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Remembering MG Greene | Multilateral Policy in the Middle East | An Army FAO’s first 100 hours in the D.R.C. Understanding U.S.-Turkey Mil-to-Mil Relations Qatar’s Role in the Central African Crisis | FAQs & Cyber Implications of Chinese Influence in Latin America | The Economics of Nation Building + More
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LETTER from the EDITOR

Remembering MG Greene

On August 5th we lost Major General Harold Greene, deputy commander of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, to an insider attack by an Afghan soldier at Camp Qargha’s Marshal Fahim National Defense University in Kabul, Afghanistan. MG Greene is the highest-ranking American officer killed by a hostile act since the September 11th attacks and the most senior officer to die in an overseas combat zone since the Vietnam War. Known by his peers and subordinates for his amazing intellect and humility, Greene had also served as commanding general of Natick Soldier Systems Center where he made his mark by urging the military to incorporate smartphones, video games and virtual worlds into military training. Later, he would become Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology).

Greene is survived by his wife, Sue Myers, a doctor and retired colonel who worked as a professor at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. She currently lives in Falls Church, Virginia. The Greenes have two children, Amelia and Matthew. Matthew is a U.S. Army lieutenant. FAOA mourns the loss of this great man. We extend our deepest sympathies to Sue, Amelia, and Matthew, and we will remember MG Greene as we continue in the valuable mission of building trust through security cooperation.
In light of recent events in the Ukraine, we invited active and retired FAOs to share timely insights as letters to the Editor.

The international community continues to express outrage over Russia’s involvement in the downing of a Malaysian civilian airliner over eastern Ukraine on July 17. Laying the blame squarely on Russian President Putin, on July 21 President Obama said that Moscow’s continued backing of the separatists “will only cause Russia to further isolate itself.” On July 27, the top human rights official for the United Nations suggested that the tragedy, which she called a “violation of international law”, could amount to a war crime. Given this condemnation from around the world, what does Putin expect to gain from continuing to arm and supply Ukraine’s separatist forces? What we need to consider is that rather than face isolation, the tragedy in Ukraine puts Russia exactly where Putin wants it to be: back in the center of the world’s attention.

As despicable and as cynical as this appears, Putin has used the death of 298 innocent civilians, and the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine more broadly, to demonstrate that Russia continues to be a force to be reckoned with. Since first becoming president of Russia 14 years ago, Putin has sought to restore what he sees as Russia’s rightful place in the world: a Great Power able to pursue its own national interests as an independent actor regardless of what policymakers in Washington or anywhere else might think.

“Since first becoming president of Russia 14 years ago, Putin has sought to restore what he sees as Russia’s rightful place in the world: a Great Power able to pursue its own national interests as an independent actor regardless of what policymakers in Washington or anywhere else might think.”

- COL Gary Espinas, USA, Ret.

Russia sits as a permanent member; and U.S. support for the so-called “color revolutions” in Russia’s backyard.

To redress these perceived slights and restore Russian prestige, Putin has resorted to ugly measures if necessary, as demonstrated by the arming and equipping of separatists in eastern Ukraine that led to the tragedy of MH17. Unfortunately, Putin has already compiled a track record of brutal tactics to assert Russia’s national interests and an independent role, despite opposition from most of the world. This includes Russia’s invasion and subsequent occupation of Georgia in August 2008, Moscow’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria, which includes providing weapons that end up killing innocent civilians, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March of this year. Despite these actions, Putin has shown that he can successfully weather international condemnation while shoring up considerable domestic support at home in the pursuit of his goals. While economic sanctions are often threatened to address Moscow’s behavior, it is difficult to build a unified front when several of Russia’s critics are also its biggest trading partners. With the tragedy in Ukraine, we can expect that Putin will again be able to outlast the furor.

So as the international community continues to express outrage over Russia’s culpability in the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, Putin offers another ugly reminder that he will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia remains a force to be reckoned with. What Putin does next remains to be seen, but unless we counter his moves with stronger measures, we can expect that Putin will continue to follow one of Lenin’s most famous dictums: “Probe with a bayonet. If you meet steel, stop. If you meet mush, shove harder.”

Author: COL Gary Espinas (U.S. Army, Retired) served as President of the Foreign Area Officer Association from 2009 to 2011. He is a Russia and Eurasia Foreign Area Officer, and from 2011 to 2013 served as Military Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he taught a course on Russia’s foreign policy.

Predict and prevent conflict through agreement. There has been a thorough lack of communication on both sides. We guarantee Russia’s unfettered access to their vital interests in Ukraine and they guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty. It is interesting to note that Pu-
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: Ukraine

Pretin’s argument against US intervention in Syria focused on preserving Syria’s right to sovereignty - the same argument used in Russia’s actions against separatists in Chechnya, Daghestan, and Ossetia. It is difficult to determine one single consideration. Against the background of the undue and blatant influence of the Russian Federation, there are such factors as the placid and flaccid response from the West, the East-West divide in Ukraine, Russian Federation strategic interests, the Western mistrust of both sides, the lack of a formal US alliance with Ukraine, the West turning a blind eye to the annexation of Crimea, the unwillingness and/or inability to achieve NATO consensus, the competing economic interests of the Netherlands, England, Germany, and France, the fact that some separatist/aka terrorist leaders are native Muscovites and/or mercenaries/ aka thugs from the Russian Federation, Poland, Georgia, and elsewhere. Who is funding the separatist/terrorist movement? Did poor coal miners from Donbass really wake up one morning to find uniforms, paychecks, supplies, heavy weapons, and ammunition in their backyards? Maybe we give too much credit to Putin. Maybe he is subject to oligarchical lobbyists. Where does the money really come from?

On another note, I recently traveled through west and east Latvia; from Riga through Daugavpils to Saint Petersburg. There is a similar east-west divide in Latvia. A generally Western-leaning and tolerant population resides in Riga. I was just as well off speaking English as Russian, especially among the younger generation. The primary spoken language is Latvian. The city was filled with tourists from Scandinavia and Germany. In relatively stark contrast, Russian was the common language/Lingua franca in Daugavpils, close to the border with the Russian Federation and not far from Pskov, where a major Russian Airborne base was/is still located. I had served with Russian officers in Bosnia who were stationed in Pskov. They all dreamed of retiring to the Baltics to escape the poverty of Russia. Yarmula in western Latvia was once considered a prime vacation spot during Soviet times and remains so today among the Russian elite, not unlike portions of the Crimea. Property values soar into the USD and EURO millions. I had the occasion to meet a retired Soviet/Russian PVO/Air Defense colonel in Daugavpils. He took me on a tour of his former Soviet training base/military academy; a now run-down fortress built during the Napoleonic Era. He remarked that perhaps 40,000 retired Soviet/Russian military now reside throughout eastern Latvia, the majority of whom just want to go fishing. I asked him point-blank about the ongoing events in Ukraine and what if a similar situation were to arise in Latvia. He laughed. He compared the strategic interests that the Russian Federation holds in Ukraine to those that could possibly be held in Latvia, a bona fide member of NATO; possibly the Port of Riga, which is under strict Western/European control. Eastern Latvia is full of dairy cows, lakes, and forests; much like northern Wisconsin and Minnesota. It’s not worth Russia’s while.”

Author: Robert Protosevich, LTC (Retired FAO)

The new era of proxy wars has begun. Instead of funding separate groups or armies to fight battles the new methodology is to utilize government trained forces, remove identifying insignia, and deny ownership or influence over their activities. Russia seized Crimea with Russian-based army forces and the world went along with it because of the thinnest deniability that Russia maintained.

Author: Andrew Zapf, Major, Command & General Staff College (Active FAO)

There is only one nation capable of leading a successful effort to reshape Russia’s sphere of interest and influence. Only one nation with the resources (diplomatic, economic and military) to thwart President Putin’s Iron Curtain 2.0 quest for the next Russian Empire. We have worked diligently for decades to find common ground, and when found, it has often only been quicksand or permafrost. Neither of which sustains building solid relationships with genuine confidence building measures. Exceptions noted, few as they are, including arguably, Cooperative Threat Reduction non-proliferation efforts. The time for the U.S. to send Russia a clear and present message is overdue. Russia is a bully, trampling economic and political opportunity in an emerging region. Continue the diplomatic effort, it’s how we conduct foreign policy; continue the economic sanctions - their impact is evident and reacted to daily in Moscow; and continue to build confidence, capacity and capability in NATO forces. A partnership which has helped shape freedom around the world for 65 years. Russia will not rationally go to war with a US-NATO coalition, albeit Russia is not always a rational actor, but it will continue to bully the near abroad if unchecked. Send the message now - clearly and decisively. Shape the Europe we want our grandchildren to Partner with, not the Europe that Russia is tearing apart.

Author: Rick Greene, COL(R) US Embassy Moscow 2000-2006, US Army Retired (Former FAO, Russia/Eurasia)

TO SUBMIT A LETTER TO THE EDITOR, SIMPLY EMAIL EDITOR@FAOA.ORG WITH YOUR PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON FAO RELATED ISSUES
The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) was privileged to host the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John O. Brennan, at the Fort Myer Officer Club on March 13, 2014. Over 200 FAO members and supporters participated including active and retired military officers, government and private sector civilians, academia, and foreign partner defense attaché offices.

FAOA President, Kurt M. Marisa, Colonel USAF (Ret.) provided welcome remarks and then introduced the opening speaker, Mr. William “Bill” Clark, Chief of the Defense Attaché Service (DAS). Bill highlighted several important functions of the Defense Attachés (DATT), many of whom are FAOs, around the world including their diplomatic skills, ability to forge bilateral partner relationships to support security cooperation, and function as advisors to the embassy Country Teams led by the U.S. Ambassadors.

Bill was pleased to announce that in September, the DAS will place its 140th Defense Attaché Office (DAO) position in Afghanistan – up from 100 DAOs in recent years. He also emphasized that the number of General Officer (GO) DATT positions has increased to 10, highlighting posts in Israel and India.

Bill concluded with a brief overview of the new Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs) standing up at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He encouraged much more integration and investment in collector/analyst initiatives, which he stated leads to, “teaming without seams – that generates faster and better results.”

As a transition to Director Brennan’s keynote presentation, FAOs were highlighted as national treasures and the DAS needs more of them.

Director Brennan began his remarks by mentioning the high regard and appreciation he has for Foreign Area Officers and military attachés as the key reason he insisted on supporting this event. He then referred to one of his CIA predecessors and former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who advocated for more fusion and integration at all levels between the CIA and DoD – tactical to strategic. Collaboration, and sharing and leveraging of all resources, is a "force multiplier" that is especially needed in the face of more diverse and complex threats than ever before. Mr. Brennan used the example of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) stating, “contrary to what you see in the press reports, the DCS is complementary to our activities and needs at CIA.”

Mr. Brennan said that those select and few DoD HUMINT assets continue to produce high level information and reporting critical to national security. He emphasized that this will be even more important in future years as budget constraints will require tough choices. Particularly since the U.S. faces such a diverse group of threats in a post-9/11 world, it is absolutely imperative that the Intelligence Community become even more efficient and reduce redundancies.

Some of these missions are not new, including Mr. Brennan’s belief that the war on terrorism will not end after a drawdown in Afghanistan. He highlighted the importance of DoD contributions to this continued fight. In addition to counterterrorism, which was Director Brennan’s portfolio at the White House before he became CIA Director, he highlighted cyber and how the “digital domain” has become a new venue for criminal networks.

Director Brennan also discussed “hotspots” in the world including Syria, which he stated, “has been unlike any other conflict in his career,” highlighting the multiple dynamics ranging from high level state actor issues to WMD proliferation and terrorist network insurgencies leading to the most complex situation for decision making and action.

Director Brennan also highlighted the high value of the Defense Attaché Service to the intelligence and foreign policy communities, highlighting the complimentary and value of the DAS and the unique access and insights gained by these diplomats in uniform. He concluded his remarks by acknowledging all of the men and women serving at the CIA and he stated, “leading CIA
Introduction

Moving into a new century, the United States must reassess its role in the world. Traditionally a reluctant power, the United States clearly stepped into the void created by the fall of the traditional great powers in the 20th century, and has shouldered the lion’s share of exporting security and maintaining stability around the world. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the Middle East. Due to the new fiscal realities facing the United States, as well as the rise of other states with global power and regional influence, unilateral approaches to the security challenges of the Middle East are no longer desirable. Coupled with an announced strategic pivot to Asia, as outlined in the latest National Security Strategy, allocation of resources for the region will be considerably less than in previous decades. However, the Middle East’s significance to stability for Europe and western interests, including energy reserves, ensures that the region will remain quite relevant for decades to come. With those factors in mind, the United States must implement a paradigm shift for its future role in the Middle East.

Much has been said for the United States’ role in the region. Whereas some consider the unilateral history of U.S. action to be ill-timed and planned, most serious scholars and military leaders will agree that the wider Middle East and the Persian Gulf still hold a significant importance to regional stability and the region remains a critical area of concern for future conflict.

As the United States contemplates its new fiscal reality, Europe and its traditional powers are also facing similar constraints, desires, and state nationalism. Europe itself is undergoing a metamorphosis of sorts that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War and European Union expansion. The United Kingdom is soon to face the proposed idea of leaving the European Union, deciding rather to resume the loftiness that distanced Britain during the early days of European unification. France has been aggressively seeking opportunities to exercise its foreign policy power outside its own borders. No longer exclusively interested in influencing European politics, France has shown itself a leader in the military operations to oust Qaddafi from Libya, as well as in conduct of counter insurgency operations in northern Mali against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militants.

Germany, the economic leader of the EU, has been relatively absent from Middle East politics, but there has been a recent groundswell of pressure for Germany to involve itself in the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as well as a desire for the German military to take on a larger international role. The European environment and the disposition of these three traditional powers are an integral part of the policies that are argued within this paper.

In addition to this current state of European affairs, Britain, France and Germany maintain considerable clout in the Persian Gulf in terms of respective sales of military equipment. In many ways, the United States, Britain, and France maintain a healthy, if not predatory competitive ness, in the pursuit of these lucrative defense contracts with the wealthy sheikdoms that line the Gulf. Although Germany is new to the game, it has had similar success, and all indicators suggest that it will continue to strengthen its position in these terms. It is in this pursuit, and the attractiveness of further defense export expansion, that will incentivize these European powers to establish a larger presence in the region. This expansion should be leveraged by the United States, not feared.

This paper will be based on four critical assumptions. First, United States will attempt to shape the recession of its long-established power, mitigating the pitfalls of an overextended nation in the international arena, and slowly develop a burden-sharing security network in the Middle East. In contrast, the traditional European powers will seek to flex their respective power outside the confines of an weakening European Union. After many years of disruptive combat, for the time being traditional nation-state war in the region will be highly unlikely, except for potential intervention in Iran. Finally, U.S. economic interests in the region will remain as they are at

“Since 1971 we have seen three major wars and the downfall of two regimes, the tottering of others, and the reassertion of authority by outside powers, ...The genie of insecurity is out of the bottle in the Gulf. Can it be put back or is that an impossible task?”

Saul Kelley
present day.

The purpose of this paper will be to express the need for the United States to engage its traditional European allies in a more developed security cooperation framework in the Middle East, specifically the Persian Gulf region. This reality, coupled with a desire of traditional European powers to play a larger role in seeking their own ends, will incentivize both the U.S. and its allies to cooperate.

Understanding the New International Environment

If the tenets of realism are to be applied, the United States is in the process of being balanced, even ever so slightly, by other states. Despite the United States’ preponderance of power since the end of the Cold War, the international system by its nature will balance against the strongest actor, regardless of lineage. Although many scholars conclude that the uniqueness of American power exempts it from this force, others argue that this is simply not the case.

In America Unrivaled, Kenneth Waltz, the great structural realist, suggests that the unipolar moment that the United States is now enjoying will eventually end due to the balance-of-power by other states. He argues that unipolar order is the least stable type of order within the international system, and thus is unsustainable. Waltz suggests that over time, the United States will eventually overextend itself in the use of its hegemonic power, which will erode the state itself due to various domestic pressures as a result. A contributor to the same book, Charles Kupchan, submits that the United States’ ability to act as the unipolar hegemon relies solely on the American people’s desire to remain involved internationally, thus identifying an Achilles heel to the continued unipolar environment. He also argues that in the coming decades, Americans will become less concerned about international politics and more focused on domestic issues, forcing the United States to recede from its current role as international security guarantor.

While the post-9/11 United States has been faced with this systematic change of the unipolar moment, the past few years in Europe have been characterized by an identity crisis of its member states. With governments in economic duress on the back-end of the 2008 global financial crisis, the traditional European powers have struggled to chart a clear path toward the future. As Britain contemplates a decision to leave the EU, the other traditional powers of France and Germany have to be concerned with the longevity of the entire European enterprise. With states deciding on the utility to leave the institution, while other states like Cyprus and Greece face insolvency, the traditional European Powers are facing an attack on their ontological security and the peace of mind of self-identity as belonging to the wider European community.

At the same time, France has shown a significant desire and capacity to play a larger role in global affairs, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Not only did France lead the effort to oust Qadaffi during the 2011 campaign and its conduct of operations in Mali to disrupt AQIM elements, it has also maintained a public position on the Syrian conflict, spearheading dialogue and encouraging international involvement.

Germany finds itself under growing pressure to play a larger role in the Middle East as well. Suggestions have been made by the international community for Germany to take on a larger role in reigniting the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Coupled with this pressure, there has been some rhetoric from the German defense establishment suggesting that German forces should play a larger role on the international stage as well, despite the ever-present fears in Europe of a return of German military aggression. What does this mean for a wider multilateral policy for the Middle East?

Despite the success of the NATO-led Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya in 2011, major NATO partners have grown disillusioned in the utility of its future, thus adding to the existing European question. NATO enacted its charter for the first time in order to support U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan in 2001. After thirteen long years of war, the major European powers could be in a position to reevaluate the nature of future NATO operations that could be linked to overwhelming U.S. stewardship. Fearing losing further prestige and freedom of action, many European powers are aggressively adopting new policies that demonstrate their national power. The first step to crafting and implementing a new multilateral approach to Gulf security is for the U.S. to come to grips with the notion that the nature and enormity of American power is decreasing. This is not a bad thing, however this continues to be a political hot potato for many reasons, as evidenced by the strong backlash of President Obama’s use of the phrase “leading from behind” in reference to the Libya operation. Upon acknowledgment, there exists today a great opportunity for the United States to engage its traditional allies of Britain, France, and Germany to carry more of the load in providing Gulf security. As explained previously, these European powers have advocated and enacted many new policies of foreign engagement. Why not the Middle East?

Following the relative success of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, the notion of subordinating traditional U.S. security roles and capabilities has caught on. With the aforementioned Asian pivot, some have suggested that the U.S. should adopt a “leading from behind” approach to East Asia. Jeong Lee writes, “The United States has a vital role to play in the region as a stabilizing force, but America’s new pivot strategy must reflect geopolitical realities. The United States should focus on ‘leading from behind’ by prioritizing cooperation with other regional powers and by exercising leadership in a more indirect manner.” Again we must ask, why not the Middle East?
Assembling a Good Team

The U.S. has established the security framework for the Persian Gulf region, through its strategic basing agreements throughout the Gulf, and its strong regional partnerships. Since the days of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the aborted attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran in 1980, the United States has been adept at securing base access agreements in the region. In 1980, it was the Omanis, the old British ally, which quietly opened its airfield at Masireh Island, which supported the initial launch of combat aircraft en route to Iran. In a future cooperative framework, European forces can simply fall-in on this existing structure, reducing costs for cooperation, while the U.S. provides the necessary leadership to orchestrate such a multilateral footprint. The bottom line is that neither France, Britain, nor Germany has the ability to solely upset the balance of power in the region; therefore American military power will still remain dominant, but applied on a more streamlined basis. This should not worry policymakers and the American public, as the seamless introduction of a stronger allied presence will encourage our regional partners in the Gulf to act more multilaterally as well, and discourage their preference of bilateral engagement which has defined previous decades.

When it comes to assembling a good team, the United States should rely upon these traditional European powers. The fact remains that the United States must create a security regime that it can trust, relatively speaking. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany present the most viable option. The incentives for the European powers to cooperate are many. Primarily, involvement by these powers would create greater leverage in the region and boost international prestige. Additionally, each of the four states mentioned needs to cooperate in order to stabilize global oil prices, thus benefiting all. Finally, as the West and Israel continue to confront Iran, involvement in the region will both increase the cost of war for Iran, while simultaneously giving these new players a seat at the negotiating table beyond that of the UN Security Council. In addition to a nuclear Iran threatening the region and potentially causing the escalation to war, Europe must acknowledge the growing influence of Middle East unrest. All three states have had domestic issues with a growing domestic Muslim counter-culture, which has attempted to subvert the status quo within Europe and undermine their secular societies.

I argue that the strategic basing arrangement that the United States has established in the Gulf over the past 40 years, with the forward presence of each respective Department of Defense agency. The Army is in Kuwait, the Navy is in Bahrain, the Air Force is in Qatar, and the USMC is in the UAE. Thus the U.S. can easily accommodate its allies to become more involved in the Gulf. This is already happening between U.S./British navies within the Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR). The cooperation model between the United States and the United Kingdom can serve as the template for this proposed multilateral security cooperation framework. In Bahrain, Headquarters for the U.S. Navy in the region, the Americans and the British work together to patrol international waters, rebuffing Iranian advances and surveillance, and essentially maintaining the open sea-lanes with the threat of force. Another template for cooperation could be taken from the multinational effort to combat maritime piracy, which includes NATO, in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia.

The U.S. must redraw a comprehensive strategy for exporting security to the Persian Gulf. Gone are the days and dollars that allowed the U.S. to operate unilaterally in the region. As the United States rebalances its foreign policy initiatives to Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf will still remain of vital interest to the United States. What must be acknowledged is that the realities of American unipolar dominance in the 20th century will not necessarily carry over to the 21st century. That does not translate to America as a declining power. In fact, the opposite is true. The U.S., by most indicators, will remain the dominant global power for decades to come. But what has changed is the fact that the gap between the United States and competing nations is shrinking, even ever so slightly.

Adopting the policies advocated within this paper would signal that the United States is serious about engaging partners and truly desires to craft coalitions to deal with international security issues, which was a stated key component of the 2010 National Security Strategy. As questions loom as to the topography of the new international system that is emerging in a multipolar world, the United States should seek strength with its known allies to address unforeseen challenges. Doing so will go a long way to strengthening liberal Western ideologies and reducing uncertainty for both the United States and its global partners.

About the Author:
Captain Nicholas B. Law, USMC, is a Middle East/North Africa Foreign Area Officer, currently stationed in Norfolk, VA. In addition to his formal military duties, he is completing his second year of doctoral course work at Old Dominion University's Graduate Program in International Studies. His work is focused on Conflict and Cooperation and Transnationalism, Interdependence, and Power. He is also a Marine Corps University Fellow. His language training includes Modern Standard and Syrian/Levantine Arabic.
Since the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq after failure to renew a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Maliki government at the end of 2011, violence has steadily increased between Shi’a and Sunni, resulting in almost daily bombings and shootings that left almost 9,000 people dead in 2013 alone. The Sunni, a religious minority that held power during the Saddam Hussein era, feel increasingly disenfranchised by the Shi’a dominated government that seems to be consolidating power and making up for the many years that Shi’ites were persecuted prior to the American invasion. Perhaps the biggest strategic miscalculation of the invasion was being oblivious to the fact that by replacing the ruling Sunni elite with a Shi’a ruling majority commensurate with Iraq’s religious demography, Iraq was no longer the check against Shi’a Iran that it had once been.

A major portion of Iraq’s reconstruction focused on rebuilding its decimated military into a more professional force that, ideally, could ensure border security, assist in the counter-terrorism fight, and act as a bulwark against aggression by other regional actors. Although Iraq has substantial oil wealth, it continues to receive U.S. military aid in the form of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), approximately $500M in 2013. The logic behind such assistance is that the influx of U.S. taxpayer dollars would encourage initial Iraqi purchases of U.S. defense platforms and services, with Iraqi funds covering future support and maintenance costs, thereby locking them in as a strategic military partner going forward. Thus far, Iraq has acquired, or is planning to acquire, F-16 fighter aircraft, integrated air defense systems, Bell 412 helicopters, Stryker vehicles, radars, Abrams tanks, HMMWVs, M113 armored personnel carriers, C-130 transport planes, aerostat surveillance balloons, various small arms and ammunition, and most recently, Scan Eagle drones and Hellfire missiles. There are also numerous military training and services contracts with the Iraqi military. Iraq has most recently asked for Apache attack helicopters, but has been stymied by elements in Congress seeking assurances that the Maliki government will not use them against political opponents or to generally crack down on Sunni communities.

Overall, arms sales to Iraq have their benefits, as they create a new strategic partnership with an oil-rich nation in the heart of the Middle East, foster military cooperation, and are a huge boon to the U.S. economy. However, there are significant pitfalls that could have lasting negative effects on U.S. Middle East policy. First, further “pump-priming” using U.S. taxpayer funds to facilitate arms sales is likely unnecessary at this point, as the Iraqis are already kitted out with enough U.S. gear such that the previous aid has already served its purpose (stated above) and additional funds would be subject to the law of diminishing returns (not to mention budget constraints at home). Additionally, despite warnings that if Iraq does not receive U.S. aid it will shop elsewhere, practicality dictates that it has little appetite for third rate Russian or Chinese equipment that proved to be little more than “smart bomb fodder” in the face of Western air power during the invasion.

The main problem facing the central government in Baghdad now is the same one American soldiers faced there (and in Afghanistan), i.e., how does one differentiate between a disenfranchised Sunni civilian and an Al-Qaeda operative? Although our stated goal is to support the government of Iraq, we must be wary of being perceived as backing one faction over another. One of the most costly lessons learned from operating in Iraq and Afghanistan is that American firepower was repeatedly co-opted by local “friendlies” under the guise of fighting the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. For example, U.S. forces would breach or bomb a suspected terrorist safe house at the behest of “local intel sources,” only to find out later that they had merely eliminated that source’s tribal rival. The difference is that it is doubtful that Shi’a dominated security forces, with an axe to grind against the Sunnis, would exercise the same restraint when “clearing” a militant Sunni stronghold that U.S. forces would. Bottom line, if it is decided that supporting the current geopolitical status of Iraq should continue, then perhaps tying arms sales/deliveries to political milestones met between the opposing factions within the Iraqi government is the most prudent course of action.

However, there is an overarching strategic question...
surrounding the future of Iraq. The present-day state of Iraq is the vestige of the Sykes-Picot agreement and subsequent mandate system that carved up the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after their defeat in World War I. The borders were not reflective of the geographical, ethnic, or human terrain and were an outside imposition of the Euro-centric Westphalian nation-state system that was (and to a large extent still is) alien to the region and culture. Tribal and familial affiliations and a nomadic heritage still trump nationalism in the region.

With respect to U.S. policy going forward, we must evaluate whether we believe we can, through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means, hold together this entity in spite of it being counter to the demographic, ethnic, religious, and cultural realities on the ground. By preventing the region from reverting back to its natural state (the Ottomans administered the region more or less aligned with the ethnographic terrain), we risk being seen as just the next power in a long line of empires trying to impose its will on the Arabs, feeding the narrative that we are indeed the Great Satan and fomenting the very terrorism we are trying to stamp out.

We are approaching a fork in the road over the next few years, as the turmoil in Iraq coupled with the prolonged civil war in Syria is creating an opening for a regional shift, i.e., the emergence of an independent Kurdistan encompassing territory of present day Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and possibly Iran. With the government in Baghdad unable to assert its authority in the Kurdish north of that country, with Assad unable to assert his authority in the northeast of Syria, and with Turkish Kurds leaving southeastern Turkey for northern Iraq under a peace deal with the Turkish government last year, the conditions are ripe for Kurds to start exercising their right of self-determination.

On 21 January 2014, Syrian Kurds declared autonomy from Damascus. Prior to that, the central government of Iraq has threatened economic penalties on the Kurdistan Regional Government for negotiating separate oil deals with Turkey without consent of government in Baghdad. The long-term fear is that arms to the central government in Baghdad may eventually be used indiscriminately, not only against Sunnis in the western and central portion of Iraq, but against Kurds in the north to bring them back under the control and dominance of Baghdad.

Northern Iraq under the Kurds has been largely spared the violence engulfing the rest of the country. There are ample resource reserves, gradually improving ties with Turkey (although still tense), and good cooperation with the U.S. during the invasion and reconstruction. The Kurds have an affinity for the U.S., especially given our protection of them under the no-fly zone implemented after Gulf War I, and would presumably continue to be cooperative and friendly to the U.S. going forward. During the 1970s, the U.S. armed the Kurds at the behest of the Shah of Iran to cause problems for the regime in Baghdad and, after the first Gulf War, President Bush Sr. encouraged the Kurds to revolt against Saddam Hussein.

The above is not advocacy for an independent Kurdistan, simply evidence that the U.S. has flirted with the idea in the past, albeit with little thought as to what might come afterwards. With respect to continued arms sales to the Baghdad central government, if the U.S. believes the winds of change are inevitable, it must carefully evaluate what is being sent to the Maliki government along the lines of shared objectives (counter-terrorism, border security, and bulwark against regional actors) and realize that only the first two make sense. Given the political makeup of the central government in Baghdad and the warming of relations with Tehran, the bulwark argument rings a bit hollow. Such platforms are more likely to be used to further cement Maliki’s power base, are not optimal for rooting out terrorists, and if turned on the Kurds and an independent Kurdistan did eventually emerge, it would cost us a valuable ally in the new Middle East.

About the Author
Mr. Greg Archetto is a Country Program Director at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. A former Presidential Management Fellow, Mr. Archetto has worked in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US Department of State and done rotational assignments at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and on Capitol Hill. He has just finished a yearlong detail as Senator Rand Paul’s National Security Advisor. He has a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from Rowan University, a Master's Degree in Public Policy/Administration from Rutgers University, and a Master's Degree in National Security/Strategic Studies from the US Naval War College. His article “Iran and the Coming Casus Belli” appeared in the July 2012 issue of the Journal.
Though the sun has gone, the heat lingers. It’s 8:15pm local time. Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It’s oppressively humid. I hate humidity. It clearly hates me.

In my new profession, my new life really, understanding oppression in its many forms and facades is part of my business. It is so humid that I can feel a bead of sweat make its way from the nape of my neck, over my shoulder, and finally all the way down the center of my back; as if the bead of sweat itself were mocking me – I’m profoundly thirsty. I’ve taken two, back-to-back, eight-hour flights across opposite worlds to get here; to my new life; to my new business. Incidentally, my perspiration is the result of the tropical climate and my nervousness; uneasiness is probably the most appropriate term. When I walk through the glass doors of the dilapidated yet functioning airport, there is a sea of faces that wear the same sun-kissed skin I wear beneath my mask of perspiration. As a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO), my job is to become a regional and cultural expert in my Area of Concentration, which happens to be Sub-Sahara Africa. My first professional experience brings me to the DRC to begin developing my knowledge and skills.

I walk to the curb amidst incredulous stares and unfamiliar chatter. I can depict a few French words out of the vocal static, but the other words my ears don’t recognize. There is something familiar to me about these people, yet there remains a tremendous veil separating us. Our stories are different, our human experience completely unfamiliar to one another. I want to move beyond the veil.

I want to know these people; my people; but were they really my people? Was I only fixed on our phenotypical commonalities?

Kinshasa, DRC, when compared to other nations on the continent of Africa, has been a prime topic in international relations discourse over the last two decades. Having been the stage for 2 wars with over 5 million dead (one being the largest in recent African history), the assassination of the president in 2001, the alleged mass rape of more than 200 women and girls in November 2012 by Congolese troops, and the home of over two-dozen militant groups, no wonder the DRC remains a hot topic. The DRC lacks some of the most basic features found in any civilized municipality. In my first 100 hours on the ground, I discovered that the one firehouse in Kinshasa had burned down? The firehouse burned down? This was merely the tip of the iceberg. The city has no means of organized trash and waste removal. The postal service, I read in a guide published by the US Department of State, while existent, is unreliable. There exists few dependable national roads connecting the major cities, and the only means to travel to the east were via air.

The mass transit system consisted of private individuals shuttling citizens about in privately owned cars, vans, and trucks. Many of the vehicles would never pass western-contrived maintenance and repair standards. The vans, which I suppose were makeshift buses, were particularly dangerous. Quite often they are full to capacity with passengers literally hanging out of the doors, or riding on the rear bumper and holding the luggage rack so not to fall during transit. The seats had been removed.

“I WANT TO MOVE BEYOND THE VEIL. I WANT TO KNOW THESE PEOPLE”
and were replaced with small wooden benches, obviously to accommodate more passengers. Seatbelts were of no concern. My first experience in the DRC involved me becoming acquainted with the “mass transit system.” I’m standing on the curb at the airport, luggage in hand, motivated to begin my journey, and realize – I don’t have a ride. For whatever reason, my ride from the Embassy flopped. Apparently the six month-long exchange of emails between my would-be sponsors and office mates didn’t satisfy the requirement for airport pickup. Maybe they got lost, or held up, or mixed up the dates, or worse. . .maybe they forgot. I’m okay nonetheless, I speak French, I look like the locals, that is to say – I’m black, how hard could it be to blend in, get a taxi to the US Embassy, and maybe a coffee? Actually, the truth is, I know French, which really means I know how it’s supposed to sound. My crash course at the Defense Language Institute - Monterey didn’t teach me Lingala, the native language I hear in the murmur amongst the sea of people. In fact, there are five languages spoken in the DRC including French, Lingala, Kikongo, Swahili, and Tshiluba. Though I am black – in color, and a would-be local from the naked eye, my ghastly accent blows my cover. What’s worse - I didn’t see any cars labeled “Taxi”?! I later realized that the sea of random cars and vans in front of me were all “Taxis.”

I approached my first possible chauffeur, an older man of probably sixty. “Sir,” (speaking in my best formal French) “I need a taxi,” I uttered, “to go where,” he replied, “the United States Embassy, how much will it cost?” “For you my brother,” he prepares “it will be seventy-five American dollars.” “Seventy-five dollars!” This man was clearly no brother of mine. Charging me seventy-five dollars for a taxi ride was anything but brotherly. In fact, it was downright sinister. Lesson number one: goods and services are absurdly expensive in the DRC. Inflation was serious. I saw a package of Oreo cookies for twelve dollars.

Before I can mentally organize a rebuttal and translate it into French, another man interjects and offers to drive me to my destination for sixty American dollars, as if that’s a deal. Living in Kinshasa is all about making deals, I learn. I have no choice. I concede. Taxis are expensive. I face it. I oblige the gentlemen and we begin the forty-five minute excursion. This is not before he and the previous taxi driver begin an argument that quickly escalates. In the DRC, stealing is one thing, stealing business is another; I learn that the latter is taboo. It didn’t help that I was an American. We speed from the parking lot through a cloud of calamity; the smell of exhaust and burning rubber polluting my nostrils; rocks and empty plastic beverage bottles being thrown at my driver’s already disheveled automobile. So, this is what FAOs do...

Despite some of its more unpleasant realities, the Congo has incredible potential to be an economic powerhouse. Even with its current resource exploration projects underway, the DRC remains a treasure trove of unexploited natural resources. Its agricultural sector is a gold mine that lays in waiting for the day it can be used to create state wealth. The lush tropical environment is ideal for the cultivation of a myriad of crops. The Congo River is also a source of potential profit. The river is the deepest on the planet (720 ft at its greatest depth), but only the ninth longest stretching more than 2,920 miles, with over 1,800,000 cubic feet of water per second pouring into the Atlantic Ocean. During the rainy season, the possibilities for hydroelectric power generation are endless. Presently, there are about forty hydropower plants in the Congo River Basin with Inga Falls dam being the largest. The Inga Project, originally launched in the 1970s, called for the building of five dams that would generate 34,500 megawatts of power. Today, there are only two dams in place.

During our turbulent ride to the embassy, I realize there are no streetlights, in fact, the roads aren’t paved. It’s David (the driver, pronounced Da-veed) and I, and the darkness. The headlights manage to keep some of the darkness at bay, but its too thick. As we move closer to the city I begin to notice silhouettes moving along the sides of the road. People. We seem to be passing through somewhat of a market district. There are small stands where fruit, bread, and vegetables are sold. I see a few
people selling garments, I even hear music. The candle light from the market stands is the only illumination. The dense foot traffic has created a dust cloud making visibility difficult, yet David continues to plunge down on the accelerator.

The darkness was abruptly interrupted when we turned a corner. The lights of the city, a paved highway, and billboards completely altered the scenery. “Civilization,” I sighed. As we approached the downtown area we weaved through tight streets, made sharp turns, probably on two wheels, and came within inches of several other motorists. There are no “real” traffic laws in Kinshasa, at least none that David obeyed. When we finally reached the embassy I relaxed. “Safety.” I later learned from embassy personnel, under no circumstances was I to use public transportation. There were an abundance of security risks. “Now they tell me.”

My next two days were a buffet of introductions, meetings, and greetings from my new family of colleagues. The fourth day would be unforgettable. Mombele. (Pronounced Mum-bel –lay) Mombele is a small town in the Limete (Pronounced Lem-ay-tay) district of Kinshasa. I rode to the township with Dr. Olivier Kalombo. Dr. Kalombo is the PEPFAR (Presidents Emergency Plan For Aids Relief) Coordinator for the embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation. We head to Mombele to get a status check of the clinic being built. I’m completely unprepared for what I see in Mombele. There is absolute poverty; the drinking water is unquestionably contaminated, there is sewage flowing through a stream that bisects the town. The dirt roads are covered in garbage and decomposing waste. The humidity seems to worsen the stench. Many of the residents walk about barefoot, the children in tattered clothing.

We park the Land Rover in the middle of the road. Dr. Kalombo pays a boy of about fifteen to keep an eye on the truck. In Mombele, survival is the theme, by any means necessary. We begin the ten-minute hike to the clinic. Just ahead I see a patient mother tending to her crying toddler. She’s using a plastic grocery bag to make a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child. We move beyond the woman and a diaper for the child.

Traces of the gray earth are on his chin and cheeks, he replies: “Bon-jour” with a bright smile. I choke back a tear. Each step makes me angry. I’m pissed. How could anyone be allowed to live in these conditions? How could any government allow its people to live in such conditions? Where was all this “aid” I kept hearing about, and why had it not reached Mombele? More importantly why had it not reached my four year-old friend. My brother. Where were all the missionaries? The Peace Corps volunteers? The do-gooders? Why wasn’t anyone helping Mombele? They needed more than clinic here. Life outside of Mombele in the downtown area was completely different. It was as if there was no consciousness of the harsh reality of those who lived just thirty minutes outside of the city.

My first 100 hours on the ground made me realize just how serious my job was. It made me understand how important it was for the global community to wrap its arms around the continent of Africa. I realized in an instant, the people of DRC weren’t simply my people because of a common genetic lineage, they were the world’s people. Hunger, poverty, and disease know no race. War, conflict, and injustice have affected people of all genetic dispositions at some point in time or another. We exist in a global community and each member of the community is affected by the other. Part of becoming a regional expert, in my humble opinion, requires a total baptism in the human experience of the people in your region. Its more than understanding language, culture, and US policy, it’s about understanding the story behind these themes. When we understand the story, we understand the experience of the people, when we understand the experience of the people we are more effectively able to assist them in bringing about change.

About the Author
Captain J. Eric Hamlin is a Foreign Area Officer completing In-Region Training (IRT) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Upon completion of IRT in summer 2014, Captain Hamlin will be at the Naval Postgraduate School pursuing a Master of Arts degree in Security Studies (Sub-Sahara Africa. He holds a Master of Arts in Diplomacy from Norwich University, and a Bachelor of Arts from Hampton University.
There is little doubt that the influence of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) in international affairs has declined in recent years. Due to the Ergenekan trials and convictions of many senior officers, the TGS has found itself rapidly adjusting to its new civilian leadership, primarily in the form of Islamist-leaning Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Notwithstanding, the Turkish military remains one of the most trusted institutions within the Republic of Turkey and its relations with the U.S. military, though shaken, have remained strong. To be sure, however, the new Turkish civil-military power structure does cast a shadow over U.S.-Turkish mil-to-mil relations, and the political context needs to be considered when engaging the TGS. Turkish political scandals aside, the DoD continues to enjoy a strong security cooperation relationship with Turkey and there exists potential to take this relationship to a higher and more mature level.

Political Turmoil
The current corruption scandal and investigations in Turkey are engulfing the political scene with heightened rhetoric between PM Erdogan’s AKP party and those loyal to the exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen. It remains unclear what steps PM Erdogan will take as he seeks to reform the government and protect Turkey from perceived foreign and indigenous threats. The current political unrest comes on the heels of last summer’s Gezi Park protests in central Istanbul, where many secular Turks demonstrated against the PM’s increasingly authoritarian behavior. There is a sense that PM Erdogan may be bolstering his party in view of upcoming local and presidential elections, in which he may run for the presidency. Fortunately, this political upheaval has had minimal effect at the working level of U.S.-Turkey mil-to-mil relations and has only slightly impacted engagement at the senior DoD level.

Mil-to-Mil Relations
Historically, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has focused on defense cooperation, both bilaterally and within NATO, as Turkey has sought a more solid place for itself in international security affairs. Throughout the years, Turkey has been an ardent supporter of peace operations, dating back to their participation with the United Nations during the Korean Conflict. Since its 1952 accession into NATO, Turkey has been a consistent Alliance supporter. This was highlighted most recently when its ISAF troop strength reached over 1,600 in 2013. From the U.S. perspective, Turkey is a force multiplier, as it serves as host to a multitude of U.S. troops. The largest U.S. footprint is at Incirlik Airbase near Adana, with nearly 1,500 personnel. This airbase has played a part in military operations from Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Afghanistan and Iraq. While U.S. relations with Turkey in the 20th century focused on Cold War threats, the current relationship is clearly moving in a new direction as the Middle East continues to present new and complex challenges. These new and emerging threats may serve as a catalyst to thrust U.S.-Turkey defense relations to new heights.

In the traditional sense of security cooperation, the U.S.-Turkey relationship is booming. Turkey has one of the largest International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in the world, and has a very robust Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Training and exercises are at a level befitting the second largest armed force in NATO, with mature combat aircraft exercises, battalion staff simulation exercises, and high-seas maritime exercises, not to mention the engagement of special operations forces and interagency cooperation for dealing with transnational threats. From an Allied standpoint, Turkey hosts the NATO Land Forces Command in Izmir, the Rapid Deployable Corps in Istanbul, a missile defense command center and radar, and a total of six PATRIOT batteries along the southern border with Syria.

Constrained Resources and Increasing Challenges
As seen in recent years, the global financial crisis has taken a toll on both the U.S. and the Republic of Turkey. This has affected the bilateral mil-to-mil relationship through the cancellation of participation in various exercises, the postponement of senior level engagements, and adjustments to bilateral working groups. These challenges have
caused HQ European Command (EUCOM) to move towards a more regional and multilateral approach to training and exercises throughout its area of operations.

Financial constraints aside, regional security issues have presented increased challenges as well. The Syrian civil war has developed into an unprecedented humanitarian assistance crisis for the entire region. The Turkish government estimates that nearly 800,000 Syrian refugees are now living in Turkey. Additionally, the unfortunate 2010 Mavi Marmara incident – where nine civilians were killed as a result of Israeli Defense Forces boarding a Turkish humanitarian vessel attempting to reach Gaza through a naval blockade – has set back a good news story in Eastern Mediterranean security relations between Israel and Turkey. On the bright side, however, the peace process with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) appears to be holding, as combat between the Turkish military and the PKK is at an all-time low.

Looking Ahead
In the future, Turkey will continue to play a significant geopolitical role in the region and will be a key partner for the U.S. as it considers engagement options in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Supporting the reestablishment of strategic-level dialogues such as the now dormant High Level Defense Group (HLDG) must be considered key to developing a long-term approach to defense cooperation with Turkey. Re-establishing cyclical ministerial/policy-level engagement will serve as the necessary guidepost for EUCOM’s security cooperation with Turkey. Obviously the U.S. should maintain its robust IMET and FMS programs, as they continue to support both countries’ interests. At the operational level, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation may provide an opportunity to forge a new direction with Turkey, where Incirlik becomes the eastern hub for NATO ISR. Not only would this support the counter-terrorism fight, but it would also support search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and non-combatant evacuation operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, there will be new horizons in the area of information and intelligence sharing, especially considering the current Syrian crisis and the long road to recovery that will follow.

About the Author:
MAJ Carl Winowiecki is a U.S. Army Europe/Eurasia FAO. He recently completed an assignment as Desk Officer for Turkey at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. He previously served on a variety of security cooperation missions in Tajikistan and Ukraine. He holds a master’s degree in East European, and Eurasian Regional Studies from Kansas University and another in Environmental Management from Websters University. He is now assigned in Washington, DC to attend attaché training and language school prior to assuming the position of Army Attaché, U.S. Embassy Riga, Latvia.
The drama that has gripped the Central African Republic (CAR) has drawn the world’s attention to a little known part of the African continent. International news reports have been replete with stereotypical descriptions alleging ethnic and religious conflict. There has been an outcry over mass atrocities that some observers have deemed close to genocidal. However, could old-fashioned geo-politics be underpinning the entire situation? There are indications that subtle foreign actors have stoked the situation to this point in order to meet their own agendas.

Qatar plays a particularly interesting role in the Central African crisis. It is no secret the Gulf States are present throughout Eastern and Northern Africa; to which the CAR has long been a peripheral country. The role played by Qatar has potentially accelerated regional conflict in the region. Although the host of major U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf, Qatar’s foreign policy is often at odds with its Western partners. In fact, outside observers often cite Qatar’s close links to Iran as proof of its spoiler role in international affairs from the Gulf to the Levant and potentially in Africa.

The Qatari government actively opposed the Libyan Transnational Council (TNC). It funneled arms and equipment to militia groups outside the government’s control, thus contributing to the security vacuum that continues to this day. Many of these actions were in direct opposition to the United States and its allies, with whom Qatar has a robust military relationship. Qatar also opposed the French-led military intervention in Mali to re-capture northern Mali from a conglomeration of loosely aligned insurgent and terrorist groups.

There are highly complicated subtle and nebulous linkages between Chad, Qatar, and Central African Republic. These rest upon the tiny Gulf State’s efforts to invest in emerging markets while advancing a particularly conservative brand of Muslim politics. All through the Arab Spring, Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and jihadist factions in Syria.

Qatar has a series of construction contracts in N’Djamena to build infrastructure, a new business district, a power plant, schools, and government buildings worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The projects are part of series of three cooperation agreements signed at Doha in 2011 between Qatar and Chad. Qatar continues to increase investment in Chad, even signing an “open-air” services agreement in December 2013 that could pave the way for Qatari Airways to service N’Djamena.

The Islamic Development Bank, to which Qatar is a major contributor, was the 9th largest donor to Chad in 2010-11, with $16 million worth of investment. Tellingly, Qatar has also been extremely generous in contributing over $500 million to the Darfur region, from where Chadian President Deby’s Zaghawa tribe originates. Chadian relations with Sudan have warmed since 2010 when Al Bashir and Deby signed a peace deal to stop supporting rebel groups in each other’s country in a proxy war.

The peace accord also called for the establishment of a mixed Chad-Sudan border force (currently in operation with 1,500 troops) and the creation of roads and a railway between Abeche, Chad and El Geneina in West Darfur. The Qatari accords included these infrastructure construction projects to link the two countries. From a Qatari perspective the Chadian decision to intervene alongside France in Mali could be...
viewed as a significant rebuke of what has become a substantial relationship on several fronts. Many in the international community, particularly France and the U.S., saw the Chadians as playing a key role in the military campaign against the Malian rebels.

Complicating this view is the fact that Qatar has played a generous host for Chadian dissidents. Following the 2008 rebel attack on N’Djamena, Timan Erdimi and other Chadian rebel leaders fled to Doha. Traditionally Qatar has kept these opposition figures contained and relatively silenced, until the Chadian deployment to Mali in Jan 2013. The Qataris protested the deployment of the Chadian forces to Mali and began to alter existing aid packages and contracts with Chad in order to affect a change in Chadian policies. Concurrently they quietly unshackled the Chadian dissidents in the diaspora.

In March 2013 Erdimi, who is a nephew of Chadian President Deby Itno, began to call for a unification of anti-Deby fighters and a resumption of the armed struggle in Chad. Many Seleka fighters are Chadian dissidents that have been sheltering in Sudan or Qatar and are exploiting the rise of the Seleka as an opportunity to return to the region and throw off the balance of power. The Chadian government remains concerned about instability in CAR, because it creates a base from which Chadian opposition groups can operate. The hosting of anti-Chadian dissidents by the Seleka forced Chad to intervene.

Since May 2013 Chad has deployed over 850 troops to CAR and Chadian military commanders have made frequent visits to the region in response to the Seleka threat. Chadian efforts have focused on evacuating people of Chadian origin from CAR, evacuating over 45,000 people by air or military convoy. Presently Chadian forces are redeploying to a newly assigned sector under auspices of the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA - Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique). This sector is along the Chad-CAR border, which allows Chadian troops to protect the oil facilities just north of the border with CAR.

Investigations of former Seleka fighters also hint at linkages to Qatar and Chadian rebel groups. It is possible that rebel groups in Sudan were associated with the Seleka in Northeastern CAR. There was a significant Chadian military strike, including assault by helicopter gunships, in the tri-border Tissi region in November 2013.

The Chad-CAR-Sudan-Qatar linkage is also evident in the example of self-declared former President of CAR, Michel Djotodia. Djotodia was born somewhere in the Chad-Sudan border region (exact location and date unknown) and later served in the CAR government before being sent as consul to Nyala, Sudan in the South Darfur state. While in Darfur, Djotodia joined anti-Bozize forces and returned to CAR leading the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), which eventually was a major part of the Seleka rebel coalition that won Djotodia the Presidency.

Reports are also surfacing that some Chadian military elements may be protecting former Seleka leaders in northern CAR. The Chadian government denies any linkage to former Seleka fighters, or protecting them, but in a region where kinship is more important than the nationality in identity politics, lines are blurred. Since 2008 Chad has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history but not all are content with the current stability. It remains to be seen who is using whom in this situation. However, what remains clear is that the people of Central African Republic will continue to suffer the consequences of regional tensions and foreign meddling.

About the Authors:
Lieutenant Colonel Brad Nicholson is currently assigned to U.S. Africa Command and is a member of the FAO Association Journal Editorial Board.
Major Arnie Hammari is Chief, Office of Security Cooperation at U.S. Embassy N’djamena and is currently writing a book on his experiences in Africa. Their collective works have previously appeared in numerous publications to include Armed Forces Journal, Small Wars Journal, Journal of Peace and Stability Operations, the DISAM Journal, and other periodicals.
National Security Implications of Chinese Influence in Latin America

By Commander George A. Walborn II, United States Navy Reserve

Introduction
As the United States identifies future challenges and seeks opportunities to meet them, the Middle East and East Asia have dominated the discussion since the end of the Cold War. However, the United States must not overlook its neighbors in Latin America. China has not. Latin American trade with China has increased by a factor of ten since 2000. Additionally, diplomatic and military initiatives have bolstered China’s standing in the western hemisphere. However, China’s increasing influence has the potential to create instability in the region and threaten the national security of the United States. To neutralize this potential tinderbox, the United States must increase its engagement with Latin America to better address the consequences of China’s expanding influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The growth of China’s economy and subsequent global influence has been instrumental in opening great opportunities for Latin American economies. China’s increasing demand for hydrocarbon fuels, precious metals, and food products has provided a generous market for Latin American exports. Additionally Chinese firms’ investment in infrastructure and manufacturing facilities has injected much capital into Latin American countries. The economic benefits have contributed to both political stability and quality of life improvement for many Latin American citizens. According to World Bank data, most (with the notable exception of Mexico) Latin America nations have seen a significant drop in poverty since the boom of Latin America-China trade began in the early 2000s.

However, Chinese growth has begun to slow. Subsequently, so has its demand for Latin American commodities. Additionally, those countries that have benefited from the commodities exports to China have seen their own manufactured products threatened by Chinese products in their domestic markets. According to a study by Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski published in their book The Dragon in the Room: China and the
Future of Latin American Industrialization, China’s entry in the Latin American marketplace has generated significant direct and indirect threats to manufacturing. Since many Latin American countries depend on each other as markets for their goods, the introduction of low-cost Chinese goods has stiffened competition, driving down prices and crowding out Latin American products. Furthermore, Gallagher and Porzecanski warn that the Chinese demand of primary commodity exports may inflate the local currency. This inflated currency valuation has the negative effect of making the country’s other export industries overpriced and uncompetitive in other markets. The effect is known as the “Dutch Disease,” and it is the result of a phenomenon known as the “resource curse.”

When Dragon in the Room was written in 2010, Latin America faced trouble by currency inflation due to the export of its natural resources and the subsequent loss of competitive pricing for its manufactured goods. Furthermore, Gallagher and Porzecanski found that 94% of all Latin American manufacturing exports (representing 40% of all Latin American exports) were threatened by their Chinese counterparts. Their research showed that China’s industrial competitiveness was improving much faster than that of Latin America and subsequently predicted that the “worst may be yet to come” for Latin America.

A subsequent study written by Gallagher and Rebecca Ray in 2013 reveals Latin America now carries an overall trade deficit with China, a deficit that is forecast to grow. As predicted in Dragon in the Room, China’s diverse exports of manufactured goods (electronics, automobiles) grew in value faster than Latin America’s exports to China. Moreover, most primary commodities exported to China from Latin America have begun to see a reduction in demand and price, which further exacerbates the trade deficit.

From 2002 to 2012, China’s share of all of Latin America’s exports rose from 2.2% to 9.1%. During the same period, China’s share of Latin America’s primary-based products and crude oil exports rose from 3.7% to 15.3%, showing increased Latin American reliance on the Chinese market for primary commodity exports. Moreover, while Latin America’s economies have thrived with China’s growth since 2000, it has been due mostly by increasing exports of primary commodities.

Latin America’s reliance on primary commodity exports to China during the period of high growth is concerning. China’s ebbing growth rate could have devastating effects on Latin America’s economies if new markets are not found or if Latin American nations do not diversify their economic policies. Some Latin American nations have already developed economic and governmental policies that mitigate the boom-bust effect of commodity-based economies. Then again, other nations eschew sound policy and strategic economic planning in order to realize the greatest short-term gain.

Conclusion

Increasing engagement with Latin America is not about crafting a grand strategy to strike a harmful blow to an adversary vis-à-vis China. Nor is it about exerting national power to widen its seat at the global table. It is about developing both existing and latent relationships that will best prepare the United States to address national security challenges brought on by increased external influence in the Western Hemisphere. In this case, the most dominant external influence is China. On their own, most Latin American countries are well equipped to meet the many challenges faced by nations in the modern world. The region possesses natural resources, geography, vibrant economies, and a desire for success. However, these assets can quickly turn to liabilities if subject to the negative forces of human nature such as greed and fear. These forces foster a lack of respect for laws and human life. Thus, as neighbors and partners in the Western Hemisphere, the United States and Latin American nations equally share the responsibility in ensuring that good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights are the predominant forces in play in the Americas.

For its part, the U.S. must demonstrate its commitment to the American neighborhood by prioritizing its foreign policy to the same. This foreign policy must meld the governmental and institutional capabilities of the United States and Latin America to successfully meet the challenges posed by the increasing influence of China in the Western Hemisphere. Moving forward, the expectation is that Latin America will demand the same transparency and accountability from China as they invest within each other’s borders and trade within each other’s markets. U.S. entry into the TPP would reinforce its own commitment to transparency and accountability in trade. In addition to TPP, cyber security is another area of engagement to protect trade as well as infrastructure. A multilateral commitment to cyber security provides both transparency and accountability for member nations’ cyber activities in addition to building a well-structured network against cyber-attack. A pervasiveness of transparency, accountability and rule of law would serve to provide a more stable political and economic environment, thus a more secure hemisphere. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States strengthen its relationship with Latin America as a cornerstone to its broader national security strategy.

As for the bad actors in the region, the United States
THE ECONOMICS OF NATION BUILDING
THINKING THROUGH THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM

By Major Jacob E. White, U.S. Army

Editor’s Note: Major White’s thesis won the Foreign Area Officers Association writing award at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff College. The full paper is available on www.FAOA.org

Thesis
Stability economics must recognize the system in which economic development is taking place, the incentives created and destroyed in the process, and the second and third order effects of our economic policy choices. We should be less focused on the immediate, mathematical outcomes of our economic strategy and more concerned with the social context of economics and the impact it has on behavior, incentives, and beliefs.

Discussion
The economic line of effort in Afghanistan is not achieving the effects claimed and could be counterproductive. The Afghan government has disillusioned Afghans through corruption and by funneling aid money into certain in-groups at the expense of everyone else. The massive influx of aid has highlighted and deepened existing ethnic and tribal divides and may even have become its own driver of instability. Commanders need a foundation in systems theory and economics in order to understand the effects of their Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) spending in Afghanistan. Effects have to be measured both in the short-term and for the group targeted as well as in the long-term and for all groups. This is critical to understanding the full implications of our funding choices.

Conclusions
Given the corruption inherent in the Afghan government and private sector, it is critical that CERP projects are undertaken with broad community support, are short-term, labor intensive, with minimal scope and scale. These project characteristics are best able to prevent wealth concentration, fraud, abuse, and wealth transfers caused by the non-neutral impacts of inflation.

Positive-sum projects are inherently better than zero-sum projects and whenever possible we should consider methods of bringing in entrepreneurs and outside capital to address economic issues. Positive-sum projects have the added benefit of receiving real time market signals to guide in their implementation and to help put them on a sustainable path.

We need to consider discarding the phrase, “money as a weapon system.” Commanders inherently see money as a way to achieve a desired security endstate and often disregard the economic impact of their spending decisions. The phrase contributes to the illusion of a COIN versus an economic effect, when in reality the relationship is not mutually exclusive.

CERP data are limited and plagued with inconsistencies and incompleteness. Drawing conclusions about what works and what does not work can be daunting. Without studies available to back up different uses of CERP we are better off doing our best to minimize the 2nd and 3rd order effects of our economic interventions. We can cause a lot of harm by using CERP irresponsibly and in many cases may be better off doing nothing, abiding by the maxim used by doctors, “first, do no harm.”

Finally, we have to be aware of a larger implication that a false economy constructed with aid money can have on the long-term strategic endstate. If we want Afghanistan to embrace capitalism and free trade then we have to stop promoting a poor copy of capitalism that is fueled by corruption and power instead of utility and merit. Afghans may be convinced that capitalism is fundamentally bad as elites become wealthy from the distribution of zero-sum aid spending. Reconciling the implementation of capitalism and free markets with aid spending is at least as important as short-term stability goals if we ever want to achieve our strategic endstate.

About the Author:
Major Jacob White, Infantry, graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2002. He has commanded at the platoon, detachment, and company level and deployed to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following assignment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin CA, he attended the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College; he graduated with distinction with a Masters Degree in Military Studies. He is currently assigned to the Office of the G5, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI.
Introduction

Human error, negligence and insider sabotage/espionage remain some of the greatest threats to any computer network. It is equally important to understand that while global sourcing for components includes many economic benefits, it also provides adversaries with increased opportunity to compromise the supply chains of critical systems. If individuals might be the weakest link for effective cyber national security, then Foreign Area Officers can be the first and possibly best line of defense in mitigating the general human weakness that is only going to become more diverse, transnational, and pervasive over time. This article aims to give a first glance/long-view strategic outlook for Foreign Area Officers, who are in many cases the best positioned to address this increasingly important national security area. Understanding the following positions will undoubtedly better equip the FAO community to fulfill one of their chief duties: advising senior leaders on political-military operations and providing cultural expertise that will translate into strategic advantage.

Chinese Cyber Philosophy and Approaches

China uses technology for intelligence collection and military operations to the point that its cyber program poses a significant threat to U.S. national security. Chinese government cyber organizations have successfully exploited unclassified U.S. networks. China not only targets U.S. information systems but those of other countries around the world, especially the networks of countries allied with the United States. China’s cyber capability provides its government and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unchecked backdoor access into data and proprietary information belonging to over 140 nations. This access enables widespread espionage and potentially exacerbates military hostilities. FAOs could have an impact in providing intelligence against this espionage.

While it is true that China’s aggressive information warfare policy presents a challenge to Foreign Area Officers, its cyberspace security leaves a lot to be desired. Chinese cyberspace security policy is focused primarily on protecting the Communist Party, government agencies and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Academia, the financial sector and the country’s industrial/business sector are left to fend for themselves in China’s state-controlled cyberspace network (Lindsay 2012). There are four chief security agencies that manage information security primarily for the Chinese Communist party and the government. First, the Ministry of Public Security is responsible for cyber crime and critical infrastructure protection. Second, the State Encryption Bureau, also known as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Office Confidential Bureau and Central Cryptography Commission, is responsible for party, military and civilian encryption management. Third, the State Secrets Bureau, also known as the CCP Secretariat Secrets Protection Office, manages all classified networks. Fourth, The PLA General Staff Department has several units that protect civilian networks (Lindsay 2012). Ultimately, China’s cyberspace security policy takes a back seat to its offensive information warfare program and many of these same organizations also conduct information cyber warfare operations.

Two Mainland Chinese companies, Huawei and ZTE Technologies, provide the Chinese government and the PLA the ability to access deployed computer equipment and services used by 45 of the top 50 telecommunication centers around the world (Maloof 2012). Huawei builds telecommunications networks, provides operational/consulting services and equipment to enterprises inside and outside of China. It also manufactures communications devices for the consumer market (Shukla 2011). ZTE Technologies is a manufacturer of mobile phones and telecommunication equipment (ZTE 2013). Many analysts believe China is using its technology exports to gain a foothold for cyber espionage and computer network attack, warning that any information traveling through networks using Huawei or ZTE equipment should be considered compromised and that even military encryption may not be enough to protect the information (Maloof 2012). In May 2013, President Obama explicitly accused China’s military of mounting attacks on American government computer systems and defense contractors, looking to map military capabilities that could be exploited during a crisis (Sanger 2013). The President based this accusation on the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress...
on Military and Security Developments Involving China. The report describes China’s primary goal as stealing industrial technology but said many intrusions are also aimed at obtaining insights into the thinking of American policy makers (DoD 2013). China’s aggressive information warfare strategy presents a particularly important policy challenge to the FAO community: Huawei and ZTE telecommunications equipment can be found in nearly every major country around the world potentially giving China access to the world’s computer networks.

**International Cyberspace**

Understanding how other nations are trying to offset cyber threats is invaluable knowledge for FAOs. Almost as soon as the US established a cyber-command within the Department of Defense, many other nations saw it as the new must-have accessory vital to their national defense. While Russia, South Korea, and have all created new military cyber centers, they look to the United Kingdom, Israel, and France as pioneers after the United States:

- The United Kingdom possesses a very active cyber program that mirrors that of the US. The primary organization is the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA). The OCSIA, along with the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency, oversees the more technical Cyber Security Operations Centre. One of the primary missions of OCSIA is to make the UK more resilient against cyber-attacks (Jowitt 2011). The new command integrates cyber-security into land, sea and air operations and compliments the intelligence agencies’ CSOC at GCHQ.

- Israel has earned its competence in cyber security mainly through extensive experience in handling persistent threats. Israel subscribes to the adage ‘the best defense is a good offense’ and is considered to be one of the most cyber-aggressive countries in the world (Sternstein 2012). What truly sets Israel apart from other nations is twofold: firstly, Israel enjoys a large pool of cyber professionals and proactively recruits its next generation. Israel actively recruits as early as tenth grade and identifies promising conscripts from the armed forces to study computer network programming in order to advance their knowledge and expertise (Bryant 2013). Secondly, Israel pushes effective collaboration between defense, academia and industry, including a legal framework that allows government to dictate to private industry what counter-measures to take to secure the vital supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems like power, water and financial (Sternstein 2012).

- France was one of the first Western nations to declare sovereign borders for internet content. In 2000, France forced Internet service providers and companies to respect French laws. In 2011, France used its G8 presidency to seek the best balance between cyberspace regulation and innovation. Little was achieved due to the high level of disagreement between governments that wanted more regulation for the internet and those that feared over-regulation as an inhibitor to innovation (Healey 2012). Up until recently, France’s overarching cyber strategy focused on cyber defense and safeguarding France’s ability to make decisions through the protection of information related to its sovereignty (Republique-Francaise 2008).

With so many nations maintaining and developing offensive cyber capabilities in the previous decade, it is perhaps surprising that the UN has not fully engaged cyber warfare, which leaves the FAO community as the best option to provide strategic insight, data, and countermeasures ‘on the ground.’ The consensus within the international community is that cyber-attacks constitute an act of war. This growing militarization of cyberspace has prompted the UN to attempt to establish rules of engagement for cyberspace. But this attempt has been uneven. In July 2010 15 nations, including major cyber actors such as the US, Russia and China, reached an agreement to reduce the threat of attacks on computer networks. The group recommended that the UN create norms of acceptable behavior in cyberspace, exchange information on national legislation and cyber security strategies, as well as strengthen the capacity of less-developed countries to protect their computer systems (Nakashima 2010). However, mechanisms of enforcement as well as established commitment from the signees are not yet mature or reliable. For better or worse, the militarization of cyberspace has become a reality that will become an increasingly important area of strategic concern and professional duty with which the FAO community must become more adept and agile.

**Cybersecurity Public and Private Sector Cooperation**

This section examines the potential academic-governmental collaboration as it relates to educating and training future cybersecurity professionals that could benefit FAOs and their cyber responsibilities. The U.S. Cyber Challenge (USCC) was founded to reduce the shortage in the cyber workforce by serving as the premier program to identify, attract, recruit and place the next generation of cybersecurity professionals. The USCC was created in response to the 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review, which emphasized expanded training and improved cyber education. The USCC took its cue from Israeli cyber education programs which start in high school to educate not only cyber professionals but produce generally savvy cyber users as well. USCC has partnered with some of the best universities in the nation, including the University of Southern California and Iowa

**CONTINUED ON PAGE 44**
A Marine Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) Security Cooperation Team is utilizing Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras as a logistical hub for ongoing partner nation operations in several Central American Countries.

The Security Cooperation Team, with Marine Corps Major Andrew Dirkes as Officer-in-Charge, arrived in Honduras in early April 2014, and will be conducting partnered training that will help build partner nation capacity and promote stability throughout the region. The Marines are organized into units of subject matter experts, which are tasked with conducting partnered training with military forces in Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras.

"The Security Cooperation Team was brought together from different units, and each of these individuals has specific skill sets we can bring to our partner nations to work with their Marines and defense forces," said Major Dirkes. "Our main purpose is to help build our partner nations' capacity, to better enable them to perform operations whether that is counter-narcotics or securing their own borders."

While MARFORSOUTH Security Cooperation teams have worked in Central America in the past, this is the first time the Marines have built a consistent relationship with partner nations. The Security Cooperation teams are scheduled to train with partner nations throughout the year, and then will be replaced by another team that will continue to build on their success.

"Maintaining a consistent presence allows us to develop deeper relationships with our partner nations and a better understanding of where we can help," said Dirkes. "It also gives us an opportunity to gain more understanding of how our partner nations work and to learn from them as well."

Soto Cano's location makes it an ideal staging area for the logistics needs of the team. "We have a headquarters section here, and I can provide support to our teams downrange," said Dirkes. "Because of the air base, we have the capability to fly in all of our logistical needs. We can have everything sent here and then we're able to send it out to them."

Dirkes said he has been impressed with the support received from Joint Task Force-Bravo as the team has worked to establish its logistic hub at Soto Cano. "I've been amazed at how supportive everyone under the Joint Task Force-Bravo umbrella has been," said Dirkes. "We've had nothing but incredible support. This has been a very welcoming and extremely supportive environment."

About the Authors
Major Andrew Dirkes is a Latin America FAO. He was stationed in Peru for his In-Country Training and also traveled to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. He has a BA in History from California Baptist University, an MA in Security Studies (Western Hemisphere) from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute (Spanish). Captain Zach Anderson is assigned to the Joint Task Force-Bravo Public Affairs Office.
The United States Marine Corps is evolving to maintain its position as the nation’s “Expeditionary Force in Readiness” within the constraints of federal budget reductions and public opposition to costly campaigns involving boots on the ground. During this crossroads moment, Marine Corps leadership is asking itself, “What will I do?” and “How will I do it?” The Marine Corps has done a solid job of articulating its vision for the future, and these questions sound simple enough.

However, one specialized skill set is vastly underutilized and has the potential to be the force multiplier in achieving the newest evolution in modern Marine Corps warfare. This skill set resides with Foreign Area Officers (FAOs). This article examines the little known secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) within the USMC and its ability to foster future successes in the exact areas the Marine Corps will be focused on, both directly and indirectly. In addition, this article lays out a vision for implementing greater utilization from both the deployment and the career progression standpoints by recommending single-track USMC FAO career progression and management.

“What Will I Do?”

Marine Corps’ Core Competencies:

1. Persistent Forward Naval Engagement
2. Integrated Combined Arms Across the Range of Military Operations
3. Manpower for Service Aboard Naval Ships, on Stations, and for Operations Ashore
4. Joint Forcible Entry Operations from the Sea
5. Complex Expeditionary Operations in the Urban Littorals and Other Challenging Environments
6. Lead Joint/Multinational Operations and Enable Interagency Activities

What the Marine Corps “does” is abstractly defined above, to give the Marine Corps a sense of general purpose, but what does the Marine Corps actually do based on these six items? In 2009, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) coined the phrase “hybrid challenges” in order to provide further clarification and encourage dialog on the future role of amphibious operations.

“Hybrid challenges can be posed by...
states, proxy forces, or armed groups attempting to impose excessive political, human, and materiel costs in order to undermine their adversary’s resolve and commitment. Thus, we expect opponents—operating in a highly dispersed manner—to blend different approaches, integrating all forms of weapons and technology to oppose our efforts.”

In an effort to mitigate these hybrid challenges proactively, the Marine Corps began to articulate its modern amphibious operations as an embarked landing force, ready to accomplish missions across a range of operations, ideally in military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and crisis response. Figure 1 places these operations on a spectrum of military operations and illustrates the associated level of conflict.

The Marine Corps was now effectively distancing itself from the historical type cast of an amphibious force capable only of forcible entry, as portrayed by the beach landings of the World War II island hoping campaigns. Rightfully so, as the last major beach landing was in 1951 in Korea, with few prospects for returning as a centerpiece of future operations. Disproving this cliché, Figure 2 depicts dozens of amphibious operations outside the

Table 1: Security Cooperation Office Relative Value Matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Availability</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
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Notes:
- Estimated value for each category (5 being the highest) is subjective and situation dependent.
- Culture refers not just to the country but to the military culture within the armed forces, particularly at the service headquarters level.
- Awareness refers to the officer’s presumed familiarity with the field of security cooperation, based on billet specific training.
- This matrix applies only to commissioned officer positions. The utility of externally assigned Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) requires a case-by-case analysis and does not lend itself to generalization; i.e. a Disbursing Accounting Officer (DAO) SSgt in Ghana may be more useful than an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) GySgt in Berlin.
scope of forcible entry beach landings that have occurred in recent decades. The Marine Corps had to change the stereotype of barbarians sprinting from ship to shore to secure a beach to that of versatile intellectuals deployed from a ship and able to respond to an array of problems with an economy of force as described by General Charles Krulak in his coining of the “three-block war”.

MCCDC laid the foundation in 2009. In 2010, General James Conway, the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, was concerned that nine years of effort in land-based wars in the Middle East had eroded the core competencies of amphibious warfare. His guidance was to reevaluate future Marine Corps’ roles in order to provide a capability to do a broader range of tasks with smaller footprints. The intent was to provide a capability larger than platoon-sized special operations teams but lighter than traditional army regiments. The Marine Corps had now effectively shifted its focus to its core competencies concurrently with Washington feeling the effects of the modern economic crisis.

“How Will I Do It?”

General Conway laid the framework for what the Marine Corps should do. It fell to General James Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, to determine how. In early 2013, General Conway made it clear that amphibious operations play a vital role in today’s world.

"People count on us for stability. People depend on us for presence. They depend on us for relationships around the world. We have a responsibility."

This responsibility to provide stability, presence, and options is what maintains the Marine Corps’ relevance. Core Competency #1, Persistent Forward Naval Engagement, makes Marines uniquely qualified and relevant for developing relationships around the world. General Amos further discussed the aspect of relationships in a speech made to the Brookings Institute in May of 2013.

“Quite honestly, we sail around the world and we interact with nations and we build relationships, relationships that can't be surged in a time of conflict, actual relationships that are important to build trust right now. That's what we do. And then when things become just a little bit questionable, we can pull off a coast and there's nothing that quite sends the same signal as three amphibious raid ships full of 2,500 Marines…”

Most recently in an August 2013 interview with Defense One, General Amos stated, “So it’s training, it’s advising, it’s assisting, it’s building assurances, it’s developing trust. It’s building relationships so that when things get frisky down the road, you’re picking up the phone and you know the person on the other end of the phone and you’re saying, ‘Ok, what do you need? I can have his force here for you, I can do that, I can help you out here in this capability.’"

Based upon the desire to get back to the Marine Corps’ amphibious roots and the responsibility to maintain a persistent forward presence and stability within fiscal constraints, one word has consistently been mentioned: “relationships”. How do you build relationships? The most prevalent answer is security cooperation. Besides boots on the ground in the form of Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) as the backbone of security cooperation, there are key billets necessary to facilitate security cooperation and maintain relationships. These billets are defined by LtCol (ret) J.P. Hesford and Mr. Paul Askins as “externally assigned billets”. These include but are not limited to nontraditional Marine Corps billets: Marine attachés (MARA), security assistance officers (SAO), personnel exchange program participants (PEP), officers attending foreign PME (Professional Military Education) schools, and liaison officers (LNO). Table 1 charts the value of each billet as well as the value of subjective skill sets necessary to perform in these positions.

Relationships established by FAOs through bilateral exercises such as Keris Strike in Malaysia are the foundation for long-term security cooperation. Table 1 illustrates that Language (22 points), Culture (21 points) and Awareness (20 points) were the top three subjective skill sets, respectively. This is where the FAO comes in. According to Marine Corps Order, “FAOs develop professional Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Knowledge (LREC) capabilities and in-
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This brings about the next point: if security cooperation is the future of the Marine Corps and FAOs possess the necessary skill sets to conduct security cooperation, then why are FAOs still relatively unknown and not a primary MOS?

The Need for Full-Time FAOs

“The goal of any effort to reorganize the operating forces must be to preserve actual war-fighting capacity; an inefficient system should not be maintained solely for the sake of officer career development or tradition.”

To better achieve future Marine Corps objectives and to further develop FAO critical skill sets, the FAO must be a single-track, primary MOS. The Marine Corps’ view on FAO training and utilization should be that both elements are force multipliers and career enhancers. In the past, Marines have accepted risk in promotion and career management to become FAOs. In fact, until recently, FAO was considered a “career killer” by Marine Corps leaders who largely misunderstood FAO capabilities and rewarded traditional deployment and combat experience in PMOS. Many Marines choose to be FAOs because it provides an outlet to link the operational aspects of being a military officer to the geo-political aspects of a complex world.

The Current FAO Situation

With support from senior leadership and the tireless efforts of the International Affairs Program Coordinator, the FAO program updated MCO 1520.11F and created avenues into the FAO community for Olmsted Scholars, FPME, PEP, and Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (APH), as well as a large population of experience-track FAO applicants who meet the requirements for the FAO MOS outside of the traditional study track program. This has enabled the Marine Corps to designate and assign officers with critical skills who were previously not tracked, as well as double annual accessions from 50 to 120 and increase the active duty FAO population from 264 to 338 between FY09-12 (a 28 percent increase) while funding the cost to train 19 new FAOs per year in the Study Track program. These boosts resulted in an increased FAO assignment rate from 71 to 82.9 percent in the same timeframe. This occurred as the demand signal for FAOs also increased from 66 to 158 FAO coded billets.

Many positive changes are occurring and commendation is owed to the IAP staff and to the USMC senior leadership, but it should not stop there. With 338 active duty FAOs, the current breakdown is 53 FAOs in training, 131 filling FAO coded billets, and 154 in non-FAO billets. 154 FAOs are outside of FAO billets! This seems absurd from the outside looking in. With three years of training time and a cost of roughly $170,000 for training, why would there not be a bigger push for the DoD prescribed 95 percent fill rate? Why would not every commander in the force request a FAO for the area of the world in which they will operate?

The single answer to these questions is that the dual-track system forces competent FAOs to leave their highly specialized training/billets to return to a PMOS job every three years to prove to promotion boards that the officer is still competitive in the traditional capacity of a primary MOS. The Marine Corps wants well-rounded MAGTF officers based on traditional promotion and operations methods. The result is a generalist population of officers with a focus on PMOS skills and resulting in less proficiency and underutilization in a secondary MOS that is potentially equally important.

It is time to change the way the Marine Corps thinks.

Current Utilization Problems: Brain Drain and Shallow Relationships A FAO is required annually to pass foreign language proficiency tests in order to maintain credentials. How does a FAO maintain/improve LREC skills when they are focused on an unrelated primary MOS and skill set likely in an unrelated part of the world? The answer is, they cannot. Atrophy occurs as FAOs do what needs to be done to excel in the current, traditional system in order to get promoted. Although FAOs have the best of intentions in maintaining skill sets, they are ultimately set up for systematic failure. Based on conversations with numerous FAOs (no statistical data for support), this often causes FAOs to feel frustrated and lacking intellectual stimulation, eagerly seeking separation from the Marine Corps for careers in think tanks or other government agencies which will invest and encourage development of their highly sought-after skill set.

There are growing demands for FAOs to engage in current events and political issues of each region. The FAO is the pinnacle of LREC expertise within DoD. The FAO, by the nature of travel, education, and language, is
going to excel at the Commandant’s objectives of “training, assisting, advising, building assurances and developing trust” when put in key roles in security cooperation and in the Defense Attaché System (DAS). However, the FAO will then leave these roles and could or could not be replaced by a FAO in that position depending on the billet coding or the availability of FAOs ready to do their utilization tours. The result is inconsistent, short-lived, shallow relationships based on huge disparities in skill sets that ultimately hurt security cooperation and the future Marine Corps’ missions being pushed so heavily by senior leadership.

Career Progression and Development: The FAO Can Be a MAGTF Officer

With the Marine Corps shrinking its manpower amid a push towards the avoidance of deploying large, costly conventional forces, the full-time FAO is a much cheaper, safer, and proactive solution. However, the number one argument for maintaining the current dual-track FAO MOS is that FAOs will be noncompetitive for promotion when competing against their primary MOS peers who have operational time within their career field.

So how is this rectified? The first step is to quit using tradition as a reason for not changing. Make FAO a primary MOS that is obtained at Captain or above, similar to feeder MOSs such as that of a MAFTF Intelligence Officer or an Air Command and Control Officer, which are both re-designated later in an officer’s career after a foundation of basic Marine Corps’ experience is established. This feeder MOS model allows for several MOS disciplines to receive standardized training after obtaining key experience milestones and standard Marine Corps’ operational knowledge.

The resulting lateral-move MOS change is then a MAGTF officer with a broader scope and responsibilities yet one who maintains tactical knowledge obtained during the original PMOS. Once the FAO MOS is awarded, the DoD’s FAO Lifecycle Development Model in Figure 3 is applicable for career progression and development, with only a minor adjustment needed to maintain the Marine Corps’ MAGTF Officer skill set throughout.

That adjustment is to ensure billets are both in the Operational Forces and Supporting Establishment at every rank. This will allow for a broader development of the FAO and to allow for participation in the various Marine Corps’ capacities in order to be competitive for both promotion and command with peers outside of the FAO MOS. This includes a balance between operational billets, intelligence billets, and security cooperation billets. Recommended examples are listed below. These are not all encompassing but merely an outline showing how current and future bil-

Figure 3: DoD FAO Lifecycle Development Model from August 2010.
lets could be categorized to create a career development system beneficial to both the Marine Corps and the FAO community.

Conclusion
The Marine Corps is on the right path to evolving back to its unique competencies in amphibious operations in order to face the world’s future challenges. Further, the International Affairs Program has successfully expanded and professionalized its FAO population far beyond expectations. However, as long as there is a systemic handicap limiting FAO utilization and career development, the Marine Corps will be missing an opportunity to maximize the utilization of a highly proficient cadre of cultural warriors primed to build relationships and mitigate complex issues necessary to achieving success in security cooperation and crisis response. The way ahead is a single-track FAO MOS that maintains the MAGTF Officer skill set while also encouraging continuous development in a highly specialized LREC skill set. This can be implemented using current the DoD FAO Lifecycle Development Model while incorporating key milestones present in other USMC primary MOSs. The end state will be a cultural center of gravity for achieving the Marine Corps’ evolving relationship-based missions.

Recommended Fleet Billets for Captains and junior Majors:
- MEU Liaison Officers
- G5/J5 Security Cooperation Exercise Planners at MARFORs/COCOMs
- Security Cooperation Officers for Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group
- MARSOC Liaison Officers/Augments
- UN/NATO Observers (on the ground)
- Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
- Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST)
- Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR)
- SPMAGTF-Africa
- Marine Corps Training Mission – United Arab Emirates
- Marine Corps Training Mission – Saudi Arabia
- Georgia Deployment Program ISAF (GDPI)
- Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF)
- Marine Rotational Forces – Darwin (MRF-D)

Recommended Nonfleet Billets for Captains and junior Majors
- Professors at ROTCs and the Naval Academy
- Operations/Executive Officer at the Defense Language Institute
- UN/NATO Liaison Officers (at headquarters)
- Marine Embassy Security Group Regional Staff Officers

Recommended Fleet Billets for senior Majors and Lieutenant Colonels
- MEU Assistant Operations Officers
- MSC/MEF Deputy G3 and G5 Billets
- Security Assistance Officers
- Rapid Reaction Force Deputy Commanders (i.e. Africa and Okinawa)
- HQMC/COCOM Desk Officers
- Operations/Executive Officer at the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group

Recommended NonFleet Billets for senior Majors and Lieutenant Colonels
- Marine and Naval Attaches
- Commanding Officer of the Defense Language Institute
- Marine Embassy Security Group Region Commanders
- Government/Think Tank/Business Fellowships

Colonel and Flag Officer Billets
- Commanding Officer of Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group

About the Author:
Captain Fretwell is a Marine Corps Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to the Joint United States Military Advisory Group-Thailand. His operational experience includes combat deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2006-07 as a Rifle Platoon Commander, to OIF in 2008-09 as a Logistics Advisor embedded with the Iraqi Border Police, and to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2010-11 as the Supply Officer for 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward). In addition, he has deployed as a Foreign Military Advisor to multilateral exercises in Malaysia and Thailand.
In Proceed to Peshawar, George J. Hill tells the story of the first U.S. officials to be invited into the border region between Afghanistan and India, now Pakistan. This 1943 expedition was commissioned by the British and intended to highlight the difficulties that they were encountering with the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan tribes. In the context of the century-old British-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, and with WWII straining Britain's ability to resource its empire, it was hoped that the American officers would see the importance of the region and the British (or potentially American) role in it. Thus, in November of 1943, Major Gordon Enders and Lieutenant Albert W. Zimmerman began their journey into Central Asia.

Hill begins by providing the reader with geographical and historical details as an introduction to the political and physical complexities of the region. This introduction serves to enrich the story that follows. What may seem surprising to many now, the trip was of little importance to national intelligence at the time. As Hill points out, the Durand Line (the recognized frontier border between India and Afghanistan, agreed to by both parties in 1893) was not a significant U.S. national concern at that time and the travelers had no inclination that this region might become an area of vital interest to the United States and the world. Fatefully, it was not until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that the Americans regarded this region as being important.

Hill merges Lieutenant Zimmerman's notes from the expedition with a selection of important historical details surrounding the time of the mission to give the reader both a firsthand account and the background information necessary to grasp the importance of traveling along the Durand Line during World War II. The story is complemented with carefully selected pictures that capture the images penned in the book and quotations from a variety of distinguished individuals that heighten the reader's understanding of the situation. It includes the correspondence between the Americans and British that led to the journey. These additions serve to enrich what is an already fascinating and informative story.

Proceed to Peshawar offers a glimpse into a time in which U.S. military officers could freely travel the Durand Line, constrained only by geography. However, conflict in this region is not a new phenomenon. The author cites historic and modern accounts of the region to make the compelling argument that, although the principle actors have changed, conflict remains an essential part of the nature of the region. Ender’s and Zimmerman’s trip along the Durand line is the point from which one should begin their study of the region.

About the Reviewer:
Mary Sloan is a first year graduate student in the Master of International Studies Program at North Carolina State University, specializing in International Development. Her specific field of study is Human Security in the Middle East. Ms. Sloan studied Arabic for several years, and has spent time in Egypt and Morocco.
American foreign policy decision makers, most of whom take office with little experience in international relations, rely on expert regional and foreign policy professionals to shape or at least inform their decisions regarding international involvements. The best of those regional and foreign policy professionals are able to offer advice based on deep, broad, and long-term perspectives, and ready knowledge of what has worked (or not) not only in their region and in recent years, but also in other regions, and in other times.

As a baseline primer for developing that sort of perspective, this book is hard to beat. Covering, as the subtitle says: America in the World in from Truman to Obama, this readable book offers a concise but surprisingly comprehensive review of foreign policy decision-making through 12 modern presidencies. The title actually tells only half the story, as the lens of the book is to contrast U.S. maximalist administrations to the retrenchers that (almost always) follow them, and the international and importantly, the domestic forces that drove their choices.

This is neither the CBS nor the FOX news version of history. Whether through Ambassador Sestanovich’s bi-partisan background or his years spent in academia, the resulting treatment of potentially polarizing issues is refreshingly objective. His ultimate assessments of presidential performance are judged consistently albeit through his maximalist versus retrencher lens; they feel fair.

What those assessments reveal is that while these presidents did not want to think of themselves as purely expanders or contractors of American international involvements, because all operate within defining budget and domestic opinion contexts, all eventually settle on essentially reactive policies. Policies of Truman, Kennedy, Reagan and Bush II essentially signaled: “we shrank our military too far; it is dangerous; we need to expand our capabilities and our engagement.” Whereas Nixon, Ford, Carter and Obama have said: “we have over-reached; we need to scale back.” Party affiliation is not the driver; the cycle of expansion and contraction reflects a demand by the political center to correct the country’s course – which certainly seems to be democratically virtuous.

Another encouraging takeaway was the clear and recurring message that things may not really be so much worse than before (as today’s strident news pundits frequently insist), or even all that different from past circumstances. U.S. foreign policy makers have almost never enjoyed bipartisan unity, fiscal continuity, or reliable allied followship. Such constant “bad news” about shrinking U.S. budgets, domestic political polarization, recalcitrant allies and ascendant bullies must, according to this history, be taken with a grain of salt - those circumstances have mostly been the norm.

The final point is that what seem to us now like decisive and visionary choices made by Truman or Reagan or Carter were at the time fraught with bitter domestic political resistance, significant budget concerns, lack of reliable international partners, and even dissension among the principal advisors of the various administrations. The essential message is positive - that others have struggled, and often succeeded (demonstrably advanced U.S. interests) against such challenges before.

Because the main chapters of the book detail the particular circumstances and decision processes of just one or two administrations, the epilogue is particularly helpful. The author trenchantly wraps up the lessons learned as they apply across all the administrations studied, and adds some analysis and suggestions for today’s foreign policy makers. The book includes an admirable 60 pages of notes and citations of interest to the would-be broadly informed Foreign Area Officer. Overall this book is a worthwhile time-investment for anyone working in foreign policy making, especially for those new to the process.

About the Reviewing Officer:
LTC Sherman D. Kelly is a Special Forces branch officer, Ranger, and South Asia Foreign Area Officer currently assigned as the South Asia Action Officer, DoD J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy). He has a BA in Political Science from The Ohio State University, an MA in Security Studies from National University of Bangladesh, and an MA in South Asian Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. He is a graduate of the Bangladesh Defense Services Command and Staff College.
In 2013, an aircraft was dying. Suffering from cost overruns and slammed for poor sensor performance, the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 30 was all but a distant memory for the U.S. Air Force. The aircraft fleet and its entire global support system were divested in the President’s FY13 budget submission, pilot assignments to the main Block 30 base dried up, and the newly purchased planes were scheduled to fly straight from the factory to the bone yard, doomed to travel from cradle directly to grave on their first and last flight.

Then, curiously, the skies began to lighten for this aircraft in the form of an unexpected savior: Congress. Not only was the aircraft snatched from total budgetary annihilation, but it was given a new lease on life, appearing in the FY15 budget with $3 billion of potential funding. Gutting operations of one piece of equipment in favor of another is nothing new in the military; this remains one of the highest priorities of each service chief, and is a necessary part of any budget. What’s curious about this decision is not only the outcome but also the international implications of a surviving Global Hawk program, a program that several allies have eyed with great interest, especially Japan.

High-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (HAISR) is a hot commodity in international circles, and no one does it better than the U.S. Along with NATO, in recent years three key U.S. allies have considered getting their feet wet in the tenuous world of HAISR via the Global Hawk, and will probably do so with some level of U.S. assistance: Germany, South Korea, and now Japan. Japan’s decision to select the Global Hawk as its first venture into HAISR is especially telling, since it represents a change in Japan’s defense thinking and a shift in Japanese system acquisition strategy. It also means increased cooperation between Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) and U.S. Air Force personnel that could positively increase already robust international collaborative efforts.

Like other remote-piloted aircraft, the Global Hawk offers game-changing options for U.S. policymakers seeking to maximize effects-based foreign military sales. The Global Hawk’s speedy setup compared to cockpit-piloted aircraft programs will encourage ally interest not only because Global Hawks can be in the air faster than cockpit-piloted aircraft, but also for cost-effectiveness. Global Hawk pilots can undergo initial training while base setup, equipment overhaul, and aircraft placements occur simultaneously at a separate location. To a nation considering the purchase of an entirely new aircraft and the accompanying cost of incorporating into their armed forces, this is an attractive cost savings advantage.

Also, the Global Hawk’s long-endurance missions have already demonstrated cost savings compared to cockpit-piloted aircraft that perform the same role, and each hour that ticks down after every 30-hour sortie makes that cost cheaper. Further, with no pilot onboard,
Global Hawks can be in the air faster than cockpit-piloted aircraft...

...Global Hawk pilots can undergo initial training while base setup, equipment overhaul, and aircraft placements occur simultaneously at a separate location.
In light of NATO’s reduced military employment in Afghanistan, Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, and expanding military capabilities throughout Asia, Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) is proposing a paradigm shift in the scope and conduct of NATO exercises. For many years NATO has not exercised large conventional forces for employment against a comparatively sized enemy. Yet Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine, and rapidly expanding military capabilities throughout Asia suggest that the world has not changed as much as once believed at the end of the Cold War. NATO, while performing admirably in Afghanistan and more recently in Libya, has reduced its conventional capability and fixated on responses to limited contingencies through the employment of the NATO Response Force (NRF). NATO should seek not only to retain the high-level of interoperability it achieved through International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan, but also invigorate its capacity to conduct large-scale conventional warfare against an equitable foe. LANDCOM is developing an exercise called TRIDENT LANCE that, if implemented and supported as designed, will enable NATO’s achievement of these two objectives.

When LANDCOM officially stood up in Turkey on 1 November 2012 it became the sole ground combat headquarters within the newly consolidated NATO Command Structure. Simply stated, it is LANDCOM’s mission to ensure NATO’s land forces transition from an ISAF campaign footing to a contingency posture, and remain relevant to the Alliance’s security requirements.

For LANDCOM to fulfill its role as standard-bearer for NATO’s ground forces it must be capable of fulfilling its own operational responsibilities. LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges, LANDCOM’s first commander, therefore conceived TRIDENT LANCE as the vehicle by which the command would earn credibility, which is necessary for it to evaluate other headquarters and to assist change in how the Alliance trains. In his vision TRIDENT LANCE must fulfill three primary conditions. First, it ought to exercise LANDCOM at a level above corps. Second, the exercise must test LANDCOM’s planning, operational, and sustainment functions. Third, it must physically stretch the staff. In short, the commander expects training realism and a staff capable of performing efficiently even under stress.

In developing an exercise design for TRIDENT LANCE, the only scenario that met all three of the commander’s conditions was one for a Major Joint Operation - Plus (MJO+), a scenario under which NATO has not trained since the Cold War. As concerns land operations, an MJO+ stipulates the employment of multiple land corps, at least two and preferably more. Anything less than two corps negates LANDCOM’s effectiveness as an operational headquarters, nor does a single corps require another land headquarters to direct its actions. The employment of multiple land corps, however, necessitates LANDCOM’s employment as a coordinating headquarters with all its associated planning, command, and sustainment functions. A scenario based upon MJO+ also stipulates the activation of a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to orchestrate the larger joint operational fight, and the additional integration of air, maritime, and special operations capabilities.

LANDCOM deemed two supporting objectives as important to the overall quality of the exercise: instilling an expeditionary spirit within the staff, and using a full 24-hour work day over at least eleven days. The commander felt it imperative to conduct TRIDENT LANCE away from Izmir, because he is keenly aware that senior-level command staffs can easily assume a bunker mentality that denies the possibility of their own deployment, and also because LANDCOM will most likely command forward in geographic proximity to its subordinated corps. LANDCOM therefore arranged to conduct the exercise at the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Grafenwoehr Training Center in Germany, a facility well known to NATO for its use by units deploying for ISAF. Grafenwoehr’s simulations centers are more than adequate to support a large staff, and its barracks and environment are appropriately austere to imitate real world deployment conditions.

The desire to conduct a 24-hour training day may seem intuitive, but in recent years NATO has adopted the habit of “extended workdays” for its exercises. This practice demands NATO’s relatively small headquarters provide only a single personnel shift during an exercise. It likewise reduces Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT’s) burden to provide personnel for exercise control over two shifts. It is a cost-saving measure at the price of realism, and a concept LANDCOM rejects as bad practice. To properly exercise as a wartime headquarters, LANDCOM will require augmentation to its peacetime staff of just 350 personnel. The design for TRIDENT LANCE is forcing LANDCOM, SHAPE, ACT, and the JFCs to think through NATO’s baseline employment requirements. This in turn should prompt a much broader discussion within NATO about appropriately manning headquarters for their wartime missions.
TRIDENT LANCE is receiving strong support from all of NATO’s levels of command. Sister commands, Air Component Command, Maritime Component Command, and NATO Special Operations Force Headquarters, have agreed to support TRIDENT LANCE with small representative staff cells, called response cells. Two full land corps, NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDC)-Greece and NRDC-Turkey, have volunteered to serve as subordinate headquarters under the condition that they be allowed to participate as secondary training entities with their full headquarters operating from their home locations.

Despite the added level of complexity, the LANDCOM commander was pleased to accept the offer for a number of reasons. First, neither corps appeared on the NATO Long Term Rotation Plan (LTRP) for several years. TRIDENT LANCE, therefore, offers them a training opportunity with support from the NATO Command Structure that otherwise would not be provided. Second, their inclusion in the exercise offers an opportunity to test the MJO+ scenario for incorporating multiple commands under one exercise. Third, the distributive nature of their participation will add yet another element of realism thus forcing NATO to think through its communications requirements. As an added benefit, Multinational Corps North-East (MNC-NE), based in Poland, has agreed to augment the LANDCOM staff, allowing it to run as a 24-hour-a-day exercise, and it will also provide a response cell as the third corps under LANDCOM.

In the role of LANDCOM’s higher headquarters, JFC-Naples not only agreed to support TRIDENT LANCE with planners and a response cell, but went further by proposing its full merger with the NRF certification exercise, TRIDENT JUNCTURE. The idea makes sense. A full merger of these exercises would greatly reduce ACT’s burden to provide exercise control, since the JFC-Naples staff would provide direction and orders to LANDCOM. It would also reduce ACT’s to develop two distinct exercises, bringing them together under a single scenario. The merger would enable at least four full headquarters to exercise simultaneously, allowing them the opportunity to coordinate in real time as they would on campaign. Finally, LANDCOM’s sister commands would have fewer overall activities to support during the training year. In short, it seemed a win-win across the board.

ACT and SHAPE approved both the concept for TRIDENT LANCE and the additional merger with TRIDENT JUNCTURE, though not for full implementation in 2014. NATO first must think through the resource requirements to support these proposals. ACT’s two training centers, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and the Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC), lack sufficient capacity to simultaneously orchestrate multiple commands in a distributed exercise. They provide excellent support to NATO’s operational commands, and their capabilities are getting better. Yet their capacity is already stretched with six command-level exercises in 2014, up from four in 2013. If they are required to support distributed exercises for multiple commands, as LANDCOM proposes they should, they need more personnel to write the scenarios for these exercises and more personnel to run exercise control. At present, ACT has only enough personnel to support a single exercise at a time, which in part explains why the JFC and land corps NRF certifications are held at separate times.

NATO also lacks material capacity to support multiple commands in a distributed exercise. NATO has but one modular tactical operations center, called a Capability Package 156, for exercise usage. Should NATO seek to simultaneously train multiple commands, all but one headquarters would operate from a fixed facility. NATO also has insufficient mobile computer and communications packages for the type of distributed exercises LANDCOM proposes. There simply are not enough systems to go around. For instance, Mission Secret computer terminals are the baseline for NATO exercises even though the baseline for NATO headquarters is NATO Secret. While both JWC and JFTC are well-equipped with Mission Secret systems, they are fixed systems. NATO deployable Mission Secret packages, such as will be used in Grafenwoehr, suffice to support little more than a single off-site location. TRIDENT LANCE will use work-arounds to communicate between the multiple headquarters, but with decreasing efficiencies in the integration of their operational planning tools. If NATO is to adopt TRIDENT LANCE as a model for the future, it must grow the means to support it.

If NATO nations agree that the Alliance must have the capacity to support exercises that replicate the full spectrum of real-world operational requirements to include large-scale conventional warfare, adopting the TRIDENT LANCE model is imperative. While most crises will likely fall on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, avoiding exercises that develop NATO’s ability to perform on the higher end of the spectrum simply to save on expenses is unacceptable. Peace and stability enable productivity and economy, and Alliance countries know better than to be penny wise and pound foolish.

LANDCOM’s analysis of its mission convinced its commander that the concept for TRIDENT LANCE is the right one for his command, and for the Alliance writ large. The exercise will operationalize the Secretary General’s directive to implement the Connected Forces Initiative.
O
ver the past decade there has been no shortage of books and scholarly articles analyzing the war in Afghanistan, but not until recently has anyone combined such a critique with a deep dive into the country’s past. With Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Thomas Barfield has done just that. His contribution to the discussion about Afghanistan is not merely a welcome examination of the country on its own terms. It also challenges the modern discourse of Afghanistan as fanatical and ungovernable. According to Barfield, his book “…views the Afghans themselves as the main players to understand the country and its political dynamics, examining the question of how rulers in Afghanistan obtained political legitimacy over the centuries and brought order to the land.”

Barfield begins with a geographical orientation to Afghanistan’s diverse regions (including Pashtun territory in Pakistan) and mountain ranges as well as its ethnic groups. He stresses that Afghans draw their identity from their qawm, which can mean their village or tribe. They often feel closer to neighbors of any ethnicity than they do to members of their own tribe who live in a different part of the country. Indeed, even the Taliban’s contempt for the people of Kabul, Barfield attributes mostly to the rural-urban divide. He continues his cultural discussion into the next chapter, paying special attention to the culture of rule in pre-modern Afghanistan. Beginning with the imperial era, Barfield argues, the state focused on ruling cities and certain agricultural lands, leaving other areas to themselves. A more egalitarian form of rule normally prevailed within these pockets, with communities bound by ‘asabiya, which Barfield defines as “group feeling, which bound all members of a social group together when facing the outside world.”

Barfield discusses British suzerainty in the 19th century, arguing that it provided the tools for future rulers like Abdur Rahman to exert more control over the country. He then analyzes Afghanistan in the 20th century in three parts – Amanullah’s failed modernization from 1901 to 1929; Musahiban rule from 1929 to 1978, which aimed at “limited and gradual social change accompanied by economic development” and provided Afghanistan with political stability; and the Marxist coup in 1978 and the resulting internal conflict that lasted until 2001.

During the rebellion of the 1980s, both political pow-

er and military strength had devolved to the local levels. Barfield writes, “The Communist regime was not so much defeated militarily as it was reorganized when its components defected to various mujahideen factions” (p. 248). It was in this chaotic context that the Taliban rose to power. Raking in money from both Pakistan and the drug trade and having convinced people that anything had to be better than civil war, they established more of a militarized social movement than a state.

In the penultimate chapter, Barfield examines the current state of war in Afghanistan, both in terms of organizational structures and in terms of personalities like Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar. Barfield points to the non-Pashtun United Front’s acceptance of the Pashtun Karzai as head of state as evidence that Afghans are far more united than is commonly portrayed, but blames Karzai for being too weak and corrupt to effectively rule the highly centralized government that both he and the international community had created.

Barfield concludes with recommendations for putting Afghanistan on a path to stability in light of the cultural and political history he has presented in previous chapters. This includes devolving more power to the regions, which he calls the “true political bedrocks of the country,” as well as continuing the economic development that has already begun – with India having recently given Afghanistan an outlet to the Indian Ocean and China building the infrastructure to exploit its mineral wealth.

Most of Barfield’s conclusions make sense, but his criticism that coalition forces allowed the Taliban to regroup because they did not initially deploy into Afghanistan in large numbers rings hollow, since he later credits coalition presence in rural areas after 2006 with helping unify opposition to them as foreign invaders. Barfield never explains why a large foreign troop presence in early 2002 would not have had the same effect.

While readers may not agree with all of his observations and conclusions about Afghanistan in the past decade, Barfield does an excellent job of laying out the personalities, cultures, and geographies that have formed Afghanistan over the centuries and will continue to shape the country into the future.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 45
At a friend’s retirement ceremony, the presiding general officer said, “We are all in retirement training, but some of us are closer to it than others.” The words rang true with me, as I was contemplating my own retirement. Thinking of retirement brings up the same thoughts with everyone. What will I do? Will I find a job? Am I marketable, and whatever I do, will it be fun? Will I make as much as when I was on active duty? Will my military skills transfer over to help me succeed in the civilian world?

I am here to tell you, being an FAO or RAS officer makes you very marketable in both the military and the civilian world. Before you stop reading and walk away thinking, “here’s that guy selling me on the RAS/FAO program again,” hear me out. I did retire and found a job quickly using the skills I attained as a regional guy. The skills I attained, thanks to the military, were exactly what the civilian companies were looking for. To be honest, there is no other place to find the skills FAOs have. Even International Affairs graduates from the best U.S. colleges will not have the in-region experiences like an FAO. Where else will you find a language and culture-trained individual, who probably has at least three years living in his or her region? And most FAOs, after a few assignments overseas, have great connections and know enough about how the political and military structures work in their regions. Companies wishing to start up shop or continue working in these regions need you and your skills!

RAS and FAOs have the connections because that is what our military expects of us in the hope that we truly become experts in the region. Our government has spent millions of dollars in training the FAOs and RAS officers. I know because my last active duty job was division chief of the International Airmen’s Division (SAF/IAPA) in the Air Force. The Regional Affairs office is part of that division and I saw the bills. Some of our FAOs spend well over three years studying and qualifying as language-trained, cultural experts. We are also thrust into positions of extreme importance. A good friend of mine, an Army African FAO, was stationed in a country while the military overthrew the government. The daily newspaper showed a picture of my friend looking over the shoulder of the new leader of the country, a host nation Army officer. My friend, the US Army FAO, was right there in the middle of it all.

I used to compare my career with that of my high school classmates. Not saying I am any better than anyone else. However, I will ask, how many of your high school classmates can say our country’s senior policy writers and leaders depend on your knowledge, counsel and opinions on certain situations? Be it as a Security Assistance Officer or as an attaché, there is a tremendous amount of trust placed in the hands of the FAOs and RAS officers who were trained to immerse themselves in the language and culture. As a RAS or FAO, you need to be the expert on your region’s affairs, including military groups, leaders, issues, concerns, and problems. In order to be successful in your military career, you need to truly understand the culture of your region.

Now stop and think how beneficial you would be, with the knowledge listed above, to a civilian company trying to do business in these same countries.

The beauty of being an FAO/RAS is that you probably enjoy studying and being immersed in a different language and culture. That is probably why you wanted to become a FAO or RAS officer in the first place. You are aware how cultural differences will impact negotiations. You understand the importance of integrating the social differences into the negotiations to ensure both sides are getting what they want or need. The world has become very small. Businesses are routinely working in foreign places, speaking foreign languages. You are the one with the connections, language skills, and cultural understanding to successfully merge companies together. Mergers and joint ventures will succeed and thrive or fail due to the work and foundation a RAS or FAO officer puts in place.

Business is booming right now in foreign markets. I don’t think it is any big surprise the U.S. military market has been curbed in recent years by serious cuts to our federal budget. The U.S. military and industrial base is surviving from sales and work in the foreign markets. The Middle East countries are still purchasing new equipment. There are huge purchases and record-breaking sales on-going as we speak. African countries are heavily involved in the African Contingency Operational Training and Assistance (ACOTA), which is providing many
of these countries the money for required military training.

All the while, the U.S. military’s ability to train these foreign military groups is diminishing. As we reduce the numbers of people in the U.S. military, the U.S. will no longer be able to send active military personnel to train like in the past. Yet these programs continue and they must continue for the security of many of our international partners. The military trainer is slowly being replaced by the civilian contractor. There are pros and cons to using civilian trainers, which is the topic of another article. But this is where many of you FAOs and RAS officers reading this article might start to see the benefits of your training. You are valuable on the outside due to the skills you have attained while on the inside.

There is a market in the civilian world for folks who can speak a foreign language, can relate and understand foreign cultures, and have connections with the current and future civilian and military leaders of foreign countries. Please do not misunderstand my message. I am not trying to tell all FAOs and RAS officers to drop everything and separate from military service. My message is to do the best you can for the U.S. military. Complete the mission as best you can. When it is time for you to retire or separate (you will know when that is), rest assured there will be employment options for you. You have rare skills. You have been trained by some of the best institutions in the country, and you have experiences that nobody else has. You have been trusted to do some of the most important work when it comes to policy making in the US. You can stack your resume with all these accomplishments, and the work will find you.

To give you examples, the two U.S. Army Defense Attachés I worked with in Riyadh are both back in Riyadh working for major defense companies. My predecessor, another USAF Colonel, retired from his attaché job to almost immediately start working for a major defense company in Riyadh, and the Colonel that followed me is now back in Washington DC as director of operations for his region. A U.S. Marine Corps officer friend of mine is currently working in the UAE. About a month ago, as I sat in my office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in walked the ex-Defense Attaché from South Korea, who had also recently retired to return as a defense contractor. It almost felt like a reunion, and we all get together often, much like we did when we were all attaches. There are at least seven ex-attaches from four different countries back in Riyadh working as defense contractors.

It is not just in the Middle East. Another good friend of mine, a retired U.S. Army Sub-Saharan African FAO is back in Africa after starting his own company, consulting for multiple companies in Africa. The list goes on and on and I am amazed at least once a month as other former attaches or Security Cooperation Officers are hired to help run corporations in their regions. My recommendation to you is no different than what you learned as a FAO/RAS officer. Do a good job as a SCO and attaché, make connections and maintain them. Maintain your language skills and keep your tests scores updated, and try to stay current on FMS changes and requirements. If you do a good job as a FAO or SCO in the military, and maintain connections, the job and old friends will find you! Most positions are either Program Managers, or Vice Presidents for Business Development, which are great jobs for a recently retired FAO/RAS.

In conclusion, the good news for FAOs and RAS officers, even in the times of severe downsizing of our military groups, you can rest assured, is that the skills gained in your military service will serve you well as you transition to the civilian world. Keep up the great work as you support our senior military and civilian leaders, but know that you are a sought after commodity once you decide to retire.

**About the Author**

Jim “Gato” Hetherington, Colonel, USAF (retired) is Director of Middle East Operations at Salient Federal Solutions. Jim served more than 26 years on active duty and has extensive experience in international relations, policy, operations, planning, budget, and intelligence. Mr. Hetherington most recently served as Division Chief, International Airmen Division at Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA). Prior to his role as Division Chief, Mr. Hetherington was the Air Attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
2014 has been a momentous year in the Navy Foreign Area Officer community’s brief 8-year history. Highlights include:

1. Approval of phased transfer of 100 identified operational and training billets (indicated in green on the adjacent diagram) to reach a “Full Operational Capability” of 405 FAOs by 2019. This will bring the community to the scope envisioned at its establishment in 2006. Nearly half of the additional billets are at the O-3 grade, supporting accession of roughly half of FAOs as O-3s. Upon redesignation, some of these additional lieutenants will serve on staffs where more experienced FAOs will be able to mentor them. Others will fill Navy Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) assignments on foreign navy ships and at foreign service academies. The small number of additional O-4s will mainly attend Foreign War Colleges. Combined with the LTs who will complete PEP assignments, this will provide a quantum leap in the in-region immersion opportunities for Navy FAOs prior to entering their initial operational assignments.

2. Establishment of a Major Milestone screening process. The FAO community has completed three annual O-5 Milestone screen cycles. These screening boards have significantly improved community distribution and promotion behavior at the CDR level. This November, the Navy FAO community will conduct its first corresponding Major (O-6) Milestone screen board to identify senior O-5 FAOs for priority follow-on detailing to the community’s most critical O-6 assignments.

3. Selection of a third Navy FAO for promotion to Flag Rank. Rear Admiral (sel.) Todd Squire joins Rear Admiral Doug Venlet (OPNAV N52 / Director, International Engagement) and Rear Admiral Adrian Jansen (Prospective SDO-DATT, Beijing) as FAO members of the Navy’s Flag Mess. The Major Milestone screening process aims to make the decisions of future Flag selection boards as difficult as possible by building a number of strong candidates who have been screened as senior O5s for future potential and reviewed as O6s for performance in critical assignments that build out their FAO skill sets.

4. Secretary of the Navy direction to field a cadre of aviation-qualified Foreign Area Officers who are eligible to com-
pete for assignment to flying assignments within the Defense Attache Service. The FAO community has completed all administrative preparations to meet Naval Aviation requirements, and the first nominees are already being slated for flying assignments in the upcoming detailing cycle.

Maturing of a career-long training and education model. The Navy has been sending all of its newly-designated FAOs to attend the “Joint FAO Phase I” orientation course in Monterey for the past 18 months. Community leadership continues to receive strong feedback on its value for providing the initial information and mentoring contacts necessary to transition well to the FAO vocation. The community has increased both the number of FAO participants and total number of hours of funded language sustainment training by roughly 75% within the past year, indicating more FAOs are aware of, and see the importance of accessing, opportunities to sustain and improve their language abilities. Perhaps most significantly, the community made attendance at a Joint FAO Phase II course a mandatory prerequisite for qualifying as a “Major Milestone Complete” officer.

Eight years in, the community has yet to achieve Full Operational Capability. At the same time, these five decisions secure a solid path to doing so by investing in the quantity of FAOs, quality of their development across their careers, and valuation of their leadership qualities. As these processes mature, FAOs will continue to exert greater strategic impact through functions described in the adjacent diagram.
Brennan’s belief that the war on terrorism will not end after a drawdown in Afghanistan. He highlighted the importance of DoD contributions to this continued fight. In addition to counterterrorism, which was Director Brennan’s portfolio at the White House before he became CIA Director, he highlighted cyber and how the “digital domain” has become a new venue for criminal networks.

Director Brennan also discussed “hotspots” in the world including Syria, which he stated, “has been unlike any other conflict in his career,” highlighting the multiple dynamics ranging from high level state actor issues to WMD proliferation and terrorist network insurgencies leading to the most complex situation for decision making and action.

Director Brennan also highlighted the high value of the Defense Attaché Service to the intelligence and foreign policy communities, highlighting the complimentary and value of the DAS and the unique access and insights gained by these diplomats in uniform. He concluded his remarks by acknowledging all of the men and women serving at the CIA and he stated, “leading CIA is the privilege of a lifetime.” He also provided similar complimentary remarks about the FAO community, “FAOs understand the richness of what’s going on in their regional areas and their insight and feedback is of high value to U.S. policymakers.”

The event concluded with a brief Q&A session including a question related to climate change and past and current efforts underway that are addressing global warming as a national security interest area.

The FAOA would also like to thank the following companies and organizations for sponsoring this event: American Military University (AMU), Leidos, Bizzell Corporation, Pherson Associates, Metis Solutions, Culmen International, Peduzzi Associates, and The Intelligence Community LLC.
State University, which are rated as the best cybersecurity schools by the Princeton Review (TPR 2013). The ideal scenario would be to see the FAO community also benefit from the USCC, though at the moment this has not yet been fully realized.

In 2009, the U.S. Government and Northrop Grumman Corporation launched collaborative research programs at three of the nation’s leading cybersecurity research institutions in an effort to develop solutions to counter complex cyber threats. The projects focus primarily on identifying future threats rather than reacting to threats currently found in cyberspace: CMU’s CyLab took on three projects focused primarily on detection and minimizing attack windows; MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL) also took on three projects that focused on information flow, secure logging, and dependable software analysis; finally, the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) at Purdue University took on four projects focused primarily on cloud computing and developing adaptable defenses against attacks on distributed systems (Collins 2009).

This potential collaboration is not perfect, however. In April 2012, a group of prominent academics, experienced engineers, and professionals published an open letter to members of Congress urging them to vote against CISPA on the grounds it exempts cybersecurity activities from existing laws that protect individuals’ privacy such as the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. It also allows data originally collected through cybersecurity programs to be used to prosecute unrelated crimes (Auerbach 2012). Despite these disagreements, which are important but secondary to the priority of FAOs, the public and private sectors need to continue working together in earnest to produce specialists capable of addressing what will come to be known as the Cyber Century.

**Mitigating the Cyber Threat**

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) suffered one of the worst compromises of its classified computer networks in history. A flash drive infected with ‘agent btz’ was inserted into a classified U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle East. The malicious code uploaded itself onto a network run by U.S. Central Command. That code quickly spread undetected through interconnected classified systems. At first, the fear was that the virus was somehow able to jump from the relatively unprotected unclassified networks onto the secured classified ones. Only later was it determined that the common practice among DoD personnel operating in war zones of using thumb drives to store everything from personal finances and downloaded music files to top secret documents was a bad idea. Worse, many soldiers purchased their thumb drives from the local bazaar where there was no quality control. The story of ‘agent btz’ points out two troubling and as yet unsolved problems with cyber security: the risk posed by the human factor and supply chain infiltration (Shachtman 2010).

The clean up of ‘agent btz’ known as Operation Buckshot Yankee took 14 months and cost the U.S. government billions of dollars. Flash drive devices were quickly banned from use on DoD network computers but not for all DoD employees. Additionally, the USB drives were not disabled on classified systems leaving them vulnerable to insider threats; anyone with a thumb drive in their pocket could upload malware and download classified data from a secure network (Alexander 2013). It was this oversight that allowed former National Security Agency (NSA) contract employee Edward Snowden to exploit the weakness by using a simple computer flash drive to smuggle classified documents out of an NSA facility (Dilanian 2013). The insider cyber threat remains a unique problem that FAOs should be trained to recognize and respond to: employees displaying inappropriate or concerning behavior must become a mitigated threat. This approach is similar to the counter-espionage training provided to intelligence personnel within the intelligence community. However, even for FAOs that deal directly with national security, it is no easy solution: the human factor will always be the weakest link in cyber security.

In 2011, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized the DoD to consider the supply-chain risk of a contractor and the government could exclude any contractor from consideration whose supply-chain security was considered an adverse risk. Protecting the supply-chain includes defense against both fake equipment that will fail when used and protection against tainted equipment that could enhance risks like embedded malware. To mitigate supply-chain threats contractors must seek parts from the original manufacturer or a trusted agent (Chiow J. and Metzger R 2013). Doing business with questionable supplies must be avoided. Huawei and ZTE are two suppliers that top the ‘risk list.’ In February 2011, Huawei Technologies Company published an open letter to the US government denying security concerns with the company or its equipment and requesting a full investigation into its corporate operations. Congress conducted a full investigation into Huawei and ZTE and found several disturbing issues of concern. Huawei’s corporate history suggests ties to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and it failed to provide a detailed explanation about those connections. Evidence shows that Huawei exhibits a pattern of disregard for the intellectual property rights
of other entities and companies in the United States. ZTE, for its part, failed to disclose information about its activities in the US and could not produce evidence of its compliance with intellectual property or export control regulations (Rogers 2012).

Unfortunately, little can be done to completely prevent a nation like China or any number of potentially hostile non-state actors representing Chinese interests from accessing cyber-critical infrastructure. It is now necessary to focus efforts on managing risk as opposed to eliminating risk as the latter is not possible. Individuals who are ‘in the field’ and constantly exposed at the ‘zero point’ origins of many cyber threats are the first and possibly best line of defense. Creating an FAO that is more diversely and intensively trained on these cyber issues is a highly effective strategy. The focus right now may be concentrated around China and its unique approaches and philosophy to the cyber domain, but long-term it is not destined to be the only threat or concern to the United States. Thus FAOs the world over will be manning the front lines.

To truly develop long-term credibility as a social and government construct worth emulating, the U.S. must allow a sovereign nation’s citizens to steer their own course. The U.S. should be viewed as an enabler for democracy, rather than using democracy as an enabler for their own self-interests. If called upon to assist a suppressed people, the United States must ensure that the people, structure, and will are in place for a capable and legitimate government to thrive. If not, the U.S. must avoid the “anybody but fill in your favorite dictator” model of regime change. As has been proven in many cases, most recently Iraq, the cost of blood, treasure and national prestige are immense.

About the Author:
COL McDonough served until recently with Allied Land Command in Izmir, Turkey. He is now assigned with U.S. Army Europe as Chief, Multinational Training Division, G37. Since becoming a FAO in 1999, he has focused primarily on developing relationships and interoperability between the U.S. military and Allied and partnered militaries from Eastern Europe.

About the Author: Commander Walborn, U.S. Navy Reserve, is a pilot with JetBlue Airways. He served active duty from 1993 to 2005, when he transferred to the Navy Reserve. He as a naval aviator aboard USS Stennis, USS Eisenhower, and USS Lincoln. He has deployed to Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom. A 2014 graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps War College, his reserve assignment is Commander, Naval Reserve Unit 0186, Navy Safety Center.
Abstract
Although China’s economic rise has benefited the Asia Pacific region, its military rise has been a concern among its neighbors. The U.S. in 2009 has decided to shift its strategic focus toward Asia so as to continue to maintain its influence in the region and secure its interests. The U.S.’s intention is to engage China to strengthen the regional security and prosperity. However, the U.S.’s effort in Asia could become counter-productive as its stronger presence could also embolden some regional countries to aggravate their island disputes with China. The escalation in tensions over the disputed islands between China and the regional countries could, in the worst case, drag the U.S. to confront China, and affect the overall security and prosperity of the region.

This research paper strongly suggests that the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy must adopt a fine balancing act to prevent the U.S. from being dragged into a direct confrontation with China over those disputed islands in the East China and South China Seas.

Introduction
While China’s economic rise is welcomed by the nations in the Asia Pacific region, its military rise is causing some concerns among its neighbors. The U.S. recently decided to strategically rebalance toward Asia so that it can continue to maintain its primacy in the region and secure its interests. The approach the U.S. has adopted is to enhance the security and prosperity for the region. However, the U.S.’s rebalance toward Asia may become counter-productive to its strategic intention if some regional countries embolden their claims to the islands disputed with China in East China and South China Seas. Heated territorial disputes between China and other Asian countries could become a source to force the U.S. to confront instead of engage China, and therefore undermine regional security and economic prosperity.

Since the U.S. shifted its strategic focus toward Asia in 2009, nations such as Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, which have island disputes with China in the East China and South China Seas, have also started to step up their claims on the disputed islands and harden their postures against China over these disputes. China, on the other hand, sees these recent bolder claims from the Asia Pacific nations as serious challenges to its territorial sovereignty, and has thus responded with strong nationalistic sentiments, increasing claims over the disputed islands, and equally hard stance against the claimant nations. The heightened tensions and volatile situations that result from these escalations in the Asia Pacific region may spark accidental armed conflict between China and these claimant states.

This paper will argue that although the U.S.’s rebalance toward Asia is to enhance the regional security and prosperity, its stronger presence could embolden some Asian countries to intensify their claims over those disputed islands with China. The U.S. must adopt a fine balancing act in order to prevent itself from being dragged into a direct confrontation with China, while playing a positive role in ensuring regional security. The paper shows that China’s perception of the recent developments in the island disputes has led it to adopt a harder approach against the claimant states. As a result, the island disputes have escalated and could have led to greater instability in the region.

Due to length, for the complete paper, please visit www.FAOA.org
Colonel Andrew Hamann has been selected as the next SDO/DATT in Morocco. He is a graduate of the International Security Studies program at the Naval Post Graduate School (IDE). After learning French at Defense Language Institute (DLI), he served as the Deputy Chief in the Office of Security Cooperation in Rabat, Morocco. He partnered with the Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) in their modernization efforts with the acquisition of Block 52 F-16s, T-6Cs and G550 aircraft. Col Hamann was the U.S. lead for both the 2008 & 2010 AeroExpo in Marrakesh. In addition to numerous FMS, Mil-to-Mil and IMET/CTFP engagements that Col Hamann led as a RAS officer, his OSC team partnered with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to form the first DoD/USAID MOU for coordinated partnerships efforts.

As a RAS, after completing a US Embassy tour, Col Hamann returned to his core AFSC (11F; F-15C Instructor Pilot (IP)) at Vance AFB to become a T-6 IP. The experience as a Middle East/North Africa RAS led to his selection as the 52d Expeditionary Flying Training Squadron Commander in Tikrit, Iraq. In this role, he commanded a combined USAF/IqAF flying training squadron, training new Iraqi Air Force pilots and instructor pilots in the T-6 aircraft. While in command, his squadron flew over 530 combat missions. He briefed the U.S. Commanding General on the topic, “One Airmen’s Lessons Learned on FMS & BPC”. Col Hamann elaborated on BPC while facilitating both T-6 & F-16 FMS to Iraq – a similar modernization/partnership effort that the RMAF/USAF had taken on just a few years earlier.

After leaving the Iraqi theater, he wrote a paper titled, “Partnership Between the US and Iraqi Air Forces“ which was published in the Jan/Feb 2012 edition of the Air & Space Power Journal http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/issues/jan-feb/jan-feb-2012.pdf . In 2012, the RAS DT board vectored him to become a Defense Attaché, and based on the RAS DT recommendation and previous RAS experience, on the 2013 DPO cycle, was selected to become the next SDO/DATT to Morocco. He started language refresher training this spring.
The FAOAM is entering into an exciting new chapter as it is in the process of revitalizing and reconstituting the organization and membership in the Monterey FAO community. The FAOAM recently hosted an icebreaker that brought together over a hundred FAOs and spouses from the Defense Language Institute and Naval Postgraduate School joint FAO communities. The event not only proved the interest for the organization, but also for the desire of incoming FAOs and their families to network and connect across regional focuses and inter-service lines. The last two months have also witnessed a broad changing of the guard for Monterey FAO leadership with the departure and retirement of Defense Language Institute (DLI) Commandant, COL Danial Pick, transition in the DLI FAO Program office, and welcoming of a new NPS FAO chair.

Following on the heels of the winter 2013 Joint FAO Course (JFAOC) Phase I that included a productive FAOA-hosted happy hour, Army FAO Proponent, along with sister services, executed the latest iteration of the JFAOC at DLI-FLC, Monterey, California. The JFAOC continues to magnify in scope and participation. The latest course, given in June, involved over a hundred students from the four military services.

Senior FAO leadership, to include Rear Admiral Douglas Venlet, the Navy's senior Foreign Area Officer, and Major General Fenton, Army Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy (G-3/5/7), provided comments and guidance to incoming FAOs. RADM Venlet communicated the utility and strategy of FAOs stating: “FAOs don’t kick in the door, we open it from the inside.” (DLI PAO) Of note, the JFAOC featured an expanded three-day spouse program, emphasizing the importance of the family team in overseas assignments.

On 27 January 2014, Dr. Laura Junor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, approved the Department of Defense (DoD) Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (LREC). The Implementation Plan operationalizes the vision of the previously signed Strategic Plan for LREC and serves as a catalyst for change by identifying the results-driven elements necessary for goal, objective, and initiative attainment. It also focuses on reducing duplication of effort, identifies how to achieve successful execution, establishes a reporting methodology, and ensures alignment with other DoD strategic documents.

In a memorandum to the organizations that participated in the creation of the Implementation Plan, Dr. Junor thanked those involved in the development of the Implementation Plan, noting their participation in working groups, coordination reviews, and performance measure interviews helped to provide specific, measurable, achievable, and reasonable goals and metrics to gauge success.

The Implementation Plan supports the Strategic Plan’s three goals and is further divided into objectives, initiatives, and measures that demonstrate the achievement of the respective initiatives, objectives, and ultimately goals.

The Department’s Defense Language Action Panel (DLAP), which recommends and coordinates DoD LREC policy and issues and provides recommendations to the Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC), will serve as the forum to receive updates on the Implementation Plan’s execution. Additionally, a tracking tool has been generated to identify the Department’s progress.

The DLAP received its first update on the execution of the Implementation Plan at its January meeting. The DLSC, which is comprised of members of the senior executive service and general officers representing twenty-five organizations, will review the Implementation Plan annually, with a specific focus on measures and targets, and provide any necessary adjustments in response to changing national strategy, resources, and risk environment.
One of our most popular and successful FAOA programs is our Academic Research and Writing Awards at Military Service professional military education (PME) schools as well as the Defense and National education institutes. The FAOA Academic Awards Program serves a number of purposes for the Association, including to promote the organization in the academic arena, boost membership, give FAOs and other international affairs specialists the chance to be officially published and recognized for their academic work, and also to provide our FAOA Journal of International Affairs with a steady stream of high quality articles written by international affairs professionals in an academic environment. The current co-chairpersons of the FAOA Awards and Scholarships Committee are John Krause, Kurt Marisa, and J.B. Shelton.

The 2014 was our 3rd academic year for running the program and we currently have 12 awards. The two newest schools added to our program for 2014 was the Naval Post-Graduate School, the National Defense University's (NDU) Eisenhower School (formerly the Industrial College of the Armed Forces), and the Army War College (first ward presentation slated for December 2014). A representative from FAOA participates in each school's graduation or writing awards ceremony where we present a plaque or other appropriate award, as well as a 1-year complimentary membership or extension in the FAOA. Following is a recap of the 2014 award winners, papers, and FAOA volunteer presenters. Look for the award-winning papers in future editions of the FAO Journal and/or on our website.

The FAOA Major General Lansdale International Affairs Outstanding Research Award is presented at Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for both the Air War College (AWC) and Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) programs. The 2014 AWC winner was international officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Gaudilliere, French Air Force, for his paper titled "From Pivot to Symmetry? Integrating Africa in the Rebalance to Asia". The 2014 ACSC winner was Major Lauren N. Diodomenico, US Air Force, for her paper titled "Land Disputes Unearth Shaky Legal Foundation: Will Liberia's Land Reform Provide Stability." The FAOA presenter of these awards was FAOA Charter Member and Alabama resident, John Fairlamb, Colonol, USA (ret).

The FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs is presented at the Marine Corp University at Marine Base Quantico, Virginia, for both the Marine War College (MWC) and Marine Command and Staff College (MCSC). The 2014 MWC winner was CDR George A. Walborn II, U.S. Navy Reserve, for his paper titled "The Americas in the Balance: National Security Implications of Chinese Influence in Latin America." The 2014 MCSC winner was MAJ Jacob E. White, U.S. Army, for his paper title "The Economics of Nation-Building: Thinking Through the Complexity of the Problem." The FAOA presenter of these awards was FAOA member, Dennis "Flap" Fowler, Colonel, USAF (ret).

The FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs is presented at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode
Island, for both the College of Naval Warfare (CNW) and the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS). The 2014 CNW winner was Lt Col Stephen Patrick Hanley Frank, USAF for his paper on "State Owned Enterprises and Economic Reform in Vietnam." The 2014 CNCS winner was LT Andrew P. Thompson, USN, College of Distance Education, for his paper on "The Violence in the Central African Republic." The FAOA presenter of these awards was long-time member and Rhode Island resident, Michael T. Byrnes, BG, US Army (ret).

The 2014 winner of the inaugural FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs at the NDU EISENHOWER School at Ft. McNair, Washington DC, was LtCol Douglas D. Jackson, USAF, for his paper "The Perilous Road to Sovereignty: Lessons Learned Through Tragedy and Triumph in Timor-Leste." The presenter was FAOA member, Dennis "Flap" Fowler, Colonel, USAF (ret).

The FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs is presented at NDU's Joint Forces Staff College at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) at Monterey, California, was LT Daniel J. Bradshaw, USN for his thesis entitled "Toward a Better Union: Improving the Effectiveness of Foreign Policies." The presenter was FAOA member and Monterey resident, Mark Chakwin, Colonel, US Army (ret).
In military life, the one constant is change.

We know what to do. We’ve been there.

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