaring piece of such a scenario; the practical result of a nuclear attack on Israel. Since the actual land the Israelis currently inhabit is seen as holy and the prize of three of the world’s major religions, to nuke it to get rid of the inhabitants would sully the land, the religious sites, and also kill many Muslims. It would be the equivalent of setting your house on fire to rid yourself of termites. Not a viable course of action.

But still the drumbeat continues.

Next we hear that Iran is a threat to the US as well. But affixing a workable nuclear weapon to a yet-to-be-built Iranian ICBM would take several more years AFTER they actually had a nuclear weapon. There would be much more evidence of a ballistic missile program that would be much more difficult to hide. Further, building an ICBM displays intent, which is much harder to justify to the international community as “peaceful.” At that point, the US course of action begins to crystallize and there would likely be much more broad international support for military action.

Further, the discussion has not really explored the Iranian response to a “surgical strike” by Israel, or the U.S., or a combination of the two. Most analysts believe that would merely delay development of a weapon, as the Iranian nuclear program is spread out all over the country, so the usefulness of such action is in question. What must be considered is that if a sovereign state attacks another sovereign state, the recipient will no doubt seek to respond, and would have some standing in the court of international public opinion to do so. The asymmetric response has been somewhat explored (rocket-fire into Israel from Iran’s proxies in the vicinity), but no real talk of a more forceful Iranian retort.

What if Iran wanted to mount a full on, conventional response against Israel? A sweeping Persian invasion is not in the realm of the impossible. They did, in fact, manage to get all the way to Greece 2500 years ago with no air cover. Begin by looking at the route necessary to accomplish this. It would likely go through Northern Iraq, down through Syria and Lebanon, and into Israel. One could posit that Iran could take advantage of Iraq’s Shi’a population and/or the central governments rift with the Kurds. Maybe Iran makes a deal with its own Kurdish population and that of Iraq to support the creation of an independent Kurdistan in return for unimpeded passage through Iraq. Iraq’s central government can’t extend its authority into the north anyway, and the North is threatening to secede almost weekly.
This could be followed by a fast sweep through friendly Syria and Lebanon, who could presumably join forces to rid the region of the Zionist menace once and for all. Having heard the phrase “one does not buy the Arabs’ loyalty, one rents it,” is it impossible to believe that, if the Arab world thinks it can rid itself of Israel, it would not switch sides? Think of the PR coup this would hand not only Iran, but Shi’a all over the region; instant “wasta,” or clout.

In the face of the unexpected outcome of massive retaliation, two likely options then remain. The first is that U.S. gets dragged into attacking not only Iran, but Iraq (again), Syria, and Lebanon. Such fighting would then spiral out of control, inevitably dragging Turkey and the rest of the GCC countries into the conflict, because Iran would lash out at any nation housing or supporting U.S. forces. And let’s not forget that Pakistan, with all of its woes, is right next door too. In short, World War III, and there will be many casualties.

The second would be that Israel, backed into a corner and faced with either a vacillating U.S. or one that just couldn’t come to the rescue fast enough, would be forced to use the nuclear weapons it doesn’t have to save itself. At that point, the military, diplomatic, and geostrategic repercussions become incalculable. Never again? That lies solely in the hands of those who first uttered that phrase.

We can conclude that, at present, Iran is clearly more of a threat to Israel than to the US. Israel cannot effectively do what it feels it needs to for its security without our military might. At this point, we should be an honest friend to them and prevent them from embarking on a truly disastrous course of action. The best outcome for them would merely be the Pyrrhic and temporary victory described above, and they would have presented Iran with all the justification it needed to react swiftly as stated above, or bide its time, acquiring nuclear weapons and retaliate against Israel at a time of its choosing.

So what can and should be done? The US should press Israel and the Arab world toward a final and lasting peace deal with the Palestinians, right now, thus removing the red herring
argument against the existence of Israel from all the Arab and Persian animosity and force those entities to finally look inward to determine the true source of their societal and economic malaise instead of blaming the ubiquitous “outsider.” In fact, Israel now has a strengthened negotiating position from which to bargain, as the Iron Dome missile defense system (that was essentially funded by the US) has proven successful against rocket attacks from Iran’s proxies.

How can we get the relevant parties to the table? By using the foreign aid we provide for its intended purpose, which is to compel countries to do what we’d like them to do. The Administration could announce an immediate 20% reduction in the $3B in military aid to Israel and $1.3B in military aid to Egypt. Why Egypt? Egypt fancies itself as a leader in the Arab world, and it can use its significant heft to press the Palestinians into negotiations. To ensure fruitful progress, the US should announce that for every year a peace agreement is not concluded, an additional 20% would be removed from the following year’s allocation. If and when a deal is reached, the amount remaining would be guaranteed to each country for 10 years, after which time, those countries would no longer be receiving US military aid.

Finally, Iran must submit to IAEA inspections of all requested facilities at a moment’s notice, or crippling economic sanctions will continue. National pride is no excuse to shirk international responsibilities. It should also be stated publicly that if the US or Israel or any of their allies ever suffer a WMD terrorist attack, the governments of not only Iran, but also Pakistan and North Korea, will be held directly responsible and dealt with accordingly. This should help ensure that any fissile or other dangerous material does not fall into the hands of irrational non-state actors.

This avenue is by no means assured and certainly impossible save bold American leadership and leap of faith. The alternative is an increasingly impatient Israel that, paralyzed with paranoia, forgets itself and does something rash, engulfing the region in a quagmire so heinous that we cannot even begin to game out all of the global consequences. Even worse, heaven forbid that some spectacular terrorist attack were to occur on the US in the coming months, causing us to forget the calm and level-headed discourse we’ve engaged in thus far and march fear-stricken and irrationally into another misguided adventure. At that point, I wouldn’t be a very good strategist if I didn’t ask myself “cui bono,” or “who benefits?”

About the Authors …

Mr. Greg Archetto - Archetto is currently a Country Program Director at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. A former Presidential Management Fellow, Mr. Archetto has worked in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US Department of State and done rotational assignments at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and on Capitol Hill. He has a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Rowan University, a Master’s Degree in Public Policy/ Administration from Rutgers University, and a Master’s Degree in National Security/ Strategic Studies from the US Naval War College. He lives with his wife Jeanette in Virginia.
The quote above reflects the oft-held, if narrow, view that “warfare is the failure of diplomacy” and that if warriors are called to do their duty, it must be because others—diplomats in particular—have failed at their. But this presupposes an “either/or” view of diplomacy and the military action, and ignores the possibility that warriors themselves can play a role in the diplomacy that may prevent war in the first place. US military tradition strongly supports political neutrality, especially among the officer corps. Indeed, any “State of the Union” address will include scenes of the bemedaled, stoic Chiefs of Staff of each branch, neither applauding nor otherwise responding to comments made by the President and Commander-in-Chief. But is the military’s role simply to be called upon after diplomacy’s failure? To wait in the wings in the event that an untenable diplomatic position is reached? Or does it have another, more nuanced role that cannot be exactly replicated by its civilian counterparts?

While “Gunboat Diplomacy” was employed frequently before World War I, this was often used with more economic objectives in mind. This article will argue that the military does play a key and active part in diplomatic efforts towards more broad foreign policy objectives, and that this role has gone through distinct evolutions from the “either/or” one it once held. The first modern evolution started at the end of the Cold War when the “threat of force” was used as a diplomatic tool. The second evolution began after the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and saw the military playing a direct role in areas that were once the almost exclusive purview of civilian diplomats. It will present examples of this role from each phase of this evolution, and relate them to a recent diplomatic training exercise.

**Post-Cold War Military Diplomacy**

The first evolution occurred after the end of the Cold War, when the US’ inability to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes solely through diplomatic efforts became more evident. After the fall of the Soviet Union, resource support to various regimes, which once served as a proxy for military involvement in key regions, significantly decreased. Without this funding stream, state collapses followed, and “soft power” alone proved insufficient to steer those who came to power towards the outcomes the US sought. It was a time when the US experienced Morgenthau’s dictum that “diplomacy without power is feeble, and power without diplomacy is destructive and blind.” During this time, “threat of force” developed as an important component of diplomatic efforts.

In Haiti, a military coup d’état in 1991 resulted in the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been elected in the first free and fair election in Haiti’s history. A military junta under General Raoul Cedras took his place, and diplomatic efforts to get the new ruler to step down had frustrated the administration of
George H.W. Bush; indeed, it was threatening to do the same to that of Bill Clinton. With discussions continuing to prove futile, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division boarded transport planes and departed for Haiti on September 18, 1994. In *Haitian Democracy Restored*, Roland I. Perusse writes, “The breakthrough in negotiations came when (Deputy Army Director General Philippe) Biamby burst into the negotiation room holding a cellular phone and told Cedras that he had just heard the invasion was underway.” Facing an untenable situation, the agreement was signed just one hour before the paratroopers were scheduled to land on the island. “Through a series of diplomatic initiatives, threats and pressure applied to the military leaders in Haiti, President Clinton was successful in accomplishing his goal of returning Aristide to office.”

The Bosnian War (1992-1995) was one of the greatest human tragedies in Europe since the end of the World War II. After more than three years of fighting, 250,000 deaths, and 3 million refugees, the antagonists met at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio for discussions headed by legendary US diplomat Richard Holbrooke. While today it is discussed as a clear diplomatic victory, his wife Kati Marton wrote in his April 2011 NY Times obituary that, “Success was not in the air for most of those three cold weeks at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Nobody trusted anybody. The Bosnians, Croats and Serbs were still at war, deeply focused on their respective grievances.” Holbrooke understood that the military played a role in diplomacy besides simply that of an instrument *ex post facto*. He arranged the opening dinner in an airplane hanger, and sat Slobodan Milosevic directly under a US Air Force B-2 Bomber, clearly emblematic of American military power. This symbol of American might, which Serbian forces on the ground had recently experienced first-hand, may not have been the decisive factor in the outcome of the meeting. But, as Morton writes, “Surely the message was not lost on the ‘Arsonist of the Balkans,’ ” and it undoubtedly played a role in influencing Milosevic. A few weeks later, the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, which have held since.

**Post-9/11 Military Diplomacy**

A second evolution in military diplomacy occurred during recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US military took on a more active role as diplomats, rather than simply being the “less civilized” men of Orwellian depiction. The military greatly increased its participation in non-kinetic efforts (such as tribal leader engagements), practiced to various extents since the start of operations in those theaters. The publication of a new Counter-Insurgency (COIN) manual in 2008 codified this new strategy, including commanders on the ground serving as the face of the US Government in an entirely different way. Suddenly, instead of remaining guarded on large bases or behind the ballistic glass of an armored vehicle, military personnel worked with village elders to develop local infrastructure projects, mediate disputes, and serve as intermediaries between these leaders and the US Government.

Special Operations Forces are normally viewed in the context of bearded soldiers galloping on horseback alongside Afghani counterparts, or Navy SEALs rescuing Americans from Somali pirates. However, focused efforts by the US Army’s African Command (AFRICOM) in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa has seen these same Special Operators armed with medical bags, treating locals’ medical conditions and inoculating livestock against disease. Members of US Civil Affairs units continue to work in underdeveloped countries, delivering supplies and carrying the message of the US as a partner. Given that al-Qaeda has introduced a diplomatic component to their strategy in the same region, and is increasingly using “soft power” when engaging the population there, these measures could not have come at a better time (see the Boston Herald’s “In Villages, al-Qaeda Lures with Cash, Candy,” December 4, 2011).

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**International Affairs Service School Writing Awards**

In order to encourage investigation, analysis and authorship of foreign policy related topics, your FAOA is currently working with various senior staff schools, and senior military education instauration to sponsor FAOA International Affairs (IA) writing awards at various PME levels.

Our concept is to encourage IA related authorship and tailor award candidate products for potential journal publication. We also plan to expand content on FAOA.org by posting finalist products, thesis and such on our website.

The details are still developing, but look for FAOA news soon.

**Coyt Hargus**

Editor-in-Chief, FAOJ
These and similar programs are true diplomatic efforts that not only portray the US in a positive light, but also convey the image that the US military can be a force for good and not just disruption and occupation. If we do not continue our efforts to leverage the military as a legitimate diplomatic force in these areas, doubtless al-Qaeda and other actors will, to the detriment of regional stability in this crucial and contested area.

The Diplomacy Exercise

A 2012 exercise conducted at the University of Denver allowed students to explore the relationship between the military and civilian governments, and seemed to confirm several aspects of the military’s role in diplomacy. One is that the military strength of one state can confer on it a legitimacy that makes other states want to become allies with it. Subsequently, these alliances are more influential in diplomatic affairs because of the collective might that backs them. Another is that when the exercise had an externally (read: diplomatically) imposed “timeline for withdrawal”—In this case, the time constraints of the exercise—it forced moves on both sides that neither would have made given time to play their role to a natural conclusion. This may replicate the situation the US currently faces in Afghanistan where diplomatic (and, to be fair, domestic) considerations could impact the way the military conducts its operations, the types of operations it conducts (including a decrease in offensive operations), and the types of recommendations military leaders make to political superiors. A simulation cannot replicate all factors that impact the nexus of military-diplomatic interactions, but for the uninitiated, it did provide a glimpse into this fascinating dynamic.

Conclusion

Some people understandably view the military playing a role in diplomacy with suspicion. It can be hard to be amenable to ideas from someone with one hand bearing a carrot while the other wields a stick. But this paper has demonstrated that the military can play a valuable role in this area. They can do so symbolically, as when US diplomats used a US Air Force bomber to reinforce to antagonists the alternatives to coming to an agreement at the Dayton Peace Accords. It can involve role-reversal, as when infantrymen and tankers become plenipotentiaries and emissaries in a combat theater. Or, as Rachael Greenspan noted in “Public Diplomacy in Uniform: The Role of the US Department of Defense in Supporting Modern Day Public Diplomacy,” it can be a “key role in providing security, tactical, and logistical support to civilian public diplomacy missions, and (they) may be more involved in these efforts in conflict zones that are unsafe for routine civilian activities.” In other words, rather than looking at the military and diplomatic corps through an “either/or” lens, an “and” connection between the two may continue to be the most beneficial.

The link between the military and diplomats has, out of necessity and because of a changing world paradigm, gone through distinct evolutions since the days of the Cold War. Before 9/11, the “threat of force” was used as an influential component of foreign policy. However, the most significant evolution with the steepest learning curve has been in the decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the military played a much more direct role as diplomats. Because of the drawdown of forces in those theaters, there exists the threat that the value of this role will be forgotten, and its practice diminished. The US military can never replace the civilian diplomatic corps, nor should they be expected to. But they should continue to play an active role in diplomacy, as the nation that ignores the benefits that the military brings to this discipline does so to its detriment. Reducing the US military to muddy-booted automatons is to remove a key element of our international engagement portfolio. And the military has been, and will continue to be, a valuable addition to US efforts to build good relations with allies, steer the behaviors of adversaries, and influence those somewhere in the middle.

About the Author …

Major Shawn Russell is a US Army Sub-Saharan Africa FAO (48J). He is currently pursuing a Master’s in International Security at Denver University, and holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Foreign Area Studies (Middle East). His previous assignments include Office of Security Cooperation, US Embassy, Morocco; and Special Forces Detachment Commander, 5th Special Forces Group, Ft Campbell.
Book Review:
Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage
Author: Douglas Waller
Reviewed by: LtCol Peter S. Phillips, US Air Force

Many are familiar with the name Bill Donovan and his contribution to the United States through standing up its first strategic intelligence function. However, Douglas Waller’s book paints a genuine and detailed picture of the father of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that is hard to come by outside of the pages of this book. Wild Bill Donovan was a fascinating read that wraps the reader up in the lives of its characters, making very quick work of its 389 pages.

Readers who are familiar with the world of intelligence and national security will be startled to read about a man who was not the proverbial “Boy Scout” that many would stereotype as the super-secret intelligence agent, but instead a man who had a tough upbringing, had to fight hard for everything he achieved, and often fell short as a husband and father. While his personal qualities may not have been the best, his service to the nation and the visionary work he achieved standing up and running the OSS made a critical difference during World War Two, and paved the way for future national intelligence agencies in the United States.

While many of us grow up interested in spy classics such as James Bond, this book illustrates the reality of getting a true spy organization off the ground, and how many times the results can turn out more like an Austin Powers movie. However, the hard work and diligence of Bill Donovan and his “pickup bench” of lawyers, accountants, scientists, and misfits made it through the trial and error stages to create an organization that demonstrated excellent results throughout the war effort. These growing pains and successes are covered in great detail throughout the chapters of this book.

Douglas Waller’s writing provides a truly interesting read on the challenges associated with getting America’s OSS off the ground and the life and work of a great American. The reading is quick, entertaining, educational, and is well worth the time. This would be a great addition to anyone’s library who is interested in military history and the world of intelligence.

Editor’s Call for topics
The journal is actively seeking the family and/or spouse perspective on FAO training, JMAS, ICT, embassy life, social requirements, overseas schools, embassy furniture, POVs and/or experiences various FAO jobs around the world … in the US and overseas

Such articles would be not only interesting to read, but might also assist in the preparation of the families that follow by sharing the facts of FAO life.

Editor@FAOA.org

About the Reviewer…
Lt Col Pete Phillips is the Commander of the 15th Intelligence Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia. He has spent his Air Force career in numerous operational, collection, analysis and leadership roles with both conventional and special operations forces. He has deployed numerous times in both South West and South East Asia.
Book Review: The People … In Arms
Author: G.L. Lamborn
Reviewed by: MSgt Adam Drowne, Af-Pak Hands, US Air Force

“The People …in arms” is a concise, clearly organized book. This book distills its many points down to simple issues; this is in contrast to the many hundreds of pages that many others take to convey their points. The straightforward, even blunt manner that many of the points are made is refreshing in its clarity. The reader is left with plenty of sources for additional information if they choose to delve further into a given topic however I think the author made his point clear enough that this will only rarely be required.

If I had to cite a shortfall of this book it is only that in chapters 21 and later the author in my mind overestimates the human capital available to GIRoA and likely other countries facing insurgencies, the number of troops we have in-country, or how a sales pitch could possibly be made to senior leaders to convince them to require the Army to operate in a manner that will more likely lead to success. That being said if the author had attempted to cover those items it would have undoubtedly required a far larger book!

I enjoyed reading this book and look forward to his upcoming book entitled “Arms of Little Value” as well as likely reading this book again immediately prior to my next trip to Afghanistan.

About the Reviewer…
MSgt Drowne volunteered for the AfPak Hands Program and has already completed his 1st tour in the program; his third time in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan he had the pleasure of working on the Norwegian and Latvian run PRT in Faryab where he managed development projects and worked as an LNO for the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program. He is currently assigned to the ACC/International Affairs office as the Deputy AfPak Hands Program Manager.

Lost Members … update your contact data online
FAOA is working hard to sustain contact with member who are constantly moving. Help us by going online and confirming your personal contact data … and by reminding other FAOs to do the same.

The following are lost life-members of FAOA., and all efforts to contact them have failed. If you know any of these life-members, please email news or contact data to admin@FAOA.org

Walter Anderson
James Cobb, Jr
Brian Dando
Kevin McGrath

Michael Bittricie
Mark Conroe
Timothy Devito
Mark Nakagawa

Tim Buchen
Joseph Contarino
Walter Kennedy, Jr
Kenneth Prendergast

Gene Catena
Rhonda Cook
Kevin Madden
Kenneth Rackers

NOTE: When updating your contact data you MUST only use the official USPS mailing data for your CONUS address. DO NOT add un-needed mailing data (particularly to APO/FPO type addresses) or the system will reject the address and you will not receive the journal you paid for with your membership.
REPORT: FAOA's Annual Black Tie Banquet - “A Smashing Success”
By: Jonathon Sachar, LtCol, USMC (Retired)

The clubhouse of Arlington’s historic Army Navy Country Club was once again the place to be when the Foreign Area Officer Association hosted its annual Black Tie Dinner for 2012. By all accounts it was another clear success made possible by the hard work of the FAOA Banquet Committee and through the support of FAOA members and their guests. This year, over 230 politico-military affairs, security cooperation, and diplomatic professionals came together to enjoy an evening of camaraderie, networking, and story-telling.

The evening kicked off with a cocktail hour in the Fort Richardson Room where long-time FAOs got an opportunity to get to know the future of our community. We were fortunate to have over 25 Midshipmen from the U.S. Naval Academy who made the trip from Annapolis and are now enthusiastic future Navy and Marine Corps FAOs!

Once in the main dining area for dinner, our guests were treated to an amazing rendition of the Star Spangled Banner sung by Miss DC, Ashley Boalch, with a precision color guard detail provided by the Maryland National Guard Honor Guard led by MSgt Michael Glaze. Our sincere thanks go out to Miss DC and to all the members of the Maryland National Guard Honor Guard for their participation and talents.

Naturally, the highlight of the evening was our distinguished guest speaker, former active duty service member and current Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper. The Director focused on the significant benefits taken from his personal experience with FAOs over the course of his long and diverse career. Additionally, he discussed the important role FAOs play in U.S. National Security from his current perspective. In the context of the unique and demanding challenges that face the world today, he emphasized that FAOs are critical to the post 9-11 security structure where strategic partnerships are so vital and positive inter-personal relationships across multiple levels lay the foundation for success.

The evening wrapped up with another opportunity for guests to socialize and enjoy the Army Navy Country Club’s clubhouse for the last time before a brand new facility opens sometime next year. If you are interested in being part of the team for the 2013 banquet, look for information on how you can participate to be available in the coming months. Thanks once again to all our guests, corporate sponsors and fellow FAOs for making the 2012 Black Tie Banquet such a great event. We will see you next year!
You’re invited to FAOA On Tap!

… it’s a “FAO Mixer”

Thursday, 21 June 2012 from 1630-1930

Sine’s Irish Pub and Restaurant, Arlington
(http://www.sineirishpub.com/cms_arlington/)

Email any questions to our prez ...
President@FAOA.org