COLOMBIA’S FARC
Understanding a Revolutionary Movement

IN SEARCH OF THE HEIRS
Leadership Transitions in Central Asia

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Calling All Problem Solvers

Dear Foreign Affairs Professionals,

The FAO Association recently held a record breaking luncheon with CIA Director, John Brennan as the keynote. We had over 200 attend, which nearly doubled previous attendance levels. Likewise, our happy hour social events, held at the Rock Bottom Brewery in Arlington, have continued to grow and we have enjoyed this format as a terrific way to network. We will continue to host regular socials and leader luncheons, and we welcome suggestions on potential speakers representing the gamut of FAO specialties. If you have a direct connection to a potential speaker, please send us a note at president@faoa.org.

You will notice some dramatic changes to the FAOA Journal with this issue. In true form to the FAO way of collaboration, I have traded consulting services to Portmanteau Media LLC in exchange for their publishing expertise. They have ratcheted up the quality of the layout and also helped to compartmentalize our content for use with a future editorial calendar. It took a little bit longer to get this to press so we are calling it the spring issue. But as you also may have noticed, our issues have had a much higher page count for the past year, so we hope you will bear with us while we continue to improve everything and the editorial process. This is how I see things evolving as a process:

1. **You submit an article to the FAOA Editorial Board**
   - Email your near final draft to editor@faoa.org
   - Article is peer reviewed and minor changes are made
   - If approved, article is placed in queue for publishing

2. **Editorial Process**
   - Articles are grouped thematically and by size
   - Current events and quality of images plays a part in whether an article is elevated in the queue

3. **Layout**
   - Text and images go to layout
   - After layout, draft goes back to editorial board for review

4. **Publish**
   - Issue finalized
   - Sent to printers to mail hard copies and also PDF copy emailed out to FAOA members

In this issue we cover quite a few things including the FAO Shortage, the FARC, leadership transitions in Central Asia, the Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force, foreign television and film studies, New Zealand’s amphibious capability, lessons on diplomacy from the Hainan incident, and a new economic approach to Afghanistan. So thanks again for the many great contributions. We have a continual stream of content coming from practitioners around the globe, making this journal an incredible representation of the foreign affairs profession at the operational and strategic levels. If you thought of contributing in the past but haven’t known what to write, the time is now.

We would like innovative articles that address the looming DoD budget cuts. With dramatic spending decreases around the corner, there is a premium on problem solving. Submit articles on the realities of smart power in a fiscally constrained environment, the fiscal advantages of partnerships with allies and humanitarian organizations, the necessity for FAOs as a cost saving measure as troops are withdrawn and we transition to local military leadership. Write articles with data and clear arguments to solve our greatest problems, and let’s continue to make this journal an amazing resource for our senior decision makers.

Best Regards

Graham Plaster

To connect with Graham Plaster, go to www.linkedin.com/in/grahamplaster
Filling the Gap: How ‘FANCOs’ Address the FAO Shortage

In 2012, the Army initiated the Foreign Area Noncommissioned Officer program (FANCO) to address a critical shortage of Army FAOs.

By SFC James T. Osaer and CSM David S. Davenport Sr.

The Army's global mission has created an increased need for Foreign Area Officers (FAO). FAOs are an invaluable resource for the Army; however, FAOs largely serve the joint military community. According to Department of the Army G1, nearly 75 percent of the total Army FAO force serves in other-than-Army billets. In fact, FAOs are among the Army's most critical shortages. Demand for their services is increasing dramatically. However, the extensive training required for FAOs has resulted in a large gap between needs of the military and capabilities.

In July 2012, Command Sgt. Maj. David S. Davenport Sr., U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR) Command Senior Enlisted Leader, initiated a program that not only helps to augment this increased need, but also allows for a renewed focus on security cooperation efforts that may be neglected at times. That program is the USAREUR Foreign Area Noncommissioned Officer program (FANCO). At each echelon in our Army, to include most staff sections, a commissioned officer is capably advised and assisted in the discharge of his duties by a senior Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) colleague. This NCO support allows officers to draw upon the perspective of the enlisted force, as well as the vast, relevant experience of a senior NCO. Davenport set out to apply these capabilities to the FAO program.

Davenport selected Sgt. 1st Class James T. Osaer and Sgt. 1st Class Roberto A. Gadson to become USAREUR's first FANCOs. Once selected, they attended the first phase of the training process for FANCOs, the Joint Foreign Area Officer Orientation Course. Upon completion of the course, Osaer and Gadson were assigned as FANCOs in the Security Cooperation Division and Multinational Training Division of USAREURs G3. There they worked directly alongside FAO Country Desk Officers. These positions allowed Osaer and Gadson the opportunity to receive on-the-job training and draw experience from these FAOs, while conducting security cooperation missions in support of USAREUR, Command Sgt Maj. Davenport, and leader development within partner nations across the European footprint.

Since that time, the USAREUR FANCO pilot program has gained great momentum and has been recommended to Department of the Army for consideration as a formal broadening assignment for senior NCOs. Thus far it has received very favorable feedback from Department of the Army G3/5/7.

By drawing upon the professionalism, experience, and capabilities of senior NCOs, the FAO program can be augmented and improved. FANCOs will bolster the Army's ability to conduct the strategic, operational, tactical-level, and leader development related security cooperation missions, which are continuously growing. They also provide the opportunity to gather an enlisted perspective on partner nation land forces working to build their NCO Corps.

“Building relationships and partner capacities with the host nation's senior enlisted advisors is an effort often neglected by the Army Attaché or Security Cooperation Officer,” said Col. Dean T. Katsiyannis, Army Attaché; U.S. Defense Attache Office Ankara. “As a result, a large dimension of professional engagement and development is lost. A well-trained, Soldier-Statesman, FANCO could be utilized to capture this often missed opportunity!”

FANCOs cannot and will not replace a formally trained FAO. This program trains the FANCO to conduct security cooperation focused tasks and educates them on security cooperation management. This position should be considered more of a technical expert. There is no language, advanced civil schooling or regional focus involved in the FANCO training plan. Rather, FANCOs draw their experience from time spent within their current theater of assignment, as well as a series of security cooperation management courses that prepares the senior NCO for security cooperation focused positions at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) level. Generally speaking, the FANCO could operate at the ASCC in Europe, USAREUR, and then later conduct another assignment as a FANCO in a separate ASCC anywhere else in the world.

Given the Army’s current state and substantial downsizing over the next several years, this program also presents a fantastic opportunity for a new broadening assignment that will set senior NCOs apart from their peers. The Army is striving for a professional force by strengthening our ranks and promoting a Profession of Arms. We must be willing to create and promote these kinds of experiences and programs for NCOs. This program presents select senior NCOs with the opportunity to perform completely outside their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS); their field of expertise. It can serve as a true measure of an adaptive NCO. The positive effects of this program are not relevant only to USAREUR. FANCOs can directly contribute to the development of our partner nations' leaders, which is an important aspect of the FAO mission.

"A key part of developing human capital with partner nations is the creation and/or development of an NCO Corps," said Lt. Col. John Frick, former assignments officer, FAO Branch. "What serves as a better example than a highly qualified U.S. Army NCO, grounded in the Profession of Arms?"

Frick also said, “As the Army looks to embrace security cooperation as a primary mission set, a FANCO can be a supporting line of effort in that initiative.”

Additionally, the USAREUR FANCO program will help ensure that the Army has a ‘bench’ of qualified, broadened senior NCO leadership that realizes the importance of partnering with other nations. These NCOs will have the experience and knowledge to advise commanders on partnering with foreign nations' land forces, even at the tactical level. The benefits of this program can be seen in combined training missions, deployments, and beyond.

The NCO Corps is the backbone of the U.S. Army, and serves to advise commanders at every level of their placement. Drawing upon this strength, it is a logical and beneficial extension to formalize this role for security cooperation organizations. FANCOs can and should provide advice to senior leaders at the operational and strategic level of our Army. The Army will remain in a situation where supply and demand for FAOs exceeds the ‘bench’ of qualified officers, and FANCOs can help fill that void. This broadening experience will not only develop a pool of qualified FANCOs, but also strengthen the overall NCO Corps as they become our future command sergeants major. From there, the next generation of NCOs is in a position to learn from a senior leader who has learned and applied the power of a coalition force.

SFC James T. Osaer assumed his duties as a FANCO at U.S. Army Europe; G-3; Security Cooperation Division on 10 July 2012.

CSM David S. Davenport Sr. assumed the duties of the United States Army Europe Command Sergeant Major on 3 Feb 12.
Military Economics: The Interaction of Power & Money

Ron Smith's book offers an objective analysis of alternatives to the existing defense infrastructure.

BY STUART RUFFIN

As dramatic budget cuts and a rash of bad publicity challenge the way that the United States pursues its security interests, calls to rethink the structure and tactics of the American security apparatus are louder than ever. But in an arena often filled by conflicting ideologies and strong protectionist sentiments, there is a glaring need for objective analyses of alternatives to the existing defense infrastructure. Ron Smith's Military Economics seeks to provide a backdrop for just this type of analysis by delineating how one can understand military issues from an economic perspective. The result is an insightful and comprehensive survey of the interactions of power & money that define the structure, maintenance, and utilization of a modern military.

In true academic fashion, Smith opens with an outstanding review of key economic, military, and political terminology critical to the reader's understanding of the subject matter. From there he quickly transitions into a series of thorough examinations of the economic relationships surrounding an impressive list of topics, both abstract (i.e. national security, global security, and arms control) and concrete (i.e. budgeting, acquisition, and the employment of military assets). In each case, he demonstrates a striking ability to discuss complex relationships without bewildering the reader with dense terminology or belaboring his arguments. This lucidity is particularly rare in other authors' discussions of defense procurement, making Smith's contributions on the topic especially valuable.

The book's glaring weakness is in its discussion of force employment, morale, and logistics. While the arguments presented in this chapter are convincing, they are broad and far too elementary to offer much useful insight into the economics of military strategy - and in just five pages it is difficult to imagine that Smith expected to provide anything more. This is particularly frustrating when viewed in comparison to the brilliant discussions provided throughout the rest of the book. Still, the weakness of this chapter does not meaningfully detract from the immense value of the book.

Smith's powerful literature reviews, clear and concise writing style, and wide range of historical examples demonstrate his expertise in the subject matter and make this typically dense topic remarkably approachable for academics and practitioners of all levels of experience. This makes Military Economics a perfect introduction to, or refresher course on the economic relationships at work when resourcing a military force. Just as the author intended, Military Economics sets the stage for readers to expand on the relationships discussed and consider how changes can be made to enhance the efficacy of military resourcing and improve outcomes across the defense world.

Readers will do well to remember that this book is not a thriller, exposé, or argumentative thesis. Those looking for prescriptions or dogmatisms regarding how security should be provided will be sorely disappointed. However, the author fully delivers on his promise to explain military issues from an economic perspective. Thus, for readers looking to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the relationships at play in the process of providing security, Military Economics is well worth the time it takes to read (at least once).

INFO PAPER

The Global Center for Security Cooperation (GCSC) is an entity of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, under the administrative oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and physically located as a tenant unit at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. It was established by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to build cohesion among the many Department of Defense international education programs. Its original mission was specifically to enhance the missions of the five Regional Centers for Security Studies, but it quickly expanded to include a consortium of all the major international education and training providers. Today, GCSC helps coordinate the activities of 29 DoD schools, centers, and institutes.

The Global Center serves as an information aggregator. It maintains databases with After-Action Reports, Lessons Learned, and hundreds of Subject Matter Experts, as well as a consolidated calendar showing all the activities of all 29 consortium members. This calendar is far more comprehensive than other tracking tools such as TSCMIS or SANWEB; it includes not only recurring MASP-type courses, but also conferences, seminars, symposia, bilateral meetings, Distinguished Visitor visits, and Subject Matter Expert exchanges. No other agency in DoD consolidates all this information in one resource.

The calendar and databases together form the Common Operating Picture (COP), avail-
The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair

This dark history – more despair than hope – focuses on the last ten years of events in the Congo region.

By Major Arnie Hammari

Michael Deibert’s latest book is The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair. However, there doesn’t seem to be much real hope for the country given the way the author describes human rights abuses, support for despots by international corporations, and the general disinterest of the international community.

The real hope seems to have been the 2006 election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where President Joseph Kabila supposedly ran in a mostly clean election. In 2006 Kabila needed a second round of voting (run-off vote) to win a close election that was closely monitored by the international community. However, the 2011 elections extinguished that hope as the military and government-linked groups literally crushed the opposition.

Perhaps the author was excessively morbid in his final glimmer of hope when he described the death of Katumba Mwanke, and influential advisor to Joseph Kabila, as divine protection for the people of the Congo. Mwanke’s death, according to Deibert, threw off the internal balance of power of the Kabila government and could hopefully create change that would be beneficial to the people.

The book was mostly a sad story of the perpetual abuse of the Congo people that detailed the pre-colonial origins of conflict in the region and the influence of continually interfering neighbors. The focus of the book was on the most recent ten years of events in the Congo region with specific discussion of the ‘Terminator’ Bosco Ntaganda (including his 2013 surrender to the International Criminal Court), the M23 Rebel group, but also continued Rwandan involvement in the Congo conflicts.

Although some sources disagree with Deibert’s simplifications of related conflicts such as with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) scourge of central Africa or UNITA’s fight against the Angolan government, the author did a great job of tying together a very complex situation with shifting alliances, front men, international affairs, and politics of all levels.

I highly recommend this book for a better understanding of the Congo wars and a good assessment of the current situation in central Africa.

Major Arnie Hammari is an Army Foreign Area Officer currently serving as the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in N’Djamena, Chad. He holds Master’s Degrees in International Relations from Boston University and in Environmental Management from the University of Maryland University College. He has previously served as an Army FAO in Uganda and Senegal.
Combing Training Objectives and Maximizing Security

After working in the field of security cooperation for several years I noticed three particular areas that can maximize training resources.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL MCCULLOUGH, U.S. ARMY

1. CONSOLIDATING MILITARY TO MILITARY (MIL-TO-MIL) EVENTS TO MAGNIFY IMPACT.

This was recently achieved with great success in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in an event called “Lion Rouge” (see FAO Association Journal of International Affairs Fall 2013). In this concept, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) requested the component command to concentrate mil-to-mil events in a very narrow window of time. The length of the window is driven by the number of events available and the host country “buy-in.” In the case of the DRC, the OSC used the month of September 2013. By consolidating mil-to-mil events you can create an “exercise like” situation that is as diverse as your requested mil-to-mil events. Additionally, as was the case in the DRC, the event attracted smaller resources that were not sufficient on their own but were magnified during the “event.” In the case of Lion Rouge, we received medical journal donations, conducted a military female sensing session, and several visitors from outside the country observed the engagement. To maximize the benefit of the consolidated mil-to-mil OSC Kinshasa combined Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) training events and held a closing ceremony at a training installation. By conducting Lion Rouge at a location where there are military schools (in the DRC case- Infantry School, Artillery School, Nursing School, NCO School, basic training, and a learning hospital), the mil-to-mil event exposed (trained) a significant amount of key officers to U.S. training techniques and facilitated the “institutionalizing” of the engagement. The un-forecasted cost was $20,000. The total cost was $82,000. Not bad for 26 days of activities, engaging 200 host country military members on seven distinct activities.

2. COMBINING STATE PARTNER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY.

Often ODCs/OSCs facilitate mil-to-mil events based on a series of Country Team goals and/or component command objectives. In many countries the State Partnership Program (SPP) provides the platform in facilitating the vast majority of mil-to-mil events. Some partner nations play an active role in development and some do not. In order to better link training strategies, I propose that OSC chiefs determine when the partner country holds its annual training event or if they do not, introduce an “Annual Training” (AT) event into your dialogue in conjunction with the State Partner. As a possibility, perhaps the U.S. National Guard already conducts an AT so why not include our ATs as part of our U.S. engagement plan. In this model, the exchange could be as dynamic as the partner nation and OSC/State Partner are willing to facilitate. On a very minimalist approach, a partner country can be invited to observe an SPP AT execution. This could lead to a reciprocal visit. On the opposite side of the spectrum, officers and/or units could be physically exchanged during a simultaneous SPP AT and a host country event. If JCATs were available at both locations, command and control could be executed simultaneously exercising the capacity to operate together, across multiple time zones and in different languages.

Whether minimalist or high end, this concept could serve as a platform to focus COCOM Annual Planning Seminars. The discussions held could synchronize engagement events leading up to the AT, addressing training requirements leading up to the event. This would help maximize the Annual Planning Seminar and move away from the typical sharing an assortment of random engagement events and opportunities that often occurs. Most of all, it creates a greater cooperation platform and synergistic event between the SPP, host country, and the COCOM.

3. COCOM TO COCOM MANEUVER CENTER COLLABORATION.

In 2012 USAREUR, via the Multinational Training Division, developed a concept of integrating partner countries into JMTMC rotations. This was an effort to prepare U.S. units and partner nations for deployment to Afghanistan, share combat experience between commanders, enhance the use of a world class training center, and strengthen our partnerships. Partner country participation ranged from the squad level up to multiple companies. Initially, the partner country participation was driven by the U.S. JMTM training scenario based requirements. Since then, partner nations have been able to communicate their training requirement to USAREUR, which has led to a much more dynamic and mutually beneficial training rotation at the JMTM. Some countries paid to participate, others used Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement monies, while others used 1206 or other related funding.

What I propose is taking this dynamic approach to JMTM and EUCOM partnerships and expanding that to the AFRICOM Theater. If the U.S. is facilitating a western European rotation, why not include a unit from AFRICOM partners such as South Africa, Senegal, Morocco, Kenyan, Uganda and/or Tanzania with their traditional European military partner? Africa has several capable partners with experiences that the U.S. can benefit from. Additionally, if this concept is proven valid in AFRICOM, participation in a rotation could be a target to use for long range engagement strategy development. Results of an exercise are a great way to measure U.S. engagement effectiveness. Granted, this will be a challenging task to facilitate logistically and thus the first several iterations would need to be small/simple but imagine the benefit for both CO- COMs if JMTM becomes a hub for a multi-partner approach to JMTM training spanning three continents (if you include the U.S.).

As mentioned above, having a capstone like event such as a multinational AT or a JMTM rotation can help focus and or synchronize our smaller security cooperation engagement events and validate our progress through a capstone event.

Many of my peers have commented about the challenges of synchronizing engagement and aligning to Country Team, COCOM and component objectives. I submit that these three recommendations may facilitate such synchronization.

LTC McCullough is the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (resident) and Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Brazzaville, Republic of Congo (non-resident).
A Gesture of Friendship 80 Years in the Making

It was my privilege to provide to the Italian government historical papers about Italian aviation pioneer Francesco de Pinedo, a gesture which is still rewarding 80 years after de Pinedo’s death.

By Colonel Steve Norton, U.S. Army (Retired)

Francesco de Pinedo touched down his S-55 seaplane in New Orleans, LA on 20 March 1927 — the first arrival of a foreign aircraft on American soil. Serving in the Royal Italian Air Force under leader Benito Mussolini, de Pinedo was tasked with demonstrating Italian capability to the world. And he did just that.

In 1925, de Pinedo and his crew shattered distance records with a 34,000-mile trip from Italy to Japan and Australia. In February 1927, de Pinedo completed an unprecedented transatlantic flight to Brazil, followed by the first aerial crossing of the treacherous Brazilian jungles. In response to Mussolini’s challenge to promote a sense of national pride among Italian emigrants, especially those in North America, de Pinedo set off from South America to make history again — this time by being the first foreign aircraft to land in the U.S. Upon touchdown, de Pinedo was swarmed by admirers and reporters. After a few days of receptions in New Orleans, de Pinedo embarked on a transnational trip visiting major cities along the way, including New York, N.Y., and Washington, D.C.

On 3 September 1933, de Pinedo died doing what he loved. With an international flight plan from New York City to Baghdad, Iraq, his aircraft crashed and exploded just after takeoff.

Fast forward to 2013 when my wife Nancy and I were sifting through items in the estate of James MacRae, a retired Army veteran who served as my commanding officer when I returned from Vietnam. We happened to stumble upon some papers belonging to an Italian by the name of de Pinedo and quickly determined they had historic value. MacRae’s mother, Mildred, was the daughter of MG James MacRae, who commanded the 78th Division in World War I. The papers were acquired through Mildred’s friendship with de Pinedo, which began while she and her husband COL Mixson were stationed in The Philippines in the 1920s.

We contacted the Italian embassy in Washington, D.C., wanting to return the historically important papers to Italy. The embassy appreciated this gesture so much that the Italians insisted on having a ceremony on the 80th anniversary of de Pinedo’s death. We passed the papers to Ambassador Claudio Bisognero during the ceremony on 3 September 2013, who would then pass them to Gen. Defense Attaché Giovanni Fantuzzi.

In a letter sent to Nancy and me, Italian Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Pasquale Preziosa called the act “an unforgettable gesture of real friendship and recognition.” The papers will be displayed in a museum outside of Rome.

Colonel (retired) Steve Norton has filled many senior positions in the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he is now the DIA Director for Security. He is a former President of the Foreign Area Officers Association and is a member of the Defense Attaché System Hall of Fame. Prior to his DIA assignments, Steve was the Senior Policy Advisor for National Security to Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia. Colonel Norton’s overseas assignments included Assistant Army Attaché, Ankara, Turkey; Defense and Army Attaché, Nicosia, Cyprus; and Defense Attaché, Athens, Greece.
A s operations in Afghanistan wind down and we begin to reduce defense in general and the force structure in particular in the face of enormous fiscal pressures, the Civil Affairs Association has seized the moment to help those shaping that process to look at issues impacting the future of Civil Affairs, in order to ensure its strategic value does not go unnoticed.

In addition to the events related to the impending release of the movie Monuments Men, the Association has leveraged a long-standing partnership with the Reserve Officers Association as well as forged new working relationships with the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA), the Global Leadership Coalition, the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the United Nations Association - National Capital Area Peace and Security Committee, and the new Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations at West Point, NY among others, to engage a plethora of players and policymakers from varied professional walks of life to look at emerging issues of strategic interest and see how the military in general and Civil Affairs in particular fits into these larger schemes.

The first of these, concurrent with the Association’s annual meeting, was the Civil Affairs Symposium on “Military Support to Conflict Prevention” held at the Hotel Intercontinental in Tampa, FL on 1 November.

Given that conflict prevention will be the major activity of steady state U.S. foreign and security assistance engagements for years to come, the Symposium looked at ways the military can play a key enabling and supporting role along political-military, civil-military, interagency, public-private, and international lines at regional and country team levels. This is especially true with regard to Civil Affairs and its ability to leverage not only whole-of-government but whole-of-society capabilities found outside government and among international organizations that are at the front and center of long-term conflict prevention.

Following a powerful keynote presentation by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Geoffrey Lambert, former Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, two panels of distinguished subject matter experts discussed what conflict prevention is and how the military, especially the FAO community and Civil Affairs can once again play a major role in sparing the Nation blood and treasure. Among the findings:

- Conflict prevention is a Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) not a Phase 4 (Stability) activity and involves two of the three major missions of the Army (Prevent, Shape, Win) in accordance the Army Force Posture Statement;
- Conflict prevention is a learning activity, especially about what you know least about - look, therefore, to create a wider, networked “learning organization” among civil and military stakeholders as done in counterinsurgency and stability operations;
- Stakeholders should agree more on what “conflict” is than “prevention” - “left” as well as “right” of “bang,” because most conflict prevention can take best effect prior to the outbreak of violent hostilities, when the conflict become much less containable; and,
- Most capabilities to prevent conflict are non-military and non-government - so military operations should look more at how the military supports that rather than leads conflict prevention or sees itself as the main player.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Lambert stated that, “planning is paramount - look 20 years ahead at what peace is supposed to look like in that country and then plan 20 years back; if you can’t find a way back from that goal to the current situation, then you probably ought not to intervene.”

Conflict prevention coordination requires the “big tent” of a strategic narrative that all can come under; additionally, it demands education more than training - for the bottom-up as well as the top-down of respective organizations.

In addition, some critical questions for force planners were identified:

- How do you measure success in conflict prevention (vs. stability operations)?
- How do we build, organize, train, and leverage Reserve Component Civil Affairs and their unique whole-of-society equities for conflict prevention to support “persistent engagement”?;
- How do we improve steady-state relationships with critical partners - especially private sector and international? What kind of platforms can be networked?
- How do you measure success in conflict prevention (vs. stability operations)?

The second major event, held a little less than two weeks later, was in many ways a continuation of that discussion - the semi-annual Civil Affairs Roundtable at George Mason University Founders Hall in Arlington, VA on “Military Support to Peacebuilding.”

Photo from the USMOG-W 20th Anniversary Reception on November 14, 2013 at the George Mason University Founders Hall in Arlington, VA. (Left to right): Congressman Jim Moran (VA, 8th District), U.S. Army Colonel (FAO) Thomas Moffatt (holding recognition award as Commander of USMOG-W), Ambassador (Retired) Donald Bliss (UNA-NCA President who provided opening remarks), and Mr. Ned Kostov (UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] Advisor).
FORWARD

As peacebuilding moves to the forefront of peace and security activities worldwide, how is – or how should – the role of the U.S. military be evolving to this challenge? How do peacebuilding actors view how the military fits into a “whole of society” effort to address “human security” concerns? What is the way ahead on civil-military coordination in peacebuilding?

These are questions a distinguish group of policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in the field began to address at last November’s Civil Affairs Roundtable on “Military Support to Peacebuilding” at George Mason University’s Arlington Campus just outside Washington, D.C.

The military plays a vital enabling role in the transition from conflict to peace in the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, support to civil authority, and security sector assistance – whether these be in post-conflict stability operations or in emerging conflict prevention operations.

However, there are significant challenges to en-
suring military efforts towards mitigating and defeating threats to stability do not find themselves at cross-purposes with the efforts of peacebuilders to reduce and eliminate the drivers of conflict to begin with. The military in general and Civil Affairs in particular need to gain familiarity and operational understanding of peacebuilding concepts, policies, and practices in order to maximize the effectiveness of our comprehensive effort while minimizing the demand for military forces to reach these common goals.

With regard to fostering that all-important steady state dialogue, I believe this Roundtable, as this report explains, was an important step in that direction. But there are many more to be taken. Among these will be the next Roundtable looking at “More than Monuments Men: Supporting Governance in the 21st Century” on March 21, 2014, as well as subsequent Roundtables every spring and fall.

Our sincere thanks go to George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program and the Reserve Officers Association for hosting the Roundtables, as well as our partners from the Civil Affairs Association, Foreign Area Officer Association, the UN Association of the USA National Capital Area Chapter, and the Better World Campaign for co-sponsoring these highly important discussions.

And, of course, our profound thanks to Christopher Holshock and Jeffrey Hoffmann for organizing the Roundtables and writing this Report.

-Melanie Greenberg
President & CEO
The Alliance for Peacebuilding

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Peacebuilding has been a familiar concept internationally, starting with the United Nations in the early 1990’s. According to the 2008 UN Principles & Guidelines, or “Capstone Doctrine,” peacebuilding is defined as:

“a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. [It] is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.”

This past November 14th, the George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program, Reserve Officers Association, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Civil Affairs Association, Foreign Area Officer Association, Better World Campaign, and UN Association of the USA DC Chapter Peace and Security Committee hosted the 19th Civil Affairs Roundtable on “Military Support to Peacebuilding” at George Mason University’s Arlington Campus. The goal of this Roundtable was to initiate a steady-state dialogue between the civilian-led peacebuilding community, represented in the first panel, and the military-led security community, represented in the second, in bridging conceptual, policy, and practical gaps in comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding that linked the two interests. One thing that became clear from the two panels was that the difference between international peacebuilding and U.S. stability operations was not merely a matter of semantics or definitions. Peacebuilding is essentially aimed at addressing the human security needs of communities to transform conflict itself, whereas stability operations tend to look more at state-building and security sector efforts to defeat threats.

This forum also aimed to better introduce the precursory concepts of conflict prevention alone with other socio-economic development initiatives including more focus on reintegration policy in addition to U.S. military investments such as the U.S. Military Observer Group – Washington (US-MOG-W) and another keystopen program known as the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program (SPP).

The Roundtable began with a message from each of the sponsors followed by a keynote presentation from Vietnam War veteran Albert Santoli titled, “From Warrior to Peacebuilder.” Santoli pointed out that, “Civil Affairs are and should consist of the most courageous and competent soldiers you have,

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<th>TABLE 1. THE PILLARS OF MILITARY SUPPORT TO PEACEBUILDING</th>
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<td><strong>Indirect and Infrastructure Support for Humanitarian Assistance</strong></td>
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<td>Military forces support peacebuilding when they respond to civilian requests for indirect assistance such as transporting relief supplies, infrastructure and medical support, and other logistical matters including airspace/port management, water purification, road and facility construction or power generation to support humanitarian efforts. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) guidance on Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) concluded that military forces should not, in principal, provide direct assistance as this can create confusion of civilian and military personnel and projects and increase risks opposing armed groups will target civilians.</td>
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| **Protection of Civilians** |
| Military forces contribute to peacebuilding when they focus on protection of civilians. While the U.S. military has made important advances in preventing civilian casualties, more training in protection of civilians is needed, as this is a distinctly different skill than merely eliminating threats through targeted killing. Military strategies to enhance the protection of civilians therefore rely on more robust multi-stakeholder dialogue with civilian populations to listen to their perceptions and interests in improving their safety. |

| **Peacekeeping and Support to Civil Authority** |
| Military forces contribute to peacebuilding when they take more of a peacebuilding approach themselves, by ensuring that all humanitarian, stability, and peacekeeping related activities should be executed by, with, and through civilian authorities and institutions – international, U.S., and host nation. This would include supporting criminal justice procedures and methods that apprehend rather than kill perpetrators of violence, as this reinforces democratic processes and legitimacy of governing institutions and avoids the 2nd and 3rd order negative impacts that may come from use of deadly force. |

| **Security Sector Assistance** |
| Too often security sector assistance undermines peacebuilding including respect to the three essential elements required: national ownership, national capacity, and a common strategy. U.S. Military forces contribute to peacebuilding by demonstrating the primacy of civil authority in security assistance activities outlined in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 (Appendix A, PPD 23 Fact Sheet). |
because they have to go to places and understand and do things that most other soldiers do not.” As a soldier, historian, journalist, an advisor to the U.S. Congress, a human rights monitor, and foreign policy expert covering complex conflict areas like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Burma, Santilli is a rare example of a longtime peacebuilder who has made the transition from soldiering. He is currently the founder and President of the Asia America Initiative, best-selling author and nominee for both the Pulitzer Prize and American Book Award for History.

The remainder of the forum was divided into two panels that represented both senior U.S. civilian and military leadership including Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, the most recent Chief of Staff for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), currently the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command as well as the Director of the new Institute for Military Support to Governance at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare School and Center at Fort Bragg, NC. Additionally, two guests joined the conversation from the UN, Mr. Stan Nkwain, Head of Policy and Planning, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at the UN Development Program (UNDP) and Mr. Ned Kostov, Special Advisor to the UN Under Secretary-General and Chief for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

**Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.**

- Dr. Lisa Schirch, Alliance for Peacebuilding, Director of Human Security;
- Mr. Stan Nkwain, UNDP, Head of Policy and Planning, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery;
- Mr. Raphael Carland, Department of State, Director for Partnerships, Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operations (CSO);
- Mr. Greg Hermsmeyer, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Center for Civil-Military Cooperation Chief, Operations, Learning and Outreach; and,
- Dr. Theodore Feifer, U.S. Institute of Peace, Senior Program Officer, Academy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding.

Moderated by President and CEO of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, Melanie Greenberg, this panel began with a presentation by Dr. Schirch. She provided a foundational base for the roundtable that defined the different layers of peacebuilding, which are not stability operations and is a strategic whole-of-society beginning at the community level rather than the whole-of-government approach; and secondly, peacebuilding aims to improve human security, much closer to the root causes of conflict. Dr. Schirch also identified the distinction between peacekeeping and stabilization; and highlighted four pillars of military support to peacebuilding (Table 1). According to Dr. Schirch, peacebuilding:

- Works in a range of contexts from latent conflict to intense warfare at the top, middle and community level;
- Involves multiple actors at the top, middle and community level of society – including government, religious, business, educational, tribal and other civilian leaders as well as in some cases, the security sector – and requiring insider leadership and the “whole-of-society”;
- Is locally defined human security as measured by the perceptions of local people;
- Utilizes dialogue and coordination platforms that allow diverse stakeholders to communicate with each other to identify shared interests and key differences to develop complementary efforts including multiple sectors such as humanitarian.
RoundsTable Report

TABLE 2. UNDP AND EARLY RECOVERY FACT SHEET SUMMARY

Building resilience to conflicts and disasters is at the very heart of UNDP’s work. UNDP helps countries prevent armed conflict, alleviate the risk and effects of disasters from natural hazards and build back better and stronger when crises happen. When a crisis strikes, UNDP ensures that while the humanitarian response focuses on the immediate lifesaving needs of a population, those responsible also work towards longer-term development objectives. This approach is known as early recovery.

In 2005, as part of the reform of the international humanitarian system, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (IASC) assigned UNDP as cluster lead for early recovery. Based on the UNDP Early Recovery Fact Sheet, there are two levels. At the global level, UNDP leads the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) which focuses on four main lines of action:

1. Providing direct strategic and coordination support to Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs), Resident Coordinators (RCs), Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) and Cluster Lead Agencies at the country level;
2. Defining and coordinating early recovery work that is not covered by other clusters (e.g., governance, non-agricultural livelihoods); Humanitarian intervention is an obligation of the international community when the impact of a crisis outstrips the capacity of the national authorities to respond adequately. Immediate action is essential to save lives, but there is a wider recognition amongst humanitarian and development actors that early recovery is a vital part of the response. It is critical in allowing the gains of humanitarian action to be more sustainable, to provide a foundation for resilience, and to ensure continuity towards longer-term development objectives.

UNDP supports the early recovery agenda through its leadership of the global cluster on early recovery; its coordination role at the country level; and its programming approach.

At the country level, UNDP helps HC/RCs and the HCT to integrate early recovery approaches into the humanitarian response through the deployment of Early Recovery Advisors (ERAs). ERAs work across the humanitarian community, and help develop common strategies to strengthen the links between relief, recovery and development – including in needs assessments, appeals and the work of all clusters. UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) maintains an inter-agency roster for quick ERA deployment on behalf of the CWGER. More background on the BCPR and their investments and initiatives can be reviewed at the website below.

www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery

assistance, political dialogue, economic development, justice, security sector reform, psycho-social healing, etc.;
• Emphasizes persuasive approaches that address root causes of conflict and deigns to use coercive means to force change – they are unsustainable and create negative 2nd- 3rd order impacts; and
• Uses short-term programs to support long-term efforts with a 10-20 year timeline.

UNDP comments followed with a leading statement from Stan Nkwain that asked the question, “What is the role of the UNDP?” He highlighted the development of the Crisis Prevention Division twelve years ago, which has expanded into the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

However, despite formal efforts and legitimate programs, Nkwain emphasized that peacebuilding is subject to political agendas that highly influence the development of goals and objectives. He also discussed the UN definition of peacebuilding, with origins in the 1970s through Johan Galtung’s work for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. Galtung is considered the founder of the field of peace and conflict studies. While less emphasis should be noted on the title of his book, The Fall of the U.S. Empire–And Then What, more importantly, like he did with the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he predicts an American republic will survive and possibly blossom, but an American empire and its foreign policy will essentially no longer be able to sustain and/or afford conflicts in multiple regions beyond 2020.

There is an international, albeit not universal definition of peacebuilding. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee agreed on the following conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform international practice. The international definition of peacebuilding thus reads:

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”

According to Nkwain, peacebuilding results due to failures in development. This supports BCPR’s designated lead role for early recovery efforts and projects (Table 2).

He emphasized that the lack of funding and resources creates issues, the perception of “military” in peacebuilding activities is not positive in all environments, and the overall nature of conflict has changed highlighting the example of organized criminal networks that lead to conflict and state failure.

Nkwain’s words were further reinforced by Raphael Carland of the Department of State who said the changing nature of conflict is the result of more varied cases combined with diverse kinds of violence in addition to the rise in popular street demonstrations that have the potential to trigger violence and bring down regimes. This was the type of violence witnessed in several countries since the first Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa beginning in Tunisia and Egypt.

Furthermore, Carland said new threats require U.S. responses to be 1) Urgent, with the capability to mobilize and deploy resources quickly, which is the goal of the Civilian Response Corps and network, 2) Concrete, enabling the delivery of
tangible benefits in the short term, and 3) Broadly Impactful, to include the development of successful catalytic programs that affect large numbers of people.

Carland used the case study of Syria, where CSO has developed a network of more than 2,000 Syrian activists, provided over 5,000 pieces of equipment, completed an estimated 488 hours of training to 431 representatives of 198 civilian organizations, and established a secure communications capacity. He finalized his presentation with an overview of CSO’s criteria for prioritized country engagement and noted that each country or regional conflict area is on a case-by-case basis.

This was an ideal opening for USAID’s Greg Hermsmeyer who identified conflict analysis as the first step in the peacebuilding development cycle. To further support Carland’s belief that the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) did not focus on “security and justice,” Hermsmeyer introduced the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. Also known as The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the New Deal was one of the building blocks formed during the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) which took place in Busan, Korea in November-December 2011. More details about the New Deal are summarized in the recommendations below including how each of the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) can be further advocated including integration with the UNDP’s Post 2015 Development Agenda.

Hermsmeyer concluded by asking, “What is the role of the military in the New Deal?” Dr. Ted Feifer of the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) also questioned the military aspect and proposed a debate to revive the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) policy and doctrine, which according to research, the update to Joint Pub 3-07 for MOOTW was 1995. Feifer concluded his presentation with an overview of USIP organization, missions, past and upcoming projects to include several examples of Security Sector Reform activities in Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

NEW HORIZON PROGRESS: KEYNOTE LUNCHEON WITH THE UN DPKO SPECIAL ADVISOR

Joining the Roundtable for a luncheon keynote, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Special Advisor, Mr. Ned Kostov (pictured right) provided an informative overview of DPKO organization in addition to current missions. Given the emergence of “multidimensional peacekeeping” laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2086, which describes peacekeeping as “early peacebuilding,” Kostov’s discussion served as a bridge between the morning panel composed largely of professional peacebuilders and the afternoon panel comprised mainly of U.S. national security professionals. Kostov’s own perspective of peacebuilding emphasized that, while both occur in parallel, peacekeeping is separate from peacebuilding. Kostov described DPKO’s peacekeeping contributions in these three areas of interaction:

- Supporting the political process such as advocacy and passage of a security council resolution that prepares and makes an environment conducive for peacebuilding;
- Assisting peacebuilding missions with varied jobs using equipment procurement practices and solutions and logistics as examples; and,
- Engaging themselves in actual peacebuilding tasks like military observer missions to monitor local security forces and the protection of civilians.

Kostov concluded that peacebuilding and peacekeeping are irreversible, prompted the topic of “conflict transformation” for future discussion, and stressed the important factor in conflict transformation is funding and future impacts of diminished troop contributions guided by Article 17 of the UN Charter.

PANEL 2: HOW THE U.S. MILITARY SUPPORTS PEACEBUILDING

Hermsmeyer and Feifer’s earlier comments set the stage for the second panel, which focused on the military perspective of peacebuilding. Participants included:

- Mr. R. David Stephenson, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Chief, Irregular Warfare Assessment & Integration, J-7 Joint Force Development;
- Colonel Eric Haaland, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Civil Affairs Policy, Office of Partnership Strategy & Stability Operations;

1st Battalion, 294th Infantry Regiment, Guam National Guard soldiers look to assist a woman robbed in a peacekeeping scenario as part of Exercise Garuda Shield 09, at the Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Darat, or Indonesian Army, Infantry Training Center in Bandung Indonesia. Garuda Shield was a two week exercise to bring together Soldiers and Marines from nine Nations to train on the UN-mandated ground-level tasks. Garuda Shield is a continuing series of exercises designed to promote regional peace and security. Training focuses on peace support operations and Global Peace Operations Initiative Certification, a Command Post Exercise, a Field Training Exercise and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Projects. Photo by the U.S. Army.
PSG 1: Legitimate Politics
Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution. Many fragile states, especially post-conflict ones, already face the arduous task of building trust in the state, and public attitudes on the processes that PSG 1 outlines are oftentimes considered to be sceptical at best. As a feature of existing and potential power structures in society, crime has considerable implications for legitimacy. Legitimacy in these contexts stems as much from the health of the state-society relationship as it does from the strength of the state’s capacity.

- Political settlement – diversity in and perception of representation, and its effectiveness, as well as the proportion of provisions in the settlement that are honored and implemented;
- Political processes and institutions – participation in elections and processes, as well as the level of satisfaction with the quality and possibility of participation; and,
- Societal relationships – the number of inter-group disputes resolved by dialogue and/or mediation, as well as the level of trust among people, including between formerly conflicting groups.

PSG 2: Security
Establish and strengthen people’s security. The relationship between crime and violence is not straightforward. It depends on context-specific variables, including interactions between criminal groups and communities; links to and/or approach of the security forces and government authorities; and the levels of competition between various criminal interests and enterprises.

- Security conditions – including violent deaths, assaults, sexual violence, cross-border violence and internal displacement. This also includes the redefining of criminal activities such as the comparison of Al Qaeda leadership to mafia gangster Al Capone or some of the other most wanted crime bosses and drug lords on the world’s INTERPOL watch list. It is time to ask the question how is a criminal terror network like Al Qaeda different from the Sicilian Mafia, American Cosa Nostra, Neopolitan Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Russian Mafia, Albanian Mafia, Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, Montreal Mob, Solntsevskaya Bratva, Clerkenwell crime syndicate, Los Rastrojos, Sinaloa Cartel, and the Juárez Cartel? Religions and faith are not a weapon, instead they are the blessed and sacred right of an individual, which equates to hope and security;
- The population’s perception of security conditions;
- The capacity and accountability of the police and the authorities assigned to monitor police performance; and,
- The population’s confidence in the police and the perception of corruption of the security forces.

PSG 3: Justice
Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice. In fragile and conflict-affected countries, government justice institutions are often relatively new and untested. Similar to the security sector with which they are inherently linked, they are still in need of gaining the confidence of the public. These institutions face the daunting task of increasing both judicial access and capacity, sensitizing the public to legal procedures, and overcoming any ethnic, religious or gender bias.

- Justice conditions – the level of trust in the formal and customary justice systems and the ratio of lawyers to total cases;
- The capacity and accountability of justice institutions – the ratio of public officials tried and convicted to reported cases, the budget allocated to the justice sector as a proportion of total government expenditure, access to the justice system by the general population, and the number of judges; and,
- The performance and responsiveness of justice institutions – the population’s perception of performance and general awareness of legal and human rights.

PSG 4: Economic foundations
Generate employment and improve livelihoods. While it is impossible to isolate specific conditions that directly lead to criminal activity, it is believed that the existence of certain structural factors such as ‘high unemployment, high income inequality, prior exposure to violence, democratic collapse, low gross domestic product and weak institutional capacity’ do contribute to a country’s vulnerability.

- Productive resources and prospects for growth – including access to infrastructure, income inequality among regions and economic diversification;
- Jobs, livelihoods and private sector development – including level of employment, number of new businesses and the share of food in household expenditure; and,
- Natural resource management – including the ratio of local/foreign employment, the existence and quality of the regulatory framework, and perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources.

PSG 5: Revenues and Services
Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery. Limited and uneven access to services is a ‘defining characteristic’ of fragile and conflict affected countries.

- Revenues – state monopoly over and capacity to undertake tax collection, the proportion of tax revenue and how the state’s tax efforts are perceived;
- Public administration – the quality of financial management and internal oversight mechanisms, the budget execution rate, the number of public officials sanctioned for corruption, and the population’s perception of the links between corruption and service delivery;
- Service delivery – quality standards, social spending, the distribution of services, access to services and public satisfaction with service delivery.

- Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command, Deputy Commander and former Military Chief of Staff, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- Colonel Rob Smullen, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division (SWCIWID); and,

Moderated by Alliance for Peacebuilding Senior Fellow and “Blue Helmet” veteran retired U.S. Army Colonel Christopher Holshek, the panel began with a comparison of UN and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) peacebuilding definitions. David Stephenson highlighted that current fiscal realities are forcing the Services to make hard
choices and focus on readiness and maintaining core competencies; resource constraints will challenge the ability to take on tasks or missions outside the “core” portfolio of the Joint Force. He deduced the Joint Force has thus clearly placed “peacebuilding” outside the sphere of U.S. national military strategy goals and objectives, which leads to the core recommendation for DoD generated from the Roundtable; namely:

the need for a comprehensive approach to issues as they relate to peacebuilding and statebuilding, framed in integrated regional and country plans with an appropriate and updated civil-military conflict assessment and analysis, planning, and overall unity of purpose that includes sustainable host nation rule of law and other governance as well as civil society structures.

Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen joined via Skype, and continued advocacy for the framework of this recommendation describing his new position including two areas of focus he has been asked to accomplish and lead as Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command. These include an assessment of transitional military authorities and to conduct a complete joint review of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) for PP-23 security sector assistance activities including peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

General Van Roosen talked about his experience as the Military Chief of Staff for UNMIL, noting that “utilization of the military as part of peacekeeping certainly works pretty well.” While in Liberia, General Van Roosen had close to 9,000 Blue Helmet personnel on mission, including Chinese troops. He discussed examples of using the various aspects of DOTMLPF-P to carry out peacekeeping activities such as the development of an operational order for a national level quick response riot control force.

General Van Roosen highlighted some of the issues he encountered, most notably the cultural differences. He said, “[he] had to learn to do things the UN way,” especially with respect to foreign military cultures vice traditional U.S. military ways. General Van Roosen provided several more comments identified in the recommendations section of this report. He concluded by proposing the challenge of standardization, specifically noting a need to develop standardized doctrine/Training, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) prior to engaging in building partnership capacity (BPC) activities.

Colonel Haaland from OSD stressed that military action is a necessity in non-permissive environments along with the need for sufficient troop levels to control populations. However, he cautioned several factors as a result of military support to peacebuilding stating it is human intensive with high costs including what he called, “sunk cost syndrome.” Colonel Haaland used the example of both Afghanistan and Iraq whose cost levels had reached $3.2 trillion since U.S. military action. He also stated that a $17 trillion debt directly impacts the political will for greater U.S. support to peacebuilding activities and the balance between the Democratic and Republican parties are not helpful saying the Democrats are more interested in domestic social issues versus the Republican interest in debt reduction.

Colonel Haaland echoed General Van Roosen in saying that U.S. military culture is resistant to peacebuilding and peacekeeping (clearly demonstrated in DoD’s decision to create its own definition of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Joint Publication 3-07.3 rather than simply adopting the universal definition of these activities). He closed his comments by introducing a new topic asking if corporate outsourcing of defense-related capabilities was becoming the way of the future. He questioned whether the use of contractors would be more cost effective than use of military personnel. In comparison, according to a GAO report, for peacekeeping alone the dispatch of UN peacekeepers to Haiti was eight times less expensive than fielding a comparable U.S. mission.

Colonel Smullen agreed that tightening budgets in the upcoming years is also impacting the U.S. Marine Corps. Despite these issues, he announced the venerable USMC Small Wars Manual was being updated as well as noted several other Security Cooperation initiatives including the rewrite of the USMC Campaign Support Plan (CSP) for FY14.

Combined with the CSP Col Smullen noted three additional reference documents that define the USMC’s Title 10 responsibilities for security cooperation to include USMC Order 5710.6A; Marine Corps Instructional Publication 3-33.03; and the Security Cooperation Training and Regulation Manual. As Director of the USMC Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division, he is responsible for developing capabilities and identifying divergences, gaps, and seams across the DOTMLPF spectrum. Later addressed in the recommendations section of this Report, a U.S. policy document like the DoD 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the appropriate means to incorporate more focused New Deal related language including cost-saving program enhancements like conflict prevention. U.S. policies like the QDR would further influence and guide Service directives and instruction including USMC Security Cooperation.

Panel 2 concluded with final remarks from Colonel Thomas Moffatt who introduced the U.S. military organization most interconnected with UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding known as the U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W). Established on October 1, 1993, USMOG-W provides command authority, force management and administrative support to the U.S. military personnel assigned in UN Military Observer missions. The Secretary of the Army (G-3/5/7) is the DoD Executive Agent. The goal of USMOG-W is to implement DoD policy regarding personnel, logistics, administration, and force protection oversight (including pre-deployment training) for U.S. personnel deployed to UN peacekeeping missions, and also serve as staff agent for DoD policies for the Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai, Egypt.

As of November 2013, in addition to UN Headquarters in New York, approximately 31 U.S. DoD personnel were deployed to Haiti (MINUSTAH), Kenya (UNMIL), Liberia (UNMIL), Israel (UNTSO), Democratic Republic Congo (MONUSCO), and South Sudan (UNMISS). The MINUSMA mission in Mali was still pending approval after the UN requested 10 U.S. staff officers.

**CELEBRATING 20 YEARS OF SUCCESS FOR USMOG-W**

Following a brief question and answer session with the audience, one closing comment succinctly stated, “The UN is a key element. We need to better integrate.” Later on, a reception honored and recognized USMOG-W’s 20th Anniversary. U.S. House of Representative Jim Moran (8th District, Virginia) reinforced the need to better integrate. He also viewed lack of U.S. participation as a possible threat to national security highlighting recent increases in peacekeeping activity and contributions from the People’s Republic of China, which he viewed as competition. Mr. Ned Kostov from the UN DPKO also offered respectful remarks to Colonel Moffatt and USMOG-W stating, “We’ve heard of you, we know you’re out there and are appreciative of what you’re doing for the UN.”

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

To reiterate, the requirements summary below captures a core theme generated from the Roundtable; namely, the need for:

“A comprehensive approach to issues as they relate to peacebuilding and statebuilding, framed in integrated regional and country plans with an appropriate and updated civil-military conflict assessment and analysis, planning, and overall unity of purpose that includes sustainable host nation rule of law and other governance as well as civil society structures.”

Too often forums like this come and go with words and ideas that fall silent with no opportunity for action. Instead, the level of effort required for this type of conflict transformation reform was best
stated by former U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger: “No foreign policy-no matter how ingenuous-has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of few and carried in the hearts of many.”

This leads to the following three recommendations:

1. **Integrate international peacebuilding concepts and language and appropriate U.S. Government policy goals and objectives across the Department of Defense, in order for the Joint Force to support rather than execute peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks.**

   After a review of the 2010 QDR, while support to peacekeeping operations is highlighted, the document does not include the words: peacebuilding, conflict prevention, or reintegration. At a minimum, the rewrite of the 2014 QDR in-sync with the Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) should include specific language that implements and initiates roadmap development in support of both PPD-23 and “study/consultative-and host level” participation in the UN Post 2015 Development Agenda, specifically the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States that fully accommodates the following peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs).

2. **Continue to conduct a complete assessment and review across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum ensuring transparent and interagency linkages with the Department of Defense, in particular the capabilities of the Joint Force to engage multilaterally and support peacekeeping/peacebuilding.**

   While under the mantra, “policy drives action,” the 2014 QDR revisions would certainly address the “-P” in this spectrum. However, there are other organizational, doctrinal, training including facilities for experimentation, and personnel/force posture tools and factors including Guidance for the Employment of Force (GEF) impacts if peacebuilding integration is accepted by senior DoD leaders.

   There are also existing tools like GMU-POPP’s Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) that can be leveraged to shape appropriate DOTMLPF in all areas of peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peace support.

   Additionally, there are other policy disconnects with international doctrine, especially with respect to organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Association for Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the European Union. Since the Brahimi Report that began the reform of peacekeeping, DPKO has produced a series of documents, beginning with the UN Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations in 2003. Later in 2008, the UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles & Guidelines (“Capstone doctrine”), which established guiding principles and core objectives of UN Peacekeeping operations, as well the main factors contributing to their success in the field including lessons learned. Other documents published by DPKO that could inform the development of standardized U.S. DOTMLPF-P reviews are highlighted in Table 3.

   However, for this to be accomplished appropriately, the UN must engage in the information sharing and be open to constructive criticism even if this leads to a recommendation to decrease and/or transition “legacy” mission areas. This is of particular interest to U.S. politicians, understandably, who often question the return on investment following America’s contributions to UN funding including peacekeeping activities (CIPA).

3. **Update and reestablish a base for country and regional conflict assessment using a coordinated State Fragility Index.**

   This recommendation is at the heart of the New Deal PSGs and addresses another theme generated from the roundtable identified as, “Conflict Transformation.”

   Specific to the New Deal, the International Dialogue in Busan, Korea made two primary commitments that support this recommendation, which include:

   - Enabling country-led and owned transitions out of fragility through country-led fragility assessments, national visions and plans that focus on peace and statebuilding, and inclusive political dialogue. International partners commit to use country compacts as the frame for their collaboration in fragile countries; and

   - Undertaking action to provide aid and use domestic resources more effectively in support of peace and statebuilding priorities, in the areas of transparency, predictability, risk management, capacity development and the use of country systems.

   An ideal model was published by the Center for Systemic Peace titled the, “Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.” It is highly recommended that an updated Global Report be wholly integrated with the International Dialogue on the New Deal for Engagement of State Fragility and Post 2015 Development Agenda activities as they relate to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and statebuilding, and reintegration.

   In comparison to the implementation of the New Deal in the pilot countries of Afghanistan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, below is an excerpt from the Global Report in 2011.

**CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, to repeat a comment during the roundtable, “It’s not about us; it’s about them.” Opposite of U.S. military that is traditionally responsive to conflict after it happens, in security development activities in particular, actors should take a peacebuilding approach that promotes capacity development or what has become known in DoD circles as Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). However, complimentary to supplying a country with a foreign military sale or security training package, peacebuilding also equates to and demands local ownership of both the problems and the solutions, which begins with a shared conflict assessment; this means prioritizing (or sorting) U.S. vs. local national interests and objectives rather than simply concentrating on the former. In both conflict prevention and peacebuilding, it is important to manage expectations constantly in civil-military coordination – tell each other about both capabilities and limitations in order to identify gap areas as well as areas of overlap or duplicity and minimize working at cross-purposes.

Civil Affairs and Foreign Area Officers including those who support U.S. organizations like USMOG-W are the most ideal Joint Force capabilities and activities to enhance peacebuilding as a means to mitigate and minimize the large-scale use of U.S. forces in particular and keep things in “Phase 0” rather than letting them drift into more advanced and expensive stages of conflict, or to more rapidly transition from conflict to peace. In the end, the latter is also not fiscally disciplined, subject to the sunk cost syndrome addressed earlier in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq. In DoD terms, the bottom line is that Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) activities must more conscientiously integrate civilian-led peacebuilding and conflict prevention concepts, policy, and practices and clearly place the military in a supportive role in order to produce more cost-effective outcomes at lower risk and with a greater chance of success for true stability that rewards local populations with jobs, a judicial system to deter conflict “trigger effects,” along with other socioeconomic principles and institutions needed for communities to prosper safely. This, from a DoD perspective, is true strategic economy of force.
Colombia’s FARC: Understanding a Revolutionary Movement

The leftist guerilla group known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) is more than just opportunist criminals.

BY SEAN M. MCCARTHY, LT COL, USAF

For almost half a century, Colombia has been engaged in a relentless battle against a well-organized leftist guerilla group known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC for short). This heavily-armed organization – originally created to defend the rights of the country’s forgotten poor – has several goals. Among them are to overthrow the Colombian government, create a new state founded on Marxist-Leninist principles, liberate the country from the ruling-class elites, and defeat the lawless national military. One of the United States’ staunchest allies, Colombia is a dichotomy of sorts. Not only is it one of our key military and trading partners in Latin America, it is also one of the world’s leading producers of cocaine. The revenue generated from this illicit drug trade is what sustains the FARC – undoubtedly the primary national security threat to Colombia as well as a key antagonist in America’s ongoing war on drugs. It is therefore argued that the second camp's viewpoint is more accurate, making President Santos’ current strategy of embracing peace talks the correct course of action. To defend this position, this paper will provide a brief overview of the FARC’s history and how it built its power. Additionally, it will examine the FARC’s revolutionary behavior during Colombia’s last three presidential administrations in an effort to show that it is much more than a criminal enterprise. Finally, it will provide a short discussion of what the FARC can do to achieve success in its half-century-long battle against the FARC.

BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF THE FARC

To understand the modern FARC, one must turn to centuries of Colombian history. In the early 1500s, Colombia was colonized by Spain, a rule that lasted some three hundred years. During that time, the government was run by powerful elites. The majority of society was rural and the economy hinged on coffee and precious mineral exports to the “Old World.” Since most of the population had no voice in government, dissatisfaction ran high which spurred widespread civil unrest. After Colombia achieved independence in 1819, power was concentrated in two highly-polarized political parties – the “Liberals” and the “Conservatives.” The struggle between the two parties was (and still is) rooted in political and social inequality, particularly the lack of representation for those not in the land-owning oligarchy and commercial-industrial classes. This inequality among social classes and the inability of the two parties to compromise would later provide the impetus behind the creation of the FARC.

Chaos erupted in 1948 after the assassination of a moderate Liberal presidential candidate. His death polarized the country, leading to numerous murders, riots, and extensive property damage throughout the nation. Referred to as La Violencia, this period represents the bloodiest moment in Colombia’s history. It took more than a decade for the violence to subside, after which members of both parties agreed to form a new bi-partisan government known as the National Front. This government outlawed all other political parties – the “Liberals” and the “Conservatives.” The struggle between the two parties was (and still is) rooted in political and social inequality, particularly the lack of representation for those not in the land-owning oligarchy and commercial-industrial classes. This inequality among social classes and the inability of the two parties to compromise would later provide the impetus behind the creation of the FARC.

There is no debating the fact that the FARC began as a small, politically-motivated insurgency that evolved into a very large and complex guerilla organization. Where the debate comes into play for the two competing interpretations is whether the FARC remains at its core a revolutionary movement. This author contends – based on extensive review of literature on the matter – that the FARC is indeed a legitimate insurgency with deep roots in society. It is therefore argued that the second camp's viewpoint is more accurate, making President Santos’ current strategy of embracing peace talks the correct course of action.

Over the decades, two main bodies of thought have emerged regarding the FARC. The first views the organization as one that began with a revolutionary cause but degraded into a violent criminal network of narco-traffickers and rent-seeking profiteers. This group rejects the notion of a peace settlement and believes the only way to deal with this illicit drug trade is what sustains the FARC – undoubtedly the primary national security threat to Colombia as well as a key antagonist in America’s ongoing war on drugs. It is therefore argued that the second camp's viewpoint is more accurate, making President Santos’ current strategy of embracing peace talks the correct course of action.

To defend this position, this paper will provide a brief overview of the FARC’s history and how it built its power. Additionally, it will examine the FARC’s revolutionary behavior during Colombia’s last three presidential administrations in an effort to show that it is much more than a criminal enterprise. Finally, it will provide a short discussion of what the FARC can do to achieve success in its half-century-long battle against the FARC.

BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF THE FARC

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for improved working and living conditions for the nation's poor. In 1961 Manuel Marulanda, a guerrilla leader and key member of the PCC, declared an independent territory known as "Marquetalia." The idea behind the territory was to provide protection and support for agrarian peasants in rural Colombia. The Conservatives viewed Marquetalia as a threat and for several years launched numerous attacks against its people. Hostilities culminated in 1964 when the government launched a major offensive against Marulanda, forcing him and the PCC into the jungle. Shortly thereafter, Marulanda and several guerilla leaders joined forces and started an armed revolutionary movement against the "oligarchic usurpers of power." The movement, which eventually became known as the FARC, appointed Marulanda and a man named Jacobo Arenas as its leaders.

**THE CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT**

The FARC's two founding fathers complimented each other. Marulanda was a charismatic leader with instincts for fighting guerilla-style warfare, while Arenas was an intellectual guerilla-style ideologue. Together they built an organization that became the armed forces component of the CCP. Early membership was low and revenue was generated through extortion, kidnapping, and the taxation of goods and services. The "base" for their grassroots movement came from the disenfranchised agrarian poor and socialist-leaning rebels living in rural Colombia. During its first decade, the FARC could only muster sporadic hit-and-run attacks on government entities because of mounting pressure from the joint U.S.-Colombian counterinsurgency campaign known as Plan Lazo. Yet despite early setbacks, the FARC continued to grow into a well-organized Marxist-Leninist insurgency based on Bolivarian principles.

Unlike other opportunistic criminal groups, the FARC structured itself like a sophisticated military organization in order to regulate its operations and provide oversight of its finances. The top decision makers formed a seven-member board known as the Secretariat. Additionally, a 25-member panel called the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) was created to provide command and control over the FARC's seven regional commands (known as "blocs"). Each bloc commander was responsible for raising money, disseminating information, maintaining public order, and handling logistics within his region.

The FARC originally targeted uneducated agrarian peasants to fill its ranks. However it soon realized it needed to broaden its recruitment beyond this demographic in order to gain greater influence. Thus it looked to the cities — with countless op-pressed laborers and impressionable university students — as areas of support. As the FARC attracted new members from all walks of life, it realized it needed a formal training program to standardize its operations. Regional training facilities were constructed to teach recruits how to attack government interests and a stern penal code was established that prescribed punishments ranging from self-criticism to execution. The seriousness of this penal code cannot be understated, as the penalty for infractions such as desertion, betrayal, fomenting rebellion and drug abuse is immediate death. This reliance on swift justice minimizes the FARC's discipline problems and allows it to maintain control over lower-echelon units. It also indicates the FARC is more concerned with building an institution rather than conducting criminal activities.

Like any organization of its kind, the FARC would be nothing without money. In 1982, members of the Secretariat decided to support coca production to fund its proposed expansion ... a monumental decision that would have lasting implications. The FARC elected to charge the coca farmers a gramaje (farm tax) even though narcotics trafficking went against its ideological principles. These drug taxes resulted in a huge influx of money, which it used to fund rural social programs that the government was not providing. To limit potential corruption, the FARC relied on a system of strict military discipline rooted in fear. It also assigned ayudantías (advisors) to each bloc commander who reported back to the EMC whenever funds were used inappropriately (the typical consequence of such violations was death). Unfortunately for the rest of Colombia, this drug money drove crime, mistrust and corruption to new heights.

By 1990, the FARC had more than 10,000 members and was actively supported in 622 of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities. Believing it would never be recognized as a legitimate political entity, the FARC decided to increase the level of violence to achieve what it could not obtain through peaceful participation in the political process. Key to its plan was the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia, an aggressive eight-year political-military strategy designed to triple the size of the FARC and rally support for the insurgency. The organization's popularity grew well under the campaign, helped in part by the government's lack of attention paid to the rural areas and the FARC's focus on security and social programs. Although some of its goals were not achieved, by all accounts the strategy was a success. By 1998, the FARC controlled more than 40% of Colombia’s territory. Many consider the late 1990s the height of the FARC's power and the point where Colombia was closest to becoming a failed state.

**MORE THAN JUST OPPORTUNISTIC CRIMINALS**

Throughout the FARC’s history, Marulanda and Arenas sought to legitimize the organization as a belligerent and gain recognition as an independent government under the Geneva Conventions. They argued it was their right to create a separate republic because they controlled territory and had an organized armed force. However critics contend once the FARC entered the drug trade, it abandoned its ideological principles and became a criminal enterprise that didn't deserve to participate in the political process. Unfortunately reality is not that simple, and saying the FARC is nothing more than a criminal network overstates the matter. This is because it did not originally start out intending to traffic drugs. Rather, its need to expand (through any means necessary) drove it to the country's most lucrative commodity. The hefty profits from narcotics fueled its revolutionary agenda and allow it to project power into the periphery, both of which are needed to maintain influence over its base. Therefore the FARC's reliance on the drug trade should be seen as a means to an end. The drugs simply provide the institutional wealth needed to further its political objectives.

Since the Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia ended in 1998, there have been three presidential administrations in Colombia and each, in varying degrees, viewed the FARC as a criminal enterprise. However it is important to guard against this, especially when it comes to lumping the FARC in with Colombia's other drug groups. Traditional narco-traffickers are nothing more than free-market capitalists motivated by financial gain. This is not the case with the FARC, which is organized around a central revolutionary cause — to create a government of the people. If the FARC was just another criminal group, it would have adopted a lower profile to avoid contact with the state. Moreover, typical narco-traffickers look to maximize profits by reducing costs. Seeing the peasants not as long-term assets, they rob and mistreat the farmers in order to get the lowest prices for the crops. Again, this is not the case with the FARC, whose socialist ideology dictates institutional wealth and equality over maximizing profits. From the FARC's perspective, the peasants are its greatest strategic asset.


In October 1998, Conservative party member Andrés Pastrana was elected president in the closest election in the nation's history. In an effort to shore up declining U.S. support over Colombia's ineffectiveness in combating its drug problem, Pastrana took negotiations with the insurgents to a whole new level. He offered broad concessions to the
guerrillas and honored a campaign promise to try and reach a peace settlement. In a public announcement, he stated, “For peace, I will risk everything.”

Several events occurred during Pastrana’s presidency that appeared to give the FARC official recognition as a political actor rather than a criminal enterprise. One happened prior to the president’s inauguration, when Pastrana called for a meeting with Marulanda to discuss the prospects of peace. Another, and perhaps the greatest indicator the president saw the FARC as a legitimate entity, was his decision to grant the organization temporary control of a 16,000 square-mile safe haven in southeastern Colombia (a cease fire was never declared beforehand). Known as the despeje, this area was the size of Switzerland and represented 4% of the country’s landmass. Pastrana promised to keep this area off limits to government forces for 90 days, but the period was extended several times throughout 2000 and 2001. This move was very unpopular with the Colombian military, since it feared the FARC was better equipped and would use the safe haven to regroup and train more recruits.

Pastrana believed peace with the FARC was a prerequisite for success in the drug war. He made a concerted effort to end Colombia’s coca production by asking drug-consuming countries to contribute to a South American version of the Marshall Plan. One element of his program, known as Plan Colombia, involved spending billions of dollars in rural areas to develop roads, schools and businesses. He hoped the peasants who grew coca out of financial necessity would be willing to switch crops if their economic situation improved. However the key to Pastrana’s plan rested with the FARC, since it was the only organization that “had the credibility, manpower, and organizational ability among the coca growers to make crop-substitution programs stick.”

At a meeting in Costa Rica, the FARC’s chief negotiator, Raúl Reyes, seemingly acknowledged the merits of Plan Colombia. He told a U.S. State Department representative that, given the necessary economic investment, the FARC could help eliminate the drug crops within five years. This meeting offers important insight into the true nature of the insurgency. The fact that the FARC hinted at giving up its involvement in the drug trade in return for greater government investment in the rural areas demonstrates it is not simply a narco-trafficking criminal organization. In this case it stayed true to its founding principle of promoting the welfare of the agrarian poor.

One of the major problems with Pastrana’s peace process was that it began without first declaring a cease-fire. Consequently, periods of “silence” were routinely interrupted by FARC attacks on government interests. This meant the rebels often arrived at the negotiating table with the upper hand. Why this schizophrenic behavior of talking peace while making war? Some argue the FARC was never serious about peace and only showed interest in the process to acquire the despeje. Others claim it had no incentive to negotiate because it believed it was winning the war. This author contends both arguments are true, and the reason the FARC stretched out the negotiations was to buy time to reconstitute its forces in order to deliver a final blow against a failing state. Moreover, if the FARC was just a criminal organization, one would expect it to drag out the peace process in order to maximize profits from the drug trade. There is no evidence this was ever the case.

Unfortunately by late 2001, hopes for peace finally collapsed. The FARC’s continued pursuit of violence and the military’s opposition to the peace effort put pressure on Pastrana to end the negotiations. “After three years of unsuccessful peace talks and eleven extensions on the despeje’s lease, the Pastrana administration had nothing to show for its efforts. However if the government learned anything from its experiences ... it was that the insurgency would not negotiate in good faith unless a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ or balance of power which favored the state existed.” In light of this, a majority of Colombians – feeling betrayed by the FARC’s disingenuous effort at pursuing peace and the government’s mismanagement of the process – decided it was time for a more aggressive approach. In May 2002, the citizens voted in the hardline independent candidate Álvaro Uribe as president.

THE URIBE PRESIDENCY (2002-2010)

President Uribe ran on a platform to take the fight directly to the insurgents in order to restore citizen confidence in the government and regain control over the entire nation. Uribe viewed the FARC as a criminal organization and was prepared to fight with all the nation’s resources at his disposal. His plan called for the government to reassert its sovereignty over guerilla-held territories and provide security to all sectors of society. However to do this, Colombia’s military and police forces would need to be significantly strengthened.

To finance the modernization and reformation of the military and national police, Uribe increased government spending on defense and implemented a war tax. The U.S. also played a significant role, having contributed $4.5 billion to Plan Colombia by 2004. To help boost its popularity, the Colombian government secured several large tracts of FARC-controlled land, which it redistributed to poor farmers. This measure, along with the president’s focus on counterterrorism and increased investment, quickly paid off. After just two years, the police had a presence in each of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities and homicides fell by 18%. Additionally, over 3,500 paramilitary members were demobilized and the rate of kidnappings drastically declined. Yet despite the government’s impressive gains, the FARC remained a considerable threat. An organization solely devoted to crime would have certainly folded under these conditions.

Presidents Bush and Uribe pushed hard in the wake of 9/11 to have the FARC designated a terrorist organization. In 2002, Bush authorized U.S.-pledged funds for Plan Colombia to be used directly against the FARC. Prior to this, U.S. money could only be used for counterdrug purposes. With better training and more sophisticated equipment, Colombia’s military grew increasingly competent in its counterinsurgency campaign. Additionally, the military’s increased presence throughout the country yielded actionable intelligence that it used
Presidents Bush and Uribe pushed hard in the wake of 9/11 to have the FARC designated a terrorist organization. In 2002, Bush authorized U.S.-pledged funds for Plan Colombia to be used directly against the FARC.

to inflict significant losses on FARC leadership. For example, Simón Trinidad – the third ranking member of the EMC – was captured in January 2004 and eventually extradited to the U.S. In early March 2008, two members of the Secretariat were killed – Raúl Reyes in a cross-border raid in Ecuador and Iván Ríos by the hand of his bodyguard. Just weeks later, the FARC’s leader (Marulanda) died of a heart attack. Although his death was not the result of military action, the loss of a founding father represented another significant blow to the insurgency.

As the Colombian military made advances into guerilla-held territory, it observed signs the FARC was more than just a criminal organization. In many of the isolated villages, it discovered evidence the insurgents were attempting to create shadow governments under a plan called New Colombia. John Baylis, a noted expert on revolutionary warfare, contends that most insurgent movements establish parallel governing institutions to act as focal points for gaining public loyalty. These networks provide a degree of legitimacy for the revolutionary forces while eroding the legitimacy held by the government. There are numerous examples of guerilla organizations predating the FARC (Mao’s Red Army, Giap’s Vietnamese People’s Army) which created these “states within states” to win over public opinion.

Under New Colombia, the FARC successfully established itself as the de facto governing authority in many rural areas. Its efforts to assert control over the local populace and create a political entity in direct competition with the government illustrates the FARC was interested in becoming its own nation state. To help achieve this goal, the FARC implemented several measures such as mandatory identification cards for all residents and social regulations that governed citizen behavior. It even went so far as to create a monetary system based on the coca leaf. The fact that the FARC attempted to create political structures resembling those of a traditional government supports the argument that it is a revolutionary organization that desires political power ... not a criminal enterprise.

Not only were government attacks having a tremendous impact on the FARC, but several internal factors helped erode the ideological commitment of its base during the Uribe presidency. First, the FARC lost several key members of its leadership positions difficult to fill with equally-qualified replacements. Second, the quality of recruits noticeably dropped as more under-aged children filled the ranks and struggled to cope with the psychological horrors of war. Third, 90% of its soldiers were illiterate and possessed little primary school education. Although competent warriors skilled in guerilla tactics, many were unable to comprehend the organization’s complex ideological beliefs. Finally, the FARC was forced to cut back on most of its regular political meetings due to increased operations tempo. As a result, many new recruits weren’t properly indoctrinated into FARC ideology and struggled to grasp the political and social needs of the people they were defending.

A sense of frustration amongst the FARC’s base reached new heights during this time. Many complained about the guerrillas’ below-average intelligence, extreme shortsightedness, and lack of dedication to the peace process. Anti-FARC rallies (both domestic and international) as well as condemnation over its use of kidnapping became commonplace. Even Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (long considered a FARC ally) called upon the rebels to lay down their weapons and end the practice of kidnapping. Public opinion towards the FARC reached new lows while polls for the president and his counterinsurgency strategy showed unprecedented support (when Uribe left office he had a 75% approval rating and 82% supported the way he handled the guerrillas). By all accounts the tables appeared to have finally turned for Colombia.

THE SANTOS PRESIDENCY (2010-PRESENT)

There is no disputing the fact that the FARC has been substantially crippled by the government’s ongoing military campaigns. Plagued by deaths, captures, desertions and low recruitment numbers, the organization is now estimated to have less than 10,000 members (down from its high of 18,000 in the late 1990s). Nevertheless, its jungle hideaways continue to provide protection for its ongoing illicit activities, allowing it to ratchet up the violence in areas still under its control. Additionally, the FARC has recently formed alliances with other cartels and paramilitary organizations. Although these alliances are often temporary and fragile, they do add another dimension to the conflict.

The 2010 election of President Santos marked a defining moment for Colombia’s future. During his campaign, he indicated he was willing to implement a “multi-faceted approach” which included resuming peace talks with the FARC. Santos argued the military-centric policies of President Uribe, although effective, would not be enough to permanently end the insurgency. As such he advocated pursuing a comprehensive strategy of negotiations with an emphasis on nonmilitary solutions.

Undoubtedly Santos wants to go down in history as the president who finally achieved lasting peace with the FARC.

However, his desire to move away from the hard-line policies of his predecessor should not be misinterpreted as an unwillingness to use strong military force against the rebels. In fact, from the surface there appears to be very little difference between either presidents’ approach to military operations. The Santos government continues to bring the fight directly to the rebels, achieving noteworthy results such as the September 2010 air strike that killed “Mono Jojoy,” the FARC’s second in command. This high-profile death forced the FARC’s new leader – Alfonso Cano – to implement radical change. For example, the FARC disbanded its large
camps and disbursed into groups of less than twelve persons to avoid being targeted. Additionally, the rebels pushed out into the periphery, seeking the protection provided by the security vacuum existing along Colombia’s southern borders.

Unfortunately for the FARC, this change in strategy was not enough to halt the government’s advance. In November 2011, Cano was killed in a military raid, which Santos says “represents the most devastating blow this group has suffered in its history.” Following the raid, the president called upon every member of the FARC to demobilize immediately. Not surprising, the guerrillas refused and vowed to press on with more attacks. Nevertheless, Cano’s death made the president feel he could enter peace negotiations from a position of strength. However not wanting to repeat the failures of the Pastrana administration, Santos clearly stipulated there would be no halt to the government’s offensive until a formal ceasefire was signed.

With respect to the most recent peace process, it appears the FARC may be willing to make good this time around. In January 2012, the FARC’s newest leader “Timochenko” wrote a letter to the president indicating he wished to engage in peace talks. The letter, which reveals the FARC’s revolutionary spirit is still alive, proposed a broad agenda that went far beyond the conflict. Timochenko wished to discuss a wide range of policies including privatizations, deregulation, freedom of trade and investment, and environmental devastation. In a goodwill gesture, the FARC leader also agreed to release all remaining security force hostages. This was in line with the announcement the rebels made at the beginning of the year of their plan to release all hostages and discontinue the practice of kidnapping.

By mid-November 2012, enough had been done by both sides to demonstrate each other’s commitment to peace. Formal talks were held in Oslo, Norway followed a month later by the FARC’s declaration of a two-month unilateral ceasefire – the first such truce in more than a decade. The delegation also met in December 2012, this time in Havana, Cuba.

One has to wonder if Timochenko’s letter to President Santos represents more insurgent rhetoric or is a genuine call for peace. Considering the government over the last two decades has taken significant steps to address the very issues he mentioned, it is most likely the latter. Given that an insurgency without a cause is not an insurgency, it seems likely the FARC finally recognizes that many of its original grievances are largely resolved. Consequently, the only way it can now become a legitimate member of the political process is if it agrees to peace. And since most Colombians are desperate to see an end to this conflict, odds are they will be very generous towards the FARC if it takes such a step (again, more evidence it is not just a group of narco-criminals).

SO NOW WHAT?

Colombia represents a strategically important country that is arguably our closest ally in Latin America. Moreover, security in the region depends on a strong Colombia – a resilient and democratic society that has successfully defeated its arch nemesis: cocaine. It is not surprising the United States’ commitment to Colombia has grown significantly, especially considering the close connection between terrorism and the drug trade. In the last twelve years, this commitment has produced tremendous results. Specifically, violence has fallen to its lowest level in a generation, government presence has returned to every municipality, and economic growth has spurred development on all fronts. Yet despite these impressive gains, narcotics trafficking remains a significant threat that has the potential to undermine several years of progress.

Defeating the FARC once and for all will not be easy. As this paper revealed, the FARC is much more than a band of narco-traffickers and rent-seeking profiteers. Consequently, treating it as just another criminal organization is a mistake … this has been done before and has failed to achieve positive results. The Santos administration recognizes this fact and its multi-faceted approach to combating the FARC (negotiating peace while keeping its military options open) appears to be working and must be continued. It is therefore in America’s national interest that Colombia handles the FARC as a legitimate insurgency rather than a criminal entity.

So what can America do to help Colombia achieve success? Joel Day of the Korbel School of International Studies contends the U.S. must support counter-insurgency programs that bring the FARC’s true believers into the political process while “flipping” its remaining members. To do this, the Santos administration must capitalize on the major disconnect that currently exists between FARC leadership, its soldiers, and the insurgency’s base. This means the true believers must be separated from those who have little interest in the insurgency and be allowed to peacefully participate in the political process. An open invitation to rejoin civil society would capitalize on the fact that many FARC members still wish to be involved in building schools, paving roads, and increasing the quality of life of its supporters. As such, Colombia must be willing to treat these ideologically-driven FARC members as patriots rather than criminals.

With respect to the non-ideologically-defined rebels, the government must focus less on eliminating them and more on facilitating their defection. Programs of reconciliation and integration will help win their hearts and minds and convince many to flip from the FARC. Additionally, they must be offered realistic alternatives to the drug trade. If jobs aren’t readily available, the government must step in with monetary incentives. However it cannot end there since permanently flipping the insurgents is far more complicated than just paying their bills. If Colombia can get the rebels to defect, then measures must be in place to keep them from going back. Consequently, the very non-monetary incentives the FARC used to recruit its members (comradeship, security and respect) must be offered by the Colombian government.

Thanks to the progress made during the past three administrations, Colombia stands a real chance at finally defeating the insurgency. The above recommendations will only enhance this effort and should be considered by Colombia in its campaign against the FARC. The time has come for Colombia to make the FARC an offer it cannot refuse . . . and the FARC to finally accept.

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In Search of the Heirs: Leadership Transitions in Central Asia

Leadership transition in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have the potential to be defining moments for the region, and to have major impacts on regional stability overall.

BY MS. GALINA KIM

This paper seeks to examine possible succession scenarios in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. All three countries are vulnerable to major changes in their political leadership. Profound weaknesses in these authoritarian regimes include undeveloped political institutions, a lack of political reforms, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the repression of any opposition, and the growing frustrations of their respective populations. The succession scenarios in these countries have the potential to be defining moments for the region, and to have major impacts on regional stability overall. This paper does not intend to predict future successors. Rather, it briefly discusses major groups and some key players who may influence successions, and it presents a few possible scenarios and outcomes that these transitions may have.

SUCCESSION IN KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan’s political elite is a blend of Kazakh historical unions, Soviet system arrangements, new business networks, and family ties; this mix is referred to as a clan or a group of influence. Ethnic Kazakhs are traditionally divided into three zhuzes (tribal unions): the Elder, Middle, and Younger. The zhuz is not a clear-cut entity. The Elder zhuz historically held power, and today, the Elder zhuz has become dominant again. Another aspect of the Kazakh elite is a relatively united core of political elite at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, since independence, President Nursultan Nazarbaev has been able to build a patronage system, which includes a closed upper-level of aristocrats loyal to the president’s family; a narrow circle of apolitical technocrats who serve to safeguard the economic system; and a vast and competitive level of diverse “replaceables” or clients, who are “politically illegitimate for power” and, therefore, loyal to their patrons and who can be used to fill the upper ranks when needed.

Although clans struggle for power in the security services, a new tradition among Central Asian rulers is to maintain a Presidential Guard as the strongest, best financed security force in the country. The Guard duplicates some of the work of other security agencies, and controls access to information for the president. The “Islamic factor” plays an insignificant role in Kazakhstan’s politics at present time.

Among Central Asian ethnic groups, Kazakhs are considered “not real Muslims” because of their mixed religious culture. Islamic extremism is widely condemned among Kazakhs due to relatively good economic conditions and traditional religious diversity. Islam is becoming more popular, however, especially in the south, and the diversification of Islam is growing in Kazakhstan.

Although all the above factors will have impact on the power transition, President Nazarbaev is the top decision maker in the country. Therefore, if he is still alive, he will be the one who orchestrates his succession. All the top influence groups are interested in a smooth transition, and a manageable and compromising candidate. Based on Russian and Central Asian media, currently the best known influence groups include the following:

THE CENTRAL GROUPS

- This group is dominant in the government and will therefore most likely produce the successor. Among the candidates from this group are:
  - Timur Kulibayev, the second son-in-law of President Nazarbaev, married to his second daughter. Kulibayev has been known as an “open Gray Cardinal” because of his economic power, and he has a strong network loyal to him. He is still very powerful; however, his influence decreased after riots in Zhanaozen in 2011. During the 20th Independence Day celebration, violence broke out in the oil-rich town of Zhanaozen. In response to unrest organized by thousands of previously fired oil workers, the local police opened fire. According to government officials, 17 protesters were killed.
  - Dariga Nazarbaeva: The oldest daughter of the president has some political weight and enormous interest in politics, but as is typical in any chauvinistic society she is not a likely candidate for succession in Kazakhstan, due to her gender.
  - Bulat Utemuratov is known as an “underground Gray Cardinal”. He does not express any political ambitions, and he appears to be very loyal to President Nazarbaev. Utemuratov is also regarded as too powerful and can become dangerous to the rest of the elite. This can unite the elite against him. Although not on the “front line”, he will be important figure in the succession process.

THE WESTERN GROUP

- This group is not united; it is more a combination of subgroups. Also, an important factor is that the Western region is rich in oil. If the group gained political power, the rest of the elite order could be destroyed. Although the Younger Zhuz has historically been considered illegitimate for supreme power, there are a couple of very strong power-holders. However, they are not leaders of the Western group, but rather are more interested in strengthening their own individual positions.
  - Immangali Tasmagombetov (Younger Zhuz), a mayor of Astana, is known to be confrontational, and would try to monopolize power if given the chance. He is also not the right person for the rest of elite.
  - Aylan Musin (Younger Zhuz) has long had presidential ambitions. It is very unlikely he would be backed by the majority of the power-holders.

The Korean group is headed by Vladimir Kim. His Korean ethnicity makes him illegitimate in the political arena, but economically he is very influen-
Another reason why President Nazarbaev might support Masimov would be his long-term goal of placing one of his illegitimate sons in power. Masimov is forty-seven now. If he can hold on to power for twenty or thirty years, he could protect Nazarbaev family interests and help one of President Nazarbaev's illegitimate sons take power. Whether this is Nazarbaev's plan, and whether Masimov would be willing to do it, are open to question.

Possible Outcome: The reaction of the Kazakh elite to Masimov becoming president could be outrage, especially among nationalistic elements such as Tasmagambetov, Musin, the southern leaders, and others who might unite against him. The best way to prevent an elite coup would be Nazarbaev's continued presence in the government during the first years of Masimov's presidency. Kulibaev's support and network would also be important guarantees to maintaining power. They have strong ties, and Masimov has been Kulibaev's protégé.

Masimov, as a compromiser, would be suitable to most of the elite. He might also be a successful buffer between feuding groups. The non-Kazakh elite, who still play an important role in the economy, would support Masimov. He also has strong credentials in terms of international politics, and is an acceptable candidate for both Russia and China. An ethnic Uyghur coming to power could be presented as a victory of democracy and equal opportunity.

Possible Outcome: This scenario would be less likely to occur if Nazarbaev's health should worsen unexpectedly. Taking into consideration Nazarbaev's desire to stay in power as long as possible, this scenario could also be risky. However, there is a chance that Nazarbaev would orchestrate a power transfer to a candidate outside Nazarbaev's family. In such a role, he would be able to preserve the power of the family.
Tajikistan is a fractured society, and clans play a decisive force in Tajikistani politics. The central government has no control over some areas of the country.
sector. Many people consider his methods as a new type of collectivization.

Possible outcome: A Mirziyayev regime could be terrifying. An obvious supporter of an iron-fist approach and strong central control, Mirziyoyev would likely strengthen his personal position and try to obtain absolute power. Repression and arrests would intensify. Any uprising would be violently suppressed, if not en mass, then with severe selective punishment. His lack of political skill would cause problems for Uzbekistan in international circles. It could be expected that Uzbek-Tajik relations would only worsen, and might escalate to war.

Rustam Azimov, the First Vice Prime Minister, is the other potential successor. Azimov, a member of the Tashkent clan, speaks Uzbek, Russian, and English, and according to some sources, he also has a Master's Degree from Harvard University. Azimov is known as a goal-oriented person, who can lead a team in a civilized manner. He has a reputation as a "liberal" reformer. Despite Azimov's significant financial power, some experts do not consider him a realistic candidate for succession. First, Karimov most likely prefers a clan-neutral successor. Second, to maintain power, Azimov needs stronger connections with the Samarkand clan. However, Azimov has been helping with Gulnara and the rest of the presidential family's finances. There are also reports that Azimov's strong relationship with the current head of the SNB clan, which increases his chances for the presidency if Inoyatov remains powerful.

Possible outcome: Known as a pro-Western reformer, Azimov is a businessman, however, regardless of his possible personal desires to reform the economy of Uzbekistan, he would be a hostage of the current system; and Azimov would bring more people from the Tashkent clan; however, he most likely would try to build a circle of technocrats in the government, similar to methods in Kazakhstan. Power would still be in the hands of the elite, but the technocrats would bring "fresh blood" into the tight circle of the Uzbekistani government. Once Azimov became strong, he might be able to soften the regime in the long run.

Unmanaged succession scenario: Although the power struggle in Uzbekistan will be furious, all Uzbekistani elites understand the danger of an "explosive" situation in the country. It is easy to lose control of the masses, especially under conditions of "underground" Islamic movements, local ethnic conflicts, widespread unemployment, a declining educational system, poverty, and repression. Therefore, there is a strong possibility of a "palace coup" in the case of Karimov's sudden death. Mirziyoyev (Samarkand clan) and Azimov (Tashkent clan) probably would be among the prime candidates for the presidency. However, these would not be the only candidates from the clans. It is possible that the clans would agree on a neutral person, who does not have strong clan ties. The SNB clan could be a guarantor of a peaceful resolution, if it remained clan-neutral.

There are also two conditions that would be desirable for a safe transition. First, summer is a good time for transition, due to a large number of young men migrating to Russia and Kazakhstan to work. The Uzbekistani government is using worker migration as an outlet for social and economic frustrations. Second, any leadership transition has more acceptable, if it is conducted before, or soon after, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, before transnational Islamic militant groups regain strength in the region. In any case, the public would not know about Karimov's death for a while.

This would give the elites time to establish public order and come to an agreement in the transfer of power.

Leadership succession in Uzbekistan could create a dangerous situation that might lead to uprisings and bloodshed. Almost half of the population of Central Asia lives in Uzbekistan, and much of this is concentrated in the south. The people suffer from socio-economic pressures and repression. Uzbekistan's population does not have the war memories that the people of Tajikistan do. Karimov and the leaders of clans could easily lose control in any protracted power struggle. Located in the "heart" of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is a time bomb that can explode at any time, igniting the entire region.

**SUCCESSION IN TAJIKISTAN**

In contrast to those in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the political elite of Tajikistan is post-Soviet, and was formed primarily as a result of five years of civil war. Tajikistan is a fractured society, and clans play a decisive force in Tajikistani politics. The central government has no control over some areas of the country. While today the president's family and clan control most of key economic sectors, many Tajikistani power-holders have some independent financial sources and maintain an armed security force. Many high-level officials directly or indirectly acquire income related to drug-trafficking.

Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon is 59, and has some time to prepare for succession. He balances power through several mechanisms, including staying away from select elites and their regions of influence, conducting administrative rotations within the government, eliminating or marginalizing some key players, promoting inter-elite marriages, and others. The regime takes advantage of the low level of mobilization among the population, and uses work migration abroad as an outlet
BALANCE OF POWER

for social and economic suffering. Some sources estimate that close to one third of the male population works in Russia, giving the latter leverage against the Rahmon regime.

In Tajikistan a part of the Islamic force, represented by the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has legitimate political power as a result of the 1997 peace agreement that ended the civil war. The influence of Islamic movements on the political situation will continue to grow, due to the emerging younger generations, which have neither a Soviet mentality nor faith in the government. If so, the current government will have to satisfy the growing religious demands of the population. If the government fails to reform the country’s economy and continues to dismiss the needs of its citizens, the IRPT, or a radical Islamic force, may come to power. In addition to a religious and political agenda, the current IRPT leader, Muhiddin Kabiri, is focusing on social and economic projects, including charitable work. Although the movement’s traditional supporters are from Rasht, Khisar, and the Pamir regions, the Islamic Party’s popularity is growing around the country and among Muslim migrant workers abroad. However, this strategy has widened a gap between conservative and more modern pragmatic members. This split within the IRPT could strengthen underground radical movements, uniting people who prefer to challenge the secular government in a more direct and active way.

Clan politics: Due to geographic and historical factors, Tajikistan is known for its “Oasis Patriotism,” characterized by a weak national identity and strong loyalty toward one’s own valley and region. Regions have different dialects, traditions, work activities, and in some cases, types of Islam. There are six major clans in modern Tajikistan: Khodzhent (known as Leninabad); Rasht (Karategin or Garm); Khisar (Gissar); Vakhsh (with Kurgan-Tyube, a major city, which often acts as a separate clan); Khatlan (better known as Kulyab), which has two major groups – Dangarin and Parkhar; and Badakhshan (better known as Pamir). Each clan has several sub-clans.

A risky trend is developing, in that Rahmon is building the strength of his family clan rather than a traditional geographic clan within the government. This is causing a shift from traditional power sharing, where the family was subordinate to the regional clan. This trend has already resulted in a break within the Kulyab clan that divides the ruling Dangarin and Parkhar sub-clans. Agreement among the Tajikistani elite is a key requirement for a peaceful succession, even if some economic and political power would have to be sacrificed.

Although Tajikistan has security agencies similar to those in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a unique characteristic of Tajikistani security agencies is the balance of power within these agencies. The power of the head of an agency is balanced by the head of the Special Forces within each agency. These key positions often belong to different clans or sub-clans. Because of such organizational fractures, none of the security agencies as an organization would be able to decisively influence succession.

At present, the strongest factions, which may play a key role in a future succession, include the secular Kulyab clan and the Islamic movement.

**Kulyab clan**

Dangarin sub-clan: Hasan Asudoladze, also known as Saduloev, is Rahmon’s brother-in-law – and a cousin, according to some reports. Asudoladze has held several high positions, and is considered to be the second most powerful figure in the country. Another candidate is Rustam Emomali, the President’s son, who is too young and weak to succeed his father now, but could gain power in the future. With the support of his family and a clan, he has a chance to become the next president.

Parkhar sub-clan: Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloev is the chairman of the National Council and the mayor of Dushanbe. He has been weakened recently, but still maintains significant power.

**The Islamic Movement:**

The moderate wing of the Islamic movement is led by Muhiddin Kabiri. The leader of the IRPT has a chance to be elected as a president in the future, due to his growing domestic and international popularity.

One of the most popular figures of the traditional wing of the Islamic movement is Akbar Turaev. He is the Islamic civil war leader of the Islamic Movement. Since he left the IRPT, he represents the traditional wing within the Islamic movement. A majority of the Tajikistani population is unlikely to support him, because most people blame Islamic fundamentalists for starting the Civil War.

The leader of the radical wing of the Islamic movement is unknown. Besides domestic supporters of radical Islam, there are still a large number of Tajik refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan, who support radical Islam. However, even if the radical wing was able to gain power, it would not be able to hold on to it for long. Radicals are unpopular among the majority of the population, and armed secular clans with support from other Central Asian countries and Russia, would be able to overthrow a radical religious government.

**POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF SUCCESSION:**

Muhiddin Kabiri, the leader of Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), can be a strong alternative to Rahmon, according to some analysts. Kabiri’s party could be the solution to the growing Islamic radicalization in Central Asia. He comes from the Rasht region, and does not have traditional legitimacy to become a nationwide leader. However, the IRPT and its independent financial sources have allowed Kabiri to enter politics.

The IRPT’s leader is a wealthy and successful politician, who has transformed the image of the Islamic party. However, he did not have a real chance to succeed in the 2013 presidential elections, even if they were fair. Many people are still politically secular, and blame the IRPT for the civil war. Kabiri’s realistic goal for the upcoming election is to continue questioning the legitimacy of the regime, and gain more international and domestic support. He needs to gain strong support from the major power holders. His ability to keep the party united and decrease the overall radicalization of the population is crucial for the success of the party. He is known for being a pragmatic, realistic, and diplomatic figure. He realizes that without strong and stable foreign support and economic cooperation, in addition to clan support, his party would not be able to improve the economic situation in the country. The party’s failure would have a negative impact on Muslim movements all across Central Asia and Russia. On the other hand, an IRPT success would inspire such movements.

Possible Outcomes: If Kabiri comes to power, he most likely would be able to maintain it for a while. However, it would be crucial to improve the socio-economic situation in the country; otherwise, all his critiques of the current regime could be used against him. Islamization of the population would speed up, which could bring a traditional Islamic leader to power in the future. If Uzbekistan continued its current political line, Tashkent would not be interested in the Islamic party's success; and would use any opportunity to undermine its legitimacy. Kabiri would most likely pursue developing closer ties with European countries, especially with France and Germany. Although he considers U.S. support to Rahmon’s regime as strengthening repression, Kabiri is a diplomat, and would try to manage relations with the U.S. to balance Russia's influence.

Rustam Emomali, the president’s eldest son, is another potential candidate to succeed Rahmon. “Prince Rustam,” as he is sometimes referred to in the country, is being prepared for big business and high politics. According to the Tajikistani constitution, the minimum age for the president is 35; thus in 2022, Rustam will be eligible to become president. However, Rahmon’s health issues, as well as overall instability in the country, put at risk his son’s succession. This succession scenario relies on Rahmon’s ability to further consolidate power in

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The Case for a Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force

Due to recent power shifts and security threats in the Arabian Gulf, the time is right for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations to move toward a regional collective security architecture.

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For decades the nations of the Arabian Gulf have relied on foreign security guarantors with strategic national interests to preserve the collective security of the region. Changes in the strategic environment resulting from the proliferation of terrorism, regional power shifts, and fluctuations in the global economy suggest the time is right for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations to move toward a regional collective security architecture. By expanding its own Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) to include missions such as missile defense, GCC nations can build toward more complex security arrangements across the air and sea domains.

The aftermath of the Second World War proved to be a dynamic period with respect to the future security umbrella of what would later become the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member nations. Indeed, the influence of Britain as the region’s premier security guarantor waned as the entire world questioned how any country in war-torn Europe could afford its own security much less the ability to protect national interests abroad. A meeting between Saudi Arabia’s King Ibn Saud and U.S. President Roosevelt in early 1945 marked the beginning of what has become a pronounced and meaningful shift in U.S.—Arab cooperative security efforts.

The military capabilities of the six GCC member nations have grown considerably since King Ibn and President Roosevelt first sat down to discuss the future of the region’s security apparatus. In 1984 the GCC nations created the PSF designed to deter and respond to military aggression against any of the GCC member countries. The creation of the PSF represented a positive step toward increased autonomy over Gulf affairs.

Although PSF progress has been marked by a number of challenges over the years, numerous developments in the strategic security environment suggest the time is right for the PSF to evolve into a more autonomous regional security construct. Specifically, an increased threat of terrorism, geo-political power shifts, and global economic trends derive the need for greater security autonomy among the PSF’s sponsor nations. Missile defense represents a promising near-term blueprint for collective security expansion because it facilitates a high level of cohesion and coordination necessary for more complex military functions. Building off near-term successes in missile defense, the PSF should pursue a collective security posture across the air and sea domains as well.

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The regional and global security environment has changed considerably since 1945. Although Nazism is dead, Islamic extremism has surged and terrorist attacks have proliferated throughout the region. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist Party in Iraq has shifted the balance of power to Iran, a nation that represents an existential threat to nearly every country in the Arabian Gulf. Resource-driven shifts in U.S. policy call into question the extent to which partners in the Gulf region will continue to rely on U.S. security promises. Finally, a worldwide increase in the demand for oil, led in large part by China’s growing economy and evolved energy policies, underscores the criticality of Gulf regional security and stability.

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon to the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council; however, the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 have served as a catalyst for increased counter-terrorism efforts throughout the GCC.3 Violent extremist organizations have openly expressed long-term objectives that include the dissolution of “corrupt” monarchical power throughout the Islamic world. Historically, terrorist groups operating in the Gulf region have purposefully avoided attacks on the oil infrastructure as such attacks would alienate the populace and be costly to repair once the regimes in power had been overthrown. Recent evidence in Iraq and elsewhere throughout the region suggests a shift in tactics that may well include attacks aimed at damaging or disrupting the GCC “economic lifeline,” that is, the hydrocarbon industry. This threat will potentially increase as insurgents from Iraq and Afghanistan return to their home countries better trained and better networked into violent transnational organizations.

Terrorism is far from the only concern facing the GCC. The overthrow of the Iraqi regime has led to a near-term shift in the regional balance of power. This shift has left all GCC nations vulnerable as Iran’s power, both conventional and unconventional, has increased relatively unchecked. The resultant freedom of action has allowed Iran to pursue its support of Islamic extremist causes around the world, albeit primarily through proxies; and the perception of a growing Iranian influence is a serious concern to GCC countries. Some analysts throughout the Middle East believe Iranian insurgents drove, in part, many of the civil uprisings characterized as the Arab Spring events. For example, Iran was among the first to show support for the revolts in Egypt, even though it was not clear to the rest of the world exactly how or why regime change in Egypt would directly benefit Iran. In Yemen, leaders allege that
Iran has been supporting secessionist rebels in the south, despite GCC efforts to promote a democrat- 

cization of power through its Gulf Initiative.8 In Syria, the GCC countries see a regime becoming 

closely aligned with Iran. Finally, the GCC was forced to deploy its PSF in 2011 to neutralize 

an Iranian-backed Shia uprising in Bahrain. This last example is of particular concern to Saudi Ara- 

bia due to their large Shia population in the eastern portion of their country. On the conventional side, 

Iran has seen significant growth in both ballistic and cruise missiles. According to an Iranian country 

profile from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Iran currently possesses the largest number of deployed 

missiles in the Middle East.

Despite the growing threats facing the region, the GCC nations for years took solace in knowing 

that bi-lateral security commitments with the U.S. would backstop security and stability in the Gulf region. However, in recent years there have been several signs that the U.S. may not be embrace 

this role to the extent it has in the past. First, U.S. policymakers have shifted the national focus to do- 

mestic fiscal policy. The result has been significant reductions in defense spending. According to the 

recently published Defense Strategic Guidance, “[a] reduction in resources will require innovative and 

creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building 

partner capacity.” Second, the Pentagon continues to plan for and execute its much-publicized “pivot 

to the Pacific.” Although U.S. leaders have vowed to uphold national commitments and responsibilities 

in the Middle East, many leaders in this part of the world believe this portends yet another decrease 

in regional security resources. These same leaders watched with dismay the U.S. “abandon” Egyptian 

President Hosni Mubarak during the 2011 military coup that ended his reign. Lastly, a decreasing U.S. 

dependence on imported oil may lessen the Gulf’s importance as a vital national interest. According 

to Dr. Sabonis-Helf of the U.S. National Defense University, the United States is past its peak oil 

demand. Moreover, new oil industry innovations such as fracking have led many analysts to conclude 

that the U.S. can achieve energy independence sooner than originally forecasted. Given the poten-

tially waning nature of U.S. interests in the Middle East, GCC members are right to evaluate how best 

they might preserve regional security and stability over the next century.

U.S. oil consumption rates notwithstanding, the worldwide demand for hydrocarbon energy con- 
tinues to rise and a big reason is the People’s Rep- 

cublic of China (PRC). Prior to the early 1990s, 

China was a net oil exporter — but by 2009, it had 

become the world’s second largest net importer. As 

China’s economy continues to expand, so does its 

insatiable thirst for oil. The largest supplier of oil to 

the PRC is the Middle East, Saudi Arabia being the 

number one source. It stands to reason that China’s 

rapidly growing expeditionary blue water capabil- 

ity is designed, in part, to secure the sea lanes that 

enable the trade necessary to fuel China’s economy. 

In short, the Arabian Gulf region will likely con- 

tinue to attract the attention of nations simultane- 

ously boasting powerful militaries and critical 

energy needs.

Heretofore, GCC member nations have adeptly 

mitigated regional security threats through bi-

lateral agreements with global powers by virtue 

of shared national interests. However, the rate of 

change throughout the strategic environment has 

increased and forecasting strategic interests has be-

come more difficult. It is therefore time for GCC 

member nations to consider a collective defense 

architecture that rightly ranks GCC interests su-

preme and ensures the collective security of the 

region for years to come.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY THROUGH 

MISSILE DEFENSE

If the GCC wants to expand the collective na-

ture of its defense capabilities, it might do so by ex-

panding its PSF mission to include missile defense. 

The missile defense mission fits well within the PSF 

mandate to be the first line of defense against any 

external aggressor. Regional missile defense, when 

coordinated and executed effectively, extends to na-

tional policymakers and sovereign leaders the time 

and space necessary to formulate appropriate re-

sponse options in coordination with international 

stakeholders. The missile defense mission facilitates 

a high level of cohesion and coordination within 

the PSF that has heretofore eluded GCC member 

nations. Missile defense planning requires a consid-

eration of command and control options, sensors 

and shooter placement, as well as numerous policy 

considerations such as engagement criteria, inven-

tory, and interoperability. The process more closely 

resembles contingency planning, as opposed to 

crisis planning where urgency too often supplants 

cohesiveness.

Indeed it appears that the individual member 

nations of the GCC have begun the process of ac-

quiring key missile defense capabilities as the 

threat of short- and medium-range ballistic mis-

siles, emanating primarily from Iran or Syria looms 

large over the region. According to a 2013 report 

to Congress, ongoing U.S. bilateral BMD coopera-

tion with our Middle East partners is providing a 

solid foundation for future progress. The United 

States is working with a number of Gulf Cooper- 

ation Council (GCC) States on missile defense, 

including supporting the purchase of BMD systems 

through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) pro-

gram. Specifically:

- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is acquiring 

  two THAAD batteries through FMS. This is in 

  addition to the UAE’s earlier purchase of Patriot 

  PAC-3 systems.

- Saudi Arabia is acquiring a Patriot PAC-3 capa-

  bility through conversion of its ground systems 

  and interceptor procurement. It may also look 

  at the possibility of acquiring maritime BMD in 

  the future as part of the Saudi Naval Expansion 

  Program.

- Qatar has received U.S. approval to purchase 

  THAAD and a Patriot PAC-3 capability.

- Kuwait is acquiring a Patriot PAC-3 capability.

While the PSF has yet to evolve as a significant 
factor in U.S. military planning, missile defense of-

fers the GCC nations an opportunity to further 

its security cooperation posture while at the same 
time achieving a greater level of autonomy in its 
primary homeland defense mandate. The U.S. Mis-

sile Defense Agency is working with U.S. combat-

ant commanders to develop the means by which 

they can also command and control BMD forces 

when operating with allies and partners with their 

own BMD capabilities. Specifically, the C2BMC 
system facilitates the networking, integration, and 
synchronization of missile defenses by providing 

1) A BMD communications network that allows 
cross-element communication, and 2) A built-in 

flexibility that enables Combatant Commanders 
to test the system, participate in exercises, provide 

training, and rehearse mission scenarios even while 

the system is in an operational state or “on alert.” 
The goal is that the U.S. can conduct BMD opera-

tions seamlessly with allies and partners by sharing 
data generated by available interoperable sensors.

Recent discussions within the GCC suggest 
the timing is right to expand its collective security 
purpose. For example, at the inaugural U.S.-GCC 
Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF) attended by 
GCC foreign ministers, the U.S. Secretary of State 
highlighted the threat that ballistic missiles pose 
against critical military and civilian infrastructure. 
The SCF endorsed the concept of increased BMD 
cooperation among the GCC States. By the time 
the forum met the following year, the foreign min-

isters were speaking in broader terms, promising 
“enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD), including the eventual de-

velopment of a Gulf-wide coordinated missile de-

fense architecture built around interoperable U.S. 

and GCC forces that would serve as an integrated 
system to defend the territory and assets of the 
GCC states against the threat of ballistic missiles.” 

As the GCC nations begin to implement ac-

tions plans to make good on their ministerial 
pledges, they might begin by building off current 
GCC participation in the U.S. Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC). Given that one of the CAOC’s missions is missile defense, to include C2BMC, GCC presence in the CAOC presents an opportunity in the future for increased situational awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for future BMD planning and operational cooperation. This level of interaction can serve as a catalyst for progress integration. Consider the Integrated Air Missile Defense Center in UAE, which not only “facilitates U.S.-UAE interoperability but also U.S.-GCC coalition building.” Finally, exercises like Falcon Shield provide an excellent opportunity to train in advanced tactics in ballistic missile defense.

OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Although missile defense may represent the best near-term opportunity for GCC interdependence, the traditional air and sea domains likewise represent collective security opportunities for greater PSF cooperation and collaboration. In particular, the current modernization of some GCC countries’ air forces makes the region ripe for partnering in air operations. As a whole, the GCC possesses fourth generation fighters, refueling, reconnaissance, C2, transportation and remotely piloted aircraft. Few partnerships even amongst many NATO Allies offer this array of airpower. As individual air forces, the GCC nations lack the strategic depth necessary to take on greater threats in the air domain. Collectively, however, the Peninsula Shield Force could bring significant air power to bear throughout the domain, thereby maximizing the assets available.

As in the air domain, the sea domain offers many areas for increased PSF collaboration. For example, the GCC nations currently lack a mine countermeasures (MCM) capability, a requirement met through agreements with the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet in Bahrain. Piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Red Sea represents a significant threat to regional tankers and therefore an opportunity for collective defense efforts aimed at counter-piracy operations. Finally, a collective PSF approach toward coastal defense operations in the Straits of Hormuz might effectively counter Iranian asymmetric threats in the future.

Moving from domain-centric discussion to joint operations, there is a lot of room for U.S.-GCC collective partnership. To date, there have been many instances of cooperation and exercise between GCC members, but the integration of joint components is relatively lacking and participation varies across the member nations. A possible solution to enhance cooperation and U.S. participation is staff planning and large scale exercises focused on major areas of mutual U.S.-GCC interest that could hone cooperation and enhance battlefield effectiveness between domains and forces in the PSF construct.

In particular, cross domain operational planning and exercises focused on areas of mutual interest such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea offer practical forums to crystallize specific capabilities each nation can offer towards regional security.

On a positive note, there is already cooperation and partnering taking effect in regional exercises and at the United States Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. However, this cooperation is more bilateral than with the GCC as a whole, and this is a problem that must be overcome to truly realize the potential of the collective strength of the GCC countries. This idea of collective strength was echoed by King Abdullah’s Riyadh Declaration calling for the GCC states to “move beyond the stage of cooperation to the stage of union so that the GCC countries form a single entity to achieve good and repel evil in response to the aspirations of the citizens of GCC countries and the challenges they face.”

As a vehicle for increased military capacity, though, the GCC has some institutional and mission failures it will have to overcome. Amongst these are force planning, standardization, interoperability, logistics, sustainability, and readiness. Despite the current institutional shortcomings of the GCC, which may or may not be overcome by the member states, the mix of capabilities of the GCC countries in the realm of relatively advanced airpower offers an area for immediate returns in mutual cooperation. Aside from partnering in air to air tactics for air superiority; refueling, mobility, battle space management, reconnaissance and intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures in the air domain will remain force multipliers. With nascent or shallow capabilities in these areas of airpower, US-GCC cooperation would go a long way to develop these capabilities.

CONCLUSION

For decades the nations of the Arabian Gulf have relied on foreign security guarantors with strategic national interests to preserve the collective security of the region. Recognizing the strength in collective action, the GCC created the Peninsula Shield Force, which will become ever more important in the coming decades. Changes in the strategic environment resulting from the proliferation of terrorism, regional power shifts, and fluctuations in the global economy suggest present GCC countries with formidable security challenges. Violent extremist organizations bent on regime demise, conventional and unconventional threats from Iran as it strives for regional hegemony, and a possible reduction of priority for security in the Arabian Gulf by the U.S.

The strategic security environment of 2013 is very different from that of 1984, and the security structures needed by the GCC to face this environment need to adapt to the times. One way to do this is for GCC nations to move towards a regional collective security architecture. By expanding upon the command and control arrangements of its own PSF, the GCC can begin to expand its collective ability to defend against the real threat of ballistic missile attack with or without the United States. The missile defense mission fits within the PSF mandate and GCC members are purchasing many of the key components.

In addition to ballistic missile defense, expanding the C2 architecture will allow the GCC nations to integrate more jointly across both the air and sea domains as well. The relatively advanced air capabilities of the GCC nations can make them a formidable force as a whole. Finally, collective maritime operations focused on anti-piracy in the region as a whole and MCM capabilities would allow the GCC countries to exert greater control over their critical sea lines of communication.

Changes in the strategic environment underscore the need for a thoughtful evaluation of the future of GCC regional security. The Peninsula Shield Force represents a promising option for the GCC to extend its collective security umbrella to the air and sea domains. By doing so, GCC nations can take an important and meaningful step toward Gulf security interdependence.

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"Operating in partnership with host-nation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge."
- Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010

The importance of culture and language studies has been emphasized more and more over the past few years with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review directing that our future military leaders build expertise in these skills. Specifically, prior to a deployment or engagement activity in a foreign country, there is a desire to instruct our enlisted and officer ranks on the important facets of daily life in that country to better attune everyone to nuances and help prevent misunderstandings. The challenge for many of us remains how to grasp cultural differences while still located in the United States. I would like to focus on one overlooked (and often-derided) method to study: through the use of popular culture, such as music, advertising, comedy, movies or television. In our increasingly globalized society, the most accessible of all of these are the latter two, films and television. Most cultural studies focus on the effects of popular media upon culture, but this article looks at the reflection and representation of culture in the media.

By studying the motifs that are present in a country’s popular films or television programming, you can gain insight into many aspects of their culture writ large. The question then becomes what are some of the specific indicators of culture that you can experience through the visual medium of television and film? Before proceeding further, I feel it necessary to offer a few disclaimers: television and other mass media outlets tend to oversimplify things for the sake of entertainment, so they may easily present an inaccurate (or stereotyped) view of life. This article is presented as an additional way (not the only way) to become familiar with a particular culture, and almost as importantly, provide a method of relating to those within that culture through common references and themes. In addition, this approach only assists with countries that have a large body of work that can be referenced. It certainly does not help if all of that nation’s domestic television stations only play American sitcoms.

The number of different categories and specific examples are innumerable, but I have divided the main concepts into seven groupings: 1) Education and Employment; 2) Politics, Government and the Military; 3) Social Structures; 4) History and Legends; 5) Crime and the Judicial System; 6) Social Issues; and 7) Everyday Life. I will provide an outline of each of these categories with examples that are often evident in television and film.

**EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT**

This category encompasses the concept that every society has a way of stratifying individuals based on education levels and types of employment. The type of education system, or even a complete lack of one, speaks volumes about the importance that a particular nation has upon higher education. Does everyone, regardless of gender or ethnicity, have equal access to educational institutions? Are there specific schools that are seen as the true institutes of higher learning? Do the elites study abroad? When someone states that they are a graduate of University X or College Y, do others make some sort of immediate judgment about that person? What are the requirements to further one’s education? Are these requirements based on examinations or nepotism? What are the requirements based on examinations or nepotism? What financial costs are incurred by students? Are there ways to offset these costs, such as grants or scholarships? If so, how are they obtained? Are there alternative learning methods, such as distance learning, that are regularly utilized? Education can help you get an idea of what motivates certain groups of people within a country, which leads us into the other half of this category.

Employment focuses on the positions within a society that are seen as important or even noble. What do the citizens of the country strive to do with their lives? What drives them forward and provides a sense of fulfillment and success? How are different positions—such as lawyers, doctors, or even politicians—portrayed in that culture and are people defined by their careers? What is the typical method of searching for employment? Are there interviews, job fairs, or are people appointed based on social connections or group affiliations? What are the benefits to full time over part time jobs? Are there certain groups within that society relegated to jobs in a certain sector? Are dual income families common? How is employment concluded? Are people hired for set periods of time (seasonally), are they fired during drawdown periods in poor economies, or is there some sort of retirement system established? All of these questions can help you focus on what drives the breadwinners in that particular culture.

**POLITICS, GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY**

The most important way that films and television can assist in this category is by providing an idea of how much freedom of expression is permitted. If there are shows or movies that present satirical views of the government and ruling politicians, it is a definite indicator that there is a high level of freedom in that society. If there is a relatively high level of freedom allowed, you can get a good glimpse of how the citizens view their government and its role in their daily life. Even without this freedom of expression, you can still garner a lot of information about the politics in that country. Many shows present a general picture of the bureaucracy present in that nation. What sort of overall structure exists and how similar (or different) is it from the American system? What are the agencies that make up the government and which are the most important? How are the bureaucrats and other government workers portrayed? Are there programs established for the society as a whole, such as social security or universal healthcare? How are the military and its members viewed? Is there a specific structure to the military and what is its relationship to other elements of the government, such as the police force, intelligence agencies or the executive? Oftentimes, these shows or films can provide a good idea of the
level of patriotism within a country, or (by viewing propagandistic calls to arms) perhaps the level of patriotism the government would like to encourage within their country.

SOCIAL STRUCTURES

This is a very broad category, which addresses the roles and relationships present within a specific society. Some of the most important aspects that can be discerned through watching popular shows are gender roles and the importance of family. A popular topic often seen is dating and relationships. What concepts exist for a relationship in that country?

In addition to familial relationships, it is important to look at the overall hierarchy within the society. The concept of “old money”, tied to the importance of family heritage, often defines positions within a country. Are there other factors as well, such as educational background or fame based on athletic prowess or military might? Are there stereotypes or discriminatory behaviors based on ethnicity, religion, or regional differences? Is there a manner of speaking or difference in language based on positions within this social hierarchy? For the linguisists, an examination of honorifics, pejoratives, terms of familiarity, humble or polite words can provide even more information and clues to social status.

HISTORY AND LEGENDS

Many films, and some television shows, have their origin in historical events or legends that can portray seminal, defining events of a nation or culture. Superstitions and myths often figure prominently in these works. What are the taboos in that nation? Are there specific symbols that hold greater meaning in a particular culture? Are there lucky or unlucky numbers, animals, or images? Does a specific color or flower represent more than what it seems? Historical events and figures can also provide background for what is important to a society. Thomas Berger notes that the historical memory of the individual is “episodic and fleeting” (War, Guilt and World Politics after World War II, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 15), so a collective narrative is formed (through mediums such as films). Narratives are “necessarily selective, including some elements of what was experienced while leaving others out” (ibid, p.24). The students of history can examine the way a nation portrays a particular event and oftentimes find out more about a culture by what is left out of this narrative.

CRIME AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

When examining crime in a society, you first have to look at what is defined as illegal activity. There are actions that are widely portrayed as crimes, such as murder and theft, but other activities may be seen in gradations and or not be perceived as crimes at all in other societies. For example, gambling is legal in many countries, but in others, it is illegal. Furthermore, there are locations in which some forms of gambling are legal, depending on the rewards (cash vs. prizes), location (special zones) or types (such as lotteries). Two additional aspects of crime are the role of illegal drugs in that society and weapons. Exactly what substances are considered illegal? Is private gun ownership allowed? If guns are illegal, how prevalent are they amongst the criminal elements? Do police use guns?

Next, you must examine how the criminal element is defined. How are the criminals portrayed? Are they romanticized or vilified? How do they act within society? Do they regularly utilize violence in their dealings? Do they generally operate individually or are there large criminal groups? How are the criminal organizations constituted? What are their interactions with the police? Are the police seen as being co-opted or independent and seen as protectors of justice and the people? How are criminals treated? Do they have certain rights (such as Miranda rights, evidentiary custody or bail hearings)? This also leads into the courts and overall judicial system. What are the roles and requirements of lawyers and judges? How are civil cases handled and what are the typical complaints? Does the country have capital punishment and, if so, what offenses could lead to the death penalty?

SOCIAL ISSUES

Many societies around the world are grappling with issues affecting certain segments of their
With the ubiquity of American popular culture, many countries are understandably proud of their domestically produced films and television programs. Therefore, familiarity with many of the popular shows, films, actors, directors and other icons can help serve as a conversation starter and provide a common point of reference when communicating with our foreign partners.

populations. A lot of these are portrayed through television programs or films. For example, bullying in schools, generational gaps and the problems they create, employment issues, etc. Oftentimes, a nation may not be ready to deal with these problems and, therefore, they will not appear in popular media. However, when they are portrayed, it provides a good glimpse into how that society views the issue and how they deal with it. Is it seen as something that the greater community needs to become involved in or is it a family issue? What are the methods of coping with the issue? Is it tied to a particular group within the society, such as an ethnic or religious group or just one gender?

Another important aspect of a nation that can be seen through popular media is the existence of subcultures. It could be as nefarious as a hate group or subversive element, or as simple as a group that feels a certain affinity to a style of dress. Oftentimes, the subcultures are linked to some of the aforementioned social issues. For example, a group of adolescents that identify themselves in a specific way may be targets of bullying in school.

EVERYDAY LIFE AND MISCELLANEOUS

The final category serves as a sort of catch-all for anything else you can divine about a culture through television and cinema. However, this category also includes the most common aspects of a culture, what I have termed “everyday life.” While watching a show or film, pay close attention to all of the details around the characters. What are manners and gestures do they use? When looking at the scenery, is it normally owned or leased? What styles of architecture are seen? Do families or individuals typically eat at home or dine out? What sorts of foods and drinks are common? Is there a typical night life in that country or city? How is smoking or drinking alcohol portrayed? Are there specific holidays or events that are celebrated, to include birthdays and anniversaries? How are these celebrations conducted (family gatherings, parades, fireworks, picnics, etc.)? What sort of hobbies do people in that country have? Do they have the free time to enjoy these hobbies or take vacations? Are there typical weather patterns or climate issues in that country? Don’t forget that countries in the Southern Hemisphere experience summer from December through March and their vacation cycle (and school year) is linked to that calendar.

As you look at their environs, study the pervasiveness of globalization in that country. Are there international chains, such as the ever present fast food restaurants, coffee shops or convenience stores? What automobiles are commonly seen and from what country of origin? Look at how widespread other forms of technology may be, such as public transportation, cell phones, the internet, etc. These cues may also provide information about the economic system and trade practices with other nations.

Examining the background of a scene will also provide you with some common landmarks and geography of that country. After all, how many American movies and television shows feature well-known locations, such as the Golden Gate Bridge, Mount Rushmore, Times Square or the Statue of Liberty? You can also look closely at the individuals in each scene, not just the stars of the production. What hair or clothing styles are popular? What types of manners and gestures do they use? Every American understands the ok sign or thumbs up. However, these hand gestures could mean something different in another country. Contrary to popular belief, the peace sign is not universal and can sometimes even equate to a middle finger (which doesn’t mean the same thing worldwide either). Even something as simple as pointing or beckoning to someone has to be done very carefully to avoid offense in other cultures.

CONCLUSION

Television programs and cinema can provide a lot of information about a nation; however, you should not use popular media as your sole method to study a culture. Use these tools to augment other studies and your personal experiences. Also, remember that culture is constantly in flux and, just like the US, each decade or generation has its own flavor. In addition, be cognizant of the fact that these productions may be developed by a certain segment of that nation’s population and could ignore certain views and opinions, or present an inaccurate portrayal of relationships.

With the ubiquity of American popular culture, many countries are understandably proud of their domestically produced films and television programs. Therefore, familiarity with many of the popular shows, films, actors, directors and other icons can help serve as a conversation starter and provide a common point of reference when communicating with our foreign partners. You may find them useful as a way to break down barriers and communicate across cultures. However, it must be cautioned that, just like in the US, many military professionals may not have the free time to enjoy these elements of their own culture.

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New Zealand’s Next Move: Amphibious Capability

Building an amphibious capability for New Zealand in the 21st Century is essential in an uncertain security environment

BY MAJOR SCOTT CORDWELL, NEW ZEALAND ARMY

In September 1999, just three months after graduating from the New Zealand Officer Cadet School, I deployed to East Timor as a platoon commander. Operation INTERFET was an Australian-led multinational operation to establish peace in East Timor in the wake of the Indonesian withdrawal in September 1999.

In the early stage of the operation, the officer commanding tasked me to secure a sea point of entry by helicopter insertion for a subsequent amphibious landing. The operation unfolded in the following manner: a Special Forces Detachment had conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the landing zone and provided an excellent ground brief.

We were aware that opposition militia were active in the air and that there had been several contacts in the days building up to the lodgement. Once the LZ was secure, landing craft were to commence landing. However, the communication to the landing craft failed and there were no contingency plans in place. Ultimately, when the landing craft beached, the mission succeeded more through a combination of good luck and initiative at the tactical level.

In retrospect, the events seem farcical. However, they sparked a desire to ensure that the New Zealand Defence Force not be placed in this position again. As a Maritime nation with a strong commitment to the South Pacific, the New Zealand Defence Force should be capable of conducting amphibious operations within our area of responsibility.

The New Zealand Defence Force is striving to establish a Joint Amphibious Task Force and is tracking well to achieving this. Despite the best of intentions, however, there remains much work to be done. The branches and services of the NZDF are well-trained and professional organisations in their own right and regularly conduct joint operations. The question many are asking is what does the White Paper call for that we are not already doing and is there a need for greater integration?

My experience with amphibious operations, albeit limited, has prompted a desire for the NZDF to construct work in the NZDF and is the reason I am writing this paper, to determine whether the concept is feasible and necessary.

I would like to extend my appreciation to a number of people who have provided me with assistance and advice throughout this project.

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"The NZDF will have a Joint Amphibious Taskforce at the core of its force structure by 2015. This taskforce will draw upon the strengths of all three services to enhance the NZDF’s ability to rapidly deploy its people and capabilities. The taskforce will also enable the NZDF to integrate more effectively with other nations and Government agencies."

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the New Zealand Government released the first Defence White paper in over ten years. A White Paper is a governmental review, in this case conducted by the Ministry of Defence on behalf of the New Zealand government. The White Paper balances the government’s strategic outlook, the environment, and the fiscal situation and is a significant document for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as it outlines the direction in which the NZDF is to develop and the capabilities it is to retain, maintain, and procure. A recommendation of the White Paper is for the NZDF to establish an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) at its core by 2015, and to integrate the Force by 2020.

The NZDF currently has the ability to conduct joint operations and already meets many of the White Paper requirements as part of its current outputs.

As a small, isolated, maritime nation with limited resources and considerable responsibilities, there is a very real possibility that an ATF will try to be all things to all people and as such has the potential to be an overambitious undertaking. The NZDF already has a significant number of commitments and outputs, and it is possible that the aspiration of establishing an ATF by 2015 is unachievable. There are a number of factors that need to be analyzed in order to determine whether the ATF goal is wholly achievable by 2015. Inclusive of the White Paper’s recommendation to establish an ATF is the requirement to better synchronize whole of government operations where the NZDF is involved and to retain and develop interoperability with key allies in the South Pacific.

An analysis of the White Paper considering the factors of New Zealand Government and NZDF hierarchy of policy pertinent to amphibious operations, the strategic situation, current force structure, training regime, and major regional exercises is required to determine whether the NZDF will be able to meet the Government of New Zealand Intention to establish an ATF. Ultimately the establishment of an Amphibious Task Force will advance New Zealand’s defense posture and make the nation a more capable and crucial participant in the life and affairs of the South Pacific. It is imperative that the New Zealand Defense Force be able to meet the Government of New Zealand’s intent...
Australia and New Zealand participate in a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises on an annual and bi-annual basis. However, to date there is no standing amphibious exercise between the two countries.

of establishing an Amphibious Task Force as the core of the defense structure, one that is capable of meeting the government of New Zealand’s stated outputs as recommended in the 2010 White Paper.

BACKGROUND

To understand the requirement for the NZDF to establish an ATF it is important to understand the historical context of New Zealand operations in the South Pacific. Since New Zealand started on its steps as an independent country, it has recognised its obligations to be a good neighbour and ally to other states in the region. Arguably, New Zealand’s first independent military action in the South Pacific was in August 1914 when the Samoan Expeditionary Force annexed and occupied German Samoa. This operation was also the first New Zealand Amphibious operation in the region. It involved two ships, Monowai and Moeraki (both ships taken up from trade) and, under an escort provided by the Royal Navy, a 1385 strong force landed and secured Apia.4. From this genesis, New Zealand and the NZDF have continued to conduct military operations in the South Pacific; from disaster relief to search and rescue, to the maintenance of law and order, there has often been a New Zealand involvement.

The NZDF is comprised of three services: the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), the New Zealand Army, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF).5. The three services have a long history of conducting successful operations both independently and together. Until recently, a specific service usually led an operation, even if supported by another service, rather than conduct a joint operation. The NZDF established a Joint Force Headquarters in 2001 and subsequently, joint operations have become more common.

The New Zealand Government White Paper of 2010 identifies the strategic situation and the outputs that the NZDF will potentially face in the future. In part, the White Paper recommends that the NZDF should establish an Amphibious Task Force, a recommendation that the NZDF has confirmed as a task. New Zealand does not have a culture of amphibious operations; however, the nation is capable of deploying a joint task-organized force by sea. The NZDF can and regularly structures forces to meet specific requirements. For example, in Exercise Tropic Twilight the NZDF deployed an amphibious taskforce comprised of an engineer detachment and a medical detachment to conduct humanitarian support in Samoa.6

The ability to employ modular forces such as this is a developing capability within NZDF that the White Paper confirmed as a future output in 2010. This example from a Senior Naval Officer quoted in the New Zealand Navy News demonstrates this:

This is the period when we begin to strengthen and add new capability, and develop our tactics and doctrine for undertaking amphibious military operations. Right now we do elements of amphibious operations, but we haven’t yet integrated Navy, Army and Air Force into one amphibious force.7

THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE WHITE PAPER AND THE NZDF CAPABILITY PLAN

In 2010, the New Zealand government issued the first Defence White paper for a decade. The White Paper analyzes New Zealand’s strategic situation, policy, and fiscal position and outlines the strategic situation from a New Zealand perspective. The White Paper identifies New Zealand’s area of interest and New Zealand’s responsibilities in assisting in maintaining the international rule of law. It identifies where the NZDF can contribute to coalition operations or potentially lead operations in support of New Zealand’s policy and objectives. The White Paper recognizes that New Zealand, as a small country with a small population and resource base, needs to maintain interoperability with allied nations and retain a versatile force capable of conducting a wide variety of tasks.8

The White Paper addresses the need for the NZDF to maintain interoperability and cooperation with Other Government Agencies (OGA) in order to maintain a Pacific-focused Ready Response Force.9 It recognizes that New Zealand will conduct and at times lead operations in the South Pacific. The White Paper also recognizes that closer defence relations between New Zealand and Australia will operate together in the South Pacific.

The White Paper identifies that the development of an ATF within the NZDF is a milestone in the long-term strategy plan of the NZDF. It does not mean that the NZDF will maintain a standing ATF. Rather, New Zealand will be capable of deploying an ATF that will be capable of responding to a variety of different situations in the South Pacific. It also means that the NZDF will be capable of deploying individual force elements that will be capable of working with allied amphibious forces. It is important to note that essentially, the NZDF will develop the ability to operate in the joint amphibious coalition environment, enhancing the ability of the individual force elements to operate collectively.

Critically, the White Paper and the Long Term Development plan highlight the ongoing development of amphibious capability and the continued integration of the NZDF. The Key milestones at 2020 and 2035 both contain directives for equipment upgrades and the trained state at which the respective services are to maintain as the below paragraph highlights:

The uncertain strategic outlook underscores the need for an NZDF, which is responsive, versatile, and professional, able to conduct the range of tasks set for it by the Government, particularly in the South Pacific but also alongside partners and friends further afield. The fiscal outlook requires an NZDF which is affordable now and in the future.10

Whilst the White Paper states that the NZDF will have an ATF at its core, the reality is the NZDF is aiming to become a more integrated force based around an ATF. Whilst the White Paper and the Defence Capability plan identify the requirement for an ATF, the requisite tasks are more likely to include elements of an ATF and not an ATF in its entirety. The question remains as to how this is different from the current manner in which the NZDF operates.

The White Paper emphasizes the importance of whole of government operations and the NZDF’s roles and responsibilities within the wider national policy framework as is shown in Appendix B11. As a maritime nation, it is unsurprising that eleven of the tasks within this appendix potentially include...
The employment of amphibious elements; however, many of the relationships between the NZDF and OGA already exist. Complex memorandums of understanding (MOU) that link different government department outputs to funding define these relationships. The lack of understanding of these MOUs at the operational or tactical level makes synchronisation of defence assets difficult. This Defence Capability plan reflects and reinforces the whole of government approach but does not delineate or assign tasks.

Whilst this lack of delineation is acceptable in a strategic document, it leads to an ad hoc application of defence assets at the operational and tactical level. As a small nation, it is critical that the NZDF and OGA cooperate and work together as efficiently as possible to maintain the most efficient expenditure of the countries’ resources. The establishment of an ATF can contribute towards this.

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence (MOD) wrote the Defence Capability plan in concert with the NZDF. The capability plan establishes a roadmap for the development of future capability in order to give shape to the first ten years of capability development under the policy framework provided by the White Paper. It confirms the requirement for an NZDF ATF and provides milestones for equipment and capability development. Critically, it highlights defence shortfalls and associated risk.

**THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE WHITE PAPER**

New Zealand has no closer friend and no better ally than Australia. A shared lineage and close cooperation in war and peace13 over one hundred and fifty years has forged the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) relationship between the two countries. Most disasters or military situations in the Pacific, certainly every one since 1997, have seen a combined ANZAC response. Therefore, it is very likely that future incidents in the South Pacific would involve a joint New Zealand and Australian Task Force. As such, it is relevant to analyze the Australian White Paper and the Australian strategic intent. The Australian Defence White paper of 2009 is similar to the New Zealand White Paper in that it confirms Australia’s strategic intent and capability development plan. As far as amphibious operations are concerned, Australia is making a significant investment in capability.

The Australian Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) will enter service in 201414. These ships are capable of deploying an embarked combined-arms battle group. They will be the largest ships ever purchased by Australia and will introduce a significant increase in capability. It is critical, therefore, that the NZDF retain interoperability with the ADF as each country acquires new capability. New Zealand and Australia are developing amphibious capability in concert albeit at a vastly different scale, as one would expect given the difference in the two nations’ size. In the future, there is the potential for a substantial ANZAC amphibious capability in the South Pacific. The elements of the respective militaries that would establish an ATF currently exercise within existing service agreements, normally annually and normally within a bilateral framework.

Australia and New Zealand participate in a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises on an annual and bi-annual basis. However, to date there is no standing amphibious exercise between the two countries. The exercise program between New Zealand and Australia is dated, and given the considerable expense both nations are contributing to amphibious capability there is scope to synchronize existing exercise to better incorporate amphibious activities. Better synchronization of exercises would enhance amphibious development and interoperability between the countries, which in turn would enhance the two nations’ ability to respond to crisis in the South Pacific. Development towards an ANZAC amphibious ATF could potentially provide support to allied operations in the South Pacific or further afield if the situation required it; this development meets the recommendation of the White Paper and further develops coalition interoperability.

**FANC**

The French Armed Forces of New Caledonia (FANC) deserve mention, as this organization is presently the third largest permanently stationed military force in the South Pacific. The FANC is a battalion-strength taskforce that maintains the ability to deploy company-sized groups into a permissive environment at short notice within New Zealand’s area of interest. France, Australia, and New Zealand (FRANZ) signed an agreement in 1992 to ensure cooperation in relief operations in the South Pacific15. The FRANZ agreement has expanded to include evacuation operations if necessary.

The FANC sponsor a series of amphibious exercises that have played an important role in the development of ANZAC amphibious capability. Both the Australian and New Zealand international exercise programs utilize the FANC-sponsored exercises as milestones in their respective amphibious force-generation training cycles. The FANC series includes a command post exercise (Exercise Cielo) and a live exercise (Exercise Crois du Sud) on a biennial basis (CPX followed by live exercise). The biennial nature of the exercise program enables New Zealand and Australia to exercise in the South Pacific in a joint, multi-national amphibious environment. The exercises are generally Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Response (HADR) or Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) centric, which is relevant to the region. In 2012, Exercise Crois du Sud expanded to include Canada, the UK, and the USA for the first time16. Whilst the participation from these nations is small, it expands the opportunity for coalition amphibious exercises in the South Pacific. As the only standing multi-national amphibious exercise in the South Pacific, Crois du Sud is pivotal in the development of NZDF amphibious operations in the South Pacific17.

**THE ENVIRONMENT**

New Zealand’s air and sea gaps provide defence for New Zealand, shape the mindset of its habitants, and shape the nation’s requirements for a defence force18. New Zealand acknowledges that it has wide responsibilities throughout the world, but, given its remoteness and size, it is not able to conduct independent military operations outside of its immediate area of interest. This concept is central to the White Paper and the decision to concentrate on the development of an ATF that can operate in the South Pacific. It is also critical to the capability of an NZDF ATF.

As an isolated island nation, New Zealand’s area of responsibility is considerable and includes responsibilities to its immediate neighbors in the South Pacific, the approaches to New Zealand, New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the EEZs of Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau, New Zealand’s extended continental shelf area, the Southern Ocean, and Antarctica. In addition, New Zealand also has search and rescue responsibility for over 30 million square kilometers19. As New Zealand does not have a coast guard to conduct patrolling and policing, this area of responsibility (anti-piracy, illegal fishing, search and rescue) lays with the NZDF. If the NZDF is not the lead agency then it is supporting OGA. The NZDF is not capable of meeting every international contingency. To best prepare itself for the contingencies it may have to meet, the NZDF divides the world into five distinct regions known as Employment Contexts (EC); these are graphically depicted at Appendix C. The NZDF ATF is structured to operate independently in EC 1, 2, and 3. These EC collectively encompass New Zealand, Australia, and the South West Pacific20.

Visitors often view the South Pacific as paradise on earth, but often this is not the reality. Resorts conceal a level of poverty in local towns and villages not commonly seen by tourists. There are sporadic outbreaks of localized violence, such as in 2006 when the NZDF and ADF deployed to Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor in response to outbreaks of localized violence, such as in 2006 when the NZDF and ADF deployed to Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and East Timor in response
to localized violence. To date, both countries retain military and police in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Fiji has had five military coups in the past twenty-seven years.21 In addition, natural disasters (predominantly cyclones) necessitate whole of government HADR operations on at least an annual basis. A recent example is an 8.0 magnitude earthquake that struck the remote island of Lata, in the Solomon Islands chain on 7 February 2013.22 This disaster prompted a quick localized response from New Zealand to a request for assistance from the Solomon Islands. It is common for New Zealand to provide a rapid response to disasters in the South Pacific region as one of the leading nations in the South Pacific. New Zealand government’s policy is to promote a sense of community and maintain stability in the region. An HADR centric ATF is an excellent platform to promote this policy.23

The future will see increased pressure on New Zealand’s EEZ resources and on the Pacific Islands. Increased competition for natural resources and interest from outside influences (both national and commercially driven) will create friction in the South Pacific. As an example riots in Honiara and Nuku’alofa targeted Chinese business in 2006; New Zealand deployed troops in response to both and, in the case of Tonga, assisted in the evacuation and repatriation of Chinese nationals.24 Outside influences often receive the brunt of the frustrations of the indigenous people; as competition for resources increases this will also likely increase.25 This environment has shaped the capability and requirements that the NZDF currently maintains and confirmed the need for the NZDF to develop an ATF.

**TASKS**

The White Paper and Defence Capability Plan outline broad tasks for the NZDF. The NZDF is primarily concerned with the security of New Zealand and recognises that whilst a direct attack on New Zealand is unlikely New Zealand has a responsibility to the rule of international law and order but that the South Pacific is the region that New Zealand should take a greater responsibility in. The White Paper states that New Zealand in conjunction with Australia must be able to react to any likely emergency in the South Pacific. This is the starting point for procuring and developing capability. An NZDF ATF enables New Zealand to be responsive in the South Pacific and maintain a level of interoperability with coalition partners as well as providing an independent response within the South Pacific.

**THE NEW ZEALAND AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE**

The Defence White paper states, “The NZDF intends to have the Joint Amphibious Task Force at the core of its force structure by 2015.”26 The NZDF has conducted operations in the South Pacific since the First World War. These have often been independent service operations that may have relied upon one or another of the services for support. For example, the NZ Army conducted a series of exercises in the South Pacific since the 1970s named the “Tropic” series (Tropic Twilight, Tropic Dawn, and Tropic Astra). These exercises have met individual service requirements but not joint requirements. Often the RNZAF would conduct an exercise in one part of the South Pacific and the Navy or Army a separate exercise in another part of the South Pacific. From a governmental perspective, this ensures that New Zealand is well represented throughout the Pacific. While it was practicable when the NZDF was not heavily committed to operations in other parts of the world, it is less practicable in today’s resource constrained environment.

The establishment of an ATF will meet the outputs designated by the White Paper. New Zealand is a small nation and the term ATF requires framing and defining in that context. The present NZDF definition is:

> The ATF will see our current force strengths – our operational and support units from across the three services – able to operate as an integrated force. The ATF will be capable of deploying and sustaining operations in New Zealand or the Southwest Pacific, and will be able to work independently or as part of a larger collaboration effort. Individual components will be separately deployable and able to more effectively integrate with other nations’ military and civilian organisations.28

This means that the NZDF will not be maintaining a permanently established ATF but will establish the ability to generate an ATF to meet specific operations. Many within the NZDF believe that the ability to achieve this already exists and that the establishment of an ATF is at best formalising the status quo or at worst fostering greater interdependence at the cost of service culture. In part, this is true; however, there are a myriad of differences between conducting joint amphibious operations and having an ATF at the core of the organization. For example, there are currently no established TTPs/ SOPs for simple procedures such as vehicle loading, command and control relationships are ad hoc and established for each operation, and no command and control system is yet in place to coordinate amphibious operations. Critically, a culture of operating in this paradigm does not yet exist in any of the three services. The Chief of Defence Force best encapsulates this in his 2012 – 2015 Statement of Intent: “It signals a shift in the way we operate and think – from an approach where we generally operated apart and sometimes came together – to one where we will operate together and sometimes work apart.”29 This shift in culture is at the core of the establishment of an NZDF ATF. The summary from the RNZAF best encapsulates the requirement and most likely employment of an NZDF ATF.

> While the ATF will be structured for the deployment of combat forces, the most likely contingencies it will be used for are disaster relief and conducting exercises in our region in support of nation building.30

It is important to reiterate that in the NZDF context a standing ATF does not mean a permanently assigned force but rather the ability to task elements of the NZDF for amphibious operations. It will mean a cultural shift to a more integrated approach to training and operations.

**COMPOSITION**

The NZDF intends to develop an ATF that is modular and adaptable. The three services are required to maintain capability bricks that can “plug and play” within an ATF framework. At present the Defence Capability Plan, NZDF Statement of Intent, and the Future 35 strategy confirm this intent but the link from the strategic to the operational lacks detail. The respective services outline broad requirements but there is a lack of synchronisation and detailed guidance to the forces elements at present. The three services are aware of their responsibilities within an ATF and have addressed this in broad terms in their respective statements of intent and annual plans.

The graphic on page 37 depicts the desired task organization and employment of an NZDF ATF. It depicts a taskforce that includes strategic surveillance, air and maritime lift, combat logistics and command elements. Each of the three services provides critical elements to the ATF.

**31 New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan, Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Defence, September 2011.**

Practically at the service level, the services are responsible for the following:

- The NZ Army provides the combat ground component of the ATF. The NZ Army can deploy and sustain three capabilities; a light infantry combined arms task group, a cavalry combined arms task group and an HADR combined arms task group. The land component is the most affordable to maintain and arguably the easiest to train. The NZ Army conducted an internal restructuring in order to best meet the ATF output. As a result, the Army trains and operates in a traditional Brigade structure but maintains the ability to deploy...
“capability bricks” to establish a task group. The three task groups are structured to meet the likely situations that may occur in the South Pacific. The HADR capability is Medical and Engineer centric and is the most likely to be deployed, the light task group is structured for peace support operations, and the cavalry task group is structured for warfighting. The Army currently meets the White Paper criteria although it acknowledges shortfalls in command and control platforms and combined arms readiness. It is important to note that the NZ Army does not provide a permanently assigned marine detachment to the RNZN.

The NZ Navy provides the means of deploying the ATF. HMNZS Canterbury is the amphibious capability in the NZDF context. Canterbury is not a true amphibious ship but a roll on roll off (RORO) ferry adapted to military use. As such, in the eyes of its critics it has limitations that prevent it from truly providing an amphibious capability. Given that the New Zealand government recognizes the South Pacific as its primary area of responsibility and acknowledges that it does not have the ability to operate in the higher end of the warfighting spectrum, the Canterbury is quite capable of meeting both the government’s requirements and the intent of the White Paper in delivering amphibious capability to the NZDF. In essence the Canterbury provides the following:

She provides a sealift capability for the transport and deployment of equipment, vehicles and personnel, and is capable of transferring cargo and personnel ashore in benign conditions (up to sea state 3) when port facilities are not available. CANTERBURY has two 59 tonne Landing Craft Medium (LCM) capable of carrying 50 tonnes at 9 knots with a range of 250 nm.

The remainder of the navy’s ships have a key role to play as protection, replenishment and surveillance. Whilst the fleet has yet to exercise in concert in a major amphibious exercise, elements of the fleet have supported Canterbury on joint exercises with the NZ Army and the RNZN.

The RNZAF provides key enablers to the ATF in the form of surveillance aircraft, P3 Orion, strategic and tactical lift, Boeing 757, and C130, and tactical lift, NH90 helicopters. The majority of RNZAF tasks are in support of the NZ Army, RNZN, and OGA. As such, the RNZAF is comfortable in the joint environment. For example, the maritime surveillance element will regularly fly in support of the Ministry of Fisheries (monitor fishing vessels), NZ customs (smuggling), NZ Police (counter narcotics) as well as on anti submarine warfare exercises with the RNZN and overland surveillance with the NZ Army. The rotary wing component is able to embark the following to support Army or OGA operations:

Up to four NH90’s can be carried onboard the MRV for deployment ashore in support of Army operations and disaster relief activities. The MRV is also capable of operating the SH-2G Sea sprite and the helicopter deck is able to handle a Chinook-size helicopter.

It is important to reiterate that these elements of the NZDF exercise and operate together though seldom in complete concert. Often two of the three services or capabilities will deploy but there are limited opportunities to exercise the force in the manner depicted in the above diagram. Competing requirements for scarce strategic assets limit opportunities for joint training.
In November 2012, the NZDF conducted Exercise Pac Tata. This exercise provided an opportunity for what was arguably the first New Zealand based joint amphibious exercise fitting the proposed model from the above schematic, albeit at a macro level and employing HMAS TOBRUK as opposed to HMZNS CANTERBURY.34

From a government and NZDF perspective, the capabilities exist to establish an ATF, and the NZDF has in fact done so on a number of occasions over the past three years. The fundamental difference is that the NZDF has yet to independently deploy or exercise an ATF that mirrors the structure reflected in the above schematic although it has demonstrated the ability to do so. To establish an ATF at the core for the NZDF will require more than an ad hoc exercise program involving elements of the three services. To achieve the ATF at the core by 2015 is optimistic without synchronizing the service exercise program.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The NZDF has yet to develop robust doctrine to support ATF operations and deployment in the New Zealand context. The Joint Force plans and coordinates current NZDF joint and amphibious operations; however, the headquarters is not deployable and is responsible for all domestic and international deployed elements of the three services.

The White Paper recognized that at times there would be a requirement for New Zealand to deploy a headquarters that could command and control New Zealand-led operations. New Zealand established the Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters (DJTFHQ) in January 2012 to meet this requirement. At present it is only staffed by the NZ Army and lacks the necessary infrastructure to operate however, it is intended to develop into a headquarters that is capable of supporting New Zealand-led operations in the South Pacific. The NZDF will continue to employ the current practice of creating an ad hoc command structure on an ‘as required’ basis until the DJTFHQ is operational. The actual shortfall is that the NZDF lacks a deployable Command and Control system capable of commanding an ATF once it is underway. The establishing of a permanent headquarters that is competent in the amphibious realm and capable of deploying is a crucial step in developing an ATF.

TRAINING, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Training, education and culture are three key enablers to the development of an NZDF ATF. The NZDF has a culture of operating independently, commencing with initial induction training and following an education and training model though the ranks structures of each of the services. At very few points do the services conduct combined courses that teach joint operations. It is important to note that the establishment of an ATF is but one milestone on the NZDF Capability Plan, the next significant milestone being an Integrated Force by 2020. Future 35 states that the NZDF is to align the major exercise program and synchronize exercises and operations.35

The shift in culture from a force that is together to one that is apart begins at induction. In 2013 or 2014, the NZDF will commence joint induction training. This is possibly the greatest change in the NZDF individual training model ever. Introducing joint induction training is not without its challenges and there are cultural and practical barriers that may yet either delay or prevent it from occurring.

The NZDF conducts training and education independently within the services. Common induction training aside there is not a culture of joint education and there are no formal courses conducted by the NZDF that teach joint or amphibious operations. Over the past ten years, various officers have attended Amphibious Operations planning courses in countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom but these have been on an ad hoc basis. As a result, a few officers have received introductory training and subsequently may have implemented this on exercise or operations. The NZDF does conduct two joint operations planning courses; the Introduction to Joint Warfare and the Joint Operations Planning Course, which are five and ten days long, respectively. These courses introduce officers from the three services to joint planning. These courses are limited in that they teach a military appreciation process under the premise that no student has received prior exposure to the military planning process.

In addition, the course employs a NEO in a semi-permissive environment as the planning medium. As a result, the students are not exposed to joint warfighting at the higher end of the spectrum and therefore do not plan for the employment of fires, attack aviation etc. The NZDF needs to develop professional military education to train officers in amphibious and joint operations. The three services also need to factor education into the service training regimes so that officers receive tiered training that develops them as they progress in their careers. The Australian amphibious operations publication provides a good baseline document to establish an amphibious education for NZDF personnel. However, there are a myriad of other options available for the NZDF to achieve this, ranging from overseas courses with organizations such as the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the British Royal Marines, or attendance on the Australian Amphibious Operations. Attendance on international amphibious courses by select personnel with the goal of a establishing a New Zealand based amphibious course would contribute significantly to the establishment of an amphibious culture within the NZDF.

Fiscal pressure has driven a level of interdependence amongst several military trades in the NZDF (medial, communications, physical training). This can assist in creating a joint culture but as the training is trade specific, it is an example of integration. There is a fundamental difference in aspects of integration and the establishment of an ATF. The ATF is a solution to the strategic environment and an uncertain future. Interdependency is efficiency driven and whilst may assist in developing a joint culture are predominantly fiscally driven with the intent to reduce three service schools to one which in turn will reduce overheads. There is an opportunity to exploit this and create an opportunity to enhance a joint culture within the trades that currently train in the tri-service environment.

The cultural shift to an interdependent force will take time, and competing outputs make joint training difficult. These issues require further analysis and development, but doing so will very definitely enhance the transition to a more integrated force and would therefore lead to advancing New Zealand’s amphibious capability.
INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARTNER NATIONS

New Zealand will only be able to lead or conduct independent amphibious operations in the South Pacific in certain circumstances. An NZ ATF provides a niche capability that can support coalition partners particularly in the South Pacific. Aside from this capability, New Zealand has a reputation for fairness amongst Pacific Island nations. This reputation is helpful in peace support or HADR operations and means that New Zealand may be called to mediate in local affairs. This, in conjunction with the military capability of an NZDF ATF, adds value to operations with multi-national forces that may operate in the area.

The NZDF ATF will be able to augment an Australian ATF and, given the close relationship between the countries, a New Zealand ATF would easily work in an Australian Brigade/MEU construct. Historically, New Zealand has provided an additional battalion to an Australian Brigade (East Timor 1999 – 2003) or company to an Australian battalion (South Vietnam 1967 – 1972). The New Zealand ATF will be capable of operating as an independent entity of a larger taskforce in a discrete AO or in direct support of an allied ATF.

INTEROPERABILITY WITH OGA IN SUPPORT OF NEW ZEALAND INC

The majority of contemporary New Zealand operations in the South Pacific are in support of OGA. These operations include maritime search and rescue, operations to prevent illegal fishing, and smuggling. These operations generally involve maritime aircraft and government representatives embarked on Navy ships. Presently, habitual relationships exist between the NZDF and the OGA and operations are successfully coordinated and conducted through the Joint Force Headquarters. This system works well when operations are planned and conducted within the existing framework, however, as the White Paper details in the below paragraph the NZDF and NZ OGA need to improve interoperability.

To enable effective independent and combined operations, the NZDF’s network systems need to be interoperable within joint, interagency, and multinational environments. The New Zealand Aid Program (NZAID) often relies on the NZDF to assist with development and relief packages within the Pacific Islands, particularly emergency response to natural disasters. This is where the NZDF currently conducts what is the most likely task for an ATF. From a land perspective, the NZ Army conducts an annual engineer and medical exercise to one of the Pacific Islands, which in recent years has grown to coalition size. For example, Exercise Pacific Partnership in 2012 saw the FANC and the United States participating in an exercise that provided medical and engineering expertise/development assistance to Samoa.

The development of an ATF reflects many of the current tasks that the NZDF conduct in support of OGA. These tasks often only involve one or two elements of a service, predominantly Navy and Air Force. Many critics question how the development of an ATF is any different from the current day-to-day operations of the NZDF. The pragmatic response is that there is little change, however, the relations with OGA are being formalized and greater efficiencies between New Zealand Government departments established. The difference is subtle but there is a defined role for greater integration of the NZDF and NZ OGA to meet New Zealand’s goals in the South Pacific.

SHORTFALLS AND RISK

Developing an ATF at the core of the NZDF by 2015 is ambitious and contains a number of challenges.

Predominantly, fiscal constraints in conjunction with competing government and service outputs will be the greatest challenge to the establishment of an NZDF ATF. RNZN and RNZAF platforms are strategic assets and are in constant demand to meet a myriad of government outputs. It is already difficult to plan and conduct joint training at the tactical level, and often there is very little joint work up time prior to a major exercise. For example, HMZS Canterbury doubles as the RNZN training vessel; this coupled with time spent in annual maintenance will detract from the HMZS Canterbury’s ability to physically train with the other two services. The NZDF has yet to investigate solutions such as greater academic exposure or simulation-based training to offset this capacity gap. These options exist and with an increase in joint education will assist in mitigating the shortfall of practical training. In addition an option is to establish an annual New Zealand based CPX that develops amphibious doctrine in the NZDF context. This could dovetail into the FANC hosted exercises or potentially a US or Australian exercise.

The greatest risk is that the development and maintenance of an ATF will not be fiscally viable and that New Zealand will not be in a position to replace the equipment that it currently has. Many of the NZDF’s platforms are recently upgraded or new; the White Paper and Defence Capability plan have mapped replacement and upgrade plans. As it stands New Zealand’s current service capability is capable of meeting the requirements of an ATF.

Organizational change takes time; many within the services understand the need for greater integration however, there is a danger that internal friction will dilute the intent and that the level of integration needed to meet the intent of an ATF at the core of the NZDF will not be met. The changes to education and training are yet to be established, once there is a strong foundation of amphibious operations and separate service operations become the norm then the statement of an ATF at the core of the NZDF will have been meet. There is a risk that the NZDF will only achieve the goal of having an ATF at its core in name only by 2015.

CONCLUSION

New Zealand’s goal of developing an ATF by 2015 is achievable; however, this level of achievement must be seen as being within the New Zealand definition and context of an ATF. The White Paper and NZDF Capability plan clearly outline the requirement for an ATF, its tasks and the program to enhance and continue to maintain and upgrade key enablers through to 2035. The detail is yet to be developed by the services and thoroughly implemented at the tactical level. Critically there is a growing awareness that this is the future of the NZDF and it is slowly permeating through the three services. There are a number of educational and training deficiencies that need to be addressed to enhance the development of the ATF in the NZDF. However, these will not prevent New Zealand from deploying an ATF for operations in the South Pacific. There are shortfalls, though, that unless addressed may limit the effectiveness of an ATF. The cultural shift to an interdependent force will take time, and competing outputs make joint training difficult. These issues require further analysis and development, but doing so will very definitely enhance the transition to a more integrated force and would therefore lead to advancing New Zealand’s amphibious capability. The establishment of an NZDF ATF is achievable within the constraints of an NZDF definition as is required by the New Zealand government, and will contribute vitally to New Zealand’s defense posture.

Notes

The collision of a United States EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a People's Republic of China F-8 air superiority fighter during the morning of April 1, 2001 touched off an eleven-day incident that would test not only the relationship of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) but also the skills of diplomats from both countries. The eleven-day ordeal, dubbed the Hainan Incident, demonstrated the importance of having clear rules of engagement for U.S. and PRC militaries and utilizing diplomatic tools to resolve issues quickly. What events transpired during the Hainan incident? Was the United States legally justified to conduct military reconnaissance flights in the PRC EEZ? Why was the U.S. letter of apology to the PRC an effective diplomatic tool? This topic paper will address these questions in order to demonstrate that the risk of future military incident between the U.S. and PRC militaries can be mitigated and addressed through clear bilateral agreements and the judicious use of prescriptive diplomatic tools.

ACCOUNTS OF THE HAINAN INCIDENT

On the morning of April 1, 2001, a U.S. EP-3 electronic reconnaissance plane took off from Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, Japan. Gaining altitude on the pristine Sunday morning, its mission was to fly close to the southern coast of China monitoring electronic signals and gathering intelligence on the “systematic military build-up” in the area. Proceeding on its flight path 70 nautical miles from the southern coast of Hainan Island, the EP-3 had thus far had a textbook aerial reconnaissance mission. However, just before the EP-3 turned around to return to base at Kadena, it was intercepted by a pair of PRC F-8 Finback air superiority fighters. In the years leading up to 2001, the U.S. Air Force had a history of flying reconnaissance missions along China’s southern coast. In response to these missions, the PRC frequently sent out interceptors to tail some of the U.S. intelligence gathering aircraft. Thus the EP-3 pilot, Navy Lieutenant Shane Osborn, was not surprised by the interception. Recently, however, the PRC F-8 pilots had engaged in a pattern of unsafe behavior by flying very close to American reconnaissance planes before returning to base. This practice unnerved LT Osborn as he experienced this form of “reckless airmanship” before flying the fateful Hainan mission.

As the Chinese pilots approached the EP-3, LT Osborn kept his aircraft on autopilot but was prepared to take full control of the plane. According to Osborn’s account, once the interceptors had caught up to the plane, one of the pilots, Captain Wang Wei, flew his F-8 roughly 50 feet away from the EP-3’s left wing. Making gestures with his hands, the Chinese pilot attempted to communicate with the American crew but was unsuccessful. Frustrated, Captain Wang de-throttled his fighter and made a second pass but this time within 20 feet of the EP-3. Taking off his oxygen mask, Captain Wang tried to communicate with the American crew but was again unsuccessful. Dropping back for a third pass, the F-8 pilot “approached again from [the EP-3’s] left rear, closing so fast the pilot couldn’t slow. Instead of dipping his nose to fly beneath [the EP-3’s] wing,...[the F-8’s] fuselage rose at a steep angle toward the chopping propeller blades of [the EP-3’s] number one engine.” The collision split the F-8’s fuselage in two and forced the EP-3’s pilot to make “a steep left turn.” According to LT Osborn, “the front section of the Finback flipped toward us... sever[ing our] fiberglass nose.” The Finback plummeted to the sea with Captain Wang deploying his parachute and the EP-3 went into a steep inverted dive. Once Osborn stabilized the plane, he and his superior officer/co-pilot decided to make an emergency landing on Lingshui airfield at Hainan Island while attempting to contact the PRC and the U.S. command via international radio.
The PRC claims, however, that the pair of interceptors did not harass the EP-3 and were never closer than 400 meters (roughly 1,300 feet). According to PRC officials, "the US plane abruptly veered towards Wang’s plane. [Pilot Zhao Yu] saw the US EP-3’s nose and left wing bump into Wang’s jet, and the propeller on the EP-3’s left wing smashed the jet’s vertical tail wing into pieces." Captain Wang then deployed his parachute, while the EP-3 plummeted towards the sea. The PRC also asserted that it was never contacted by the EP-3 with a request to land at Lingshui airfield and it never gave the US plane verbal clearance to land. While the events of the collision and subsequent landing of the US EP-3 plane are unclear, it is indisputable that the PRC Finback suffered fatal damage and the US EP-3 suffered critical damage that forced it to make an emergency landing at Lingshui airfield. Thus, determining who is at fault in the incident is not as important as addressing the issues that caused the collision and offering effective ways to solve these issues and prevent future collisions.

CHINESE AND AMERICAN REACTIONS

Once the EP-3 landed at Lingshui, PRC military guards immediately detained the American crew. At the same time, the PRC sent a large contingent of naval ships and aircraft to sweep the section of sea where Captain Wang Wei fell; they would not be successful in their search. The public reaction on the Chinese mainland towards the collision and the breach of national sovereignty was overwhelmingly negative, as scores of newspapers grilled the US for its "hegemonic conduct" and labeled it a country that "made trouble at the door of...[a] person’s home." The PRC vice president, Zhu Bangzao, expressed outrage about the collision and demanded that "the US government make an explanation to the Chinese government and people on the US plane’s actions."

The US reaction was largely relegated to a concern for the return of the EP-3 crew, as well as the damaged US plane. President George W. Bush Jr. demanded that "the Chinese government...do the right thing...[and let] our service men and women...return home...[and] to return our plane." In the days following the incident, the US crew was detained in a military housing barracks on Lingshui airfield. During this time, the PRC military constantly interrogated Lieutenant Osborn about the collision and the reconnaissance mission he performed. According to LT Osborn’s account, the PRC guards also deprived him of sleep during the duration of hisstay: “whenever I fell asleep, the guards would scrape their chairs and blow smoke in my face...I was drained, having gotten a total of about four hours of real sleep since takeoff at Kadena.” This harassment was focused on LT Osborn, with the rest of the EP-3 crew being left alone.

Meanwhile, high-level US officials and military attaches worked furiously to secure the release of the US crew and plane. Negotiations were held between Secretary of State Colin Powell, US Ambassador to China Joseph Prueher, and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. After several days of negotiations, both sides settled on a US apology letter. The letter itself, submitted by US Ambassador Prueher, did not expressly apologize for the incident but instead expressed “sincere regret” over the missing PRC pilot, Wang Wei, and further stated that the US was “very sorry for entering China’s airspace” and landing without verbal clearance. Deemed a sufficient apology for the incident, the letter secured the release of the entire US EP-3 crew on April 11, 2001. The American EP-3 would remain in PRC custody and was transported back to the US several months later. This entire series of events, collectively named the Hainan Incident, was a bump in the road for Sino-US relations and collectively set the stage for the legality of US military flights in the PRC EEZ and the use of the letter of apology as a diplomatic tool.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

The Exclusive Economic Zone is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as an area that “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” The convention elaborated that foreign states performing activities in a home state’s EEZ “shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” The UNCLOS also defines two other zones: the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. The territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the coast of a State and the contiguous zone extends for an additional 12 nautical miles from the end of the territorial sea. In both of these zones, the home state exercises a high degree of sovereignty. Furthermore, the UNCLOS forbids military operations of foreign states in these two regions without the consent of the home state.

The United States, which has declined to ratify the UNCLOS, claims that it was legally justified in conducting military operations in the PRC’s EEZ. The US argues that there was a precedent of overt military reconnaissance missions in the PRC’s EEZ and that it was simply performing the missions on the principle of ensuring the transparency of the PRC military and the national security of the United States. Lieutenant Osborn confirms this, stating that his “squadron had been flying such [reconnaissance] missions in this area...for decades without serious incident.” US officials would go on to say that the US military was “absolutely going to continue reconnaissance flights” off of the PRC coast in order to “guard our national security and that of our allies.”

The United States also claims that there is a legal basis for flying military reconnaissance missions in the PRC’s EEZ. American Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Petras contends that beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit, states should enjoy “complete freedom of movement and operation for all ships and aircraft.” Petras further contends that the UNCLOS does not grant a home State sovereign rights or jurisdiction in its EEZ but only the authority to enforce its economic powers in the zone. Thus, Petras equates the EEZ to international waters in which a home State can exercise only economic powers and foreign States may conduct military reconnaissance missions freely. Another American scholar, Raul Pedrozo, argues that even though Article 19 of the UNCLOS forbids military aircraft from “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state,” the convention has no article specifically prohibiting intelligence gathering in a home State’s EEZ. Pedrozo further contends that “whatever is not prohibited in international law is permitted,” therefore the US is not legally barred from conducting reconnaissance missions in the PRC’s EEZ.

The People’s Republic of China rejects the US line of reasoning and contends that there is no legal justification for the US to conduct reconnaissance missions in its EEZ. The PRC argues that the US reconnaissance flights in its EEZ pose a threat to its national security and that under the doctrine of hot pursuit it may send fighters to intercept and police foreign military aircraft out of its EEZ. PRC officials have repeatedly voiced concern that “US military planes have frequently flown into [its] airspace...on spying missions,” and contend that these missions “pose a serious threat to China’s national security.” In order to stem these violations of national security, the PRC states that it “shall have the right to take the necessary investigative measures in accordance with the law and may exercise the right of hot pursuit.” The PRC has cited several UNCLOS provisions in its argument against US intelligence gathering operations. For example, the PRC has heavily cited Article 58 of the convention, stating “countries exercising their rights and performing their duties in the EEZ...should give appropriate consideration to the rights and duties of the coastal countries.” The PRC also refers to Article 301 and 88 of the convention, which states that the high seas should be used for peaceful purposes.
The issues at the heart of this debate are important because they carry serious implications for the rights of foreign states to carry out reconnaissance missions in the EEZ of a home state and will dictate to what extent a home state can legally police foreign military aircraft in its EEZ. Thus, which side has a more legally supportable claim? The PRC’s claims are slightly more supportable, primarily because its claims are based on the UNCLOS, a convention cited by many countries—including the United States—and ratified by several others. Even though the provisions of the UNCLOS do not specifically state that a foreign state is legally barred from conducting reconnaissance missions in a home state’s EEZ, the spirit of a select number of articles would imply that foreign military aircraft do not have the right to conduct these missions if the home state prohibits it. This claim is supported by Dr. William Tetley, as he contends that the spirit of the Article 58 provision of the UNCLOS, which mandates that foreign states show “due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State,” generally prohibits foreign military reconnaissance aircraft from operating in a home state’s EEZ without the home state’s permission.

The Article 58 provision is very general, however, as pro-U.S. scholars could argue that foreign states only have to show due regard for the home state’s economic rights in the EEZ. The United States military has taken this stance and argues that, since the UNCLOS does not specifically prevent reconnaissance missions in a country’s EEZ, the U.S. may legally fly in the EEZs of other nations. Furthermore, even though the U.S. considers the UNCLOS customary law, it did not ratify the convention and thus is not technically bound by its provisions. Thus, the critical conflict is clear: the PRC not only felt that the U.S. violated its sovereignty and several UNCLOS provisions but also felt justified to police U.S. reconnaissance planes out of its EEZ. The U.S., on the other hand, felt there was sufficient precedent and legal justification for its reconnaissance flights. The fact that both nations felt they were right set the stage for a collision.

The U.S. publicly stated that its “right to fly in international airspace to conduct military surveillance is in our national interest...[and] it contributes to regional stability...[and must] not be hampered in any way.” While it may be true that the flights provide transparency to the notoriously secretive PRC military, this attitude disregards the rights and concerns of the nation being surveyed. In fact, the primary reason the PRC dispatched military fighters to intercept U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was because it felt its national security was being threatened. Thus, can a country claim that its national security takes precedence over the national security of other countries? This is a contentious question which has not been adequately addressed in the context of Sino-US relations. Thus, the conflicting interests of the U.S. and PRC will set the stage for another Hainan Incident if both countries do not work together to produce a bi-lateral agreement that addresses the issue of the adversarial actions of both countries in the PRC’s EEZ.

DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS

A clear, collaborative bilateral agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China would be the best solution to mitigating the risk of another mid-air collision and international crisis. A framework for this kind of bilateral agreement between the U.S. and PRC already exists and is called the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement or MMCA. This agreement sets up a framework in which military and diplomatic officers get together in an annual meeting to discuss “the safety of maritime activities, the avoidance of maritime accidents and the adoption of other confidence-building measures.”

The MMCA was initially set up in 1998 in order to “promote common understanding regarding activities undertaken by [each country’s] respective maritime and air forces.” However, the agreement was not taken seriously by either side until the Hainan Incident, and no binding rules of conduct were ever produced that would regulate military-to-military vessel interactions. The MMCA is an excellent framework but must be improved in order to mitigate the risk of another mid-air collision. Dr. Tao Li, advocates “supplementing the security dialogue of the MMCA with formal rules of interaction” that both militaries will use in order to govern future military-to-military vessel interactions. This suggestion might be a way to improve the MMCA, prevent future incidents, and resolve the legal ambiguity in the UNCLOS because it would set clear guidelines for how U.S. and PRC militaries interact with each other in a confrontation. Thus, in the absence of clear international laws, transforming the MMCA into a bilateral agreement governing the interaction between U.S. and PRC military aircraft might reduce the risk of another incident similar to the Hainan episode.

The judicious use of prescriptive diplomatic tools is another effective way to not necessarily mitigate the risk of another Sino-US crisis, but rather to address the crisis once it has occurred. One of the most effective diplomatic tools when it comes to resolving issues in the Sino-US relationship is the formal apology letter. The apology letter sent to PRC Foreign Minister Tang calmed the intense anti-U.S. feeling in the PRC and achieved the U.S.’s top priority, the release of all 24 members of the EP-3 crew. The letter itself did not expressly apologize to the PRC but expressed “sincere regret” for the missing PRC pilot Wang Wei and the violation of PRC sovereignty.

Even though the letter did not secure the release of the damaged U.S. EP-3 back to the U.S. military, the public reaction to the letter was positive on both sides. The Chinese government felt that the letter allowed the PRC a level of dignity in the crisis and encouraged its citizens to “turn patriotic enthusiasm into strength to build a powerful nation.” Thus, the PRC government acknowledged the letter as a satisfactory response from the U.S. and encouraged its citizens to accept it and move past the crisis. The U.S. government also felt satisfied with the resolution of the conflict; as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that “the American public should be quite satisfied...24 Americans...return home this Easter...that is a good outcome.” Thus, in one diplomatic stroke the United States alleviated the crisis with the PRC and normalized Sino-US relations.

In a diplomatic context, the U.S. letter to the PRC should be interpreted as an effective diplomatic gesture that allowed “both sides to claim victory after [the]...11-day diplomatic standoff” by placating the PRC’s public outrage and allowing the U.S. to avoid directly claiming responsibility for the Hainan Incident. While using an apology letter to resolve an international crisis is a very prescriptive gesture in context of the Sino-U.S. relationship, it is nevertheless an effective method of crisis resolution. Although apology letters cannot necessarily be used to solve crises between the U.S. and other countries, judiciously using prescriptive diplomatic gestures to resolve a crisis is a prudent approach that should be utilized by governments around the world. This involves knowing the demands and needs of each country in a crisis and working on a solution that will produce the best possible outcome. Many periods of tension have occurred between the U.S. and PRC in the past and, fortunately, in the case of the Hainan Incident, an appropriate letter from high-level U.S. officials was a satisfactory diplomatic gesture for both sides. Thus, if the United States remains willing and open to utilize prescriptive diplomatic tools, it will be able to effectively address conflict with the PRC and ensure satisfactory solutions to Sino-U.S. crises.

CONCLUSION

The Hainan Incident demonstrated the importance of having clear rules of engagement for U.S. and PRC militaries and utilizing prescriptive diplomatic gestures to resolve issues quickly. In the absence of clear international laws and in the pres-
Afghanistan – A New Economic Model For Change

In order to promote stability and growth in Afghanistan, the U.S. must abandon policies that establish a capitalistic free market and redirect its efforts to establish a centrally-managed socialist economy.

BY CDR JEROME DIXON, USN; LTC WILLIAM E. KERR, USA; LT COL ED D. MANGAHAS, USAF

Post-World War II American history is rife with both economic and foreign policy failures. After eleven years of occupation and a belated counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, our policies left this nation poised to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Today the United States (U.S.) is guiding Afghanistan toward an unrealistic and unsustainable economic model. The present policy of pushing Afghanistan to establish a “private-sector market based economy” presents an unachievable expectation for a sixteenth-century economy in a twenty-first century world. In order to set conditions that promote stability, growth, and Afghan government legitimacy, the U.S. must abandon the policy of establishing a free-market capitalistic model in Afghanistan, and redirect its efforts to establish a centrally managed socialist economy.

Before understanding why a different economic model is required, the current Afghanistan environment and strategy must be understood. After looking at the environment, an examination of the problem from a different frame of reference must occur. Systems Dynamics, a modeling and analysis tool developed in the early 1960s by MIT Sloan Professor Jay W. Forrester to assist in understanding electrical engineering systems, has applicability in addressing the current Afghan problem. This “systems perspective” approach adds new dimensions for understanding and framing complex problems such as the ones faced in Afghanistan. This analysis, along with a careful review of other developing country economies, provides evidence that the current U.S. guidance pushing Afghanistan to establish a “private-sector market based economy” is doomed to fail. Additionally, an actual issue tackled with the proposed economic strategy will demonstrate how this new economic model works.

THE ENVIRONMENT

The Afghan landscape is complex and includes diverse cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic factors. Thirteen different ethnic tribes with varying backgrounds and beliefs vie for political, military and economic control in overlapping geographic regions. Further muddying the economic waters are the dynamics of “feudalism”. Historically feudalism emerges as a result of the decentralization of an empire, as in the case of the Japanese and European empires, which both lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure necessary to support cavalry without the ability to allocate land. These acquired powers significantly diminished centralized power in these empires. Only when the infrastructure existed to maintain centralized power—as with the European monarchies—did feudalism begin to yield to this new organized power and eventually disappear. For Afghanistan, feudalism applies to the warlords and the various tribes under their control. Feudalism remains at odds with Afghan self-governance, economic progress and modernization.

Success in Afghanistan is an important symbol and a key metric for U.S. policy in the Middle East. In order to counter anti-U.S. sentiment in the Arab world, the U.S. must show positive returns for the Afghan people. Since the denouncement of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan continues as the source of 87 percent of the world’s illegal opium and heroin. The responsibility for curing this epidemic rests on the U.S. and Afghan government. Other challenges in Afghanistan include legitimizing the government, providing credible security, basic services (i.e. electricity, clean water), and maintaining ethnic harmony. Given the current situation, the U.S. and its coalition partners are working to establish an economically viable Afghanistan with a strong, legitimate central government. With that end state in mind, the U.S. uses a certain design model to determine its strategy and policy.

CURRENT U.S. MODEL AND STRATEGY

In Spring 2010, the graphic in Figure 1 depicting “Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics” skewed public perception of U.S. efforts to unravel the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Although first published as a “tongue-in-cheek” effort lampooning the U.S. military’s dependence on Microsoft PowerPoint® slides, the military felt slighted that its “spaghetti diagram” was not taken as a serious effort to tackle the myriad of complexities within Afghanistan. Upon closer inspection, the PowerPoint® slide is a “hybrid Causal Loop Diagram (CLD),” which is a type of influence diagram. CLDs serve as visualization tools that aid in generating ideas and conceptualize effects. This type of model helps a user understand complex systems and depicts the dynamics U.S. strategic planners believe exist in Afghanistan.

The current strategy in Afghanistan, outlined in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), was initially written in 2008 yet continues to undergo modifications. The ANDS represents a comprehensive plan developed as a sequel to the Afghan Compact of 2006, which represented an agreement between the International Community and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to establish goals for nation building, security, governance, development, and a crosscutting counter-narcotic strategy. The ANDS was written as a comprehensive “bottom-up” approach that addressed all of the social and economic issues confronting people throughout the country, to include all 34 provinces, not just those living in and around Kabul.

The three parts of the ANDS vision for Afghanistan in 2020 are:

• A stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors, standing with full dignity in the international family.
• A tolerant, united, and pluralistic nation that honors its Islamic heritage and the deep-seated aspirations toward participation, justice, and equal rights for all.
• A society of hope and prosperity based on a strong, private sector led market economy, social equity, and environmental sustainability.

The ANDS is written to also serve as the guiding document for reducing poverty, and is also known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This task is rather daunting when considering that as recently as 2007 forty-two percent of the population in Afghanistan still lived in poverty. Reducing poverty is included under the three pillars/goals of the ANDS, which are:

2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights: Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.

3. Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

In essence, the ANDS seeks to replace the narcotic trade with an honorable resource while concurrently reducing poverty across the populace by institutionalizing a private-sector-led market economy. It is not difficult to imagine that the Afghan government would want to model its economic system on that of the U.S. in the hopes of increasing its prosperity.

Current U.S. strategy takes a typical western approach to economics with policies geared toward free market capitalism. The ANDS codifies this with its strategic objective of enabling "the private sector to lead Afghanistan's development within a competitive market-based economy in which the Government is the policy maker and regulator of the economy, not its competitor. The establishment of a strong enabling environment for a competitive private sector is an on-going effort by both the government and donors."

As a review, capitalism is an economic system based on the private ownership of capital goods and the means of production, with the creation of goods and services for profit. Elements central to capitalism include capital accumulation, competitive markets, and a price system. This model also assumes an educated labor force, property ownership, natural resources and the production capacity for multiple markets, and a strong central government. All of this must be established in order for a capitalistic economy to succeed. The question is does Afghanistan have all these attributes?

Afghanistan is largely an agrarian economy; roughly eighty percent of the Afghan population engages in some employment in the Agricultural sector. With few markets (opium being the largest), property under the control of tribes and a historically weak central government, Afghanistan simply does not have the infrastructure and resources for capitalism to work. Current processes may, in their complexity, prove a “bridge too far” for GIRoA. Some argue that this is the purpose for reconstruction and economic development – to build infrastructure and economic capacity. Overall, there are indications that the current strategy implemented by GIRoA and the International Community produced some limited success. Per capita incomes have grown from $147 to $289, and foreign assistance to Afghanistan has grown in recent years. However, the level of foreign assistance has actually grown to forty percent of the Afghan GDP, a level not conducive to internal growth within Afghanistan. Overall economic growth has been at a healthy seven to nine percent in recent years and growth in the Agricultural sector is expected to continue in the vicinity of five percent. That level of growth may not be sustainable in the years to come, particularly if the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorates to a non-permissive level, prohibitive to public and private economic development. If nation state capacity decreases and the security level deteriorates, the Afghan economy will suffer a devastating setback and return hundreds of thousands of Afghans to unemployment.

Below is a short list of some of the items the ANDS lists as shortfalls for the economy:

- **The ‘hard infrastructure’, including roads and reliable supplies of water and power, is inadequate to support rapid and sustained economic growth.**
- **Limited ‘soft infrastructure’, which includes the human and institutional capacity necessary for an economy to function. Considerable emphasis is being given to developing capacity in both the public and private sectors and to institutional development, but these efforts will take time.**
- **Economic governance is weak. The Government is pursuing comprehensive economic reform, including the introduction of new commercial laws and regulations, but lacks institutions needed for effective implementation and enforcement.**

1. Afghanistan’s commercial connections to regional and global economies must be redeveloped.
2. Critical markets for land and finance are largely undeveloped, limiting the ability of private investors to establish and operate businesses. Property rights are often contested or difficult to defend.
3. Afghanistan is experiencing high population. Continued rapid population growth will substantially increase the levels of investment that will be required to substantially reduce poverty.

Clearly, the dynamics of the current process must evolve, with the hope of strong progress before the 2014 removal of major U.S. military forces. So how can nation state capacity increase in Afghanistan?

Figure 2: Causal Loop Model for Key System Dynamics Driving Nation State Capacity

**NATION STATE CAPACITY**

Figure 2 is known in system dynamics terms as a causal-loop diagram. Following system dynamics conventions, each arrow in the diagram represents a link of causation between two variables. For example, as Economic Maturity Level (a key index) increases, Nation State Capacity increases. As Economic Maturity Level decreases, so does Nation State Capacity. This positive reinforcement is depicted with a (+) sign. The opposite scenario is
depicted as a (−) sign, as depicted by the increase in the degree of Segmentation and Feudalism and the decrease in Nation State Capacity decreases. As Nation State Capacity increases, Segmentation and Feudalism decrease. Because the key factors are depicted with their respective relationships and how they feed back to one another, the entire chain of variables in Figure 1 is known as a "causal loop."

To summarize the model depicted in Figure 1, Economic Maturity Level drives Nation State Capacity and Nation State Capacity will also in turn drive the Economic Maturity Level. Modernization and Reform have the same effect, where any increase will also develop an increase in Nation State Capacity and the Economic Maturity Level. After thorough analysis, Tribal Structure does not necessarily impede Nation State Capacity and Economic Maturity Level, nor does Tribal Structure necessarily affect Modernization and Reform. The key conflicting variable is actually Segmentation and Feudalism though this is usually tied to Tribal Structure. An economic model that can leverage Tribal Structure but still shift the Afghan population away from Segmentation and Feudalism best address this situation.

ECONOMIC MODELS AND MATURITY LEVEL

A number of different economic models exist across many spectrums, ideologies and regions. These models can be grouped into three general economic types: traditional, market and command. The main difference between these systems is the amount of autonomy the government allows the economy (reference Figure 3). As the global environment evolved, developed countries typically do not use a traditional economy. Since most counties welcome or require government participation in the economic environment, most twenty first century economies are considered "mixed," where there is some combination of the market and command economies. The amount of government participation is one, if not the only, defining characteristic between the largest market economies, with capitalism on one side and socialism on the other. One of the implications of government involvement is a corresponding change in complexity.

A joint study between Harvard's Center for International Development and MIT's Media Lab mapped the path to economic prosperity and documented their research in a book titled "The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity." Researchers determined the path to economic prosperity is based on the accumulated knowledge of its citizens and the complexity of its products. "Our most prosperous modern societies are wiser, not because their citizens are individually brilliant, but because these societies hold a diversity of know how and because they are able to recombine it to create a larger variety of smarter and better products".

Afghanistan needs a new economic model taking into account current limitations but still promoting the accumulation of knowledge, diversity of products, and strong governance.

Arguably, capitalism is the most "mature" model in the group. Referring back to the joint study and the path to economic prosperity and its relationship to complexity, the economic model that accumulates the most knowledge and produces the broadest range of products with the current resources at hand drives a country and its citizens down the path to prosperity. Therefore economic complexity is the best indicator for how mature and capable an economic model will perform and is the best indicator for Economic Maturity Level. From the Economic Complexity Index in the joint study, the top ten economic models are all capitalist economic models (Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, United Kingdom, and Slovenia) with the exception of Singapore at number 7 (note that the U.S. was ranked number 13 due to the outsourcing of its manufacturing base). Based on the high number of free market capitalist economies at the top of this scale – the capitalist model is the best model for a nation with a highly educated workforce and the technical capacity to produce a broad range of goods and services.

Afghanistan does not have a highly educated workforce or a broad range of goods and services, making the capitalist economic model a distant goal and unrealistic at this point. So which economic model should it use? The next step is to apply the various known economic models against the facts presented in the key dynamics of Afghanistan.

A NEW MODEL FOR CHANGE

Derived from Figure 2, Figure 4 shows how a centrally planned economy with market socialism best fits Afghanistan’s needs. The key variable that drives us to this model is Available Work vs. Available Workforce. In mature capitalist societies, there is a highly educated workforce with the necessary demand for their skill sets. This is not the case in Afghanistan. In order to build Nation State Capacity, the government of Afghanistan must first figure out a way to create both demand and a workforce to meet such demand. Natural resources are an enabler, but these are a finite stock and a temporary, not systematic, fix.

Economist Robert Heilbroner describes socialism as system where “the government controls all means of production,” and emphasizes the state’s control and its role in planning. Economist John Marangos expands on this, emphasizing the government’s responsibility for “forecasting, coordinating economic decisions, and guiding and directing economic development,” and its ability to “dissolve information barriers” in order to have “generated all the information required for decision making in the social interest.” Additionally, the government can “internalize the externalities associated with investment, to produce public goods, and to compensate for incomplete markets.” In Afghanistan, a centrally planned economy that has the ability to effectively manage Available Work vs. Available Workforce, creates the effect of weakening Segmentation and Feudalism (reference Figure 4).

As the tribes begin to send workers into the national workforce, cross-pollination of ethnic groups increases, thereby creating more national identity. In addition, education continues to permeate the populace and reliance on Afghan nation-state infrastructure increases. An interesting piece to this dynamic is that as Available Work vs. Available Workforce goes up, Segmentation and Feudalism goes down. However, as Segmentation and Feudalism goes up, Available Work vs. Available Workforce will still go up creating a drain to Segmentation and Feudalism. Keep in mind that this process will not occur overnight; it took Vietnam over twenty years to make this shift. However, this model has proven effective for driving change and...
Building nation-state capacity for developing nations.

In the past, other countries have used a socialist mixed economy to set the conditions for capitalism. In fact, "evidence that the socialististic economies met the population's basic needs better than did the capitalistic economics" indicate that for fledging countries, a socialist economy provides the basis for a prosperous economic future. When compared, socialist economies seemed to improve the "nutritional, health and education standards" of the "lower-strata of its population" better than its capitalistic counterparts. As the perception of a better quality of life grew, the populace accepted increased government responsibility for economic decisions.

Economist John Marangos states that although the idea of market socialism is often regarded as radical, people in transition economies are likely to be much more willing to endure sacrifices if the gains and losses during the transition appear equitably distributed.

Based on the above factors, the current economic model that best fits Afghanistan is the mixed model where Afghanistan implements a centrally planned economy with market socialism. As its workforce becomes more educated and technical capacity increases – free market initiatives can be introduced. Over time, a socialist market economy will fail to provide "competition" which is the "necessary incentive for people to work hard... lower costs and raise efficiency." But the shift in a market economy from a socialist to capitalist based model can be executed when the conditions in Afghanistan support the transition. A great place for the GIRoA to start is with India's plan to invest in mining operations in Afghanistan.

**USE CASE: AFGHAN NATIONAL RAILROAD NETWORK**

GIRoA must take more control of its economy, and India's investment plan provides an excellent opportunity for the government to exercise economic control. Afghanistan has significant potential for economic growth, which is partially rooted in its substantial mineral resources and its strategic location as a "business hub linking the markets of Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and China." India plans to build a 900 kilometer railroad from Afghanistan's mineral-rich heartland in Hajigak to an Iranian port in Chabahar on the Arabian Sea in attempt to open a new trade route and reduce Kabul's dependence on Pakistan. For India, the prize is a potentially highly lucrative contract to mine Afghanistan's iron reserves (Figure 6), which are estimated to be worth up to $3 trillion – several times the size of India's growing economy – and the strategic advantage of a new trade and logistics route to Afghanistan which bypasses Pakistan. Although only ten percent of the country has been studied, the discovery of over four hundred minerals holds promise of an economic resource jackpot.

With outside influence from India (and potentially other countries like China), it is imperative the Afghan government acts judiciously in order to capitalize on the opportunity to build its economic base. While leveraging international support to strengthen legitimacy in the eyes of populace, the government can help build infrastructure for the country for transportation, while simultaneously employing and training the populace. Later these trained workers can use the railroad to transport themselves to other regions of the country with expanding job opportunities. Referencing the model from Figure 2, how would these policies and decisions play out?

The first objective of the Afghan government involves leveraging Tribal Structure for the Available Workforce. The Afghan government must then secure investment funding for training, equipping, and paying this Afghan workforce (Available Workforce) to build the prescribed railroad network (Available Work). Politically, the Afghan government must work with tribal leaders to build, secure, and maintain the railroad network utilizing mined minerals (Natural Resources) and finished goods (Economic Maturity Level) to offset costs. These are the types of policies and the implementation required by the GIRoA to drive Nation State Capacity and Economic Maturity Level to their respective highest levels.

**CONCLUSION**

The GIRoA can begin now on its path to economic prosperity by meeting with tribal leaders to build solidarity, by developing prioritized markets for investment with respective business plans, and developing the training plans and procedures for the Afghan labor force based on these prioritized markets.

In addition, the GIRoA, with U.S. and coalition partners, must develop and execute a plan for a national rail system to not only build access to remote areas for minerals and other natural resources, but also for linking tribal communities. U.S. and coalition partners must review and support Afghan investment strategies while simultaneously building international support and funding for Afghan investments. Finally, the U.S. and coalition partners must provide the training and specialized education necessary to support the desired end state for
the Afghan labor force.

It is easy for the U.S. to believe that a free-market economy based on capitalistic theory and limited government intervention is the best economic technique and model for all nations to follow. However, history shows that countries with strong free market economies all went through some type of transformation or maturation process from decentralized loose confederations to a centralized government model designed to pool resources and provide the population the essential services and security required. The axiom “when the only tool you have is a hammer, all problems look like a nail” warns of the trap of using a good tool or useful technique as the panacea for every situation.

The economic situation in Afghanistan is not on the same historical timeline as the economic environment of the U.S. The U.S. and its coalition partners must advise and shift Afghan economic policies to a centrally planned, socialist market economy. The announcement of a 2014 deadline clearly changed the pace and the decision points typically associated with a counterinsurgency transitioning to stability, and as a result, places the entire Afghan effort at risk. After Afghanistan makes gains in economic prosperity by reaching a high level of accumulated knowledge with a broad spectrum of goods and services, only then will it be ready to evolve into a free market capitalistic economy. A highly centralized, socialist market economy is needed to break the dynamics of feudalism and propel Afghanistan towards the eventual end state of a prosperous free market economy setting the foundation for stabilization and security in the region.

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the hands of his family and negotiate an agreement with the leaders of other clans. For the Dangarin clan, Rustam could be the right person, because of his loyalty and relative weakness. Rustam at present does not have his own circle of loyal supporters, while many members of his father’s group are potential competitors. If Rustam became the president, during the first years of his rule at least, the power behind him would be his uncles: Hasan Asudoladze, Said Saduloev, as well as Nuriddin Rahmon. However, their strength could also be an obstacle to Rustam’s succession.

Possible Outcomes: When (and if) Rustam comes to power, the younger generation will not have the memories of the civil war that their parents have. Many of the young men have developed anger, having been treated as “second-class people” working abroad. Increasing numbers of young Tajiks are uneducated. Migrant workers returning from Islamic countries bring a stronger Muslim identity. Rustam does not meet the criteria for being a good Muslim due to his hot-temper and hobbies, such as street car racing, gambling, night clubs, and luxurious parties. He would have to adjust his behavior, fix his image, and develop diplomatic skills, or lose power.

Inter-elite coup: The most probable scenario for Tajikistani leadership succession remains an inter-elite coup. There are a several trends that could lead to such an event. Rahmon’s concentration of power in the hands of his family members creates frustrations among members of the Dangarin clan. At the same time, Rahmon is weakening the Parkhar branch of the Kulyab clan. Although the Leninabad clan has lost power since the civil war, the idea of being the traditional ruling elite remains strong. The clan is too weak to lead a coup, but it would add credibility if it supports a potential successor. Rahmon’s attempts to involve his son in politics are a warning sign for those frustrated with the current regime. Also, the drastic decrease of financial revenue as a result of the planned 2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and disruption of other aid, will weaken Rahmon’s regime.

Two possible scenarios are an internal Dangarin coup, or a Parkhar clan-led coup. A successor could rise from powerful members of the clan, or even the president’s family circle. One of the candidates is Hasan Asadullozoda, Rahmon’s brother-in-law. Although he seems loyal to Rahmon, Azasullozoda would most likely have a hard time watching Rustam rise to power. Asadullozoda also may attempt to take power if Rahmon’s position weakens to the extent that it threatens the power of the family.

The Parkhar clan’s power has been weakened over recent years. Rahmon arrested one of the most influential members of the clan, Gaffar Mirzoev, the former head of the Presidential Guard. At present, the strongest Parkhar figure in the government is Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloyev, who has been the chairman of the Tajikistan Parliament since 2000, and the mayor of Dushanbe since 1996. In addition, Ubaydulloyev would have the support of the Dushanbe police, which is a significant armed force in its own right. The Leninabad clan might join such a successor, to strengthen its position in the government. This scenario could also involve some influential figures from the Russian business sector; however, the Russian government does not favor Ubaydulloyev himself.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of some similarities, each Central Asian country has distinctive conditions and unique approaches to maintaining stability. Any international actions that ignore informal bonds among elites would fail or would be rejected. These bonds maintain not only regimes themselves, but sometimes hold the countries together. The current regimes combine an environment of highly personalized politics and weak institutions. The leader’s role is a key element in the selection of a strategic course for the country. Under such conditions, the transition of power can destabilize a particular country, and the entire region.

Whether Central Asia would be able to maintain stability in the face of an unstable Afghanistan is questionable; however, it is certain that there would be no stable Afghanistan if Central Asia was unstable. To build regional cooperation for further joint developments in the region, the first step, must be gaining a better understanding of the region, its people, and its leaders.

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