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It is hard to believe that the 2011 FAOA Formal Dinner is already a few months behind us. Everyone had a great time during what is quickly becoming one of the most highly anticipated events in the National Capital Region.

This year’s event was held at the historic Army Navy Country Club in Arlington, VA, where over 120 past, current, and future FAOs from all services came together for an evening of camaraderie. This historic location provided the backdrop for a fun evening of mingling, dinner, and entertainment. The evening began with a reception in the Fort Richardson Room. Here, guests were able to meet and engage our guest Speaker, Major General Ben Hodges, Director of the Afghanistan, Pakistan Coordination Cell.

The ambiance was further enhanced by the great piano music of US Air Force TSgt Robert Barnes. In order to continue the Joint involvement, a US Marine Corps Brass Quintet, led by MGySgt Max Cripe, provided a brass quintet for the opening ceremonies and presentation of the colors. Our thanks to their participation and admiration for their abilities.

Following a very enjoyable meal, Major General Hodges provided an informative presentation on US policy in the South Asia region. His brief was especially timely given the recent demise of terrorist Osama Bin Laden. Major General Hodges lauded the efforts and benefits of FAOs serving not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in all regions that carry out US National and Military strategies. The expertise and level of competency FAOs provide commanders in today’s conflicts, as well as the unforeseen engagements of the future, has been and will continue to be a vital part of the implementation of our policies, he stated.

All attendees had a great time at this annual event and many are already talking about next year’s formal. As the Army Navy Country Club’s historic club house is set to be demolished next summer, the FAOA has one additional opportunity to take advantage of this remarkable venue for next year’s Formal Dinner, currently scheduled for April 2012. As we move into Fall, we will solicit volunteers to work as part of next year’s formal committee. Consider becoming part of this effort so we can raise the bar even higher than the one we exceeded this year!
Dear FAOA members,

As the new FAOA President, I would like to update the members on our plans to continue to build the Association into the premier organization for advocating the FAO field within the US military and USG; providing social, sustainment, and networking opportunities for current, new, and retired FAOs and associates; and for mentoring new FAOs.

First of all, since my last membership update, we have had several additional changes to the Board of Governors (BOG). Due to their new overseas military assignments, CPT Ivan Raiklin, USARNG, has asked to resign and MAJ Vince Martinelli, USA, has become a non-voting Ex-Officio BOG member. Additionally, due to a demanding new civilian job, COL Steve Wilkins has stepped down as Treasurer but will remain on the BOG as a member-at-large. To round out the nine voting BOG members, I have appointed LTC Don Baker, USA, as Vice-President and Col Michael Welch, USAF (ret.), as Treasurer until the next elections in August 2012. Don and Mike bring a wealth of FAO experience and management skills to the BOG—welcome aboard.

Thanks to those who took the time to respond to our on-line survey for the FAOA Dinner—we received about 30 respondents who all provided great feedback to help us with the planning for the 2012 FAOA Black Tie Formal Dinner, which will be held on 28 April 2012—mark your calendars! We also hope to see as many members as possible at our next event—a “FAO on Tap” Happy Hour with the Service FAO Proponents and POLADs on 8 September at Sines Irish Pub at Pentagon Row. Please register for the event at www.faoa.org.

Our editor, Coyt Hargus, has put together another excellent journal this quarter—he and his assistant editors continue to raise the bar with each new edition. However, we will continue to need the support and assistance of the entire FAOA membership to take the Journal to the next level as a highly-subscribed, “peer reviewed” professional trade journal. To this end, we ask that you continue to submit articles for publication, encourage FAOs and associates to use this as a channel to “get published,” and offer to assist with “peer editing” as your time and schedules may permit. Over the next year, we also plan to establish FAOA writing awards at the Service and Joint PME institutions, which will be another source of diverse, high-quality articles.

As part of our outreach, the FAOA BOG also regularly engages in information and benefit exchanges, event co-sponsorship, and mutual meeting attendance with other like-minded intelligence and international affairs organizations, such as the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), Defense Intelligence Agency Alumni Association (DIAAA), Diplomatic and Consular Organization—Retired (DACOR), and the Intelligence Community Associations Network (ICAN). To this end, FAOA will serve as a co-sponsor of the Fall 2011 NMIA symposium.

I am pleased to serve as your President and will strive to make the FAO Association relevant and advantageous to your job, profession, and career and social networking. Please contact me with any comments, questions, or suggestions at kmsl_marisa@hotmail.com or by phone at 703-853-0928.

Very Respectfully,

Kurt M. Marisa
Colonel, US Air Force
The concept of equipping military officers with regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of US and foreign political-military relationships dates back to 1889 when the US sent permanent military Attaches to London, Paris, Vienna, and Saint Petersburg. To provide a greater worldwide historical perspective, one year prior to the deployment of our military “soldier statesmen,” the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party had just been formed whose later roots evolved into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The following year, the “rising star” in Britain, Sir Winston Churchill was only fourteen years old, attending private school, struggling to pass the entrance examination for the British military academy at Sandhurst. This same year, the London Dock Strike had occurred, which formed the foundation of what is known today as the British Labour Party. Additionally, in 1889, a counselor network of British-Indian officers began their assignments in Iran, the Eiffel Tower in Paris, France was inaugurated, and the Berliner Fußball-Club Marbert was formed, which became one of the founding members of the German Football Association, more commonly affiliated with the FIFA World Cup.

That same year, the Treaty of Berlin had been signed between Britain, the US and Germany over the Samoan islands and the Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler was born in Braunau am Inn, Austria. To the east, US Secretary of State, John Hay, negotiated the first “Open Door Policy” with China to establish new trade agreements and the transition of power was passed from Alexander the III to his son, Nicholas the II, which reigned in the Industrial Revolution. Further advanced in the former Soviet Union, Russification was well underway, forcing the replacement of language, religion, and cultural norms in the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus. Amid the Industrial Revolution, following Tsarist defeat in Russo-Japan war, the 1905 Bloody Sunday massacre occurred in Saint Petersburg starting the Russian Revolution.

By 1945, the US/Allied victory from World War II and Nazi war tribunals had begun, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) was established, and creation of the Arabian American Oil Company paved the way of making Saudi Arabia known for having the world’s largest reserves of oil. The US had military attaches in 45 capitals (38 of which had air attaches and 28, naval attaches). In parallel, the United States Army (USA) had developed the Language and Area Training Program to provide officers with high level staff potential with knowledge of language and areas to form sound intelligence estimates and to provide command decisions. The program required four years of training; language school, graduate degree from a civilian university, and two years overseas in, or near, the region of specialization.

In 1953 the program was re-designated Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) with continued management and oversight under the Department of Army (DA) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI). During 1956 the FAST Program expanded beyond the principal intelligence responsibilities and control.
to include other functional interests like psychological warfare, the Attaché system and civil affairs and military government, with the Deputy Chief for Military Operations sharing responsibility for program review with the ACSI. By 1956, the US had 166 Attaché posts in 71 countries: 68 Army, 45 Navy, and 53 Air Force personnel, in contrast to sixty (60) foreign countries that had established 121 Attachés in Washington D.C.

In 1963, the FAST program was further expanded to specifically designate positions requiring FAST qualifications, which included advisor duty, special warfare operations, DA General and Special staff, area study instructors at service academies and schools, and within the national intelligence community.

Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert McNamara advocated for problems and other existing compatibility issues with the intent of President Lyndon B. Johnson to centralize the Attaché system under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Instead, SecDef McNamara announced the decision to designate a Senior Defense Attaché in each country and established the Defense Attaché System (DAS) on 12 Dec 1964. This was the first step toward bringing the DAS under the full operational control, which the DIA Director gained on 1 Jul 1965.

Alongside, in 1969, an additional program was created alongside FAST called the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP), which focused on aspects of military advisory duty, stability operations, and civic action having social, political, economic and psychological impact. By the beginning of the 1970s, the USA had soundly established two international-oriented career programs; one driven by intelligence requirements (FAST) and the other by operational needs (MAOP).

Similar to present-day political/military conditions, against the background of the diminishing war in Vietnam, sustained withdrawal of American forces from the combat zones, fiscal constraints, and returning peacetime (Phase Zero) conditions, Army demobilization continued through fiscal year 1972 (FY72). Operational Force constructs were realigned in the Pacific and Far East to include the engagement of a five-year program to upgrade the Republic of Korea’s armed forces, USA continued “keystone” presence in Europe to support North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) land defenses, and maintained an Infantry Brigade and maneuver battalions in the Panama Canal Zone, primarily providing US military assistance training in Latin America.

Because of the decrease in the level of large-scale demonstration connected with civil disorder, US active military forces were not deployed during FY72. However, with a possible disturbance connected with the Governor’s Conference in San Juan, Puerto Rico, a Marine regiment was placed on alert and a liaison (LNO) representative of the Army Chief of Staff and DA LNO were sent to coordinate with local officials. While the conference was held without conflict, this was the first instance of detailed planning to deploy forces in a civil disturbance outside the continental US. In comparison, prior to 1972, the UN had deployed ten security and observation peacekeeping missions; three that are still active today in Jerusalem, Cyprus, and India and Pakistan, in addition to over forty (40) other missions established after 1972 to include high threat/conflict countries like Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

Complementary to UN initiatives, on April 21, 1971, President Richard Nixon proposed a realignment of foreign aid into two programs; one oriented to military assistance, the other to economic and humanitarian assistance. What became the International Security Assistance Act establishing foreign policy tools like foreign military sales (FMS), international training, and excess military equipment developed the term, “security assistance.”

Nixon doctrine also led to Department of Defense headquarters reorganization that established the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) in 1971. USA, Europe (designated Executive
Agent) took over from the Air Force the responsibility for administrative and logistical support of military assistance advisory groups and missions in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Later, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 and to increase FMS in line with greater Pentagon objectives, the Army suggested and began to dispatch briefing teams from DSAA, military departments, and industry to orient and instruct US country teams and host country representatives on the various aspects of FMS.

Following the formal creation of the USA FAO program, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 changed the title of the 1968 FMS Act to the AECA. The 1976 Act also repealed Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 which provided authority for commercial licensing through the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).

Over the next ten years, security assistance programs continued to grow and by Sep 1981, 76 countries and organizations had been receiving materiel from either the military assistance program or FMS; $22.7 billion in Saudi Arabia alone. The USA solidified its FAO Program to include the establishment of an International Affairs Symposium FAO Course at the USA John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center in Fort Bragg, N.C. Stated by LTG (Ret) Julius Becton during the 26th International Affairs Symposium on 30 May 1984.

“Since the Marshall Plan days, we have truly been an international philanthropist. As a nation we have provided $125 billion in economic assistance worldwide, and supplied life-saving nutrition for over 1.8 billion people, equaling to 656 billion pounds of food to over 100 countries. We have also provided $79 billion in direct developmental assistance programs to help others help themselves.”

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the diminished threat of Cold War, FY92 proved to be one of the most productive in the history of the USA’s security assistance and international defense programs. In 1997 the term, “security cooperation” was first introduced by the Defense Reform Initiative. Additionally, on February 22, 1997, Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White signed DoD Directive 1315.17, Service FAO Programs. Leveraging Title 10 authority for each of the services; Chap 303 (DA), 505 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations), and 803 (Dept of the Air Force), this was the first directive that established policy and assigned responsibilities for the development of FAO programs within the military services.

On 1 Oct 1998 - To better reflect its enlarged mission and diverse functions beyond security assistance to other agencies, the private sector, and foreign governments; DSAA was re-designated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

FAO Policy (DoDD 1315.17) was further revised on 28 Apr 2005, adding Title 10, Section 163, leveraging authority for the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), stating, “The COCOMs shall have the requisite war fighting capabilities to achieve success on the non-linear battlefields of the future.” In Feb 2005, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap was published and an additional DoD Instruction 1315.20 was signed on 28 Sep 2007. This instruction provided further guidance for the management of
DoD FOA programs to include the establishment of a standardized format to be used by the military services, DoD components, and COCOMs for the Annual Report on DoD FAO Programs. The instruction also identified the Deputy Under SecDef for Plans within the Under SecDef for Personnel and Readiness as the principal staff advisor to the SecDef for DoD FAO Programs.

Today the FAO Program continues for each of the services, which was best stated in the most recent DoD FAO Program Review and Report, “Progress has been achieved, but additional work remains to ensure that the Department is producing qualified FAOs to meet joint mission requirements.” When the FY09 report was released in August 2010, the restructured DoD Joint FAO Program had been in its fifth year of implementation with an increase of nearly 1,860 officers holding the FAO designation; an increase of an estimated 90 from FY08. The FAO program traditionally managed by the active duty military services had also expanded within several Defense Agencies like DSCA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

In FY09, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had also established a Civilian Foreign Area Specialist (CIVFAS) program, which has also been proven successful with the US Navy having identified several Force Protection Detachment (FPD) civilian special agents with a FAO designation. Additionally the FY09 report encourages more FAOs to serve as Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches (SDO/DATTs), but also serve in expanded and new SCOs and recommends more focus on the development and growth of Reserve FAO programs.

With a shift from a Cold War to more irregular/unpredictable environments, the demand for FAOs are greater especially in countries that are becoming new state threats like Iran along with other non-state threats including African-based transitional terrorism and Latin American crime resulting from counterdrug activity. While individuals and events like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin and the collapse of the Berlin Wall have passed, there are new threats to US national security.

Based on the Economist Global Debt Clock, since 2000, the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and several western European countries have sustained the highest amounts of government debt with no expected relief in the near-term future. In comparison, China, Russia, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, and several African countries are predicted to maintain the lowest government debt levels.

There are also new actors and future “political instability” indicators to follow. A few examples include: Iranian elections scheduled for Jun 2013, Turkey’s desire to join the European Union by 2014, along with the Winter Olympics in Sochi Russia on the border of Georgia that same year. Others include the ongoing conflict in the sensitive area of Abyei between the border of North and South Sudan along with a dozen other UN active peacekeeping missions deployed across the world, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and an Arab Spring. An Egyptian Army tank amidst street protestors. FMS have long been an instrument of US diplomacy. By the end of 1981, Egyptian sales had reached $1.4 billion, managed by Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs).
continuing into the summer, fall, and winter. Several North Africa/Middle East countries affiliated with Arab Spring also have a growing “ideological” al Qaeda presence to include Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq in addition to the Xinjiang province of China. Also important to note, in Aug 2010, FBI special agent Brian LeBlanc stated to the US news network, “He (Adnan G. El Shukri Jumah) would be equated with being chief of operations.” Adnan Shukri Jumah, on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list was born 4Aug 1975 and spent most of his life growing up in New York and Florida. He is believed to have ascended to his new leadership position following the death of two other operational leaders and remains active in Pakistan’s Waziristan region.

Despite the threats, the FAOA continues to thrive with a growth in membership and corporate sponsorship(s). The Association has enhanced their website at [www.faoa.org](http://www.faoa.org) and expanded its program to host a guest speaker for a quarterly luncheon, most recently, the Chief of DSCA’s Middle East Division, Mr. Mark Rumohr. Additionally, during the 2010 Annual FAOA Dinner, which hosted Ambassador Ryan Crocker as the keynote; the first color print FAO Journal was introduced along with the unveiling of a new seal recognizing the three disciplines that represent FAOs; Political-Military Affairs, Intelligence, and Security Cooperation.

The FAO Association is interested in gaining more historical research, archives, and photographs. If you have any information you’d like to share please contact the FAOA Historian at, faohistory@gmail.com. The history, which will soon be updated on the FAOA website will be maintained by the FAOA and shared with the FAO community and can be used for advocacy and outreach efforts.

FAOA is a 501c non-profit organization dedicated to the professional development of and advocacy for the FAO community. All content is copyrighted by FAOA unless otherwise stated.

**LTC Shannon Beebe Dies in Plane Crash—7 Aug 2011**

The FAO Association sadly announces the passing of LTC Shannon Beebe on Sunday the 7th of August, in Warrenton Park, Virginia. His basic branch was aviation, and he died pursuing his love of aviation while piloting a small aircraft that crashed in Warrenton Park, Virginia. Shannon was a well published Africa FAO, with a recent book titled “The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon” and numerous newspaper articles. He also taught as Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University and at the Elliot School of International Affairs, and appeared in many speaking engagements as an expert on Africa affairs.

His last assignment was as a Country Program Director for Africa Security Cooperation at the Defense Security Operation Agency. Previously, he served as Assistant Army Attaché to the US Embassy in Luanda, Angola. Prior to that, he was the Senior Africa Analyst, Office of US Army Deputy Chief of Staff. He also served in combat and stability deployments to the Balkans, commanded during Operation Desert Fox, and prepared a unit for deployment to Kosovo in 1999.

In 1991, LTC Beebe graduated from the US Military Academy at West Point and earned a Master of Arts degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Shannon will be missed by the FAO community.
The Founding of the FAO Association

On 17 October 1995, an informal discussion took place between a small group of FAOs located at the Pentagon. An ordinary session with an extraordinary outcome. The problem that was revealed during this pivotal discussion was that the Army had no way to contact FAOs in the active, reserve and retired communities. There was no database that captured these highly qualified individuals for the Army. The FAO Proponent was constantly receiving inquiries from the retired community seeking qualified FAOs, who were about to retire themselves or had already retired, for possible job opportunities in the civilian sector. The old-boy network was neither sufficient nor extensive enough to answer the volume of requests. Adding to the community’s communication problems, the FAO Proponent was forced to discontinue the publication of its only method for "getting the official word out" -- its newsletter -- for lack of funding. The question was how to solve these problems, a task Dr. Joseph Tullbane (a retired FAO himself) decided to tackle.

Over the next month, these ideas coalesced into the nascent FAO Association (FAOA), which Dr. Tullbane founded in concept on 30 Nov 1995. Overcoming the first issue facing the Army’s FAOA, there was enough support established to build up sufficient funds to become established. The subsequent months were occupied in creating a Board of Governors of former and current outstanding FAOs; writing a Charter, Articles of Incorporation, organizational elements such as brochures and applications, and creating initial data bases. By 1 Jan 1996, the FAOA was officially incorporated in Virginia.

The newly appointed Board of Governors met in February 1996 and validated the organizational steps taken so far. The Board members also created a series of goals and suggestions for where the association should go, as well as which member-services it should offer. The intent of the organization has, from the first, been to band together the officers of the various FAO regional areas of concentration and to provide an informal social and professional forum in which members could share ideas and experiences. FAOA is intended to unite active, reserve and retired FAOs in a mutually advantageous network, to both further Service goals and to help the individual FAOs as they advance through their military careers and their subsequent civilian careers.

At its two-year anniversary, the FAOA had over 750 members. It opened an web site (www.faoa.org) and began producing “the FAO Journal” -- our own military professional magazine.

Today, the membership has expanded farther than ever anticipated at its inception -- we now have Marine, Air Force, Navy, and other civilian FAO-like members. The future of the FAOA is bright. We hope to soon expand membership to include corporate sponsors to help fund our future activities. In the next two years we also hope to add a scholarship program for worthy FAO family members, and continue to expand upon the FAOA journal, *International Affairs.*
Introduction
The DoD has recently put increased emphasis on something it identifies as Irregular Warfare (IW). In truth, as in most art forms, IW is difficult to define; however most military professionals know it when they see it. In the January 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, IW is listed as a DoD Core Mission Area. That document defines IW as “operations in which the joint force conducts protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeat them through direct conventional military confrontation. IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support.”

IW is also more succinctly defined in JP 1-02 as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.” In the context of Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO is currently assisting Afghanistan to organize, train and equip their forces to the benefit of the nascent Afghan military, the Afghan government and ultimately the civilian populace. The Afghan military benefits greatly by gaining self-confidence and encouragement from the NATO community, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support.

As part of the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF), and now NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) from December 2009 to Nov 2010, I served as an air advisor to the Afghan Air Force (AAF). According to the Air Advisor Academy’s Charter, Air Advisors serve to “apply aviation expertise to assess, train, educate, advise and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet national needs in support of US interests.” My specific mission was to help them understand the utility and importance of airpower and, in particular, how to employ their Mi-17 helicopter force in support of their national objectives. Over the course of that year, I observed and participated in numerous missions with AAF crews that had a direct and positive impact on the lives of average Afghans. I also observed and participated in numerous direct action missions against Taliban forces. These are not mentioned in this article because I chose to highlight the building partnership and irregular warfare aspects of the NATC-A mission.

The AAF is a highly visible representation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) – a government that is struggling to establish its legitimacy among a far-flung and fiercely self-reliant population. Airpower, in the form of the AAF’s Mi-17s, provides GIRoA with an ability to reach the people, no matter how remote they are, and to help them meet their basic and humanitarian needs. This use of airpower demonstrates GIRoA responsiveness and commitment that Afghans are not likely to forget in their lifetimes. More important from a U.S. perspective, facilitating this kind of unmistakable connectivity between GIRoA and its population is at the very center of the NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan. According to Defense Secretary Gates, writing in the January 2009 edition of Foreign Affairs:

“Where possible, US strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as
The “Soldier-Statesmen”

important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more than, the fighting the United States does itself.”

This article describes the mission of NATC-A and highlights the ability of AAF airpower to support the strategic-level objectives as defined by the GIRoA and NATO.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a geographically unique area of the world. The country has some of the highest and most treacherous terrain anywhere. Temperatures can range from -50°F to 120°F in the most extreme locations. It is comprised of over 250,000 square miles of desert, mountainous and forested terrain. The highest mountains are in the northeastern Wakhan Corridor with the highest peak being Nowshak (24,557 feet / 7,485 meters). There are few high quality land transportation routes and airfields in Afghanistan. It has a very limited road system that is generally in poor condition. There are 12 paved runways, 34 unpaved runways and nine certified heliports. The more remote locations lack large airfields. Due to the poor state of roads and airports, a rural population (of which about half live in areas physically inaccessible for large parts of the year), and the slowly-developing civil aviation infrastructure, helicopters are critical for transportation of goods and services throughout the country. They are especially critical to supporting irregular warfare operations in Afghanistan.

Figure - The typical Afghan Airfield (Bamiyan)

NATC-A/AAF

The NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) is part of the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A) and is a critical piece in the mission of building partnerships with the Afghan government. NATC-A is headquartered at Camp Eggers in Kabul. The official mission of NATC-A is to “set the conditions for a professional, fully independent and operationally capable Afghan Air Force that meets the security requirements of Afghanistan today … and tomorrow.”

NATC-A is organized similar to a U.S. Air Force Wing as the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (438 AEW). The 438th AEW staff is located at Kabul International Airport. The 438th AEW is comprised of three Air Expeditionary Advisory Groups located in Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. The 438th AEW is equipped with Alenia C-27, Mil Mi-17 and Mil Mi-35 aircraft. NATC-A has 737 personnel, and includes members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force. It also includes members of the British, Canadian, Colombian, Czech Republic, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Mongolian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Ukrainian militaries as well as Afghan interpreters, all supporting the NATC-A mission.

The Afghan Ministry of Defense’s Guidance for Operational Planning (GOP) states that insurgent efforts to control the populace through intimidation and coercion remains the highest threat to the authority of the government and the general public’s faith in democratic institutions. Given the current political and economic challenges and harsh operational environment found in Afghanistan, the unique capabilities of the AAF rotary wing aircraft play a key role in executing IW operations. If all goes according to plan, NATC-A will train themselves out of a job after establishing self-sustainable training, maintenance and operations programs for the AAF.

The mission of the AAF is to “provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the air in support of the Afghan National Army and when directed by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff, to support by air the civil authorities of Afghanistan at all levels.” AAF missions include Presidential and Distinguished Visitor transportation, casualty evacuation, air mobility, training, and close air attack in support of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). This means the AAF must be ready to support a myriad of tasks as directed by the MoD.

The AAF is organized as a distinct subdivision of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA is currently divided into six geographically assigned infantry Corps, and one Capital Division, supported by the
single Air Force. In January 2011, the AAF had 57 aircraft and 4,098 airmen. It is on track to grow to a planned full strength of 146 aircraft and approximately 8,000 airmen. The AAF inventory will consist of both rotary and fixed wing training, cargo and light attack platforms. The majority of missions that the AAF accomplishes are congruent with those the DoD characterizes as IW missions. AAF airpower brings a significant asymmetrical capability unmatched by Taliban forces and as such, bolsters the Afghan government.

Recent AAF Irregular Warfare Operations

Disaster Relief

The Afghan government’s Guidance for Operational Planning cites the importance of the Afghan government’s capability to successfully respond to natural disasters as a major factor in reducing its vulnerability to internal and external threats. This capability is also listed as one of the strategic priorities for the Afghan Ministry of Defense. Nowhere does the AAF rotary wing force shine brighter than when it conducts disaster relief operations. In February 2010, heavy snows triggered deadly avalanches that killed approximately 150 people in the Salang Pass in north-central Afghanistan. Once notified of the tragedy, the AAF and NATO air advisors sprang into action using Mi-17s to fly soldiers and recovery equipment to the approximately 11,000 foot (3,353 meter) high disaster location. As a result of these quick actions, they rescued scores of Afghan civilians. Almost as important was the recovery of numerous deceased that succumbed to the calamity. Of note, Muslims are very sensitive to the quick recovery and burial of their dead. This is a very important capability the AAF currently provides to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The AAF is executing the requirement to move soldiers killed in action from the battlefield to their final ancestral burial site within 48 hours of notification. Movement usually requires a combination of rotary wing and fixed-wing aircraft to ensure timeliness while retaining maximum battlefield support capability. Also, the AAF is required to provide for the recovery and evacuation of injured ANSF personnel. The AAF aims to begin mission execution within one hour of notification and deliver any wounded ANA soldier to a level II medical facility within five hours of notification. They support patient transfers throughout the country. The positive reaction exhibited by the recipients of this capability and their families was immense.

Figure - Patient Transfer to ANA Base in Gardez

On 28 and 29 July 2010, the northwest corner of Afghanistan and the surrounding area was deluged with severe flooding. This disaster provided another opportunity for the AAF and NATC-A to provide vital humanitarian assistance. This particular mission occurred soon after the delivery of new Mi-17V5 aircraft, which were part of official U.S. government assistance to the Afghan military. The AAF leadership employed two of these new aircraft to assist the devastated region. Notably, these aircraft were equipped with rescue hoists, aft ramps, increased armor protection, and large side doors on both sides of the helicopter. What they lacked at the time of these missions were gun mounts for self protection. The crews on this mission consisted of one US mentor pilot per aircraft, a US crew chief and flight doctor on one of the aircraft with Afghan crew members filling out the remaining members of the 6-man Mi-17 crews. To the credit of the Afghan

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leadership, an Afghan Public Affairs (PA) cameraman was placed on board one of the recovery platforms. This cameraman was charged with the task of documenting the rescue operations.

On 28 July, the crews performed rescues in the eastern Laghman and Nangarhar provinces. These initial missions saved approximately 200 local nationals from the flood waters. After completing the rescues for that day, the crews intended to return to Kabul. Due to poor weather, they were forced to spend the night at the nearby air base in Jalalabad. At first light the next day, the crews resumed rescue operations in Nangarhar Province. After recovering approximately 40 additional people, the crews returned to Jalalabad to obtain fuel for the return trip to Kabul.

While on the ground, the Governor of Kunar requested the AAF to rescue more people from the flood waters. These rescues occurred in the Kunar Valley, a location notorious for routine Taliban small arms and RPG fire against AAF helicopters. Despite this risk, the combined Afghan/U.S. crews began recovering those in need of lifesaving assistance. These rescues involved many extraordinary feats of airmanship. The crews valiantly landed their aircraft in rushing water and landed precariously on the remains of a bridge washed out by raging flood waters to recover many stranded civilians. Notably, during the execution of these rescue missions a large, Taliban flag could be seen flying to the east of the recovery zone where the crews offloaded the recovered personnel. The Afghan civilians on scene informed the crews that this flag served as an unambiguous signal that the Taliban was observing the recovery operations in the area. Despite their unmistakably close proximity, the Taliban forces opted not to attack the aircraft and crews that day, as they were obviously helping them and their families survive the deadly floods. Also, during these missions it wasn’t uncommon to see Afghan civilians taking pictures of the event using personal cell phones.

Despite the extremely poor weather and the potentially high threat environment, the crews were credited with rescuing almost 2,100 Afghan civilians from the flood while only a few lost their lives. These same floods resulted in thousands perishing in nearby Pakistan. The strategic impact of these missions is still playing out. Evidence of the impact of these rescues is exhibited by the fact that the nearby Taliban foot soldiers observing the missions stood down for the duration while the AAF helicopters executed these rescue missions. Flush with confidence gained by accomplishing these challenging missions, the AAF deployed to Pakistan the following month to support the multinational flood relief efforts occurring there.

![Figure - Afghan Civilian Taking Picture of Rescue Mission with Personal Cell Phone](image)

### Humanitarian Support

AAF helicopters, with NATC-A assistance, also provided extensive support for a number of humanitarian missions. NATC-A members and AAF leadership developed a working relationship with two humanitarian organizations, Global Roots and the Central Asian Institute (made famous by the book “Three Cups of Tea” by Greg Mortenson). With the support of AAF leadership, the team began planning helicopter airlift missions to facilitate the construction of an orphanage in the remote Badakhshan Province. The AAF/NATC-A team also delivered school supplies to the towns of Bamiyan, Kabul, and Panjshir over this same period. These school supplies were typically donated by U.S. or coalition civilians that wanted to provide help to the children of Afghanistan. During these missions, members of both NATC-A and the AAF took the opportunity to interact with local men, women and children from the area on a one-on-one basis. These missions showed Afghans that both the Afghan military and its collation allies were able to operate freely in most areas of the country and more importantly, they would bring positive change with their presence. These missions provided a great amount of fulfillment for participating NATC-A mentors and AAF aircrew. It permitted positive contact among the Afghan people. It also showed
that the AAF truly had their best interests at heart and were not the “monsters” the Taliban claimed.

**COMING SOON***

ELECTIONS

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The mission involved employing two AAF Mi-17s to recover the ballots and two U.S. Army AH-64s to provide escort. The mission was executed successfully despite poor weather and the Taliban threats. Lieutenant Colonel Qudratullah Hotaki, one of the AAF pilots that participated in the mission, stated that in his thirty years of flying helicopters (which included flying with the Russians and Northern Alliance), he had not seen or participated in anything of this magnitude or complexity. The mission showcased the rapidly escalating operational capabilities the AAF was gaining as a result of the NATC-A training, support, and mentorship. The Kabul Wing Operations Group Commander, Brigadier General Asadullah Hashimi, stated that although the election support was very challenging for the AAF and was not without national controversy (with respect to the fairness of the elections), it was good for the Afghan people to see the AAF executing these complex missions. He also stated that as Afghanistan got more experience in holding elections, the elections would become more transparent and less challenging. Overall, AAF support of these elections had a major strategic impact on the Afghan populace as it illustrated the growing competence and proficiency of the Afghan military and Afghan government.

**Figure - Delivery of School Supplies to Towns in the Panjshir Valley**

**Election Support**

AAF helicopters also assisted in ballot distribution and collection for Afghanistan in the September 2010, Wolesi Jirga (Afghan Parliament) election. AAF helicopters delivered ballots to select, relatively secure locations throughout Afghanistan. Although a few areas were deemed too active with enemy activity, most areas were provided election ballots. In one particular instance, in the vicinity of the village of Dowlat Shah AAF aircraft were attacked with small arms and RPGs by Taliban forces as they attempted to deliver ballots to the village.

After the successful delivery of the ballots, the Taliban warned the AAF not to return to retrieve those ballots. The AAF aircrew and their NATC-A mentors were undaunted by the threats. NATC-A mentors formulated a plan to execute the mission to recover the ballots under cover of darkness. Only a few AAF aircrew were qualified to fly the Mi-17 using night vision goggles and were assigned exclusively to the Presidential Airlift Squadron. The Afghan pilots were briefed on the potentially dangerous mission and asked if they were willing to participate. The AAF crewmembers eagerly volunteered and were brought into the planning cell.

**Figure - Delivery of Ballots for use in the Afghan Parliamentary Elections**

**Banking**

In September 2010, the Afghan government turned to the AAF’s helicopter force to assist with a challenge to the Afghan economic structure. Nervous Afghan depositors had withdrawn the equivalent of $180m
million from the Kabul Bank over the course of two
days. Some had predicted a collapse in the country’s
financial system unless the Afghan government and
the United States moved quickly to help stabilize the
bank. It was thought that if Afghan depositors contin-
ued to withdraw their money at that rate, Kabul Bank
would almost certainly fail, undermining confidence in
the basic financial system the Afghans have been
trying to build with American help. The Afghan
government determined that cash deliveries to banks
throughout Afghanistan were the solution to the
issue. Concerns over security made land transporta-
tion untenable. Because of this, the Afghan govern-
ment tasked the AAF to deliver large sums of cash to
locations throughout Afghanistan. The majority of
these locations did not have access to a nearby
runway; therefore AAF helicopters were pressed into
service for this mission. The strategic impact of the
potential collapse of the Kabul Bank is hard to
estimate, as most Afghans do not use banks the way
Westerners do, but keeping the bank solvent
certainly supported the Afghan government's
legitimacy, while its failure would have served the
Taliban insurgency as a sign of the government's
inability to care for the peoples’ basic needs.

Conclusions

The unique environmental, political and topographical
nature of Afghanistan lent itself to extensive use of
rotary wing aircraft in support of numerous IW
missions. Current US strategy depends on an
effective and strong central government that is visible
and relevant to a population scattered across a huge
area that is difficult to reach. Thus far in Afghan
history, the goal of a strong central government has
never been attained. Development of Afghan
airpower, in particular the development of the Afghan
rotary wing capability, provides a direct and uniquely
powerful reinforcement of what many say is the
toughest challenge of US strategy. FM 3-24 Counter-
insurgency states:

“The counterinsurgent strategy focuses on
stability operations, addressing the root
causes of societal discontent through reforms
or reconstruction projects, performing
other measures to positively influence the
support of the people, and conducting combat
operations against insurgent forces.”

In the case of NATC-A/AAF rotary wing operations,
successful mission execution helped set the
conditions to gain the popular support of friendly
elements, address the root causes of discontent, and
positively influence the support of the people. The
rescue of a couple thousand of Afghans will certainly
incline those individuals less committed to the
insurgency and shift their support to the Afghan
government as a result. The rescue videos taken by
the Afghan PA officer, the cell phone pictures taken
by civilians, and the school supplies delivered by
AAF helicopters may be a deciding factor in
determining which path a tribal chief takes in
establishing his tribe’s future. It is clear that the AAF
is a requisite component of US and Afghan IW
operations. The NATC-A mentorship program that
facilitated these high payoff missions should be
nurtured and maintained.

About the Author:

Lieutenant Colonel Bernard M. Willi leads the
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earned his pilots wings with an initial assignment
flying Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). His
tours include service in the 56th Rescue Squadron in
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Operations Squadron at Kirtland AFB, NM as an
instructor. Willi served an exchange tour with the US
Navy at NAS North Island, CA, flying the SH-60F
and HH-60H and then transferred to Nellis AFB, NV
to eventually command the HH-60 Combined Test
Force. Following this assignment, Lt Colonel Willi
was assigned to Headquarters Air Combat Willi
recently completed a tour in Afghanistan as the
Deputy Commander of the 438th Air Expeditionary
Advisory Group where he flew the Mil Mi-17.
Despite projected withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, the US will continue to face asymmetric threats throughout the world, many of which emanate from under-governed spaces. In his influential *Foreign Affairs* article “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Secretary Gates said these threats are “the main security challenge of our time.” Security cooperation activities will continue worldwide, despite a reduction in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Setting the conditions for success in this environment, while working to satisfy the demands of eager combatant command (COCOM) staffs and host nation militaries, is a challenge. Frequently there is confusion and misinformation at many levels of the security cooperation “two way street.” Security cooperation professionals fulfill a key role ensuring organizational expectations are managed during planning, implementation, and supervision of activities. Security cooperation professionals are not only those at the “tip of the spear” in embassy teams and the combatant commands but also includes staff at independent defense agencies, non-military departments, the services, and various other organizations.

While administrative processes, available assets, and funding sources are inherent to all security cooperation activities, the implementation environment vary greatly. Security cooperation activities executed with a major NATO ally such as the United Kingdom, or a major non-NATO ally such as Jordan, will differ greatly from the types of activities executed with a less mature partner nation’s military, such as that of Democratic Republic of the Congo. The diversity and number of operational contexts necessitates a “cookie cutter” approach to security cooperation, but this does not preclude the need to tailor activities for unique settings.

Environmental factors impact security cooperation efficiency due to cultural, linguistic, and institutional differences. These differences can trigger unrealistic outcomes for both US providers and host nation recipients. Misunderstandings could potentially result in reduced desire for continued security cooperation. Four focus areas where expectations must be appropriately managed in order to reduce friction are time, decision-making, resources, and perception.

Differences in conceptualizing time drive many mutual misunderstandings, resulting in delayed or missed opportunities. This is most evident in planning cycles. Respective differences in timelines are not adequately understood between partner nations. There is often a large difference between US and partner nation planning timelines. Many militaries conduct planning on a one to two year cycle, or less, as the case may be. This contrasts significantly with US planning timelines of three to five years. Also, partner nations often do not have the staff capacity to adequately resource for the future given their fiscal challenges. A US planning staff could easily overwhelm their counterparts in terms of requests for information, resource queries, and long-term commitments.

Another associated timeline issue is the decision making cycle. Regarding US expectations with decision-making, LTC Bob Paddock, Security Cooperation officer in Tunisia says, “Most decisions on military cooperation are made at the highest levels. Any new initiative has a very long approval process. In general, the US expects more of its partners than they can give and expects decisions to occur at a similar level and on a similar timeline as we have in the US.” Frequently decision-making and commitment authority on behalf of the COCOM or service is vested in a senior officer at the Colonel level. While this same level of delegation can be found in a well-established partner like the United Kingdom, it is frequently not the case in many developing countries, or even in some NATO countries.
Developing partners’ decision-making cycles are often tied to complex chain of command hierarchies where all decisions are made at political-strategic levels (CJCS or Service Chief equivalent). While serving as Security Assistance Officer in Nigeria, LTC Tom Cook experienced this bureaucratic system first hand with a large developing country partner and recipient of US military aid. As part of a normal IMET case, a soldier was designated to attend a small-boat outboard motor repair course in the US. However, because several senior Nigerian military leaders were unavailable, the approval decision was unobtainable within the normal timeline. At the last minute the Nigerian soldier was identified, appropriate permissions obtained, and training attended. While common, these situations create and reinforce existing opposing stereotypes with both US and partner nation organizations.

LTC Cook further said, in his experience, these traits “are more the norm than the exception and reflect fragile societies where control is important.” That these same nations often also present the most likely future operating environments for US forces is not coincidental.

Combatant command and service component command staffs often lack depth in terms of personnel who have worked on the ground in their respective AORs. One of the chief responsibilities for security assistance officers is to act as a conduit to both clients and providers to communicate mutual expectations. The US military culture can clash with the military cultures of the partner nations. This is particularly true of staffs characterized by officers with a great depth of recent combat experience in operational and tactical assignments.

The current US military operational environment and fiscal climate make resourcing security cooperation activities difficult. Comments such as “we’ve had 3 JCETs cancelled in 2 years due to requirements in other countries,” “demand for Army forces for OEF/OIF (Operation New Dawn) has created an operational tempo (OPTEMPO) that is keeping the US Army either deployed, getting ready to deploy, or just returning from deployment,” and “there is not even a whole lot ‘left over,’ even in the USAR and ARNG, to support security cooperation and build partner capacity,” reflect these impacts.

The ability to fill US force requirements for security cooperation activities is an acute challenge for combatant commands that do not possess assigned forces. While US security cooperation personnel understand the limitations attached to being part of a military at war, many of our partners do not. Continual canceling or rescheduling of exercises or combined training events due to resource scarcity can be problematic. Frequently our partners have unrealistic expectations of US capacity to provide forces because of their misinterpretations of US military capabilities. Partner nation perception is that the US can bring an “endless stream of resources and finances” to bear.

Many security cooperation activities involve highly specialized units and training. Specialized engineering, intelligence functions, medical services and other “low-density” capabilities are some of the most in-demand forces for deployment in support of US operational forces. Mr. Mark Devlin, a retired US Army Colonel (and former Security Assistance Officer to Yemen and Italy) now employed as a senior Army civilian working security cooperation issues, says, “without assigned forces and enablers, we either burden the Global Force Management/Request For Forces (GFM/RFF) system with ‘onesy-twayne’ requests that it is not designed to handle, or we take the capability out of hide, and do it with our current small staff.” The current RFF system is not adequately designed to most effectively produce small, tailored teams for the types of familiarization.

**Quotable Quote …**

““There is no such thing as impartial governance or humanitarian assistance. In this environment, every time you help someone, you hurt someone else.”

-- General Rupert Smith, Commander UNPROFOR 1995

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training most often conducted in less mature theaters. The system remains focused on responding to request for forces with large units. Planners at joint combatant commands are not always aware of the force limitations facing subordinate service component commands or have direct operational experience on the ground in the combatant command’s AOR.

A key area related to resources where security cooperation personnel must delicately mitigate issues is comparing “needs vs. wants.” “Foreign nations must develop their own plans for growth and stability before they request US assistance,” writes COL Scott Wuestner in “Building Partner Capacity” for the US Army Strategic Studies Institute. The ability to rationally and objectively view threats and challenges is difficult. Sometimes this can place partner militaries at odds with their own political leadership. Many partner nations do not have an adequate institutional capacity to fully assess the state of their own forces and make realistic evaluations of what activities would be most beneficial. Also, in places where US security cooperation is nascent, partner sensitivity negatively impacts the veracity of assessments and hinders host nation decisions on training.

In some cases, US security cooperation efforts are a victim of US forces’ successes. Partner nations have closely observed US forces’ combat performance during the current wars, while consuming open source AARs, lessons learned, and best practices reports. This is especially true for those partners facing many of the same challenges as Afghanistan and Iraq such as insurgent/criminal networks, weak border security, and complex urban terrain. Increased awareness drives the demand for UAVs, helicopter gunships, complex individual soldier kit, and other items when these same partners would be better served with sustained junior NCO leadership or basic soldier skill training. Again many of these wants are based upon capabilities that are also in high demand with US forces for ongoing operations. These situations require subtle military diplomacy because it is important for the US to not be viewed as “telling” rather than “listening.”

The education for security cooperation personnel where the curriculum remains focused on Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in spite of the fact that FMS makes up only a small portion of the types of activities needed and executed with most partner nations. These processes were not designed to be quickly reactive to meet emerging opportunities. Describing the traditional mechanisms for funding, COL Dykeman explains in his article entitled “Security Cooperation: A Key to Understanding Challenges of the 21st Century,” “most State Department funded security assistance programs like FMS require multiple years to be put in place.” It is difficult enough for US security cooperation professionals to fully grasp and understand the US funding process, let alone our partner nations.

Following 2006’s Summer War between Israel and Hizballah in Southern Lebanon US Central Command sought to establish a comprehensive “train and equip” mission funded through 1206 authorities to build increased capacity in the Lebanese Armed Forces. This was intended to reinforce the Government of Lebanon as the defender of the state and delegitimize the role of Hizballah. However, from its inception the program suffered from fitful starts and stops from 2007 to 2009, as the funding available for this program varied by the tens of millions making long term planning difficult.

Maximizing success in the long term requires a dependable and predictable funding stream. Resource scarcity will continue into the foreseeable
future. Combat requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan despite planned reductions will endure. The overall budgetary situation necessarily reflects the reality of the current global fiscal climate. Defense budget supplemental funding has provided much of the “growth” in security cooperation activities since 2001. These activities will have to compete in a resource scarce environment against legitimate force demands for training and exercises. The current operational environment, described at the recent AFRICOM Theater Security Cooperation Conference as “constrained,” simply reflects the realities of competing demands on a military at war.

There are simply not enough units or personnel available to meet all demands generated by the system. Those available often do not have the requisite cultural training and expertise to operate fluently in a cultural environment that is removed from major military operations. Resource availability directly influences perceptions of security cooperation activities. This is true not only in dealing with partner nations but also with interagency partners. Secretary Gates himself has called attention to the mismatch in resources available between the Departments of State and Defense. This is problematic because both organizations share responsibility for security cooperation activities. Frequently one hears “relationships matter” in security cooperation.

Inaccurate modeling and mirroring, within US interagency or with foreign partners, can skew perceptions. Particularly in the US interagency this is due to the vast mismatch of resources between DoD and non-defense stakeholders. The military agencies, departments, and services are populated with heavily professionally educated and experienced personnel from which to form planning and operational staffs. This is one reason the State Department’s Political-Military Bureau borrows heavily from military manpower to populate its staff. There is not another US government agency that has a professional education system like the military. Secretary Gates says he will, “never miss an opportunity to call for more funding for diplomacy and development and for a greater emphasis on civilian programs for investing in government other than the military.”

Problems result when military personnel inaccurately mirror their professional cultural, organizational, and institutional experiences with foreign militaries or governments. Bureaucratic cultural differences exist even among different US governmental departments. Security assistance professionals must play a key role in providing the cultural interpretation between partner nations and US security cooperation organizations. A well-intentioned group of US military operational planners could easily overwhelm their counterparts. It is important to keep expectations accurately targeted to what is achievable while maintaining sensitivity to others’ interests and professionalism.

Resource mismatch can awe less developed partner nations and stifle their willingness to be transparent. The US military’s low context culture conflicts with many of our partners’ high-context cultures where direct communication are not always the preferred method. The expectation for a frank and open exchange of information can lead US personnel to appear as arrogant or seeking to embarrass partner nations. Sometimes this is a result of a limited cultural understanding and a lack of awareness all partners desire to be treated as professional equals.

It is imperative to recognize that security cooperation involves an honest and frank dialogue based upon needs, capability, and capacity. Matching security cooperation activities with absorption capacity is an essential task for relationship building. Obviously these are sensitive issues for any military and national government. Frequently the US will want to move faster and farther than our partners are prepared to commit. The reasons for deliberate action must be explained and tempered by the lead US agencies, as must confirmation of partner nations’ understanding of US goals with regards to security cooperation efforts.

Managing expectations remains key to opening a dialogue where the US can “listen rather than talk” to put the partner nations at ease in order to facilitate cooperation. This will encourage frankness in conversation and encourage more effective security cooperation activities. Without engendering host nation “buy-in” any gains achieved risk being temporary. One of the most effective tools for creating dialogue and building trust between organizations is senior leader engagement. Such engagement also allows a
unique opportunity to influence or manage expectations for a higher command. Many of the same lessons could be applied to US interagency senior leader interactions.

Particularly in developing states, before security cooperation activities can take place, effective senior leader engagement must occur. Many partners utilize a top-down planning and execution methodology. Exposing US senior leaders, who most likely have little to no security cooperation experience outside Iraq, Afghanistan or NATO, to other military cultures, can provide a unique perspective to security cooperation activities. Enlightening senior leaders on the particular challenges facing security cooperation personnel will enable them to provide more effective guidance to operational planners while enhancing their ability to advise commanders of potentially successful COAs.

Where ungoverned spaces and weak institutions are numerous, relationships are essential to successful implementation. The same is true on staffs where security cooperation is planned and resourced. The relationships between those staff officers with direct security cooperation experience in their respective area of operations and key decision makers are crucially important for ensuring well-implemented strategies. Better security cooperation activities through planning and execution highlight the need for patience at the ASCC or COCOM level in order to prevent a similar reaction from the US perspective.

All of these factors place a premium on security cooperation professionals capable of shaping an environment for success, both with domestic agencies and foreign partners. A major role is managing expectations. This helps prevent institutional fatigue at either end of the security cooperation pipeline. Numerous US leaders have reinforced that security cooperation will become increasingly important in the future. An accurate management of expectations regarding activities, which are inherently difficult to measure in terms of effectiveness, will help balance the expenditure of limited resources under constrained fiscal environments.

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Major Jason B. Nicholson is a US Army Sub-Saharan Africa FAO serving at US Embassy Tanzania. His previous assignments include Political-Military Strategist for Middle East and Africa Branch at HQDA, G-3/5/7 and Political-Military Planner for Lebanon, Syria, and Israel at the Joint Staff, J5. He holds a Masters in Public Policy from Georgetown University. Major Nicholson’s next assignment is Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Uganda.

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It is easy, with America’s current involvement in the Middle East, and with so much written about the region after 11th Sep, to overlook the military strategic opinions and views of Arab strategic thinkers. Additionally, the language barrier makes the study of contemporary military writings by Arab generals intimidating in American staff colleges. Nonetheless, America’s national security and in particular its future military leaders, who today define their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, demands an analysis of books written by Arab generals and the incorporation of their views in the curriculum of US command and staff colleges. Just as we passionately kept updated with Russian military thought during the Cold War, the same aggressive scholarship is needed with Arabic books on military thought in order to enhance our ability to combat Islamist extremism.

Dr. Salah Salem, an Egyptian Army General ranks among Egypt’s most important strategic thinkers and lecturer on military and political affairs. He has reduced his views into a book published in 2001, titled, “Hurub Al-Mintaqa Al-Arabiyyah: Al-Mawqif Al-Siyasi and Misri,” translated, “Wars of the Arab Region: Egypt’s Political Posture.” It represents a survey of wars that have involved Egypt since 1948 (the first Arab-Israeli War) to more recent conflicts in Somalia, the Sudanese civil war and Operation Desert Storm; with a discussion on the negative and positive national security consequences Egypt faced with each conflict. Salem also discusses what he sees as potential crises the Middle East will confront in the 21st century, with a discussion on resource based conflicts, nuclear proliferation and much more. Published by Dar-Al-Shirook Press in Cairo, the book runs 325 pages. This review essay will focus on Salem’s views regarding wars that have had a direct impact on Egyptian national security, as well as his discussions on future wars of the Middle East. What makes Salem’s book significant is his focus on current wars of the last two decades with a theoretical discourse on sources of warfare in the Arab world in future years. Most Egyptian Generals focus their writings on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in this book represents only one chapter. Salem surveys past Arab-Israeli wars but also adds a troubling section on Egyptian perceptions of Israeli nuclear strike options. This is troubling, because the book contains no reference to global terrorism and shows a persistent fixation on Israel, despite the passage of over 25 years of peace between the two nations; a product of the Camp David Accords. It is my hope that we can bring such military academics as Salem, armed with an interpreter to share the Egyptian perspective of different regional conflicts, with US military cadets and midshipmen as well as war college students. We can disagree with his theories on Egyptian national security, but getting this insight is important, as the stability of the Middle East has been inextricably linked to America’s national security.

Definition of Military Terms

Salem’s opening chapters lay the foundation for the rest of the book by educating Arab readers to the various terms used in the vocabulary of political-military affairs. He defines these terms; many of which are familiar to American military readers and are taken directly from western sources, such as preemptive war and general nuclear war. Salem’s book however does contain a few pages on terms specifically used in Islamic warfare. He writes that Islam divides warfare into two categories each with its own rules to justify its undertaking. The first is inter-Muslim warfare, in which Islamic scholars have justified under certain conditions such as (keep in mind these rules were developed between 7th and 9th century AD):

- When two Muslim factions disagree and have exhausted negotiations and third party mediation, then warfare is sanctioned, and usually against the uncompromising party.
- If two Muslim factions who have settled their disagreement through mediation or agreement and one faction breaks the peace then war is sanctioned.
- If a Muslim tribe or faction breaks a mediated settlement, witnessed by a tribal confederacy, then war is sanctioned.

Salem cites the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a classic and modern example of an Islamic nation breaking the peace and ignoring mediation. This led to several Islamic jurists sanctioning the cooperation of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States in joining a western coalition to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait.
The second category is Muslim warfare against non-Muslims. Here Salem, a military man and strategist, quotes from the Quran, verse 190 of the chapter of the Calf (al-Baqarah). His analysis turns modern Islamist extremist opinions on jihad on its head by arguing that warfare against non-Muslims is sanctioned to repel aggression and to preserve the ability to freely express Islamic ideas through the protection of free religious expression of all peoples (Muslims and Non-Muslims). Islam, Salem writes, does not sanction warfare based on asabiyah (tribalism) and unsuriyah (racism) such as wars of colonization and subjugation. The focus of early Islamic scholars was not keys to paradise and virgins but the questions of what is a moral justification for warfare and the conduct of war. The freedom to practice one's faith is a fundamental right in seventh century Islam and this was derived from the Meccan genocide of early Muslims that led to Prophet Muhammad's migration to Medina, north of Mecca. This early Muslim genocide by the Meccans, also saw the importance of Christians who provided asylum to Muslims escaping religious persecution. Salem's book does not delve into the details of why Prophet Muhammad made a conscious policy decision to wage war on the Meccans and his thirty-seven battles that represent the early evolution of the Quran's seventy verses on warfare, that have their origins when Muhammad led the city tribal confederacy of Yathrib, that would evolve into Medina.

**Egypt's National Security Gains and Losses in the Four Arab-Israeli Wars**

Salem gives a quick synopsis of the history and reasons for each conflict which will not be covered in this review essay as there are many books from Arab and Israeli sources that provide in-depth details of each of the Arab-Israeli Wars, including Somalia and the other conflicts cited in the book. However, what is of interest is the author's assessment of what Egypt gained and lost from a national security perspective in each conflict.

**The 1948 Arab-Israeli War:** The poor showing of Egyptian arms and the lack of quality weapons and training led a discontented group of officers and troops to undertake radical changes within the armed forces. This change necessitated the removal of the old regime of King Farouk I. Thus, the seeds of the July 1952 Revolution that ended Egypt's Mohammed Ali dynasty were sown. Another result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was the obsession with forming a national popular army that was to be provided the most modern arms available. This is significant for it meant that Egypt would acquire the latest weapons from any source that would offer them. This began President Nasser's courtship with the Soviet Union and the signing of the infamous Czech Arms Deal of 1955, one of several reasons for the start of the 1956 Suez Crisis (or second Arab-Israeli war).

**The 1956 Suez Crisis:** The most important lesson derived from this conflict by the Egyptian military was that it could not militarily resist the combined forces of Israel, England, and France. To compound this, the Egyptians were completely unprepared to mount a robust and costly defense of Egypt. What Egypt needed was to combine the knowledge of military sciences with the new technologies they were absorbing from the Soviets. Egyptian military leaders wanted to find ways to benefit from the new military technology offered by the Eastern Block, while at the same time learning the doctrine, technical aspects and techniques of this technology. This is a problem Arab armies have struggled with, and in the case of Egypt, it did not truly begin finding ways to incorporate technology with doctrine until after the 1967 Six-Day War. The easy political victory brought on by the intervention of President Eisenhower, and his Soviet counterpart Khrushchev, on behalf of Egypt led to military leaders not addressing this as expeditiously as initially assessed after the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Further results of the 1956 Suez Crisis were the conscious military policy decision to abandon any western style military doctrine and totally embrace Soviet military doctrine and tactics. Egypt also entered into a program of localized military production after this war, starting with small-arms and grenades, then expanding into experimentation with chemical weapons. The Egyptian military today is fixated on any opportunities for co-production, and according to Salem this began after 1956; and has over the decades included the military co-production of jet trainers with Germany [the Jumhuriya (Republic)-5 aircraft] as well as with India (the Cairo-300 jet trainer). The Egyptian Navy was given a massive infusion of resources with a focus on the ability to repair, refurbish and overhaul warships and transports at Alexandria Naval Base. Aside from military self-sufficiency, other motives for Egypt's military co-production programs included: 1) being a jobs program for citizens, 2) preserving hard-currency used to pay for weapons and repairs, and 3) finally, bolstering Egypt's prestige in the region as having the capability to manufacture complex weapons systems.
1967 Six-Day War: This particular conflict can only be described as an Egyptian debacle for both the civilian and military sectors, the Arabic word to describe this particular traumatic conflict is **Naksah** (setback). The author spends time analyzing the strategic gains and losses of this particular conflict. Soon after the Six-Day War, Egypt set about laying serious plans to restore and restructure the Egyptian military by appointing a few highly critical military minds like General Abdel-Moneim Riad and General Madkoor Aboul-Aez; both were advocates of securing Egypt's airspace before proceeding with rebuilding its ground forces. Neither cowered before their respective war ministers. Egyptian military scholars divide the inter-war period between the 1967 and 1973 wars into four overlapping phases:

- **Sumood (Pause)** from June 1967 to August 1969: Primary goal was the reconstruction and self-examination of Egyptian defense policy, equipment and training and the analysis of military options to return the Sinai by force.

- **Difaa Al-Nahshet (Static Defense)** September 1968 to February 1969: A primary objective of this phase was to keep the Israelis in a constant state of stress and high level of alert through the amassing and shifting of artillery along the canal zone. The Egyptians opened fire irregularly and infiltrated Special Forces, as well as PLO guerillas, into the Sinai to harass Israeli Defense Force (IDF) patrols and bases.

- **Istinzaaf (Attrition)** March 1969 to August 1970: This is different from static defense which concentrated on harassment. This phase added the element of experimenting with artillery and multiple rocket launchers to breach the IsraeliBar-Lev Line with a secondary mission of causing maximum loss to Israeli troops manning the line. Although this ended up being just an intensive form of harassment for the Israelis, the Egyptians began seriously discussing methods of breaching the Bar-Lev Line and used this to gauge reaction times of Israeli forces along the Sinai. These lessons would be incorporated into the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

- **Iqaf Al-Niran (Cease-fire)** August 1971-October 1973: A US brokered cease fire was used by the Egyptians to draw upon the lessons of the attrition phase. The Egyptian general staff opened consultations and detailed tactical studies with the Soviets during this phase analyzing such topics as the weaknesses of the F-4 Phantom Jet Fighter as seen in studies of the Vietnam War. Aside from the phases, the author also discusses the importance of securing internal dissent and political intrigue that was seen to degrade the strength of Egypt's ability to project power externally. Salem does not go into details about Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, who was so political and occupied so many non-Military postings that involved making money that he scarcely focused on preparing Egypt for war. Another aspect of securing Egypt's internal security was the conversion of Egyptian industries into a wartime footing. A valuable lesson for the Egyptians was the importance of integrating civilian industries with military production.

What is revealing in Salem's analysis is that the Egyptians made a strategic decision to fight the next war with no Soviet advisors and that they expelled them from Egypt as soon as practicable. This would occur in late 1971 by President Sadat, but the author indicates this decision was part of Egypt's political-military strategy formulated when Nasser was still President (1954-1970). After the 1967 War, Nasser and senior leaders took several important steps that re-organized the defense establishment, such as:

- The immediate replacement of the War Minister, his Chief of Staff and head of operations.
- The creation of National Defense Council and a Higher Council of the Armed Forces (a primitive form of a National Security Council and military Joint Chiefs of Staff).
- Nasser gave up the portfolio of General Commander of the Armed Forces and designated this title to the Minister of Defense. He appointed two Deputy Defense Ministers to assist the Defense Minister. The title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Commander-in-Chief) was retained by Nasser.
- Egypt created a new and fourth -- the first three are the Army, Navy and Air Force -- branch of the armed forces, the Egyptian Air Defense Force which was separate from the Egyptian Air Force.
- The 2nd and 3rd Army Groups were created with a distinct staff and positioned along the length of the Suez Canal in conjunction with two regional strategic centers in the Canal Zone and Red Sea.
- Egyptian Border Guards were created.
- The Egyptian Special Forces (saqqah) and paratroopers were given their own distinct and separate command; as well as a closer command and control of the civil guard was instituted.
- Plan 200 was developed as the first stage of what would become Operation Badr - the crossing of the Sinai and securing of the bridgeheads.
The 1973 Yom-Kippur War: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is celebrated by Egyptians as a victory. No doubt the deception of Israeli, Soviet and US intelligence as to the time when Egypt and Syria made its surprise combined attack on Israel, coupled with the innovative tactics employed by Egyptian forces crossing the canal and breaching the Bar-Lev Line, were great feats of achievement in the annals of military history. But overall, Egyptian public history stops at the crossing of the Suez Canal and its subsequent recapture. There is no discussion, except in detailed military memoirs by Generals Fawzy, Shazly and Gamassy on the surrounding of the Egyptian 3rd Army and the crossing of Israeli forces into Egypt proper at Deservoir. Salem’s book deduces the following national strategic issues from the 1973 War, that still have application today among Egyptian military thinkers, as evidenced by the fact that Salem’s book was published only four years ago. They include:

- maintaining a balance of power with Israel and maintaining strategic deterrence;
- creating self-sufficiency in military production that encompasses light weapons, armor, and military export capacity; and
- developing an Egyptian aerospace industry, electronic warfare capacity, missile development and guidance systems co-production.

Salem cites the co-production of the 122-mm howitzer and M1A1 Abrams Tank at Abu Zabel as examples of how Egypt is working to attain a sophisticated level of military manufacturing.

Egypt spends much effort and treasure worrying about Israel, a nation in which it has been at peace with for over 25 years. This is regrettable, as the Egyptian armed forces and the geo-strategic importance of Egypt can be a source for positive change and great potential as evidenced by:

- a field hospital in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
- working with Israel to ensure stability in Gaza and dealing with tunneling and cross-border weapons smuggling between Egypt, Gaza and Israel
- a first-responder with humanitarian aid to the Darfur region of Sudan as well as providing several peacekeeping battalions and a medical aid station to alleviate suffering in that troubled region
- efforts by Egypt to immediately accommodate coalition forces through the Suez Canal; and
- an enthusiasm to adopt western military doctrine and the ability to project a mass of peacekeeping forces in Africa, Europe and the Asia

Arab Regional Wars

Salem’s book divides the Arab-Israeli conflicts separately from other modern wars of the 20th century that have impacted Egypt such as the Yemen War (1962-1967), the First Gulf War (which is commonly known in the west as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and Somalia. He provides a fresh Arab, and in particular Egyptian, perspective on the impact these wars have had on Egyptian military thought.

The Yemen War (1962-1967): Known as Egypt’s Vietnam, the history of the origins of this war are fairly straightforward - Egypt wanting to spread pan-Arabism and sweep away old Arab monarchies intervened in a revolution of Yemeni Army Officers who overthrew the ruling Imam of Yemen. This led to a civil war between monarchists and republicans over control of the country. Finally, this would evolve into both a regional proxy war that pitted Egypt against monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Sheikhdoms, Jordan and clandestinely Israel. It also was a chance for France and Britain to get even for the 1956 Suez Crisis and undermine Nasser, whom they considered a basic dictator. This conflict would spiral into the splitting of Yemen into North and South, with the North being the first and only communist Arab nation. This essay will only focus on the impact this war had on Egyptian military thinking:

- A serious development of Egyptian military-political thought, it was this war that led the Revolutionary Command Council to view the Clausewitzian edict of warfare being an extension of policy by other means. It was after this war the Nasser Higher Military Academy was established to give senior Egyptian officers a linkage between military and political objectives and robust discussions of national security and instruments of Egyptian national policy.

Quotable Quote …

“Any fool can criticize and complain … and most fools do.”

-- Benjamin Franklin

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The elaboration of an Egyptian (Nasserite) policy to provide support to those nations in the region who are striving for their independence, self-determination, and freedom from colonialism. Egypt sponsored national liberation movements in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, meddled in internecine fighting among Syrian generals and supported Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas; the PLO being created by Nasser in 1959. It also had a standing policy to oppose any power that prevents pan-Arabism and supports those who endorse it; thus Nasser’s strategic decision to move towards the Soviet sphere.

Egyptian general staff also understood acutely the problems of limited resources. The Yemen War prevented Egyptian projects for hardened bunkers for new MiG fighters. Salem argues that Egypt could not sustain a war on two fronts, Yemen and Israel. This lack of preparedness in Egypt would provide a serious advantage to the Israelis in the 1967 Six-Day War, in particular the aerial blitzkrieg that wiped out Egyptian airpower in hours.

Egyptian officers neglected the ability to wage conventional warfare and were consumed by the guerilla and psychological warfare campaigns waged in Yemen. This would haunt Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War. An Egyptian side benefit to this was the focus on the importance of airlift and sealift in projecting and sustaining Egyptian military power over 3,000 kilometers. Egyptian arms also looked into developing mobile, rapid, and airborne rapid response tactics.

The First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War): This war would last eight years, with Saddam Hussein firing the first shot on what he thought was a tottering regime brought about by Ayatollah Khomeini. Iraqi objectives were to expand its territory in Arabstan and the Shatt Al-Arab waterway. Salem writes that this long war would teach Egyptian officers the importance of domestic military production, to vary sources of arms, and the effectiveness of deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction and the world response to the use of these weapons. The end of Egyptian military observation was the importance of non-proliferation agreements and the banning of WMD use in world’s armies. No mention is made of Egypt’s role in supporting the Iraqis in their war against Iran with military advisors, technical assistance and weapons sales.

The Second Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm): Operation Desert Storm is still avidly studied by Egyptian military officers as evidenced by Salem devoting ten pages to this particular conflict. Egyptians expanded their view on the important balance of power in the Middle East beyond just Israel and Egypt and began looking at the impact of other regimes in the region attaining a military edge like Iran and Iraq, and how this impacts Egyptian security. Sadly, he delves into a discussion over the importance of keeping Saddam’s Iraq militarily weak to enhance Israel’s security but not weak enough to be invaded by Iran. Despite this obsession with Israel that is recurring throughout the book, Egyptian military thought began viewing the military developments of Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria more closely. Egyptian military leaders also called for increases in military expenditures and American military aid to modernize its forces as any remnants of old-style Soviet doctrine left in Egypt was completely discredited after Desert Storm. Also recognized was the importance of coalition building before beginning a major war; however, Salem seems to have remained attached to Arab unity and Arab coalition building which has been useless in addressing conflict in the region. What did emerge from Desert Storm was a form of Arab coalition of the willing. The Arab states that participated in the Gulf War Coalition signed the Damascus Declaration to incorporate Syria, Egypt, and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to a commitment to be a first line of defense when Middle East conflicts flare up in order to relieve the European Union and the United States from intervening in the region. This agreement would not be successful except in the realm of military exchanges for training.

Arab Civil Wars and Regional Border Skirmishes

Salem devotes a chapter in the discussion of Egyptian military viewpoints of Arab civil wars, starting with Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia, then ending with the border disputes of the nations that share the Nile River. He also addresses border disputes among Arab Gulf states. Each would be analyzed by Egyptian military strategists. This essay will not cover the border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait which predates Operation Desert Storm, nor will it cover the civil war between communist (North) Yemen and the republican Yemen Arab Republic; as well as border skirmishes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Salem also discusses the border disputes between Bahrain and Qatar, Iran and the Emirates, and the Western Sahara dispute between Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario Front (Sahrawis). All of which Salem does not link to Egypt’s national security interests, but these conflicts are discussed in Egyptian military war colleges.
Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989): Salem pays close attention to the Syrian deployment of forces and their effective use of helo-borne troops. He also discusses the use of proxy armies of resistance to weaken Israeli forces in Lebanon. Israel’s military prowess in Operation Peace for Galilee confirmed the undeniable fact of the Jewish state and affirmed the Egyptian decision to seek peace with Israel. Egyptians looked at the impact the fielding of an expeditionary force in Lebanon had on the Israeli economy; attempting to derive models as to how long the Israelis could sustain a force outside its borders.

Kurdish Civil Insurrection in Iraq: Egyptian observations of Saddam Hussein’s campaigns against the Kurds include the overall strategic view that as long as the Kurds enjoyed Iranian patronage they would be safe. The United States would take over part of the protection of the Kurds in Operation Northern Watch and bring them real autonomy in Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, when Iran withdrew its support of Kurdish factions, Saddam’s forces were able to deal crushing blows on them. This outside assistance provided the Kurds would be used rightly or wrongly as a justification for Saddam’s genocide. Arguing that their affiliation with outside powers represented a clear and present danger to Iraq’s national security, this view was shared by many Arab nations that had troublesome minorities, like the Shiites in the Arab Gulf states. It offered a new look at rules of engagement for Arab regimes, which was to use a groups’ outside assistance, be it western or regional, as a pretext for purges of minority groups. These are interesting observations that can only be found in an Arabic book like Salem’s and confirms the importance of tribes, cliques and kin in ensuring internal security.

Somalia (Operation Restore Hope): Egyptian military thinkers see the overarching strategic problem of continuing civil strife in Somalia as a threat to the security of the strategic Bab-el-Mandab Strait by which commerce and tankers pass towards the Suez Canal with cargo and oil for Europe and Israel. They also view Somali instability as impacting the security of Blue Nile and thereby threatening water sources for both Egypt and Sudan. Salem always inserts a reference to Somali and Sudanese instability as a means for Israel to insert itself into a conflict and gain an advantage along the Red Sea coast. The Egyptian views are reinforced by the planned blockade of the Bab-el-Mandab Strait during the outbreak of the 1973 War.

North-South Sudanese Civil War: July 2005 would see the formation of a Government of National Unity (GONU) that would hopefully end a long civil war between the Muslim majority in the North and the Sudanese non-Muslim minorities in the South. Perhaps the most defining worry for Egypt would be the separation of the Southern Sudan as an independent state and any unity with Uganda and Ethiopia, be it military or economic, that would lead to control of the sources to the Nile.

Conflict over Water
Salem believes the next wars of the region will revolve on a competition for resources and will likely be over water with the following flashpoints:

- Turkey, Syria and Iraq going into conflict over the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.
- Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and any future Palestinian state sharing the water reservoirs and the Jordan River.
- Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania sharing the Nile River, and its tributaries and sources.

Israeli Nuclear Dominance
The Israelis do not acknowledge whether they have nuclear weapons or not. Their policy of nuclear ambiguity is a form of deterrence. This has not stopped Egyptian military thinkers from spending much time and effort dealing with the probability that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them on regional adversaries. Salem devotes an entire chapter on the subject.

Salem’s chapter begins with a discussion of weapons systems that Egyptian strategists covet. They include the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system
and unmanned aerial delivery systems that can be guided to a missile and detonated. Egyptians feel that Israel has one or two kiloton warheads and believe the Lance Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) to be the delivery system of choice for targeting Arab capitals. Another fixation are tactical nuclear weapons of less than one kiloton that disable electronic systems during an Arab-Israeli wars of the future. Salem writes that an important aspect of Israeli nuclear deterrence from Egypt’s perspective is the Ofek-3 Satellite which the author believes enables the Israels to constantly reprogram their targeting packages. He provides no sources for this information in the book. Salem also expresses concern about the Israeli Dolphin-class submarines, and argued that Israel’s air, ballistic and submarine force represent a triad of nuclear deterrence against Arab nations.

Salem reflects the likely thinking of many Egyptian strategists who believe that Israel likely possessed 13 tactical nuclear weapons during the 1973 War and feel this arsenal has increased to 200 bombs of various kilo-tonnages. Salem then discusses the Egyptian perspective of how Israel acquired nuclear weapons from 1968 to the present. Yet what is revealing is the mirror-imaging of the Israelis and targeting packages the Egyptians have developed; writing that the Arabs need only three tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, yet the Israeli retaliatory response against the Arabs would likely include:

- Aswan High Dam and Euphrates Dams between Iraq and Syria.
- Egyptian urban centers of Cairo, Giza, Aswan and Alexandria.
- Syrian urban centers of Homs, Hama, and Damascus.
- Iraqi urban centers of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.
- Jordanian urban centers of Amman, Zarqa and Irbid.
- Saudi Arabian cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca and Taif (note the oil rich eastern province is not included in Salem’s calculus).
- Libyan urban centers of Benghazi and Tripoli.
- Troop concentrations amassing towards Israel could be neutralized using smaller nuclear payloads.

Conclusions

Salem’s final chapter refers to work on Israel’s nuclear ambiguity policies and options by Dr. Shai Feldman’s of Tel Aviv’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. This indicates that Egyptian military strategists, and likely their Syrian counterparts, do read carefully works produced by war colleges and strategic think tanks. Sadly, Egyptian strategic thought is obsessive of Israel despite three decades of peace between both sides. This fixation with Israel is counterproductive to dealing with such issues as global terrorism, which is scarcely mentioned in Salem’s book and Egypt’s ability to integrate itself and realize the full partnership of being a major non-NATO ally. Ironically, both Israel and Egypt share this special designation as major non-NATO allies. This fixation by Salem also reveals the real work of how Egypt and Israel are cooperating to bring stability to Gaza, as well as cooperation in such tragedies as the 2005 terrorist attack on Taba and Nuweiba in the Sinai.

There is much the American military mind can find to disagree with in Salem’s book, but what Salem does offer are the strategic national security concerns of a major Arab nation. Egypt occupies an important geo-strategic location and is the most populous Arab state. Its strategic views influence the general Arab view in the region. Therefore, it is incumbent on American War Colleges to analyze and assess the latest works produced by Arab military thinkers, such as General Salem.

About the Author:

CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Medical Service Corps officer who (since 9-11) has served as Advisor and Analyst on Islamist Militancy and Middle East Policy. He is author of “Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat,” (Naval Institute Press, 2010) and has written prolifically for the US Army, Naval Postgraduate School as well as the US Air Force Counter-proliferation Center.

CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thank both the Pentagon and Georgetown University librarians for making Dr. Salem’s work available for analysis and review. In addition, he wishes to express his appreciation for CAPT Eugene Smallwood, MSC, USN for his edits and discussion that enhanced this essay.
Lieutenant General Vernon Walters is one of the greatest Foreign Area Officers (FAO) to have served his country. Walters’ autobiography, *Silent Missions*, is a fascinating read that chronicles Walters’ military career. Walters navigates the tectonic shifts in world power from World War II to the Cold War through loyalty, personal courage, ingenuity and an uncanny ability to master language. Perhaps most interesting is Walters’ close proximity to world leaders at some of the most pivotal moments in history. For Foreign Area Officers however, the life of Vernon Walters offers more than a unique personal history, it provides a primer for military attaches and a testimony to the impact soldier-statesmen can have on national defense.

If a crafty screenwriter sought to create a narrator to observe the happenings of the second half of the twentieth century he would create Vernon Walters. Walters through the twists and turns of life found himself an eyewitness to countless major events and a confidant to U.S. Presidents and foreign leaders. Walters was born in New York in 1917, but spent ten years in Europe where he mastered French, Spanish, Italian, and German (he would later learn Portuguese, Chinese, and Russian). After initially enlisting in 1941 as a truck driver, Walters was quickly sent to Officer Candidate School and eventually became a Military Intelligence Officer. Walters was a part of Operation Torch in North Africa and later combat in Italy. After the war, He would serve as a special assistant and translator for Averell Harriman, the proponent of the Marshall Plan. He also was assigned as a defense attaché to France, Italy, and Brazil. In France, he would coordinate Henry Kissinger’s secret meetings with the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Walters was selected as an aide and translator by several presidents due to his language ability and loyalty. He went on to become the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and capped off his exceptional career as the US Ambassador to the United Nations.

It is easy for modern day FAOs to see the importance of common attaché skills in Walters’ successes. While most FAOs are not as naturally gifted in languages as was Walters, his life highlights the importance of language proficiency. Walters served as an aide and translator for Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon. In one anecdote, Walters was forced to simultaneously translate French, Spanish, and English during the Bogotazo after Secretary of State George Marshall decided to endure violent unrest and continue with the critical Pan-American Conference that would later create the Organization of American States. Walters’ role as a communicator proved to be absolutely crucial in the achievement of US policy. Language remains just as critical today and FAOs continue to push themselves to master their regional languages. Tools such as FAOWeb and online Defense Language Institute programs offer some modern implements unavailable to prior generations of FAOs.

Walters was a renowned conversationalist and his knowledge of host nations enabled him to not only understand his environment but also to effectively represent the United States. Walters knew the importance of relationships; he instructs that “the vast majority of the peoples of the world are moved by human relationships and by personal feelings of friendship or hostility.” As such, one must understand “other peoples’ history, literature, culture and even poetry; in a word, all things that make them what they are.” When asked to take advantage of his relationship with Brazilian President Castelo Branco, the soldier-statesman notes “it seemed more important to me that he have a good opinion of
the United States and of the Army and of me than I obtain any particular piece of information.” The tension between the security assistance, information, and representational missions remains today but Walters’ priority of “projecting a favorable image” of his country and service remains valid.

Having served as an attaché in Rome and Rio de Janeiro, Walters demanded a deployment to Vietnam to strengthen his authority as an attaché in Paris. Walters admonishes “I have always believed that an attaché, to be professionally credible, must also be able to talk intelligently about his profession, that is the profession of arms.” Despite having already faced intense combat conditions during World War II, Walters convinced the Defense Intelligence Agency to approve a short tour in Vietnam. Walters would travel throughout the country making some 145 trips by helicopter and taking part in several air assault operations. One can clearly see the parallels to modern day FAOs taking part in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to fortify their own *bona fides*. Walters’ trip proved invaluable to his role as a military attaché in France and he highlights that “the hard facts are that no one can talk to a soldier like another soldier. We must recognize this fact and use it where it can be of service to our nation.”

In addition to Walters’ demonstration of the value of FAO skills, his career illuminates the fact that FAOs can have an effect that is disproportionately greater than the resources they require to operate. Early on in Morocco, Walters, armed only with a driver and a half-track, was able to convince a French battalion to cede a critical bridge at Oum er Rbia. Walters was able to use personal courage, his mastery of the French language, and his knowledge of culture to convince the French battalion commander to join the allied cause and retire from his position. Walters, one man, was able to dislodge a battalion because of his unique skill-set.

Perhaps the most impressive example of the disproportionate results a single FAO can achieve was Walters’ work with the Brazilians. Walters, like many current FAOs engaged in foreign schools and In-Country Training, began building productive relations when he organized and attended a course at Fort Leavenworth for Brazilian officers. Walters quickly built strong ties with the Brazilians during visits to the United States, a reconnaissance of the Mediterranean Theater, and a short period as an aide to the attaché in Rio. His interactions with the Brazilians would pay dividends throughout his career. In 1944, Walters was personally requested by the commander of the Brazilian division in Italy. Acting as the liaison officer between the division and the forces of the Fifth Army, Walters was instrumental in the successful integration of the division. It is hard to measure the exact value of Walters’ contribution, but the deployment and successful utilization of 25,000 Brazilian personnel was due in no small part to his efforts. Building the capacity of partner nations is currently a priority focus of the Secretary of Defense. Just as Walters was able to facilitate the addition of an entire division to the fight, single FAOs today develop host nation militaries and encourage their participation in peacekeeping operations, combat operations, and maintaining security in the global commons.

**Quotable Quote …**

“If you ever see a turtle on top of a post … remember that it didn't get there on its own.”

-- Grant Ethridge

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FAOs can easily relate to Walters’ challenges and accomplishments, but perhaps contemporary attaches and security assistance officers will also notice some distinct differences between Walters’ world and the present global security situation. When Walters reported to the US Ambassador in Brazil as the Army Attaché he was given these simple instructions: “From you I want three things: First, I want to know what is going on in the Armed Forces; second, I want to be able in some measure to influence it through you; and third, most of all, I never want to be surprised.” In the bipolar world of reporting and monitoring foreign militaries and Soviet sponsored insurgencies, this guidance may be “complete.” However, in many ways the world has changed and the FAO structure that Walters was under must also change. FAOs now operate in a more ambiguous environment with networked transnational threats.

Globalization will require a shift from solely providing insight on the actions of conventional forces to non-state actors and the conditions that promote their growth. Radical Islamic groups offer an alternative to desperate people living outside of the benefits of globalization; while drug cartels pay high salaries for violence and trafficking narcotics. The September 11th attacks and the increasing danger of weapons of mass destruction proliferation have made ignoring these groups irresponsible. Just as Walters’ role as a FAO was critical in the Cold War, FAOs remain vital today. However, FAOs must adapt to modern transnational threats.

Walters’ autobiography, *Silent Missions*, is an essential for every FAO’s personal library because it offers an account of how a FAO was able to achieve success in the most demanding situations. Walters was effective because he mastered his craft as a linguist, attaché, and soldier. Also striking was Walters’ ability to punch above his weight class when he maximized his skills as a FAO. A properly utilized FAO can dislodge a battalion and generate a division of friendly troops. Yet one has to wonder how Vernon Walters would adjust to the modern threats presented by advanced communication technology and weapons proliferation. After studying his achievements, it is easy to imagine that Walters would adapt quickly to leverage his potent skills against international terrorists and transnational criminal networks. That is the challenge facing the FAO community today; retaining the valuable skills and lessons that served Walters and the United States so well and finding ways to translate them to modern globalized threats.

About the Author:

Major Michael L. Burgoyne, US Army, recently completed FAO in-country training in Latin America. He is a graduate student at Georgetown University. In 2003, MAJ Burgoyne deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as a squadron logistics officer and again in 2005 as commander, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry. He is the co-author of *The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa*, a tactical primer on counterinsurgency.
Introduction
As a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), you depend upon an in depth knowledge of your region and your professional network. In order to meet these specific demands, the Joint FAO Skill Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP) – a program sponsored by the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R) – developed FAOweb (http://fao.nps.edu). FAOweb provides the Joint FAO Community with a professional social network, a web-based virtual teleconference application, an open discussion forum, a wiki space, an open content space, and multiple learning resources for language and regional knowledge. This paper will review the major components and applications within FAOweb and demonstrate the portal’s potential to benefit all FAOs.

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Table - FAOweb Resources and Its Commercial Counterparts on the Internet.

Social Network Tools within FAOweb

FAO Directory — One of the most fundamental resources that a FAO can draw upon is his or her professional network. Many of us have turned to online applications such as LinkedIn (www.linkedin.com) and Facebook (www.facebook.com) in order to maintain our personal network of business acquaintances and friends. However, there are virtually no web-based applications that provide you with private and secure access to your large network of professional contacts that serve as FAOs. FAOweb fills this void with its comprehensive FAOdirectory. The FAOdirectory allows you to contact any FAO who has registered for FAOweb and created a brief profile. This construct allows every FAO to update his or her contact information whenever he or she changes jobs. As long as the FAOdirectory is widely used by the Joint FAO Community, it can serve as your virtual Rolodex. Within an individual’s profile, everyone can create tags with respect to specific groups and specific areas of interest or expertise. Hence, you may not know an individual by name; however, you will be able to find FAOs based on similar work-related interests and needs. Finally, the FAOdirectory is not limited by service boundaries; it is a directory for the Joint FAO Community. Although the FAO Directory offers us a powerful tool, it is only as useful as the information provided by the FAOs who use it. Active participation makes the tool better; however, only individual FAOs can make this happen. In summary, the FAOdirectory is a dynamic tool that facilitates uninterrupted connectivity to the Joint FAO Community as a whole.

FAOwiki, FAOforum, and FAOfiles — In addition to the FAOdirectory, FAOweb also provides an open discussion forum (FAOforum), a wiki area (FAOwiki), and a place to share files (FAOfiles) for all FAOs. These collaborative initiatives can take the form of a discussion thread, a wiki page article, or any form of digital content available for upload to the web. If you have used Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org), then you understand that a wiki page article is an article that can be authored by any individual on a subject area of interest to the community. Unlike conventional forms of writing, the article is subject to constant correction, revision, and elaboration by other
members of the Joint FAO Community. These virtual peer reviews yield content that is timely, accurate, and relevant. In addition to the wiki page article, FAOs can open a public discourse on any subject within FAOforum, the discussion thread section of FAOweb. Usually, a discussion thread details a minor event or subject area that does not merit a full wiki page article, yet it is a subject of common interest. Finally, FAOs can upload digital soft copies such as Power Point, Word documents or PDFs to the FAOfiles section of FAOweb. This feature is similar to Dropbox (www.dropbox.com) that is widely used to upload and transfer large files on the Internet. The digital content stored in FAOfiles provides access to source documents from meetings, courses, seminars, and conferences that would otherwise not be available to the whole community. For example, all of the briefs from each cohort of the JFSSPP In-Residence Course are uploaded to FAOweb via FAOfiles; hence, this information is available to all, not just the course participants. As with other components of FAOweb, these three tools are only as effective and useful as the content provided. If people are interested in a wiki page article on FAOwiki, then users will read it and update it. However, if there is no interest from the community, then the article will continue to exist on FAOweb, but it will not be used or updated. In a Darwinian analogy, useful digital content survives and non-useful digital content dies.

FAOweb VTC — If you use Skype (www.skype.com) or Facetime (www.apple.com/mac/facetime), then you are familiar with personal video teleconferencing (VTC) with your friends and family. FAOweb has adapted one of the most advanced web-based VTC technologies available to support global communication for FAOs. This tool is unhindered by billing rates, hardware, software, or even bandwidth. In order to use Elluminate Live (www.elluminate.com), FAOweb's VTC application, all you have to do is establish an Internet connection and notify up to six other FAOs that you would like to hold a VTC. This feature requires no download or installation to use it, and it can still deliver superior performance with a low bandwidth Internet connection. In addition to establishing a VTC, you can also actively share ideas and references on the virtual whiteboard that is available within the VTC window. This is one of the most valuable and easy to use collaborative tools available. FAOs, by the nature of our job, are widely dispersed throughout the world and FAOweb VTC allows you to coordinate with other FAOs right from your computer at work or your laptop while you travel. In addition to coordination and communication, FAOs are also using this tool to assist with continuing language education. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) has started using FAOweb VTC to conduct language sustainment/enhancement training and to conduct Oral Proficiency Interviews (OPIs). In summary, FAOweb VTC is a free and easy to use tool that breaks down physical communication barriers within the Joint FAO Community.

Language Content on FAOweb

Language Resources — Beyond the multiple networking tools available through FAOweb, it also offers advanced distance learning in nearly 40 different languages. FAOweb offers FAOs convenient access, rich content and feedback in their efforts to improve valuable language skills. First, while FAOweb is not the only online resource for language education, it is the only online resource that offers single sign-on capability to access language content from Joint Language University (JLU), Transparent Language CL-150, and SCOLA (Multilingual Media Service). In other words, once you log into FAOweb, you have full access to all of the most widely used DoD language learning resources. Furthermore, you do not need your DoD Common Access Card (CAC) to access these sites. Second, FAOweb’s native and peripheral language content offers FAOs the most comprehensive portal for improving one’s language abilities. Finally, FAOweb offers FAOs direct access to DLI. In turn, DLI performs
diagnostic assessments and conducts advanced FAO distance learning courses in your target language through FAOweb VTC. As you know, personal and direct interaction with a DLI instructor saves time and enhances results for any FAO seeking to improve his or her speaking and listening skills. Additionally, DLI can easily conduct OPIs through FAOweb VTC. In summary, FAOweb provides easy access, abundant materials and several tools that assist the Joint FAO Community in maintaining and improving their language skills from anywhere in the world.

Regional Education Content on FAOweb

In addition to language resources, FAOweb also provides users with extensive resources to support relevant and current education on regional issues and affairs. While the majority of the content is currently derived from guest speakers who support the five regionally specific JFSSPP In-Residence Courses that take place every year, additional content is being developed through partnerships with other educators such as the United States Institute for Peace (www.usip.org), the George C. Marshall Center (www.marshallcenter.org) and the National Defense University (www.ndu.edu). Within the Learn section of FAOweb, FAOs have access to four primary resources: FAO Modules, Language Resources, Country Resources, and Video Resources. Language Resources have already been discussed, so I’ll focus on the other three resources.

FAO Modules — First, FAO Modules are in-depth courses that provide comprehensive reviews of subject material such as FAOs and the Intelligence Community, Working with NGOs for FAOs, FAOs and the Interagency Process, and many others. In addition to FAO Modules, FAOs also have access to some external modules that result in course completion certificates in areas such as conflict analysis, interfaith conflict resolution, and others.

Country Resources — Second, FAOweb is gradually building in-depth resources that support specific content for major countries in which FAOs operate. Within this category, the featured courses are Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia.

Video Resources – Finally, the most extensive library within FAOweb is the Video Resource section. Within this section, regional experts, professors, practitioners, policy makers, and senior military leaders share their experience, insights, and opinions with a focus on an audience of senior FAOs. Currently, there are over 80 videos and approximately 160 hours of content. This area serves as a cornerstone of FAOweb and provides an outstanding resource for all FAOs who are striving to improve their regional expertise and to remain current on regional issues. In summary, FAOweb serves as the primary distance learning resource for FAOs.

Conclusion

FAOweb provides the Joint FAO Community with an un-paralleled collaborative tool and learning resource. Reviews by independent consultants, each of the services, and DoD have been very positive, so it is likely that the portal will continue to grow and expand to meet the needs and demands of FAOs. It is now up to the individual members of the Joint FAO Community to populate and use this tool. The more that we all use FAOweb, the more valuable it will become to FAOs.

About the Authors:

LCDR Jim McMullin (U.S. Navy) is a Navy PACOM FAO who is currently serving as the Military Associate Dean for the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS’s) School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS) in Monterey, California.

LTC (Ret) Jim Howard is a recently retired Army CENTCOM FAO who serves as the FAOweb Director for the Joint FAO Skill Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
The Comprehensive Approach (CA) is an increasingly relevant concept that FAOs should understand. CA seeks to coordinate all relevant governmental and non-governmental agencies to achieve a desired end state in complex multinational operating environments, such as Crisis Management and Stability and Support operations. Put simply, it is interagency coordination beyond the government to include Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and Inter-Government Organizations (IGOs). Most of these actors have identified the importance of such coordination, but questions still remain as to how to translate various theories into practice. The US Army and NATO are independently developing the CA to provide answers. Because of their work at the policy level in the international arena and at country teams, Foreign Area Officers are increasingly likely to encounter CA and would be well-served to understand the concept, so that they might serve as a facilitating force in the realization of CA structures and policies.

“The comprehensive approach represents the greatest challenge our leaders will face in the next generation.”
-LTG Caldwell
Commander,
Combined Arms Center,
Fort Leavenworth Kansas

The US Army’s FM 3-07 Stability Operations provides an initial framework for the CA in stability operations. Taking lessons learned from centuries of reconstruction and stability operations, the manual is aimed at providing mid to senior level Army leadership the concepts necessary to win the peace. Indeed, the entire authorship of the manual put into practice the coordinative principles it touts: the composition of the writing team included members from the Consortium for Complex Operations, the Institute for Peace, USAID, and only one Army officer. FM 3-07 defines the CA as an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal.

The concept nests the Whole of Government Approach, which is defined similarly within the context of the US government, relying upon what is generally referred to as interagency coordination. From the military perspective, Joint Operations are nested below where military organizations work within the interagency environment (See Figure 1). Having been cited in the National Security Strategy of 2010, the US State Department identified the Whole of Government Approach in its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review as a key capability in the security reform sector. The State Department created the Office for Conflict and Stabilization Operations to address the civilian gap in specialization in this area. It subsumes and builds upon the mandate of the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The S/CRS manages the Civilian Response Corps; a small organization aimed at providing deployable officers from various government agencies to execute expeditionary diplomacy.

Where FM3-07 limits itself to stability operations, NATO broadens its application to crisis response as well. Ever bridging US military doctrine to that of the collective security organization, ADM Stavridis (SACEUR) cites that, “the Comprehensive Approach is a point of view that articulates the links along the spectrum from security to humanitarianism, illustrates the most appropriate roles for soldiers and civilians in this complex arena, appropriately resources government agencies crucial for success in the military and humanitarian nexus, and searches for productive partnerships with allied governments and international organizations that share an interest in promoting security and prosperity around the world.”

**Quotable Quote …**

“…to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.”

-- T.E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt

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In his article in *Prism*, he identifies the importance and success of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan. His interpretation redefines the highest-level coordination as Whole of Society in the context of Afghanistan.

The US and NATO models are fundamentally similar and share common themes. The US Institute for Peace and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute identify the following inherent principles: Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Security, Conflict Transformation, Regional Engagement, Host Nation Ownership, Capacity, and Political Primacy.

Evidence of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan abounds, from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to coordination with Doctors Without Borders or the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. NATO is currently undergoing development of its Comprehensive Approach Action Plan to crisis management, an effort whose seeds were sown at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. This broadened view to include civilian organizations in crises extending beyond stability operations is steeped in foresight. After all, civil-military cooperation in disaster relief has been a challenge routinely dealt with over the course of the last year. Military assistance following the earthquakes in Haiti, Pakistan and Japan provide examples of military resources being brought to bear against these devastating humanitarian aid problems. In each case it was the military logistical resources such as naval vessels and rotary wing assets that made possible relief efforts.

The challenge of coordinating the various interagency and multinational actors in achieving a common goal would be obvious to FAO’s. The many obstacles include divergent interests among the many actors involved that deny unity of effort, cultural incongruences inhibiting regional engagement, and the military’s monopoly on resources that in many ways precludes legitimacy in the eyes of many affected parties (such as NGOs that seek to divorce their association with the military). The military has put a prime on the ability to resource and conduct humanitarian aid and stability and support operations. This trend has led to the military’s ownership of such operations in the short to mid term. While the formation of such entities as the Civilian Response Corps is a step in the right direction, the military still has an overwhelming presence in crisis response efforts making the CA all the more necessary.

Translating the Comprehensive Approach into a Comprehensive Capability is the next challenge. Operationalizing this concept into a doctrinal and normative framework detailing appropriate responsibilities and expectations will not be as simple as agreeing that all actors need to coordinate. It will require integration among agencies in training and planning scenarios, codify common terminology and to share more information across actors. It also requires that all of the relevant organizations prioritize coordination with the same weight the military does. The recently released Joint Publication 3-08 *Inter-organizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (June 2011) addresses some of these concerns, applying many of the same fundamentals of the CA to a concept called Inter-organizational Coordination. It further emphasizes the commonly identified need for cooperation by discussing Joint Interagency Coordination Group in planning down to the theater level and roles of various US Government, NGOs and IGOs. The publication asserts that the necessary relationships will not be formed overnight and that unity of effort is necessary for integrated planning.

So why is all of this important to the FAO Journal’s readership? Shouldn’t the Civil Affairs branch take the lead on this? Civil Affairs officers are integral in joint operations and in the interagency environment (and beyond) in applying the CA. The author submits that FAOs are well placed to serve as enablers in interagency coordination and where international dynamics must be considered. Civil Affairs officers and FAOs will work in concert to apply their unique capabilities against operations calling for the CA.

FAOs serving in a country team where humanitarian aid or stability operations are conducted are contributing to CA. MAJ Stephen Brown’s account of his contribution to humanitarian aid operations in Japan (published in this journal) identifies his unique assets as a FAO that allowed him to serve in such a capacity. RADM Losey, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa, cites country teams in Eastern Africa as integral in coordinating civil-military operations in his area of operations, noting that every country and situation is different and require adapted solutions. Additionally, FAOs working at the policy level, such as MAJ Reed Anderson at the US Mission to NATO- Defense Plans, are involved in the NATO’s development of CA implementation strategy. That said, FAO’s in Europe must be familiar with the concept our allies have an interest in.
Figure 1: FM 3-07’s design of the Comprehensive Approach with author’s attribution of roles to Civil Affairs and FAO specialties.

FAOs throughout the world have been and will be increasingly involved in operations requiring a CA. FAOs posted in the developing world (as well as disaster stricken areas) will serve at the operational level in coordination of civil military efforts while others will serve at the strategic level in developing policy among allies or advising combatant commanders. The concept is simple -- all inter-agency and multi-national actors should be well orchestrated in delivering their contributions towards a coordinated end state. FAOs have a deep understanding that this is easier said than done.


About the Author:

MAJ Michael Wise (48C) is currently conducting In Country Training in Paris, France. Upon completing graduate studies at Texas A&M he will serve as a FAO focused on Western Europe. He would like to thank LTC Reed Anderson for helpful insight into NATO’s development of the Comprehensive Approach.

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Or to Don Baker at (donbakerfao@hotmail.com)
Foreign Area Officer Association Board of Governors member COL (ret) John B. Haseman has been inducted into the Defense Attaché System (DAS) Hall of Fame. The induction ceremony, which added six new members to the Hall of Fame, was held on 10 August 2011 as part of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 50th Anniversary observances. DIA Director Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., presided over the induction ceremony.

In addition to COL (ret) Haseman, the 2011 inductees included BG (ret) Dan Eagle, USAF; BG (Ret) Gratton (Neal) Sealock, US Army; COL (ret) Daniel Tarter, US Army; CW4 (ret) Randy Nored, US Army; and CMSGT (ret) John Asher, USAF.

COL Haseman joins FAO Association President Emeritus COL (ret) Mike Ferguson and six other FAO Association members in the DAS Hall of Fame. The Hall of Fame was established in 1988 to honor DAS personnel who have served with great distinction and made unique contributions to our nation. The first 17 inductees were installed on 15 December 1988. The 10 August 2011 ceremony was the ninth such intake of Hall of Fame inductees, and brought the number of members to 117. Some well known members include General of the Armies John J. Pershing, Fleet Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, General William Knowlton, General Maxwell Taylor, General Joseph Stilwell, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, and former DIA Directors Lieutenant General James Williams and Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson.

The citation for COL Haseman’s induction includes praise for all three of his attaché assignments and lauds his professionalism, personal courage, and influence in fostering U.S. foreign policy with Burma and Indonesia. Excerpts from the citation follow.

“COL Haseman served three assignments in the DAS: Assistant Army Attaché, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1982-85; Defense and Army Attaché, Rangoon, Burma, 1987-90; and Defense and Army Attaché, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1990-94. Leadership, professionalism, innovation, courage, and personal integrity were the hallmarks of COL Haseman’s career.

“As the Assistant Army Attaché to Indonesia, then-Lieutenant COL Haseman built upon a previous assignment at the Defense Liaison Group in Jakarta to great effect, becoming USDAO Jakarta’s principal contact with the Indonesian Army and its most prolific reporter. COL Haseman provided key insights and analysis on the dynamics of the Indonesian army, its rising leaders, and its connections within the Suharto regime. When he returned to Indonesia five years later, officers COL Haseman befriended years earlier

JOINT DACOR-DIAA FORUM
12 September 2011 at
DACOR Bacon House 1801 F Street, NW Washington, D.C.

Reception starts at 1200, lunch at 1230

Lieutenant General Harry Edward Soyster, USA (Ret.), and John Guandolo will speak on the Islamic Doctrine of Shariah

The speakers were on the team that wrote Shariah: The Threat to America. General Soyster was director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has served as Commanding General of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and 24th Infantry Division chief of staff. He served in Korea and in combat in Vietnam. Following retirement, he became vice president for international operations for Military Professional Resources, Inc.

John Guandolo advises internationally on the Global Islamic Movement. In the FBI, he served in the Counterterrorism Division, investigated narcotics trafficking, was the bureau’s liaison to the Capitol Police, and created and implemented the bureau’s Counterterrorism Training and Education Course. A Naval Academy graduate, he was commissioned into the Marine Corps and served in combat in the first Gulf War.

This Forum is open to members of all Intelligence Community associations and their guests.
had become leaders, exactly as he predicted. COL Haseman’s reporting was cited by the Ambassador, DIA, CIA, and the DoS for its accuracy, wide coverage, and depth of analysis.

“COL Haseman’s next assignment within the DAS was as the Defense and Army Attaché to Burma, where he bared witness to the most extended period of violence in that country’s recent history. Although COL Haseman was directed to support US policy to improve relations with the Burmese military when he first arrived in Rangoon, the Burmese Army’s violent repression of the pro-democracy movement resulted in a significant change in US policy. What had been a policy of engagement became one of criticism of the military regime’s violence and persuasion to reform its actions. As a consequence, the Burmese junta denied COL Haseman access to his contacts and began continual surveillance of his activities.

“During this time, COL Haseman demonstrated courage amid threats to his life on several occasions. On the first day of shooting, COL Haseman responded to a call for assistance from the embassy’s administrative officer, whose car was fired on by a platoon of army soldiers shooting into a crowd of Burmese civilians. COL Haseman went to the scene, confronted the platoon commander, demanded they cease firing and, with rifles pointed at him by skittish soldiers, diverted their attention away from the location of the American diplomat long enough for him to escape the situation. In the process, COL Haseman saved the lives of scores of fleeing civilians.

“In September 1988, as pro-democracy marchers approached the U.S. Embassy, COL Haseman spotted a squad of armed soldiers in the adjacent National Bank building. Together with the embassy guards and regional security officer, COL Haseman was able to get many of the marchers inside the embassy before those soldiers opened fire, killing and wounding those remaining in front of the embassy. He took the only known photographs of the resulting carnage.

“When Ambassador Levin ordered the evacuation of families and non-critical personnel, he appointed COL Haseman to plan and carry out the evacuation operation at Rangoon’s Mingaladon International Airport. COL Haseman carried out his duties with typical aplomb despite the desertion of airport personnel and while including evacuees from foreign embassies throughout Rangoon.

“COL Haseman accompanied Ambassador Levin on his calls on senior government officers to emphasize that the civilian and military leadership of the United States were in agreement on policy toward Burma. This was critical because of the penchant for the Burmese military leadership to feel that foreign military services would support their own military in its activities. Of COL Haseman, Ambassador Levin wrote, “His articulate and courageous criticism of the regime’s egregious human rights violations disabused the regime of its hopes of securing approval or a less hostile attitude from the US military.” Levin continued, “In my 36 years with the Foreign Service I can recall only two other officers who came close to COL Haseman’s standard of performance.”

“As COL Haseman departed Burma, he was declared persona non grata by the military junta for his unflinching stance towards the regime. However, COL Haseman’s superb leadership and reporting on the situation enabled USDAO Rangoon personnel to earn the Humanitarian Service Medal and his office to receive the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, one of only 16 Defense Attaché Offices to receive this distinction since 1981.

“In 1990, COL Haseman returned to Jakarta for a third assignment, this time as the defense and army attaché, fulfilling a career progression that allowed him to draw upon six previous years in Indonesia, his knowledge of the country and the Indonesian armed forces in particular, and his personal friendship with the senior officers now directing them. COL Haseman’s reporting enlightened the embassy and.

Quotable Quote …

“You can easily judge the character of others by how they treat those who can do nothing for them or to them.”

-- Malcolm Forbes

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the U.S. Government of the Indonesian armed forces’ political-military activities, professional development, and leadership accessions.

“Despite the additional duties levied upon him as the Defense Attaché, COL Haseman’s tireless efforts and extensive contacts made him the most prolific and articulate reporter at USDAO Jakarta. His reporting on the Indonesian military received numerous “major significance” evaluations and was considered unparalleled during his tenure. COL Haseman’s senior rating officer called him “the singularly most effective communicator in the Defense Attaché System – the best!”

“COL Haseman is one of the few foreign military officers to have been decorated by the Indonesian government, which, upon his retirement, awarded him the Bintang Yudha Dharma Nararya medal for his service “to better the relationship between our two countries.” COL Haseman continues to support the DAS and FAO community through elected positions in pertinent professional organizations. He is a member of the Board of Governors of the FAO Association and Membership Director for Counterparts (an organization of former Vietnam War advisors).”

The Chinese have arrived at a capital near you. In fact, the proliferation of Chinese businesses around the world is becoming a key characteristic of this century. As regional businesses ties develop, so too will Chinese national interests, security concerns and PRC government oversight of their citizens’ abroad activities and well-being. For the U.S. attaché’s deployed around the world, expect your Chinese counterparts to become more accessible, and more interested in not just what you know, but how you do your job. This article offers more than twenty years of lessons learned by the author in dealing with the Chinese. It is written to provide non-China FAO’s a peek into the veiled logic and workings of an ethnic Chinese, or Asian from a Chinese-based society. It is not intended to be a catch-all, will not apply in every case (though I argue the principles listed here will apply more than the average American will recognize) and most certainly are not intended to disparage or exalt the Chinese as a people, race, military or sovereign nation. This is just the way they think, and the better you understand it, the more you can achieve in your relationship.

The following few paragraphs offer a list of principles that apply to every Chinese relationship at every level of society. These principles are so ingrained in their culture that many Chinese don’t recognize them as traits and couldn’t adequately explain them if they did. To them, they just are.

The Chinese are not your friend.

They will be friendly, but the Chinese do not make friends in the western sense, where nothing is expected of the relation but companionship. The Chinese have two types of relationships: family and acquaintances. Family is sacrosanct to the Chinese psyche and nothing will trump their sense of duty and obligation to their clan. This principle comes to play especially around Chinese (Lunar) New Year and Grave Cleaning Days. Do not try to invite, or solicit an invitation from, your Chinese counterparts during these periods.

As an acquaintance, your Chinese counterpart will treat you in a friendly manner, especially
when you first meet. Expect to be flattered and feted, especially if invited out to dinner (never in their home). You will think him or her aggressive in the manner of questioning about your personal life, education, career, hobbies, etc. This is common to all newly acquainted relationships with foreigners and other Chinese alike, and is designed to establish societal hierarchies and commonalities, to be used later in the relationship. You will especially be questioned about your type and level of access – in the Embassy, in your service, or in your organization. Again, this information is important to develop the relationship later. Within reason, do not be worried about these questions, but keep track of what was asked, and expect to be approached later should your access be needed by your new acquaintance. The key here is that Chinese have acquaintances and keep friendly relations with them because of the potential that the relationship will be useful to meet future requirements. Why? Because…

The Chinese are always negotiating.

From the moment they awake, the Chinese are negotiating. Every time your Chinese counterpart approaches you or responds to your approach, he is negotiating. This you must know. What you will not know right away (if ever) is with whom he is conducting the negotiations. Sometimes the negotiation is with you, sometimes with other acquaintances in your capital, and nearly always with themselves – often all at the same time. When entering into discussions with a Chinese, the trick is to first determine who your interlocutor’s primary antagonist really is (because it may not be you). In other words, are you being used as a tool to further negotiations with someone else? Recognizing this possibility leads to the understanding that…

The Chinese always think in triangles.

From the Chinese perspective, all relationships outside of the family circle exist for their potential access to a third party. This means there is always another agenda on the table besides yours. Do they really like you, for example, or do they happen to know you are good friends with the Consular Officer? Or do they hope, as an officer on your local Attaché Association, you can influence agendas and discussions with your host nation? As with your bilateral relationship, achieving success in this triangular dynamic requires determining when you are the target and when you are the tool. Often, if your Chinese acquaintance seems overly aggressive in pumping you for a favor or information, you can easily surmise that you are the tool, without knowing who he is trying to impress or for whom he is trying to fulfill a promise. Think back in this case to whether you gave any indication that you are always available and willing to answer his questions. It is typically American to offer assistance, and comes with an unstated implication that reason prevails – that your offer does have limits (legal, OPSEC, financial, etc). If your Chinese acquaintance is not himself very familiar with Americans, he may take your offer literally, because…

The Chinese assume you want whatever you enter into negotiations for.

Going back to the shopping analogy; have you ever asked the price of something just out of curiosity, then have the shopkeeper get mad at you when you walk out without buying it (or anything) from the store? It’s because they don’t understand the idea of casual shopping. If a Chinese raises an issue (just like picking up a trinket), they signal an interest and willingness to

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Quotable Quote …

"Give a man a fish and he eats for a day, but teach a man to fish and suddenly your high paying job as the village's only fisherman has just fallen into jeopardy."

-- LtCol Luke Henry

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trade. And of course they are often just as bad as we are for mirror-imaging, so they expect the same of us. The key to this principle is that meeting or engaging a Chinese for engagement’s sake might be detrimental to the overall relationship if you raise an issue on which you have no intention of following through. The reason they get upset at casual conversations (like casual shopping) is a combination of the next two principles.

The Chinese are always business-like in selling you their position.

Their first cut/position will always meet 100% of their goals, and will be determined by their assessment of your willingness to buy, ability to pay, and knowledge of your negotiating skills, much of which they determined in their first set of meetings with you. They will portray their initial position as being good for you too (think “win-win”) and will lobby hard for a quick deal, often delivering personal gifts as a “pre-signing bonus.” Assuming their fourth principle was correct, that you do want to deal for what they have, they will expect you to offer a counter-proposal to their starting bid. If you do want to bid, to gain the best deal possible you must be patient; be ready to hold out until they come back with a subsequent proposal (or maybe two or three). This means you also must be ready to stall or walk away if your expectation/price range is not reached. The reason it is important for you to initially slow-roll the negotiations is because of the next, very important principle.

Chinese negotiations are always layered.

You will never negotiate with the decision maker, at least not at the beginning. Your first interlocutor, perhaps their Assistant Attaché, will usually not be the most knowledgeable of their own bottom line. Their job is elicitation, to find your vulnerabilities and bottom line (remember all of the questions I mentioned at the beginning?)

Later interlocutors (perhaps the Attaché or an old friend he introduces to you from “out of town”) will have an in-depth knowledge of the issues, including their real bottom line and the history of your side’s early positions and comments (especially those made with your predecessors, or in another location, if applicable). The lesson here is to be careful what you say/promise/think out loud. Second, if you are part of a delegation, be sure all speak with one voice. If they find a seam among you (and they will attempt to find or create one), expect them to exploit it to the fullest.

Chinese will alternatively play their culture against yours within the negotiations, so you must pre-determine how you are going to approach the Chinese in the talks. Americans like to show a friendly front. We like to be polite, so the Chinese stress the politeness side of Chinese culture in an attempt to get you to think you are friends (see Principle One) and play their game. Don’t fall for it, unless you really know Chinese culture (I can count on one hand the number of current American government officials I would trust to be able to pull this off).

If you play their game, and allow them to set the negotiating rules, remember that …

Politeness does not equal courtesy.

To the Chinese, courtesy is relational, so if you defer to your “more senior” (they are always more senior if you look at time in service) interlocutor, you are playing the younger brother role
and will be treated that way (including being lectured - vice consulted - and given lower-level office calls). If you are (by rank) or play the big brother, be ready for them to expect magnanimous behavior (“you are the strong/developed country; we are the weak/developing country. Therefore you should go first/give more,” etc). I strongly recommend playing the role of the neighbor/equal; ready to bargain hard for everything you get. The bottom line - at the end of the negotiations, do not be beholden to their generosity, since they will use that as an obligation on your part the next time they want something.

**Honor is relative**

Bringing this discussion back to the beginning, the effort Chinese will expend to be loyal to their word is proportional to the closeness of your relationship. If you are not family (and you won’t be if you are a serving Attaché), do not expect a level playing field when it comes to their willingness to meet promises to you over their family, colleagues, or even other Chinese. Know where you stand toward the outer ring of their concentric relations. This is as important at the conclusion of an agreement as it is in the beginning of the negotiations. Just like in a shop, Chinese negotiating continues long after the agreement is made. Never negotiate alone. Always insist on others being present, possibly even a third-country attaché, because...

**Obedience requires a witness** – Which requires no further explanation.

When dealing with your Chinese counterpart, the above principles will help you maintain your preferable role as a respected equal. Some other concepts to consider are:

- Centralized versus decentralized decision-making. This is a major difference between their system and ours, and helps to explain why their negotiations are layered. You will often be empowered to make decisions on behalf of the U.S., but they will always have to request guidance from Beijing. If they don’t have to go back to Beijing for advice during your negotiations, then you haven’t negotiated hard enough for them to need new guidance and you can expect to “pay too much.”
- Do not be surprised if your Chinese uniformed counterpart knows nothing about his own service. This is typical of centralized decision-making systems, but is especially true if your counterpart comes from their Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office. The Beijing Foreign Attaché Corps fondly thinks of this office as the Barbarian Handlers whose role it is to keep us (the Barbarians) as far away from the real PLA as possible. Expect this also from escort officers (if you join a ship or unit tour) and from your first set of interlocutors.
- Pay as you go. Do not build up a negative account of good will with your Chinese counterpart. If you do, expect or be prepared to have to repay their generosity later at a premium. In an odd quirk of cultural arrogance, this concept does not work in reverse, unless certain steps discussed below are taken.
- Generation matters. Senior officers are extremely set in their ways, even shunning local foods. The young officers are often more reachable, in part because they understand the local language (and probably some English as well). Troops want to learn, but will only be allowed to speak if vetted. If you try to give a soldier a unit coin for example, he will look (in fear) to your handler for guidance before accepting it, so it is best to tell your escort of your planned gift to prevent long awkward pauses.
- Chinese decision-making is, in their word, “scientific”, which means it must be quantifiable, and peer-reviewed. This same concept applies to the way that deals are evaluated.
- Communications upward is in the form of reports, not suggestions. If you have ideas you want sent up, be sure they are clearly stated in your talking points. Talking them over in private with a lower-ranking interlocutor will not ensure the leadership gets the message. If possible, send your message through more than one message chain, such as the Embassy’s military attaché and political officer, to prevent organizational bias from diluting or stopping it.
Transparency and reciprocity mean different things to each side. Be sure to understand in detail their side’s definition, before trying to apply either one.

Corruption is a matter of fact. Promotion-buying has been reported throughout Chinese society, but a more likely area for foreigners to view this concept is in the “bonus” gifts mentioned above. Accept them at your own peril.

Like with the old Soviet Union, don’t fall for the 10-foot tall soldier line. The capability of the PLA units (like everyone’s) equals their weapons systems’ capacity minus training (individual and unit) and maintenance. Their experience against Vietnam from 1979 to 1984 taught them the use of mass wave attacks is no longer politically feasible. Expect to see guile and deception, instead of brute force in their approach to us, while coercion is a viable option for them to use against an assessed weaker military.

The Chinese are generally not risk-takers. This goes back to the first principle and the visceral need to protect one’s family or faction. Throughout modern Chinese history, senior Chinese leaders checked themselves into hospitals just before a major action took place. Two note-worthy military examples are Minister of Defense Lin Biao prior to Chairman Mao ordering the Chinese Volunteers into Korea, and several unit commanders just before the 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square. The logic here is by removing themselves from the chain of command they protect themselves/family/factions from the expected fall-out of a potentially wrong decision; while providing them a face-saving reason should things go well.

Retreat is valid strategy; surrender a result of situational factors such as face, self-esteem, being #2, moral high ground, etc. If they don’t feel they can make a good deal, they will walk away. The Chinese will always seek to live to fight (or negotiate) another day, so expect them to come back later if they really want something.

Keeping these concepts and principles in mind will help anyone who deals with the Chinese understand much of what they are seeing or hearing. Chinese logic is not always fathomable to the western mind, but it is logical, and can be recognized over time. Remembering that flattery is a technique; that you hardly ever meet the final decision maker; and that you are negotiating with an individual who has a large support base behind him is important. Don’t be afraid to stall, to admit the need to confer with your own leadership (support base), or to walk away. All of this can be done politely, without jeopardizing your individual relationship, and frankly is expected by your Chinese interlocutor. The key is to conclude all negotiations with a true win-win solution, not the promise of favor in the future.

About The Author …

Frank Lewis Miller JR.  Colonel, US Army (Retired) - Retired in June 2010 with over 30 years active duty in the Infantry, Special Forces and China Foreign Area Officer (48F). Has extensive interaction with all Asian militaries during 23 years in or focused on Asia at local, regional and national levels. Served as a Military Attaché (Vietnam and China), regional Security Assistance Officer (PACOM), and Political-Military Analyst (PACOM and Joint Staff). Last served as Director, Northeast Asia Division, Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. Currently serving in the Defense Intelligence Agency as the Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States provides a synopsis of the last sixty years of US-Pakistan relations, looking at how negotiations occur between both countries, and supplemented by historical examples. The book authors’ purpose is to “analyze the themes, techniques, and styles that have characterized Pakistani negotiations with American civilian and military officials in recent years and to reach some conclusions about what these are likely to be in the future.”

Pakistan’s approach to negotiations with the US is defined by three concepts: Pakistan’s viewpoint of where it fits in a global context and its desire to be seen as equal to or better than India; its culture is built on personal relationships; and its overreaching and oversized military is coupled to a government with unbalanced authority. For example, Pakistan’s foreign policy is overseen and largely dictated by the military.

Pakistani negotiators use these three concepts to project onto US negotiators a sense of obligation -- termed by the authors as the “guilt trip.” Pakistan’s partnership with NATO in the War on Terror, and its permeable borders with Afghanistan, bond the interests of the US and Pakistan for at least the near term. Additionally, Pakistan’s shared borders and relations with China, Iran, and India, make it certain that the US will be linked to greater South Asia for decades to come.

Considering America’s national security priorities, one gains several advantages from reading this book. The first is a condensed version of Pakistan’s history. While not a complete historical accounting, examples throughout the book provide key illustrations of the US and Pakistan relationship. At times the book is frustrating to read, due to Pakistan’s selective and revisionist self-accounting, focusing on a favorable narrative and selecting particular parts of history to support this narrative. Nevertheless, the reader benefits by comprehending Pakistan’s viewpoint, which provides Pakistan’s outward perspective versus a view of history and US-Pakistan relations only through the US lens. Whether or not the reader adjusts for what one would consider questionable historical accounts, the book enables the reader to gain an understanding of why and how Pakistanis negotiate and communicate, and to see why Pakistanis feel that the US has abandoned them repeatedly over the years.

One drawback of the book is that the authors did not sufficiently elaborate on their purpose, and could have defined the main concepts in more detail instead of merely providing a concept followed by one to two examples to support a point and then moving on to the next point.

This book is highly recommended for any civilian or military professional who will engage in US-Pakistani policy issues. A significant advantage of reading How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States is that it prepares a US professional for the inevitable history lecture and the questions of why the US abandoned Pakistan that they will receive from their Pakistani counterparts. The reader is prepared to respond to the Pakistani position with an appreciation for their historical, political and geographic perspective.

The book follows a concise format and is easy to read. Its main points – Pakistan’s self-perception of its place in the world, the culture of personal relationships, its overreaching and oversized military and its disjointed government – form a fascinating and useful primer on US-Pakistani relations.

About the Reviewer …

LTC Breaux has a Masters Degrees in Management from Texas A&M, a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies from the US Army Command and General Staff College, and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Biology from Bowling Green State University. She volunteered for the AF-PAK Hands Program, and will soon start language training in Urdu, followed by deployment to Pakistan. She is currently assigned to the HQDA International Affairs Division as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Desk Officer.
“We should invigorate the alliances, partnerships and institutions that allow us to address numerous hazards at once without having to build a consensus from scratch to respond to every new challenge.”

Richard L. Armitage

With current operations in Libya underway and continued debate about roles and responsibilities in Afghanistan, it is clear that multinational operations will remain an integral part of current and future missions. Increasingly more Air Force officers may find themselves working in multinational environment. Does our current system of education and training prepare Airmen to perform successfully in this environment? Isn’t it the same working on a multinational staff as it is in an American staff? The answer is no. There are numerous cultural and procedural barriers that must be recognized in order to achieve the kind of trust and confidence needed in the multinational environment.

Multinational operations are certainly not new to our military. The United States has a long history of operating in coalition environments. Our great victory during the Revolutionary War at Yorktown involved more French forces than colonial troops. During World War I and II, American forces fought side by side with many nations. In particular, we combined with Allied forces in pivotal operations such as the Battle of the Marne and later the Liberation of Europe. During the Korean conflict, United Nations forces rose to the challenge of communist aggression and showed remarkable solidarity. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, stands as a successful example of an alliance that has stood the test of time and conflict.

During the Cold War, generations of US officers gained personal experience working in and alongside the professional militaries of other nations, training side by side in a multinational environment, practicing the difficult art of coalition warfare. At one time, we had thousands of service members deployed to Europe, Korea, Japan and Okinawa. Annual exercises, unit exchanges and multiple overseas tours offered the opportunity to participate in coalition planning and multinational staff procedures. It was not uncommon to find officers who had the opportunity to command small unit organizations of other NATO countries.

However, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the reduction of combined training operations in Europe, the chance for participating in combined operations dwindled. Today, due to operations in the Middle East, there are many airmen serving in Afghanistan and Iraq working in “advise and assist” roles. Even when these positions arise, many Airmen may enter a coalition staff as an individual augmentee with little preparation or practical knowledge of the nuances of operation in such an environment. In my experience, I have found more and more officers who have minimal exposure to training or operating closely with professional allied armed forces. They have operated almost exclusively with US forces or training host nation forces.

The demand for officers who understand how to operate in a multinational environment will increase. Undoubtedly, not only will the US seek maximum coalition participation in future operations, but due to budgetary restraints and political appetite, allies may be asked to do more. At one point in October 2006, General David Richards (UK) was in charge of more US forces than any British officer since World War II. The ongoing operation in Libya demonstrates this trend. As we seek to operate in a multinational environment where international will and legitimacy gives powerful synergy to the mission, we owe some critical thought to the question, “How do we better prepare future Airman for multinational operations?”

How do we better prepare future Airmen for multinational operations?
Make a concerted effort to train future Airmen to be more proficient and comfortable operating in the multinational environment. To do this, we must change some of our own culture and take some innovative approaches.

Start early in a career to develop a keen sense of cultural awareness in our leaders. The world is becoming smaller and more networked, a phenomenon some call Globalization. Yet, we can become culturally isolated, if we do not take the time to learn about other cultures and perspectives and gain a better understanding of their perspectives.

**Career long language training** should be a goal for all Airmen, not just those of us in the RAS career field who were fortunate enough to attend the Defense Language Institute. Cadets and midshipmen in pre-commissioning programs should study a foreign language with a goal not necessarily of achieving fluency, which is a significant investment in time, but as a means of studying another culture of the world. Speaking a second language makes one much more sensitive to the importance of communications and the challenge of accurate interpreting. Airmen who have studied a second language have a better sensitivity operating in any new cultural environment. Many languages could be offered—not just Arabic and Dari. We should continue to provide access to study materials and we should encourage career-long study to promote proficiency. The military should continue to capitalize on innovations in distance learning. It is a small price to offer free tuition to any service member who desires to sustain their language skills. We would then have a generation of leaders that has a greater appreciation of our diverse world.

“We Americans no longer have the luxury of existing as a nation isolated from the rest of the world... We now have no choice but to engage with many different peoples out there in all their many dimensions; and we can’t do this as outsiders, looking at them through our own lenses, trying to force our thinking on them..”

*General (Ret) Anthony Zinni*

Pre-commissioning programs should offer opportunities to **study abroad**. It would be hard to measure the insights a cadet or midshipmen would gain living and studying in another culture: the experiences and relationships formed would better prepare him or her for the challenges of leading in a multinational environment.

We should continue to seek individuals from a variety of academic fields. We must have a strong balance between science and liberal arts. A well-rounded officer corps will be better prepared to operate in the complex environment we anticipate.

“We need renaissance men and women. We need officers who are part economist, part political scientist, part anthropologist, and part all sorts of other disciplines...”

*General (Ret) Anthony Zinni*

**Increase exchange assignment opportunities**

There is great merit to working within an Allied military. Assignments within structured alliances are helpful in preparing for service within ad hoc coalitions. These organizations have procedures and processes that have been institutionalized over time and this can be helpful in organizing temporary groupings.

Immersion allows for the bonds of friendship to develop and for the healthy exchange of ideas and approaches to problem solving. Although we are the best resourced military in the world, with
superior equipment, training and personnel, we still can learn much from our Allies. Smaller militaries bring unique perspectives and experience and can offer truly unique solutions to asymmetric challenges.

Many of our past senior leaders gained much from such assignments. As a field grade officer, General Dwight Eisenhower travelled extensively throughout Europe with the monuments commission and later on assignment in the Philippines. These opportunities all contributed to the formation of his understanding of how other nations and cultures worked.

**Multinational operations are all about personal relationships.**

This is a critical lesson to teach Airmen. I had the unique opportunity to serve within the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium. I made many friends during that tour and learned so much from an exchange of ideas. These friendships and bonds of trust, built from mutual experience, allowed for excellent coordination and paved the way for smooth coordination. Our officers have to keenly develop their sense of cultural awareness. As Americans, we often get right down to business and bypass some informality. This is not the case in many other cultures of the world. In the end it doesn’t help us. This is the same lesson we are learning as we work with Iraqi and Afghan counterparts in building their military’s capacity. By the same note, we can be unaware of the unique cultures of our long standing allies and not be as effective as we could be in coordination. By increasing our exposure to allied forces and diverse cultures, we will build mutual confidence and trust with our coalition partners.

**Increase Multinational Training.**

Recognizing that we seek to operate in multinational operations, we should take advantage of every opportunity to inject multinational factors into our training. From tactical to operational settings we should expose Airmen to the complexities of operating in, with and alongside our Allied formations. The more exposure we can get, the better our leaders will be in realistically understanding the challenges of command and control, rules of engagement and interoperability. Our young Airmen will learn to think about these challenges during planning and not after. **Adding multinational considerations after the plan has been formed is like adding eggs after the cake has been made.** It usually doesn’t work and it is very messy.

The US military has made huge strides in operating in a joint environment. Generations of officers have worked side by side with all services. We’ve trained together, attended school together, served in peace, in humanitarian assistance efforts, and in combat. We have made efforts to understand each others’ unique service cultures and capabilities. The present world situation has shown that coalitions bring incredible synergy and legitimacy to our operations. We don’t want “to go it alone”. We must look for better ways to prepare our emerging Airmen to succeed in multinational environments. To do this, we have to start at pre-commissioning and build a base of thoughtful, culturally savvy Airmen who will incorporate multinational operations early in planning. Multinational forces should not be an oddity, but incorporated throughout our training exercises and scenarios. Soon we will have Airmen who not only think joint-but think combined. Then we will really see how much we can achieve.

**About the Author ...**

Major Michal Kloeffler-Howard is a West European RAS. She holds a Master Degree in International Relations from both the Naval Postgraduate School and Troy State University. She earned a Bachelor of Arts in Religious Studies from San Diego State University. She has served multiple assignments as a Public Affairs Officer and has served in SOUTHCOM, EUCOM and Allied Command Operations, SHAPE. She is fluent in Brazilian Portuguese and Spanish and is currently assigned to SHAPE working as a Military Cooperation / Development Staff Officer.
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