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Dear FAO Colleagues,

I had the pleasure of speaking to a group of new Army FAOs at the FAO Orientation Course, which was held from July 14-16 at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA. The audience was comprised of senior Captains and junior Majors who were just starting out on their FAO careers, beginning with language training at DLI. I was impressed by the enthusiasm of the audience and, judging by the number of right-sleeve patches, this was an experienced group of combat seasoned officers. So language training should be a piece of cake!

I thought I would share with you some of the opening remarks I made at the course. They reflect a few of the personal observations I have made over the years. I hope they were able to provoke some thought and provide some useful insights:

Understand the world you are entering. You have all had successful careers in the Army. Otherwise you would not have been selected to be a FAO. However, you need to recognize that, for the most part, you have left the tactical and operational Army. Beginning now, you are entering the joint, interagency, multi-governmental, and multinational environment, which will place different demands on you. A key to success will be an ability to draw from your knowledge, experience, and judgment to be able to provide senior decision-makers with informed advice, analysis, and recommendations. Learn to write and communicate effectively!

Grow networks. You will continue to count on the peers that you meet in language training long after you complete FAO training. Develop and nurture what in many cases will become long-lasting relationships. You will meet lots of people – both military and civilian – who could play an important role in your future. To illustrate, one of the professors in my program at graduate school is now my boss – a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – and the Ambassador under whom I served in U.S. Embassy Moscow is my next higher boss – an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Build relationships!

Develop your skills. Keep in mind the three pillars of Leader Development: institutional training, operational assignments, and self development. The Army will provide the initial tools required to help you succeed: language training, advanced civil schooling, and in-country training, but it will be incumbent on you to continue your professional FAO development throughout your career. Operational assignments will play an important role, but self development is critical. Maintain your intellectual curiosity!

Advocate. The good news is that FAO is a successful brand name with a solid reputation. However, most FAO assignments exist in the joint world and are therefore largely invisible to “Big Army.” Advocate for FAO by sharing our good news stories!

Gary Espinas
Colonel, U.S. Army
Comments about “Beyond Diversity and Tolerance
By: Dr. Denny Howley (PhD) FAO, US Army

I have no problem with the general thrust of the article dealing with the threat Radical Islamic Fundamentalist presents to the USA and their potential threat in the military. Nor do I have issues with the general approach to dealing with that threat, but I do have some methodological and definitional issues with the “broad brush” applied to Islam, use of quotes and depiction of Mohammad.

Clearly defining “Radical Islamic Fundamentalist” is a must in any article discussing Radical Islamic jihad/terrorism. The writer slips, subtly or on purpose, a fuzzy notion seemingly placing all Muslims under the same radical Islamic umbrella.

I use the same quotes Mr. Silinsky uses in his article in a class I’ve taught for some time here at the Institute for Criminal Justice in Key West, titled “The Terrorist Mindset, Underwater Port Security” (a Homeland Security presentation). It is a two hour lead-in focused exclusively on Radical Islamic Fundamentalists, who use those Koranic extracts to justify their terrorism.

In my class, unlike Mr. Silinsky’s article, I carefully differentiate between Radical Islamic Fundamentalist and mainstream Islam. I do however explain how the fundamentalist exploit socio-economic-political issues within mainstream Islam to recruit adherents. In other words, unlike Mr. Silinsky’s article, I do my best to present issues in their proper context.

Interpretation of the sayings of Mohammed, his life and the Koran has been a major problem plaguing Islam since Mohammad died in 632. Certainly Mr. Silinsky is entitled to his rendition, as are people like Bin Laden, but they do not represent the some billion plus Muslims in the world or the some 5 million in the USA. Those narrow self-serving interpretations of Mohammad’s life and the Koran are a threat to main stream Islam…and the Muslim leaders and Muslim theologians know it.

The “spin” that “much of Mohammad’s personal narrative celebrates mass murder, looting, laying waste to enemy villages, taking slaves, raping woman, killing and ordering the death of those who criticize him…..” is certainly not necessary to the threat scenario, but is important if one seeks to “smear” Islam as a religion. (If we substituted Jesus for Mohammad I doubt if those lines would have reached the light of day.) I Would love to know the source of those lines, which are rubbish.

On the Islam/Terrorism bit one might read an article published in Army Magazine, January 2006 title “Islam, Islamism and Terrorism” by Col. Norvell (Tex) De Atkine. Tex is one of the original breeds of Middle East Army Foreign Area Specialist (FAS), the program that gave birth to the present FAO version.

The danger of bias in dealing with Islam and the West/ the Arab-Israeli problem/ Islam and Islamic Fundamentalist is the rhetoric coming from the Protagonists. The Islamic Fundamentalist jargon is easily recognized. That coming from the so-called hard line Zionist/way right wing Christian and similar views, are more polished, making it more difficult to recognize the “spin”.

I’m interested to see what kind of comment/responses you get from the current breed of Middle East FAO’s on Mr. Silinsky’s “scholarship”.

Not even going to attempt to address the complexities Moslems face with “modernization”, identity etc etc… But like many angry people, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, et al, they are susceptible to the “piper” who can place blame for their situation.

About the Author -
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US Army, Middle East FAS (FAO), 1969-1993
J-2 DIA/Middle East/Terrorism 1972-1993
Editor’s Note -

Islam, Political Islam and Fundamentalism specifically are all critical issues currently facing our nation. All citizens, national security officials and international affairs specialists must study all aspects of Islam and its potential impacts on our society, our nation and our global national interests.

All historic views, all perspectives and all interpretations must remain on the table for discussion because (PC or not) they impact US national security. We must have this difficult conversation and for that reason, the journal eagerly printed the initial article and the preceding reaction letter. Other views, studies and analysis are strongly requested.

Coyt D. Hargus
Editor and 48G, Retired

Quotable Quotes …

President John F. Kennedy

West Point Graduation comments, 6 Jun 1962

… On the other hand, your responsibilities may involve the command of more traditional forces, but in less traditional roles. **Men risking their lives, not as combatants, but as instructors or advisers, or as symbols of our Nation’s commitments.** The fact that the United States is not directly at war in these areas in no way diminishes the skill and the courage that will be required, the service to our country which is rendered, or the pain of the casualties which are suffered.

… This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to … to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires … a whole new kind of strategy … wholly different kind of military training.

… The nonmilitary problems which you will face will also be most demanding, diplomatic, political, and economic. In the years ahead, some of you will serve as advisers to foreign aid missions or even to foreign governments. … You will need to know and understand not only the foreign policy of the United States but the foreign policy of all countries scattered around the world who 20 years ago were the most distant names to us. You will need to give orders in different tongues and read maps by different systems. You will be involved in economic judgments which most economists would hesitate to make.

At what point, for example, does military aid become burdensome to a country and make its freedom endangered rather than helping to secure it? To what extent can the gold and dollar cost of our overseas deployments be offset by foreign procurement?

In many countries, your posture and performance will provide the local population with the only evidence of what our country is really like. In other countries, your military mission, its advice and action, will play a key role in determining whether those people will remain free. You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power, to decide what arms should be used to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight, to determine what represents our vital interests and what interests are only marginal. …"
Among many FAOs, very little is known about the National Guard’s substantive role supporting US international affairs (IA) objectives. It seems that many within the greater IA community have even less exposure to guardsman working within the IA world. The service FAO programs are entered around the active duty components and, as such, observed Guard support is usually limited to individual guardsman augmenting the active duty effort. There is more.

National Guard international engagements are coordinated by the National Guard Bureau’s J5 International Affairs office in Chyrstal City, VA. Their Mission: To: “Enhance combatant commanders’ ability to establish enduring civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all levels of society.”

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is the NGB’s most important program supporting that mission. Currently, there are 62 established partnerships worldwide supporting a variety of regional priorities and objectives. In EUCOM alone there are 21 Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) that are supported and funded by the EUCOM commander. Those BAOs serve as members of the US country team. They are critical assets to the Geographic Combatant Commander and support his theater mission requirements. Two US states have special, more limited bilateral relationships: Minnesota and Norway have partnered for a cold weather training mission; Iowa and Russia have are partnered for counter-proliferation, emergency response and disaster preparedness.

These long-term relationships emphasize NG’s support through state assets for a “whole of government” approach by providing organized, trained, and equipped forces in support of the theater commander’s campaign plan; demonstrating US commitment, reassuring US allies and partners, and expanding our relationships with those partners while providing more culturally / globally aware guardsmen for joint Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations, and Irregular Warfare missions.
The End of the Free Market is a straightforward and necessary read for all those in the United States government who wish to understand other nations of the G20 and how they leverage their own economies to influence domestic and international policies.

“This book is about the emergence of this new strand of capitalism and how it threatens free markets and the future of the global economy. The main characters are the men who rule China, Russia, and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf... It's the story of how, in the first decade of this new century, public wealth, public investment, and public ownership have made a stunning comeback.”

The President of Eurasia Group, Ian Bremmer, a political risk think tank, writes about the rise of a new system of capitalism called State Capitalism and its impact on the free market system. He opens the book by giving a brief history of capitalism, discussing the iconic Adam Smith, the concept of mercantilism and how this developed into state capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The book further discusses in detail how Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Algeria, Ukraine, Russia, India, Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Southeast Asia countries (Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia) and China use the various tools of state capitalism. He divides these tools into various categories: national oil and gas corporations such as Gazprom, other state-owned enterprises, privately owned national champions, and sovereign wealth funds which manage several hundred billion in assets. More specifically he explains these countries’ role in oil, aviation, shipping, power generation, arms production, telecom, metals, minerals, petrochemicals, and other industries.

Bremmer argues that state capitalism threatens free markets and the future of the global economy, however, offers advice on how the United States and large U.S. corporations can counter this global trend which has occurred in the wake of the financial crisis.

This is a good read on the interaction between government and economics. Notwithstanding, there is some discussion of how the US military can play a role in ensuring that market capitalism remains the dominant force with the United States as an indispensable component.
Russian as a Dying Lingual Franca: Time to Train FAOs in Regional Languages?

By: Michael Tyson, Major, USAF

Is Russian still a useful language for foreign area officers operating in the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU)? Would it make more sense to train FAOs in Kazakh, Azeri, or Lithuanian? How about FAOs who already possess professional-level Russian language proficiency? Should their service spend the time to teach them an additional language useful in the FSU?

Nicholas Ostler developed a model to describe why colonial languages survive after the colonizing peoples leave an area. Using this model, as well as census results from the last Soviet census in 1989 and censuses from the resulting “new” nations, I will show that the Russian language, while still useful as a regional lingua franca, is losing numbers of speakers. In essence, Russian is a dying lingua franca, and I believe that our services should start training FAOs in other languages prevalent in the states of the FSU.

Creole is not the reason

It is clear that typology alone does not explain Russian’s continuing prestige in some states of the FSU. If so, Tajikistan, whose titulars speak a language related to Russian, would not have so few speakers while Kazakhstan, whose titulars speak a language not related to Russian, would not have so many. Belarus would not have lost over a million Russian speakers since the 1989 Soviet census and Uzbekistan would not have gained two million more.

Nicholas Ostler, in Empires of the Word, listed four reasons why a “colonial” language would maintain its prestige after the colonizing peoples leave. The reason could be that the people remaining after the colonizers departed speak the colonial language as their first language, and had been speaking it for some time. The experience in the Americas is an example of Ostler’s first reason, with English, French and Spanish being the first language of both the colonizers and the colonized peoples. This is known as the creole reason.

Secondly, the people who shook off the shackles of the colonizers may still desire some sort of relationship with the former colonizing power, and thus may maintain the language to stay in communication with them. English in India, Spanish in the Philippines, and Portuguese in East Timor are all examples of the nostalgia reason.

While some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have good relations with France, many do not. Still, French remains a useful language in this huge region. The countries that maintain French as a regional lingua franca are illustrating Ostler’s unity reason. As Ostler states, “it just would not be practicable to administer Cameroon in any of its 270-plus indigenous languages.”

English today and French a couple centuries ago both demonstrate Ostler’s fourth point, the globality reason. In many countries around the world, English as a Second Language classes are full, not because everyone loves America, England or any other Anglo state. The classes are full because the students see the usefulness of knowing a language that is a second language to millions of people around the world, not to mention the language of television, popular music and the Internet.

Russian is still being used in all the fourteen FSU states. Ostler has already applied his four reasons to the case of Russian. He sees the creole reason as applying only to the peoples of Siberia, an area not dealt with here. However, he mentions the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan as possibly fitting into this area. With respect to nostalgia, he points to Belarus, with their heavy reliance on Russian as an indicator of their close relations with the government of Russia. Ostler sees no reason for any of the former Soviet states to “persist with Russian” for unity reasons. Finally, he believes that Russian has no chance of overcoming English’s use as a lingua franca in the world.

Russian is spoken in each of the 14 FSU republics as a regional lingua franca. There are over 54 million speakers of Russian in 13 former republics for which there are data (I was unable to find census data for Turkmenistan). If Russian were not a useful language, there would not be so many speakers. However, I would argue that the reason the language is spoken by so many is not from nostalgia or for
creole reasons. Instead, unity connects these neighbors for no other reason than economics.

Ostler places Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan into his creole group. He comes to this conclusion based on the population of Russian-speakers in the affected areas. However, he admits that the creole reason only applies when the colonizers overwhelm the current inhabitants and remain there, in effect becoming American, Venezuelan, Canadian, or, in this case, Estonian, Latvian or Kazakh.

This certainly did not happen in the case of any of the FSU republics. Not only did many Russians repatriate themselves shortly after they woke up in a new country, but even those who remained did not suddenly become Kazakh, Estonian or Latvian. They may continue to be residents in the countries of the FSU, but they are still Russians. The evidence is in the censuses conducted in each of these new states. Likewise, Russian-speaking Kazakhs, Estonians and Latvians did not become Russians, simply because they speak Russian.

Latvia and Estonia were severely affected by Russian immigration, especially after World War II. Latvians made up 77% of the population of Latvia in 1935. That percentage fell to 52% by the last Soviet census (1989). In 1939 Estonia, 92% of the population was Estonian. By the time of the 1989 Soviet census, that number had fallen more than 30%, to just below 62%. Additionally, Russian became the working language of both states, and many Estonians and Latvians knew the language fluently. It is no wonder that Ostler lists Estonia and Latvia in his creole group. But knowing Russian fluently does not a Russian make.

Things have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Estonians comprised 68% of the population of Estonia in 2000. Russians comprised only 26% of the Estonian population. Over half a million Estonians speak Russian as a second language. But this is a significant decrease from 1989, when almost 710,000 considered themselves “good” at Russian. Still, this does not mean that their reason for maintaining the language is a result of Ostler’s creole reasoning. More likely, this is a case of using Russian as a lingua franca in the Baltics. Certainly, Latvian and Lithuanian are close enough typologically that it would be easy for a Latvian to learn Lithuanian (and vice versa). However, Estonian is a Finno-Ugric language, unrelated to its neighbors, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian. It is no easy feat for Estonians to learn Russian, and vice versa. Russian may be surviving in the Baltics in order to unify the region. In fact, Estonia is a popular destination for vacationing St. Petersburg residents. It is to the Estonians’ monetary benefit to maintain some level of Russian language proficiency.

In 2000, Latvians made up 57% of the total population of Latvia, with Russians making up another 30%. In 2006, Latvians were 59% and Russians were only 28.5% of the population of Latvia. In real numbers, this is a loss of a quarter million Russians from the population. Latvia’s law on citizenship is one of the harshest, attracting criticisms from the EU. One is a citizen of Latvia automatically if he was a citizen of Latvia on June 17, 1940, the date of the Soviet occupation of the country, or a direct descendent of someone who was a citizen then. However, it is possible to become a citizen of Latvia through naturalization, which includes a test of Latvian proficiency. However, since the collapse, only about 200,000 people have become Latvian citizens through this means. Equally interesting, a majority of Baltic Russians (87%) agreed that they should learn the titular language; indeed they stated it was “an obligation of residents in these countries” to learn the local language.

Russian knowledge among Latvians is still strong, most likely for Ostler’s unity reason, and not the creole reason. In 1996, only 5% Latvian-mother tongue respondents to a language survey reported to not know any Russian. Only four years later, in the 2000 census, it was 25%. Another indicator of the decreasing prestige of Russian in Latvia is school enrollments. In Latvia, parents have a choice of sending their children to a school that uses Latvian as the language of instruction, Russian as the medium, or a combination of the two. In the 2000-2001 school year, less than six percent of Latvian children attended a Russian-medium school, despite a third of Latvian children knowing Russian. Additionally, 18% of Latvian children have no proficiency in Russian.

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians accounted for 40% of Kazakhstan’s population, equal to the number of Kazakhs. Even more telling is the percentage of Russians and Kazakhs in urban centers. Russians constituted over 50% of the urban population according to the 1989 census, while Kazakhs were only 27%. Things have changed over the years. By 2004, Kazakhs were over 57% of the population of Kazakhstan, while
Russians were only 27%. The urban population changed appreciably. Almost one of every two urban dwellers was a Kazakh (48.5%), while one of every three was a Russian (37%). In the 1989 census, more than 64% of Kazakhs claimed Russian proficiency, while almost 78% of Kazakhs in urban areas claimed to be fluent in Russian. In 1999, 75% of Kazakhs nationwide claimed fluency in Russian.

In the 1988-1989 school year, 73% of urban schools taught all classes in the Russian language, while only 11% were in Kazakh. Rural schools were a little closer to equal, with 47% in Russian and 37% in Kazakh. Numbers have vastly changed in the years since. In 1999, 72% of ethnically Kazakh urban children and an incredible 88% of ethnically Kazakh rural children attended schools in which classes were conducted in the Kazakh language. Country-wide, only 18% of ethnically Kazakh children attended Russian-medium schools. Like many of the FSU republics, parents have a choice to send their kids to Kazakh-only, Russian-only or mixed schools. In 2005, in urban areas of Kazakhstan, 712,000 school children attended schools where Kazakh was one of the languages of instruction. A bit more than 60% of these students attended Kazakh-only schools, while the remainder attended mixed schools, where some kids learn through the medium of Kazakh while others learn through another language, most often Russian. Despite this growth in Kazakh-medium enrollments since the collapse, approximately 20%, and possibly as high as 30%, of all Kazakh children attend classes in which Russian is the language of instruction. Much like the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the reason is probably less creole and more unity.

**Nostalgia ... isn’t the reason, either**

Belarus is Ostler’s one example of a population maintaining Russian for nostalgic reasons. Scholars, Ostler included, have pointed to the close relationships between the Russian and Belarusian governments as the reason for Russian’s prestige. If this is the case, inclusion of Belarus into Ostler’s unity group seems more appropriate. Besides, a nostalgic feeling for the days of communism and the Soviet Union in the Belarusian government does not equate to a nostalgic feeling to the Russian language for the same reasons by Belarusian people.

For example, a recent study asked Belarusians what their mother tongue was. Fewer than seven percent said Belarusian, while 69% answered Russian. These results initially lead one to surmise that the Belarusian language is dying, in favor of Russian. But they are in stark contrast to the second question in the survey, the question of the respondent’s native language. In answer to this question, just over 30% answered Belarusian, while 27% said their native language was a mixture of Russian and Belarusian. Only 34% responded Russian to this question.

Belarusian census data give us even greater discrepancies. The most recent census conducted in Belarus was in 1999, about six years before the study mentioned above. In this census, 85.6% of Belarusians (6.98 million) consider Belarusian to be their mother tongue (there was no question on the census about native language). Again, these data lead one to believe that the status of the Belarusian language is safe. But another question asked on the census reveals the strength of Russian. Of the 8.15 million Belarusians in 1999, 58.6% of them consider Russian to be their home language. Additionally, almost 63% of the total population of Belarus (considering all nationalities) speaks Russian at home, despite Russians comprising only 10% of the population. This, more than any other datum, spells the doom of Belarusian. It is difficult to maintain a language without the support of children. And if Belarusian children are not hearing their mother tongue spoken at home, the chances of them passing it on to their children are small. As the author of the study above says, “[a]bandonment of Belarusian...has progressed to what some linguists would consider a point of no return.” The fact that so few Belarusians consider it to be their mother tongue or even speak it at home certainly will not help.

In summary, I agree that the Belarusian government may consider Russian nostalgically, as shown on official government websites. If the website is available in the Belarusian language, it is listed after Russian. Some official government websites are only available in Russian and English. However, I do not agree with Ostler’s placing Belarus in the nostalgia group. The country is an example of a combination of Ostler’s reasons: unity because of all the Russian speakers in and around Belarus, nostalgia because of no ill will between the two countries and creole because so few Belarusians truly can speak Belarusian. Most Belarusians speak Russian because their neighbors, whether Russian or Belarusian ethnically, speak Russian (unity). Most of their children attend Russian-language schools or
colleges; an amazing 76-77% of children from nursery to high school attended Russian language schools in the 2005-2006 school year (creole and unity). This is no surprise due to the close relations between Russia and Belarus (nostalgia), and these school data are an example of parents’ recognizing where success lies for their children (unity).

Interestingly, nostalgia can be seen as a reason for abandoning Russian. There is no love lost between Russia and the Baltic republics, and they were some of the first to de-Russify their countries. In fact, Estonia erected a monument in 2004 to celebrate Estonians who donned the German uniform and fought with the Nazis against the Soviets during World War II. As already mentioned, citizenship laws in Estonia and Latvia are quite restrictive, at least in the opinion of Russia and the EU. Additionally, each of the Baltic countries guarantees its citizens the right to contact the government in their native language. Because of this, all three countries require government employees to pass a language exam. Despite all this, Russian is still spoken in the Baltics as a regional lingua franca.

**Russian - Dying Regional Lingua Franca**

One area where Ostler errs in his prediction of Russian prestige is in the area of unity. He defined unity as the use of Russian by a population because it is useful as a regional lingua franca. This is the area where I believe the FSU republics fal.

I have already reviewed the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan, mistakenly put into the creole group by Ostler; these three countries more properly fall into the unity group due to their use of Russian as regional lingua francas. Belarus represents a combination of three of Ostler’s reasons, including unity. The remaining FSU republics all use Russian as a regional lingua franca to varying degrees. However, in all of the states, except possibly Belarus, Russian’s use as a lingua franca is slowly dying. In order for a language to remain as a regional lingua franca, younger generations must embrace its use. This is not happening. According to the deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Russian Language Academy, fewer schools teach Russian in the FSU states, and as a result, fewer children know it.

Uzbekistan had a rise in the number of Uzbeks with fluency in Russian as a second language since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But these numbers surely will fall as fewer and fewer children study Russian in school. In Uzbek middle schools, children only study Russian for 70 hours per annum. Russian is only required in the first two years of college, for a total of 120 hours.

Add to this the fact that current textbooks are Uzbek-made, concentrating on local Uzbek culture and not covering Russian history or culture. Even supplemental Russian textbooks, donated by Russia, are used in only 8-10% of schools. In Uzbek schools where Russian is the language of instruction, officials have reduced the number of hours of Russian language tuition. Additionally, the number of college majors in Uzbek universities where Russian is the language of instruction has been greatly reduced. Uzbek is increasingly the language of everyday communication for the younger generations of Uzbeks.

In Kazakhstan, where a huge percentage of Kazakhs maintain Russian proficiency and relations between the two countries are strong, Kazakh parents are choosing to send their children to Kazakh schools. Fully 80% of Kazakh children were educated through the medium of Kazakh in 2004. Russian still dominates in colleges and universities, especially in technical areas, mostly because of the lack of textbooks in Kazakh. With the appearance of Kazakh textbooks, enrollment in Kazakh-language higher education should rise. More telling are age-group data: In 2007, over 90% of Kazakhs aged 55 or older spoke Russian fluently, while only 45% of Kazakhs 23 years old and younger could. The same is found in Tajikistan, where a state law mandates Russian language instruction from the second grade and up. Still, only a quarter of Tajik college students attend Russian-language schools. In Turkmenistan, the government shut down the Russian department at the Turkmen State University.

Kyrgyzstan is the one possible hold-out. Kyrgyz is the majority language in Kyrgyz homes, but Russian is still strong in the schools. One such school is in Naryn province, a rural area of Kyrgyzstan reputed to be the “center of pure Kyrgyz ethnicity.” Even here, the best secondary school according to parents is the Russian-language one. A graduate of this school dismissed criticisms that the school was “a threat to national identity” by pointing out that not only is Russian a useful language to know, but they “will know Kyrgyz anyway [because they] live in this [Kyrgyz] environment.” Still, country-wide, only 23% of schools offer Russian as a language of instruction, and only two institutions of higher learning offer instruction through Russian.
Lithuania offers an excellent illustration of the decline of Russian proficiency. The 2001 Lithuanian census organized language data along age groups. Of those Lithuanians below 15 years old, 70% know only Lithuanian. Only 14% know Lithuanian and one other language. This age group represents Lithuanians who were no more than five years old at the end of the Soviet Union, if they had even been born yet. In 2001, only 9% of schools in Lithuania were “minority language schools.” Of these, half were Russian-language schools; the other half were multilingual schools where Russian was one of the languages of instruction. Five years later, less than 5% of school children attended schools where Russian was the language of instruction. Trends were similar in Estonia, where only 13% of schools use Russian.

In Ukraine, as recent after the collapse as the 1993/1994 school year, fully 88% of 1st-graders were taught in Ukrainian. Twelve school years later, 78% of Ukrainian high school students attend Ukrainian-language schools. During the 2006-2007 school year in Moldova, 80% of students attended secondary schools where Moldovan was the language of instruction. More than two-thirds of college students study through the medium of Moldovan.

In all of Armenia, there are only eight Russian-language schools, and half of these are run by the Armenian government. In Azerbaijan, only 7% of elementary and secondary education is completed through the medium of Russian. In Georgia, fewer than 7% of school kids attended Russian-language schools, and many of these are ethnic Russians and non-Georgians. Quite possibly, the number of Georgian children attending Russian-language schools will fall with the aftermath of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Before the conflict, Saakashvili said “What changes if you know Russian? You can’t get Russian visas, trade with Russia is going down, we have our own TV channels now. To have a career, you don’t need to know Russian. You need to study English, Turkish.” Relations have only gotten worse since the conflict.

Typically, parents make a choice of school in the best interests of their child’s future. Previously, FSU parents chose to have their kids educated through the medium of Russian, because Russian provided a better opportunity for success. More and more, parents are choosing to educate their children in their mother tongue and a western tongue as a second language, for example in Moldova where most children learn English or French as a second language, rather than Russian. Even in Ukraine, where there is more sympathy for Russia and the Russian language (especially in eastern Ukraine), the intelligentsia sees the “center” as being in Germany or New York, not in Moscow. Russian’s use as a regional lingua franca in the 14 FSU republics is dying a slow death.

Russian Government

- Attempts too recover the advantage -

The Russian government recognizes the perilous state of the Russian language. Demographically, the Russian population is declining, losing about three million people every ten years. Fewer people are learning Russian in the states of the FSU and Warsaw Pact. Typology alone is not enough to guarantee the continued use of Russian. If so, Lithuania would have a higher percentage of its population fluent in Russian, and Kazakhstan fewer.

The Russian language enjoyed a year all its own when Putin declared 2007 to be the “Year of the Russian Language.” He described Russian as “a language of true international communication…[a] common heritage of many peoples” and expects that Russian “will never become a language of hatred…or isolationism.” This was an attempt to halt the decline in speakers that the Russian language has suffered since the end of the Soviet Union. Of course, the Russian language seems to be doing just fine according to the latest All-Russia census (2002).

Journal Submissions

- Writing Guide -

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Slightly more than 98% of all residents of the Russian Federation claim to “know Russian.” But this is 98% out of a population of just over 145 million. The last Soviet census, conducted in 1989, revealed a population of 147 million persons in the area that today is the Russian Federation. This is a loss of almost two million people, despite an increase in Russia’s population of 3.8 million, due to migration of diasporic Russians returning “home” after the Soviet’s fall.

Russia should have recognized the need for emphasis on Russian’s universality immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Students in former Warsaw Pact nations dumped Russian language instruction as soon as possible, and students in East Germany “celebrated the occasion by burning their Russian textbooks.” There was no immediate response by the Russian government.

The response came, finally, in 2005, when the Russian government approved the federal program “The Russian Language (2006-2010).” The program includes concrete goals for increasing the number of children being educated through the medium of Russian in the states of the FSU, as well as increasing the number of students in foreign countries studying the Russian language. In the five-year life of the program, organizers aim to “increase the number of participants in organizations which deal with the Russian language, and the literature and culture of Russia from 5 to 25%.” The program also recognizes the need to further educate children of diasporic Russians in foreign countries: one aim is to increase “television and radio programming consumers from 15 to 40%.” The Russian government is putting 1.58 billion rubles to this effort. “The Russian Language (2006-2010)” will, perhaps, halt the slow death of the Russian language’s prestige in former Soviet states.

Most “foreign countries,” as declared in the Russian government decision, are FSU countries. This is understandable, as there is a healthy population of Russian speakers among the titular nationalities, from which to draw teachers and advocates. However, the Russian government has not ignored non-FSU nations. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs celebrated the Year of the Russian Language by opening an exhibition in Paris. The event was even observed in the US with a grand opening at the Russian Cultural Center in Washington, DC. In China, right across the border from Russia, a new museum branch was opened as part of a project related to the Year of the Russian Language program.

The services should begin teaching their new Eurasian FAOs these languages. For those “old hands” with professional-level proficiency in Russian, it is high time to learn an additional Eurasian language. Think of the benefits to having a Eurasian FAO serving in Kazakhstan able to speak both Russian and Kazakh, or one in Georgia with proficiency in both Georgian and Russian.

For FAOs going to attaché jobs in the region, their service should consider training them in the national language of their future duty posting. In Defense Attaché Offices with more than one service attaché, it could prove useful for the principle attaché to be a Russian speaker and one of his or her assistants to speak the national language.

It remains to be seen whether or not the decline of Russian language prestige in the states of the FSU will continue. However, with fewer and fewer children speaking Russian in the last decade, the upcoming generation of military officers we meet will increasingly speak languages other than Russian, such as Latvian, Moldovan, Georgian and Turkmen. It is not too early for our military services to start training the new generation of FAOs in Eurasian languages other than Russian.

About the Author:

Major Tyson, an US Air Force Eurasian FAO, with over 24 years of service in the USAF. He served initially as an enlisted linguist in Russian and Serbo-Croatian, and currently serves as the assistant Air Attaché in Moscow, Russia.
Throughout his career, he has deployed to Saudi Arabia, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Mike is a consistent contributor to the journal.
A “Partial” Return to the Dual-Track System — Is it time?
By: Major Shawn Kyle, US Army

Since the adoption in 1999 of the “single-track” system for officer management, US Army FAOs have been accessed, trained and perhaps most importantly, assigned into one restricted sub-specialty for the rest of their Army careers. This current policy, in my view, needs to be modified somewhat, in order to increase the effectiveness of regular Army units as well as to increase the current and future quality of the US Army FAOs.

Single-track policy in current form
weaken “Big Army”

Our previous Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker repeatedly stated that the Army needs “pentathletes.” Dr. Francis Harvey, a former Secretary of the Army identified this pentathlete “as a multi-skilled leader which personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from war-fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management.” Other key leaders have also argued forcefully for Soldiers who are skilled in various functions, yet above all remain Soldiers who will be leaders of our current and future Army. FAOs then, based on job description alone, seemingly fulfill this complex job description.

Yet in its current form, the single-track policy effectively isolates FAOs from the rest of the Army, which in the process weakens regular Army units. FM 3-0, which discusses the Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations, offers a great example. Our divisions are seriously hampered without FAOs in planning and executing key tasks within the four components of Full Spectrum Operations. Specifically, planning for stability operations with tasks such a civil security, civil control, support to governance and support to economic and infrastructure development, just to name a few, are regretfully impaired without an experienced FAO on staff. A FAO with joint, interagency, language and cultural experience would be of enormous contribution to the success of a division in theater or CONUS. Yet under the current form of the single-track policy, FAOs are not habitually assigned to these billets.

Single-track policy in current form weakens current and future FAOs

If, on one hand, this lack of assigning FAOs to divisions is detrimental to the Army as a whole, it unfortunately also hampers the quality and long-term success of FAOs in OCONUS positions such as Defense Attaches and Security Assistance Officers. Imagine a senior FAO serving on a country team without recent division level staff officer experience, what quality of advice would he or she offer to a country team? Or what sort of security assistance programs would they seek to establish for military to military engagements? The Army’s doctrine and organization have dramatically transformed in the last few years, much of it based on our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. An experienced FAO with recent staff experience in a division however, would offer a different point of view that ideally, would be more aligned with current Army operations and doctrine.

Much like a foreign language DLPT is an indicator of a FAO’s language abilities, a staff assignment in one of these units, would also serve as a guidepost of “being green” or maintaining currency in key Army operations and doctrine. Major modifications of Army doctrine happen, so it necessary for all FAOs to periodically return to the “Real Army.” Without such modifications to FAO personnel policies, current and future FAOs will ultimately not be as successful as ideally they should be in providing military advice to senior leaders, or designing quality security assistance programs.

A Possible Fix – 1/3 and 2/3?

What I do not propose is a return to the time where FAOs would compete for XO/S3 positions at the battalion or brigade level. Nor do I recommend that our personnel files in HRC migrate from FA 48 back to our basic branch during these assignments. These elements of the current single-track policy I endorse. I do however, envision a future FAO performing two typical FAO coded assignments followed by a third CONUS based division and/or brigade level staff position in perhaps in the G2/G3/G5 or most likely in the G9 staff. These assignments can be either basic branch, branch immaterial or FAO specific billets. I also recommend that the Army FAO program must continue to grow in order to fill these proposed changes at the division and brigade staff levels. In FY11, FAO accessions for the Army are expected to increase to 70 officers, after several years of accessing only 50 FAOs per year. This is a
positive sign in the right direction, yet the program must continue to grow. Due this increase in quantity of FAO positions however, FAO Proponent must also be willing to recommend deleting other FAO positions that are no longer truly required. This is not impossible, but it is certainly no easy task.

**Final Analysis**

The President of the Foreign Area Officer Association, Colonel Gary Espinas, recently stated that many of the FAO current positions are invisible to the “Big Army” in a recent speech to brand new FAOs at DLI earlier this month. This should decidedly not be the case for the reasons outlined above. Such self-imposed isolation hinders the successful accomplishment of the Army’s various missions, yet it is also detrimental to the success of current and future FAOs. I sense that as FAOs we have taken parts of the “pentathlete” model too far, and have forgotten our basic skills as Soldiers. My proposed modifications of the Army’s single-track system policy might seem controversial, yet an honest discussion of this current policy’s advantages and disadvantages is what our FAO profession demands.

**About the Author**

Major Shawn Kyle is currently a student at CGSC-ILE, Fort Belvoir, VA. His next assignment will be Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation in Yerevan, Armenia.

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**The Warrior’s Shield**

*By Alan D. Preisser, LtCol, USAF (Ret)*

The warrior’s shield is molded rust
No longer beats the drum
On Flanders Field where poppies grow
There once the blood did run
In silent tribute row by row
The names of heroes stand
Diminished not by sands of time
The honor they command
On marble tablets and silent walls
In hallowed halls of pride
The nation calls to those who gave
To long with us abide.
The eternal sentry upon the wall
His watch forever stands
His cry to those who follow on
“Take care and watch my friend”
On distant shores and battlements
The soldiers bravely fell
In dogged combat in the air
And fire pits of Hell
In mighty ships and under seas
The sailor ventured forth
To battle bravely and defend our shores
From Satan’s evil force
The mighty cry of brave young men
Defending those who can’t
Wherever freedoms bell may toll
And drums of thunder rant
So remember those who gave their all
And those who gave just some
Give thanks to all who came and served
Now rest--your watch is done
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 in Turkey, many were satisfied with the AKP’s assurance that it would make Ankara’s European Union (EU) accession the chief aim of Turkish foreign policy, despite the AKP’s Islamist pedigree. The promise of a European Turkey helped assuage fears both within Turkey and Europe about the AKP’s Islamist roots; if the AKP desired a European Turkey, it certainly was not Islamist.

Initially, the AKP did push for EU membership, legislating reforms and making Turkey a candidate country for talks in 2005. However, just as Turkey began accession talks, the party turned its attention to the Middle East, suggesting it would make Turkey a “center country,” a bridge country earning the trust of both Europe and the “Muslim world.” Eight years later, is neither a bridge between European states and the “Muslim world,” nor a European country. In fact, if anything, under the AKP’s rule, Turkey is fast becoming the tribune of a politically-defined Muslim world against Europe. It is run by an increasingly authoritarian government open to the reality of governance by Islamist politics.

No Europe under the AKP

The AKP, whose predecessor, the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah), was banned in 1998 by Turkey’s constitutional court ... the decision was later upheld by the European courts, emerged in 2001 with an avowedly non-Islamist platform. The party jettisoned Refah’s anti-European rhetoric (Refah had dismissed the EU as a “capitalist and Christian club”) and instead embraced the accession process.

Despite its pro-European re-branding, the AKP never truly believed in a European destiny for Turkey, nor did the party possess a strategic view of EU membership. Instead, the AKP used the EU accession process merely as a tactical ploy to shed its Islamist image, gain credibility from the West, and curb the power of the secular military.

Surely, vehement French objections undermine Turkey’s EU accession prospects. So far, twenty-two countries have negotiated for EU membership and all were ultimately offered accession. Yet, French President Nicolas Sarkozy wants to treat Turkey differently and opposes Turkey’s membership regardless of the current accession talks with the EU.

Yet, Turkey’s EU accession prospects, an anchor that ties the country to Europe, are stalled for reasons having to do as much with French objections to Ankara’s EU membership as with the AKP’s lack of commitment to European values. The real problem is that the Islamist AKP does not share the dream of a liberal, European Turkey. While I have always supported Ankara’s membership bid, it is time to admit that the reason Turkey will not join the EU any time soon is not because of European reservations toward a Muslim country, but because of the Turkish government’s reservations toward liberal values.

The French public opposes Turkey’s EU entry and backs Sarkozy. Turkey could have broken this impasse by reforming aggressively toward European norms and forcing an embarrassed Sarkozy to lift his objections.

Having ingratiated itself to both Brussels bureaucrats and liberal Turks until 2005, though, the AKP simply dropped the EU process just as it was expected to implement tough reforms towards full membership. This is consistent with the AKP’s tactical view of EU accession. The party pursued EU membership for as long as the AKP’s EU accession policy had little domestic cost and gained the party much in terms of European legitimacy as a pro-EU (and, thus, non-Islamist) party. However, once accession talks began in 2005 and the domestic economic and political costs of EU reforms became apparent, the AKP pulled back from the EU process, judging the benefits of a cool attitude toward the EU as superseding those of membership.

In addition to the AKP’s calculations regarding the domestic political costs of unpopular reforms required for EU accession, the party’s appetite for Europe waned for another reason: the European Court of Human Rights’ 2005 decision to uphold Turkey’s ban on Islamic-style headscarves (turbans) on college campuses. The AKP had hoped that Europe would help it recalibrate Turkey’s powerful secular norms by allowing more religious freedom. The court’s decision suggests, however, that Europe is as content with Turkish secularism as Turkey is. A symbolic sign of the AKP’s loss of interest in the EU
emerged when the AKP declared 2005 the “Year of Africa,” opting to refocus the country’s attention on a different continent at a crucial time.

In due course, the AKP dropped the reform process, allowing the state of reforms to deteriorate. As the government resorted to jailing critical journalists under the pretext that they were planning a coup, Turkey dropped twenty spots in the Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index. In last year’s survey, Turkey ranked only 122 out of 175 countries, compared to 102 in 2008. Moreover, the AKP has used plot allegations—most infamously in the “Ergenekon case”—to target its political opponents in the media, military, and academia.

Independent media appears to present an acute problem for the AKP. After Milliyet, a paper owned by Dogan Media, an independent media group, reported alleged AKP links to an Islamist charity in Germany, the government slapped Dogan with a record $3.3 billion tax fine last year, a sum that exceeds the company’s worth. Under the AKP, Turkey is becoming more like Russia than Europe in the realm of government-media relations.

What is more, the AKP’s rule has also dealt a blow to the cause of gender equality. In 1994, the percentage of women in executive civil service positions was 15 percent, according to IRIS, an Ankara-based women’s rights group. The number has since decreased to 11 percent. While 33 percent of all lawyers in Turkey are women, not a single woman exists among the nine top bureaucrats in the Turkish justice ministry. Contrast this with the large number of female jurists in the country’s high courts, where judges are appointed by peers and not by the government. Almost half of the members of the Council of State, Turkey’s top administrative court, are women.

But even this refuge of enlightened gender policy might soon come to an end. The AKP has recently pushed constitutional amendments that would enable it to appoint the majority of the judges to the high courts without a confirmation process. Female judges may no longer bother to apply. As Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan put it so delicately on the 2008 World Women’s Day, the role of women in Turkish society is not to have a career but “to make at least three babies each.”

These developments only furthered Mr. Sarkozy’s objections to Turkish aspirations in Europe. Such objections, in return, led to an impasse in Turkey’s EU accession process. Turkey’s failure to reform assists Mr. Sarkozy in his stance against Turkey’s accession on grounds that Turkey is failing to become European. The more Mr. Sarkozy vetoes Turkey’s membership, the more Turks turn against the EU, embracing the AKP’s foreign policy drift away from Turkey’s traditional role as a country Muslim by religion, but Western in its political identity.

As the AKP dropped the EU process it simultaneously entered into regional conflicts in the Middle East. Therein lies the problem with AKP policy: there is incongruity between the AKP’s activist foreign policy in the Middle East and the its alleged commitment to EU accession: when everything is a priority, nothing is, and no country has ever gotten into the EU without making membership a top domestic and foreign policy priority.

“Huntington was Right; there is a Clash of Civilizations”

Since 2005, the AKP has made a 180-degree turn in Turkey’s Middle East policy, moving closer to Iran and its proxies, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Sudan. An ideological view of the world, rather than religious sympathies, motivates this policy. Mr. Erdogan and his government believe that Samuel Huntington correctly perceived a clash of civilizations, and Mr. Erdogan and his government are on the side of the Islamists, not the West.

For the AKP, “Turkey’s traditionally strong ties with the West represent a process of alienation,” wrote Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu in his opus “Strategic Depth.” Unfortunately, “Strategic Depth” has not been translated into English, though European policymakers would do well to read it to understand Ankara’s new weltanschauung. The work’s executive summary answers many questions about the AKP’s foreign policy: “Since the end of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims have gotten the short end of the stick, and the AKP is here to correct all that.”

The AKP will not correct all wrongs against Muslims, though. This is because Islamism—a political ideology that sees Muslims in perpetual conflict with the West and with “non-believers”—and not Islam, guides the AKP’s foreign policy. Ankara will therefore favor other Islamists over Muslims that do not share their Manichean worldview. Thus, the party will forgive and even defend the ills of Islamist regimes against fellow-Muslims, such as the Sudanese genocide of Darfuris or Tehran’s suppression of its own population. Likewise, it will support Islamist Hamas and its violent goals, but not
the secular Palestinian Authority or the peaceful Palestinian cause of statehood.

This selective solidarity also applies to ills committed against Muslims by non-Muslims, as long as those non-Muslims are anti-European. It exists because political Islam has made the strategic decision that the enemy of its enemy is its friend. Hence, Russia will get a pass regardless of how many Chechens it kills. Ankara, though, will always singularly target Israel, because the AKP adheres to the Islamist view that the Jewish state as such—irrespective of its specific borders or policies—will always be a sore in the “Muslim world.”

Permitting this Islamist catalyst to exist within the Middle East’s various conflicts produces devastating results for Europe. Because the AKP sees a clash of civilizations everywhere it looks, it cannot be an impartial mediator. Hence, when the AKP is allowed to interject itself between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or between Europe and Iran, it quickly becomes an advocate for the Islamist side. Approximately 90 percent of Turks do not read or write languages other than Turkish. Many see the world as reported to them and debated by their government. After eight years of increasingly authoritarian and dominant AKP rule at home, many Turks now view the world through the Islamist perspective of a civilizational clash.

**The Way Forward: Turkey must join Europe**

Believing that the supposedly reformed Islamist AKP could be a bridge-builder between Europe and Muslim countries, some have promoted the AKP as a special mediator in the region, while shielding it from those critics who worried early on about the AKP’s worldview. In 2002, many people celebrated the idea that the AKP was the herald of Europe to the Muslim world; now it appears that the AKP is the envoy of a politically charged and, by fiat, anti-Western “Muslim world” to Europe.

The AKP’s foreign policy vision has failed. Turkey has moved away from Europe and, in doing this, it has not become a regional power or a trusted mediator in Middle East issues. Much to the chagrin of those who want to see a powerful Turkey, Turkey has not become the “center country” which bridges the East and the West, communicates with both Israelis and Palestinians, and garners the trust of both Iran and Europe. The EU needs to face the reality that, despite the country’s NATO membership, Turkey can no longer be considered a European ally under the AKP.

There is a way forward: EU accession. If Turkey’s EU accession had been stalled in the pre-September 11th world, I would have said it was a real shame. Then, Turkey had room to be outside the EU but still part of Europe and the West. Now, with the EU pushing its boundaries into the Balkans and towards Turkey, and with al-Qaeda pursuing a war between a politically-defined and charged “Muslim world” and Europe, a gray area in which Turkey can position itself no longer exists. Turkey must become an EU member and part of Europe, or else fold into the “Muslim world,” as per al-Qaeda’s vision.

Turkey’s foreign policy involvement produces unconstructive results for Europe and stimulates Islamist tendencies among the Turkish population. The solution is to take Turkey out of the Middle East, and put it in Europe where it belongs. Therefore, European leaders should make Turkey’s EU accession and NATO membership the dominant part of discussions with the AKP and the Turkish public.

There is hope in this regard since Turkey remains a multi-party democracy and only one-third of Turkey’s population supports the AKP. The AKP has been sliding in polls since the opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) elected charismatic, pro-European, liberal, and social democrat leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. As a result, following the Gaza flotilla incident, the AKP has been employing vehement anti-European rhetoric, conjuring hysteria to boost its popularity. The AKP will continue to use populist, anti-European foreign policy to boost its popularity in the run up to next year’s elections.

**And this would be good for Europe, too**

But what if Turkey’s EU accession talks fail to move? Membership talks have slowed to such a grinding halt that the proverbial Turkish-EU accession train recalls a joke about the trains in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union: with Russia stagnating, the trains did not move and the scenery did not change, so the people said “choo-choo” to create the illusion of locomotion. This epitomizes Turkey’s EU accession and, at some point, the Turks will realize that their EU train is not moving forward and will disembark. This will be a disaster, ending Turkey’s consolidation as a liberal democracy and exposing dangerous consequences for Europe.

***If Europe keeps saying no to Ankara, what kind of a message is the continent sending to its Muslims?***

On a recent trip to Paris, I received a forty
minute lecture on Turkey’s EU accession from a Parisian whose parents had immigrated to France from Mauritania. He was not only well acquainted with the historic details of Turkey’s EU accession—“Ankara applied to join the Union in 1963, before my parents came to France,” he noted—but he also knew more than I did about the details of the accession talks, including on which of the 120,000 pages of EU legislation France is now blocking Turkey. When I asked him why he followed Turkey’s accession with such interest, he responded that “this is about whether there is room for me in Europe.” What is good for Turkey is also good for Europe.

The Cult of Nikalseyn

By: Major Asslan Sayyar, US Army (48D)

Inevitably T.E. Lawrence is the first name that comes to mind when one conjures up an image of an intrepid, culturally aware officer who went to extreme lengths to further his nation’s interests abroad. An early 20th century celebrity in the middle of a war that was in desperate need of heroes, this ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ fit the bill by displaying with flair the foreign area officer fundamentals of military prowess and knowledge of local culture. While Lawrence had a profound effect on the future of the Middle East as well as on world headlines, books, and finally the famous Peter O’Toole movie, the name of John Nicholson over half a century earlier and half a continent away during another desperate time sadly draws little to no attention. This article attempts to address and change this unfortunate situation, as Nicholson clearly grasped an understanding of Pashtunwali, the tribal honor code that coalition personnel conducting military operations in the same region today would do well to understand.

From the Khyber Pass to the Punjab to the walls of old Delhi, both Sahib and commoner alike respected, feared, and in some cases worshipped Nicholson. Nicholson was a civilian administrator turned officer in the British East India Company and one of several notable individuals in the story of the British Raj. Similar to Lawrence, Nicholson also seamlessly blended military skill and cultural aptitude with violently ruthless interpersonal acumen and a clear understanding of the collective mindset of the people in the area in which he operated. By today’s standards however, history would undoubtedly ignore Nicholson’s more positive attributes while most likely casting him as a war criminal as some of his early 19th century actions fly in the face of the 21st century’s concept of what is publicly acceptable.

Unmarried, Irish, and reputed to be quite cold and distant, the edges of Queen Victoria’s empire directly influenced and shaped Nicholson’s life. During Britain’s first incursion into Afghanistan in 1839 as part of the Raj’s attempt to replace Dost Mohammad with Shah Shujah, Nicholson was responsible for escorting the king’s harem; over the course of the First Afghan War, he found himself to be one of the few soldiers who survived the British Forces’ eventual destruction at the hands of Dost Mohammad’s son Akbar Khan (interestingly enough the modern day name of one of the more prestigious residential neighborhoods in Kabul). Nicholson’s brother Alexander died during that campaign, with Nicholson finding his brother “stripped, with his genitals cut off and stuffed into his mouth” after the retreat in the Khyber Pass (Holmes 204). While many persons may argue that coming upon one’s brother in such a state probably only served to intensify the ruthlessness in which Nicholson executed his duties, this author would also argue that such a discovery opened for Nicholson a

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window into the cultural mentality and senses of justice and fair play of the people that he was charged with administering. Nicholson's personal tragedy in the Khyber added much to his entire sub-continental and Afghan experience, and also indirectly delivered large dividends in the future.

The mutiny of 1857 triggered the disintegration of the British East India Company's authority over the Indian subcontinent. Known to contemporary Indian citizens as their First War of Indian Independence, the violence spread across the northern portions of the Raj from the east to the west until it reached the Punjab. Rampant indecision on the part of the company’s senior personnel plagued initial British reaction to the uprising, with officers and their dependents suffering horribly as a result. Attributing the cause of the mutiny to the British use of new rifle cartridges laced with cow and pig fat, which offended both Hindus and Muslims is overly simplistic; however, after dragging the scholastic waters one would likely see the political machinations of disenfranchised Oudh nobles and opportunistic relatives of the last sitting Mughal Emperor at work.

During the 1857 mutiny, Nicholson was stationed in the Punjab in what is today Pakistan. This relatively ungovernable area suited Nicholson perfectly, and added to his reputation among the local Pashtuns and Sikhs by inspiring respect in some cases, and fanatical devotion in others. Cultural aptitude, coupled with his ruthless enforcement of the law appealed to the locals' (not Europe's) sense of what they deemed as right. Nicholson himself had a squadron of locally recruited cavalry known as the Multani Horse, which provided him with both security and local intelligence. At the time not one person in the East India Company is known to have had any opposing illusions; all were loyal to no one but Nicholson.

The author Julian Spilsbury writes of how "Nicholson’s policy of strict-but-fair justice meted out with an iron hand won him the admiration of the tribesmen, who declared that the early Muslims must have been like him – and that he was a true Hakim (master)." Some Hindus praised him “as an avatar of Vishnu and – under the name 'Nikalseyn' – worshipped him.” Reginald Wilberforce, a contemporary and fellow officer, in speaking of his relationship with the Sikhs describes the phenomenon further:

**John Nicholson was worshipped by the Sikhs. Their religion admits of repeated incarnations, and this noble, sad-faced man was thought by them to be their god veiled in human flesh... During the time Nicholson was with the column, it was a common sight of an evening to see the Sikhs come into the camp in order that they might see him; they used to be admitted to his tent in bodies of a dozen at a time. Once in the presence, they seated themselves on the ground and fixed their eyes upon the object of their adoration, who all the while went steadfastly on with whatever work he was engaged in, never even lifting his eyes to the faces of his mute worshippers. Sometimes, overcome perhaps by prickings of conscience, or carried away by feelings he could not control, one of them would prostrate himself in prayer. This was an offence, against the committal of which warning had been given, and the penalty never varied: three dozen lashes with the cat-o’nine-tails on the bare back. This they did not mind, but on the contrary, rejoiced in the punishment, for they used to say: ‘Our god knew what we had been doing wrong, and therefore punished us.’"
crucial correspondence that led to the capture and punishment of the ringleaders before they could entice the sepoys of the Bengal Native Infantry Regiments to turn on their officers. Nicholson additionally mitigated risk by disarming all regiments in the Punjab of dubious loyalty, and under the later instructions of the province’s senior administrator, Sir John Lawrence gave Nicholson command of the column of troops that would recapture the city of Delhi in tandem with other forces in the area.

Though Nicholson would die in the process of crushing the mutiny, anecdotes exist that chronicle his conduct and provide valuable insight into his character and the effectiveness of his methods. While concern existed at the time that the recently-pacified Sikhs and the Afghans to the north-west would take advantage of the mutiny and reassert themselves in the region, at one point along the march to Delhi Dost Mohammad, the restored ruler of Afghanistan and our hero’s former enemy, sent an envoy to Nicholson’s column “assuring loyalty to Nicholson and offering support in the form of troops if necessary” (Spilsbury 90). Reginald Wilberforce would later write that “the fact of the Dost sending the message to Nicholson instead of to Sir John Lawrence, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, shows how much Nicholson was thought of, even by those who were not under English rule.”

Another well-publicized incident notes that Nicholson’s officers were kept waiting for their boss and their dinner for close to two hours one evening. Their commander eventually arrived in the mess exclaiming “I am sorry gentlemen to have kept you waiting for your dinner, but I have been hanging your cooks!” Again, Wilberforce elaborates:

*We soon learnt the story. One of the cook boys, whose conscience revolted at wholesale murder, went to Nicholson and told him that the soup was poisoned with aconite. Nicholson kept the boy safe until just before dinner was to be served, when he sent for and arrested the cooks. The soup was brought in with the cooks. Nicholson told one of the cooks to eat some; the cook protested, on the ground of caste. Nicholson knew that a Muslim had no caste, and peremptorily ordered the cook to swallow some, telling him at the same time that he, Nicholson, knew it was poisoned; of course the cook denied this. Nicholson then had a small monkey brought in, and some of the soup poured down his throat. In a few minutes the truth of the cook boy’s story was seen – the little monkey was dying of poison.*

Sentence of death was at once passed, and a few minutes afterward our regimental cooks were ornamenting a neighborhood tree

Incidents like these boosted spirits among the officer corps at the time, with plenty of additional instances existing that note John Nicholson’s mere presence having an instant effect on morale. Sir John Lawrence himself was reputed to have referred to him as “worth the wing of a Regiment.”

Nicholson died as he lived, in battle and in the process of recapturing Delhi from mutinous sepoys. The British put down the 1857 mutiny as ruthlessly as it rose, with reprisals in response to the sepoys’ atrocities appearing vicious even by the standard of the day. The mutiny also heralded the end of company rule and ushered in a new era of direct British administration over the subcontinent, with another 90 years passing before the local population would again taste independence. The times were changing and, had he survived, not much room would have likely existed for John Nicholson in the new British Raj. Nonetheless, Nicholson was a man for his time and living proof at what effect being in tune with the host nation’s culture can have on the accomplishment of one’s objectives. In our own current struggles in the region, officers of this caliber remain needed more than ever.

**About the Author:**
Major Asslan Sayyar is a US Army South Asia FAO who has recently completed In-Country-Training in Bangladesh and is currently attending the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California. Asslan is so inspired by the tales of John Nicholson that the next time he has a bad meal in South Asia he plans to have the cook executed.

The author also expresses special appreciation to Col Randall Kohlmoos (48D) for his assistance with the article.
**Mission Statement:** Political-Military Affairs advances the State-DoD relationship by bringing "smart power" to US foreign policy in six key ways:

1. Providing the Secretary with a global perspective on political-military issues;
2. Supporting the DoD by negotiating basing agreements, reviewing military exercises, facilitating overseas operations, and by providing embedded Foreign Policy Advisors to military service branch chiefs and combatant commands worldwide;
3. Promoting regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs;
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6. Regulating arms transfers and US defense trade.
When you think of the word genocide there are common associations that begin to formulate. Words such as ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and extermination all come to mind. You then might begin to associate these words with events in history such as Jews during the Holocaust or Tutsis in Rwanda. These two examples are internationally understood as genocide. However, not all events of grave and horrific violence around the world are so readily termed with the phrase, such as the Indonesian occupation and attacks of East Timor. The question exists of whether or not the violence inflicted upon the East Timorese between 1975 and 1999, and in particular leading up to and following their referendum for independence, was genocide. According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) there is a burden of proof that must be proved in order to legally claim genocide took place. Specifically for East Timor there remains the question of whether the actions of Indonesia, its army, and its militias were directed towards a group as defined by the Genocide Convention and if the intent to destroy that group existed. This article will argue that the East Timorese were a national group as defined under the Genocide Convention possessing the right of self-determination, and that Indonesia’s intent was indeed to destroy that group.

History

When explaining the violence in East Timor, it is important to understand the history of Indonesian occupation. For years, East Timor had been an “overseas province” to Portugal. On April 25, 1974 the Portuguese military staged a pro-democratic bloodless coup in Lisbon called the Carnation Revolution. The Portuguese government transformed from a dictatorship to a democracy, paving the way for the decolonization of East Timor. In 1975, the Portuguese withdrew from East Timor, ending its reign of colonization. The country was left divided into multiple opposing political entities. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) were the two most popular. The UDT was backed by Indonesian armed forces in hopes of stopping any independence movement. After the island erupted into a civil war, Fretilin declared independence for East Timor on November 28, 1975. Indonesia, claiming the Fretilin forces had illegitimately overturned Portuguese rule, invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975. Indonesia annexed East Timor on July 17, 1976, as the country’s 27th province.

Over the next 23 years, from the invasion in 1975 until 1999, East Timor suffered irrevocable violence losing over one-third its population (over 200,000 people) under Indonesian occupation. In the 1980’s Indonesia launched a campaign to “normalize,” or “Indonesianize” the East Timorese population. Indonesian authorities implemented numerous policies such as education reform in which Timorese were sent into “resettlement villages,” and transmigration where approximately 150,000 ethnically distinct Indonesians were relocated to East Timor. These programs successfully pacified and controlled the Timorese population while forcefully implementing Indonesian culture. In January 1999, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced that he would give East Timor a “second option” which allowed East Timor to choose independence following a ballot. The UN-sponsored referendum would decide whether the East Timorese supported pro-integration with Indonesia or pro-independence.

After Habibie’s announcement, East Timor became a place of mass murders and severe violence. In an attempt to suppress any movement towards independence, the Indonesia government and militias shot dead, decapitated, disemboweled, or hacked to death with machetes pro-independence supporters. Torture along with rape and sexual violence were also extremely common. This systematic violence led to an estimated 60,000 people being dis-
placed from their villages to urban centers. The U.N. responded with Security Council resolution 1246 on June 11, 1999, which established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to help stabilize the Indonesian military and secure a “direct, secret and universal ballot.”

On August 30, 1999, the polling took place under U.N. supervision, with 78.5% of the East Timorese population voting for independence. The announcement of the results was quickly followed by numerous militia attacks by the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). The Indonesian military and militias are known to have killed between 1,200 and 1,500 East Timorese in 1999, 900 of which were after the ballot. Also, there was the forced displacement of an estimated 500,000 people seeking refuge within East Timor, while 240,000 crossed the border to West Timor where tens of thousands still remain. On October 25, 1999, UN Security Council resolution 1272 established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to help assist in the humanitarian crisis and to rehabilitate East Timor. UNTAET continued until May 20, 2002 when East Timor was finally declared independent.

Genocide of a Group

There is no question within the international community that crimes against humanity took place in East Timor during its 23 year Indonesian occupation. However, there remains the debate of whether those acts of violence constitute as genocide. According to the Genocide Convention, Article II states:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

To define the people of East Timor as a national group, a definition of a national group must be determined. To date, the only legal interpretation of a national group for the purpose of the Genocide Convention can be found within the ICTR. In the Prosecution v. Akayesu, a national group was defined as “a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.” This definition was based upon the Nottebohm case Liechtenstein v. Guatemala which determined the concept of “nationality” as the granting of citizenship by a state. Using this definition, it is argued that because East Timor was a province of Indonesia and not its own state, genocide of a national group did not occur.
However, the origin of the word genocide, in regards to a national group, suggests a different explanation. The definition of genocide was first founded by Polish Jew Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Lemkin claimed that the genocide of a national group has two phases: first, the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; second, the oppressor imposing its national pattern after the removal of the population and the colonization by the oppressor’s own nationals. Using this original definition, the East Timorese were a national group because they possessed a national pattern for independence. After the Portuguese withdrew in 1975 and Indonesia consequently invaded, East Timor maintained their fight for self-determination for 23 years and solidified that want with a majority vote for independence in the 1999 UN referendum. Indonesia’s attempt to choke East Timor’s national pattern of self-determination by attacking and destroying them was genocide of a national group. The creation of a state does not create the national group; rather the national group creates the state.

**The Intention of Genocide**

Defining East Timor as a national group is only part of the equation. The next step is to prove that Indonesia had the intent to destroy that group. The intent to commit a crime is one of the most difficult things to prove legally. In the ICTR judgments of *Kayishema and Ruzindana*, “intent can be inferred from either words or deeds and may be demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action.” There is the often the argument that the conflict in East Timor between December 1975 and September 1999 was a military one between Indonesian forces and the East Timorese resistance movement over political and territorial control of East Timor. However, although the majority of the killings were carried out by the TNI and Indonesian backed militias, the majority of the victims were civilians and not resisters.

According to the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), a commission mandated by UNTAET Regulation 2001/10, acts of civilian killings between 1974 and 1999 almost dubious those of Fretilin victims. Of the non-fatal violations that were reported to the CAVR, including displacement, torture, and starvation, 88.7% were violations against the civilian population, clearly showing an intent beyond military means. Equally important, 93.3% were attributed to Indonesian security forces and auxiliaries, indicating a systemic program of sexual violence. These sexual violations were mostly directed towards women and included rape, sexual slavery, sexual torture and harassment. According to the ICTR case *Prosecution v. Akayesu*, “rape and sexual violence... constitute genocide in the same way as any other act... [And] certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims.” This case set the precedent for including rape and sexual violence within acts of genocide.

The manner in which these crimes were committed also suggests that there was intent to destroy the East Timorese population. The majority of executions, massacres, and rapes were carried out in public areas and were commonly witnessed by Indonesian police and sometimes officials, showing that these were accepted and encouraged practices. In addition to the public physical abuses carried out by the Indonesian military, severe mental harm was also a common practice. Prior to the independence ballot, East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN) briefed the US House of Representatives Human Rights and Progressive Caucuses in May 1999, about not only the physical but mental harm that had been taking place in East Timor. After a massacre on April 6, 1999, survivor Francisco de Jesus de Costa recounts how an Indonesian militia began terrorizing the town of Liquica, kidnapping and killing civilians while burning down houses. De Costa states that about 1,000 people gathered in the home of Father Rafael de Santos as refugees until members of the Indonesian army attacked the residence. Plain-clothed military men waited outside the house to shoot anyone who tried to flee the
massacre. This hunting down and killing of innocent unarmed civilians was intended to cause not only physical but mental harm to the victims. According to the Genocide Convention, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group constitute as genocide.

In addition to the ETAN House of Representative briefing, the 106th Congress submitted House Concurrent Resolution 97 on May 5, 1999, finding that the following was true about the violence in East Timor: since November 1998, at least 10,000 East Timorese civilians have fled from the countryside to seek refuge, Indonesian special forces have carried out a systematic reign of terror in East Timor, and the Indonesian Government has obstructed attempts to deliver international humanitarian assistance to East Timor. These actions carried out by the Indonesian government to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction constitute Indonesia’s actions in East Timor as genocide.

Conclusion

It is universally accepted that genocide and the extinction of a group is one of the most serious crimes that can be committed. It is a particularly heinous act that when committed deserves special condemnation. The violence that took place in East Timor for 23 years, which led ultimately to the killing of one-third of the population, is genocide. Currently, the Genocide Convention, in coherence to the findings of the ICTR, states that a national group must possess legal bonds on common citizenship. In the case of East Timor, the victims constituted a group that engaged in their right of self-determination in an attempt to establish a state, but were unsuccessful because of Indonesia’s invasion. This does not undermine the fact that an East Timorese national group did indeed exist and was deliberately targeted. Indonesia’s policies of mass murder, forced relocation, sexual violence and starvation were intended to eliminate the East Timorese as a distinct group with a recognizable identity worthy of expression and recognition through a state. East Timor chose to exercise their right to self-determination by attempting to possess legal bonds of common citizenship and as a result was systemically targeted by Indonesia with the intent to destroy their national group. History must recognize the conflict in East Timor as a legitimate genocide; otherwise, history might fall victim to repeating the same atrocities.

About The Author …

Alyssa Litalien served as a summer intern working in the Foreign Policy Advisor’s (POLAD) office at Air Combat Command, USAF. She is currently a junior at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, VA, where she majors in political science, and pursues double minors in International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies. Alyssa works as a Supplemental Instruction Leader for International Relations at her university. In April 2010, she was selected to participate at the Fourth Annual L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs Student Research Conference where she presented research about Pres. Nixon and the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Alyssa has participated in student foreign exchanges in Mexico (2004, 2005) and Germany (2007).

Quotable Quotes …

**Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding.**

-Albert Einstein

Share your Quotable Quote … send it to the editor.

editor@FAOA.org
Current Intelligence is the vital “front line” in supporting international policy decisions to insure decision makers understand the political and other ramifications of US actions or lack of actions in a geographic area of interest. It is a highly complex environment that involves a mosaic of cultural, social, political, economic, and other currents that can impact on short and long range US interests.

This complex area is the operating environment for the qualified national-level current intelligence analyst, whose effectiveness is based on his/her ability to identify issues, interpret events and project implications accurately. Without essential tailored training the analyst, as the untrained soldier in an ambush, will “hug the ground”, forcing “unsupported” decision makers into a defensive and wholly reactive mode.

No Shortcuts

An inherent problem in the development of the national-level-capable current intelligence analyst is the perception, or possibly wishful thinking, that some type of irrefutable intelligence will arrive on the scene in the midst of the decision making crisis that will preclude the necessity of analysis. No report, regardless of the source, can be taken at face value; neither can an intelligence officer doing his or her job, simply repeat such a report and pass it off as finished intelligence.

Decision makers seldom suffer from a lack of information, but they tend to be starved for interpretive-projective analysis that distills the volume of information and makes it meaningful and understandable. Decision makers have neither the time nor the background to effectively analyze events and/or project implications in their proper cultural context.

There is also the fundamental problem that “operators” continue to look on “intelligence types” with at least some degree of ambivalence, despite their acceptance that knowledge of the “enemy” is crucial to a successfully military or political effort. This means that the intelligence officer must not only effectively present his/her analysis, but must concurrently “sell him/herself” if that information is to be fully accepted as credible.

Training Remains the Key

The training of the national-level-capable intelligence analyst must focus not only developing regional expertise and interpretive-projective skills, but also the ability to convey his/her message clearly and concisely in either written or oral form. The analyst must be developed into a highly motivated self-starter who knows not only his/her region of responsibility, but is also attuned to the needs and perceptions of the decision makers and the environment in which they must function.

Clearly, therefore, there are two essential factors involved in the training of a national-level-capable current intelligence analyst – having the substantive knowledge, and having the ability to convey that knowledge to the appropriate decision makers in a form that is meaningful to them. This involves not only “boiling-down” highly complex analytical insight, but also being able to “package” that information in a manner that is both meaningful and useful to the decision makers.

Analytical Judgment

One of the inherent problems in current intelligence is the minimal level of appreciation of what a national-level-qualified current intelligence...
an analyst can do substantively in the interpretive-projective area. As a result, there tends to be a focus on presenting “the facts” with considerable less regard to what those facts mean. It is undoubtedly important if country “X’s” missiles have been relocated, but it is equally important to determine why the missiles were deployed and what country “X’s” intentions are, if an effective response is to be developed.

Seldom, if ever, is there a single intelligence report that clearly spells out motivation and intent, since few if any bureaucracies operate in such a clear cut fashion. Nonetheless, a highly skilled regional analyst can determine the players and pressures under which decision are made, thereby recreating the general environment in which county “X’s” decision makers must operate.

The analyst can then monitor, on a real-time basis, the decision making process in country “X”. Without this type of analytical insight and interpretive-projective analytical effort, our policy makers remain in a reactive mode, giving up the initiative they might otherwise have had.

Qualifications and Training

The ideal candidate for developing into a national-level-capable current intelligence analyst is one who had had extensive “living experience” and dealt with people in widely differing circumstances. He/she should also have completed a graduate degree in area studies, have lived in the area, have small unit ground-oriented military experience, and have worked with a broad cross section of intelligence products.

With this foundation, the training effort can then concentrate on developing analytical insight. This is accomplished primarily by narrowing the more academic focus to specific incidents or events, while drawing on the cultural background to put them into the proper regional context. The goal is, of course, to teach the analyst how to create, as much as possible, a “model” that parallels the operating environment of the various regional players.

Once the analyst has identified the key players, he/she must then determine the interplay between them, their motivations, objectives, and capabilities. Other constraining factors, such as religion, culture, economics, family ties, etc., must also be weighed. In addition, pressures such as rivalries and outside player manipulation have to be examined. Since no one operates in a vacuum, once the fundamental operating environment has been determined, the analyst can make judgment calls that are in real time and closely parallel those of the on-the-ground regional players.

Many analysts at the national level, however, lack the regional expertise, which must be developed if they are to be effective. This can be accomplished through their reading of the intelligence reports, outside reading and studies, and the guidance and assistance they receive from fellow analysts and the senior analysts. Without this insight the analyst will tend to repeat the last intelligence report with a minimum of analytical judgment.

Rounding out the Resource

New analysts, when they arrive at the national level, seldom have sufficient regional, military and intelligence expertise to operate effectively. They generally have some background, however, in at least one of the areas. All analysts, therefore, require on-the-job-training in at least one of the three building-block areas, if they are to round out their capabilities. The new analyst must also adjust to the new work environment of current intelligence.

Packaging knowledge is virtually as important as the intelligence provided, if the information is to be of use to the decision maker. The decision maker has neither the time nor the expertise to evaluate raw
data, although they attempt to do so periodically. The analyst, therefore, must not only have an insightful message to convey that has significance to the decision maker, but it must be packaged in a manner that is clear, concise and precise. This packaging effort is often contrary to previous training, especially from the academic world, which tends to be less specific and projective in focus.

Effective packaging by the analyst can only be accomplished, if the national-level-capable analyst knows not only his subject and mastered the writing techniques, but also knows the environment in which the decision maker operates. While many of the writing approaches used in current intelligence appear to be stylistic and simplistic, they are designed for the busy decision maker. Therefore, it must be mastered to be successfully passed meaningful intelligence through the bureaucracy on its way to the decision maker, and have the desired impact when it arrives.

The analyst’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently once a crisis has erupted can be enhanced immeasurably by a well defined and organized filing system. In addition, he must know how to tap into other organizations and agencies to gather supporting information such as weapons capabilities, in-depth order of battle, or data on a nation’s economic infrastructure.

Tailoring the Product

One fundamental rule in using the written word is to “front load” the paper so the most significant information is at the beginning. Subsequent explanatory information and/or supporting data should follow. In addition the paper should be as short as possible. The paper should also provide the decision maker with some insight into the logic of any conclusions drawn, which will enhance the credibility of the conclusion.

Sentences should be straightforward and aim at highlighting the message, not detracting from it with a demonstration of literary prowess. Writing is also a technique for developing the analytical process and internalizing ideas. It is, therefore, a vital vehicle in the development of the national-level-capable current intelligence analyst.

The oral presentation is potentially the most powerful of the message delivery techniques, but it also depends on a clear focus, conciseness and precision. In addition, however, there are other “atmospherics” that are crucial if the information is to be properly received, such as the speaker’s physical appearance, his/her bearing and delivery technique. The adjunct aspects of the oral delivery can significantly enhance the credibility of the message presented.

Conclusion

National-level-capable current intelligence analysts are not born; they are developed through effective tailored training. It is a process that takes at least two years, providing the analyst has an effective mentor who continually structures his/her growth. The result, however, can be an individual who can contribute immeasurable to the decision making process by providing insightful interpretative-projective analysis to the decision maker.

This type of analytical development, however, is dependent on the realization that there is no such thing as pure “facts”, since they remain relatively meaningless unless placed in their proper political and regional context. Therefore, despite the apprehension some feel toward “analysis”, it is the only methodological technique that can provide the necessary insight for decision makers to develop effective policies in the international area.

About The Author …

Dr Denny Howley completed his “basic academic” FAS/FAO training at the American University of Beirut from 1969-1972 where he acquired a Masters Degree in Middle East Studies. At that time he traveled extensively, mostly with back-pack, from Afghanistan to Morocco, and from Turkey to Yemen.

From 1972 until 1993 he functioned as a Middle East/Terrorist Specialist in DIA’s J-2 as both a military officer and later as a civilian. During his J-2 time he completed a second Master’s Degree at the American University in Washington, DC, in International Politics and a PhD at George Washington University in International Relations.

Denny is an Airborne-Ranger-Special Forces qualified Officer who commanded two Special Forces “A” Detachments and a Rifle Company in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam before entering the FAS/FAO program. He retired from the Army as a Major and has lived in Key West, FL since 1993, where he is a Scuba Instructor and Serves Process.
One event narrated by one author has left a lasting impression on the Jewish Nation. The well known, well revered fall of Masada was documented by Josephus Flavius in his book *The War of the Jews* circa 75 AD. This historical narrative of the infamous Sicarii Jewish group rising up to defend their fortress until the end of life itself is one that is viewed by many Jews as a symbol of heroism, patriotic loyalty, and the human spirit’s will to be free. However, this complex also births reason for doubt and despair: “As long as this spirit governs Israel it is difficult to see how there can be peace.” The Arab – Israeli conflict has subsisted since the 20th century where rights of entitlement and land ownership of Palestine has produced violence from both groups. Also, it is no secret that Iran has made threats against Israel’s existence; a threat that could become reality with the country’s endeavors to acquire nuclear arms. However, Israel’s unique sense of Masada and its symbol of heroism could lead the country to preemptively strike Iran, even if mass devastation and obliteration of the Jewish nation would surely follow.

The word “Masada” comes from the Hebrew word “Metzuda” meaning “fortress” and it is an archaeological ruin atop a plateau towering over the Dead Sea. This grand fortress was built by Herod the Great who had feared enslavement by his many adversaries. The story of the Fall of Masada begins in 66 AD when the Jewish population revolted against the Roman Empire after much calamity, enslavement, and persecution was bestowed upon them by the great empire. In his book, *The War of the Jews*, Josephus describes the Roman conquest which left Judaea and the Temple in Jerusalem utterly destroyed. Acting as catalysts to the revolt against the Romans, the Sicarii found refuge in the Masada fortress where they carried out raids and attacks on the Roman Empire. According to Joesphus, it was the last fortress that remained standing against the Romans and it was commanded by the Jewish leader Eleazar ben Yair. The Sicarii are described by Josephus as barbaric Jews who wreaked havoc upon any opposition, including other Jews, who were willing to submit to the Roman Empire. The slashing of throats, the driving away of cattle and gross incendiary actions were all methods of torture the Sicarii Jews used against their enemies. Josephus goes on to illustrate the seizure of the Masada fortress by the Romans which ended in tragedy. After seeing the walls of his fortress under fire,
Eleazer convinced his people to commit suicide as opposed to surrendering to Roman leadership.

While resenting the plan was the initial reaction, the Sicarri people later stood courageous, ready to die with honor after further enticement and encouragement by Eleazer. Escaping from the horrifying suicide campaign were two women and five children who hid themselves under ground and later reported the misfortunes of the 960 Jews that were slain. Upon reaching the sight of the massacre, the Romans were in disbelief and yet in total amazement of the valor displayed by the Sicarri on their fateful day. “Nor could they [the Romans] do other than wonder at the courage of their resolution, and the immovable contempt of death which so great a number of them had shown, when they went through with such an action as that was.”

The validity of the fall of Masada and the events that followed has been questioned by archaeologists and scientists alike. Certain aspects of the so-called battle are not commensurate with the findings many archaeologists have made. For example, Josephus points out that the Masada fortress was the last fortress standing against the Roman Empire. But, according to author and former dean of the department of Sociology and Anthropology at Hebrew University, Nachman ben Yehuda, this information is not proven. However, factual substance is not the only issue concerning Masada. It is the belief or complex many Israeli Jews hold concerning their ancestral background. According to Middle East journalist and scholar, Milton Viorst, the Masada Complex is one that has engulfed the Jewish way of thinking: it governs their attitude and actions. He believes that this complex instills within them a sense of patriotic honor, and respect is demanded when patriotic suicide or the willingness to die for country is ensued. However, the question of embellishment by Josephus does not seem to be of much concern to many Jews where this grand story is taught in their education institutions. Many Israelis continuously perceive themselves as being surrounded by hostile extremities, outnumbered and inferior and thus find the story of Masada manifested in their daily lives. Author and Professor of Jewish Studies and History, Yael Zeruvabel, describes it as people that anti-Semitic Europeans tried to erase. However, this narrative is but a collective memory where the actions are not as significant as the meaning behind it. For example, instead of focusing on suicidal behavior, which is frowned upon in Jewish culture, the Sicarri Jews were transformed into honorable patriotic men and women who gave their life away in a vow to never be subdued by the Romans.

During an interview conducted by Yael Zerubavel, many Jewish students and adults alike described the Masada people as “having fought to the bitter end” or “having died at the altar of our homeland.”

In his article Can a Nuclear Armed Iran be Deterred?, Amitai Etzioni argues that the Masada complex, held by many Israelis, could lead the country to attack Iran based on its nuclear capabilities even if the attack could be detrimental to...
the country. According to the author, Masada is more than just a piece of history, it is a belief to “never again go like lambs to the slaughter” as was done during the Nazi regime. Though some may argue this belief is not rational and thus improbable, Etzioni states that these “beliefs are based on non-rational commitments that one cannot argue with on the basis of fact and logic, and thus cannot be reliably deterred.” Etzioni furthers his argument by describing a person who believes he has been commanded by “God” to slay his enemies. This person will not question whether to execute God’s plan, but instead, he will question how the plan should be executed. The simple fact that Israel’s national security is threatened if and when Iran gains nuclear capability leads one to question whether Israel will indeed decide to strike their archrival first. Nonproliferation is the US policy towards nuclear weapon capability. However, quelling the production and use of these destructive weapons is not as simple as it may sound. Nonproliferation cannot be accomplished by the US alone. Each country must come together to ensure the safety of their citizens. However, Iranian President, Mahmoud Amidenijad, has stated Israel “is an illegitimate regime, there is no legal basis for its existence” and that the Middle East would fare far better “without the existence of the Zionist regime. The Israeli government has made it known that it will not allow an attack aimed at destroying Israel. This was proven during the 1981 strike Israel made against Iraq, the first air strike attack against a nuclear plant in history. If Israel does not feel safe protected under the banner of the US, will they preemptively strike Iran in defense of their territory, identity, and as a model made precedent at the Masada fortress?

The bravery and allegiance to country exhibited by the Jews at the Masada fortress has left lasting impressions on succeeding generations. The vow to fight until the end has been the declaration of Israelis in the Middle East, unwilling to give up territory and determined to conquer its enemies, defending the land that was promised to them. Israel’s tendency to strike first may be credited to the Masada complex. The fall of Masada is a part of Jewish history and it has been engrained in Jewish culture. In 2010, Israel finds itself more defiant and repulsed against many nations: Israel may feel that it stands alone in a fight towards national preservation and if Israel stands alone, the Masada history may repeat itself – “Masada represents for all of us in Israel and for many elsewhere...a symbol of courage, a monument to our great national figures, heroes who chose death over a life of physical and moral serfdom.”

About the Author:
Sheri Lamb recently served as a summer intern with Air Combat Command’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Langley AFB. She attends Howard University in Washington, DC where she is a Psychology major, a Sociology minor and a 4th year cadet with AFROTC. She will receive her commission in the spring, and enter active duty.

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Speaking on "FAOs and the Defense Attaché System"

Quarterly FAOA “Policy” Luncheons are a great opportunity to hear distinguished speakers present their views on critical issues facing the greater international affairs community, impacting US national interests. Guest speakers include key flag officers, authors and national security officials impacting all aspects of international affairs.

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USAF International Affairs Specialist News -

**Promotion Statistics**

The International Affairs Specialist (IAS) program congratulates its recent selectees for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel on the P0510A board! As the blow statistics indicate, Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS) and Pol-Mil Affairs Strategists (PAS) are out-performing their peers.

- In the Promotion Zone (IPZ) to Lieutenant Colonel
  -- Line of the Air Force (LAF) average for IPZ officers was 74%; IAS average for IPZ officers was higher at 96%
  -- 33 RAS eligible; 30 selected (91%)
  -- 60 PAS eligible; 59 selected (98%)
- Below the Promotion Zone (BPZ) to Lt Col
  -- LAF average for BPZ officers was 4%; IAS average for BPZ officers was higher at 5%
  -- 64 RAS eligible; 4 selected (6%)
  -- 125 PAS eligible; 6 selected (5%)

**Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI)**

In FY10, the IAS office sent a total of 59 USAF personnel on LASI programs, providing an language and culture immersion program for 24 Attaches, 18 RAS, 6 PAS, and 11 General Purpose Force personnel. LASI programs are generally four weeks in length and include scheduled classroom and one-one-one language study and cultural lectures and excursions. The critical component of the LASI is the home stay. Living with a host nation family exponentially increases the student’s understanding of the host nation culture and contributes to a sometimes dramatic improvement in linguistic ability. The IAS program office will continue to offer LASI programs for IAS officers in Fiscal Year 2011.

**Focus on Speaking**

The IAS program is leading the charge to improve the critical RAS/FAO linguistic skill – speaking. Maj Dan King (IAS Force Management) and Mr Christian Paasch (IAS Force Development), with the support of Sister Service FAO proponents and the Defense Language Office, are working with the Defense Language Institute-Foreign Language Center in Monterey, CA to develop both a two-skill oral proficiency interview (OPI) and a 15-level course devoting more attention to the speaking skills RAS/FAOs require to successfully interact in their regions of specialty.

**RAS Skills Maintenance**

Beginning in FY11, RAS officers will be required to complete at least 40 hours of training annually in language study or regionally-focused courses. First and foremost, RAS officers can accomplish this training by participating in online course work such as the module offered on FAOWeb. RAS officers who attend regionally-focused study programs or language tutoring as part of their assigned duty or as components of other coursework may request credit for those program hours. The IAS program office will continue to provide a variety of in-residence courses including programs at the Foreign Service Institute, the Air Force Special Operations School, the regional centers, among others. We urge our senior RAS officers (O-5 and O-6) to participate in the Joint FAO Skills Sustainment Pilot Program during the coming fiscal year, the final year of the programs “pilot” status.

**PAS Visit to Washington DC**

In conjunction with the Sep 10 Air Force Association convention at National Harbor, the IAS program hosted the PAS officers currently attending the ACSC-PAS course to a 2-day orientation in Arlington, VA. The PAS officers were treated to a series of lectures and discussions on the role of the Pol-Mil officer in today’s international environment from the SAF/IA leadership and State Department experts. Additionally, 16 PAS officers had the opportunity to interview for 9 one-month CSAF POLAD-sponsored Embassy Internship positions.

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Without you … WE FAIL

A key part of the journal’s charter is to provide the Joint FAO community with the most current contact information and service news that is humanly possible … but that requires your proactive help.

If you have service news, contact lists, services updates, policy updates, text from key speeches … whatever … submit them to the Journal and we will gladly publish them as a service to the greater community.

editor@FAOA.org
Or just remember our web site www.FAOA.org
Rear Admiral Jeffrey Lemmons, Director, International Engagement Division (N52) addressed the Foreign Area Officer community at-large at a recent association luncheon.

Rear Admiral Lemmons is the Chief of Naval Operations’ principal representative for foreign engagement. For many of our partners and allies he is the personification of our Navy’s numerous foreign activities. At the Fall Luncheon hosted by the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) at the Ft McNair Officers Club in September, the admiral communicated his vision of the Navy’s FAO Community, one of the practical applications of the 21st century Maritime Strategy. “What the Army has known for over three decades, the rest of us are now just learning,” the admiral smiled complimenting the achievements of the Army FAO Community on the fifth anniversary of the relatively young single-track Navy FAO Community.

Without question, the Navy FAO is an officer community, whose relevance is only increasing with the rapid speed of globalization. FAOs are viewed as a key enabler of the Maritime Strategy and core function of the Navy’s global engagement mission. The admiral shared his views about the Strategy establishing new capabilities for long-standing challenges in front of a mixed audience of both active and retired FAOs from all services. His firm belief is that the language, regional expertise and the cultural knowledge of FAOs are a crucial component of the Navy’s Maritime Strategy of tomorrow.

According to the admiral, the Maritime Strategy began with discussions with Navy’s world partners and the American people and it is reflective of those collaborations. No one nation can face the challenges of the post-Cold War world alone – success depends upon continued interaction with the world, and especially the creation of the next generation of Navy leaders. “We want to have FAOs among them,” the admiral stated. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) N52 continued: “We have come a long way. However, there are still a few mile markers to pass before the race is done.”

The Navy FAO cadre remains on track toward achieving its goal of 400 FAOs by year 2015. The admiral pointed to some of the highly competitive trends observed during the last few Lateral Transferred Re-designation Boards. The Community enjoys no shortage of qualified applications at each board with the acceptance rate now at 1 in 11 (9%) qualified applicants. Coincidentally, nine percent happens to be the same acceptance rate that the country’s number one institution for higher education - Harvard University - enjoys. The Navy leadership supports the plan to access FAOs yearly with a goal to mature the community to 300 operational billets and 100 training billets by 2015. RADM Lemmons confirmed the Navy leadership’s determination to support this increase in billets and continue to be fully engaged in the process to ensure only the best and fully qualified are selected and stay in the community.

Recently, the Navy FAO management team has initiated a new career path that includes Milestone Screening at the O-4 level for future O-5 jobs. This new career path also succeeds in better alignment between requirements and training.

Additionally, the Navy is taking a hard look at the promotion structure in order to grow the highest quality O-6 populace possible. The Fleet demand for FAOs is extremely high, reflecting a growing recognition among forward commanders of the value and potential of FAOs to Theater Security Cooperation Missions.

Further, the CNO N52 underscored the importance of giving every FAO the academic, language and regional expertise training that they need. “With your help and support we can build a successful future force considered invaluable to our Navy’s and our nation’s interests abroad,” Lemmons continued. To that end, in 2011 the Navy will initiate a three-month In-Country Training Program for Navy FAOs. Also during the same year, the newly established Reserve Component (RC) of the Navy FAO Community is expected to gain its initial strength of 30 to 40 members, growing to approximately 100 in three years. The Maritime Partnership Program (MPP) is a great example of a Maritime Security Cooperation tool and a natural fit for the Reserve FAO Component.
Today FAOs are serving as key enablers for the Theater Security Cooperation efforts of the expeditionary commands, the Naval Component Commands (NCC) and the Combatant Commands (COCOM). There are a number of billets available, but according to the admiral, we need “quality” and not “quantity” to ensure the future success of the force. The Navy FAOs, together with their Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force brothers-in-arms, are the frontline experts in their areas, thus their input about “FAO-like jobs” becomes invaluable to the process.

Relationships among Flag and General Officers are extremely important, but the admiral is convinced that junior officers around the globe must also help to develop lasting friendships. The admiral’s ideas reflected the spirit of the audience that opportunities for young officers to work together with their foreign counterparts and to develop relationships early in their careers are essential.

The Navy FAO is a maritime professional who is a culturally savvy and language-equipped international relations specialist. The unique nature of the global maritime environment and the Navy’s role in advancing Cooperative Sea Power in support of national security creates enduring requirements for Navy FAOs. In addition, the admiral concluded that the Maritime FAO is a key figure in planning and facilitating positive outcomes while implementing Maritime Security Force Assistance, the aggregate of training, equipping, advising and building partner capacity in the Maritime Domain.

The FAO of today is all of these and more.

As a Village Elder from Eritrea once said: "If I speak only one language, I could help my country as only one man. If I can use two languages, I could help as two men, but if I could use all nine languages, then I can work as nine men..."

Could you think of a better metaphor for the multiplying power of the talented FAO force?

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**US Navy**

**FAO Proponent and key contact lists**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Email</th>
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Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Lemmons
Director for International Engagement, (OPNAV N52)

Rear Adm. Lemmons, originally from Brownwood, Texas, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979 and was designated a Naval Aviator in November of 1980. He spent his early sea duty years with Patrol Squadron (VP) 23 home-ported in Brunswick, Maine, and forward deployed to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. He later reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, as a Naval intern developing Joint service personnel policy.

Lemmons received a Reserve commission (RC) and reported to Naval Air Facility, Washington, DC, where he became the commanding officer of VP-68 in February 1996. His subsequent RC unit commands were in support of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71); Naval Air Station (NAS) Keflavik, Iceland, and the Navy Command Center, supporting Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N3/N5. He also served as the deputy commander, Navy Reserve Region Southeast and was the OPNAV Deep Blue liaison to Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Selected to Flag rank, he was assigned as the commander, Naval Air Force Reserve (CNAFR) and also served as the vice commander, Naval Air Forces at NAS North Island, San Diego.

Staff assignments have been as director for Fleet Readiness (OPNAV N43); associate director, Assessments Division (OPNAV N81D); Reserve assistant deputy Chief of Naval Operations for the Integration of Resources and Capabilities (OPNAV N8R); assistant deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operation, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5B). He has been recently assigned to lead the newly formed U.S. Navy Directorate for International Engagement (OPNAV N52).

Lemmons is most proud to have served with shipmates who together earned four Meritorious Unit Commendations, the Joint Meritorious Unit Commendation, the Coast Guard Unit Commendation and two Battle "E" Awards for excellence. He has completed the Naval War College and National Defense University Reserve Component studies curriculum and is a member of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Force Policy Board.
Brigadier General Robert A. Carr
Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center

Brigadier General Robert A. Carr was commissioned through an ROTC program at Stetson University in 1980. He earned a Master of Public Administration from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and a Master of Science in Strategy from the United States Army War College.

His military education includes the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

Before coming to the DCHC, Brigadier General Carr served as the J-2 for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), USFOR-A, in Afghanistan from January 2009 to September 2009, and held several significant staff and command positions during his career.

His staff assignments include: S-3 of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Meade, Md, from June 1993 to 1995; Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of Information Operations (G-3) for the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at Fort Belvoir, Va., from June 2000 to July 2001; Chief J2 of Stabilization Force (SFOR), Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina from July 2002 to 2003; Assistant Director for Intelligence (J-2) for The Joint Staff in Washington, D.C., from September 2005 to August 2007, and as the Director for Intelligence (J-2) for U.S. European Command in Germany until January 2009.

His command assignments include: Chief of Staff, J-3 Operations and Deputy Commander of 713th Military Intelligence Group, INSCOM at Menwith Hill Station, UK, from July 1995 to August 1997, and Commander of the 721st Military Intelligence Battalion, 702nd Military Intelligence Group, INSCOM, from June 1998 to June 2000. He returned to Fort Gordon in July of 2003 and served as the dual-hatted commander of the Gordon Regional Security Operations Center, transitioned to NSA-Georgia, 116th Military Intelligence Group until July 2005.

His personal awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Parachutist Badge and Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.
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Next luncheon is … Friday, 5 Nov 2010
Seating is limited … register online to reserve your seat. As always, go to your FAOA website to register, more information, or to ask questions … www.FAOA.org

Guest Speaker: Brigadier General Robert A. Carr, US Army
Director, Defense Counterintelligence And Human Intelligence Center
Speaking on "FAOs and the Defense Attaché System"

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