Inside This Issue …

The Delafield Commission: Forerunner to FAO
In-Country Training Report: Paris and Brussels
The DPMO: New Inroads with Chinese Military
Winning Without Fighting: Toppling North Korea

FAO HISTORY
Will the original FAO please stand up?

A Joint FAO Intro Course?
OSS Society’s Annual Banquet Report
Turk Concerns of US’ Iraq Withdrawal
Southeast Asia: “Indo” or “China”

Book Reviews, Proponent news and other Field Reports
DISCLAIMER: The association’s professional journal *International Affairs* (a non-profit publication for US Regional and International Affairs professionals) is printed by the Foreign Area Officer Association, Mount Vernon, VA. The views expressed within are those of the various authors, not of the Department of Defense nor any of it’s elements. The contents are not intended to report/reflect a DoD position and are not intended to supersede official government sources. The publication simply intends to advance the FAO profession through thought, dialog and academic discussion. Journal content neither implies nor constitutes affirmation nor endorsement by the FAOA, or DoD.

PURPOSE: To publish a journal for the dissemination of professional knowledge and furnish information that promotes understanding between US regional and international affairs specialists around the world, and to improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS and MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association.

Membership information may be obtained primarily on the FAOA website: www.faoa.org or by mail at FAOA, P.O. Box 295, Mt. Vernon, VA 22121. The email address is: secret@faoa.org

Sponsorship, office subscriptions, bulk mailing distributions are also available. For information and pricing, see the website www.FAOA.org or ask a FAOA officer.

SUBMISSIONS: The FAO Association’s journal *International Affairs* is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, book reviews and news from the field. Submissions should e-mailed to editor@FAOA.org for review by the editorial board, and are subject to light editing for brevity and grammar. Submissions process information and format requirements can be found at FAOA.org, and within the inserts.

WEB SITE: www.FAOA.org

ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a service organization but without updated contact information, we are unable to provide those services to members. Individual members must update their personal data online or just e-mail address changes to secret@faoa.org.

Managing Editor
Mr. Coyt D. Hargus
48G, US Army (R)
editor@FAOA.org

---

“*The FAO JOURNAL*”

*International Affairs*

- Politico-Military Affairs - Intelligence - Security Cooperation -

The professional Journal of the FAOA Association

Volume XIV, Edition Number 4 — Published December 2011

ISSN 1551-8094

---

Inside This Issue:

The Delafield Commission: Forerunner to FAO Program  
By: LTC Lester Grau, US Army (R)  
Pg 6

Improved FAO Training: A Joint Intro Course?  
By: MAJ Karl Asmus, US Army  
Pg 17

In-Country Training: Paris and Brussels  
By: MAJ Mike Wise and MAJ Ben Selzer, US Army  
Pg 19

The OSS Society’s Annual Banquet: Event Report  
By: Col Kurt Marisa, US Air Force  
Pg 22

The Defense Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office:  
Shaping New Inroads into the Chinese Military  
By: LTC Christopher Pultz, US Army  
Pg 24

Turk Concerns with US Withdrawal from Iraq  
By: Ms. Karen Kaya, DoD Civilian  
Pg 28

FAO Skills Sustainment program — Event Report  
By: COL Gary Espinas, US Army  
Pg 30

Win Without Fighting — Leveraging China, Sanctions and Information to Topple North Korea  
By: MAJ Greg Archetto, US Army  
Pg 32

Southeast Asia: “Indo” or “China”  
By: Mr. Ivan Welch, DoD Civilian  
Pg 35

Book Reviews, Proponent News and other Field Reports  
Pgs 42

---

Special Features:

Letter from the FAOA President  
Colonel Kurt Marisa, US Air Force  
Pg 3

Obituary - COL Randall L. Koehlmoos, US Army  
By: COL John Haseman, US Army (R)  
Pg 40
Dear FAOA members,

“Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today’s dynamic global environment.”

“Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations.”

“We must build relevant career models for officer and enlisted personnel that place a high value on language, regional and culture expertise to increase DoD’s capacity to support global missions.”

These insightful comments did not come from a lone FAO proponent crying out in the wilderness for attention—they came from Secretary of Defense Panetta on 10 August 2011 in one of the first Memos he promulgated after taking office. While there is much to be done to develop and advance FAO programs, significant progress has been made by all Services in the past 5 years to develop and field effective joint service FAOs. But SECDEF Panetta’s guidance goes beyond viewing FAOs as the sole DoD practitioners of cultural adaptability, cross-cultural communications, and linguistic skills. He is also asking for the Services to strive to develop all officers and NCOs into proto-FAOs, with the professional joint FAO cadre serving only as the storm troopers of foreign engagement. A lofty goal but one that has already been initiated at basic training, academies and commissioning programs, PME, and doctrine centers. We should be optimistic that the SECDEF’s early focus on the critical value of language, regional, and FAO expertise—and career advancement of these personnel—will translate down to the Service FAO proponent and personnel systems.

As your professional association, the FAO Association (FAOA) remains at the forefront in representing and bringing together active duty, reserve, civilian, retired, in-training, and future FAOs. We just hit a landmark in November of reaching 1000 members. Unfortunately, many memberships are overdue, so I encourage you to renew on line at www.faoa.org to ensure you continue to receive the FAO Journal, E-mails announcements, website access, and the other opportunities FAOA offers.

On 8 September, we held our first “FAOs on Tap” Happy Hour with special invited guests from the service FAO proponents and POLADs. The Sines Irish Pub, the “unofficial Pentagon O’Club,” was a great venue to host the 90 attendees. Given the success of this event and the obvious demand for an informal outlet for FAO mentoring, career discussions, and peer social interactions, we are making this a semi-annual activity along with our traditional Speaker Policy Luncheons at Ft. McNair. Dr. Tristan Mabry, the NPS Director of the Joint FAO Skills Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP) was our November luncheon speaker, packed the house with his presentation on his book “Arab Nationalism as An Antidote to Islamism.” The next FAOA luncheon event will be 16 February 2012.

The FAOA Board of Governors continues to remain engaged with counterpart associations, including NMIA, DIAA, and the OSS Society. FAOA recently signed an MOA with NMIA for mutual support, cooperation, and sharing of benefits. We also continue to upgrade and expand International Affairs,” and, through our new Administrative Assistant, we are reaching out to expand our readership and subscription base to include military PME and base libraries, as well as appropriate civilian institutions. We are also in developmental stages with the War Colleges and other PME institutes to establish FAOA writing awards.

Lastly, for those who enjoyed our FAOA Black Tie Formal Dinner in May, and for those who were unable to attend, mark your calendars for 19 April 2012, which we have now locked in as the date for our “main event” again at the Army Navy Country Club. Our very special guest of honor and speaker is LTG James R. Clapper, Jr., USA (ret.), Director of National Intelligence.

As always, please let me know any comments or suggestion of how we can improve your professional association. Please email me at President@FAOA.org

Respectfully,

Kurt M. Marisa, Col, USAF
President, FAO Association
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities in the Department of Defense (DoD)

Language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today's dynamic global environment. Our forces must have the ability to effectively communicate with and understand the cultures of coalition forces, international partners, and local populations. DoD has made progress in establishing a foundation for these capabilities, but we need to do more to meet current and future demands.

The Department must establish and execute policies and procedures that show we value these skills. As a minimum, both military and civilian personnel should have cross-cultural training to successfully work in DoD's richly diverse organization and to better understand the global environment in which we operate. Commanders must ensure that deploying units, leaders, and staffs receive the language and culture training that is commensurate with their missions and responsibilities. We must also increase and sustain the foreign language proficiency of our language and regional professionals if we are to be able to understand and plan for future missions. Finally, we must build relevant career models for officer and enlisted personnel that place a high value on language, regional and culture expertise to increase DoD's capacity to support global missions.

In order to move forward to meet the challenges of building and sustaining these skills, I have asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a way ahead. I expect your full support as we proceed in building and institutionalizing these vital skills in our Force.
US Navy FAO Community Celebrates 5th Birthday
By LTC Lester W. Grau, Army, 48E (Retired)

On 8 September 2011, over 40 Navy FAOs and friends of the community held a dinner function at Thaiphoon restaurant in Pentagon Row near the Pentagon to celebrate 5th Navy FAO Community birthday. Distinguished guests included FAO Community Sponsor, RDML Rich Landolt and former FAO Community Sponsor, RADM Jeff Lemmons. At the event, Admiral Lemmons who is a Naval Aviator was awarded the designation of an “Honorary Foreign Area Officer” for his “steadfast leadership, tireless efforts, and unwavering service in the advancement of the FAO Community”.

Officially, the Navy FAO community celebrated its fifth anniversary on 05 September 2011. The FAO designator, 1710, established Navy FAO as a separate, independent community. Since then, it has grown to over 240 officers and is on track to reach 400 officers by 2015. In 2010, RDML Douglas Venlet, currently serving as the Defense Attaché to Russia, was chosen as Navy’s first FAO Flag Officer.

Navy FAOs serve in 47 countries in every AOR, and the FAO inventory includes conversational capability in 29 languages. Assignments are diverse, ranging from defense and naval attachés, representatives in offices of defense cooperation, policy planners, and regional desk officers on joint and major staffs.

Today, Navy FAOs fill 40% of all navy attaché billets and nearly 80% of all navy security assistance office (SAO) billets. Additionally, there are over 50 FAO billets supporting OSD, JCS, COCOMs, Navy Component Commanders, numbered fleets, and interagency.

In a recent Navy message (NAVADM 288/11) VADM Bruce Clingan, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5) wrote “happy birthday, FAO Community. I am proud of the service and the strong reputation you have earned, in such a short time, as Navy’s international engagement experts.”

Quotable Quote …

“An armed society is a polite society.”
Robert Heinlein
Beyond the Horizon, 1942

Share your quotes with the editor … editor@faoa.org
Who was the first FAO? When did the US Army begin training officer/linguists who specialized in understanding the military of another nation? The United States did not begin assigning military attaches to embassies until late in the 19th Century. Still, there were US Army officers who studied and interacted with other militaries long before that. After all, foreign officers such as Baron von Stueben, the Marquis de Lafayette, Casimir Pulaski, and Thadeus Kosciuszko were there at the start of the US Army and instrumental in its successes. The presence of the French fleet and army were instrumental in the victory at Yorktown.

After the War of 1812, the United States Army took steps to become a more professional army. The wartime performance of the militia forces and the successes of the regular forces provided a strong argument for a permanent standing army with a professional officer corps. Congressional legislation put the Army and the United States Military Academy (USMA) on a stronger footing. The evident threats to the United States were maritime invasion from Europe and the incessant Indian Wars in the interior. The Napoleonic Wars provided the model of modern warfare for study. Between the War of 1812 and the War Between the States, American officers traveled overseas over 150 times to study and gather military information. Trips to France, Britain, and Prussia were the most common. "Scientific Corps" (engineer, topographic and ordnance) officers traveled to keep pace with developments in technology, usually at government expense. Line officers (infantry, cavalry, dragoon, and artillery) more often traveled at their own expense. Engineer, cavalry, artillery, and dragoon officers attended French military branch schools. While most American officers visited Europe, Major Henry C. Wayne visited Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey to purchase camels for the experimental Camel Corps.

During this time, the United States sent two commissions abroad. In 1815, Major Sylvanus Thayer and Lieutenant Colonel William McRee went to France for a two-year education commission tour during which they examined the fortifications at Lille, Cherbourg, and Brest; studied at the l'Ecole Polytechnique; and studied at the Engineering and Artillery school at Metz. These engineer officers purchased about 1,200 French books on mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, geography, military and civil engineering, natural history, military history, and military art and science—the basis of the USMA library. Sylvanus Thayer returned to become the Supervisor of the USMA. During his 16-year tour at Superintendent, he imprinted the French Military system on the corps of cadets. The French military was considered the military worth emulating. Napoleon may have finally been defeated by the British and Prussians, but his military genius was undeniable. Every cadet studied French for two years at the academy and most of the French texts in the West Point library (which were the bulk of the library) were not translated.

After Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, Europe settled into a long peace. But in late 1853, war broke...
out again. France, Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia allied against Russia (the Crimean War). After bottling up the Russian Black Sea Fleet, British, French, and Turkish Armies laid siege to the Russian port/fortress of Sevastopol. The US Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, decided that the United States Army needed to get observers to the Crimea to study the modern way of war and modern military technology. He dispatched the second military commission to Europe—the Delafield Commission. He considered five high-quality officers for the commission—all USMA graduates and all commissioned in engineer branch. They were Colonel John K. F. Mansfield, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee, Major Richard Delafield, Major Alfred Mordecai, and Captain George B. McClellan. Colonel Mansfield and Lieutenant Colonel Lee declined or were unavailable, but the remaining officers took part in the effort. At the end of March 1855, Jefferson Davis summoned the Delafield Commission to Washington.

**The Members of the Delafield Commission**

Major Richard Delafield, the senior member of the commission graduated from West Point as the valedictorian in 1818. He was now 57 years old and already had a successful career behind him as an engineer and as the Superintendent of West Point from 1838-1845. Delafield was instrumental in the construction of Fort Monroe, Fort Calhoun, Fort Richmond, and the Cumberland Road. He was one of the army's most well-respected and experienced engineers. West Point remembered him as a stern disciplinarian. His foreign language was French.

Major Alfred Mordecai graduated from the USMA at the head of his class in 1823 and was commissioned in the engineer branch. After five years service, he was still a second lieutenant despite premier jobs and job performance. The army had no retirement system and so promotions were dependent on the resignation or death of more-senior officers. The army re-organization of 1832 expanded the ordnance branch. Mordecai immediately applied for a captaincy in ordnance and was accepted and promoted. His first ordnance tour was as Military Assistant to Secretary of War Lewis Cass. In 1833, Mordecai took a year's leave of absence and sailed to Europe for professional development. He visited military schools, fortresses and arsenals in France, England, Prussia, Italy, and Belgium, returning to become Commander of Frankford Arsenal, Pennsylvania. In 1839, Secretary of War Joel Poinsett created the Ordnance Board and selected Captain Mordecai as a member. He would serve on this board for the rest of his career. Shortly after this selection, Captain Mordecai was back in Europe—on a delegation to study improvements in artillery. The delegation spent nine months touring England, France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and several German states. They observed maneuvers and visited forts, foundries and arsenals.

Captain Mordecai was a prolific writer with books, manuals and reports to his credit. In 1842, he began a 14-year tour at Washington Arsenal and was promoted to Brevet (temporary) Major during the Mexican War in recognition of his role in the production of weapons and ammunition. In 1853, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis sent him on a diplomatic mission to Mexico to investigate indemnity claims from the Mexican War. In 1854, after 23 years service as a captain, Mordecai was finally promoted to major. He was a recognized scientist; an author and member of leading professional societies and committees, but promotions were slow. He was 51 years old when selected for the Commission.
The final member of the commission was a mere 28 years old. Before George B. McClellan enrolled at West Point, he was fluent in French and Latin. He was 15 when he arrived at the USMA. He graduated second in the class of 1846 and became a brevet second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. He joined a newly-formed company of sappers and miners at West Point that soon deployed to Brazos Santiago, Texas near the mouth of the Rio Grande. In January 1847, his company led a column on a 400-mile march from Matamoros to Tampico where they joined General Winfield Scott’s invasion force.

Brevet Second Lieutenant McClellan was with one of the first groups ashore at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Although he was the most-junior engineer officer at the siege of Vera Cruz, he soon earned a reputation as a fire-eater and would frequently be found in the thick of the action.

After the fall of Vera Cruz, Scott’s force moved on toward Mexico City. At Contreras, McClellan had two horses shot from under him. During the fighting, he assumed command of an artillery section and then the entire battery after all of its officers were wounded. McClellan was mentioned in dispatches for his actions at Contreras and Churubusco and promoted to brevet first lieutenant. At Chapultepec, McClellan aided Robert E. Lee in employing artillery batteries and then led engineer troops in an infantry assault on Mexico City. During this last battle, McClellan won a promotion to brevet captain.

After eight-month’s occupation duty in Mexico City, McClellan and his company returned to West Point. He continued to serve with his company while performing additional duties as Assistant Professor of Engineering. While at West Point, McClellan translated a French manual on bayonet combat and taught it to his company. The US Army adopted his translation as a manual in 1852.

In 1851, McClellan became the assistant engineer in the construction of Fort Delaware. During this time, he also taught himself German. In 1852, he joined an expedition to explore the Red River and Palo Duro Canyon in Texas. He became the chief engineer in the Department of Texas and surveyed the rivers and harbors of the Texas coastline. In 1853, he conducted an independent survey of the Washington Territory coastal area through the Cascade Mountains. In 1854, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis hand-picked now-Regular Army First Lieutenant McClellan for a secret mission that surveyed the Dominican Republic’s harbors for a suitable American naval port. After successful completion of this mission, McClellan did a survey of the nation’s railroads for Davis. Davis had convinced Congress to create two new infantry and cavalry regiments. McClellan applied for a captaincy in the cavalry and was accepted. A few days after his selection, he was summoned to Washington to serve on the Delafield Commission.

Preparations for the Mission

On 5 April, 1855, Jefferson Davis summoned the three officers for an interview and told them that he had personally selected each of them for a study of modern war and armies in Europe. He issued a detailed list of military subjects that they were supposed to pursue dealing with organization, technology, logistics, equipment, fortifications, and even the use of camels for transport. They were not limited to the usual tour of France. They were to get to besieged Sevastopol, the center piece of the Crimean War, as rapidly as possible and then visit military facilities in Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and England. They were supposed to return by the start
of November 1855, but had the latitude to extend their tour for extenuating circumstances. He placed his reliance “on your judgment and discretion to conduct your movements in such a manner as to give no reasonable ground for suspicion or offense to the military or other government authorities with who you may have intercourse.”

Major Mordecai was appointed treasurer for the commission and provided funds and a letter of introduction to the State Department’s banker in London. The commission was provided letters to the US ambassadors in Europe asking them to assist the commission in any way possible. Secretary Davis hosted a dinner for the commission and the ambassadors from England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria and asked the ambassadors for letters of introduction to their governments. All, but the French Ambassador, complied. On 11 April, the commission sailed from Boston—six days after notification. There were a lot of loose ends and issues still to be resolved—and these would have to be resolved by the commission members and their force of personality and persuasion.

The Mission Begins

On 22 April 1855, the steamer Asia arrived in Liverpool. The commission traveled to London with the hope of quickly arranging permission to visit British forces in the Crimea. American Ambassador James Buchanan arranged an audience with Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary on 27 April. He explained that they must first be presented to the Queen. Once they had been presented, their petition stood a better chance of favorable consideration. During two weeks in Britain, they toured the shipyard at Blackwell and the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, met with leading officers who had served in the Crimea and attended a lecture on operations in the Crimea. Their presentation to the Queen worked and they received permission from the Foreign Office to go to the Crimea without restriction.

On 6 May, 1855, the commission sailed for Calais and arrived in Paris on the seventh. Meetings with the ambassador disclosed that the French Foreign Minister had just resigned and no other French officials would help the commission. The ambassador persuaded the officers to wait until the new minister would speak to them. They waited over two weeks and were not allowed to visit French military facilities while they waited. Finally, on 24 May, Count Walewsky, the new foreign minister saw them. Walewsky informed the commission that they might visit the French works in the Crimea only if they promised not to visit any Russian camps afterward. The commission’s plan had been to travel from Paris to Marseilles and then sail for the Crimea. Now, they would have to get Russian permission to visit their side first. The best solution appeared to travel to Berlin, Prussia where there was a Russian embassy and seek guidance about the best way to Sevastopol. The commission prepared to leave, but then their departure was delayed by another five days, since they were then invited to meet the Emperor, Napoleon III.

The European rail system moved the commission rapidly to Berlin. They arrived on Friday, 1 June and met with US Ambassador Peter D. Vroom the next morning. He took them directly to the Russian Ambassador who already had letters prepared introducing them to the Russian Governor in Warsaw. The Russian ambassador ensured them that they had government permission to go to the Crimea and that the Russian Governor of Poland would expedite their travel. The American Ambassador then took the group to meet Prussian Foreign Minister Baron von Manteuffel, who gave them permission to visit all military installations in Prussia. After England and France, Prussia and the Russians were a welcome change. The officers were in a hurry to get to
Warsaw and then on to Kiev and down the Dnieper River to Crimea. Consequently, they spent little time in Prussia before boarding a train to Warsaw, 4 June.

Arriving in Warsaw on 6 June, they called on several government offices. Unfortunately, the Russian Governor, Marshal Prince I. F. Paskievitch, was on a hunting trip. Two days later, when he returned, he treated them graciously, entertained them well and assigned an escort officer. They toured the Modlin fortress, participated in a Cossack cavalry regiment review held in their honor and toured a military hospital in Warsaw. But there was bad news. Despite the assurances of the Russian Ambassador to Prussia, the Governor did not have the authority to allow the commission to proceed to the Crimea. They would have to travel to St. Petersburg for this!

At this time, the group learned that the Allies had attacked Sevastopol on 7 June and carried the southern redoubts. The fighting might be over before they ever go there! They left for St. Petersburg on 13 June. Much of the 783-mile trip between Warsaw and St. Petersburg was by horse-drawn coach. It took six days.

The commission toured the Baltic Sea fortress of Kronstadt several times. The Crimean War was fought both in the Crimea and in the Baltic Sea. The British fleet was blockading Kronstadt, so the commission was present in one theater of war, although most of the fighting occurred 1,100 miles away in the Crimea. The commission visited military schools, hospitals and arsenals. The reason for the Russian delay became apparent. Prince Gorochakov, the new commander in the Crimea, did not want the American commission within the besieged city. The Tsar granted most of their other requests, but would not override his commander’s wishes. On 19 July, the commission took an eight-day excursion to Moscow by train where they visited the Kremlin and numerous schools, arsenals and hospitals. Finally, on 2 August, the commission again boarded a horse-drawn coach and returned to Prussia.

Six days later they arrived at the Prussian fortress-city of Konigsburg. They toured the new fortress, which was under construction, and spent three days with Prussian officers before boarding a train. They spent two weeks touring yet more fortresses, coastal defenses, and a cavalry school as they travelled through Danzig, Posen, Schwinemunde, and Schweltdt. On 25th, after the meeting, the commission received an imperial invitation to attend a military review on the Field of Mars where they sat next to Prince Vasily Andreyevich Dolgorukov, the Russian Minister of War. He assigned Lieutenant Colonel Obrezkov, his aide-de-camp, as their escort. At the end of the review, the commission was presented to Tsar Alexander II, who invited them to tour the Kronstadt naval base and fort. The Russian reception was overwhelming and the Francophile orientation of the commission changed to Russophile. But Russian permission to travel to the Crimea was slow in coming. McClellan, who was quick at languages, learned passable Russian during their time there—although French was the language of the Russian court and most Russian officers spoke passable French.

They arrived on 19 June and met with US Ambassador Thomas H. Seymour who arranged a meeting with Foreign Minister Nesselrode on the 25th. After the meeting, the commission received an imperial invitation to attend a military review on the Field of Mars where they sat next to Prince Vasily Andreyevich Dolgorukov, the Russian Minister of War. He assigned Lieutenant Colonel Obrezkov, his aide-de-camp, as their escort. At the end of the review, the commission was presented to Tsar Alexander II, who invited them to tour the Kronstadt naval base and fort. The Russian reception was overwhelming and the Francophile orientation of the commission changed to Russophile. But Russian permission to travel to the Crimea was slow in coming. McClellan, who was quick at languages, learned passable Russian during their time there—although French was the language of the Russian court and most Russian officers spoke passable French.

They arrived on 19 June and met with US Ambassador Thomas H. Seymour who arranged a meeting with Foreign Minister Nesselrode on the 25th. After the meeting, the commission received an imperial invitation to attend a military review on the Field of Mars where they sat next to Prince Vasily Andreyevich Dolgorukov, the Russian Minister of War. He assigned Lieutenant Colonel Obrezkov, his aide-de-camp, as their escort. At the end of the review, the commission was presented to Tsar Alexander II, who invited them to tour the Kronstadt naval base and fort. The Russian reception was overwhelming and the Francophile orientation of the commission changed to Russophile. But Russian permission to travel to the Crimea was slow in coming. McClellan, who was quick at languages, learned passable Russian during their time there—although French was the language of the Russian court and most Russian officers spoke passable French.
again requested French permission to visit the Crimea, noting that they would not enter Sevastopol. They waited two weeks for a reply that did not come. They were still waiting in Berlin on 4 September 1855 when the French successfully stormed Fort Malakov, forcing the Russian evacuation of the southern side of Sevastopol. The war was mostly over. The men had missed their main mission.

On 12 September, the commission left by train traveling through Dresden and Prague to Vienna. They spent two days in Dresden touring an armory, an arsenal, a military school, and a military museum. The officers arrived in Vienna on 16 September and received Austrian government permission to visit Austrian military establishments. They toured the Vienna arsenal and the Napoleonic battlefields of Essling and Wagram, then arrived in Trieste on 20 September. The next day, they boarded the Adria steamer for Constantinople arriving on 30 September, and called on Rashid Mustapha Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War. They also called on Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier. But even though they had met the two most powerful men in the Ottoman Empire, the officers were still no closer to the Crimea. After six months of travel, the commission had little to show for its effort.

Crimea at last!

On 6 October, the commission finally found passage on the British Royal Navy’s steamer, Prince of Arabs and arrived at Balaklava two days later. The British took good care of the Americans and the British Commander, General Sir James Simpson, saw to their needs with quarters, escorts, and access; as they toured all the battlefields and both sides of the southern Sevastopol trench works. The Russians still held northern Sevastopol and artillery duels continued. The commission worked frantically to make up for lost time gathering data on artillery, rifled small arms, ammunition, field fortifications, and the like. Major Mordecai succumbed to diarrhea, which stopped his efforts and ended with his evacuation to a British field hospital in Balaklava, where he was tended by Florence Nightingale.

The French were far less hospitable than the British. The commission was unable to meet with the French Commander and was not afforded any special privileges, although they received a general permission to visit the French trenches. Major Delafield had a rewarding conversation with the French chief engineer. On 31 October, the commission boarded the British steamer Brandon and after two days at anchor, they steamed for Constantinople. They had three major conclusions.
First, the scale of warfare had changed dramatically due to steamships that allowed many more men, horses and guns to move and subsist in a distant war. Europe was devoting national treasure and attention to building a threatening military capacity. Second, Britain and France were no friends of the United States and might cooperate in an attack on America. Third, American coastal fortification work needed to be finished quickly. American’s threat was from the sea.

The return route went through the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the commission did a thorough job touring barracks, hospitals, riding schools, arsenals and academies. On 9 January 1856, they were presented to the Emperor Franz Josef. Their reception on their return to France was no better than before, but Prussia opened all doors to them. They toured the armaments city of Liege, Belgium and the Waterloo Battlefield. They also revisited the United Kingdom, but they were kept from military sites so they became tourists. Finally, they boarded the steamer Persia on 19 April 1856 and sailed to New York. On 29 April, they were home after traveling almost 20,000 miles in just over a year.

The job’s not done until the paperwork is finished

The commission reported back to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis who wanted the commission to get their reports out soon. The commission members, following a year’s close—and not always friendly—association, preferred to work from home. Delafield worked from New York, Mordecai from Washington, DC, and McClellan worked from Philadelphia with Delafield concentrating on engineering matters, Mordecai on ordnance, and McClellan on cavalry. They maintained an office and library in Washington, DC for the hundreds of books, papers, maps and sketches that they brought back.

Delafield resumed command of New York harbor defenses and in September of 1856, returned to the USMA for a second tour as Superintendent. Mordecai was put to work revising the army’s regulations and in February 1857, he became Commander of the Watervliet Arsenal in Troy, New York. McClellan’s work went faster as this was now his sole duty. McClellan finished his report in January 1857, Mordecai finished in March 1858, and Delafield finished in November 1860. The reports focused on Jefferson Davis’ detailed list of military subjects and technical details. Wider issues of the scope of modern war were not fully addressed and there was no effort to produce a single report from their efforts.

Instead, the commission’s report was published in separate volumes. The reports are thick and detailed. McClellan’s report was published in 5,000 copies by Congress in 1857 and republished commercially along with his Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of the US Cavalry in Time of War in 1861. The Delafield and Mordecai reports were published in 30,000 copies in 1860 and 1861.

Their impact was immediate. The engineer, ordnance and cavalry branches were the primary beneficiaries with much of the information reaching the branches before the reports were published. Major Mordecai advocated adoption of the French “light 12-pounder gun, Model of 1857”—the “Napoleon” gun-howitzer that became the most effective artillery piece on both sides in the looming
War Between the States. Further, his advocacy of wrought-iron carriages for fixed artillery (fortress) guns was adopted before the Civil War. Captain McClellan translated the Russian Cavalry manual that became the unofficial United States Army Regulations and Instructions for the Field Service of Cavalry in Time of War. He also consulted French texts from the French Cavalry School at Saumur and used French and Russian experience in his “Report on the United States Cavalry.” McClellan made many suggestions in the equipment and organization of the cavalry branch. He urged the adoption of a Hungarian-designed Prussian saddle which he modified. US mounted troopers rode on the McClellan saddle until horse cavalry disappeared in 1943.

Major Delafield provided much material on fortresses and sea coast defense and his report is replete with hundreds of sketches of fortresses, battlefield maps and photographs. Delafield took a close look at the logistics in the Crimea, particularly military medicine, hospital ships and ambulances. He provided a detailed report on iron-clad gun boats. He emphasized that steamships had greatly transformed the logistics of war. Another of his studies, “Theory and Practice of Modern Systems of Fortification,” relied heavily on the work of a Spanish engineer and the fortifications of the German states that the commission visited.

The gathering storm

“Bleeding Kansas” began before the commission left and continued after their return. The nation was fracturing. The main threat to the United States was not foreign invasion or the interminable Indian Wars. Much of the commission’s work would soon be put to practical use. Still, its members did not get everything right. The Crimean War was primarily an artillery war and a large number of artillery pieces were deployed by both sides in the battles and siege. The rifled musket and other rifled small arms were used, but the bulk of the infantry still used smoothbore muskets. Consequently, the commission focused on the artillery and failed to see the impact of rifled weapons on tactics and the infantryman’s need to go to ground in trenches and foxholes. Consequently, the North and the South went to war using Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William J. Hardee’s 1855 Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics; For the Exercise and Maneuvers of Troops when acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen as their bible. Volunteer and state militia officers studied the book from cover-to-cover. Hardee had studied tactics in France in 1840 and his book reflected Napoleonic experience using smoothbore muskets, but the Crimean war employed enough rifles to force the troops to dig in. After initial bloody encounters during the War Between the States, infantrymen on both sides learned that their best friend was not their weapon, but their shovel.

Although the telegraph and railroad were used in the Crimean War, their impact was modest. Their impact was colossal during the Civil War. The logistics effort—and its failures—during the Crimean War were obvious to the commission. The logistics demands in the coming war would be much greater.

Secretary of War Davis later became the President of the Confederate States of America. Major Delafield became the Chief of Engineers of the Union Army with the rank of Major General. Major Mordecai was from North Carolina and was offered the position of Chief of Ordnance for the Confederate States of America and a similar position in the Union Army. He did not want to abandon his country, but did not support the Federal government’s attack on
states’ rights. He resigned his commission to teach mathematics in Philadelphia. His son, Alfred Mordecai Jr., graduated from West Point and fought for the Union at Bull Run. Captain McClellan’s rise was meteoric. He became a Major General commanding the Army of the Potomac and served as the General-in-Chief of the Union Army. Following his unsuccessful Peninsular Campaign in 1862, he was relieved of command as both general-in-chief and Commander, Army of the Potomac. McClellan ran for President against Lincoln in 1864 on the Democratic Party anti-war ticket.

So who was the first FAO?

There is no easy answer, but the experiences of the Delafield Commission duplicate many of the experiences of contemporary FAOs. First, FAOs must negotiate the top tiers of United States and foreign governmental bureaucracy to accomplish their missions. Matters that initially seem to be resolved at mid-level bureaucracy, keep getting moved higher. The commission had to meet the crowned heads of Europe just to watch artillery batteries in action. It took six months to get to the Crimea.

Second, study of a language and culture puts the FAO in danger of becoming an advocate for that country. The Delafield Commission left the United States as convinced Francophiles. Only French actions changed their orientation to Russophiles.

Third, host nation support is wonderful, but it can also mask the truth. The Delafield Commission was convinced of the might, efficiency and potential of the Russian Army by the units that they visited around St. Petersburg and Moscow. These were the best units in the Russian Army that were stationed there in the event of an Anglo-French invasion of Russia from the Baltic Sea. The escort officers assigned to the commission, particularly Lieutenant Colonel Obrezkov, did a good job of presenting a positive image of the Russian Army, one that survived the Russian defeat in the Crimea.

Fourth, mastery of a language does not equate to mastery of a culture. This only comes from living there. The commission could communicate in French, German, Russian and English, but they still did not always understand what was in front of them as they travelled. This was particularly true in Russia proper, where the autocratic nature of the state did not make an impression on the commission. The commission usually interacted with the higher echelons of a society.

Fifth, the final value of a FAO’s product might have little to do with the original mission guidance. Britain and France did not jointly invade the United States, although the French Foreign Legion and the Federal Army came close to fighting along the Rio Grande after the Civil War. But, England and France also did not recognize the Confederate States of America—a recognition that was probably prevented by the Emancipation Proclamation and actions of a friendly Russian government. Russian fleets arrived almost simultaneously in both New York harbor and San Francisco harbor while Britain and France were considering formal recognition of the Confederacy.
The actions of the Delafield Commission contributed to a closer harmony between the Russians and Americans—a harmony that continued to the Russo-Japanese War.

The Delafield Commission was drawn from the active army—and returned to the active army. Today’s FAOs are specialists, no longer part of the main-stream army. This specialization permits more time for the FAO to learn about his country and region, but it means that the FAO’s experience in the day-to-day army is not current. The Delafield Commission wrote primarily for their branches and helped their branches stay abreast of European developments. Today’s FAOs leave their branches and seldom return.

My candidate for the first FAO is Alfred Mordecai. This Jewish southerner married a northerner and raised a Unionist son, although he declined to fight on principle for either side during the Civil War. He made multiple serious study trips abroad although he was violently prone to seasickness. He was comfortable in a variety of cultures and was a keen observer of his surroundings. The Delafield Commission, and his impressive report for it, proved the capstone of his FAO career, but his contributions from FAO-like activities started long before the commission and continued long after his resignation. His impact on the ordnance and artillery branches was particularly noteworthy. Mordecai was a serious linguist, scientist and military professional.

US soldiers who spoke foreign languages and understood foreign cultures have had a major impact on the successes of our military and nation. We are their heirs and as we FAOs look to the present and future, we should learn from our past. Alfred Mordecai and the Delafield Commission are an important part of that past.

About the Author:

Lester W. Grau is a Senior Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Defense Language Institute (Russian) and the US Army’s Institute for Advanced Russian and Eastern European Studies. He retired from the US Army in 1992 at the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. His military education included the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Air Force War College. His Baccalaureate and Masters degrees are in International Relations, and his doctorate is in Military History. He served a combat tour in Vietnam, four European tours, a Korean tour and a posting in Moscow. He has traveled to the Soviet Union and Russia over forty times. He has also been a frequent visitor to the Asian sub-continent, especially Pakistan and Afghanistan. He is a recent CENTCOM Fellow.

CENTCOM’s 2nd Annual Afghanistan-Pakistan Conference

US Central Command’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Center (APC) hosted its 2nd Annual Af-Pak conference (16-17 Aug) at the West Shore Wyndham Hotel in Tampa, FL to assess progress in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The two-day event titled “Assessing Progress Toward Objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan” was structured to bring a diverse set of strategic thinkers and security experts together to contextualize the current situation and examine the potential steps ahead.

As its largest event to date, the APC held its 2nd Annual Conference to foster conversation and debate amongst a diverse and knowledgeable group of individuals with a substantial combination of experience in the region, gained from various. For two days, Tampa’s West Shore business district became an international hub for over 280 world-class experts and intellectuals. In true interdisciplinary fashion, the audience was peppered with a range of academics, including those from the neighboring University of South Florida. Day-one of the conference revolved around contextualizing the current campaign while day-two centered on discussing strategy. Topics discussed included reconciliation in Afghanistan and threat sanctuary in the Pakistan region.

General Petraeus created the APC in 2009 as an “intelligence Center of Excellence” to function as the long-term repository of expertise on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asia States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), for USCENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the wider US government inter-agency. As USCENTCOM’s internal think-tank, the APC provides leadership to coordinate, integrate, and focus the command’s analysis on the Afghanistan-Pakistan problem-set, synergizing collaborative efforts from across the command’s intelligence, operations, and planning functions. In keeping with this goal, the APC integrates formal and informal outreach initiatives that bring together experts from academia, non-governmental organizations, and the interagency to develop a more nuanced understanding of the region.

For further information regarding this or future APC conferences and events, contact Program Manager Tiffany Bell, or the Analytic Outreach Coordinator Karla Stevenson. For a full conference agenda, visit the APC Website.

How Can I Help FAOA?

Annual FAOA Banquet Committee
Journal’s Editorial Review Board
Graphic Design
Historian
Legal Review
Blog Master
Outreach Coordinator
And many, many more.

If you want to help the association, contact the president at president@faoa.org

Quotable Quote …

“Trains do not stop for barking dogs”
The Department of Defense should establish a comprehensive Joint Foreign Area Officer Introduction Course (JFAOC) as a basic course for a career as a Foreign Area Officer (FAO). The course should be required for all Officers entering their Service's FAO program. FAOs need a detailed introduction to the full spectrum of professional FAO functions and responsibilities prior to reporting for In-Region Training (IRT), a vital foundation for Functional Area 48 professional development. This paper's focus is limited to discussion of a comprehensive FAO course, rather than focusing on the challenges associated with establishing a Joint course. The current course for preparing FAOs for IRT, the FAO Orientation Course (FAOC), is insufficient and is not mandatory. The FAOC does not provide a comprehensive introduction to the embassy Country Team, the role of the Combatant Command (COCOM), and the special responsibilities of the different military offices in the embassy. This introduction often occurs much later, meaning that new FAOs are not fully prepared for their assignments and may remain unaware of the diverse duties of a Foreign Area Officer for years after accession to the career field. Additionally, FAOs must be made aware of personal risks and operational limitations during IRT. The proposed course would give the outbound FAO a fundamental understanding of embassy Country Team responsibilities, describe the COCOM’s priorities, and provide a regionally specific counterintelligence and security introduction.

The current IRT training program’s limitations derive mostly from the omission of basic information on what embassies, embassy military offices and Combatant and Service Commands actually do. FAOs report to their IRT assignment with language proficiency but an incomplete understanding of the embassy’s specific functions and are generally unaware of the sensitive programs to which they may be exposed. The result is that the FAO hits the ground half blind. FAOs in IRT often learn the details only by incidental exposure, and much of this learning depends on what the sponsoring office and staff has time to introduce. IRT-bound FAOs need a preparatory explanation of the missions of the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC or equivalent), how these offices work together, and how they fit within the larger context of the US embassy’s mission. The special responsibilities of the DAO and the OSC are sometimes unclear even among US military personnel working in the respective offices. JFAOC is an ideal time to introduce Security Cooperation and basic intelligence functions as they apply to Combatant Command and embassy operations. JFAOC can build on what FAOC has already established, and the addition of this important information will make it a much more useful component of FAO training.

At least three years of training are required for an Officer to achieve FAO qualification. It is completed in several phases including language training, In-Region Training, Advanced Civil Schooling, Joint Professional Military Education Phase I, and is completed with training specific to their assignment as an Attaché or Security Assistance Officer. During the IRT phase, FAOs are usually based at embassies or Service Component Command headquarters. The current four-day FAOC is their preparatory program, held at the Presidio of Monterey, California, and run concurrently with the Defense Language Institute’s (DLI) language training. It focuses on Army policies, the FAO training phases, and region-specific topics. All are necessary for understanding FAO qualification processes but it is insufficient for either IRT or long-term career preparation. FAOC omits discussion of specific geographic command operations and priorities, sensitive missions and counterintelligence concerns, and it lacks detail on functional FAO assignment options. Although the current Army FAO training program is extensive, much of the relevant information is introduced toward the very end of the training sequence, and is limited to only that position’s requirements. FAOs headed to an operational assignment at an embassy, Geographical Combatant Command, Service Component
Command or Pentagon staff will not have the benefit of understanding the whole picture. Moreover, the FAOC is optional, so some Officers do not participate in even the current program. Mandating two weeks of training cannot be achieved simply by adding it to the language students’ calendar, though. Competing with DLI’s priorities and overcoming the inertia of established organizational practice will be challenging.

DLI will not easily accept a new program that impacts language training. The Defense Language Institute faculty opposes releasing students from classes for a week for the current FAOC, so a two-week absence is an even more difficult proposal. DLI will have to grant a considerable concession if students are to be excused from the highly structured and progressive class curriculum. One day out of class means a student may miss a new topic and the chance to review critical material. The importance of FAO-specific career training is of little significance to the language instruction staff and their resistance is likely. Even when the Officer students are available for training, some will not have completed the Top Secret security clearance application that often takes over one year to process. A further complication is that the Presidio of Monterey does not store classified material nor is there a suitable facility for presenting classified briefings. Reorganizing a comprehensive introductory course for Army FAOs is problematic, and pulling the Joint FAO community together poses an equal challenge. Agreements must be reached regarding funding, Service responsibilities and contributions to the program, Service-specific instruction topics, temporary duty assignments for non-DLI FAOs, and access to a sufficient facility. Most of these obstacles can be overcome through leadership recognition of the value and necessity of a better IRT preparation course.

Despite the inconveniences, JFAOC’s advantages outweigh the costs in effort. DLI’s senior military leaders certainly appreciate the importance of fully preparing FAOs not only for IRT, but for their careers. It is essential that FAOs understand the environment into which they are being introduced, and this is best achieved by scheduling the training to occur before the hands-on IRT experience. This enables the FAO to use what he or she has learned and avoid learning lessons through errors. They will be better prepared for the new and sometimes unclear embassy environment with an understanding of the Country Team members’ particular responsibilities. Basic Security Cooperation training is relevant for the entire force, and it is a core function for FAOs. It is equally critical to understand intelligence functions and a FAO’s potential in this area. Beyond the fundamental knowledge of how the DAOs, OSCs and geographic command headquarters work, IRT FAOs should be sensitized to mission-related responsibilities and restrictions. An informed and sensitized FAO is unlikely to in-advertently disclose restricted information or place himself at risk by engaging in unauthorized activities during IRT. It is important to note that IRT FAOs are not protected by diplomatic immunity. Current FAO preparation does not mandate Individual Terrorism Awareness Training attendance or the Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) for family members, though an IRT FAO and families will probably be exposed to the risk of serious criminal and even terrorist threats during regional travel or in their city of residence. These risks can be mitigated through enhanced preparation. Having the necessary security clearances will always be a challenge. To the extent permitted, FAOs should have access to classified information that bears on their assignment. Access to a secure facility for classified presentations requires coordination and Naval Postgraduate School may be able to support this need.

The Services recognize that FAOs are essential force multipliers. DoD’s August 2011 FAO Program Review and Report reflects widespread support for a fully staffed and trained FAO corps that combines language, military, political and cultural expertise. A two-week course, early in the FAO training sequence, is necessary to ensure each FAO is given a complete preparation for the demands of the career. It is the support necessary to fully prepare a career FAO.

About the Author:
Major Karl M. Asmus is a Sub-Saharan Africa FAO, and is currently assigned to Army International Affairs (DAMO-SSR) at Headquarters, Department of the Army. His most recent assignment was as Army Attaché in Senegal.
The Army’s In-Country Training (ICT) program offers an unparalleled opportunity to broaden regional knowledge and understanding of FAO competencies. In an era of increased defense financial belt-tightening, ICT continues to provide valuable experiences to future FAOs in training. In order to maintain this resource for future generations of FAOs, two officers share their thoughts from the past year in Europe.

MAJ Mike Wise spent the last year in Paris, France, making observations and analyses of French cultural, military and policy issues. He concluded that the French are proud of their identity, have capable (but limited) armed forces and yearn to simply “matter.” MAJ Ben Selzer conducted his ICT from Brussels, Belgium, where the absence of a national government highlighted the difficulties of linguistic and cultural divides. Additionally, both FAOs traveled throughout Europe to see first-hand the diversity across the continent and witness FAOs performing in a wide range of positions.

For Mike Wise, the Paris location afforded an “ideal” scenario to balance a focused perspective of the host country and regional exposure. The first six months he was a student at l’Ecole Militaire where he attended a French Army staff course. This was a tremendous opportunity to familiarize himself with French operational strategy, cultivate bonds with the army’s top officers and to bring language skills to new heights. The second six months entailed regional travel and short work stints in the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and the Defense Attaché Office (DAO). His supervisor directed him to focus his travel on key strategic areas rather than try to briefly stop through every country in Europe which fostered a deeper understanding of each location, vice a more wide but more shallow. He visited pivot points in Central Europe and the Balkans as well as Europe’s core.

From the capital of the European Union, Ben Selzer developed his training plan from scratch, without any official schooling in the host country. Instead, he occupied two months by working with the Belgian Land Force Component (Army) during national field exercises and as a staff officer in two brigade HQs. Later in the year, he interned at the US Mission to NATO analyzing NATO’s biennial defense capability reviews of all member countries’ contributions to the alliance. His regional travel was sub-regionally aligned, allowing him to focus on important issues between neighboring countries that might not span the entire continent. The majority of countries he visited rested in Central and Eastern Europe, but also included Scandinavia.

Both FAOs visited EUCOM, SHAPE, USAREUR and other key headquarters to build on their understanding of military operations and policies within the European region at an echelon above any previous exposure. Additionally, to gain insight into how military organizations relate to industry, both FAOs volunteered as escort officers for the Paris Air Show. All of these opportunities allowed personal access to military, intelligence and civilian industry leaders who would not otherwise be available.

ICT is an extremely independent endeavor and differs significantly based upon the location. Being successful during ICT comes partly from working in new, sometimes vague environments. ICT officers risk wasting time and financial resources if they are not capable of planning ahead, coordinating with efficiency and reacting to changes when necessary. During this last year, ICT travel budgets were suspended twice due to budget issues in Washington, DC. However, with some resourceful last minute coordination, both officers were able to maximize their yearly travel budget and ICT experiences. We make the following recommendations to ICT officers and their supervisors.

Establishing and exploiting contacts is essential to getting the most out of the experience.
Wise was able to stay in touch and meet with French classmates who had been sent to Brussels and glean their points of view while serving at NATO and the EU. More importantly, fellow ICT officers are the best contacts to leverage when conducting visits in their respective countries. They can help administratively to set up meetings, may offer to host visitors to cut costs and generally have the time to discuss what they’ve learned in depth.

Preparation is essential to maximize the effects of each trip. We generally began planning about 45 days out to make contact with target interviewees, refine a schedule and submit necessary clearance information. We would develop background knowledge from official web pages (Embassy or Command sites-- whichever was appropriate), FAO Web and STRATFOR. Stepping into an interview expecting to be in “receive mode” was never an option.

If time and agendas allow, coordinate similar countries on the same or adjacent trips. Selzer paired Greece and Cyprus into one trip followed shortly thereafter by visits to Turkey, Albania and Macedonia. By doing this, he analyzed all aspects of the “Cyprus issue” in a relatively close time period. Between trips, he was able to realign his travel goals and digest the information learned to help focus future trips to Albania and Macedonia. The timing of these trips also allowed the observation of Greece’s handling of financial difficulties and Egypt’s evacuation through the region during the Arab Spring.

Lastly, ICT officers are in a unique position to serve as a conduit among regional country teams that would otherwise have no interaction. Our supervisors were curious about the climate and priorities of other offices and vice versa during visits. We found that FAOs are often unaware of country teams’ focus outside their immediate region. Not surprisingly, the US engagement strategy is different in large embassies like Paris versus smaller ones such as in the Balkans. The most important facet of ICT was keeping supervisors informed of our activities and they in turn offered professional mentorship.

This was an exciting year to conduct ICT in Europe (though probably not as lively as for our Middle East colleagues). Europe as a whole has made great strides toward closer integration and solidarity. However, the EU generally avoids confronting issues that would create chasms. These issues are becoming unavoidable and the national characteristics that lead to the perpetual wars for the last millennium are beginning to surface. While armed conflict within the EU is extremely unlikely, national interests will continue to dictate behavior for the foreseeable future. The financial crisis remains an issue that threatens the Eurozone and has put European solidarity to the test. France, the UK and the US began the Libyan campaign to be turned over to NATO’s control with sharp divergence among members. Less noticed was the development of partnerships among European nations. The Weimar Triangle has shown increased coordination. The Visegrad Group intends to construct its own battle group due to security concerns. The Nordic countries are developing their own arrangement. All of this points to a trend that sub-coalitions are likely to flourish while the large collective EU bureaucracy (while in no danger of collapsing) will progress slowly at best. Long-term defense strategies vary in degrees of expeditionary capability versus territorial defense. This translates geographically as well; generally, the farther east, the more things lean toward territorial defense. National interests and cultural identities remain factors in intra-European politics and military cooperation. As US engagement strategy in Europe clearly states, it is far easier to deal with a handful of actors at a negotiating table rather than seek consensus among many. If Belgium, “Europe’s Battlefield,” serves as a bellwether, the current government stagnation portends difficulty for further EU integration.

As many bureaucratic institutions work in cyclical patterns, it is vital for ICT officers to integrate themselves throughout the year, looking for opportunities to participate. Without boots on the ground for an entire calendar year, many ICT officers would miss opportunities that would pay future dividends. Besides embassy visits and host-nation
military schooling, trade shows, annual military training exercises and memorial ceremonies are all examples of ICT opportunities waiting for officers to contribute. Many of these events are outside the combat-experienced FAO-in-training’s purview, which makes these training opportunities that much more important by growing the officer’s strategic mindset. But, these events require prior planning for officers to participate. Under our current system, ICT officers have the necessary time to develop, coordinate and execute their participatory timelines in their host countries and abroad. Even when fiscal year budget crises limit regional travel, resourceful ICT officers can participate in these types of events to continue their training without access to their travel budgets.

The ICT experience is more than just an opportunity. It is an obligation to prepare oneself for the diverse responsibilities FAOs enjoy at the strategic level. We were fortunate that our ICT programs had such balanced attributes that were further complemented by solid mentorship from senior leaders. However, the threat to adjust or curtail the traditional FAO training program remains. ICT supervisors can continue to ensure quality training by balancing ICT programs to include a mixture of military and political events outside the officer’s previous experience. ICT will remain a cornerstone of the Army’s FAO training process that should be approached with persistence, creativity and diligent planning.

About the Authors …

MAJ Michael Wise will attend Texas A&M (The Bush School) following ICT in Paris. MAJ Ben Selzer will attend the George Washington University after ICT in Brussels. Upon completion of graduate study, both will serve as FAO’s concentrating on Europe.

Both would like to thank their supervisors — LTC Griggs and COL Sweeney in Paris, and COL Buzzerio in Brussels — for outstanding mentorship and development throughout the past year.

FAOA Board of Governors

Kurt Marisa, Col USAF, European RAS (FAO), President

Don Baker, LTC, USA, European FAO Vice-President and Events Chair

Michael Welch, Col USAF (Ret), Latin American FAO, Treasurer

Graham Plaster, LT USN, Middle East FAO, Webmaster and Secretary

Michael Ferguson, COL, USA (Ret), Africa FAO, FAOA President Emeritus and Sponsorship Chair

Gary Espinas, COL USA, Eastern European FAO, Monterrey LNO - “the FAO Foundry”

Coyt Hargus, USAF Civilian & USA (Ret) Middle East FAO, Managing Editor – The FAO Journal International Affairs

John Haseman, COL USA (Ret), Southeast Asia FAO, Associate Editor – The FAO Journal International Affairs

Steven Wilkins, COL USA (Ret), Latin American FAO, Associate Editor – The FAO Journal International Affairs

* Bios available at www.FAOA.org.
** Scheduled BoG elections coming soon. To run or vote, go to the website.
The OSS Society (OSSS) recognizes and honors the historic accomplishments of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the World War II strategic intelligence organization founded by William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan that was the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Special Operations Forces, and elements of Defense Intelligence Agency. The purpose of the OSS Society is to educate the American public about the importance of strategic intelligence collection and analysis and special operations to the preservation of freedom and protection of our nation. Their primary activities include an OSSS newsletter and magazine, the OSSS Annual William Donovan Awards Dinner, and efforts to create a National OSS Museum of American Intelligence and Special Operations.

The FAO Association partners with the OSS Society and nearly 40 other related organizations in the Intelligence Community Associations Network (ICAN), which is a forum that holds quarterly lunch meetings for representatives of member organizations to provide updates on activities, invite participation in open events, and offer shared benefits. The ICAN meetings, normally attended by a FAOA Board of Governors (BOG) member, are held at the historic DACOR-Bacon House in Washington DC, see www.dacorbacon.org. Other ICAN member organizations include the Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired/DACOR (which is open for membership to all current and retired military FAOs), the National Military Intelligence Agency/NMIA (partner of FAOA in various events), the National Defense Intelligence College (formerly JMIC) Alumni Association, and the Defense Intelligence Alumni Association (DIAA).

Representing the Association, FAOA President, Colonel Kurt M. Marisa, recently attended the Annual OSS Society William Donovan Awards Dinner on 15 October 2011, which honored Admiral Eric Thor Olson, USN (ret.), the former commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). During the event, which was attended by over 600 people, Colonel Marisa had the opportunity to meet and chat with Admiral Olson and congratulate him on his fantastic career and receipt of the “William J. Donovan Award”. The Admiral commented that he was a huge supporter of FAOs and the FAO programs now in existence in all Services, and whenever possible he had advocated for them and the contributions FAOs make to Special Operations, as well as the broader military community.

Buried among Admiral Eric “God of Thunder” Olson’s many military accomplishments are the facts that he holds a Masters of Arts Degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and was a Joint Specialty Officer and Navy Political-Military Affairs sub-specialist (forerunner to the Navy’s FAO program) with emphasis on Africa and the Middle East. Amongst his better known accomplishments, Admiral Olson participated in the “Black Hawk Down” Battle for Mogadishu and was the first Navy SEAL promoted to three-star and four-star rank, the first Navy officer to command US- SOCOM, and before he retired was the Navy “BULL FROG”--an honorary title held by the longest serving SEAL on active duty.

The OSS Society’s “William J. Donovan Award” is the highest-level award given by the
organization and is presented to an individual to recognize significant or lifetime contributions to strategic intelligence or special operations. The award was presented by former OSS officer, Major General John K. Singlaub, USA (ret.). General Donovan chose the spearhead as the OSS symbol, from his vision of his WW II organization as the “tip of the spear.” It is said that if the OSS was the tip of the spear, then MG Singlaub was the “tip of the tip of the spear” as a member of the elite “Jedburghs”, forerunners of today’s U.S. Special Operations Forces.

Other notable past recipients of the OSSS Donovan Award include Allen Dulles (1961), President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1965), the Astronauts of Apollo 11 (1970), William J. Casey (1974), Margaret Thatcher (1981), Richard Helms (1983), Ronald W. Reagan (1986), George H.W. Bush (1991), William Colby (1995), William Webster (2005), MG John K. Singlaub (2007), General David Petraeus, USA (ret.) (2009), and Ross Perot (2010). During the dinner, Colonel Marisa had the opportunity to meet the Director of National Intelligence, General James R. Clapper, USAF (ret.), Mr. Perot, and MG Singlaub, who now serves as Chairman of the OSS Society. The OSSS “John Singlaub Award,” given to an outstanding member of USSOCOM, is also presented in his honor and to maintain the historic bond between the OSS and USSOCOM. Also of note, General Clapper has committed tentatively to be the Guest of Honor and Keynote Speaker at the FAOA Annual Black Tie Dinner on 19 April 2012 at the Army Navy Country Club—PUT IT ON YOUR CALENDARS!

During the evening’s presentations, it also became clear that many WW II OSS veterans went on to distinguished careers in the CIA and the U.S. military after the war. Several officers, including OSSS Senior Vice President, Colonel William H. Pietsch Jr., USA (ret.), were even selected for the Army Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) program, the forerunner to the Army’s FAO program, which at the time was run by and initially very integrated into Army intelligence.

Douglas Waller, former correspondent for Newsweek and Time magazines, has recently authored an authoritative biography on the founder of the Office of Strategic Services, entitled “Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage.” Mr. Waller, from Annandale, VA, was also honored during the event by receiving the OSSS “John Waller Award” (no relationship). He conducted a book signing before and after the dinner.

The evening and dinner turned out to be a highly interesting, entertaining, and educational event, and offered the opportunity for outreach, recognition, and collaboration for the FAOA and the FAO discipline.

About the Author …

Col Kurt Marisa - European RAS (FAO) - USAF

Col Marisa currently serves as Division Chief under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Col Marisa is a career intelligence officer who has been an Air Force FAO and Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS-Europe) since 1998. He has served as Attaché to Saudi Arabia, Suriname, and Denmark. He has also had assignments in Germany and Korea and deployments to Saudi Arabia and South America.

Col Marisa has an MS in International Studies from the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Netherlands and an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the NDIC (formerly JMIC). He is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College and Air Command and Staff College and Air War College, from which he wrote and published his paper on the integration of Attaché and Security Assistance programs, contributing at the SECDEF level to the current DoD Senior Defense Officer (SDO)/DATT program.
Over the last decade there have been significant challenges to the military-to-military relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Military relations with China have consistently remained captive to the larger bilateral relationship. Since US–China relations were normalized in 1979, the military component of it has remained unstable and at times, unpredictable. The military relationship has traditionally felt the impact of political crises between the two countries and normally the first element of the relationship to be severed. Severing this relationship has occurred after extreme political crises such as the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the Taiwan Straits missile exercises in 1996, the EP-3 Orion incident of 2001, and in recent years, the selling of weapons to Taiwan.

From the Chinese perspective, military relations are viewed in a political context only, largely because the decision to establish or cut military ties with the US rests with the Party, not with the Army. Maintaining and enhancing this relationship remains a challenge to senior US defense and policy officials as modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), continues to accelerate. The nature of the relationship, even during times of good rapport, has remained superficial at best. The PLA prefer to focus on high-level exchanges and visits along with highly scripted training events rather than on low operational or working level substantive visits and exchanges. At best, the military relationship between the US and China can be characterized as inconsistent, shallow and lacking true reciprocity.

The year 2010 marked a significant turning point in the relationship when the office of Defense Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), US PACOM Joint Personnel Accounting Command (JPAC) and the Archive office of the PLA jointly discovered the remains of a US Navy aircraft that had been lost in China for over 61 years. The events that led to this discovery go back to 2008, when DPMO and the PLA Archives signed a memorandum of arrangement to share critical information from our numerous archival holdings. Initially the agreement limited information to the before, during and after Korean War era, but both sides agreed to explicitly expand this to include World War II, Korean War and the Vietnam War.

There are more than 655 cases of unaccounted servicemen in China spanning the three wars. Most of the cases of missing servicemen are concentrated in the WWII era and include aircrews flying the “Hump” missions to supply forces in China fighting the Japanese, B-24 reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea and an assortment of fighter aircraft. The scope of and number of these losses span the vast territory of China. In many cases the crash sites are located in remote areas that are not easily accessible, and are further constrained by language and local customs that contribute to the complexity of recovering these aircraft.

Adding to the difficulty is the political enigma of China’s vast bureaucracy that challenges our ability to get access to these areas requiring extensive negotiations with central and local government authorities from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense down to local governing authorities. This complex political landscape, along with our unsteady military relationship, requires strong US interagency effort to engage, negotiate and establish a functional working relationship with the corresponding counterparts in China. The agencies responsible for this include Office of the Secretary of Defense Asia Pacific Security (APSA), JPAC, State Department, US
Embassy Defense Attaché Office, and DPMO. Although DPMO accounting efforts are worldwide, approaches vary from region to region and the cases in China require extensive research, planning, negotiations and above all patience.

With the signing of the archival memorandum of arrangement in 2008, the relationship between DPMO and the PLA archivists has steadily improved with efforts from the PLA to provide actionable information on crash sites and expanding research on requested cases from DPMO. The memorandum of arrangement stipulates that the PLA will provide information from their existing holdings related to unaccounted for personnel and conduct active research on recommended cases from DPMO researchers. In addition to supporting joint research, representatives from the PLA archives are invited to participate during the investigative and recovery operations conducted by JPAC. In return, DPMO provides the PLA access to US national archival holdings at the National Archive and Records Administration at College Park Maryland.

It was during the first archival exchange meeting that the PLA provided DPMO with records of a possible American airplane crash that occurred in November of 1950. In addition to providing the written report, the PLA allowed DPMO researchers to photo copy the official photos of the crash site from 1950. The DPMO researchers in concert with the JPAC staff were able to identify the missing aircraft by comparing the information provided by the PLA with US documented “Missing Aircraft Crew Reports (MACR)” as a PBM-5 Seaplane, reported missing and “lost at sea” and eventually unaccounted for. The aircraft had originally taken off from the seaplane base at Sangley Point, Philippine Islands, on the evening of November 5, 1950. The seaplane was on a routine patrol up the Formosa Straits with a final destination at Buckner Bay, Okinawa, where the seaplane tender USS Salisbury Sound awaited its arrival. According to the report, the aircraft made a routine position report off the south end of the Formosa Straits, and then simply disappeared. The inclement weather and 13-foot swells on the open seas would have precluded the aircraft from landing safely on water. Soon after the aircraft failed to report in, an air and sea search began on November 6th and continued for nine days, but no sign of the aircraft or its crew was found. There was no indication that Chinese forces engaged or were even aware of the presence of a patrol aircraft in the area. According to the reports taken by the PLA in 1950 after the crash was found, local personnel from Chaozhou had observed an unidentified aircraft at flying low altitude around the mountain areas south of the town. It then dropped a flare before it attempted to land on a hill facing the village below. The official PLA accident report indicated the aircraft broke up upon impact on the mountain and 15 bodies were discovered around the wreckage. The PLA authorities who surveyed the crash site misidentified the aircraft as a B-29 and listed it so in the report.

JPAC recovery team and local Chinese workers sifting soil at the crash site location in Chaozhou, China.

Fifty-eight years later, the information from this crash site report was determined to be credible and warranted an investigation. In the summer of 2010, JPAC assembled an investigative team consisting of members from JPAC, the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Beijing and the PLA Archives and travelled to the reported crash site, located on a mountain top just outside the small city of Chaozhou in Guangdong Province PRC. During the investiga-
tion, the team interviewed local citizens and officials and physically surveyed the area to determine that a crash had occurred. The team was able to locate small items associated with that type of aircraft including small-caliber ammunition and various amounts of aircraft equipment associated with a PBM-5 airplane. The assessment found sufficient evidence to support a full recovery operation and JPAC began planning and coordination with Chinese officials at both the local and national level. Over the next few months, members from JPAC, DAO Beijing, MFA and PLA Archives negotiated a date in February 2011 start for the operation.

On February 15, 2011, a US Air Force C-17 aircraft landed in Guangzhou with a 14-person JPAC recovery team. In addition to the JPAC members, local workers (mostly tea farmers) were hired to assist the JPAC team in excavating the crash site. Over the next few weeks the team excavated nearly 1,000 cubic meters of earth and found numerous items associated with that type of aircraft. Items such as life support-equipment, personal items and aircraft equipment were found through endless sifting of soil. Unfortunately, after nearly six weeks of excavation, the recovery team failed to locate any human remains and was forced to temporarily close down operations. The team coordinated for a follow-on recovery at the same location to return in early winter 2012 to continue to resume operations in hopes of recovering the remains of the crewmen.

The relationship that began between DPMO and the PLA Archives in 2008 directly led to the discovery and the follow on recovery operation of this lost aircraft. The relationship has continued to grow and mature over the years even during the rocky periods of US-China military relations, thus reflecting a functional and positive venue for mil-to-mil relations between our two countries. Just recently DPMO and the PLA Archives held their annual meeting and discussed future amendments to the joint arrangement to improve the quality of the information sharing. The arrangement will allow unprecedented access and information sharing that will positively impact DPMO’s ability to continue to research and pursue those unaccounted for cases in China keeping the promise, to bring those servicemen home to their families.

About the Author …
LTC Christopher Pultz was commissioned as an Armor officer from the State University of New York, Cortland. After initial armor assignments he transitioned into Military Intelligence in 1994 with a variety of assignments before he began training as a China FAO. In 2011, Chris earned an MA in Asian Studies from Cornell University. Starting in 2001, his FAO assignments include Assistant Professor of Chinese at West Point, Senior Asia Analyst at DA, China Branch Chief in DIA’s Office of Asia Pacific Analysis, the DPMO’s Asia Policy Advisor within OSD. LTC Pultz is the inbound Assistant Army Attaché to Mongolia. He and Diane have three children Jonathan, Sarah, and Molly.
Association Board of Governors Member Travels to South East Asia

In May FAO Association Board of Governors Member Colonel (ret) John Haseman conducted another of his trips to Southeast Asia. He visited a number of friends in Jakarta, Indonesia and Dili, Timor Leste (also known as East Timor), including many senior local military and civilian officials he has known from his three assignments at the U.S. Embassy, Jakarta.

In Jakarta, he met with Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro and Vice Minister LTG (ret) Syafrie Syamsoeddiein and many other senior active duty and retired military officers. He also met with U.S. Defense and Army Attaché/Senior Defense Officer Colonel Russell Bailey and Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation Colonel Randall Koehlmoos.

In Dili he stayed with long time friends Ambassador Judith Fergin and husband Greg – who served in the economics and political sections, respectively, in the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta during John’s assignments in Jakarta. He had a lengthy discussion with Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation Major Rex Copeland, who manages a broad range of security assistance programs with the armed forces of the new nation of Timor Leste, and provided him with a copy of the most recent issue of the FAO Association journal International Affairs. He also met former Indonesian-era Governor Mario Carrascalao, who also served as Vice Prime Minister in the Timor Leste government, with whom he met on many of his visits to East Timor when it was a province of Indonesia. The Governor provided a fascinating tour d’horizon of his own career serving under two different national governments.

The primary purpose of this trip was to meet with Indonesian and Timorese friends to refresh memories of events over the past 35 years – as research for a book he will co-author with several former FAO colleagues. He particularly enjoyed meeting with several FAOs in the two embassies to spread the word about our Association while he gained an appreciation of the challenges and rewards that today’s FAOs deal with on a daily basis in far away assignments.

Submit your trip reports, observations, experiences and opinions to the journal for potential publication. How? See the journal insert or look on the website, www.FAOA.org

LOST FAOs

Your FAOA is attempting to update our membership contact data without which, you will not get current announcements or the printed FAOA Journal which comes with your membership fee.

Many are not aware that their memberships have expired.

Please go to the web site to update your membership and/or your data at www.faoa.org.
If you are not able to, then send an email to the webmaster at webmaster@faoa.org.

Six3 Systems

Six3 Systems, Inc. (Six3) was founded in 2009 as a highly focused intelligence, defense, and national security company with specialized capabilities in Intelligence Solutions, Cyber Security, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Mission Focused IT Solutions.

The Six3 family is comprised of industry-leading companies including BIT Systems, Harding Security Associates, and Novii Design. Our teams solve complex problems with top-line subject matter expertise and leading-edge technology solutions to meet mission-critical requirements.

www.six3systems.com EOE
The pending withdrawal of all American troops by the end of 2011 is a cause for great concern in Turkey. Turkey fears that the eventual departure of US forces could exacerbate security problems in Iraq, jeopardize Iraq’s territorial integrity and give the outlawed terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) a freer hand to attack Turkey.

The Issue of Territorial Integrity

Turkey’s main concern has to do with the territorial integrity of Iraq. Ankara fears that the power vacuum that could emerge following the US withdrawal could spark sectarian and ethnic clashes in Iraq that could easily spill over to Turkey. There are numerous problems between different groups in Iraq, including between Shi’a and Sunnis and the Arabs and Kurds. All of these could be magnified once the US pulls out of Iraq. If an internal balance is not achieved in Iraq, Turkey, as a neighboring country, will not be spared from all the turmoil.

Turkey views Iraq through the prism of northern Iraq. The issue of northern Iraq is an existential issue for Turkey, for two reasons. First, Turkey perceives northern Iraq to be a safe haven for the PKK, which is a national security threat for Turkey. The PKK is a separatist violent terrorist organization recognized as such by the State Department, Turkey and the European Union, which launches attacks on Turkey. Second, an independent Kurdistan which would be formed in northern Iraq would be a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Such an entity might embolden separatist aspirations within its own Kurdish population. With approximately 14 million Turkish Kurds, Turkey is home to the largest Kurdish population in the world.

The borders of the Middle East were drawn over former Ottoman territories. The British and French, as the victors of World War I, divided the Middle East and imposed a European nation-state system Turkey’s southern and southeastern frontiers were drawn during the period when Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan emerged as new nation-states into the international system. Therefore any change in the composition of Iraq becomes an automatic concern for Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Thus Turkey’s ardent support for the territorial integrity of Iraq is actually a self-defensive position of defending its own borders. In fact, the recently released National Security Council statement, which identifies what the Turkish government’s approach should be to fighting PKK terrorism, highlighted the strategic goal of Turkey as: “One nation, one flag, one country, one homeland.” From Ankara’s point of view, the strategic goal, in other words, is to protect the national and territorial integrity of the country.

The PKK and US Intelligence Support

Turkey credits US intelligence provided by reconnaissance planes with assisting in the fight against the PKK. Given that the PKK continues to launch attacks on targets in south eastern Turkey from its bases in northern Iraq, this intelligence support remains critical. Turkey is concerned that once US troops withdraw from Iraq, the US will cease to provide intelligence regarding PKK activities. Without the daily satellite monitoring, it will become difficult for Turkey to follow PKK elements’ activities, their internal fights, and where and how they get support. The US has flown the unarmed Predators from Iraqi bases since 2007 and shared the planes’ surveillance information as part of a joint fight against the PKK. However, the drones that provide this intelligence are set to be withdrawn along with the rest of US forces by 31 December 2011.

As Turkish military and government officials often say, the PKK is to Turkey what Al-Qaeda is to the US, or that “the PKK is Turkey’s Al-Qaida.” Aware of Turkish concerns, US State Department spokesman Michael Hammer has recently reiterated...
that “Turkey is a long-standing ally and partner of the United States, and we continue to support Turkey in its struggle against PKK terrorism through various forms of cooperation,” adding that “We support continued cooperation between Iraq and Turkey in combating the PKK, which is a common enemy of Turkey, Iraq and the United States.” In fact, the US is currently considering a request from Turkey to base a fleet of Predator drones at the joint Incirlik base for counterterrorism operations to fight the PKK.

This is particularly important because elements of the PKK have launched an increasing number of attacks since August 2011, from their stronghold in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq. They have escalated the violence and killed over 70 Turkish soldiers and policemen in the last few months. Following this, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that his patience had run out and ordered a wave of air strikes against PKK targets.

Based on its agreement with the US, Turkey is currently able to conduct air strikes against PKK targets. While Iraqi air space is under American military control, Turkish war planes have the freedom to bomb PKK targets in northern Iraq. However, once all US forces have left, the Iraqi government may try to restrict this freedom for the Turkish war planes.

The Issue of Kirkuk

Kirkuk enters the equation within the framework of Turkish concerns of an independent Kurdistan. Turkey worries that Kirkuk will be incorporated into Kurdistan, and its oil will provide the economic infrastructure for a Kurdish state, further accelerating Iraq’s disintegration. In addition, Turkey considers Kirkuk as a microcosm of Iraq, with its Kurds, Turkomans and Arabs. Turkey considers Turkomans to be its ethnic brethren and would like to see a consensus based solution for Kirkuk that reflects its multi-ethnic, multilingual and multicultural identity. However, there is suspicion that Saddam changed the ethnic composition of Kirkuk to drive out the Turkomans.

The withdrawal of all US troops from Iraq at the end of the year has been the cause of debate in Turkey. There are serious concerns regarding Iraq’s territorial integrity and fears that Turkey will face an uphill battle against the PKK. As many warn that Turkey may be on the brink of upsetting events, they also caution the US to plan its withdrawal very carefully, and to take note of Turkey’s concerns in the process.

Call for topics

The journal is actively seeking the family and/or spouse perspective on FAO training, JMAS, ICT, embassy life, social requirements, overseas schools, embassy furniture, POVs and/or experiences various FAO jobs around the world … in the US and overseas

Such articles would be not only interesting to read, but might also assist in the preparation of the families that follow by sharing the facts of FAO life.

About the Author …

Ms. Karen Kaya is a Middle East / Turkey Analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office, located in Fort Leavenworth, KS. She earned her Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Brandeis University, and has worked as a linguist and defense policy analyst for the US government.
Eighteen senior FAOs representing all four Services participated in the Europe and Eurasia FAO Program, conducted under the Joint FAO Skills Sustainment Pilot Program, from September 12-23, 2011 in Germany and Belgium. During the program, participants had the opportunity to engage in strategic-level discussions and analysis relating to US security and defense interests in the region. The group’s discussions were facilitated by Dr. Donald Abenheim of the Naval Postgraduate School.

In Germany, the group met in Oberammergau for a weeklong seminar at the NATO School, which included lectures by noted Russia experts Dr. Marie Mendras, Dr. Roy Allison, and Mr. Roger McDermott. Participants then travelled to Stuttgart for discussions at U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR). A highlight of the trip was a meeting with Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, Deputy Director (DJ5) for Plans, Policy, and Strategy at USEUCOM. Rear Admiral Montgomery shared with the group his observations about FAO education and training, and praised the contributions that FAOs make to the command on a daily basis.

The group then travelled to Brussels, Belgium for discussions at the U.S. Mission to the European Union (USEU) and U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (USNATO). Vice Admiral Richard Gallagher, U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Committee, met with the group to share his thoughts about strategic leadership. The group also met with several military representatives from other nations, who very candidly responded to the questions they fielded. The program concluded with a meeting at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons and a visit of the Waterloo Battlefield, which was led by Dr. Douglas Porch of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Program participants included FAO Association members Colonel Kurt Marisa (President) and Colonel Gary Espinas (former President). While in Oberammergau, Marisa and
Espinas took time out to climb to the top of the Kofel Mountain, elevation 4,400 feet (see photos).

The Joint FAO Skills Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP) is located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Under the direction of Dr. Tristan Mabry, JFSSPP is an advanced education and skill sustainment initiative for FAOs from all Services: Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Recognizing foreign language ability and specialized regional knowledge as mission critical skills, the JFSSPP fulfills a Department of Defense mandate to provide resources and opportunities for FAO skill sustainment and professional education.

For more information see https://fao.nps.edu.

―… but being right, even morally right, isn’t everything.
It’s also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable.
It’s important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence.
It’s important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist.‖

Anne Applebaum
Director of Political Studies, London
and widely published journalist

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org
Win Without Fighting: Leveraging China, Sanctions and Information to topple North Korea
By Greg Archetto, Major, US Army, FAO

The challenge of how to deal with North Korea has confounded American diplomats and strategists alike for decades. The addition of nuclear weapons to the equation has made the situation infinitely more dangerous. North Korea is the primary contributor to instability and insecurity in Northeast Asia and because of a lack of a coherent, comprehensive strategy over the years, the problem has been allowed to fester and is arguably more difficult to resolve now than at any time in the past.

Negotiations have proved fruitless as the North Koreans have shown that they are untrustworthy masters of manipulation and have engaged in talks simply for the sake of talking. Nothing has come of them, save the burnishing of the resumes of Western participants and the occasional wasted aid package. Military action is the least desirable option, as North Korea has threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” in the past, and most analysts believe that if the Kim regime were backed into a corner it would do just that. It could also lash out and attack Japan (and US assets based there) in an attempt to broaden the conflict into a wider regional war.

In order to find the “least bad” option to bring about the end of the Kim regime and eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula, thoughtful strategic analysis is necessary to identify the relevant international players and their subsequent interests (centers of gravity), leverage international relationships and mechanisms to put pressure on North Korea, and open pipelines of information to the North Korean people, so as to help facilitate the collapse of the regime from within. This will by no means happen overnight, but perhaps if the US begins to think in terms of decades as opposed to election cycles, we can help bring about former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s “soft landing, meaning gradual unification or accommodation with the South, rather than a destructive crash.”

First, we must understand the core interests of the key players, mainly the US and China. For the US, the main concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated technology and know-how to other state and non-state actors. North Korea has shown willingness to transfer nuclear know-how to disreputable parties in exchange for weapons, cash, food, or anything else that preserves the Kim regime. Additionally, North Korea represents a constant threat to important US allies like Japan and South Korea. The U.S. is keen not to be drawn into an East Asian regional war that could easily spiral out of control.

For China, North Korea acts as buffer between it and the forces of perceived Western imperialist aggression. Further, it acts as a convenient distraction serving to focus regional and Western attention away from China’s own economic and military rise. A sudden North Korean collapse would also undoubtedly cause a massive influx of refugees into Manchuria, putting severe social and economic stress on China.

The key to any successful strategy on North Korea must include cooperation with China. “First, (the US and China) must formulate a common definition of the Korea problem. Second, they must acknowledge that they have common or at least overlapping interests regarding Korea. Third, based on the recognition of those convergent interests, the U.S. and China should devise a plan for concerted action.” In order for the US to obtain such cooperation, we must alter China’s current strategic calculus that the status quo is in its best interests.

China is the lifeline of North Korea. It not only provides subsistence aid, but has a captive market of sorts, as most other countries are prohibited from trading with it. As such, China has substantial influence over this mercurial country. China also seeks recognition by the international community of its “emerging world power” status. If the U.S. and the international community reinstate harsh sanctions (including those that may exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, cancelling port calls, flights, and other
exchanges, etc) and then "name and shame" China as the sole supporter of this brutal regime, perhaps China will reassess its stance and work toward a comprehensive solution. The US and the international community could sweeten the deal by offering assistance with any future refugee issues (advance planning for such a crisis is prudent), financial or technological incentives, and/or promises to re-evaluate US positions on certain Chinese "core interests."

Further, it must be explained to the Chinese, in public and in private, that the concept of North Korea as a "buffer state" is outdated, and that US troops have no intention of invading China. In fact, if the North Korean problem were solved, it would negate the need for US forces on the Korean peninsula at all. In return, we would require intelligence cooperation from the Chinese on the disposition of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and attempts at illicit transfers of WMD know-how or technology to other countries or non-state actors. At the end of the day, the diplomatic full-court press should be focused on China, not North Korea.

Concurrently, and key to the overall long game strategy, is the flooding of North Korea with information about the outside world. Not necessarily propaganda about the evils of the Kim regime, per se, just free access to information about anything a typical North Korean might have questions about. Put brilliantly by a senior South Korean official, "the most dangerous virus for the [DPRK] regime is the truth about the outside world and the truth about themselves. They try to contain and prevent information from infiltrating. But they don't have a vaccine against this kind of virus."

In an age of information, any government that seeks to maintain control by limiting access to it is destined to fail. In the past, balloons dropping leaflets have been floated across the DMZ and loudspeaker messages over the border, but the success of those efforts must be questioned, as the regime endures. It is just not enough. However, with the advances in technology over the past decade, a much more aggressive campaign is not only possible, but would likely hasten the collapse of the regime, particularly in the near future as uncertainty about succession abounds.

In a recent article in The Economist exploring how North Korea's dictatorship remains so entrenched despite causing such misery, one theory is that "outside Pyongyang (where the elites enjoy perks and are protected by an overwhelming security apparatus) the population is more geographically scattered than outsiders had originally thought. This is mainly in the North and East of the country, where lack of transport and communication work as an unintended form of social control. The tentative conclusion is that North Korea has not only managed to cut itself off from the world, but also created an internally isolated underclass, mostly in the east, that is left to fend for itself. The underclass's isolation reduces the burden on the state and the odds of it rising up in an organized fashion to challenge the regime."

This sparseness, however, could also be a weakness of the regime, if exploited properly. If transport and communication are difficult among these population centers, we can also assume that the same applies for overseers and regime authorities. Theoretically, this would allow contempt to slowly build far away from the center of power and hopefully, with help, coalesce into a full-fledged revolutionary movement.

In addition to current attempts to break the information stranglehold over North Koreans, including VOA broadcasts, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker messages over the DMZ, the technology exists today (in the form of the Internet) to amplify these efforts at low cost and at lower risk than pointless negotiations and outright confrontation. All that is needed is a little creativity.

Last year, "India's human resources development minister unveiled a prototype tablet PC priced at about $35, which has gone into production this year. It has a web browser, multi-media player, PDF reader, Wi-Fi, memory card and USB ports. It was developed to provide rural children quality education." For the cost of the last aid package to North Korea, picked up by the U.S. taxpayer,
hundreds of these tablet PCs could be purchased and smuggled into North Korea. An informal black market has already emerged between North Korea and China; it had to for the sake of the survival of the population in the North and East of the country during the famine of the 1990s. It’s only logical to piggyback off of this existing network for such an operation.

The other major hurdle to overcome would be the lack of an existing support infrastructure to enable internet access in North Korea, i.e., transmission towers, power sources, bandwidth, and antennae. However, over the past couple of years, advances have been made in the transmission of Wi-Fi over long distances, as far as 190 miles. The U.S. could likely park maritime assets in international waters in the western portion of the Sea of Japan and, with modified antennae, transmits wireless access to North Korean cities in the coastal north and east of the country, such as Chongjin, Kimchaek, and others. This could provide a tiny opening in a window to the outside world that has remained shut for decades.

The oft-recycled strategies currently employed to deal with the North Korean situation have failed, and will continue to fail. A bold approach is necessary if the U.S. and the international community are serious about resolving this issue. Only by frank discussion and close cooperation with China, biting international sanctions, and provision of free access to uncensored information will the dream of a Kim-free North Korea be realized. As stated, it will by no means happen quickly and there will be further suffering in the DPRK, but given the strategic assessment of the overall dynamic, this is likely the best option.

Finally, while the overall effectiveness of the “open spigot” information campaign can by no means be guaranteed, this author believes it correctly identifies the North Korean center of gravity on which to focus, and that, in and of itself, augurs success. How? It is helpful to think of the flow of information as water flowing between cracks in a massive boulder. It may not happen quickly, but over time, the water will widen the cracks and the boulder will crumble.

About the author …

Mr. Greg Archetto is currently a Country Program Director at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. A former Presidential Management Fellow, Mr. Archetto has worked in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military and has completed rotational assignments with OSD-P and on Capitol Hill. He has a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Rowan University, a Master’s Degree in Public Policy/Administration from Rutgers University, and a Master’s Degree in National Security/Strategic Studies from the US Naval War College. He lives with his wife Jeanette in Virginia.
Introduction

Understanding the current dynamics of the world’s several geostrategic regions, is a full time effort for the government, military, or business professional. In the past decade Southeast Asia has seen massive natural disasters, government turmoil, terrorist attacks and on-going insurgencies. Within this mix of tumults, the region saw economic expansion as the adjacent India and China lead global growth. US political focus is consistently drawn back to the region and the US military is often a first-responder in time of need. Study of Southeast Asia is well worth your time.

Indochina encompasses the geographic realm now commonly called Southeast Asia. It captures the two major world civilizations that have historically influenced the peoples of this realm. The archeological, linguistic and historical evidence depicts millennia of sequential migration of peoples and influences into this southern peninsula of the Asia mainland, and the islands beyond. Is there a primary influence from the past? Will there be a dominate influence in the future?

The Indic civilization has overlain and inspired the traditional cultures of Southeast Asia while the Sinic civilization has penetrated and dominated the economic activities of these peoples. This pattern will continue.

Influence of India

The kings and kingdoms of Indochina were culturally and politically influenced from India. Tenets of religion and structures of governance flowed from India into the settled agricultural states along the great rivers of the region. Indian culture came across the seas, borne by the monsoons, as early as the 6th century BC. Hindic culture’s developed medical arts and abundant trade provided access to leaders and communities along the coasts and river ways of Southeast Asia. Hinduism influenced the arts, commerce, and law. Brahmans brought Sanskrit texts on ritual and government, introducing Southeast Asia’s first written language. Yet Hinduism’s characteristic social constructs of caste and the subordinate role of women were not adopted in Southeast Asia.

Buddhism added additional layers of meaning, social structure, and links to India. The exchange of missionaries, pilgrims, and teachers brought Buddhist thought which overlay the Hindu foundations. The scripts of the Southeast Asian languages (except Vietnamese) were all derived from the Indic family of Brahmi scripts. This Indian cultural influence reached deep into the great archipelago of today’s Indonesia.

Influence of China

In Chinese historical records of the Chin Dynasty (221-207 BC), we find that armies, merchants, and colonists pushed south into today’s Vietnam with enduring cultural impact. Northern Vietnam remained a Han Chinese colony for a thousand years. No other area of the region saw this degree of Chinese dominance, yet, as early as the first century AD, the interplay of India and China within the Kingdoms of Southeast Asia was evident. Known as the kings of Funan by the Chinese, the earliest recorded Mekong Kingdoms traded goods and envoys with the two great civilizations of Asia. Chinese merchants established trading communities throughout the region. By the coming of the modern era, the landscape bore the mark of India’s cultural and China’s economic influence.

Geographic Factors

Southeast Asia consists of the continental peninsula or Mainland Region and the outlying archipelago or Insular Region. These regions, with the surrounding seas, contain a realm of rugged mountain ranges, long sinuous rivers, scattered plains and plateaus, and thousands of islands all within a tropical climate.
The Mainland Region can be delineated by the major rivers and intervening highlands. The headwaters of the mighty Irrawaddy, Chao Praya, Mekong, and Red River (Song Koi) lie in the mountainous southern provinces of today’s China. The river valleys and surrounding plains of these rivers are the heartlands of the major agriculture-based kingdoms of antiquity and nations of today. The mountains and high plateaus create sub-regions and boundaries throughout the mainland. East-west movement is channelized and truncated.

The Insular Region consists of the major and minor islands along the equator plus northern-reaching islands of the Philippines. Lacking the great rivers of the mainland, this region is characterized by mountains and highlands sweeping into complex and continuous coastlines. The population clustered in the flattest and most fertile areas of volcanic soils. The great kingdoms of the island rich insular region were founded on maritime trade rather than agriculture.

Located in the tropics, the Southeast Asia realm has a hot climate with a dry and wet season. Topography and latitude combine in the northern areas to produce a subtropical climate with cooler temperatures at altitude. The equatorial location of the major islands maintains their less varying, torrid tropical climate. The monsoon winds and rain influence most of the realm.

Cultural

The dominant languages and people groups of today’s Southeast Asia are a result of a long epic of migration, diffusion, and assimilation. The greater cultural landscape reveals both adoption and resistance to religion, language, food ways, social structure, and governance. And the landscape never lies.

Southeast Asia has long been home to hominids and the earliest Homo sapiens. Archeological evidence reveals that people groups have migrated from the northern mountainous regions in successive waves of settlement and transit. This flow continued through the neo-lithic and iron ages. Rice has been the principle cereal crop since antiquity. The settled agricultural communities, perfecting wet-rice cultivation along rivers and in their deltas, provided the base for the formation of centralized states.

The earliest states were influenced fundamentally by the Brahmin religious traditions of India. As early as the sixth-century BC, Indian traders, driven by monsoon winds, traveled to the coasts of the Shrikshetra (Burma/Myanmar), Dvaravati (Thailand), Funan (Cambodia), and Champa (central coastal Vietnam). These contacts brought Sanskrit as the language for ritual and learning. For 600, years the Indic world brought a holistic structure of social and political life that found root in the growing Kingdoms of the realm. For centuries Hinduism and then Buddhism influenced royal legitimacy and social structure; as shown in art, architecture, and the cycle of agrarian life. This is seen in the Buddhist Kingdom of Sriwijaya (Sumatra) of the 7th century AD and the 13th century Majapahit Hindu Empire in East Java.

The overlay of Chinese culture was restricted by topography and imperial interest to the valley of the Red River (Tonkin) and to enclaves along the South China Sea coast of Vietnam. Here the Chinese
Imperial Armies and envoys held sway for centuries (221BC-907 AD). Chinese commercial concerns established merchant communities throughout the realm, settling in ports and focal points of trade. This was the initial “String of Pearls.”

The importance of rice as a cultural and caloric element throughout Southeast Asia cannot be over emphasized. In the past, its cultivation and consumption was foundational to all royal societies of the realm. Today the commoditization of rice is a fundamental factor in cultural, economic, and political considerations. Thailand is the largest exporter of rice in the world.

European Impacts

By the 16th century European navigators had made their way to the fabled shores of the “golden lands” and began to dominate the maritime trade. This earliest interest is repeated today in the western world’s focus on maritime control and commercial mastery. By 1511 AD the Portuguese had captured Malacca, yet significant European cultural and political impact had to wait until the the Industrial revolutions of the 19th century.

With the increased demand for raw materials, European colonial powers launched massive efforts to exploit the largess of Southeast Asia; Britain in Burma, France in “Indo-China” (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), the Dutch in Indonesia, and Spain in the Philippines. In the last decade of the century Britain and France agreed to leave Siam (Thailand) as a buffer state and made no moves to conquer that Kingdom. The United States seized the Philippines from Spain. Each power exploited their colonies according to national dictate, yet all left their dependencies underdeveloped economically and politically. The British ruled Burma from Calcutta and provided the impetus for waves of Indian migration to both Burma and Malaysia for the purpose of plantation labor. The British imported Chinese labor for mining and agriculture. Colonial commercial interests grew and the region’s cities reflected these colonial pressures of mercantilism and governance. Chinese and Indian communities concentrated in these cities supporting colonial administration and commercial activities.

The 20th century saw the nadir of colonial influence after the conclusion of World War II. Independence and national movements removed the European and new world dominance. US intervention in Vietnam was the final massive military and political attempt to influence Southeast Asia from across the seas.

Today: Indo or China?

The influence of the People’s Republic of China and Chinese influence are not the same. Chinese communities that have existed for centuries in Southeast Asia are not political or national extensions of China. Yet they remain distinctly Chinese and maintain a separate identity in the nations of Southeast Asia. This Chinese commercial prowess is not widely recognized in the west.

These overseas Chinese communities originated primarily through migration from the coastal area of southeastern China, in particular Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. This migration peaked in the second half of the nineteenth century, driven by British colonial demand and the opening of treaty ports after the First Opium War. These communities have assimilated to various degrees, but all have become significant economic factors in the host country.

In Malaysia, 29-percent of the population is Chinese. This overseas Chinese community controls 61-percent of share capital by market capitalization. They occupy 60-percent of all private sector administrative and managerial positions. Only 3.5 percent of the population of Indonesia is Chinese. The Sino-Indonesians control about 73 -percent of listed firms by market capitalization. By the end of 1993, they controlled 68-percent of the top 300 conglomerates and nine of the top ten private sector groups in the country. The Chinese account for 77
percent of Singapore’s population and are estimated to control 81 percent of Singapore’s listed companies by market capitalization (Richter 1999, 194-196). Thailand’s Chinese population is the most assimilated in Southeast Asia. It is 10 percent of Thailand’s overall population. This group controls 81 percent of listed firms by market capitalization.

Chinese clan ties and proximity to southern China create significant impetus for trade, commerce, and investment between Southeast Asia and China. Movement of goods from Guangzhou and Shanghai to the ports of Burma and Thailand is an efficient step along the route to the markets of the Middle East and Europe.

The Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) is the regional voice of the Southeast Asian geographic identity. According to ASEAN statistics, since the launch of the Free Trade Agreement with China in 2003, ASEAN’s trade with China has been rising at an annual average rate of 26 percent, tripling ASEAN’s trade with China, from approximately USD 60 billion in 2003 to USD 197 billion in 2008. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, accounting for 11.6 percent of ASEAN’s total trade. To promote ASEAN-China infrastructure and inter-connectivity, China announced the set up of a USD 15 billion credit facility for investment cooperation projects. Chinese and China’s economic clout is well established and growing.

Indic influence is more cultural than economic or political. In particular the newly won peace in Sri Lanka has expanded access to Buddhist pilgrimages to the island cites. This continues a 2500 year old cultural contact. As a sign of devotion and solidarity the first ship to enter the newly constructed Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka carried statues of the Buddha from Myanmar. This is an echo of the long Indic cultural influence in Southeast Asia. However this Buddhist culture of Southeast Asia is better echoed in the population of China (102 million Buddhists) than that of India (7 million Buddhists).

Conclusion

India and China, ancient seats of civilization once buffeted and dissected by western colonies and concessions, are now being moved by modernity into engines of influence both regionally and globally. Betwixt them lies Southeast Asia, a realm of great human and natural resource. These three actors represent 3.5 billion people (over half the population of the planet). How ASEAN responds to these regional pressures may be an indicator to how global relationships will unfold in the coming decades.

China’s growing influence is of concern to just about everyone. The Chinese are not new to Southeast Asia or its commerce. Around 1350 AD, Ibn Battuta records the massive Chinese merchant fleets that dominated the ocean routes from India to China. The average ASEAN business person is well aware of this long history of contact and commercial interaction. Still for many US analysts this Chinese presence is considered novel and sinister. For the region, Sino-centric economic activity is normal and the expanded presence is to be expected.

This realm has experienced global commerce, foreign invasion, and internal achievement for centuries. India will continue to supply some sympathetic cultural support while China will continue to expand commercial contacts and commitments. What role will the erstwhile colonial powers of the United States and the European Union play? Who’s military will police the maritime world of Southeast Asia? Who will dominate its world trade? Who will inspire their culture? Who will legitimize their governments? Who will count them as allies?

For the time being, China’s economic influence is over shadowing any residual cultural influence of India. Whether one chooses to contain or engage the Indic and Sinic worlds, Indochina is the place to start. Cultural meaning can never be ignored, but commerce remains the leading indicator of intentions. Any professional doing “business” in Southeast Asia will be dealing directly with China or the Overseas Chinese community.
General Clapper, DNI Confirmed as Banquet Guest Speaker

Gen Clapper, DNI, has confirmed with FAOA that he will attend and make remarks as the keynote speaker for our next Annual FAOA Black Tie Banquet

19 April 2012

FAOA is seeking volunteers to serve on the banquet committee. To volunteer, contact the association’s secretary. Secretary@FAOA.org

Register for the banquet and get planning updates online at: www.FAOA.org

Elections!
Board of Governors

Your FAOA by-laws require officer elections every three years … it’s that time again.

The current Board of Governors (BoG) is now preparing to offer elections in the August, 2012.

Some sitting BoG members do desire to continue to serve, and will stand for re-election. Some BoG members (elected in 2009) have resigned during the three-year term for various reasons and must be replaced.

Our elections are held online.
If you would like to help, to represent your portion of the FAO community, then contact the FAOA president at

President@FAOA.org

Watch our the FAOA web site for news, and to elect your BoG in August.

www.FAOA.org

FAOs On Tap!
… it’s a “FAO Mixer”

Our first mixer on 8 Sep 2011 was highly successful so your Board of Governors is going to make these mixers routine events

Our first event was at Sine’s Irish Pub and Restaurant in Arlington, near the Pentagon. Given the positive feedback we received, we will likely continue to “mix at Sine’s”.

The next FAOs On Tap is already Scheduled — 22 March 2012 — … same place, same plan.

Let us know how you thought the event went or give us other ideas for social networking opportunities.

RSVP online at www.FAOA.org
Email questions to the secretary at Secretary@FAOA.org

As editor, I request that you share event news and even some casual happy snaps of events so that we can share them with the FAO community … email the editor at:

editor@FAOA.org

Call for Topics

In conjunction with our “Policy Luncheon” guest speaker program, your BoG is planning a special event where the guest speakers from the various service proponents will update and explain the various service programs of single/dual-tracking for FAOs.

In preparation for that, the journal intends to commit an entire edition to the merits of dual/single-tracking, FAO education, and FAO development.

Help us drive the “conversation” and express your views and recommendations with regard to FAO development and utilization.

Submit your views, analysis, opinions and recommendations … email the editor:

editor@FAOA.org
Colonel Randall L. “Randy” Koehlmoos, Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation, US Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia, died in an automobile accident in Jakarta on 27 August 2011. He leaves behind his wife Tracey Lynne Perez Koehlmoos and three sons: Robert (17), Michael (15), and David (12). Randy was born 2 June 1965 and raised on a farm outside of Pilger, Nebraska. After accepting the challenge of his art teacher to attend a drill weekend, he enlisted in the Nebraska National Guard at age 17 and served five years as an infantryman. He was commissioned as an armor officer via the University of Nebraska ROTC. He served with the 3/73rd Armor (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina as a Sheridan platoon leader and company executive officer during the 1991 Gulf War. He next served with the 2/68th Armor and 1/35th Armor, 1st Armored Division in Baumholder, Germany, where he commanded both tank and headquarters companies during NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska.

Randy became a South Asia Foreign Area Officer in 1997 and subsequently served with the US Central Command during Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM; as Office of Defense Cooperation Chief, US Embassy Kathmandu, Kingdom of Nepal; and as Defense and Army Attaché to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, US Embassy Dhaka. Prior to Indonesia, he served in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a liaison officer under the Office of the Defense Representative – Pakistan (ODRP). He assumed the ODC Indonesia Chief post in 2010.

COL Koehlmoos’ military education included the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Field Artillery Advanced Course, the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Joint Forces Staff College. He spoke German, Urdu, Nepali, and Bangla. He attended the Pakistan Army Staff College in Quetta, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Baluchistan. He also earned a Master of Arts degree in South Asian Studies from the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. His military awards and decorations included the Defense Superior Service Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Master Parachutist Badge and many other US and foreign awards.
Randy was very well liked and respected by his Jakarta diplomatic colleagues and the senior Indonesian military and defense officials with whom he worked. All took part in a dignified repatriation of remains ceremony at Halim Perdanakusuma Air Base in Jakarta before Randy was flown home to the United States by the US Air Force. Besides his wife and children, Colonel Koehlmoos is survived by his parents, Karen and Larry Koehlmoos, and grand-parents, Herman and Mary Anne Oetken and Verona Koehlmoos, also of Nebraska.

The family asks that you thank a soldier for your freedom and in lieu of flowers, any memorial contributions can be made to the COL Randall L. Koehlmoos ROTC Fund at the University of Nebraska.
Jeremi Suri is a Professor of History and Director of the Grand Strategy Program at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. His latest book is a cerebral biography of the Henry Kissinger, the only American to occupy the position of Secretary of State, and National Security Advisor to the President simultaneously during the Nixon Administration. The story of Henry Kissinger is one shaped by his childhood in southern Germany, the rise of anti-Semitism, and the escape from a poor immigrant background by sheer intellect in New World. I enjoyed Suri’s books, as I empathized with the many advantages the United States has provided me in my own career thus far. Suri takes us to a childhood in which his father Louis Kissinger would lose his job as a teacher due to anti-Semitic laws being passed, upon arrival in America, Henry would work as a brush cleaner, and he and his brother Walter would get their first experience in the US Army. Henry would begin to find his promise in government beginning with the Army, aside from a wider world, he would return to Germany in World War II, and as a Non-Commissioned Officer would oversee the running of a German town, balancing the needs of a civilian population with the U.S. Army troops engaging in questionable behavior against German civilians. The pre-cursor to the CIA, the OSS, would draft German-speaking American Jews for service in occupied Germany. The idea was they were fluent in German while at the same time their loyalty was determined to be sound as the Nazi’s were virulently anti-Semitic.

Using the GI Bill, the face of America’s University’s would change, and Kissinger would pursue a PhD in Political Science from Harvard. This would force gradual changes in Harvard’s composition, makeup, and traditions. What is fascinating is the amazing foresight of using America’s colleges as a laboratory for theoretical policies in an academic-government partnership. Kissinger would be the driving force for a series of highly popular international seminars, inviting the best and brightest to the United States for debate, discussion, and exposure to ideas. Many of those invited would be leaders in their own countries.

The book contains many insights on Kissinger’s ideas on containment of the Soviet Union, and his first book was avidly read in policy circles and entitled, “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” This book was read by no less than President Eisenhower. The central thesis of Kissinger’s policy approach was probing limits to American power, from there his ideas of détente with the Soviet Union and China, was an attempt to leverage great powers to manage a myriad of small crises around the globe. Suri’s work delves intellectually on Kissinger’s policy formulation during the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the controversial rollback of communist influence in Latin America. In particular, I enjoyed the last paragraph of the book in which Suri writes, “From Germany to Jerusalem, Kissinger offered policymakers in multiple societies imperfect but practical options for dealing with a troubled world.” This is a profound sentence that reflects the realism of international security affairs. This is an excellent read for those interested in America’s national security decision-making.

About the Reviewer ... CDR Aboul-Enein is the author of “Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat,” (Naval Institute Press, 2010) and currently serves as Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at NDU’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Before we get to the last part, the front end sets the stage and gives an excellent thumbnail history of a conflict that many would like to pretend has not been happening. The Turks, The Crusades, and the Ottoman Empire are there and wrapped into a quick, understandable synopsis that is both informative and essential for understanding what follows. His assessments are astute and insightful and he deals with each topic in a frank and refreshingly no-nonsense way. He is a master communicator and doesn’t mince words; like his GPS approach to strategy – “The first thing you need to understand about the historical moment is where you are.” That plain and clear speech runs throughout the book – “Wars are won by officers who know the smell of the streets, not by those who swoon over the odor of political science texts.”

Ralph Peters is not afraid to speak his mind on the issues surrounding today’s military as it tackles a conflict that does not seem to go away. You may not agree with him but you cannot ignore him. You owe it to yourself to read this one – or read it again. We are not yet done in Afghanistan and Iraq and we cannot afford to keep the flawed assumptions and planning that got us to this point. Time to re-examine them and this is a good place to start.

He even manages to suppress his natural inclination to bash airpower. As an airman I only found myself flinching a couple of times.

About the Reviewer …
Dr. Albert “Bull” Mitchum is the Political Advisor and Director of International Affairs for the USAF Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, VA. He is a retired USAF Officer with extensive “boots on the ground” time throughout Latin America, Europe, Africa and South West Asia. Besides his background in small unit operations he served in positions as political advisor to the Commander United States Air Force in Europe and to the Commander of NATO’s Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.
Book Review
Inside a US Embassy—Diplomacy at Work
Reviewed by: Steve Ferguson, COL, US Army (Retired)

Styling itself “The Essential Guide to the Foreign Service” this updated edition (including two new sections) is an excellent compendium of experiences and perspectives that meets its three key objectives. It does an effective job of informing the general reading public on the organization, activities and contributions of US Embassies overseas. The book also provides an unvarnished look at the officers, staff and families who make up the Foreign Service and the nature of family and professional life representing the US overseas. Finally, a new section has been added that provides basic guidance on applying for appointment as a Foreign Service Officer.

The Editor has done a remarkable job of collecting and collating short articles addressing the main subject headings discussed below from over 70 contributors ranging from Ambassadors to Locally Employed Staff. Over 45 of the mini-chapter authors were posted across the globe (every continent except Antarctica) and the rest appear to have been directly engaged in the activities they write about. There was a uniform. This first-hand approach to the subject endows the book with great credibility and demonstrates an honesty that is both commendable and compelling.

Profiles: Discusses functions, responsibilities and authorities of staff in nearly every State Department sponsored position in the embassy environment. The authors (all incumbents at the writing) also discuss briefly the challenges they face in the position they occupy and conclude with a brief biographical sketch.

Foreign Service Work & Life: Opens with a brief discussion of Country Team and its internal and external relationships. This portion also includes the roles and relationships of Foreign Service National (now officially Locally Engaged Staff). Finally, FSOs and spouses “on the job” contribute to this section with articles on language training, professional development and opportunities for Fellowships and “details” to other agencies. The new FAO spouse will find the 20 pages on family life in the Foreign Service both interesting and useful in understanding his or her counterpart.

A Day in the life: Excellent insights are gained from of junior and mid-range officers across the globe describing the diverse, often surprising, and always essential activities undertaken on a typical day. It reinforces the previous sections in the book by illustrating how FSO/FSS employees from Regional Security Officer to Ambassador meet the responsibilities and discharge the functions of their office in a variety of locations.

Tales from the Field: Provides a look at some of the not so typical situations, often sensitive and too often dangerous, faced by Foreign Service Officers in the field. The section is realistic and contains sixteen articles that address the real threats of evacuation, terrorism, natural disaster, and political violence—all written by personnel who were there.

So You Want to Join the Foreign Service? This section explains the process, philosophy, standards and considerations for applying to the State Department’s Generalist (Foreign Service Officer,-FSO) and, Specialist (Foreign Service Specialist, FSS) positions. It is straight forward, unvarnished and very easy to follow. A must read for anyone or any dependent interested in competing for a State Department career.

The book also contains four excellent appendices: Acronyms and Abbreviations common
in the State Department; a list of Foreign Affairs Online Resources; an excellent list of Selected Readings and recommended Study Resources for the FSO Test.

The only weakness in the book is in the introductory section which contains an excellent chart on US Presence in the World in 2011; however, a following map of Department of State Locations is dated 2006 and is inconsistent with the information in the first chart. A third illustration displays “Foreign Affairs Agencies inside US Embassies” and mentions 20 Federal Agencies or organizations that have a presence in embassies somewhere in the world. Unfortunately, there are probably less than five or six pages of discussion elsewhere in the book on those 20 “non-State” sponsored agencies (including Defense, Homeland Security, FBI, Peace Corps and others). Given the Editor’s stated purpose these omissions are understandable but they also highlight the need for a companion volume that, to the same degree, addresses those other important components of the US diplomatic effort.

If this book is not now issued to new FAO/RAS it should be, it is a quick and easy read worth the three or four hour investment. I would urge each newly identified FAO/RAS to add this book to his or her library as a reference and that the read it again if assigned to duty at an Embassy, in the Department of State or on the OSD staff in a position requiring an understanding of Embassy or State Department operations. The job descriptions and the Foreign Service perspectives provide significant insight into the State Department culture that is critical to effective integration into the Country Team. I would also commend it as an excellent review and reference for experienced FAOs who have been away from the Embassy environment for a while.

About the Reviewer …
Colonel Ferguson’s 40 year career included 25 years as a Foreign Area Officer and nearly 20 years in Africa where he operated in (or from) 27 Embassies. He has a Masters in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Bachelor of Science in History from SUNY. He is a President Emeritus and current member of the Board of Governors of the FAOA and a member of the Infantry OCS and Defense Attaché System Halls of Fame.

Coming Soon …
International Affairs Service School Writing Awards

In order to encourage investigation, analysis and authorship of foreign policy related topics, your FAOA is currently working with various senior staff schools, and senior military education instauration to sponsor FAOA International Affairs (IA) writing awards at various PME levels.

Our concept is to encourage IA related authorship and tailor award candidate products for potential journal publication. We also plan to expand content on FAOA.org by posting finalist products, thesis and such on our website.

The details are still developing, but look for FAOA news soon.

Coyt, Editor
The Army FAO proponent office conducted a systematic review of the Army’s FAO program from January to August 2011 with the results being released in September 2011. Since release of the report, the FAO proponent has received and fielded many great comments and questions regarding the changes taking place within our program that has generated some great discussion in our community.

As part of continuing that discussion and providing feedback on the comments and questions, the proponent office would like to provide more information to the community and hopefully stimulate even more discussion about our program. In the first article of this series, we would like to address some of the questions regarding the proposed modifications to the initial FAO training formally called ICT, now called In Region Training or IRT.

As some of the comments we received came in the form of questions, for this article I am going to use a Q&A format. If you have questions or comments regarding the article, I highly encourage you to join the discussion by adding your comments to the AKO FAO Bulletin Board or the FAO discussion Forum on FAOWeb or by contacting any of the FAO proponent officers (see POC information here in the FAO journal). It’s our community - participate. Enjoy!

**Question 1:**
What is FAO In Region Training and what is its purpose?

a. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) have five phases of training to complete prior to becoming a fully qualified Army FAO. They are: FAO Orientation Course (1 week), Language training (6-16 months depending on language), Advanced Civil Schooling (12-18 months), In Region Training (IRT) (12-16 months) and Army Intermediate Learning Education (3 months).

b. FAO IRT is typically a 12 month in-resident experience in a country within a FAOs assigned region in which the FAO ‘interns’ with the Security Cooperation Office and Defense Attaché Office, attends a host nation military course, works within a host nation school/institution as an instructor or advisor, and conducts extensive travel within his/her region to familiarize self with entire region.

c. The purpose of FAO IRT is to develop in-depth knowledge of the region, provide advanced language development opportunities and develop firm understanding of the functions and duties of a FAO through a program of travel, research, self-study and “on the job” (OJT) experiences. In addition, through OJT, the FAO trainee is able to see and execute US security cooperation objectives within their region that will greatly enhance their ability to perform their key tasks once a fully qualified FAO. While in IRT, a FAO has six competencies he/she is to develop:

- Regional Experience and Knowledge
- US Policy Goals and Formulation
- Language
- Mil to Mil Experience
- US Military Involvement in the region
- Embassy Administration and Offices

**Question 2:**
What is really changing about the FAO regional training?

Currently some FAOs attend host nation courses that are anywhere between a few weeks to a year long. These courses typically are at the senior CPT and MAJ staff level. The proposed changes
would affect some/most of those courses that are longer than 4 months in duration, modifying them so that the FAO trainee is provided the opportunity to develop all 6 competencies during their 12 months in country.

Question 3:
Why are you making these changes?

Army FAOs play a pivotal role in security cooperation for the Army and the joint force. With increased importance by the Army and the DoD on security cooperation, it became evident during a recent review of the FAO program that officers who attend these long courses are not able to focus on all competencies which is critical in understanding the larger security cooperation effort and the part a FAO plays in that effort. Host nation schools can still play a large part in the development of a new FAO, but should not be the sole experience a FAO receives during this training.

Question 4:
Why are you making these changes now?

These are not changes that can be made overnight. As a matter of fact, we anticipate needing up to three years to do this correctly. We also recognize that officers attending these schools play a part in the security cooperation engagement plan for the US efforts in that nation and as such, the country team will require time to be able to transition our officers out of the course as well as seek to include the course in the Army’s “School of other Nations” (SON) program so that the Army can continue to engage with that nation through school attendance.

Question 5:
Are you going to eliminate all attendance at foreign schools?

No. The FAO proponent office fully recognizes that every region is different and as such will work with every country individually to examine the developmental opportunities that can be afforded the FAO trainee and then develop a program that will best develop the Army FAO for his/her region. In some cases, FAOs will continue to attend Host Nation staff colleges if that provides the best developmental opportunity.

In addition, it should be pointed out that this is only impacting FAO initial training, not Army attendance at foreign PME through the SON program. In fact, it is likely that some of these courses that FAOs currently attend will transition to the Army SON program due to their importance for the Army in our engagement programs with that host nation. This will provide more general purpose force officers opportunities for broadening assignments.

Question 6:
What is the real impact to the training?

Of the approximately 75-80 officers we have conducting IRT, there are up to 20 that could attend a long course that may be affected by this change.

Question 7:
Will this impact foreign PME courses – CGSC and SSC?

This change will in no way affect whether FAOs can attend a foreign SSC as part of the SON program. In addition, this program will not affect the Army’s SON program at the CSC level either. These are very vibrant programs that are only likely to continue growing in the future as they are a key element to our Army’s engagement. However, we do recognize that FAO trainee attendance at CSC level SON courses is likely to drop as we shift away from attendance in long duration host nation schools.

Question 8:
Will this change affect funding or other resources?

The FAO training program may realize a small gain in training time saved for officers who may have attended one of those courses, as they were typically allowed a 15-16 month IRT experience which won’t be necessary with the change. There will not however be any additional costs to the program due to the change.

Quotable Quote …

“All growth depends on activity. There is no development physically or intellectually without effort, and effort means work.”

Calvin Coolidge

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org
Question 9:
The new policy seems to indicate that FAO training in foreign countries will be limited to foreign courses of 4 months or less, removing the opportunity to attend Foreign Staff and Senior Service Colleges. For many, these courses have been the pinnacle of their preparation for service as senior FAOs. How do you counter that view?

The FAO initial training program is in no way limiting officers to one format of training. There is no 'cookie cutter' method for training our FAOs. As a matter of fact, the FAO proponent office has made flexibility in program development a key aspect of its IRT program, allowing the senior FAOs on the ground to have the most input into the development of the FAO trainee’s program development. In addition, regional differences have an impact on what a particular program looks like. Thus, you may find an officer in one country that attends a host nation course for up to 4 months and then spends the balance of his/her 12 months developing the other competencies/objectives, while in another country you may have an officer who doesn’t attend any host nation schooling but rather conducts ‘internships’ in the security cooperation office and defense attaché office. In addition, these changes will in no way prohibit our senior FAOs from attending foreign senior service schools.

Question 10:
I thought this phase of training was called In-Country-Training (or ICT) but it now it seems to be called In-Region-Training (or IRT). How should we now correctly refer to this portion of FAO training?

The training is now called In-Region-Training or IRT. No major structural change ‘happened’ to cause this name change, we just thought it sounded better…"IRT", ok, just kidding. The change to IRT is really to place more emphasis on the regional aspect of the training vice country. Believe it or not, we still have some commands and even some FAOs who think they are a country FAO because they speak that language or went to what was then called “ICT” in that country. For example, “I am a Korean FAO…, no, you are a 48H”. There couldn’t be anything further from the truth and this is one small way we are placing more emphasis on the regional aspect of being a FAO.

Voice Your Views

The Journal strives to publish a variety of opinions, views, observations and analysis from tactical to strategic. We encourage you to express your voice by submitting articles, book reviews and Op-Ed pieces. Letters to the editor with both opposing and supporting the views of those expressed in published articles are encouraged. Submit your writings by either going to your association’s website at www.FAOA.org website, or via email editor@faoa.org

Quotable Quote …

“There are no great limits to growth because there are no limits to human intelligence, imagination, and wonder.”

Ronald Reagan

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org
Fact Sheet
The Joint FAO Skill Sustainment Pilot Program

What:
The Joint Foreign Area Officer Skill Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP) is an advanced education and skill sustainment initiative for Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) across the Armed Services. The JFSSPP provides two types of education: in-residence courses and distance learning. The in-residence courses bring a select number of seasoned FAOs to Monterey for advanced seminars on security policy and international politics taught by NPS faculty and senior practitioners; customized language training is provided by expert Defense Language Institute (DLI) instructors. The NPS itinerary is followed by a program overseas that focuses specifically on regional security affairs. The distance learning elements are delivered online via FAOweb, an internet portal available to FAOs worldwide that provides self-paced, job-relevant education modules as well as customized DLI language resources. FAOweb also serves as a professional community hub fostering FAO professionalization and interaction within and between the Armed Services.

Why:
Recognizing specialized knowledge of regional affairs and foreign language ability as mission critical skills, the JFSSPP fulfills a Department of Defense mandate to provide resources and opportunities for FAO skill sustainment and professional education.

Who:
As experts in the politics and culture of their assigned country and region, FAOs are highly skilled officers who provide critical guidance in the formulation and execution of defense operations worldwide.

Where:
The JFSSPP is based in the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. It is sponsored by the Defense Language Office (DLO) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).

When:
The first in-residence course was conducted for Eurasia FAOs in September 2009; courses in 2010 include Latin America (February/March), Asia (June/July), Africa/Near East (August), and the second Eurasia course (September). The distance-learning portal FAOweb (http://fao.nps.edu) opened in February 2010.

Contact:
Dr. Tristan James Mabry,
Executive Director

Quotable Quote …
“The best example of the difference between being committed and involved is a good American breakfast of bacon and eggs. To make the breakfast, the chicken was involved but the pig … the pig was committed.”
Dr. Grant Ethridge
Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org
Quotable Quote …

“Real leadership is not making your own decisions. Real leadership is owning your decisions, once they’re made.”
Dr. Andy Stanley

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org

Quotable Quote …

“A blog is merely graffiti with punctuation.”
From the movie Contagion

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org

Quotable Quote …

“You never want to be the slowest antelope in the herd.”
A staff officer … anon

Submit your favorite quotes to editor@FAOA.org
THIS IS HOW

America will always be the land of the free. Because it is the home of the brave men and women of our military forces. We thank them – each and every one – for their service and sacrifice.

lockheedmartin.com/how
General Clapper, DNI
Confirmed as Banquet Guest Speaker

Gen Clapper, the DNI, has confirmed with FAOA that he will both attend and make remarks as the keynote speaker for our next Annual FAOA Black Tie Banquet

19 April 2012

Save the date and register online.
FAOA is seeking volunteers to serve on the banquet committee. To volunteer, contact the association’s secretary at: Secretary@FAOA.org

Register for the banquet and get planning updates online at:
www.FAOA.org