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Letter from the FAOA President
Colonel Gary D. Espinas, US Army
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Dear FAO Colleagues:

I write this letter to express my gratitude for having had the privilege of serving as FAOA President these last two years. It has been an exciting and gratifying experience, but I must relinquish my duties for a permanent change of station departure from the Washington, DC area. I am pleased to announce that Vice President Colonel Kurt Marisa, U.S. Air Force, will fulfill the duties of President until next year’s general election for the Board of Governors.

During my tenure as President, I have had the pleasure of meeting and working with FAOs from across the Services. It is really terrific to see how FAOs are being recognized as the Department of Defense’s premier regional experts. We serve at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels; and across the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment. Our retired FAO community continues to play a valuable role in advocating, mentoring, and lending their support.

As your professional organization, FAOA’s role is to provide visibility of the Foreign Area Officer, promote esprit de corps, and facilitate professional, social, and networking activities. To these ends, I believe we have achieved a number of successes with particular thanks to the hard work and energy of the FAOA Board of Governors. To my fellow board members: Kurt, Mike F., Coyt, Graham, Steve, John, Ivan, Vince, and Mike W., I owe a debt of gratitude for your support. Thank you for all that you do and all that you will continue to do.

To FAOs everywhere, I look forward to continuing my support of our community in every way that I can. If I can be of assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me at gary.espinas@us.army.mil. It has been a pleasure to serve as President, and I thank you for the opportunity.

Very respectfully,

Gary D. Espinas
Colonel, U.S. Army
The Army Navy Country Club:  
A Rich History of Service to the National Defense and Diplomatic Communities  
By: Kurt Marisa, Colonel, USAF, FAO

The Army Navy Country Club (ANCC), not to be confused with the Army Navy Club (which is a social dining club in downtown Washington, D.C.), has been selected as the location for the annual FAOA “Black Tie” Formal Dinner, to be held on 26 May 2011. The ANCC is a private Country Club established to support the recreational, social, and networking needs of the elite active-duty and retired military officer cadre and greater national defense community. Located in Arlington, VA only a few miles from downtown D.C., and with an additional full-service club less than 15 miles away in Fairfax, ANCC offers an unparalleled range of country club luxuries in the “backyard” of the workers of the national defense community. ANCC offers 54 Championship golf holes, 19 outdoor tennis courts, a 6-court indoor tennis center, five pools including an outdoor Olympic-size facility, a fitness center, and two clubhouses with a full range of banquet, dining and meeting facilities with views of the Washington Monument.

In the summer of 1861, President Lincoln’s thoughts most assuredly did not dwell on the pastime of golf. The disastrous rout of the Federal Army in the First Battle of Bull Run (or First Manassas, depending on the allegiance of one’s forebears) left the nation’s capitol virtually defenseless. With the victorious Confederate Army encamped only a few miles away, Mr. Lincoln’s thoughts were focused on the problem of erecting suitable defenses, and within a short time a project was underway which would, in the next four years, make Washington D.C. the most heavily fortified city in the nation.

Commanding the highest ground of all the forts on the Virginia side was Fort Richardson, sited on a crest which would eventually be part of the ANCC. Today, only remnants of Fort Richardson’s parapets and ditches remain flanking the Red 9 green; they are usually unnoticed except when an approach shot is shanked or hooked. Additionally, in the aftermath of the First Bull Run disaster, an emergency convalescent hospital and isolation ward was established for Union Soldiers in the present area of #12 fairway.

63-years later, this land was going to take a very different military direction. There was much discussion during the summer and early fall of 1924 about the need on the part of Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers stationed in the Washington area for outdoor recreation facilities. This need sprang from the realization that such officers, with modest salaries and generally without other means, were hard put to meet expenses for the necessities of life, let alone

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**2011 FAOA’s Black Tie Banquet**  
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Space is limited
afford the high initiation fees and dues associated with membership in existing private country clubs of the area. Moreover, officers stationed for only a few years in the D.C. area, with only limited time available for recreation, were confronted with long waiting lists at the existing clubs. The locations of these clubs on the fringes of the Washington area were also so remote as to make them almost inaccessible in the limited time available for recreation to military officers. Finally, on 11 November 1924, the Army Navy and Marine Corps County Club was incorporated. (The name was changed to Army Navy Country Club in 1930.)

Since the Club’s founding in 1924, ANCC has been a home away from home for many of the most illustrious names in America’s elite political and military history. Today, ANCC retains its proud heritage of fostering a community of exceptional members of the national defense community, who share a common bond living and working adjacent to our nation’s capital. Past dignitaries of ANCC include Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and William J. Clinton; 5-Star flag officers Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and General Omar N. Bradley; as well as numerous U.S. Senators, Congressmen, and other elite Washingtonians.

The ANCC also has had a rich history of involvement with hosting the diplomatic and Foreign Military Attaché community, and with the training and preparation of U.S. military Attachés. Foreign Attachés frequently attend events sponsored by various DoD organizations, including the Attaché Counterpart receptions sponsored by the Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) since the mid-1990s. In what is their first “real world” diplomatic event, U.S. military Attachés in-training “meet and greet” their foreign counterparts based in D.C. to learn more about their countries of assignment, practice their diplomatic skills, and ply the training they have learned during JMAS. These Attaché Counterpart receptions are held in the Richardson Room, named for the Civil War fort that was located just 100 yards to the north.

In existence for nearly 90-years, the ANCC membership has made a major decision to replace the historic Arlington ANCC clubhouse building, that was gravely in need of major infrastructure repairs, with a modern, grand Clubhouse which will include new golf and tennis pro shops and outdoor tennis facility, and even more spectacular views of the nation’s capital. As construction proceeds with the new Clubhouse during 2011, the current historic building will remain open for members and to host events. Thus, FAOA has taken the opportunity to hold its 2011 Formal Dinner at the historic Arlington Clubhouse, which will be demolished in 2012, in order to give its members a chance to experience the history and memories of this building one last time.

The Dinner will be held in the Clubhouse Grand Ballroom, with the social hour taking place in the same Richardson Room — which has been used to host dozens of foreign attaché receptions. The FAOA Board of Governors looks forward to hosting both FAOA membership and guests at what promises to be our most-attended event ever.

ANCC membership information will be available during the dinner. Sponsorship information for ANCC membership can be provided by the FAOA’s BoG Vice President, Kurt M. Marisa, or other current ANCC members.
Why Did Japan Attract So Much Attention?

By: Brian Hobbs, USAF, China / Northeast Asia FAO (Retired)

Following Japan’s March 11 earthquake and tsunami, news about the disaster commanded higher billing on TV and more top headlines on news websites than many other similar or recent world events. Why? Why would some argue that news about Japan surged worldwide to a higher level of intensity than coverage of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, Haiti’s earthquake in January 2010, the April 2010 British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, or the Pakistan earthquake in January 2011? Why did Japan suddenly capture more attention than evolving politics throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and continuing stories with Afghanistan and Iraq? The following Top 10 List addresses the most visible issues for Japan. Although some of these items alone are enough to draw significant focus, added together they spell out why the world watched Japan more intently than other news items at the same time or similar issues in the past.

1. Nuclear. Whether radiation from the damaged Fukushima power plant becomes widespread or is carefully controlled, it will likely create health and environmental problems while definitely producing personal, national, and international psychological issues with long lasting doubt and fear. Although Japan physically and economically recovered as a nation from World War II, the Fukushima power plant problem is reviving concerns about radiation poisoning (air, water, food, and more), immediate health issues, slowly developing cancer, and birth defects that are usually experienced only among individual descendants of survivors from the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Varying wind patterns have spread radiation from coastal Fukushima to more of inland Japan, and could also increase exposure to regional neighbors and Northern Pacific shipping lanes. Although not seen as likely at this time, the nuclear issue could also propel political changes, especially as doubts spread about real and perceived safety issues with Japan’s 16 other commercial nuclear power facilities – vital for this resource-poor but economically advanced state’s electrical needs. To be sure, however, political representation could involve new names or different political parties, but will not entail the kind of drama seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, or Libya. Outside of Japan, doubt is spreading about the safety of nuclear power, leading the U.S. public to raise questions largely dormant since the Three Mile Island core meltdown in 1979 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Russia’s problem with Chernobyl in 1986. China, Germany, France, and a growing number of other countries are now re-thinking the viability of their own nuclear power programs. This also leads to greater international concern with nuclear safety in the hands of states who remain less responsive to the international community, such as North Korea, Syria, and Iran.

2. Earthquake Size: According to the U.S. Geological Survey, Japan’s 9.0 magnitude earthquake was the world’s fifth largest since 1900, and the largest on record for Japan. The epicenter was offshore, about 231 miles northeast of Tokyo, and 80 miles east of Sendai city (where most damage occurred). Following the main quake, at least 20 aftershocks have been detected at 6.0 magnitude or greater – meaning even aftershock magnitude exceeded levels for most earthquakes in the world.

3. Tsunami: It’s quite telling when a Japanese word is commonly used throughout the English speaking world for “tidal wave”. Japan suffered not only from a historic earthquake, and not only from the force and flooding from a tidal wave only 10 to 15 minutes later, but also from problems compounded by the worst of both in the same areas of Japan’s northeastern
coast. The tsunami, after all, not the earthquake, is the primary cause for the Fukushima nuclear problems. On top of all that, the tsunami was large enough to span the Pacific Ocean at the speed of a jet aircraft, damaging marinas in Hawaii and killing at least one man in California.

4. Personal Disaster: As of the 26th of March, Japanese authorities reported about 27,000 dead or missing. The town of Minami-Sanriku was virtually wiped out, with approximately 10,000 (half its population) dead or missing there alone. In the Sendai area, the population has been encouraged to evacuate because radiation released from the damaged Fukushima power station contaminated local water and food. Japan’s Ministry of Health has determined that tap water 100 miles away in Tokyo is too dangerous for infants. Japanese authorities are still bringing the Fukushima power station under control, in order to prevent even greater human and economic tragedy.

5. Economy: Japan is mutually linked to the global economic system and with other national economies, and is the second largest holder of U.S. debt ($885.9B) after China. Japan has the third-largest national economy after the U.S. and China, and ranks in the top five countries for the value of products it both imports and exports. Much smaller events than this earthquake and tsunami have caused great concern for economists elsewhere. In 1997, for example, the “Asian financial crisis” started in Thailand without any natural disasters. Although limited mostly to Asian countries, it raised fears of a global economic meltdown. The world cannot afford similar events to unfold with Japan due to this limited natural disaster, because a problem with Japan’s economy will be a problem for all of us. In order to prevent such a spreading catastrophe, on March 17 the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the U.S.) announced cooperative measures designed to shore up Japan’s economy. However, Japan’s relative wealth means it is unlikely to need the level of external donations provided for earthquake relief to Haiti and Pakistan in the past, although the financial impact to Japan according to a World Bank could be as high as $235B, and termed in the press as the “world’s most expensive disaster.”

6. Telecommunications: We only witnessed Japan’s crisis because Japan is not only “wired” without political restriction, but also because the West is likewise “wired” without restriction. Instantaneous and lasting audio-visual documentation of Japan’s unfolding situation (natural, personal, political, and otherwise) abounds worldwide through the TV and the internet. Even in countries that experience larger natural disasters or tougher political situations, it would be difficult for events elsewhere to receive the level of exposure that they receive within Japan. Personal computers and cell phones (with cameras) are widespread and widely linked, significantly more

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so than they are in less developed countries, and even more so than in most advanced countries. Anyone can record and transmit current events without fear of government or religious reprisal, unlike in Iran, or more famously in pre-transition Egypt when the government initially tried to “turn off” their part of the internet in attempt to prevent a political transition. Because of widely available telecommunications in Japan, documentation is pervasive and immediately accessible to anyone else in the world with TV reception or internet access. Conversely, since this natural disaster does not carry a message loaded with anti-government activism, viewing is not apparently blocked in places like China, which actively restricted citizens from accessing information about Egyptian political upheaval.

7. Global Citizenship: Japan contributes to global stability, and is a member of the United Nations. In addition to participating in multinational anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia that protected tens of thousands of transiting mariners and untold tons of cargo bound for points throughout the world, Japan is a member of APEC, the G8, ASEAN+3, and various other international organizations. Japan has security pacts with the U.S., Australia, and India, and is the world’s third largest donor of official development aid after the U.S. and France.

8. Geographic Location: The importance of Japan’s stability and strength is defined as well by its neighborhood. On the positive side, Japan is in an economically advanced region with powerhouses such as China and South Korea, and more distantly Taiwan and Hong Kong. It sits astride numerous vital shipping lanes and is over-flown by aircraft transiting between mainland Asia and the U.S. From a different perspective, although Japan shares territorial disputes with China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Russia, the dispute of greatest U.S. concern is with China, which broadly asserts exclusive economic zones impeding open international navigation of the high seas, and which recently announced a double digit increase in defense spending. As well, Russia regularly tests regional air defenses with military flights through Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. North Korea also offers continued problems through past kidnapping of Japanese citizens, the Nov 2010 artillery attack on South Korean territory, and uncertain ballistic missile and nuclear developments. Although Japan’s geographic location is ideally situated as a host to U.S. Forces countering such intimidation, a weakened Japan could fall increasing prey to more aggressive neighbors.

9. America Presence: The continuing U.S. presence in Japan is the result of Japan’s and America’s importance to each other, expressed primarily through the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation. Normally there are approximately 36,000 U.S. military members and 5,500 support civilians stationed in Japan. In addition to the U.S. military, numerous other agencies and organizations and their families live at various locations throughout Japan. Currently the U.S. is in the lead of international Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief through Operation Tomodachi (meaning “Friend” in Japanese), with about 20 US ships off of Japan’s northeast coast and all branches of the U.S. military that provided vital assistance.

10. Cultural links: Although Hollywood, the American economy and dollar, and continued U.S. military presence more obviously highlight the American
cultural imprint upon Japan, the Japanese cultural influence on America is still significantal. Americans of Japanese ancestry live throughout the U.S., concentrated in Hawaii and along the west coast. Tens of thousands of Americans and Japanese tourists and business people visit and enjoy each other’s countries regularly, and American and Japanese universities host each other’s students. American English is the most studied foreign language for Japanese students, and although not popular to the same levels, Japanese is available at many US universities and some high schools. In Washington DC, the annual National Cherry Blossom Festival highlights our cultural links, commemorating Japan’s gift of a large number of cherry trees in 1910 and celebrating the continued close relationship between the U.S. and Japan.

As stated at the beginning of this article, although some of these issues alone are enough to draw significant focus, these points added together spell out why world interest in Japan surged beyond other news items at the same time, and gleaned higher interest than similar world events in recent years. Although Japan is facing unfolding challenges on many levels, it is clearly in our interest for Japan to successfully pull through and recover as it has from even greater national disasters in the past.

About the Author:
Mr. Brian Hobbs retired from the US Air Force as a Foreign Area Officer / Regional Affairs Strategist for China and Northeast Asia (Japan & Korea), with proficiency in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean languages. He was a high school exchange student to Japan, and after receiving a Bachelor’s with a double major in Psychology and East Asian Languages & Cultures from the University of Kansas, and furthered his studies at the Kansai University of Foreign Languages in Osaka, Japan. In addition to numerous Asia-Pacific assignments, he has a Master’s in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, taught Chinese and Japanese at the US Air Force Academy, and taught Northeast Asian international relations and US foreign policy as an exchange officer to the Korea Air Force Academy.

Brian now works as a defense contractor. The opinions expressed herein are his own and do not represent any official view.
Imagine an enemy who has killed 35,000 people—1,000 of them children—in the past 4 years, an average of 25 new corpses every day. Imagine an enemy who is choking out the vitality of an entire nation’s small businesses, and agricultural and manufacturing economies. This same enemy enjoys a virtually bottomless coffers and is better armed than most police forces. This enemy is the Mexican drug cartel, and it is entrenched just outside the US border, slowly but surely crossing onto American soil in an effort to expand its business. Known formally as Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), drug cartels—and their horrific violence triggered by their greed for illicit drug profits—are the equivalent of a cancer that is slowly but steadily weakening its host (Mexico) to the precipice of failure. In this respect, peace and stability in Mexico today have been weakening; and tomorrow it looks weaker still. Our two nations are so inter-dependent that TCOs are now fast-becoming the most imminent threat to America’s peace and stability as well.

What are we to do?

Despite the international community’s hesitation to acknowledge it, I argue that before this decade comes to a close, the US will have little choice to but to deploy military forces within Mexican borders to support Mexico’s efforts in toppling the TCOs. In this discourse, I will unpack my position by bringing to light the TCO’s horrific—and increasing—penchant for shocking violence, its growing activity in the US, and most importantly, the political game-changing turn of events presented by the recent bilateral agreement to fly US drones into Mexico’s airspace. Within this framework, the concept of sending US military forces inside Mexico is not out of the conversation, and in fact, is a natural evolution in the war against drugs.

Background

TCOs have been trafficking illegal drugs from, within, and to Mexico for decades, realizing a spike in business and profits in the early 1990s as an inadvertent side effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement and Mexico’s embrace of free enterprise. For the past 20 years, these illicit organizations have become stronger, wealthier, and bolder beyond the vision of any politician’s crystal ball. Between five and nine TCOs, depending on how you count them, jostle for primacy in Mexico’s illicit drug trade, estimated to be worth $15 billion in annual revenue.

Above all, greed of power and profits drive TCO strategies, and protecting those profits through terrorizing violence drives their behaviors and tactics. To a cartel leader, the more illicit profit he can steal away from his cartel competitors, the better; and the more he can terrorize his competitors and countrymen (not to mention government authorities) into passivity, also the better. It is this recipe that has translated into almost 35,000 drug-related murders over the past 4+ years, attributed to the violence unleashed by Mexico’s drug cartels since December 2006 when Mexican President Calderon officially launched his “war” against the cartels’ bloody and violent crime sprees.
“Who” the TCOs kill, and “how” the TCOs kill have changed over the past decade. Before the 21st century, most cartel violence was confined to restrained, precision strikes between TCO operatives, generally without public knowledge. But that has transmuted to appalling levels in the past decade, as the TCOs’ boldness of action burst forth and their drive for profits ballooned. Not only are TCO operatives targeted, but also friends and family members (including women and children), drug rehab patients, civic leaders, police chiefs, and military generals, and--as of February 2011--American government agents. The methods of torture and murder employed by TCOs have morphed into shocking scenes out of a psycho-terror novel: midnight bedroom raids, car bombs outside elementary schools, public beheadings, skinning, and mailing body parts to loved ones are all regular occurrences in Mexico. President Calderon has focused significant resources to combating these tactics and arrests are on the upswing. However, with Mexico’s toothless judicial system, such efforts are making little meaningful progress.

Considering their daily proximity to US soil, TCOs arguably present a more imminent threat to US homeland security than does an Al Qaeda attack. TCO presence is confirmed in 45 states operating drug routes, trafficking locations, and even torture houses. In 2009 the US Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center identified 200 major US cities with a known presence of Mexican TCOs, and that presence is expanding. Mexican cartels have long had links to marijuana farms in California and are extending into the Pacific Northwest and the Eastern US. In February 2011, a nationwide sweep by US officials against TCOs resulted in 676 arrests in 150 cities including Atlanta, St. Louis, Denver, Detroit, San Antonio, San Diego, Chicago, and Newark. Authorities seized 18 tons of marijuana, 476 kilos of cocaine, and $12 million cash, among other items. The map below depicts locations of cartel activity inside the US.

Not only are cartels establishing business roots in the US, they’re recruiting American teens and training them as sleeper cell assassins. In 2005, Rosalio Reta and Gabriel Cardona were part of a sleeper cell of American teenagers in Laredo, Texas, working as hit men for the notorious gulf cartel in the US. Both teens received military-style training in Mexico and were each paid a retainer of $500 per week to wait for the call to kill. After carrying out a hit, they were paid up to $50,000 and 2 kilos of cocaine. The teenagers lived in safe houses near Laredo and drove a $70,000 Mercedes-Benz. As they became more immersed in the cartel, the teens’ appearance changed. Cardona had eyeballs tattooed on his eyelids. Reta’s face became covered in tattoos. “These organizations, these cartels, they function like a Fortune 500 company,” Webb County, TX, prosecutor Uriel Druker said. “We have to remember that the US is the market they are trying to get to.” In Cardona’s interrogation tape, there are clues that TCOs are reaching deeper into the US. Cardona is asked, “Where else are the Zetas?” Cardona responds, “I’ve heard in Dallas and Houston.”
Cartels have recruited US Army troops to act as hit men in the US. In 2009, Private Michael Apodaca, an active duty US Army soldier stationed at Fort Bliss, was found to be a paid hit man for the Juarez cartel. Apodaca later shot a man who the Juarez Cartel believed to be an informant.

TCOs don’t need American hit men to commit murder in the US. Cartels are not afraid to cross the US border in order to commit murder in the US. In October 2010, a Mexican TCO assassin moved to Arizona to track down, befriend, and then stab (and behead) a Mexican national for suspicion of stealing drugs from his cartel. One man has been charged in the killing, but three others have fled back to Mexico. Lastly, let us not forget that TCOs now engage in many profitable illicit activities, to include human trafficking: It may not surprise you to know that the #1 “kidnap for ransom” city in the world is Mexico City. However, it may surprise you to know that the #2 city on that same list is Phoenix, Arizona. TCOs are active in the US. With such a pronounced presence and with an established recruiting base among US youth, the threat presented by TCOs requires more immediate attention than does the Al Qaeda threat on American soil—I argue that level of attention may inevitably require US forces inside Mexico.

American Drones over Mexico.

In a significant swing of political will, the Mexican government confirmed on 16 March 2011 that unarmed US drones were given permission to fly over Mexican territory to gather intelligence on TCOs. “The Mexican government has requested from the US government, on specific occasions and events, the support of unmanned planes to obtain specific information” on security, the National Security Council reported in an official statement. The New York Times said Presidents Obama and Calderon formally agreed to the missions in a 3 March meeting but kept it secret because of political and legal constraints. The confirmation of the flights was likely in response to rising concerns about Mexico’s ability to bring down its TCOs. By this monumental agreement, both governments have demonstrated a major shift in policy by agreeing to fly US drones over Mexican air space for the first time in history. Until March 2011, both countries maintained policies that were fiercely against such an idea. Historically, the US and Mexico have decreed that crossing borders would never come to fruition, citing non-negotiable limits for each country’s respective sovereignty. “It wasn’t that long ago when there was no way the DEA could conduct the kinds of activities they are doing now,” Mike Vigil, a retired chief of international operations for the DEA, told the New York Times.

As Mexico prepares for its 2012 presidential election, the drug war dominates the political agenda. Many Mexicans now seem used to living in fear. The daily news of beheadings, executions and mass killings by TCOs have taken a toll on Mexicans’ perception of security. In a survey by Mexico’s National Statistics Bureau, 70% of respondents said they felt that overall security had worsened in 2010 compared to 2009. Over 30% believed the situation would get worse in 2011. Meanwhile, 41% admitted they did not feel safe to walk alone between 4pm and 7pm in their neighborhoods. That seems to be the most worrisome aspect of this conflict: The fact that many Mexicans now seem used to living in fear. And when it comes to addressing kidnappings for ransom, affluent families in Mexico are already turning to private US firms instead of their own law enforcement officials to rescue their loved ones from brutal TCOs, driven by abysmally low levels of public trust in Mexican police. The statistics speak for themselves: According to a recent Mexican congressional report,

The first tenant of international affairs ...
“Never say never” … quite apropos in this case.
kidnappings have increased 317 percent in Mexico since 2005, and experts estimate 75% of total abductions go unreported in the first place.

Mexican nationals want the TCOs defeated too. Mexico is a beautiful country, rich with tradition and culture. By their nature, the Mexican people are gentle and giving. I’ve seen this goodness with my own eyes, having traveled in official and unofficial capacities throughout all regions of Mexico. The TCO activity does not accurately represent who the good Mexican people are. Although Mexicans want the cartels gone, I argue they cannot oust them alone under their limited government; the drug profits and resulting violence are too powerful.

Conclusion

The TCO threat to US national security is too great to not eventually deploy to Mexico in order to stop the violence from gaining hold inside the US. US presence in Mexico may be still be years away, but the TCO threat to US national security is arguably greater than any other threat Americans face. Consequently, as the TCO threat festers, the US will have little option but to focus more resources to combat that threat before its roots in the US run deep. TCO’s growing violence unfolds within mere yards of the physical US border, and in some cases actually spills over into the US. Hundreds of men, women, and children are violently maimed, tortured, and killed every day, and almost 300 Americans have been killed by TCOs since Mexico’s President Calderon initiated his “war” against illegal drugs. In Feb 2011, US National Intel Director James Clapper confirmed what many of us suspected: the Mexican armed forces abilities are “inadequate” to combat TCO activities and “contain criminal violence.”

When analyzing the combined trends of: 1) The TCOs’ rampant and out-of-control violence, 2) The citizenry of both nations whose political will to accept such violence is nearing the saturation point, and 3) the willingness by both governments to place US military assets inside Mexican airspace, the concept of placing US military forces inside Mexico is a natural, logical next step. What would US military forces actually do in Mexico? How many would deploy and for how long? The answers remain to be seen, and in the big picture, are somewhat minor. For in this era of global interdependence, the one compelling component in the North American fight against TCOs is to acknowledge that political boundaries no longer mean as much as they used to. And in this spirit, why not utilize the more capable US military in the fight to defeat TCOs once and for all. The tipping point is fast approaching.

About the Author:

Lt Col Tony Mena is a USAF Political Affairs Specialist and former Latin America FAO. He has served in various International Affairs related assignments including tours with USSOUTHAF’s Latin American Branch and as SAF/IA’s Personnel Exchange Program Manager for Latin/South America. Mena is a 2008 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and currently serves as the Military Deputy for Air Combat Command’s International Affairs Directorate, Langley AFB VA.
Turkey’s New Relationship with NATO: Implications for Washington

By: Dr. Soner Cagaptay, PhD, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Ankara’s recent attempt to block the NATO mission in Libya and the 2010 quarrel with NATO over the missile-defense initiative point at a new Turkish stance vis-à-vis NATO. Ever since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Ankara in 2002, Turkey has grown gradually cold toward cooperating with the West in the Middle East. Now, the AKP is increasingly taking issue with NATO. On March 29th, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu told the BBC: “As the only Muslim country [in NATO-] for decades, we have certain sensitivities regarding NATO operations in neighboring countries.”

U.S. President Barack Obama called the AKP leadership during the missile defense crisis and over Libya, and this personal plea from the White House persuaded the AKP to lift its objections to NATO taking charge in both cases. However, the two cases are still significant for they provide insight into a new relationship between the AKP and the Transatlantic Alliance. Washington can address this dynamic by studying the following policy suggestions:

Turkey is fast becoming the Alliance’s “opt-out” member in operations in Muslim countries. The AKP seems to consider itself the defender of a politically defined “Islamic world” and will likely object to NATO missions whose area of responsibility falls in Muslim-majority countries even when such operations target criminal regimes or aim to protect civilians. Along these lines, on February 28, 2011 Erdogan objected to NATO intervention in Libya, asking, “What business does NATO have in Libya?” adding: “Turkey will never and never support pointing weapons at Libya.”

Facing elections at home in June; the AKP will aim to avoid persistent quarrels with the US. This is since public perception of American support for the AKP will help the party at the polls. After coming to power in 2002, the AKP has stayed popular also thanks to economic stability. Until the AKP rose to power, the pattern of the Turkish economy was such that growth would always be followed by a downturn, as it happened in the 1993-1994, 1997, 1999, and the 2000-2001 crisis, creating a sense of perpetual economic instability.

This changed under the AKP as Turkey enjoyed almost a decade of stable growth with no annual downturns. Now, as it prepares for elections, the AKP will be interested in repeating this success. To this end, the party needs to avoid a public row with Washington over its policies. A major conflict with the United States could weaken the markets’ confidence in the Turkish economy, creating politically damaging economic problems for the AKP in the run-up to the polls.

Therefore, over the next two months, the AKP will continue working with Washington even if it voices strong public objections to NATO-led missions in Libya and other potential theatres in the Middle East –hence, the AKP’s willingness to come on board with Washington after initial foot-dragging over allowing NATO assume responsibility for the Libya mission.

Polls suggest that the AKP will win the June elections. Then, the AKP’s policy of opting out of NATO would likely consolidate. At this stage, Ankara will emerge as the enfant noir of NATO. In the same way Greece opted out of and blocked NATO operations against criminal regimes in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, citing its “affinity with its Orthodox brothers,” the AKP would use the “we will not act against Muslims and will not let others do so either” formula to abstain from or hinder NATO operations in Muslim majority countries.

The AKP will, however, remain in NATO. Membership to the Alliance provides Turkey with crucial technology and political clout; it is unlikely that the AKP will act to end Turkey’s NATO membership. But particularly if the elections allow it to cement its rule, the AKP will increasingly use its NATO membership to slow down or block operations in Muslim countries out of sympathy for certain regimes, such as Syria, or in defense of its view of global politics whereby the party feels compelled to keep NATO out of Muslim countries.

U.S. President Obama himself will be a key component of U.S. policy to try to align the AKP with NATO. This is since the AKP government has a rather positive view of President Obama, even if it takes issue with particular U.S. policies. This
perception is rooted, firstly, in Obama's April 2009 visit to Turkey, his first overseas trip after coming to power. The AKP has come to view this gesture as a sign of appreciation for the party and its policies. Secondly, the U.S. president and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan have a good rapport, with President Obama regularly calling Erdogan to exchange views on foreign policy. In recent weeks, for instance, the president has phoned Erdogan at least a dozen times to discuss the events in Libya, Egypt, and elsewhere in Middle East. Finally, the AKP has an emphatic, if factually incorrect, connection with the president. This bond stems from the fact that, as one Washington-based Turkey analyst has stated, “Prominent AKP leaders believe that President Obama is a Muslim.”

Therefore, frequent interventions by the President to relay to the AKP leadership U.S. policy will be needed to ensure AKP alignment with NATO over the coming year even as Ankara’s policies slow down NATO’s operations and hamper the Alliance’s decision making process.

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**News From the Field …** With all of the ongoing events in the Middle East, and around the world, we have decided to highlight FAO contributions around the world. The following short summary was written by MAJ Chris O’Brien in Afghanistan.

“I am MAJ Chris O’Brien, a 48I recently returned from a deployment to the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan/ Combine Security Transition Command-Afghanistan as a security assistance officer. During my time in NTM-A/CSTC-A, I was the Afghan National Police FMS Branch Chief. As a branch of 5 officers (1 Army, 2 Navy, and 2 Air Force), we were responsible for equipping the ANP using the Foreign Military Sales system. The position primarily focused on ordering major end items, such as trucks, weapons, and radios through the Security Assistance Management Directorates of various Life Cycle Management Commands and incorporating these articles in to the ANP sustainment systems using the Total Package Approach. We also managed cases to purchase ammunition and support service contracts for the ANP.

While we had limited interaction with our Afghan counterparts, we had daily contact with the stateside security assistance community. From this experience, I gained a deep appreciation of the complexity and mechanics of the FMS process and how it interacts with fiscal legislation, end-use monitoring requirements, acquisition regulations, and multiple other rules, organizations, and systems.

Within CSTC-A, the branch managed the ANP equipping budget which required us to work within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process to ensure that adequate funds were requested in future budgets to support the necessary equipment procurement. This process required extensive coordination with the CSTC-A Comptroller, OSD Comptroller, and the different requirement generators, such as IJC. While this position had limited interaction with the Afghans, this experience in the FMS world should prove invaluable in future assignments.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Christopher O’Brien, US Army”
The Kissinger Principle posits that in a triangular relationship, a nation-state’s objective should be to have a better relationship with the other two actors than they have with one another. This principle became famous during the early 1970s as the United States determined it was to its advantage to engage the People’s Republic of China in order to thwart Soviet power and influence. This principle remains valid today regardless of your perspective emanating from Beijing, Moscow, or Washington, DC. Even in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era, the significance of this triangular relationship can not be overstated.

This paper will present an American perspective on Sino-Russian relations. It is not intended to be an exhaustive, scholarly study on the subject. Instead, it is intended to present a view based on several years of observing and working on issues related to Beijing-Moscow interaction that is of interest to the United States and many of its friends and allies in Asia. This experience was primarily attained during four years of service in Beijing as a military attaché during the years 2004-2008 and, to a lesser extent, during a similar assignment in Hong Kong during the period 2008-2010. This article will focus on four areas:

1. My experience with the Russian military attachés in Beijing.
2. Russian arms sales to China and other military cooperation.
4. Areas of tension and discord within the Sino-Russian compact.

My experience with Russian military attachés in Beijing

Russian military attachés fulfill all of the traditional roles of attachés in a foreign capital. It can be argued that the Russian attachés in Beijing are in many ways more engrossed in the whole host of customary attaché work than their U.S. counterparts given the robust security assistance relationship between Russia and China. Whereas U.S. military attachés are not involved in security assistance activities with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) such as the sale of military hardware and extensive training and exercise planning, their Russian counterparts in Beijing are in fact heavily engaged in such activities. Due to this extensive interaction and cooperation, the Russian Defense Attaché Office was one of the largest in Beijing while I served in China (2004-2008). The Russian Defense Attaché was as an Army Major General and all military services, except for the Strategic Rocket Forces, were represented by service specific attachés.

Much like U.S. Army FAOs, the Russian attachés were true China hands. They possessed Chinese language skills honed during multiple tours in China; they had an affinity for China’s culture, history, and its people; and they were proud of their country’s special, historic bilateral relationship with China. In fact, they boasted of their Embassy’s unique role throughout the centuries and in many capacities. This included serving as the base for Czarist trade missions, the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest Soviet Embassy in the world, and now the only remaining foreign diplomatic mission within today’s Second Ring Road. For them, this was emblematic of the close ties between Beijing and Moscow.

I had the opportunity to engage with my Russian counterparts on a relatively regular albeit superficial basis. Because of the size of the Russian DAO, there was usually Russian military training and exercise planning, their Russian counterparts in Beijing are in fact heavily engaged in such activities. Due to this extensive interaction and cooperation, the Russian Defense Attaché Office was one of the largest in Beijing while I served in China (2004-2008). The Russian Defense Attaché was as an Army Major General and all military services, except for the Strategic Rocket Forces, were represented by service specific attachés.

“The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Army, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.”
representation at most of the diplomatic events in Beijing particularly if it was a Beijing Military Attaché Corps (BMAC) event. During conversations at multilateral events on the diplomatic circuit, the Russian attaches were always cordial and willing to talk. We shared common operational experiences in the combat arms, an assignment history in a divided Germany, and an affinity for and interest in China. Since the U.S. and Russian DAOs were the largest, it was only natural for U.S. attaches to want to interact both professionally and socially with the Russian officers. Based on the favorable contact at diplomatic events, U.S. attachés invited their Russian colleagues to functions at their homes or at restaurants or other venues. However, it was fairly obvious that the Russians were constrained in their interaction with us.

Invitations to individual Russian attachés were consistently, yet politely rebuffed for a variety of excuses. Although it was unknown to us if there was a specific policy precluding contact, it became readily apparent that the only Russian attaché allowed contact with the Americans was the Russian Major General. Thus, the only U.S.-Russian military contact was between the two Defense Attachés with only few exceptions. At the urging of several of the more junior attachés, the U.S. Defense Attaché agreed to approach his Russian counterpart to directly address the lack of contact between all of the American and Russian military attachés. After a discussion between the two Generals, the more junior Russian attachés began to accept invitations from their American peers. However, they were still somewhat constrained in that they usually attended events in pairs. Nonetheless, it was an improvement.

**Russian arms sales to China and other military cooperation**

The US and its regional friends and allies have seen the PLA transform into a moderately capable force within the past two decades; largely the result of assistance from Russia. Since Dec. 1992, Russia sold China more military hardware than all other countries combined. In the decade between 1996 and 2006, China paid Russia more than $26 billion for arms sales. In short, Russia provided 95 percent of all arms materiel to China that decade.

These large scale security assistance sales allowed the PLA to leap-frog technologically one to two generations of militarily sophisticated hardware that it would not have been able to develop indigenously. The Russian sale of certain systems brought the PLA from the 1950s to the 1980s in 10 years instead of 30 years. These systems included Kilo-class submarines, SA-20 air defense systems, Sovremenyy-class destroyers equipped with Sunburn surface-to-surface missiles as well as SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft. Moreover, this substantive assistance in providing defense articles, technology, and other know-how formed the basis for the Chinese production of advanced systems “made in China” that were on such prominent display in Tiananmen Square during the 1 October 2009 commemoration of the founding of the PRC.

US concerns related to Russian arms sales to China are two-fold. First, the sales are destabilizing. The rapid increase and enhancement of Chinese offensive capabilities is decidedly lop-sided and one-side in the area of the Taiwan Strait. Further, China’s neighbors also view this marked improvement at least technologically with some trepidation. Observers have argued that a new arms race as already commenced. Second, defense planners in the United States, as well as in Japan and Australia, must consider the operational and strategic implications of China’s new capabilities as they expand their reach past the first island chain in the West Pacific. This is both a natural reaction and a professional obligation.

In short, Russian arms sales have dramatically improved PLA capabilities both directly and indirectly. This has certainly complicated US and other countries’ contingency planning. However, Russian arms sales have been significantly reduced. Whereas in 2006, Chinese purchases represented 40% of Russian military exports, in 2007, the figure was 20 percent. In 2009, it was 18 percent and for 2010, it is projected to be 15 percent.
Sino-Russian cooperation in a multi-polar world as a balancing force against the US in a post-Cold War and post-9/11 era

Some have characterized Sino-Russian cooperation in a multi-polar, or at least multi-lateral, world as a response to what has been viewed as U.S. exceptionalism, unilateral action, and operating outside of the United Nations framework. Beijing and Moscow share a common emphasis on internal stability and security, countering separatism, and establishing a multi-polar order in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era.

In Central Asia, it appears that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been frequently used as a forum for criticizing and a means for countering the U.S. presence in the region. The SCO seemed to politically conspire to affect the Uzbek decision to remove U.S. forces from on its soil in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Similarly in 2007, the Kyrgyz decided to limit, albeit temporarily, U.S. access to Manas Air Base.

Several SCO sponsored military exercises have occurred that had an ostensibly counter-terrorist theme. However, the Peace Mission series of exercises have frequently involved conventional capabilities such as amphibious landings and long-range bombers. This appeared to send more of an anti-separatist message than a counter-terrorist one.

Elsewhere, China and Russia have been relatively united in their opposition to what they perceive to be the U.S. engineered “Color Revolutions” in the Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. An over-arching focus on non-interference and national sovereignty caused vehement opposition to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the more recent declaration of Kosovar independence from Serbia. The Chinese saw a correlation to Taiwan and the Russians a possible precedent for its troubled territories in the Caucasus. Beijing and Moscow opposed the Iraq invasion of 2003 for many reasons, but publicly because it did not have explicit UN Security Council authorization. Furthermore, there have been numerous examples of Chinese and Russian attempts to thwart or water-down UN sanctions against such governments in power as those in power in Iran, North Korea, Burma, and Sudan.

Areas of tension and discord within the Sino-Russian compact.

Despite the 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation between China and Russia, there are areas were there are significant difficulties and distrust.

Many in China view Russia as a fair weather friend that cannot be counted upon in the long run. In part, this harkens back to the historic antagonism that ultimately led to the break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. Soviet leaders turning their back on their predecessors (as Khrushchev did with Stalin) and their own system of government (as Gorbachev did with the fall of the Soviet Union) are historical moments that the Chinese leadership continues to view with disdain. Some Chinese observers believe that Russia often succumbs to Western political pressure and does not fully support China on critical issues including trade, space policy, the environment, social policies, as well as national defense. Moreover, they conclude that Russia does not want China to take its rightful place on the world stage due to contempt, jealousy, historical animosity as well as racial prejudice.

Even the massive Russian arms sales to China have elicited criticism in some Chinese quarters. Some have stated that Russia intentionally sold only hardware lacking the latest sophistication to China. The Chinese specifically wanted systems such as long-range strategic bombers and ballistic missiles which Russia refused to sell. Observers cited Russia hedging against a rival and potentially revanchist China and accommodating U.S. and Japanese concerns as the rationale behind this refusal. Moreover, Russia’s relatively recent agreement to sell Vietnam, an erstwhile Chinese foe in the South China Sea, six Kilo class submarines as well as the advanced SU-30 aircraft fueled Sino-Russian mistrust.
In Russia, many see China as a threat particularly in the Russian Far East. Demographically, the sparsely populated Russian Far East abuts a Chinese landmass whose population grows unabatedly. Some Russian politicians and the media cite an invasion of sorts already underway which may lead to the de facto Chinese annexation of this part of the Russian Federation. The vast disparity in population densities on each respective side of the border weighs heavily against Russia. Race also plays a factor with Chinese, and other foreigners, often carrying the blame for crime and lost economic opportunities.

China’s phenomenal economic growth has sparked a serious competition for natural resources which some Russian observers watch with concern. Exploitation of Central Asia’s natural resources, particularly oil and gas, is an acute area in which Moscow and Beijing have conflicting interests. The announcement in December 2009 of a Turkmenistan-China pipeline carrying natural gas from eastern Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China’s northwestern Xinjiang region effectively broke Russia’s monopoly on regional gas exports.

Conclusions

Contemporarily, we can observe examples of cooperation, collusion, as well as conflict between China and Russia. The case of Iran and its nuclear program offers examples of all of the aforementioned. Beijing and Moscow have cooperated and colluded to water down United Nations sanctions resulting from Tehran’s uranium enrichment program. Yet, there is also some commercial conflict evident with respect to the arms embargo. Russia froze its contract to sell Iran the S-300 air defense system in light of the latest sanctions. However, China remains under fire for selling dual use technologies to Iran.

Moreover, it is also relevant to view China and Russia within the context of the increased role and influence of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) states. It is probable that it serves the interests of Beijing and Moscow to establish BRIC as a new pole in a multi-polar world particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Originally characterized in the light of overseas investment opportunities, BRIC states now are often described as a possible future political block on the international stage. However, given the many differences amongst the BRIC members (demographics, size and scope of economies, cultures, national imperatives and more), it remains unlikely that BRIC will be willing and able to assert a concerted policy on issues of international security affairs.

The relationship between China and Russia is less a marriage of convenience and more an opportunistic tryst. Sometimes, the two are together and sometimes they are not. Areas in which Beijing and Moscow have a confluence of interests will continue to see some cooperation. This is probably most applicable to areas in which the two see the U.S. or the West, more generally, as advancing too aggressively on an agenda that counters Chinese and Russian objectives. Examples will most likely include unilateral or non-United Nations authorized military action or economic sanctions. Strategically, the two countries will also have many areas in which they compete for influence, power, and resources. This is particularly the case in Central Asia.

In this context, China and Russia find themselves in the quintessential Prisoner’s Dilemma. The more they compete against one another, the more the other actors, namely the U.S., will benefit. Ever cognizant of this fact, the U.S. must continue to work with both countries, bilaterally and multilaterally, to facilitate the attainment of its own policy objectives. This should entail actions and policies that ensure that the U.S. always has the advantages epitomized in the Kissinger Principle.

About the Author:
Colonel Heino Klinck, a China FAO, authored this article on Sino-Russian relations while serving as the U.S. Army Senior Service College Fellow at the Italian Ministry of Defense’s Center for High Defense Studies in Rome during 2010-2011. Prior to that, he served for six consecutive years as an attaché in Beijing and in Hong Kong.
The Quran is the single most important document within Islam. It is the primary source of guidance and direction for millions of Muslim believers worldwide. Any student of Islam, or student of the world’s Muslim regions must include a thorough understanding of the Quran and its true meanings. Back in the days of the Prophet his followers simply asked him what particular verses meant --- but when the Prophet died, the search for Quranic meaning developed into a science of its own: a rigid science called *Tafsir*. That process is formal, fixed, clear, long-established and commonly agree. Therefore that process for deriving meaning from the Quran and related texts is not open for negotiation. Earthly manipulation of God’s word is deemed “innovation” … it is heresy.

Some Quranic verses are very clear and apply in general circumstances. When the Quran says to take the thief and cut off his hands --- that is pretty straightforward. Variant interpretations only arise when we are left to determine for ourselves if a verse is applicable now or if we are required to determine what a verse even means. The science (or even art) of *Tafsir* has evolved greatly over the centuries and is comprised of many facets. The most important of those facets is the historical context within which a particular verse was revealed: *Asbab Al-Nuzul*. Each verse of the Quran was revealed for a reason. Each verse met (or meets) a particular need and had a target audience. Its intent is clear.

To most scholars the historical moment which is most commonly used to define a key change in the discussion of Quranic context is the *Hijra* --- Mohammed’s flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE. That event marks a clear shift in the orientation of Mohammed’s revelations. The period before the *Hijra* is known as the Meccan period (marking the history and revelations when the Prophet was living in Mecca) while everything that follows in know as the Medinan period (marking the history and revelations when the Prophet was living in Medina).

The Medinan period began in 610 CE with Mohammad’s first revelation and continued until the Hijra, in 622 CE. During this period Mohammad was preaching to fellow Meccan citizens as he attempted to convince them to follow monotheist God as “revealed” to him. Therefore his revelations (or scriptures) from the Meccan period are more general in nature. They seem to deal with issues such as man’s actions and his association with God. He attempted to convert regional Christians, Jews and (to a lesser extent) Pagans to his monotheist religion and his revelations/ scriptures reflect that tone. During this period Mohammed’s following was growing and the verses of that period were oriented at building a following. Additionally, those verses deal with the oppression and persecution that the fledgling Muslim community was feeling and make reference to overcoming adversity and survival.

The people in Mecca became tired of Mohammed’s “new religion’ and chased the small group of early Muslims out of the city in 622 CE --- the *Hijra*. Mohammad sought and gained refuge in Medina, established a following there, and Islam continued to grow in regional influence. The Medinan period starts in 622 CE with the events of the *Hijra*, or the flight, and continues until the death of the Prophet in 632 CE. The revelations of that period are oriented at conquest, expanding the Islamic State, warfare with Christian and Jewish tribes, the
needs of that growing community and its administration. An example of a Medinan verse is Maida 51. This verse was written in reaction to events around the treaty of Hudaibiyah and warned the Muslim community about the pressures (and treachery) of the surrounding Christian communities.

“O ye who believe! Take not Christians and Jews for your friends and protectors: They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them for friendship is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust.” (5:54, Translated by Abdullah Yusaf Ali.)

Among the obvious issues with this contentious verse is its possible use today as a Quranic directive against Christians. It continues to be used against US basing in Saudi Arabia and to condemn current regimes for their political connections to the West.

The division of the text into Meccan and Medinan verses is very general, but critically useful because it establishes the relative position of the young Muslim community within the context of history — and that context critical. Because of that fact, the published Tafsir of notable scholars usually indicate which of the two periods the revelation of a verse came from.

Within the framework of the Meccan and Medinan periods, the contextual or historical circumstance surrounding a particular revelation is critical. In pursuit of that added meaning, scholars have investigated, compiled, and scrutinized related historic events (within the Suna and Hadeth) for centuries. Although the compilation and analysis process started shortly after the death of the Prophet, the analysis continues today.

**Evolution of established Tafsir**

The development of Tafsir can be tracked through both the Sunni and the Shii (Shiite) branches of Islam. Although the two are different, they do generally correlate. Sunnis form the vast majority of the world’s Muslim population and, therefore, this work will focus on their traditions.

During the reign of the Caliphate (632-732 CE) the companions of the Prophet were available to relate what they had heard and what they had seen. Because of that, there was little initial need to record and test the veracity of the text as related. Most of the conveyance of the time was accomplished orally in the traditions of the period.

Tradition relates that the Battle of Yamama (633 CE) was a pivotal point in the development of the Quran. Tradition holds that the many of the companions (the original “companions” accompanied Mohammad and possessed first-hand knowledge of Islam’s early teachings) were killed or wounded during the battle so the community feared their knowledge would be lost. It is during this period that the verses were collected and amassed into a text commonly credited to Othman (an early caliph, or successor of the Prophet).

That Othmanic text was distributed to the points of the empire and became the standard that continues to today. The critical accomplishments of this first period are the establishment of the text and the Hadeth that accompany it.

Following the deaths of the companions of the Prophet, their relatives were used as sources of information as passed down to them. This second period lasted from 732-832 CE. During this term scholars completed major works of Tafsir and Hadeth with sound chains of passage, called an Isnad. The validity of the Isnad is beyond critical because the verse, Hadeth, or the information which surrounds a given event also must be accurately related. Sound Isnad is the quality control measure for scholarly Tafsir.

The third period (832-932 CE) was marked with the breakdown of the science of Tafsir and begins a phase of personal Judgment. In other words, there was a shift in focus from the Hadeth to the opinions of the writer in establishing the meaning of a particular verse.

The last period of Tafsir development (932-1932 CE) focused primarily on methodologies, and those various methods developed into the Quranic sciences of grammar, language, theology, mystical, traditional, legalistic and other interpretation approaches each leading to meaning. Each leads to Tafsir --- to understanding. Each method tends to emphasis its own strengths and traditions while minimizing those of the other methods.
This last group can be logically broken further by geographic and political relevance. As an example, writings taken from differing areas of the Ottoman Empire could arrive at different (and often politically motivated) meanings for the same Quranic text. Therefore we often see examples of Tafsir where a scholar writing in Egypt (while under the “protection” of the British Empire) arrives at a different interpretation for a given text than another scholar working in Ottoman controlled Damascus.

But what does this list mean to us today? The student of the Quran must understand two very critical factors when reading published Tafsir: (1) when historically was the Tafsir written, and (2) to which methodological group do the authors belong.

### Zahir Vs Batin
the hidden meaning of the Quran

On of the key issues to the understanding of the text is the concept of external (Zahir) and internal (Batin) meanings of the text. The external is the manifest meaning while the internal is the spiritual or esoteric meaning. The concept is that the literal meaning of the text can change but the spiritual meaning can never change. In other words, God’s message to man can not change.

Tawil is the art of understanding the hidden meanings of the Quran. Using Tawil, the scholar would substitute one word for another in order to arrive at an analogy, they would also use the stories of the apostles as allegorical examples for our lives, or they would use words figuratively. Because these rules do not appear to be used uniformly their use is rather disturbing to me. Word substitutions that support Ali (as an example) should also be used throughout the text. However if the student uses this substitution method constantly, the result makes no sense. Therefore scholars using this “word substitution” method appear to be clearly manipulating the text to support a political or religious agenda, and that appears to be innovation --- heresy.

### The Quran and its role in law

Islamic law has four sources: the Quran, the Sunna, Ijma, and Qiyas. They are prioritized in that same order with the Quran as the most official and Qiyas as the least preferred.

The Quran is simple the word of God as revealed to the Prophet by the angle Gabriel. When the Quran says that a particular crime is punishable by death, or by the cutting of a hand, that is literally what it means. Consequently little interpretation is required here. Reading the Quran is difficult because much is lost in translation (in my opinion), and because of the sequencing of its scriptures … the Suras. When the Quran was complied they chose to sequence the Suras by size, not chronologically. Therefore, the flow of Quran scriptures can be counter-intuitive, and confusing to a reader who is not paying strict attention to the historic background.

The second element is the Sunna. The Suna are the acts or sayings of the prophet but they were not actual revelations, so they were not included in the Quran. Many of the Suna are legalistic and apply to the administration of the growing Muslim community of the Medinan phase. Islamic law (Sharia) logically leans heavily on the Sunna, so they are second only to the Quran.

The third in priority is the principle of consensus or Ijma. Tradition has held that “if consensus is achieved on an issue then the decision of the group can not be wrong.” Therefore, once consensus is achieved, it can never be changed. This very un-forgiving stand on the issues does not leave much room for re-interpretation of key societal issues. Ijma has been problematic for both the Islamist and scholarly communities for generations --- particularly in the effort to reform or modernize a very traditional society. The “current consensus” is most likely discounted because most issues now under evaluation have already been evaluated … although decades, or even centuries ago. Besides --- a consensus among whom? Who voted? When did they vote? “Scholarly Ijma” (the agreement of Islamic scholars, meaning clergy) was often sealed as the consensus of the community as a whole. Once sealed it is virtually impossible to revisit.
The final element is *Qiyas*. *Qiyas* is the use of logical analogy to derive a modern law. A simple and common example would be concerning the legality of drugs. Drugs did not exist at the time of the Prophet so their legality was not in question, but alcohol was prohibited because it produced an intoxicating effect on the human, and was bad for the body. It follows; similarly, drugs are intoxicating and are bad for the body. Therefore, the Quran prohibits drugs on the same grounds. Obviously, this logic method is subject to both interpretation and opinion, and the analogies drawn are subject to healthy stretch.

**The modern applications of a verse**

Furthermore, the division of the Islamic community into sects has refined sectarian laws and traditions into highly defined sets of rules. Hannfii, Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali, Jafari, Shii, Sunni, Wahabi, and other sects have developed their traditions largely independently with relatively minor differences between the sects. Some sects are more permissive on some issues, while other sects are more restrictive on other issues. Woman’s issues such as veiling, working in public, and elements of a marriage contract are all great examples of key differences that are very relevant in today’s world.

Modern scholarly restrictions of the Hadeth to the six *Sahih* (confirmed or valid) collections and the breakdown of sectarian divisions can be viewed as an attempt at addressing such key issues. Because scholars have fewer Hadeth to draw from they are free to fill in the blanks as they choose. Further, by accepting past judgements from other sects, scholars add validity to proposed changes to the status quo. Both can be seen as vehicles for societal change and as attempts to avoid theological stagnation in communal development.

We all know that we are not *Mufessors* (one with authority to evaluate the data and then author *Tafsir*) and that only a *Mufessor* is supposed to interpret the Quran because of their “extensive background and formal education” on the topic. However, we live in a modern world with an educated population and each of us is now smart enough (and educated enough) to conduct exhaustive research of a given subject for ourselves. The works of the *Mufessors* are important because they serve as a point of departure for the Quranic student, but even *Mufessors* are open to interpret the text based on their own personal backgrounds, perspectives, biases, and agendas. In an educated community we must all challenge the conclusions of those who came before us in order to insure that the Godly truth is reached. Only by understanding the development and methodologies of Quranic *Tafsir* can we possibly hope to even begin to decipher centuries of scholarly writings and legal decisions within their proper context. These writings are the foundations of the fundamentalists and the Islamic modernists shaping our world today. With the context derived from this analysis, we can then individually judge the validity (or lack thereof) of the “Quranic arguments” made for and against the US, the West and against non-Muslims with un-obscured facts.

The Quran is difficult to read, and it conceals its meanings well. Those interpreting the corpus of documents literally and figuratively still argue over its true meaning even though there is a rigid means of *Tafsir* which is long established --- and commonly agreed by history. The fundamentalist literalist view is entrenched and remains the prevailing scholarly view and the Quran unarguably contains much to support fundamentalist violence for those who seek it. Only with this deep understanding of the background and history of a given story/verse can anyone properly put a given verse into its proper historical context (from which we derive true meaning) and counter those calls for God-directed violence.

**About the Author:**

Mr. Coyt D. Hargus, is a retired US Army FAO (48G) and USAF civilian. Throughout his uniformed and civilian career Hargus has served in a variety of International Affairs positions including CENTCOM’s J5, EUCOM’s JAC, NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Center, and Homeland Security’s Field Intelligence Unit. He teaches Mid-East regional topics impacting national security at a variety of IA schools. He now serves as the Deputy Director of International Affairs at Air Combat Command, Langley AFB.

Hargus is a member of FAOA’s Board of Governors, and serves as Senior Editor of this journal.
In an era of persistent conflict, supporting friends and allies to support and defend themselves has become a key component of our National Defense Strategy. In the October 2009 issue of Army Magazine, the outgoing Chief of Staff of the Army, General George W. Casey called for engagement to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies as one way to prevent future conflicts. On a daily basis the United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization or “USASATMO,” undertakes to building the military and security forces of key allies and local partners. USASATMO provides agile and flexible security cooperation teams in support of United States Army Campaign Plan and U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. USASATMO is responsible for the planning, formation, preparation, deployment, sustainment and redeployment of all continental United States-based Security Assistance Teams (SATs) tasked to execute out of country Security Assistance missions that support Army Security Assistance Enterprise missions.

Training of Foreign Armies

With missions located within all of the geographic commands, USASATMO has 29 teams currently deployed and supports an additional 64 missions, supporting training contracts worth more than $71 million. USASATMO is funded through a variety of sources not normally found in the typical military organization. They include counter-terrorism, international training and education, and counter-narcotics. Direct purchases by interested partner nations is also possible. By deploying assets to teach US Army doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures — USASATMO is a security cooperation enabler which allows the US government to engage foreign partners at no cost to the US Army.

How to Request

The training request process begins when the requesting nation identifies their potential training requirements and requests assistance. The customer will quantify system life-cycle costs and determine if the potential capability is a viable cost alternative. Normally there will be ongoing consultations between the partner nation and the US Embassy, normally the in-country US security cooperation organization. These discussions will result in the issuance of a Letter Of Request, or LOR. There is no standard format for an LOR. However, a complete and comprehensive LOR is a critical document for communicating customer requirements and desires. This LOR will be passed to the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) for staffing. If it is determined to be “Army” business, the LOR will be passed to the GCC’s army component for action.

The Army component will determine whether or not it has the assets to support the training request or not. In many cases, it is decided that the training request is best supported by the Army itself. Once assigned to the army, the LOR will be sent to the United States Army Security Assistance Command or USASAC. USASAC will then task USASATMO to develop a price and availability response (P&A) to the LOR. This P&A data will contain a training proposal along with costs as well as an estimated timeline for implementation. When both sides agree on the terms, a letter of acceptance (LOA) will be written and the training case initiated.
Funding for Training

Training teams are provided when funded by other US agencies or by the requesting country. Funding is available through programs such as Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), or Security Assistance Programs of International Military Education and Training, the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (RDCFTFP), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Funding may also be available under Security Cooperation and Security Assistance funds such as Combatant Commander Initiatives (CCI) or Traditional Security Cooperation Activities (TSCA). In addition, USASATMO is prepared to conduct an analysis of the host nations’ requirements to source mobile training teams from appropriate US Army elements most capable to address those requirements.

Structure of USASATMO

Restricted only by foreign disclosure and release requirements, USASATMO can assist and train a friendly Army in almost anything contained in the Army inventory, doctrine, tactics, equipment. USASATMO can train any military force, on any skill, at the host nation’s location of choice and to any level of competency, under any condition short of combat operations. USASATMO’s goal is its motto, “Training the world, one soldier at a time!” USASATMO can help a friendly army develop schools, build buildings and otherwise increase their capabilities to respond to their national needs. All security assistance cases are managed by the Operations Divisions; consisting of four branches: PACE (PaCom/CentCom), SANE (SouthCom, AfriCom, NorthCom, EuCom), Aviation and Engagement.

To meet these engagement challenges, USA-SATMO, in coordination with the Army’s Human Resources Command, hand-picks trainers from the Active Component, the Army Reserve and the National Guard. USASATMO presents to the world at large, a snapshot of the best of the US Army and provides technical and tactical assistance designed
to make our friends stronger. USASATMO trains partner countries to employ and maintain US systems which the US has provided: allowing them to fight better and more effectively, and therefore to better deter aggression from opposing countries.

**Operations Directorate**

PACE and SANE represents the classic model of security assistance, designed to meet long-term planning requirements and support the fielding of new equipment. These divisions represents the core of USASATMO’s ability to execute its mission to plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain and redeploy CONUS-based Security Assistance Teams (SATs) to execute OCONUS Security Assistance missions that support Army Security Assistance Enterprise missions. Each branch is responsible for life-cycle management of USASATMO executed missions by monitoring every aspect of the program from initial partner nation request, through execution, and ending with the closure of the case.

Often a cumbersome process, these branches handle longer duration temporary duty and permanent stationing requirements to meet our friends’ and allies’ long-term security assistance needs and requirements. Within this cycle, after the allied/friendly nation requests assistance, the Security Assistance Team (SAT) Managers - the USASATMO desk officer assists in determining mission and funding requirements in accordance with existing policy and regulatory guidance. This process establishes both the desired end state for the program as well the resources required by both the requesting country as well as the US Army to execute this mission. Mission objectives and desired end states are determined, with necessary resources allocated. Security Assistance team members are then, receive all necessary training and deploy in-country for mission execution.

**Aviation**

Designed to support aviation specific security assistance cases, the aviation branch provides subject matter expertise on a broad range of aviation specific subjects. This expertise is in addition to routine security assistance case management. This branch is capable of providing senior instructor pilot level certifications, inspections and reviews of aviation related policies and procedures and conduct assistance visits as requested.

**Engagement**

The newest addition to the USASATMO team is the Engagement branch. Designed to meet immediate requirements, Engagement is formed around small teams, capable of deploying with minimal notice and can serve as a bridging mechanism until arrival of robust training teams. Engagement teams are also capable of providing limited specialty services and assist in building host nation capacity across a broad spectrum of combat arms, combat support, leadership and institutional building subjects. This branch is tasked to stand
Enterprise Mentorship

An additional USASATMO core competency is providing subject matter awareness and training in security cooperation for ASAE — a term we have labeled as enterprise mentorship. USASATMO training responsibilities for the ASAE include, but are not limited to, conducting internal training for deploying USASATMO personnel (Security Assistance Team Training or SATTOC), as well as executing program management training for the USASATMO Security Assistance Team (SAT) Manager or SAT-M training, to ensure those individuals responsible for case management understand their assigned duties and responsibilities. SAT-M can be tailored and exported to Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) to facilitate security cooperation management and oversight. Training is designed to emphasize management of programs at one level above execution; SAT-M offers the opportunity for on-site instruction needed at the Action Officer level for security cooperation programs. Highlights of that POI include a primer on basic security assistance / cooperation terms and definitions as well as Army unique security cooperation—SATMO scheduling / contract development / case writing, using the Army Global Outlook System (ARGOs and so forth). This training can facilitate the understanding of security cooperation / assistance rules, policies and procedures for those brigades assigned a Security force assistance (SFA) missions as required.

About the Author

Colonel Pete Aubrey is the current Commander of USASATMO. He is a Special Forces/Foreign Areas Officer with extensive operational and security assistance experience in both peacetime and combat environments. Prior to assuming command, he served as the first Director, Security Cooperation for United States Army Africa. Other previous assignments included service as the Defense and Army Attaché in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Mozambique, the nonresident Army Attaché to Burkina Faso, Malawi and Uganda, and the Security Assistance Chief to Djibouti. He has also served as the Deputy J3 for US Forces Japan.

Become “Published” - Journal Submissions - Writing Guide

Your Journal needs your submissions … interesting items of all lengths.

When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication

Email submissions to in single-spaced WORD documents (Ariel 11) and insert supportive graphics, maps and pictures within the text at the appropriate location.

Within the same email attach separate copies of each graphic, an a short “About the author” biographical paragraph and a personal photo for publication.

Photos, maps and graphics add interest to your articles and are highly encouraged.

Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed therefore include critical references within the body of your product.

Key data for added understanding can be added as text boxes

All submissions are subject to minor editing for format and grammar as required.

Email submissions to editor@fao.org

www.FAOA.org
My name is Major Stephen Browne (48H) and prior to 11 MAR 11, I was conducting ICT in Japan and preparing for my next assignment to serve as the US Army Japan’s (USARJ) Liaison Officer (LNO) to the Northeastern Army (NEA) of the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF). After Japan’s big earthquake last month, this changed immediately and I assumed duties as LNO as the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) developed their first ever Joint Task Force and assumed Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADR). Likewise the US established a Joint Support Force (JSF) to assist the Japanese in the HADR mission.

My duties as a LNO to JTF-Tohoku have provided me with the ability to operate in a Joint and Bilateral environment working hand-in-hand in the development, coordination, and execution of HADR operations. As LNO, I serve a critical role on the Bilateral Coordination Action Team (BCAT) routinely working with Japanese ground, air, and maritime forces coordinating U.S. Air, Navy, USMC, and Army HADR support operations.

As part of this BCAT process I have played a vital part in Joint and Bilateral site survey teams which go to the affected disaster areas, work with local authorities, conduct needs assessments, and then make recommendations to the Japanese on how US forces can assist. I serve as the primary liaison between the JSDF leadership as well as the local leadership at the Prefectural, City, and Village level and US commanders facilitating communication and cooperation to support the needs of civilians and JSDF forces. I also routinely interface with members of the US Embassy, Consulate, State Department, USAID, and NGOs to help synchronize US support to JSDF operations.

In the course of my duties, I have had the unique opportunity to meet with military, government, and civilian leadership at all levels and provides recommendations that have helped shape current operations and strategy strengthening the US-Japanese Alliance. While I must admit that I am still "drinking from a fire-hose," I have learned three keys to success:

1 - Language and cultural understanding is a critical skill set to effectively facilitate smooth bilateral operations. As a FAO, your ability to understand not only the language, but more importantly the organizational culture of a foreign military, society, etc. will enable you to provide sound advice and recommendations to US Commanders;

2 - While language and cultural understanding is extremely important, operational knowledge about capabilities of all US services, task organizations, structures, and operations is paramount as much of my time is spent in teaching the Japanese about US capabilities and operations; and

3 - Developing strong relationships of trust and mutual respect provide a medium for successfully working with both US and foreign forces to accomplish the intent of US commanders.

FAOA’s Policy Luncheon Program

Our Policy Luncheons offer International Affairs (IA) professionals with the opportunity to hear key national-level leaders and strategic thinkers speak as they provide their views about developments impacting the Services, DoD and US national security to drive key topic discussions, and aid in the development of IA professionals.

Luncheons also offer the opportunity to network and sustain relationships within our community.

Future events are already being planned. For more information go to www.FAOA.org.

Members receive announcements and event updates via email alerts by registering online.
USAR Component FAO Program

Program design

As the Army Reserve Components have transformed themselves from a strategic reserve force to an operational partner of the active Army, the RC FAO program is exploring the same transition. The FAO proponent, responsible for program and policy for Army FAOs, is analyzing ways the RC FAO program can make this transition. As a strategic reserve force, RC FAOs were, and are now, assigned primarily to non-Army, non-deployable agencies, providing a backup to existing capability. As an operational asset, RC FAOs may serve increasingly in Army and deployable organizations and may do so as part of ARFORGEN. In this way, RC FAOs may undertake a given workload and may maintain that as a supplement to the organization while complying with Army mobilization policy underlying RC ARFORGEN. As part of this operational construct, if implemented, Army RC FAOs will continue to serve in joint and inter-agency positions in organizations that commit to having their Army RC FAOs progressing through the continuum of RC FAO training, another policy revision under consideration. This training program will ensure that RC FAOs are available for worldwide deployment, not just to their current assignment. RC FAOs will also be able to participate in the RC FAO control group on an AT and inactive duty for points-only basis and be eligible for short tours to support active duty commitments through the World Wide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS) or ADOS through organizational resources.

Current FAO program provisions

Due to the training requirements to qualify as a FAO at each grade, having mastered the competencies of security assistance, political-military advisor, host nation collection and reporting and language capability, RC FAO is a single track functional area, meaning that the functional area will serve as the control branch for the remainder of an officer’s career. Those failing to maintain their skills, as demonstrated by appropriate and timely participation in the continuum of training and those accepting non-FAO positions without proponent approval will be returned to their basic branch and FA 48 will be revoked. Entry into RC FAO demands an officer’s complete commitment. Those applying for RC FAO will, in some cases, need to be released from their basic branch or will have to qualify in another basic branch that will allow them to single track as a FAO.

Accessions

HRC is responsible for accessions and assignment of officers for the RC-FAO program with DAMO-SSF-RC providing program and policy oversight and coordination. The prerequisites for a RC-FAO are the same as the Active Component (AC). Specifically, for designation as an RC-FAO, normally as a Major, applicants must meet military and branch qualification requirements, possess a graduate degree in an appropriate field of study, possess regional experience, and have a minimum current language qualification of 2/2. To be designated as part of late entry, officers will need to meet the more advanced standards required for successful assignment as a Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel. Late accessions will only be approved in an effort to rebalance the RC FAO population due to unforeseen losses or emerging requirements, with applicants seeking waiver for entry at ranks above Major. Late entry waiver requests will need to document how the applicant obtained equivalent experience to having served as a FAO at the preceding ranks.
An early entry process for branch qualified captains and majors are in the pilot stage. Officers requesting conditional accession may request a waiver of two out of three for language, graduate degree or ILE. Each waiver request will need to include a plan and timeline for correcting the deficiency.

Majors and senior Captains applying for the RC-FAO Program send their application packages to Commander, US Army Human Resources Command, ATTN: AHRC-OPB, 1600 Spearhead Div Rd., Fort Knox, KY. 40121

An electronic application process also exists using a DA Form 4187. Captains should consider the application requirements in preparing themselves to apply for the FAO program as promotable captains or majors.

Officers will not be approved for assignment until their training is complete with the exception of ILE. Officers must make sufficient progress in PME and must complete ILE common core prior to primary zone promotion board to Lieutenant Colonel. Further PME is required in order to be competitive for promotion to Colonel.

Upon acceptance to the Army RC FAO program an officer will be nominated for an existing position based on the officer's preferences. Those not immediately assigned will be reassigned to the IRR until qualified for assignment to a FAO position.

**Training and Education**

There are opportunities for RC-FAOs to attend the Foreign Area Officer Orientation course at the Defense Language Institute, however, all officers will complete the online version of the course (to be prepared on Defense Connect Online (DCO)) since the FAOOC residence course does not cover all RC issues. In addition, DAMO-SSF has developed regional training experiences and language immersion sustainment programs of up to one month in various CONUS and OCONUS locations. RC-FAOs must have a current DLPT in order to participate in these training events.

Entry level FAOs continue to develop their language skills during the first assignment since the DOD FAO standard is 3/3. Failing to attain and maintain the required language standard will result in removal from the program.

**Assignments**

RC FAOs maintaining their readiness may be assigned to fill active duty positions. Officers desiring this option will request consideration by submitting a DA Form 4187 and additional documents to HRC-STL MI branch. For assignment to a DIMA position, the HRC tools page provides a way to query for available positions. The MI branch PMO will provide points of contact for interesting positions. The officer then contacts the agency and coordinates assignment. For those interested in a contingency assignment, the WIAS page provides a list of available assignments to the officer’s inbox. Tours are also available on the HRC-STL web pages. Finally, for those who do not seek or cannot find an assignment, the IRR Control Group is an option that allows the officer to earn points through skills maintenance, and annual training tours will be available to some based on funding.

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**Voice Your Views**

The Journal strives to publish a variety of opinions, views, observations and analysis from tactical to strategic. We encourage you to express your voice by submitting articles, book reviews and Op-Ed pieces. Letters to the editor with both opposing and supporting the views of those expressed in published articles are encouraged. Submit your writings by either going to your association’s website at www.FAOA.org website, or via email.

editor@faoa.org

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**Quotable Quotes**

Please grant me …

the senility to forget the people I never liked anyway,

the good fortune to run into the ones I do like,

and the eyesight to tell the difference.

Anon
On March 17th, the UNA-NCA Peace & Security and Sustainable Development Committees co-hosted an event with the Atlantic Council Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the DACOR Bacon House in Washington D.C. The keynote speaker at the event was Ambassador William Bellamy (pictured right), Director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU). Ambassador Bellamy spoke about his experience in Africa while a US Ambassador to Kenya from 2003-2006 and his time serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (2001-2003). He discussed differing aspects of northern Africa and proposed sub-Saharan Africa as a New Frontier. Touting the rise of middle class households, he stated stating “after 2005, a combination of trends in changed economic policies and established rule of law attributed to successful peacekeeping missions evolved following years of civil conflict.”

However, in a June 2009 Security Brief authored by Ambassador Bellamy he relays in most cases, progress made in peacemaking remains fragile and tentative. He credits successful Peacekeeping Operations in Africa to missions that involved direct support from members of the UN Security Council along with the creation of the African Union (AU). According to an April 2010 Security Brief, since 2000, there have been over 40 peace operations deployed to 14 African states. The Human Security Brief 2007 concluded that the rise in peace operations since the mid-1990s was a major contributing factor to the 60% decline in the number and magnitude of African conflicts.

Ambassador Bellamy concluded his presentation with the question — can recent events sustain their positive trend? He referred to the challenges posed by upcoming elections, rapid urbanization and population pressures (including a large youth population bubble) and other threats like the increase in transnational trafficking and terrorism.

Over 50 attended the event from several demographics; to include a veteran UN PKO “blue helmet” soldier, academia faculty members and students, a officer from the US Army FAO proponent, and one dignitary from the Republic of Guinea Embassy to the US.

Following, the UNA-NCA Peace & Security and Sustainable Development committees hosted a joint quarterly business meeting to discuss other events being planned for the 2011 program.

About the Author:
Mr. Jeffrey Hoffmann, UNA-NCA Board of Director (Member-at-Large) and co-Chair, Peace & Security Committee and FAOA Associate Historian

The UNA-NCA Peace & Security Committee promotes the core principles of the UN concerning the peace and security of the global community including over 100,000 peacekeepers serving on approximately 15 worldwide peace operations (six of these currently in the continent of Africa). The Committee also examines US policies towards the UN’s initiatives on peace and security ranging from field support, police missions, mine action, to environment and sustainability.
From the Army FAO Proponent…

FAO Azimuth Check
By: COL Raymond Hodgkins, USA, FAO, 48C
LTC Donald Baker, USA, FAO, 48C

The Army has recently undertaken a comprehensive review to examine the impact that nearly a decade of war has had on our profession -- the Profession of Arms -- and ensure that all Soldiers understand and are living up to the principles that define us as a profession. To launch the review, in a recent letter, General Dempsey stated, "you're not a profession simply because you declare yourself to be profession...you have to earn the title every day. We need to review, reemphasize and recommit to our profession. We need to ensure that our leader development strategies, our training methodologies, and our personnel systems all contribute to defining us as a profession."

Functional Area 48 remains strong and relevant, and its officers possess those unique skills and competencies that will remain in high demand as the Army continues to operate in a volatile and complex environment which the Chief of Staff has defined as an era of persistent conflict. Nevertheless, as our Army embarks on an extensive self-examination, it is appropriate that we in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community also pause to critically examine ourselves and check the azimuth that should set the course of our future.

The FAO Corps has gained tremendous experience from our continued deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and other operational areas. We should feel proud to be contributing our skills and experiences to the Army's operational and strategic needs. We are assigned to positions throughout Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIIM) organizations. From our experiences of the last decade, we now have a new cohort of FAOs who view the Army and its foreign engagement activities through lenses that have been tested by combat and developed by working with partners and allies to address 21st century challenges to the security environment.

This reality necessitates an assessment of where we are as a branch. Now is the time to conduct an assessment to ascertain if we are performing to our maximum potential as the premier Regional, and many times International, experts for which we have enjoyed a solid reputation. Many organizations in which we work appreciate the quality contributions that we provide on a daily basis. Our reputation is one of excellence throughout the JIIIM. Can we do better, though?

Over the next four months, the FAO Proponent will conduct a holistic review of FA 48. The review will cover all aspects of our life cycle: accessions, structure, distribution, development, sustainment and separation. We will ask the community to participate in a series of fundamental surveys that will serve to inform the Proponent and the Army leadership on how FAOs can remain relevant as our Army transitions. We must be prepared to keep the parts that work, but not afraid to "break glass" when necessary.

During this process, you the FAO will be asked for your input. Without your thoughtful and informed insights, we risk making decisions in a vacuum and losing valuable opportunities. The Army Research Institute (ARI), in conjunction with FAO Proponent, has developed surveys that you have already, or will soon, receive. Please take the time to complete them.

We must ensure that FAO retains its well-deserved and hard-earned reputation as foreign regional experts and that we remain integral to the implementation of our Nation's National Defense and Military Strategies. We see your input as a professional responsibility and an obligation to maintain our piece of the larger Profession of Arms discussion. You have a role to invest in the development of our future FAOs.

We value the opinions of all FAOs in the field — active and retired — junior and senior. The more senior FAOs will have a very different experience from younger officers, but everyone's input will help shape our collective future. We look forward to hearing from you.
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An open letter from the US Navy’s Senior FAO ...
By: Admiral Doug Venlet, SDO/DATT Moscow

From RDML Venlet, Senior Navy FAO
10-Jan-11

TO: Fellow Foreign Area Officers,

Not long ago, I was asked by the Chief of Naval Personnel if I would consider changing my designator from Surface Warfare to FAO. I eagerly accepted. I had achieved my personal career goal of commanding a ship and was lucky to be able to do it twice. Now, I have been given the opportunity to help Navy achieve its goals by being your senior representative and promoting international cooperation and engagement around the world - an honor, and a responsibility I take most seriously.

Tina and I have been in Moscow for 5 months, doing much the same work many of you are doing. It is both challenging and rewarding. We know that friendships we are making will last a lifetime, and relationships we are building with our host nation counterparts will impact future cooperation and collaboration in ways we can only imagine. We are happy to engage and contribute within this part of the global arena to further our Navy’s and nation’s interests.

We clearly live in a globalized, interconnected world where the demonstrated talents of regional experts who are both culturally and linguistically capable will reap great benefits in the future. You represent the Navy’s corps of professionals who will take us into that future, and I am proud, honored, and humbled to be part of such an effort.

As we all pause to enjoy the upcoming holidays, I wish each of you the very best as you celebrate the season, wherever you may be. Spend time with your families, loved ones, and friends - for they form the foundation of who you are, and give you the motivation to well serve our country and everything for which it stands.

Happy Holidays from Moscow!

Very respectfully,

RDML Doug Venlet
SDO / Defense Attaché
US Defense Attaché Office
Moscow, Russia
Rear Admiral Douglas J. Venlet
Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché Moscow

Rear Admiral Venlet is a former enlisted Marine. He graduated from Michigan State University in 1982 receiving a bachelor’s degree in Political Science. He also attended the U.S. Naval War College earning a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. Venlet served at sea in USS Clifton Sprague (FFG 16), USS Stark (FFG 31) and USS Fox (CG 33). He was executive officer aboard USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), and commanded USS Wadsworth (FFG 9) and USS Chosin (CG 65). Both ships under his command were awarded a total of three Battle Efficiency awards, and Chosin was awarded the Spokane Trophy for warfighting excellence.

Ashore, he served at the Naval Communication Station Rota, Spain; as an instructor of Combat Systems at Surface Warfare Division Officer School; as speechwriter and executive assistant to commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet; as the Asia/Pacific regional manager at the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; as an executive assistant to the director of the Navy staff; as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the Executive Office of the President; as a fellow with the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group; and as the branch head for Strategic Concepts, Strategy and Policy Division (N5SP), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

He is currently serving as senior Defense official and Defense attaché in Moscow, Russia.

Venlet’s personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, and various other personal and unit awards.
Machete Season by Jean Hatzfeld looks at the Rwandan genocide from the point of view of ten Hutu killers interviewed in prison during March 2003. The ten Hutus in the interviews were a group of associates or friends; a gang living in the hills of Nyamata in south central Rwanda. Once the killings began the men left their fields and took their machetes and began cutting their former Tutsi friends and neighbors and didn't stop for nearly 100 days.

The book is organized in short chapters by subject starting the morning after the death of the president and just prior to the beginning of the slaughter — when the men were gathered into the square and given instructions to kill all the Tutsis. In their interviews, the men discussed the emotion (and even their lack emotion) during their first kills, and how they motivated each other to keep killing. Not only Tutsis were cut, but also moderate Hutus and those that spoke out against the genocide (aka "the Just"). In their interviews, the men mentioned how looting was a major motivation in the killings was actually the fact that corrugated steel and the lands of the deceased were highly prized. Each day, as they returned from the killing fields they were rewarded with beef and beer. Most spouses supported their husbands' new line of work.

The most amazing part of the book is when the author asks the killers about their remorse for their actions. The men for the most part were upset for not being forgiven and felt no need to change, if they were not going to be forgiven. They said repeatedly throughout the interviews that they were just following orders and were influenced by peer pressure to continue the cuttings. Some of their major concerns were how they would return to their homes in the hills where they killed their neighbors and try to resume a normal life.

Only one of the ten men in the gang was sentenced to death for his role in the genocide, and only because he was a local political organizer how had helped to plan the slaughter. Because of their ages (and owing to their confessions) the others were still awaiting sentencing in a traditional court. The back of the book features a photo of the group and a brief biography of each man, which helps the reader to better understand each of the men.

This book provides valuable insight into the thinking of men who slaughtered thousands of their former friends and neighbors. The interviews are tinged by their location and can't be taken completely at face value despite the promise of the author to not reveal their content to authorities. The men undoubtedly held back certain truths and emotions that they thought would get them in trouble or present them in a worse light but they still provide a rare look into the minds of ordinary Rwandans who “at the drop of a hat” picked up their machetes and nearly exterminated all the Tutsi in their neighborhood.
Book Review
Potsdam Mission: Memoir of a US Army Intelligence Officer in Communist East Germany
Reviewed by: Dr. Stephen R. Bowers, LTC, USAR (Retired)

For a Soviet Foreign Area Officer during the Cold War, few assignments were more appealing than service with the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. Sometimes disparagingly referred to as “Cold War cowboys”, the USMLM provided an invaluable early warning service by identifying signs of Soviet or East German military moves. Former “Missionary” and FAO James R. Holbrook offers readers an inside look at the work of the USMLM in his *Potsdam Mission: Memoir of a U.S. Army Intelligence Officer in Communist East Germany* (Bloomington, IN: 2008). In addition, this excellent book outlines the career path of a FAO including the requirements for becoming a Soviet FAO as well as the contributions of the FAO program to U.S. security during this period.

The value of this book can be seen in three ways. First, it contributes to the historical record of the Cold War. During the years of LTC Holbrook’s service with the USMLM, that record consisted of the routine confrontations with Soviet forces but also the functions at the Potsdam House on special occasions such as the 4th of July, Thanksgiving, the April anniversary of the meeting between US and Soviet forces at Torgau, and Christmas. The book also provides insight on the USMLM role during major international crises such as the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the 1983 Able Archer Crisis. Holbrook’s account of the activities of the USMLM supports the arguments of those who suggest that this spy organization played a key role in the prevention of East-West war as a result of a misunderstanding of real Soviet intentions as contrasted with the political bluster of their political leadership.

Second, *Potsdam Mission* enhances our understanding of the FAO program during this era. At least in part as a result of his FAO training, in his direct contact with Soviet military officers LTC Holbrook was capable of responding in a manner that indicated his knowledge of the Soviet system, Russian culture, and the special sensitivities associated with US-Soviet contacts. *Potsdam Mission* provides a thorough account of the “making” of a Soviet FAO. The greatest part of the first one hundred pages is devoted to the author’s military and civilian education. This education included two and one half years at the US Naval Academy and a growing interest in the study of languages. This was followed by enlistment in the US Army, attending the MI Officer Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca, and an eventual assignment to what was at that time the Army Language School in Monterey. With completion of language training, the author was assigned to the Army Security Agency’s “Teufelsberg” monitoring post in West Berlin and eventually made his way into the FAO program and was assigned to the USMLM.

Finally, *Potsdam Mission* is a concise study of military intelligence. One feature which enhances the value of this book for contemporary students of intelligence is its concentration on the specifics of military intelligence. At a time when it is difficult to distinguish between intelligence *per se* and military intelligence, this is no small accomplishment. As a university professor, I teach a class on military intelligence and use *Potsdam Mission* as one of the basic textbooks.

LTC Holbrook’s account of the work of the USMLM demonstrates the specifics of military intelligence – in contrast with political intelligence – with its primary emphasis on reporting indicators of the imminence of hostilities. For the “missionaries” traveling in East Germany, the most important indicator was Soviet or East German troops on the move. For the USMLM tours, convoys on the road, the movement of aircraft or ordnance, or any signs of a heightened state of readiness were evidence that a military strike might be coming. The search for clues about Soviet
intentions often led USMLM personnel to rail yards and even refuse heaps.

The author devotes considerable attention to the latter target and dismisses speculation that Operation SANDDUNE, as it was known, was little more than a "latrine run". While visits to Soviet trash sites were reported as early as 1964, SANDDUNE did not become a systematic effort until 1974. By the end of 1976, approximately 40% of ground intelligence reports were derived from SANDDUNE products. Missionaries working trash dumps found a technical maintenance manual for the T-62 tank, a notebook outlining the operating parameters of the Soviet military radio station, and the information needed to produce conclusive documentation on the ethnic composition of the Soviet ground forces in East Germany. Over time, SANDDUNE came to be regarded as one of the most valuable sources of intelligence generated by the USMLM.

As an occasional user of USMLM products in my work in Cold War era special operations, I found the unit’s activities fascinating but somewhat mysterious because so little was written about their work. Though the organization was not secret, it was discreet. There might be published references to the Mission, but they were usually limited. In 1980, Steven L. Thompson produced a fictionalized account of the Mission in *Recovery*. It is only in recent years that this gap in the intelligence literature has been filled. *Potsdam Mission* joins a small number of books dedicated to systematically examining the role of the three Western liaison missions working during the period from 1947 through 1990. The first book to appear was *Brixmis: The Untold Exploits of Britain's Most Daring Cold War Spy Mission* (1997) which was an account of the work of the British Mission. In 2002, former USMLM member John Fahey published *Licensed to Spy: With the Top Secret Military Liaison Mission in East Germany*, a book that had a personal slant in that it dealt with disagreements within the USMLM. Finally, in the same year that *Potsdam Mission* appeared, Patrick Manificat published *Propousk! Missions derriere le Rideau de fer*, his 500 page account of the French Military Liaison Mission. This book, written in French, is not accessible to an English speaking audience.

While all of the above books make important contributions to our understanding of the role of the military in international affairs and the policy process, *Potsdam Mission* is exceptional in that it combines anecdotal material with fundamental observations about the intelligence process and the role of military education. What emerges is an effective mix that helps Cold War veterans understand what we were actually doing at that time, when each day was driven by immediate requirements, while students of the intelligence process take away guidance that will enhance their prospects for career success. Holbrook concludes with the observation that "military intelligence is a multifaceted discipline". Its two primary tasks, he writes, are (1) to reveal military strengths and weaknesses and (2) to lay the groundwork for policymakers and military leaders. *Potsdam Mission* puts these tasks into a perspective that will assist beginning intelligence professionals to distinguish between the short-term demands of intelligence as a job and the long-term requirements of intelligence as a service.

**About the Author:**
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FAOA’s 2011 Annual Black Tie Dinner
Army Navy Country Club
26 May 2011 (Thursday) at 6:00 PM

The 2011 FAO Association Annual Black Tie Dinner is 26 May 2011 at the Army Navy Country Club.
(Note that this is different venue than last year's dinner which was at the Army Navy Club.)

We’re honored to confirm Major General Frederick B. Hodges as our key note speaker.
General Hodges is the Director of the Joint Staff’s Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell

This is a formal "black tie" event.
Military members are encouraged to wear their Mess Dress, others wear appropriate evening attire.

Sequence of Events
1800 - Social Hour
1900 - Call to Dinner
1910 - Welcome and Toasts
1920 - Dinner
2030 - Special Presentations
2045 - Address by MG Hodges

For more information, directions, and online registration go to FAOA’s web site www.FAOA.org

Time for registration is running out ... register now.