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Dear FAO Colleagues,

As I write this letter at the beginning of 2011, I would first like to wish you and your Families a happy New Year. Thank you for your support of the FAO Association. We hope that we can continue to count on you.

FAOA ended 2010 with several noteworthy events that I would like to highlight.

On November 5, Brigadier General Robert Carr, U.S. Army, Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center, addressed a maximum capacity audience at our quarterly FAO policy luncheon held at Ft McNair. He shared his thoughts and observations about FAOs and addressed topics of current interest. For those of you who weren’t able to join us, we have provided General Carr’s remarks in this issue.

On December 5, several members of the FAOA Board of Governors had the privilege of participating in a tribute dinner in honor of Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired). General Williams culminated a lifetime of service to the Nation as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1981 to 1985. Among other honors, General Williams is a member of the Military Attaché Hall of Fame. Thanks to board member Mike Ferguson for organizing this event. It was a terrific way to recognize a great Soldier.

Lastly, on December 10 I had the honor of representing FAOA at a retirement ceremony for Lieutenant Colonel Shirley Rapues, U.S. Army. Shirley’s last assignment was in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, where she served as the DoD FAO Program Manager. Shirley’s contributions to the FAO community will have a lasting impact and we thank her for all of her efforts. We send Shirley our very best wishes as she transitions to a new chapter in life.

As we look at the road ahead, we hope you can join us for our next FAOA policy luncheon, to be held on February 10 at the Ft McNair Officers’ Club. Our guest speaker will be Dr. Soner Cagaptay, who will address Turkish political developments and their impact on US strategic interests. We can look forward to what I am sure will be an intellectually stimulating discussion.

We are also looking for a group of energetic volunteers to help us plan and organize this year’s formal banquet, to be held later in the spring. Please let me know if you can help – you can contact me at gary.espinas@us.army.mil. We had a terrific dinner last year that featured Ambassador Ryan Crocker. We hope to have another event that will be just as memorable.

Please continue to monitor the FAOA website (www.faoa.org) for updates and events. Thanks to webmaster Lieutenant Graham Plaster, U.S. Navy, FAOA is now on Facebook! We hope to see you there as well!

In closing, on behalf of the FAOA Board of Governors, I send our best regards to all FAOs wherever you might be – from Vancouver to Vladivostok or from Kinshasa to Kuala Lumpur. In particular, we recognize those FAOs currently serving in harm’s way.

Gary Espinas
Colonel, U.S. Army
President
Good afternoon everybody, and thank you very much for having me here with you to say a few words today. I’d like to talk for few minutes, and I have a couple of points that I would like to share with you, and maybe reinforce a few thoughts with you, but I’d like to also leave a few minutes to open the floor for questions and a little discussion.

Let me say a special thanks to the Association’s president, Colonel Gary Espinas, and vice president, Colonel Kurt Marisa, for having me here today, and past president Steve Norton who I think might have been a little bit instrumental in blocking my calendar over there at DCHC (Defense CI and HUMINT Center). And let me acknowledge my lunch guests -- General Williams, General Hughes and many other distinguished and influential civilian and senior officers that were announced earlier. I’d like to also recognize the presence of Mr. Dave Koger. Dave is a staff member on the SSCI (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) staff and oversees the GDIP account and, quite honestly, I’m glad Dave is here. He and I get to corroborate quite a bit ensuring that our (Senate) oversight committee is knowledgeable about what we’re doing, and we try to work together in the best interest of the HUMINT community to keep it moving. Thank you all very much.

I’m a little humbled, not only by the turnout, but by the people present here who each are extra-ordinary in their own right. We have current FAOs that are out there in the field, we have current FAOs that are members of the Hall of Fame, we have many in the room that have benefited from FAOs, and folks that just admire FAOs for what they bring to the game. I’m in the latter of those categories and, if truth be told, I did ask the Army once to go be the DATT in Jakarta. That paperwork died a slow death in PERSCOM, and I found myself on the Joint Staff. I really paid a price for that one, but I’ll tell you that I am firmly within that latter category, as I’ve benefited greatly from FAOs for many years. Quite honestly, I really admire what they bring to the game -- I’m a big fan.

I guess this is the point where I’m supposed to tell a joke. Anyone who knows me knows that I’m not a big joke-teller. I’m grateful that General Jones made that gaffe in public a couple of months ago. Remember when the National Security Advisor was up at some luncheon and he made a gaffe and that made the blurb on CNN for awhile, and the CNN web page had an editorial the next day, where the CNN guy said that “Generals should never tell jokes in public”? I’ve never told another joke since, and so you won’t get one here today either.

I guess I am the senior DoD Attaché manager --- so to speak. You might expect me to concentrate my thoughts today on the duty of FAOs and maybe on
the quality of those men and women that we’re trying to track to serve in what really is a unique capacity in the field, and I will to an extent, but I’d like to make some of my remarks for discussion on work that I’ve been deeply involved in since July of this year.

In reading through some of the FAO Association website notes, I was trolling out there and saw some notes by your president, who was addressing a FAO graduation event. He said;

“Beginning now, you are entering a joint, interagency, multi-governmental, and multi-national environment which will place very different demands on you. The key to success will be an ability to draw from your knowledge, your experience, and your judgment, to be able to provide senior decision-makers with informed advice, analysis and recommendations.”

I thought that was pretty good, so I looked at that, and I thought about a few things that I’m doing today in a couple of areas. Because a Foreign Area Officer in whatever service is pretty special and it is undoubted, in my opinion, that I see that superb output every day. Unfortunately, it includes weekends. The Foreign Area Officer is most often well-educated, has a proven history of performance in another primary duty specialty, has learned to converse in another language, geography and culture, and often seeks an opportunity to represent and serve our nation in a special capacity. He creates relationships which often lead to privileged access with foreign officers and he finds those who may be sympathetic to share a common interest with us. We accept that FAOs will likely spend much of their Attaché or Security Assistant or Pol-Mil advisory careers in a Joint environment; an environment more likely in the future to contain fully qualified FAOs from the sister-Services, whereas today the Army probably has a higher percentage of the highly-qualified and vetted professionals. But the other Services have the same level and are starting to create the same volume --- and that’s greatly needed. So I only need to point out (I think we did point out earlier) the distinguished FAOs in the room whose accomplishments on behalf of the nation are not only outstanding for the security of the country, but in their own right they act as an inspiration for those who follow the Soldier—Statesman—Diplomat path. It takes a special type to work in this regard.

Let me go back to the point about “since July of this year” Some organization called WikiLeaks decided to post some things on the web and within a couple of days I ended up assuming the role of Director of the WikiLeaks Information Review Task Force for the Department of Defense. It has changed my daily habits. Before that day, you know, I thought I was fully employed. I had all the attaches. I had Defense HUMINT, Defense CI and Defense Cover. I had a pretty healthy volume of work to do, and I did not realize I was underemployed. I found room for multiple VTCs a day and multiple briefings in the Pentagon per day. I had meetings with the Secretary of Defense. Since then I’ve learned that I had more time than I realized. And I think I would still recognize my wife, but I’m not sure right now.

Let me tell you, if you visit the Task Force you would quickly realize that we are very much in a Joint environment, and we are very much in an interagency environment because the data that is out there is not all Department of Defense data. And, here is where I’ve got a problem, it’s not multi-national. And so I will tell you that is a huge “oops” that I cannot fix right now, and I cannot fix it because of what we don’t know is still out there. So, consequently, that’s where the international engagement, the diplomats, the attaches come in and help me. Very much, my multi-national link is through my FAOs, through my attaches, and through those of us in the Intelligence community who are out there doing international engagement. Similar to the excellent counsel the Colonel (Espinas) gave to the graduating class, the key to the success in this endeavor is an ability to draw from knowledge, experience and judgment to be able to provide senior decision-makers with informed advice, analysis, and recommendations on what to do with the WikiLeaks release. Does anybody know where the play book is for this one? It is not in the TTP.

Folks, there are over 500,000 classified documents on the web today, and he’s not done. And he’s got at least, from the key source we know of, another quarter of a million documents that he has at his disposal to play with. I thought I’d be out of business by
Christmas, but I’m not sure when I will be out of business now.

As a Foreign Area Officer, you may immediately appreciate the complexity and the difficulties of the compromise, but consider for a moment your thoughts and actions in the light that, maybe, we have a moral responsibility to notify and protect folks that may be harmed by these messages being out there. You've got to understand that when Battalion Commander “Marisa” or Squadron Commander “Carr”, or Ambassador “so-and-so” wrote and put secret on that message, it was never intended to meet scrutiny on the World Wide Web. It was never intended to be discovered by our adversaries.

So ponder for a moment your reaction and attempt to mitigate the impact of these disclosures, and the impact it might have on our close friendly forces---we're talking coalition warfare. Or special partners whose actions and cooperation were formed by a sense of security which now may have been betrayed. Consider the effect on weak or newly established governments, where the potential for trouble making is greatest, the disclosure may hand aid to adversaries or critics --- or as Julian Assange said in his press engagement in the UAE the other day, he takes great pride in the fact that he's already brought at least two governments down by his efforts. Think about how you might notify allied or coalition government representatives that their heretofore closely-guarded involvement and government cooperation is about to be paraded across the international media, the internet, the blogosphere --- and the blogosphere is amazing on this. The media attention is persistent, and there is often little rationale to the understanding of their involvement out there in this. Consider how you might ensure that each and every coalition member, special partner or collaborator might be satisfied when you've delivered the explanation of the facts, and what do you say when a long-term trusted ally comes to your office and says “can I have any faith that I can still cooperate with confidence?” that it will not be on the front page or on the World Wide Web? So, from my standpoint, I could not bring them into the party. I still cannot bring them into the Task Force because of the quarter of a million documents that I think are still out there. So I'm Joint, I'm interagency, I'm well beyond DoD --- well, well, well beyond DoD. But I need the FAO diplomats to assist in getting us through this wicket with minimum loss of credibility. Credibility that ironically we've really earned in the last 10-15 years since the Balkans and in the last eight years of coalition warfare while working together with our partners. It's all potentially being exposed. So, the issue I talk about here goes well beyond the Beltway, well beyond the Task Force, and is a problem that I only wish was theoretical. But it is one tailor-made for FAOs, certainly the diplomatic piece of this, because I cannot tell you that I'm going to be able to tell them in advance of the release. I may know it, but I don't know if our system is fast enough to get all of the authorities to allow that disclosure and coordination. I can tell you this: from NATO's perspective, and from our 5-eyes, and from our German and French partners -- we get an “A” on Iraq and Afghanistan. We have met the mark with them and we shared the phenomenal work that some guys got through some 5000 documents and getting that out in an official way. But I think it is getting tougher. It is going to get tougher because what I was dealing with was tactical data so that we could make the decision within the Department. Some of these other decisions go well beyond the department, and it gets harder.

So, I still have a few more minutes, so I'm going to tell you a couple of stories. I'm going to embarrass somebody, or I'm going to give credit to somebody who’s in the room here and has been a great partner
in the past. Hey, I’ve been lucky. I’ve come across and I’ve been able to find success from a number of FAOs out there. A few years ago, when I was the J-2 at EUCOM, that was where I stopped you (Col Espinas) because I didn’t want you to go back further than that, I was fortunate enough to partner with, rely on, and find success with an amazing Lt Col attaché -- It’s not about you Matt, you see you thought it was about you ---- in Chad. So think about that, you can only imagine the paucity of intel resources available to maintain I&W on a rebel advance on Injamina in Chad in 2007. You’ve got multiple 4-stars out there yelling for I&W in a fight, and how much focus do you think you really have in Chad about a couple of rebels coming across from Sudan? But the real story here is not intel, although I will tell you that the guys on the ground, whether they be SOF or attaches, or whether they be the guys at JAC Molesworth enabling national systems, they got us the picture. The community as a whole was well served and it advanced our French relations like a rocket boost. It was amazing what we could do at that point with the French. The real story in my mind was how a young Lt Col attaché became the lone conduit to keep a COCOM commander informed. He became the right -arm of the US Ambassador who really had not had a whole lot of experience in this. He truly was thrust into a statesman’s role to find a safe landing and avoid the loss of life, while finding stability. This Lt Co. could have come out of there on multiple occasions … for a shower, for a break, for hot food; but at the end of the day, he knew his job was to stand next to the ambassador. He never left. He became the ambassador’s shadow throughout the entire thing. EUCOM never re-enforced him, we never sent anybody else into the fight; it was a diplomatic solution that was going to be worked. You might say I’m telling you the soldier’s story, but I think this really goes to the statesman point. This is the FAO that is a statesman.

So, I’m going to conclude with what I think is my soldier’s story. This is about a DATT in Tbilisi who happens to be sitting at this table right here. How many people really believed that the Russians were going to cross that border when they went into Georgia? Not in this day and age. They wouldn’t do it. The story was out there, the intel was out there --- the timing wasn’t precise --- but the data was there. The real story, though, was skin, it was not the intel. It was what the attaché soldier did once it happened because this one was unlike almost anything I’d ever seen. We quickly got comms in there, and the attaché in the embassy became the hub of a twice a day VTC that went from Tbilisi to Stuttgart, where the COCOM commander or his deputy took it. He took it typically once a day for most of the crisis, but it did not stop there. It ended up going to the Pentagon and the State Department, so on a daily basis the attaché forwarded the un-vetted, unrehearsed, “no script” story to the entire inter-agency simultaneously, and often with some (foreign) partners in the room … unrehearsed. Matt, did you ever rehearse? There was no script, there was no script from EUCOM, there were no rudder orders. This was “you tell the story and you bring the DoD picture to bare,” and he often cited and quoted the Ambassador, DCM and others. His contacts and relationships were mature and reliable.

He had phenomenal access to the Georgians and his knowledge of the region was at the doctoral level. The threat and the pressure were intense; I can remember on a Tuesday night, Matt, I, and the Chief of Station all had conversations and we weren’t sure if the Georgians were going to Tbilisi or not. They were stopped 12 miles out and we really didn’t have an answer, and families were still there. That was the soldier leader, and I’ll tell you that the Army did the right thing when they picked Colonel (P) Matt Brand to be an attaché and a general officer --- so Matt, congratulations to you. (Applause)

So, I only thought that my problems were theoretical, but I can tell you-- FAOs are soldiers, they are statesmen, they are diplomats --- ladies and gentlemen it is a distinction which I do not hold, but one that I know I take great pride in, to be part of that system in the job I’m in, and to be friends with many of you today. Thanks very much. I’ll take some questions or take some comments. (Applause)

**Question #1 – Views of the Senior Defense Official (SDO)/DATT Concept?**

**Answer #1 – Great question.** I think I have to answer that in about 3 or 4 different areas and maybe the bottom line up front is that the jury may still be out in terms of the final reports and assessments. But I’ll tell you from where I sit right now the indicators are positive in a number of regards. Now that does not mean that we’ve mastered it and we don’t need to tweak it anymore, but the indicators are very positive. Let me give you some examples: I think the State Department is very pleased that the Ambassador and his/her team no longer have to go and figure out who somebody within the DoD works for anymore. They’ve got a single point, they can go to the SDO/
DATT and that SDO/DATT has the authority to get transparency, visibility, and coordination with any other DoD asset that’s running around inside the country. That was a challenge and as we move through the GWOT phase with more SOF activities out there --- that was becoming an increasing challenge for the Ambassadors and the country team. I think we have gone a long way toward solving that, and State Department gives us credit for making that improvement.

The system inherited a lot of general officers as a result of bringing in a number of Security Assistance generals that were already out there in the system. Many of them were not comfortable at the start point, they had some trepidation as they were getting ready to assume new roles, and they were concerned about their own time management ability to accomplish the job. Some looked at it very openly and realized that their accesses might change as a result of this. Some were optimistic and some were pessimistic. As it turns out, I think we are probably 80/20 with a positive view out there by the general officers that, whether they are doing Security Assistance or Intelligence, their access within the country has improved in a positive light and from an intel standpoint our access to information has definitely improved in a positive light. So that’s a good thing.

Where I think we still have some challenges is that we haven’t right-sized the various Defense Attachés to account for both mission sets. We’ve got some embassies out there that are doing a little too much security assistance with a little too much intel. I have to be careful --- don’t hold that to me. This may be the point where we have to turn that tape recorder off. (Laughter) It is a concern and we’re working it, but it is a legitimate concern because we’re crossing funding lines and we need to make sure we stay correct there. Otherwise, I think it’s working pretty well right now.

**Question #2 – Assessment of the future of the Civilian FAO Program?**

**Answer #2** - I’m not sure I’m current on that, to tell you the truth. I don’t have anything working on it right now to make any major changes. I think I’ve got some civilians out there right now doing Attaché-like functions. It’s not overly robust but there are a few of them out there. From where I sit, I’m probably not in the daily management of it, but none of them have set off any fire alarms at this point --- none of them have gotten in trouble. But I think maybe the effectiveness and how other people perceive them--- we may still need to look at the down the road, so I think there still may be some open discussion about that in the future.

**Question #3 – Based on your experience managing attaches, what is your experience of FAOs as attachés vs. attachés from the operational fields, particularly with an intelligence background mix. What is the right balance of FAO vs. non-FAO attaches we need to strike?**

**Answer #3** – That’s a great question. I think we need to be careful about putting everyone in the same bucket. There are first-tour attaches out there that are phenomenal, and if you would look at their background, you might not have come to that conclusion at the beginning. But they go into large embassies where there is a significant management challenge and there is a significant opportunity to engage with our host nation and others, and some folks just have a knack for it. They are writers, they are articulate. They are smart. And even though they have not had the experience for 5-6 years, they listened well during their lessons, they got it, and they are doing some great jobs. So I would never want to necessarily assume that someone coming in for the first time isn’t capable of playing at a world class level, because they are. But the percentage and the chances of getting the right person at the right spot when a crisis hits are greatly enhanced by some earlier tours. You don’t want an armored brigade commander who spent his career firing cannons… you really need some experience. We have had some who have come in the first time who have not done as well, but we can work our way through that. I think it behooves us as a department, and it behooves us as a nation, to spend a little more time so that the O-6’s that are going out there get a chance as an O-4 and O-5 to go out to the country teams, and I think that in the long-term that will pay us great benefits. One case does not fit all.

**Question #4 – What skills do FAOs bring to the fight? The relevance of FAOs volunteering for the current fight in the Middle East ... coming from other AORs?**

**Answer #4** – There are really two points there. The real question is “what do FAOs bring to the fight?” There is a broad set of tools FAOs bring to the fight. FAOs are already involved with developing armies around the world and coalition partnership building and such, so your mental approach to the problem set is probably already in the right domain. You’ve
already got a leg-up on a lot of people on that regards. The ISAF environment is not all kinetic. Yes, there are a lot of kinetics to it, but it is not all kinetic. A lot of it has to do with getting the right relationships among people and figuring out the non-kinetic aspects of the battlefield. Somebody with some attaché experience and attaché training is already in that mode. When you go into an embassy and work with a country team you are not purely thinking kinetics and military. You have got to figure out how to balance and bring in the Department of Agriculture, the FBI and everybody else who is part of that country team. So if you are out there advising a brigade commander as part of a BCT, as the Foreign Area Officer, you are probably going to be the single person that is most creative to help the commander in being able to build a Joint / interagency team as he tries to take control of that province or that area of the battle space that he’s got. In PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), folks that have had FAO backgrounds have done phenomenal. In that case, it is definitely not all combat operations; it’s about getting the “whole-of-government” approach out there to build what we need to get inside the Afghans. So, I think you can come up with all kinds of goodness as to why attaches can contribute in that environment. Now, from my standpoint, and you guys know this better than I do, but a particular embassy may not have a lot of depth in the attaché office. Some are only manned with 3-4 bodies, some a little larger, so if I were to “open the can” and allow them to head down-range at their will, then I might have a real challenge. I was told it was locked-down tight. Steve, help me out here, maybe 4-6 months ago I unlocked the box and I put a governor on it. I unlocked the box and I said that the guys can look in, to see what’s inside the box. And the guys inside the box can look out and raise their hand. Then, we’ll have a discussion. If the country team thinks that this might be of value, then that’s a check block. If I think that it’s good for the Soldier, Airman or Marine’s career, then that’s a check block. If it fits into the PCS, family, and other DATT PCSs, then the DATT will check that block --- so we have allowed a couple to squeak out, but there have not been many. There are some that truly want to go, and we’re trying to give them that opportunity. So we’ve had a couple go, but not a whole lot. Precise application there.

Anything else? Well folks, thanks a whole lot. I appreciate the time. (End of presentation)

NOTE: Following General Carr's commentary, COL Espinas presented General Carr with the coveted FAOA Medallion … “and that’s no small matter”.

Our Policy Luncheon is – 10 Feb 11
At the Fort McNair Officer’s Club
With Dr. Soner Cagaptay (PhD)

Dr. Cagaptay serves The Washington Institute for Near East Policy as its Turkish Research Program Director. He is an accomplished and influential author writing about evolving events within Turkey, political Islam and their impacts on internal, bilateral, regional and global security issues.

He is a valued contributor to FAOA’s professional journal International Affairs and his recent products can be accessed at www.cagaptay.com and on the Institute’s website, at www.washingtoninstitute.org.

We look forward to Dr. Cagaptay's commentary on current political developments within Turkey, its influence within both Europe and the Muslim world, and the implications of these developments for the long-term US-Turk security relationship.

More information and to register online — www.FAOA.org
The historic referendum vote on independence in South Sudan, which took place from January 7th-15th, 2011, is expected to lead to the creation of the world’s newest nation, an independent South Sudan (this article will treat North and South Sudan as separate nations). The separation of North and South represents a fresh start for both nations and a favorable foreign policy situation for the U.S. Even before its independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1956, war wracked the Sudan. From 1955 to 1972 and again from 1983 to 2005, two violent North-South civil wars raged in the country. Then, just as the Second Civil War had come to a close, the Darfur Conflict began in 2006. This conflict pitted rebels angered over being marginalized by the Sudanese Government in Khartoum against government forces and the Janjaweed Arab militia. The decades of fighting brought great economic hardship and terrible humanitarian conditions to the country. The outlook for the future of war-torn and poverty-stricken Sudan, however, contains immense promise. Sudan will soon be an important player on the world stage. Despite its years of war and desperate levels of poverty, the soon to be North and South Sudans will both be prime targets of international attention, owing to their locations and resources. The U.S. foreign policy with regard to Sudan should consider a three-part approach to U.S.-Sudan relations. First, the U.S. should consider providing humanitarian aid and security assistance to both countries, especially the extremely poor South, in order to bring stability to the region. Second, the U.S. should foster an enduring relationship with both Sudans, while respecting the sovereignty of both countries, in order to secure the cooperation of their respective governments and gain fair access to valuable resources. Finally, the U.S. should quickly move to check nations with anti-U.S. interests from establishing strong ties with Sudan, thereby maintaining Sudan as a buffer against the advancement of religious radicalism and preserving favorable U.S.-Sudan relations.

The first objective of U.S. relations with the two Sudans should focus on bringing the countries out of their deep poverty and promoting the security and survivability of both states. The supply of basic humanitarian aid can be accomplished through several means. The first option is direct U.S. government aid sent to the Sudanese people. The U.S. has been involved in humanitarian relief efforts in Darfur for some time. This aid must now extend to the desperately poor South.

Current United Nations figures estimate that 90% of the population of South Sudan is living below the international poverty line (U.S. $1.00 per day). It would be impossible for a nation to make real progress while such a huge portion of its population is living a day to day existence. The North’s figures are only slightly better, with 70% of the population below the poverty line. In direct aid distribution, the U.S. should first focus on the South, as it is the least well equipped to deal with its internal situation. In addition to its direct aid, the U.S. should encourage non-government organizations (NGO’s) to take an active role in improving the quality of life in both Sudans and in repatriating the United Nations estimated two million displaced persons. Long term solutions to humanitarian issues also need to be implemented to ensure that neither country slips into decline when the international aid inevitably begins to slow. It is critical to any further U.S. actions in Sudan that the desperate humanitarian situation be alleviated. Poverty breeds unrest and violence, creating a cycle of death and destruction in which a profitable strategic relationship
with a country is impossible. Any U.S. involvement in Sudan must first address the poverty issue.

Closely related to humanitarian conditions, security is a necessity for a nation to function with any degree of efficiency. During the referendum on independence, Southern Sudanese security forces kept incidents of violence to a fairly low number, with only about 40 known fatalities from fighting during the referendum week. There is no guarantee, however, that this trend will continue. Both countries contain an alarming number of armed militias and rebel groups, all still intent on fighting. At this point, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to remain out of an active role in the peacekeeping effort. Given the widely unfavorable U.S. reputation in Africa and the nearby Middle East, new hostilities would likely be ignited if U.S. troops were introduced into Sudan in a peacekeeping role. Instead, the U.S. should support the already present peacekeeping missions, under the control of the United Nations and African Union. The U.S. should consider furnishing military and financial support to both organizations up to the point of deploying troops, an action from which it should refrain. The presence of the UN and AU should prove to be enough to quell any outright attacks on the new government of South Sudan. In the North, the U.S. faces a separate issue.

The presidency of Omar Al-Bashir in the North complicates matters for the U.S., especially as it relates to security. Coming to power in a military coup in 1989, Bashir is a dictator. He is wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity committed by his government in the Darfur region of Sudan. He is also a Muslim and has instituted Sharia (Islamic) Law in Northern Sudan. The main threat to the security of the North from a U.S. perspective is that it will become increasingly Islamic in its sentiments and become a safe haven for terrorists and radicals. So far, Bashir has not shown any sort of radical tendencies and has actually gone to some lengths to ensure his country remains free of Islamic extremists, an example being the government review of all sermons that are to be delivered in mosques. Islamic fundamentalists in North Sudan have, however, made it known that they are displeased with the independence referendum in the South and the split of the two countries. Despite Bashir's seemingly moderate stance, these independent groups have the possibility to inflame tensions in the North. In a region that is prone to coups and rapid destabilization of governments, a fractured and violent Northern Sudan is a very real possibility. The breakaway of the South could be the spark to initiate such unrest. Many Arab and Islamist groups are claiming that separation would come at much too high a cost to the North. If these groups attempt to take matters into their own hands, it would not only destabilize the North, but would also pose a major threat to the survival of the South. The U.S. is faced with a dilemma: support the ICC-wanted Bashir in his pursuit of moderation, or refuse to help and hope the North does not descend into chaos. Given the alternatives, it seems that maintaining the status quo in the North is the most direct path to the safety of both Sudans and the overall stability of the region. These steps by the U.S. would demonstrate its concern for the safety of the Sudanese people and

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governments, while also displaying a respect for the sovereignty of both nations.

Once the humanitarian conditions have been advanced and a steady state of security has been established by the Sudanese and international forces, the U.S. can implement phase two of the U.S.-Sudan relations plan. Whereas the first part of the policy involved one-way U.S. aid to Sudan, this stage rests on a mutually beneficial relationship between all three nations: North, South, and U.S.

One of the first tasks that will offer an opportunity for U.S.-Sudan cooperation will be the development of infrastructure. Infrastructure in South Sudan is practically non-existent, with some estimating the total mileage of paved roads in the South, which is about the size of France, to be approximately 30 miles. Investing in and aiding South Sudan in its attempt to establish a more modern and connected society is critical for the continued stability of the new nation. Projects such as road construction ought to be headed by the Sudanese themselves, with the U.S. maintaining a more supportive role. But in return for this support, the U.S. should seek favorable trade climates and access to wanted resources, specifically, oil.

Sudan is home to substantial oil reserves. Approximately 75% of these deposits are located in the South. As of yet, the U.S. has been only lightly involved in the Sudanese oil business. With U.S. aid and support coming into the country, however, the U.S. would be in a strong position to negotiate a favorable deal for Sudanese oil. Such an agreement could help all three nations. The South would benefit from having a steady consumer of its oil, bringing in desperately needed income and creating jobs. The North, home to the oil pipeline to the coast, would also stand to benefit from a U.S. oil deal, as it would receive transport fees. The U.S. would be supplied with a steady flow of oil that is outside the volatile Middle East, lessening that region’s strangle-hold on U.S. energy needs.

Strong, bilateral economic ties between the U.S. and each of the Sudans could greatly enhance the U.S. image in the region. The U.S. must engage in a steady course of “partner-building.” It should avoid any appearance or public perception of a “nation-building” relationship with Sudan. Such a course of action would only cause the U.S. image in Africa and the Middle East to deteriorate further, and could endanger future U.S.-Sudan relations. Rather, the U.S. should choose a road of cooperation and equality with both. Even bordering on a colonial image could be disastrous to U.S. policy. To ensure a continued, beneficial relationship with North and South Sudan and as a means of fostering a favorable opinion of the U.S. in the region, the U.S. should steadily pursue a “partner-building” relationship with the two nations, especially the South.

The final component of the U.S. policy on Sudan should include measures to block nations with anti-U.S. agendas from gaining the same access to North and South Sudan that the U.S. has built up to this point. In terms of economics and national security, the U.S. stands to lose much in Sudan if an unfriendly power manages to gain a strong relationship with either African nation. To maintain the strategic gains made by the implementation of the

Quotable Quotes …

“The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is trying to fight a war without allies.”

Winston Churchill
previous two phases of the U.S.-Sudan relations plan, it is imperative that the U.S. jealously defend its cooperative relationship with both Sudans, to the exclusion of any foreign powers with a view to weakening the U.S. position.

The largest international player on the scene that could have a derogatory effect on the U.S. position in Sudan is China. Already with well over $20 billion invested in Sudanese oil, the Chinese are also very interested in establishing a healthy cooperation between Beijing and the new nation. Chinese demand for oil in 2007 was over 7.5 million barrels a day, with demand expected to increase at least one million barrels every three years. The Sudanese oil fields provide a very attractive target for supplying China’s growing oil needs. The U.S. should attempt to gain and maintain the position of Sudan’s majority buyer of crude oil. This position would give the U.S. a stronger say in Sudanese oil dealings, thereby allowing the U.S. to check the growing appetite of China. With China likely to pursue its Sudanese oil interests very quickly to account for its growing demand, the U.S. should act swiftly in making moves to counter such actions.

The Islamic Republic of Iran also has a great degree of interest in Sudan’s future, particularly the North. Both countries have signed mutual defense treaties in the past, and Iran has even trained elements of the Sudanese Army. Trade between the two nations is also very high, topping $43 million in 2006. In a public showing of disdain for international pressure, Northern Sudan has issued statements saying it stands by Iran in its nuclear ambitions. In return for North Sudan’s show of support, Iran has publicly denounced the ICC charges against President Omar Bashir. It is clear that Iran has placed great emphasis on growing a close relationship with northern Sudan. An Iran-influenced north Sudan would be very dangerous to U.S. interests not only in Southern Sudan, but throughout the entire region. As yet, it seems Iran has been unsuccessful in radicalizing Bashir or stirring the country to strong anti-U.S. feelings, but such actions are acutely possible. The U.S. should make it known to the north that they stand to benefit from increased U.S. support if the North discontinues its cooperation with Iran. Any sort of continued cooperation between Northern Sudan and Iran would preclude the possibility of a strong U.S. relationship with the north.

Sudanese-U.S. relations are a complicated and complex matter even in their most elemental form. There is no easy solution. Each step will have unforeseen consequences that will influence steps planned for the future. This maze of unseen problems could necessitate shifts in U.S. focus, hampering the progress of U.S.-Sudan relations. If the U.S. can adhere to some semblance of a three-part plan in its dealings with both new nations, however, a workable relationship could very well be formed. Aid and recovery should be placed first, allowing the South to establish itself as an independent nation and the north to adjust to operations without the now independent south as part of the country. After the humanitarian conditions are met, the U.S. can begin to see the benefits of a robust cooperation with South Sudan in the form of favorable business practices and oil imports. An alliance between the two countries should be encouraged in order to secure the U.S.’s economic and national security interests. Finally, the U.S. should guard, albeit through peaceful means, its position in Sudan against foreign interests, such as those of China and Iran. With these steps in place, the U.S. could expect to see a strong, mutually beneficial relationship develop between the U.S. and Sudan and the new Southern Sudan.

About the Author:
Mr. Christian Burne recently served as an International Affairs “winter intern” within the International Affairs Directorate, Air Combat Command (ACC/POLAD) Langley Air Force Base, VA.

Christian has now returned to the University of Scranton, PA, to resume his studies in Political Science and International Studies.
To the soldiers serving as foreign area officers in our Army:

In today’s environment, you play a critical role in the accomplishment of our Army’s mission. But we, the Army, could do better to ensure that you have all the tools and skills you need to do the best job you can.

We have not sufficiently leveraged your experiences and expertise in the Army, from its service institutions to the boots on the ground doing hard work for our nation. We have isolated you much too often outside the mainstream of our Officer Corps, despite the fact that your role is absolutely essential to our daily pursuit of our national security interests. We have sent you and your families to difficult and austere locations with limited access to quality-of-life services. We have not established true senior leader ownership and oversight of your community. We do not have nearly enough of you to fill all the requirements of the geographic combatant commanders, at all levels.

The applicants are many, but we have not done enough to bring in more highly talented and motivated soldiers such as you. Hence we have not provided you with the appropriate and adequate military education; nor have we guided you on sensible career progression, thus placing you on the path to early retirement or prematurely leaving the service. We must fix this. And we will.

As one who also carries the functional area (FA) 48 banner—and having worked in security assistance at several embassy posts and as the former deputy commander of U.S. European Command and current commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)—I know firsthand the tremendous contributions you make in helping the United States pursue its national security objectives.

Foreign area officers (FAOs) were on the front lines in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, listening and learning from our new partners who desired to break with the past and integrate with the West. In many cases, Army FAOs were the primary boots on the ground, working within the U.S. Embassies to establish and develop important strategic relationships with military leaders, some of whom were apprehensive and needed time to change deeply held attitudes towards us. Your predecessors did the right thing, exercised patience and sustained the long-term view. The results would not be seen for a decade, but they would come. Some of our staunchest supporters, such as Poland, who stood by us during Operation Iraqi Freedom, did so in part because of the groundwork of Army FAOs.

Today, as Africa has grown in strategic importance to the US, Army FAOs are once again doing the hard work on the ground to build the same types of relationships. The purposes are different, as many African nations are seeking to remove the vestiges of post-independence strife and establish good governance, effective institutions, and a security sector that confronts an array of nonconventional threats including violent extremism, poverty and environmental degradation. Yet the approach is the same, sustaining a long-term view that fosters the development of needed security capacity over time, while helping partner-nations sustain sufficient stability and freedom from violence to allow progress. In many of these nations, FAOs are the only boots on the ground, the joint commander’s only eyes and ears inside our country teams, and the U.S. ambassador’s link to host nation militaries and combatant commands.

Yet every strategic and operational plan, security assistance activity and mission in the partner-nation has an FAO thumbprint on it, either as the primary in-country subject-matter expert or as the liaison to the ambassador working to gain concurrence and approval. FAOs serving in combatant command headquarters, The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are equally important—they lend expertise, experience and sometimes a necessary degree of sanity to the development of plans and
operations. There is no other way to put it: You are a vital part of the team.

So what do we need to change, and why? First and foremost, the very definition of an FAO (functional area 48), as described in the current Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, is out of date. The purpose is right: "Army Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers who are regionally focused experts in political military operations with advanced language skills, cultural understanding and the ability to advise senior military and civilian strategic decision-makers in an era of persistent conflict." But the following functions are incomplete:

Advising senior military and civilian leaders as political-military officers. Engage foreign military leaders, personnel and government officials to help build partnership capacity and facilitate foreign military training and exercises. Train future leaders as instructors at U.S. service academies and schools as well as international military schools.

These functions reflect an outmoded focus on security assistance programs, defined as foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), and international military education and training. The primary roles that FAOs traditionally played were related to FMS and FMF in the partner-nations' portfolios and provision of prospective future partner military leaders to attend U.S. military schools. This demand-driven approach meant that distribution of FAOs was prioritized according to the largest portfolios.

DA Pamphlet 600-3 acknowledges that FAOs are "often the sole Army and/or Department of Defense representatives in foreign countries," which means the functional portfolio must be expanded to include all that provides added value to the geographic combatant commands-building relationships, establishing strategic and operational planning, coordinating access to host-nation facilities to support U.S. military operations, and serving as liaison officers to deployed U.S. forces in country. This approach works.

There have been several instances in Africa when major or lieutenant colonel attachés working alone within an embassy have greatly advanced our relationships with partner militaries through their language skills, cultural immersion and social acuity. The best are often embraced as one of the members of the partner military and are sometimes granted special honors as they depart. Then there is the problem of utilization within DoD after serving in an embassy.

The majority of jobs are at agency level, such as in the policy division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense or in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. You can add far greater value on the Joint Staff as a regional expert among any of the J codes, even J-8. Or you should have more opportunities to lead divisions in combatant commands or Army major commands where your foreign area expertise is highly valued and critical to the mission. Agency jobs are interesting, but they do not offer you the same opportunities to make an impact on our Army and on the joint environment.

Equally important, agency jobs may limit your exposure and thus opportunities for advancement to general officer level. Leadership jobs will get you there, and we need more FAOs to compete for general officer. We need experienced (also accrued from time in military formations) FAOs running our largest security assistance organizations such as those in Egypt, the Middle East and elsewhere. We need FAOs who understand well how the Army and joint commands run, who know how to articulate and develop programs and activities that help our partners reach their security goals.

The second thing we need to change is how you have become far too isolated from the rest of the Army without sufficient ownership and oversight. It is not that the functional area is placed in the separate operational support career field along with acquisition (FA 51) as some have alleged; it is that, because you are operating in distant locations with limited direct contact with the Army, you are too easily "out of sight and out of mind." I saw this firsthand when I served...
as the chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Egypt. This security assistance office was of good size and served a critically important mission for our nation, developing the security capacity of a crucial Middle East partner. I had several Army FAOs serving in my organization. While they enjoyed their jobs and felt like they were making a difference, they could not help but feel that their careers had been sidelined. Some questioned the wisdom of pursuing the field-not unusual given that most were junior field grades facing key career- decision points. No one at the Army or joint levels established senior leader ownership, oversight and vision. As their chief, I mentored them, but never enough given my brief 20-month tour.

When I assumed command of U.S. Africa Command, I took full stewardship of the 48J (Sub-Saharan Africa) community and the 48Gs working North African issues. I endeavored to monitor the movement of these officers through jobs on the country teams and in the AFRICOM headquarters to establish stability and a sense of progression. But this cannot nor should it be done by the combatant commanders alone, and the service component commands only have limited ability to help. Ultimately, Big Army needs to do this for the totality of the FAO community.

The third thing we need to do better is to standardize your entry-level orientation. A key phrase in DA Pamphlet 600-3 describes FAOs as “regionally focused experts in political military operations with advanced language skills [and] cultural understanding." Yet your training, education and cultural awareness are not standardized, even for FAOs working together in an embassy. For example, if you are assigned as an attaché, your training is managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, while security assistance officers are managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. These represent two completely different standards—one provides adequate language training, and the other does not. One provides defensive driving skills training - vital in some nations- and the other does not. These inconsistencies are confusing and frustrating to our partners in the country teams, and they hamper the mission. We need to rethink this. All FAOs should have a common set of required skills in order to operate in a foreign country. This should not be driven by agencies and funding streams, but by the mission.

The fourth thing is to do more to utilize the skills and expertise of FAOs within the total force. We need more FAOs embedded among our doctrine writers, schoolhouses, and operations and exercise planners. We also need a better process for collecting, archiving and disseminating corporate knowledge about foreign societies for operational use. We should institute a new program or military occupational specialty series for foreign area noncommissioned officers. We are increasingly finding that NCOs are performing important FAO-like work in key partner nations. We need to offer them the same quality training, education and career management as commissioned officers so that they can be just as effective. We can correct all of this; we simply need to move forward and figure it out. In the meantime, this general greatly appreciates all the work you do in support of our nation. When I look at my service in U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command and other high-level headquarters, all accomplishments, achievements and relationships had the involvement of an FAO somewhere.

We simply can’t do our jobs without you. As a loyal member and customer of the FAO community, I thank you for your service under difficult conditions. Army Strong!

Editor’s Note:
This article “An Open Letter to FAOs” was written by General Ward for publication in AUSA’s Army Magazine, Jan 2011 and has been reprinted herein with their permission.

About the Author:
COL Thomas P. Galvin and LTC Laura Varhola contributed to this article.
Lieutenant General James A. Williams (USA, Ret) was honored on Sunday evening, December 5, for a lifetime of distinguished service to the nation, the Intelligence Community, the national security/foreign affairs community, and his family. A formal tribute dinner with nearly 200 guests was held at the McLean Hilton Hotel in Tysons Corner, VA. LTG Williams retired from active military service in 1985 after serving for four years as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington, DC. Since then, he has remained extremely active in national security and intelligence affairs, most notably serving for almost a quarter century as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), which organized the dinner along with the National Military Intelligence Foundation (NMIF) to benefit scholarships for military and civilian students in college intelligence studies programs. Williams received NMIA’s Lifetime Achievement Award and was elected the first ever Fellow of the NMIF.

The honoree was born in Paterson, NJ, and in 1954 was commissioned as an Air Defense Artillery officer from the United States Military Academy (USMA), only 30 miles from where he grew up in Allendale, NJ. He is married to the former Barbara Widnall of Saddle River, NJ. At the dinner LTG Williams was joined by his wife, daughter Karen, son Steve and his wife Nell, and two grandchildren. Following a rousing kickoff to the evening with patriotic and “Army Spirit” music provided by the Potomac Harmony Chorus, Williams was feted by scores of military and civilian colleagues, old friends, and officers who had been inspired by his legacy of excellence in intelligence, language, and foreign area specialty activities. The youthful Jim Williams first contributed to U.S. national security when, at the ripe old age of ten, he volunteered to be an aircraft spotter for the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Region during World War II. A mere 39 years later, he had risen to three stars and selection as one of the youngest officers to attain that rank, plus being the first USMA graduate to progress from lieutenant to lieutenant general in the military intelligence career field.

Among his notable intelligence assignments were several which took advantage of his foreign area specialty and Spanish language expertise, to include the 470th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment at Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone; the 470th CIC Detachment at Fort Brooke, Puerto Rico; the Defense Attaché Office in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was officially Assistant Army Attaché but became involved in a number of high-level, sensitive diplomatic activities; and Director of Political-Military
Affairs in the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. As a newly minted general officer, he was Director of Estimates at DIA, responsible for helping to write and oversee the preparation of numerous National Intelligence Estimates and regional assessments. Throughout his long military career, and ever since in a variety of roles, LTG Williams has unfailingly served as a role model and mentor for countless MI officers and FAOs, not just those serving in Latin America but all over the globe.

A large number of senior dignitaries were on hand for the dinner, some of whom were called to the podium to make remarks (see adjoining photo). Those who could not be present sent their best wishes in writing. Most notably, former President George H.W. Bush stated in a letter, “Barbara and I are checking in to add our personal congratulations and thanks as you are appropriately honored for your decades of service to our country. . . . The safeguarding of our way of life has depended on the vigilance, the bravery, and the dedication of our military and intelligence personnel. . . . You have unselfishly answered the call to duty, serving with resolve and dedication to the principles upon which this Nation was founded, and this former Commander in Chief salutes you for your readiness to meet the challenge of defending our freedom. I also thank all your family for the sacrifices they made on behalf of our country.”

Army General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and head of the newly established U.S. Cyber Command, asserted, “As the Association’s longest-serving Board Chairman and the Foundation’s first fellow, you have dedicated yourself to promoting the professional development and recognition of our men and women in uniform. You have strived to ensure that the defense and intelligence communities have a well-trained, well-equipped, and ready cadre of military professionals to serve the nation. . . . You are an exemplary leader and inspirational mentor.”

Ms. Letitia Long, Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and former DIA Deputy Director, observed: “Your leadership continues to be felt following your retirement from active duty, most notably through your contributions to the evolution of imagery collection management and your continued influence on the civil remote sensing program. In addition, you have had an enduring impact on the Army Unmanned Vehicle Program . . . Thank you for your leadership, mentorship, and service. Your contributions will have a lasting impact on our community.”

Fellow former DIA Directors Ed Soyster and Pat Hughes served as honorary co-chairs for the event. The two retired 3-stars entertained the audience with their personal and insightful remarks about the honoree and praised his richly intriguing military career. LTG Soyster lauded LTG Williams for having been selected the first Honorary Colonel of the Military Intelligence Corps and a Distinguished Member and Charter Member of the MI Hall of Fame, not to mention the Attaché Hall of Fame at DIA. He also was the first West Point graduate to join MI Branch and become a lieutenant general via that path.

Quotable Quotes …

Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn’t mean politics won’t take an interest in you!

Pericles (430 B.C.)
LTG Hughes called LTG Williams “perhaps the example of the quintessential military renaissance man—good citizen and good student, committed patriot, West Point graduate, military officer, husband, father, combat veteran from the Vietnam War, commander, diplomat, Attaché, mentor, role model, advisor, theorist, developer of ideas and doctrine, general officer, businessman, consultant, business owner, and iconic personality. We are lucky to have him—and we can all wish we had more like him… In the best traditions of Ralph Van Deman, Edward Sibert, William Friedman, Oscar Koch, Hal Aaron, Bill Roya, Ed Thompson, and Tom Weinstein, you can add the name Jim Williams to the fabric of the history of U.S. Army Intelligence…”

The current DIA Director, Army LTG Ronald Burgess, commended LTG Williams for his many contributions to the Agency since retiring as Director. In particular, Burgess cited Williams’ work on counterintelligence and human intelligence transformation along with his unswerving promotion of the National Defense Intelligence College, for which he served on its Board of Visitors for the past 15 years and actively oversaw the development of its research program and a major curriculum overhaul. In all, there were four present or former DIA Directors at the dinner, along with a former NSA Director, retired Air Force Lt Gen Linc Faurer.

In honoring this remarkable man, the NMIA citation proclaimed: “Lifetime Achievement Award is hereby presented to Lieutenant General James A. Williams, United States Army (Retired), for his lifetime of service and support to our nation as well as those who served with him who were the beneficiaries of his continuing leadership, his abiding compassion, and his exceptional example. Duty—Honor—Country. Active duty, 1954-1985. Chairman of the Board, NMIA, 1986 to Present. ‘Always Out Front.’ Presented by the National Military Intelligence Association, December 5, 2010.”

In addition to being honored for lifelong achievements, the NMIF elected LTG Williams its first Fellow of the Foundation. The citation reads, in part: “…Throughout his more than 56 years of service to the nation, General Williams’ contributions enhanced the capabilities of all intelligence entities in support of our national security objectives. As a Founding Director of the National Military Intelligence Foundation he constructed the Foundation’s program of public recognition and awareness of military intelligence disciplines and scholarship support for the next generation of intelligence practitioners. His leadership, mentorship, and unflagging devotion to the military intelligence profession provide the model to which all intelligence practitioners should aspire…"

Joining LTG Williams in celebrating these honors were numerous former DIA co-workers, NMIA members, FAOA members, and corporate representatives of the defense industry. Several highly accomplished colleagues were in attendance, to include Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former US Representative to the UN and envoy to six separate countries spread around the globe, who worked with Williams at the State Department; Donald Kerr, former Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence; and Vice Admiral Robert Murrett, former Director of NGA and former Director of Naval Intelligence. LTG Williams acknowledged all the plaudits received with brief but humble remarks, extolling the teamwork from which his career benefited and the camaraderie he had experienced. He gave special kudos to his wife who had accompanied him on this long journey and helped him reach his goals. It was truly a memorable evening for all who participated.

About the Author:
COL (USA, Ret) William Spracher serves as editor, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College, and the NDIC Press. A career MI officer and Latin America FAO, he was DATT/ARMA to Colombia (1995-98) and ARMA to Peru (1994-95), served as Div Chief in SOUTHCOM J2 and senior LATAM analyst for the Army DCSINT. He is a charter member of the FAO Association and in his spare time edits the NMIA’s American Intelligence Journal.
No issue divides the Muslim world more than the rift between Shiites and Sunnis. Although this long-standing divide has evolved to transcend culture, politics and the theology of religion itself the basis for the conflict is seemingly simple. The core issue has been oversimplified to the question of successor-ship of Ali and his line: Hassan and Hussein. Further investigation into the background circumstance of succession of the Prophet and maneuvers for power behind the scene show the complexity of the situation leading to the eventual rift. This paper will investigate Ali's eventual break with orthodoxy and, in particular, the two key women involved with the issue: Fatima and Aisha. Furthermore, Fatima and Aisha, the two female characters on each side of the conflict, are each revered by their respective sects as the ideal form of womanhood.

Ali Abu Talib was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet and, arguably, the second convert to Islam at the age of 10 after only Khadidja. Ali grew up in the house of the Prophet because his family had fallen on hard times. Over time he became very close to the Prophet as is even credited with taking the place of the Prophet as a decoy to delay assassins as Mohammad fled to Medina expanding Mohammed's trust in him.

Although both Uthman and Abu Bakr proposed marriage with Fatima, Muhammad's favorite daughter, Mohammad refused their offers. He said that he was waiting for God to make it right. Shortly there after the Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Medina, Ali married Fatima. At the time Ali was 25 and Fatima was between 15 and 21. That union provided Mohammad with the male heirs he could provide himself: Hassan and Hussein. Every source states that the Prophet adored his grandchildren.

The conflict over successor to the Prophet started immediately after his death. Some reports paint Ali as a meek hero who attended to the body of the Prophet while others were grabbing what they could. Other reports have Ali center stage in the struggle for power. The two real successor candidates were Ali and Abu Bakr. Although most reports have Ali bowing-out gracefully in support of Abu Bakr in order to prevent discord in the community, there were other factors involved. Most importantly, Arabs of the region routinely select leaders that are older, regardless of their experience or familial connections. At the time of the death of the Prophet Abu Bakr was almost twice Ali’s age, who was only 30, so Ali was simply too young to lead the fledgling nation.

With the election of Abu Bakr as the first Caliph, Ali continued his protests. Over the following six months Ali’s core followers cast their support to the new Caliph but Ali held out. Some reports state that Abu Bakr and Umar came to Ali’s house immediately after his election in order to have the family of the Prophet swear their allegiance to him. Ali greeted them with sword drawn. Umar disarmed Ali, and only Fatima’s screaming saved Ali’s life. Other stories state that Abu Bakr and Umar were to set fire to Ali and Fatima’s house. Either way, their relationship was off to a rocky start.

The real issue between the warring sides was Fatima’s inheritance. Fatima claimed lands held by her father but Abu Bakr was attempting to disinherit her because the prophet was attributed with saying “Prophets have not heirs.” The question breaks down to what the Prophet meant by that: it appears logical that the intent was to state that his power as a prophet could not be passed to a successor who would, therefore, also become a prophet.

Within one year of the death of the Prophet, Fatima was dead too. Although we know she died at home --- though the exact cause of her death is lost to history.

Ali resisted the Abu Bakr and Uthman on issues of money, land distribution, and most importantly on issues of religious practice. Ali accused Abu Bakr of Bida (innovation, which equates to heresy) in that Abu Bakr was changing small religious practices and attributing those changes to the Quran or Sunna when they did not previously exist. Ali remained a troublesome thorn in the side of Abu Bakr until his death. On one occasion Abu Bakr banished some key citizens of Mecca for causing trouble. In defiance of Abu Bakr’s orders, Ali took his
entire family to the city’s wall to see off his expelled friends.

During the reign of Uthman, Ali passively (at least) supported multiple coup attempts. On one occasion Egyptian rebels set siege to the Capitol City and openly requested that Ali take command of their number. Ali refused their offer but offered no support for his besieged caliph either. As with Abu Bakr’s reign, Ali continually accused Uthman of misdeeds and criticized his policies. The growing coffers of the new nation particularly troubled Ali.

When Uthman was eventually assassinated and Ali was elected as his successor as Caliph. Although there is not direct evidence showing Ali’s complicity in Uthman’s assassination, rumors and accusations still abound. Particularly damning is the fact that the partisan assassins were closely associated with Ali and more importantly, after his election as Caliph; Ali did nothing to punish them for the murder. Ali’s first significant action as Caliph was to empty the treasuries of all his major cities and divide the proceeds among the people. He also distributed state food stores and moved to redistribute lands, but was stopped by fear that squabbling over the land distribution could be serious enough to destroy the nation.

Next Ali moved to replace regional governors that were appointed by Uthman (and therefore would tend to be loyal to Uthman’s surviving family) with governors that would be loyal to him and his family. By now Egypt was functionally in revolt against him and Syria (whose governor was the cousin of Uthman) was in total rebellion: refusing to pay homage to the caliph at all. In the face of such open rebellion Ali had no choice but to form an army and put Syrian province back in line.

Ali did form an army and headed north to Syria but he never arrived. Enroute Ali received grave new. Aisha was out of the city when Uthman was killed and Ali was elected as the new caliph. When she returned to the city Aisha started an open campaign of propaganda directed at Ali. Four months later former Ali friends and supporters Talha and Al-Zubayr joined her. Aisha, Talha, and Al-Zubayr formed an army and headed northeast to Al-Irak — Iraq.

It was the news of this army that caused Ali to delay his military campaign in Syria in order to turn the armies were apparently bent of bloodshed. In December of 656CE, fighting started and the battle that followed became know in history as The Battle of the Camel. During the battle both Talha and Al-Zubayr were killed and Aisha was sent home under guard.

Aisha lived out the remainder of her life in Mecca abstaining from further political and military activity. Her opinion was valued but she took no active political role and opposed neither Ali nor Muawiya. Aisha died in July of 678.

Ali returned his attention to the rebellious Syrian governor, Muawiya. Ali opened negotiations with him but they were at loggerheads over one key issue. Muawiya wanted the murders of Uthman to be handed over for justice, or revenge, in accordance with Quranic law. The Quran states that unjust killing should be either punished or handed over to the family of the one killed for justice, or revenge. Muawiya believed that the killing of his uncle Uthman was unjust and wanted revenge. Ali protected the killers saying that the “people” killed him for his policies and un-Muslim conduct. It seems silly that a man trying to hold on to a country would risk it all to protect murderer’s therefore the student must at least suspect that Ali’s part in the assassination was greater than history was able to record.
Ali’s negotiations with Muawiya failed, Ali returned to the offensive and the two armies moved toward each other. The two ten thousand man armies met on the plain of Siffin in June of 657CE. For most of the months of June and July the two armies skirmished in small local daily battles. Even though the armies never met in full battle some sources give casualty totals as high as 70,000 total dead. The tide of battle is shifting toward Ali’s forces so Muawiya tried a new tactic.

Upon the advice of one of his men, Muawiya tied copies of the Quran to some of his lance tips. Though that might appear a sign of surrender it is actually a call invoking to the old Muslim custom of arbitration according to the Quran. Ali had little choice but to agree. As the armies dis-engaged, each chose arbitrators to represent its interests.

The key issue in the arbitration was the death of Uthman. If Uthman lived and ruled justly then his killing was unjust and Muawiya had a right to seek his revenge. If Uthman was an unjust ruler then his killing was just and Muawiya had no right of revenge. Muawiya would also own Ali his loyalty. More critically, if Muawiya won his case then Ali would likely lose this caliphate too.

The arbitrators concluded that Uthman had committed no wrong. That implication of that decision was that Ali lost the arbitration. Muawiya supporters rejoiced while Ali rebuked both arbitrators, and their decision, as against the Quran as he dismissed their decision. The men dis-engaged, each chose arbitrators to represent its interests.

Ali’s forces began to see widespread desertions as Muawiya’s forces gained strength. Ali’s forces met part of Muawiya’s forces at a place called Al-Nahrawan in July of 568CE, one year after the initial battles. Ali forces utterly destroyed the rebels in what became called a massacre. That “victory” led to further moral problems and desertions in Ali’s army. Ali’s tactical situation continued to deteriorate until he was forced to withdraw from the field.

Forced back into negotiation, the convention of arbitration continued. There are different versions of final decisions resulting from those negotiations. One called for the removal of both Ali and Muawiya, and the election of a new Caliph. Another version called only for Ali’s removal, and yet another version called for Amr to take control. The vague results of this convention could greatly contribute to today’s disputes over succession.

At any rate, Ali continued to be considered the Caliph even though he enjoyed no power in Mecca or Medina. Muawiya made attacks into the region in 569 but Ali was powerless to do anything about it.

Finally, when Ali was 62 or 63, a man seeking revenge for Ali’s attacks in Syria cut him with a poisoned sword outside of a mosque in Kufa. Some report this assassination was to be one part of a more complete revenge for the anarchy suffered by the Muslim nation. They report that assassins were to kill all three of the main players: Ali, Muawiya, and Amr. At any rate only Ali died.

Throughout Ali’s disputes with Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman his sons, Hassan and Hussein played no role in the political intrigue. Upon the death of Ali his son Hassan was to take the Caliphate but Hassan renounced the office in favor of Muawiya. It could never be as simple as that.

Initially Hassan supporters rallied to his side and called for his election as Caliph. At the same time Muawiya was massing his forces for campaign again. Hassan, at the head of a massive force, moved toward Iraq to face his foe as his father had. Nearing Mosul, Hassan sent a forward guard of over 12,000 men toward Muawiya. Shortly before what was shaping up to be a great battle, Hassan divided his forces by sending his radicals out on missions.

With them gone he started a speech to his remaining men. His wording told them that he had no intent of fighting and that he had intended conciliation the entire time. The men exploded in anger sacking Hassan’s tent and tearing the robes from his body. Hassan pleaded some of his loyal men, who aided in his escape from his own camp.

On the run from his own army, Hassan rode into a village where he was recognized by a villager who stabbed him in the leg. The village said that Hassan had turned into an infidel just like his father had. Hassan was now badly wounded and bleeding.
That day’s events led to widespread desertions. Negotiations between the two sides had been ongoing throughout the conflict, but now the cards were all in Muawiya’s hands. In the final agreement, Hassan did abdicate to Muawiya. In exchange Hassan would receive an annual payment of one million Darhams, a single payment of five million Darhams from the treasury of Kufa and the entire revenue from a district of Persia. Additionally he secured a seemingly small payment for his brother Hussein of a couple of million Darhams. Some claim that part of their agreement was that the Caliphate would return to Hassan upon the death of Muawiya, although no action appears to have been taken to that end.

Hassan was invited by Muawiya to participate in military actions against rebellious regional leaders, but he always declined. He stated that he had abdicated to Muawiya in order to bring peace to his people and he would not violate that peace again. Hassan later earned the name “the divorce’er” for the number of wives he went through. Hassan died around 670CE: Some claim under suspicious circumstances, of course. There are a variety of conspiracy stories associated with Hassan’s death; many involving his wives, Muawiya and poison.

Upon the death of Muawiya Hussein was called to pay homage to the new Caliph. Hussein and his companions justly feared for their lives. Many fled, but Hussein went to the palace and talked his way out of danger. Two days later he too made his escape from the city.

News of Muawiya’s death was welcome among the Shiite community so when Hussein arrived he was greeted warmly in towns like Kufa. Hussein was invited to Kufa to take control and lead them in revolt against the Caliph. Hussein was suspicious of a potential trap so he dispatched his close friend (named Muslim) to the city in order to scout the situation. Upon his arrival in Kufa, Muslim received thousands of signed pledges of support in Hussein’s cause. As a result, Muslim sent a glowing report (along with the letters of support to Hussein.

Meanwhile, the new caliph, Yazid, heard reports of the coming uprising in Kufa so he dispatched his son, Ziyad, to take control of Kufa. (Ziyad was already governor of Basra, so he was well-trained in intrigue.) Ziyad decided to go to Kufa in disguise where he quickly summed up the situation, identified Muslim as an instigator and murdered him.

Hussein received the report and started moving to Kufa, not knowing that Muslim was already dead. In September of 680 Hussein slipped out of Mecca en route to Kufa against the advice of many friends. He took with him a party of about 50-armed men. During the journey the Caliph’s men searched for Hussein and his followers, to no avail. As Hussein neared Kufa, he sent a messenger into the city to announce his pending arrival but the Caliph’s men discovered the messenger and killed him too. Angered by the deaths, Hussein’s party was now bent on revenge in addition to revolt.

Upon arriving in the region of Kafu, Hussein found that the situation had changed drastically. The Caliph had enforced the local garrisons with over 4,000 additional troops. The situation was rather hopeless and Hussein attempted retreat but his way was blocked by hundreds of horse mounted soldiers screening the border regions.

Hussein entered into negotiations for their release with the local governor. (The governor seems to have been rather sympathetic with Hussein and his men.) At any rate the two men came to an agreement with three conditions. Hussein would be allowed to pay homage to the Caliph, he would be allowed to fight infidels on the borders, and he would be allowed to return in peace. After the agreement the caliph decided to force Hussein to pay homage with military power if required. Soon the Caliph’s men approached Hussein’s camp and informed Hussein of the Caliph’s demand that he pay homage. Skirmish was avoided with a respite of 24 hours.

The following day the final battle began. Numerous heroic account of Hussein’s last struggle exist, but suffice to say that Hussein ordered the youngest family member to flee the area so that a male heir would survive — so he apparently knew what was coming. After blessing his soldiers the battle began and it lasted throughout the day. Hussein was wounded multiple times: first across the face. He was then wounded in the hand and again in the body. Eventually the caliph’s men cut off his head, as ordered by the Caliph’s son. Hussein’s
body was then desecrated: and trampled under the hooves of stampeding horses. The location of the severed head is not truly known, but one of several stories (and tradition) places it within the mosque in Damascus. That tradition makes the Damascus mosque a primary holy site to Shiites today.

Although Fatima and Aisha were key figures within the nascent Muslim community throughout their lives, their true impact as a unifying force was nominal, at best. They clearly encouraged dispute and Aisha took up arms to gain/retain political power, but after her failed attempt to exercising political influence she withdrew from public light and left the stage to Hussein --- alone. When Hussein lost his head, the line of Ali was functionally over and the stage was set for the rift in Islam into its two main sects which continues: Sunni and Shiite.

**About the Author:**

Mr. Coyt D. Hargus, USAF civilian and retired 48G (Arabic) Army FAO. Throughout his uniformed and civilian career Hargus has served a variety of International Affairs positions including CENTCOM’s J5, EUCOM’s JAC, NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Center, and Homeland Security’s Field Intelligence Unit. Hargus teaches Mid-East regional topics affecting national security at a variety of schools. Currently, Hargus serves as Deputy Director of International Affairs at Air Combat Command, Langley AFB. He is an elected member of FAOA’s Board of Governors, and further serves the Association as Managing Editor if this journal.

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**FAOA has lost a friend and great supporter**

**Thomas Dillon passed away, 22 Jan 2011**

LTC US Army (retired)

On 22 Jan 2011, LTC Tom Dillon died at his home in Alexandria, VA after 20 years of service in the US Army and 28 years as a civilian intelligence officer. He was a mentor and role model for all who served with him.

Dillon graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1957 with BAs in English and Philosophy, and an MA in Political Science from the University of Kansas in 1973. Dillon enlisted in 1955 and was later commissioned as an infantry officer. He transferred into Intelligence in 1960, and served a variety of important Counterintelligence and HUMINT assignments in CONUS, Germany, and Southeast Asia including two command assignments in Vietnam. He was an honor graduate of the Army’s CGSC, and a graduate of the Army War College and the National Senior Intelligence Course. He retired from active duty in 1987.

As a civilian, Dillon rose to become a member of the Senior Executive Service with postings as the first Executive Director, Defense HUMINT Service; Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAREUR; HUMINT Advisor to the Deputy Assistant SecDef (Intelligence); and USAREUR Senior LNO to the Federal Republic of Germany’s intelligence and security agencies. He served as Director, Foreign Disclosure and Security Directorate, G-2, US Army until he retired in 2004 after which provided training for Intelligence professionals with the Phoenix Training Center (a DynCorp Intl. division) until he passed.

Dillon was awarded the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, and the Meritorious Service Medal. His civilian honors include US Army’s award for Meritorious and for Distinguished Civilian Service, NMIA’s Special Achievement Award, DIA Director’s Award, CIA’s Agency Seal Medallion, and the two awards of the Intelligence Community’s Distinguished Service Medal. Dillon also received the 2000 Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive. His foreign awards include the Honor Medal First Class from the Republic of South Vietnam; the Gold Cross of Honor from the German Bundeswehr and the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit from the Federal Republic of Germany.

Friends may call at Everly Wheatley Funeral Home, 1500 W. Braddock Rd., Alexandria, VA on Tuesday, 10 May from 4 to 7 pm. A Funeral Service will be held on Wednesday, 11 May at 12:45 pm. at Fort Meyer Old Post Chapel with Full Military Honors and interment to follow at Arlington National Cemetery.
The Crucial Role of the Manager-Leader in Intelligence
By Dr. Denny Howley

Bureaucratic Complexity
In the military, particularly in combat units, leadership is the accepted norm in motivating people to achieve the maximum in team cohesion to accomplish the mission. Business has learned that “managing” people and LEADING people are two very different approaches. LEADING involves different skills and a much higher degree of personal involvement and commitment. Yet, as in a combat unit, business has come to realize that personal involvement and dedication to one’s people, as well as MISSION FOCUS are indispensable if full individual and organizational potentials are to be achieved.

In Intelligence, particularly at the national level in an organization such as The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the importance of leadership is no less crucial. Its application, however, is considerably more complex since DIA has all the problems and challenges inherent in business as well as those found in combat units. Added to this mix is the fact that DIA is a unique blend of civilian and military personnel from widely differing work cultures.

Furthermore even the military is not homogeneous, since they represent all the services and branches, line as well as support personnel. While the military shares the same dedication to country, the services and respective branches use different methods in mobilizing and motivating their personnel. The differences in military approaches is itself often a factor determined by their specific mission.

In Intelligence, especially at the national level, the role of the manager-LEADER becomes crucial in molding and fostering, at each level, a work culture. This work culture not only allocates resources and dispenses requirements, but seeks to blend the mosaic of people into a team of highly motivated self-starters who initiate actions rather than wait passively for requirements to be levied upon them. This leadership aspect of the manager-LEADER’S job is no easy chore.

No previous assignment or job has totally prepared an individual for this manager-LEADER role, a role in which he/she must understand the nuances of bureaucratic politics with its hidden organizational and personal agendas; the interactions of the Intelligence Community of which DIA is a part; the relationship of his/her own organization with other groups within the Agency; the unique professionalism that exists; and the vital pivotal role he/she can play as a facilitator in the development of a forward leaning, aggressive Intelligence team determined to play a meaning role in the decision-making process.

Role of the Manager-LEADER
One of the major problems the Intelligence manager-LEADER faces when he/she assumes his/her new position is a sense of being almost overwhelmed. Not only is he/she in a new organization, which always triggers some sense of apprehension, but at a national level where the tensions and pressures are pervasive, even if they are just below the surface. There are civilian-military and inter-service relationships within the Agency on the superiors, peers and subordinate’s levels; direct interaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Services, Unified and Specified Commands; as well as active dialogue, and sometimes rivalry, with the other organizations within the intelligence community.

This almost awesome new environment tends to trigger the survival mechanism in many new managers who realize immediately that their careers could be seriously threatened. Concurrently, however, most also recognize that if they survive the getting-their-feet-wet-break-in period, their careers might also be substantially enhanced. The pressures, therefore, are sufficient to push some new managers into adopting a “pass on the requirement” management style, where he/she simplifies his/her job by viewing it as a passive conduit between the intelligence user, his/her boss and the intelligence producer at the lower level.

Some others opt to become “limelight” managers, who seek to grab the spotlight and opportunities for higher visibility in an attempt to enhance their own career, rather than utilizing and providing exposure for their analysts. Without question becoming a manager-LEADER is not an easy task. It requires not only dedication to the mission, but an equal dedication to one’s people.

Parameters of Responsibility for the Manager-LEADER
The manager-LEADER has three general areas of responsibility in which he/she must develop an operative understanding, if he/she is to maximize the
effectiveness of his/her organization’s Intelligence effort. These three categories are:
- Management to the consumer;
- Peer management; and
- Management-LEADERSHIP of subordinates.

Management of the consumer is challenging at best. The JCS, for instance, is divided into a number of diverse and sometimes competing organizations, with their own mode of interaction based on a variety of missions and personalities. The Unified and Specified Commands are another consumer and they do not necessarily always agree with the JCS. In addition there is the Intelligence Community, which interacts under a myriad of internal organizational and extra-organizational pressures and sometimes rivalries. All these factors should be generally appreciated if the Intelligence product is to have its maximum impact.

Peer-management is an equally important and challenging area, since interaction on the manager level can ease many of the pressures that so easily arise between organizations that work together. Since day-to-day coordination and cooperation is crucial to the accomplishment of mission, the investment of time in developing personal links with peer managers is insurance designed to side-step the problems that so easily arise and escalate in the bureaucratic environment. Finally the example set by the manager-LEADER in cultivating organizational peers encourages subordinates to also seek effective, non-abrasive interaction with their own peers. Since cooperation is the lubricant that keeps bureaucracy moving efficiently, this positive interaction is time well spent.

Management of subordinates is the third area of responsibility and possibly the most difficult, since here the effective manager must be a consummate LEADER as well. A prerequisite for accomplishing this however, is the need to know his/her organization, how it functions, his personnel and their various capabilities. He/she must also develop a feel for quality analysis, if he/she is to give proper and effective recognition. Concurrently he/she must learn the available tools of recognition and determine which are most appropriate for civilians and military commensurate with their particular careers, ranks and branches of service.

**Does Iowa have Closer Ties to Russia than Nebraska?**

Edited by Ivan Raiklin, Captain, US Army National Guard

Little known to the average international affairs policy wonk, the Iowa National Guard has a bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation. Its goal is to promote long-term institutional and professional relationships between Iowa and Russian military-governmental organizations. This is done by developing and reinforcing senior leadership contacts between the Iowa National Guard and their Russian counterparts in order to build trust and foster transparency at the senior leader decision-making level. While not formally under the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership for Peace Program, it has a very strong resemblance.

The Iowa-Russia relationship has a deep-rooted history at the national level and spans over 50 years. In September 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited Iowa. After seeing the corn fields of Iowa, he determined that it should grow in all of Russia from North to South. 1988 saw the beginning of the sister state/city relationship between Iowa/Des Moines and Russia/Stavropol.

Some activities of the sister city/sister state program include the promotion of timely and effective response to humanitarian crisis and emergency situations; supporting the non-proliferation of WMD weapons and technology; promoting peaceful solutions to conflicts in the region; and Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace.

The Iowa-Russia bilateral relationship currently exists without the benefit of a formalized program, but through EUCOM J5, Cooperative Threat Reduction funding and by leveraging established international protocols with the Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) and the NGB. Areas of future interest/possibility include: Joint IA/Russia participation in EUCOMIFEMA/Joint Committee initiatives involving EMERCOM and Russian Ministry of Defense in Defense Language Schooling, Urban Search and Rescue training, and Security Studies Programs. Additionally, to explore initiatives designed to combine/coordinate efforts relating to humanitarian assistance projects.
The Work Culture

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the manager-LEADER is the fostering of a shared work culture — a team environment at every level. This aims at getting everyone - from the senior managers, to the analysts and administrative personnel - on the same page: To instill in them a sense of not only belonging to a mission oriented team, but that it is THEIR team and THEIR organization. This team building role of the manager-LEADER is essential if that sense of belonging, of participation, is to be instilled.

The manager-LEADER, therefore is of necessity a developer, mentor and coach of his personnel in helping them reach their full potential. One concept that is basic in effective leadership is the conviction that people “want to do good”; that they want to belong to some worthwhile endeavor; that they want job satisfaction and seek personal growth; and they want recognition. Obviously knowledge of the various forms of recognition available is important, but face-to-face recognition of a job well done has by far the most immediate impact in the team build effort.

The manager-LEADER must also maintain an upward responsiveness mode to safeguard his/her own career. This role of manager-LEADER involves, therefore, nothing less than a total commitment to both the mission of providing the best possible Intelligence and, simultaneously, a commitment to the people who produce that intelligence.

Conclusion

Intelligence at the national level can achieve its full potential only with manager-LEADERS who are personally committed to both mission and their people. DIA, for example, is a hybrid organization with a wide mosaic of people possessing unsurpassed expertise. The very diversity of these people, the complexity of the bureaucratic environment and nature of the missions, creates a situation to challenge even the best manager-LEADER.

A grassroots work culture that encourages participation, initiative and a sense of belonging is imperative to produce the proper mission and policy oriented Intelligence designed to maximize the Intelligence impact on the decision making process. It is also key in providing positive motivation to stimulate and encourage initiative driven analytical efforts which lie at the heart of the projective-interpretative Intelligence products. But these basic manager-LEADER principles have equal applicability in virtually any organization.

About the Author …

Dr. Denny Howley completed his “basic academic” FAS/FAO training at the American University of Beirut from 1969-1972, where he obtained a Masters Degree in Middle East Studies and completed Arabic training in Monterey, CA.

Following the Infantry Advanced Course he commanded a Rifle Company in Alaska, lead two detachment “A’s” in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam and commanded a Rifle Company in the 1st Infantry Division — also in Vietnam. Later, Howley taught at the Special Warfare School, and commanded a Psy-Ops detachment.

In 1972-1993 he served as a Middle East /counter-terror specialist in DIA’s J-2, both as a military officer and as a civilian. Howley completed a second Master’s Degree (American University) in International Politics, and a PhD (George Washington University) in International Relations.

Denny now lives in Key West, FL.
The internet began as a web of information, but it is evolving into a web of relationships. This is important to understand, especially as Foreign Area Officers. We’re diplomats and as such are experts at building relational coalitions. This aspect of social media should come fairly naturally to us. While some have argued that social media fails to foster real community, there is a great case to be made for FAOs using it to maintain their “weak ties”. Our relationships span the globe and world events are unfolding at an exponential rate. We need to adapt to the real-time international discourse. The alternative is living in a stove pipe.

The risks are obvious enough. The lines between professional and private are being blurred, and this demands higher integrity from us as individuals. Every code cable and tweet should be written with the wisdom of knowing one’s intended and potential audiences. Every transmission is for the public record, and this should give us pause. With that said, new media tools also provide increased power for strategic communications. Mastering the medium is essential to navigating the tide of ideas.

But how much time should you spend figuring out newfangled technology? Time savers can become time wasters, hence the market for consultants and also what I call curators. Curators are those people and publications that save us time. They are the “Mavens”, as Malcolm Gladwell puts it in The Tipping Point. Matt Drudge (drudgereport.com) is a curator of news. He links to articles and rebrands them with his own headlines, becoming "the Walter Cronkite of his era." As of April 2010, the Drudge Report was the number one online referrer to all online UK commercial newspaper websites.

As more and more people transition to smart phones, they are seeking news curators like BreakingNews on Twitter or using Google’s rss feed reader to collect daily readings from various sources. Think Tanks are curators. Traditional publications are curators. However, many print magazines and newspapers, once held in high regard as the curators of news, are spiraling downward as independent bloggers, like Drudge or BreakingNews, provide more efficient sources of information. The bottom line is that we are always looking for the one-stop-shop for this or that. We want all the good stuff in one location.

In a sense, curators are like our own personal teams of advisors. We assemble around ourselves a virtual panel of experts. Who better to be in that panel than your friends, family and colleagues? Social media allows us to build communities that help us curate information for each other. It allows us to build a community and curate knowledge together.

This, in short, is the goal of www.FAOA.org - to capitalize social media for the benefit of our trade without getting bogged down by the bells and whistles. As you have time and desire, we hope that you will join in the project with us. We appreciate all you have to offer.

About The Author …

LT Graham Plaster (US Navy) is a Middle East FAO, and is currently assigned as an Operations Officer for US Military Observer Group Washington under the Army G-3/5/7 where his missions include Israel and Iraq. Among his assignments, LT Plaster has served as a Surface Warfare Officer aboard the USS Reuben James (FFG 57) out of Pearl Harbor, deploying in support of OIF and OEF to the Persian Gulf. LT Plaster completed a Masters degree in Humanities at Salve Regina University with a thesis focus on electronic democracy in Iran and was selected by the USN for FAO training/duty. He is currently writing a book on the blogging phenomenon in Iran. Graham serves this association as a member of the Board of Governors and FAOA’s Secretary / Webmaster.
The book describes in detail the importance of oral traditions and how they are continue in 21st century. Chapter three describes the journey of a 17-year old American girl named Reem who works thru the traditional process of Quranic memorization and certification, thus ensuring the continuation of those oral Quranic traditions. Reem's story is also serves as an example of the trustworthy nature of oral traditions, and is designed to support the authenticity of today's Quran by explaining the high standards of its transmission over the centuries. Reem's story is an interesting vignette for the reader to follow.

The Story of the Quran is a great book written by a practicing Muslim female to address most of the commonly asked questions regarding Quran, and Muslims --- including the roles some women played in the life of the Prophet Mohammad. Mattson gives the reader a logical understanding that Quranic authority is not only a product of revelation alone, but the weight of its authority is derived from history and long-established tradition.

In a post 9/11 world --- there is no shortage of books condemning Islam, and there is no shortage of apologetic books recruiting for Islam. This book is neither, and that's refreshing. It explains the history and the facts while using solid data to illuminate its analysis. I recommend it highly.

About the Reviewer: Mr. Coyt D. Hargus (USA 48G Retired) is a USAF Civilian assigned as the Deputy Director of International Affairs at Air Combat Command. He is an elected member of FAOA’s Board of Governors, and further serves the Association as the Managing Editor for this journal.
Fellow FAOs,

Please join me in welcoming our newest shipmates. If you work with any of these officers, please extend your congratulations.

SPECIAL DUTY OFFICER - FOREIGN AREA OFFICER - 1700
CARTER MACKENZIE J 1110 CHOI JIHOON P 5100
EHREDT DAVID J JR 1320 KRUSE JOHN E III 1310
LARKIN PATRICK J 1110 LORD CHRISTOPHER J 1120
MANUEL KIMBERLY T 1110 MARTIN EUGENE T III 1110
OGDEN RICHARD J 1110 OSWALD STEPHEN 1110
PARISH WILLIAM J 1300 POLLARD GLENA K 1110
SAITO HENRY T 1110 SCUDI JOHN P 1320
STUEWE CHAD J 1110

We have again gained a group of exceptionally qualified officers for our work. They are characterized by superior performance in their parent communities and an aptitude for international engagement work.

This is the breakdown
Communities:
9 Surface Warfare
4 Aviation
1 Submarine
1 Civil Engineering Corps

Rank:
CDR- 2 YG 89, 91 (have not been considered for O6)
LCDR- 6 YGs 98, 99, 00, 01
LCDR(s)- 2 YGs 01, 02
LT- 5 YGs 01, 02, 03, 04

Qualifications:
Education- 5/15 already received relevant regionally focused masters
Language- DLAB Average 120.56
Languages with qualifications (>= 2/2 DLPT)
- Japanese
- Spanish
Other Languages with documented scores
- Italian
- Russian
- Korean

Best regards, Jeff

RADM Jeff Lemmons, USN
Director for International Engagement
OPNAV N52
2000 Navy Pentagon (Room 4C453)
Washington DC 20350-2000
The acquisition and sustainment of foreign language skills is a challenge for global military readiness. Military linguists can attest that these skills are notoriously perishable, and that maintaining proficiency in any language is easier said than done. Compounding the problem is the fact that military language specialists who require sustainment training on a recurring basis are scattered throughout the world, making centralized instruction infeasible. Fortunately, the Army has established and developed a program to address this capability gap and I have found it to be practical, flexible, and extremely suitable for the professional military soldier.

The Total Army Language Program (TALP AR350-16) serves as the Army’s mechanism to “provide personnel proficient in foreign languages the ability to perform mission essential tasks critical to the successful accomplishment of Army missions.” The primary aim of TALP is to establish policies and procedures for the development and management of Major Army Command and unit Command Language Programs (CLPs). The CLP is a most important component of sustainment training, distance learning and the maintenance of perishable language skills. A successful CLP must be designed to accomplish foreign language “refresher, remediation, sustainment, enhancement, and cross/conversation-training of assigned linguists.”

Under the umbrella of TALP, Army soldiers are able to access funding set aside for a wide variety of language sustainment activities. These include the contracting of foreign language instructors and the acquisition of language training materials. Furthermore, TALP makes funding available for team training, self-study, or self-paced instruction, as well as immersion programs and courses offered by colleges or universities. While assigned to United States Army Pacific, I have leveraged many of these activities to conduct a wide spectrum of sustainment training. My recent experience of home station language training followed by a week of intensive immersion in the target language is a primary example of a well developed and successful command language program.

For the past ten months, I have been engaged in weekly Chinese language sessions with a contracted tutor. We generally meet for two hours a week with the goal of balancing speaking, listening, and reading proficiency. In some cases, I come prepared to focus on a particular issue or topic that relates to my current duties or interests. Otherwise, our sessions generally devolve into a fascinating exploration of Chinese history, philosophy, and culture. As a result of my busy and aggressive travel schedule, we sometimes leverage technology to hold class on-line. This instruction is so realistic that our separation by distance is transparent to the learning process.

As part of my language sustainment training plan, I requested funding to culminate the fiscal year with a week-long language immersion trip to Shanghai, China. Although the recommended immersion program is somewhere between two and six weeks, I discovered that my abbreviated approach exceeded all hopes and expectations. In addition to over 30 hours of intensive one on one tailored instruction, I was afforded time to interact with the local populace, putting into practice recently reviewed material. Repetitive and consistent exposure to my Chinese surroundings dramatically improved my reading, listening, and speaking comprehension. A primary example of this methodology was our approach to a series of classroom sessions dedicated to material about the World Expo. We focused an entire day of in-classroom training to reading, listening, and conversing about Expo topics related to science, technology, economics, politics, and environmentalism. On-line articles and news stories reinforced concepts and ideas that we would experience while visiting the Expo site the following day. This proved to be invaluable in terms of cementing vocabulary and difficult concepts.

Although it is a soldier’s individual responsibility to maintain an appropriate level of language ability, the command also bears some of the burden to make sure resources are made available for sustainment training. In my case, the Command Language Program affords me the ability to employ a variety of learning methods to sustain and improve language skills. Like most dedicated professional soldiers, I find it difficult to devote an appropriate amount of time to language sustainment training. The command language program is the ideal vehicle for promoting continuous language learning. Tailored to an individual’s unique abilities and requirements,
the program can be easily adapted to fit a soldier’s particular learning profile, lifestyle, and personal desires for language improvement.

I strongly encourage linguists across the Army to seek out more information about TALP and in particular find out who the CLP manager is for your unit. You may not even be aware that resources are available. As experts in our field, commanders rely on our language expertise to keep him informed and the general purpose force culturally astute. A strong, healthy CLP will go a long way toward achieving that end.

**About the Author …**

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This year’s list contains 14 books divided into three categories: leadership, strategic context and military heritage. Gen Schwartz will highlight these books throughout the year. This quarter’s top three are:

* **The All Americans**  
  by Lars Anderson

* **Technology Horizons: A Vision for the Air Force Science and Technology**  
  by Dr. Werner Dahm

* **Three Cups of Tea: One Man’s Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time**  
  by Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

The three categories of the Chief’s reading list highlighting the three facets of professional development: Leadership, Strategic Context and Military Heritage. The other books in this year’s reading list are:

**Leadership**

* **Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace**  
  by Mark Perry

* **The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953**  
  by Robert Dallek

* **Secrets of Special Ops Leadership: Dare the Impossible; Achieve the Extraordinary**  
  by William Allen Cohen

**Strategic Context**

* **Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power**  
  by Robert Kaplan

* **Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It**  
  by Richard Clarke and Robert Knake

* **The Return of History and the End of Dreams**  
  by Robert Kagan

* **A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962**  
  by Alistair Horne

* **Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia**  
  by Ahmed Rashid

**Military Heritage**

* **Fighter Pilot: The Memoirs of Legendary Ace Robin Olds**  
  by Robin Olds, Christina Olds and Ed Rasimus

* **Red Eagles: America’s Secret MiGs**  
  by Steve Davies

* **Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan**  
  by Herman S. Wolk
In an effort to better highlight candidates who possess the skills necessary for officer promotion in today’s expeditionary Air Force, senior Air Force officials approved changes to the officer selection brief.

The modified officer selection brief will be used beginning with boards in June and include a more detailed professional military education section, the addition of a foreign language proficiency section and an acquisition qualifications section.

"The modifications to the officer selection brief better highlight important competencies for global Air Force operations and allow officers with these attributes to be more easily identified by promotion boards," said Brig. Gen. Sharon Dunbar, the force management policy director, deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel.

The Force Management and Development Council, which makes strategic-level recommendations to the secretary of the Air Force and chief of staff of the Air Force on force management and development issues based on input from leaders across the Air Force, recommended the modifications as a means to identify Air Force officers with key skills in today's force.

For example, the enhanced PME section reflects the Air Force's emphasis on officer development. The section will include an at-a-glance summary of the school attended, method of completion and date of completion. Previously, the section just included the level of schooling and date of completion.

The council also found that officers who have foreign language skills and cultural experience relevant to world operations play a key role in supporting joint combatant commanders. Therefore, they recommended the addition of a foreign language section to help identify these in-demand officers to promotion boards. This new section will capture the language, listening and reading proficiency level and a certification date.

"Officers who possess such language skills and cultural understanding underscore the service's efforts in developing regional expertise and building partnerships across the globe," said Mike Nolta, the deputy chief of the international Airmen division for the Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs office.

Finally, the addition of the acquisition certification section helps identify those contracting professionals who have the necessary skills and training to ensure acquisition excellence—one of the Air Force’s top priorities. The brief identifies majors who have met all acquisition corps eligibility requirements with the exception of rank as "eligible" for admission into the Air Force Acquisition Corps.

Personnel officials said identifying these Airmen also keeps the Air Force in compliance with U.S. code that ensures active-component officers selected for the acquisition corps are promoted at the rate of line officers. This code does not apply to the Reserve component.

Promotion boards are conducted and administered at the Air Force Personnel Center and Air Reserve Personnel Center. For more information and links to resources, visit the Officer Promotions page at the Air Force Personnel Center personnel services website or the Total Force Service Center at 800-525-0102.
IAS New Notes

- On 4 Jan 2011, SAF/IAP signed a policy letter requiring RAS officers to test annually in the two-skill Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI). Implementation instructions have been forwarded to the field. The Air Force’s Senior Language Authority (SLA) is considering the implementation of the same policy for participants in the Air Force’s Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP).

- A true indicator of the importance the Air Force places on language skills, the Officer Selection Brief (the “coversheet” for an officer’s records at a promotion board) will now include a Foreign Language section that will list the languages in which an officer has tested in the past year, the test scores, and the test dates.

- Thanks to the Air Force ISR Agency, the IAS Program is now offering two new skills maintenance programs.
  -- Project X, a classified program aimed at improving ability to use military and technical terms in the target language (Arabic, Spanish, or Korean), will begin with its first iteration on 24 January 2011. Additional courses will be held in February and in March. Eighteen RAS officers are currently scheduled to participate in this pilot program.
  -- iPod Touches are available to all RAS officers to use for language and regional skills sustainment applications. RAS officers who have not yet received an iPod should contact Force Management.

Quotable Quotes …
from DoD’s Language and Culture Summit

“Cultural understanding is extremely important to our ability to affect positive outcomes. As we pursue our national interests in an inter-connected, globalized world, we must be cognizant not only of socio-economic and political institutions; we must genuinely and increasingly appreciate linguistic, regional, and cultural constructs.”

Gen Norton Schwartz
Chief of Staff, USAF
USMC International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Input

1. Desk Officer Adjustments. The 2011 rotation of International Affairs Branch officers will commence in January. Maj Brian Boyce will be replaced in the EU-COM/West Europe desk by Maj Howard Beasey (Jul); Maj John Krause will be replaced at the Western Hemisphere desk by Maj Manuel Munoz (Jul); Maj Ryan Connolly will be replaced by Maj (LtCol-Sel) William DeLorenzo (Jul); LtCol Seth Folsom will be replaced by Maj Jonathan Brown (Jan); and Maj Greg Starace will assume the AFRICOM desk (Jan).

2. FAOs outbound to commence In-Country Training (ICT) in spring 2011. Twenty-three USMC FAOs will conduct ICT during 2010. Of these, ten will execute orders this spring.

a. Latin America (MOS 8241). Two FAOs will complete Spanish language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute ICT in Lima, Peru this spring.

b. Northeast Asia (MOS 8243). One FAO will complete Chinese language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute ICT this spring in Beijing, China.

c. Sub-Saharan Africa (MOS 8245). Four FAOs will complete French language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. Two FAO will execute ICT in Dakar, Senegal, and two FAOs will execute ICT from Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany.

d. South Asia (MOS 8246). Two FAOs will complete Hindi language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring/summer. Both officers will execute their ICT in Muscat, Oman. One FAO will complete Persian-Dari language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute ICT this spring with II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) in Operation Enduring Freedom.


3. Commandant’s Planning Guidance Task. The Commandant of the Marine Corps directed Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) Department to “institutionalize the FAO/RAO program” in his initial Planning Guidance. A comprehensive report was delivered to CMC on 21 Jan 11, detailing recent milestones, efforts at institutionalization, and options to increase FAO/RAO program capacity and promotion/command competitiveness.

4. IAOP Order Rewrite. Revision of the 21 Dec 00 IAOP Marine Corps Order (MCO 1520.11E) continues to gather steam and is in the final administrative review phase. The final order will realign several regions and incorporate changes to program criteria that in turn will ensure the USMC’s International Affairs Officer Program is in full compliance with DoD Directive 1315.17.

5. Monterey FAO Orientation Course. The International Affairs Branch Head, IAOP Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator will attend the annual FAO Orientation Conference (FAOOC) conference from 16-18 Feb 2011. The conference is sponsored by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and will include presentations by former Ambassador Edward Peck. This event provides FAOs from all four services a forum in which to interface, share ideas, and build professional relationships.

6. USMC FAO Orientation Course. In June 2011, the International Affairs Branch, in concert with the Defense Language Institute’s Marine Detachment, will host its second FAO Orientation Conference. This three-day conference will serve as a welcome aboard for newly selected FAOs, will provide curriculum, utilization, and career guidance, and will include representatives from the Marine Corps Component Command headquarters and other USMC organizations that employ FAOs on a regular basis.

Quotable Quotes …

“The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him but because he loves what is behind him.”

G.K. Chesterton
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Email submissions to editor@fao.org
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Edited by Colonel (retired) Ray Bluhm, this book encompasses text previously published separately by The Army Historical Foundation, The Naval Historical Foundation, The Marine Corps Association, and the Air Force Historical Foundation. This cooperative effort by distinguished military historians has produced one of the most important historical accounts of the Vietnam War.

This is a coffee table book — oversized, weighty, and beautifully printed. It presents a chronological sequence of selected tactical events, strategic decisions, and Cold War political events with emphasis on Vietnam but including events elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. As Colonel Bluhm notes in his opening Editor’s Note, the book is a listing of “… key events that led up to, comprised, and finally ended the Vietnam War,” beginning with the French era of the 1950s and ending with political events as late as 1977.

Senator Jim Webb begins the book with a poignant Foreword that combines his own combat experience in Vietnam with clear statements of the purpose and achievements of the men and women who fought in Southeast Asia. In his words:

“This volume presents a refreshing look at the actual conduct of the war, separate from the political considerations that drove the larger policy decisions. In that respect it allows those who wish to understand the war a clearer window into how it was fought. And it provides those who fought the war a measure, understanding, respect, and recognition that they earned so many years ago on those faraway battlefields.”

Each “event” in the book is short and succinct, usually only a column inch or two in length. Even the outbreak of the 1968 Tet Offensive is covered in less than five column inches. The breadth of coverage is astounding – from company-sized operations to country-wide strategic planning, from tiny remote advisory teams to division-sized formations, headquarters offices, and far-in-the-field outposts. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard activities are all covered, as are national-level policy decisions made in Washington, Hanoi, Paris, and elsewhere.

The best part of the book is the huge array of photographs, maps sketches, and combat art that is found on every single page in the book. Though formidable in size and weight, the book is a pleasure to read.

Readers of a certain age will peruse the book looking for coverage of those years of closest personal interest. Currently serving Foreign Area Officers should find the wide coverage of one of the most important events in recent American history – and the book’s wonderful artwork – of great interest as well.

**About the Reviewer:**
Mr. John B. Haseman, Colonel U.S. Army (Retired) is a Southeast Asia FAO, frequent contributor to this journal, and serves as a key member of FAOA’s Board of Governors.
What Major Shawn Kyle proposes in his November 2010 article, A “Partial” Return to the Dual-Track System — is it time?, is not a return to a dual-track system, but rather a re-coding of billets.

The dual-track system was designed for FAOs to bounce back and forth between their basic branch and FAO assignments; what Shawn proposes is FAOs serving as FAOs, but at the tactical level, or what he terms the “Real Army.” (A SIDE NOTE: I’m not sure what this “Real Army” is, but I do know that we do indeed fight at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. While it is true that FAOs mostly operate at the latter two, there is a need for FAOs at all levels.)

In the old dual-track system, staying “green” in their basic branches was essential in order to retain competitiveness with peers for promotion. Maintaining competency, however, in two branches can be quite challenging. Dual tracking could be equated to an officer serving in two basic branches (for example artillery and quartermaster), while expecting the officer to be competent and competitive in both branches. Feasible? Sure. Practical? Not so much. Should FAOs, however, maintain their core competencies as U.S. Army officers and able to operate at all levels of war? Absolutely! This can be done by assigning FAOs to the relevant assignments at the relevant levels.

Shawn clearly highlights this need for FAOs to remain “green” in the Army. His example of FAOs serving on division staffs is not a new concept for FAO assignments. In fact, there was discussion at one point during the development of the brigade modular system, under which we now operate, to take FAOs down to the division, and even the brigade, level. Due to multiple considerations, to include a manpower shortage in the FAO branch and other officer assignment/requirement considerations, this never panned out. Do recall, however, that FAOs must also remain “purple,” and whatever color would represent the interagency aspects to national security.

I agree FAOs need to remain relevant at all levels of war. Commanders in the field have identified the need for FAOs. So what, in the end, is needed is a re-coding of billets to assign FAOs down to the relevant command and staff levels where their expertise can serve as tactical, operational, and strategic multipliers; and then a modification to the assignments process to provide FAOs experience at all levels. This would of course require growing the FAO community. With today’s shortage of mid-grade officers, this may not be a viable option for the next several years. However, there are plenty of opportunities for FAOs to stay “green” while employing the skill sets FAOs develop over several years and the investment of thousands of dollars. Also recall that in most FAO assignments, the contribution to our national security is vital, even if it is not with the “real Army,” as I am sure Shawn will realize as he serves in Yerevan.

About the Reviewer:
Major Reed Anderson, 48C, is currently assigned to the US Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, as a strategic defense planner in the Office of the Defense Advisor. Prior to this assignment he was the Azerbijan desk officer at EUCOM in Stuttgart, Germany. Reed is a repeat contributor to this journal including Oct ‘09 article on his experiences within EUCOM.
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NMIA and FAOs honor General Williams for a lifetime of service to the nation.