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Every two years the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to review the missions, responsibilities and geographical boundaries of each Combatant Command within the US military, and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary. The review process includes combatant commanders, service chiefs, and DoD leadership.

DoD Unified Command Plan 2008 is a key strategic document that established the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands. It was signed on 17 Dec 2008 by President Bush.

US State Department Regional Bureaus provide country-by-country information on Political-Military administered security assistance funds.

Each DoD geographic command’s area encompasses all areas within designated borders. State Department Regional Bureau AORs include land areas within DoD AORs and overlap multiple DoD AORs.

* Data and graphics derived from DoS sources by Journal Editor.
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See the insert within the Journal for details.

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Dear FAO Colleagues,

I hope you are as excited as we are about the new look of the journal. The Board of Governors took on the mission last year of making FAOA more relevant to the FAO community. One of our ideas was to make better use of the journal as a strategic communication tool. Thanks to the hard work of editor Mr. Coyt Hargus, I believe we have succeeded in producing a higher quality, more professional journal that should greatly assist in promoting the visibility of FAOA.

Along with the new journal, we have launched a brand new logo design. The new logo, which is actually the third design since FAOA was established in 1995, better reflects that we are truly a joint organization. Again, thanks go out to Coyt for making this happen.

As this letter goes to publication, we look forward to the upcoming Annual FAOA Formal Dinner on May 20. The banquet planning committee, led by Mr. Brian Hobbs, has done a terrific job in getting Ambassador Ryan Crocker to be our guest speaker. We hope to see many of you on the 20th.

Since my last writing, I am pleased to report that the Board of Governors has continued to work tirelessly on your behalf. COL (Ret.) John Haseman, USA – armed with copies of the journal – recently traveled through Southeast Asia where he met with several FAOs serving in the region. Coyt Hargus recently attended a FAO conference at Monterey, CA, where he provided a presentation about FAOA. While there, he met with Dr. Tristan Mabry of the Joint FAO Sills Sustainment Pilot Program to discuss ways of creating synergies between our two organizations. Col Kurt Marisa and COL (Ret.) Mike Ferguson, USA, have continued to serve as liaison with the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), the Intelligence Community Associations Network (ICAN), and Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired (DACOR).

On April 16, several members of the Board of Governors met with the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps FAO proponents, and OSD (Personnel & Readiness). During the well-attended meeting held at the Pentagon, we discussed ways that FAOA could be value-added to the service proponents.

In closing, let me share the thought that once you become a FAO, you become a FAO for life. Most of us volunteer to come into the field because of a true passion and appreciation for regional expertise, language study, and cultural awareness. As demonstrated by many in our retired community, that passion remains long after service in the active ranks. With that in mind, I hope FAOA can continue to be a useful tool.

Sincere regards to all FAOs and your families, especially those serving in harm’s way.

Gary Espinas
Colonel, U.S. Army
The Naval Postgraduate School hosted the 4th Annual FAO Conference, 8-9 April. The event brought together each of the service’s FAO proponents, along with senior FAOs from each service, interagency representatives, and several international affairs experts. Between the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute, there are over 200 student FAO/RAO/RAS/PAS who represent all four services. There is no better place to influence the next generation of FAOs.

The 2010 FAO Conference was a joint project between the NPS National Security Affairs Department, the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) and the Joint FAO Skill Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP). The goal was to answer the following research question: “Bridging the gap as a warrior, scholar, and diplomat: How can foreign area officers (FAO) reconcile their many roles?”

To answer the research question, six panels were established, each having its own objective and set of questions.

1) WARRIOR PANEL I: Discuss inter-service gaps. What is each service’s expectation of Foreign Area Officers with respect to service missions, DoD policy, and national interests?

2) WARRIOR PANEL II: Discuss the strategic and operational gaps FAOs must learn to overcome given the multiple demand they receive and techniques to reconcile potentially conflicting requirements.

3) SCHOLAR PANEL I: Bridging the gap between theory and application. Discuss how FAOs can apply a largely theoretical graduate education to the development and execution of policy.

4) SCHOLAR PANEL II: Bridging the gap between the classroom and the field and strategies for staying smart and sustaining the FAO education.

5) CULTURE AND LANGUAGE PANEL: Cross-Cultural Communication: The factors that impact communication and intercultural relationships.

6) DIPLOMAT PANEL: Bridging the gap between the DoD and embassy working environments. Discuss the FAOs unique role as a part of the Country Team.

Warrior Panel I included: Mr. Richard A. Genaille Jr., Senior Executive Service, Director of Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs; Captain Hong C. Kim, USN, Office of the CNO International Engagement Directorate, OPNAV N52; LTC(P) David E. Brigham, USA, Chief of Operational Support Division Foreign Area Officer Branch; and Major Seth W. B. Folsom, USMC, International Affairs Officer Programs Coordinator, HQMC. All four services agreed on the necessity to put both resources and career management investment in international affairs programs but there was no clear consensus on ‘dual track’ versus ‘single track’ approaches for the FAO career path. In the end, the logic behind which approach a service employs seems to depend on the unique culture and professional development requirements of that service.

Warrior Panel II included: CAPT Todd Squire, USN, currently preparing for assignment to ODC Ankara Turkey; LTC Christopher Herndon, USA, Chief Pan-Africa Programs Branch at US Africa Command; Lt Col Glen Roberts, USAF, Senior Strategic Communication Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy; Lt Col Steve Bergey, USAF, currently Air Attache USEMB Doha Qatar; and Lt Col Michael Mollohan, USMC, Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies. The discussion highlighted that the DAO, SAO, ODC, MAG, MILGRPs need better coordination in order to close the seams/better integrate/collaborate activities from a perspective of optimizing roles and responsibilities to address real capacity building within the host nation security forces. Efforts need to focus on the relationship building with the host nation in order to have sustained effects for US interest and policy.

Scholar Panel I included: Dr. Anna Simons, Professor in Defense Analysis Department, NPS; Tom Johnson, Director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies; and Dr. Brian R. Selmeski, Director for Plans and Policies, AFCLC; and Dr. Heather Gregg, an Assistant Professor of Anthropology in Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School. This panel included a lively discussion about trying to teach ‘culture’ as a subject itself, which implies a lack of understanding on what culture is and what it takes to ‘learn’ a culture. The FAO must not only study the basic complexion of a society or group or organization but also must live within that environment to learn the intangible and unteachable characteristics. The consensus was that only so much can be taught and conveyed in a classroom; nothing substitutes living and breathing in the environment.

Scholar Panel II included: COL ‘Sak’ Sakoda, USA(Ret); COL Mark Chakwin, USA, U.S. Army FAO Chair, Naval Postgraduate School; and Dr. Tristan Mabry, Executive Director, JFSSPP, Naval Postgraduate School. The discussion focused on how the FAO can sustain his or her skills whether in a single track or dual track service. The agreement is that language is a perishable skill and it is incumbent on the FAO to maintain proficiency. The FAO must also visit the region at least once every couple of years to maintain the smell and feel to be useful to his or her respective service.

Culture and Language Panel included: Lt Col Jay Warwick, USAF, Deputy Director for Education and Training, AFCLC; Dr. Kimberly Hudson, Deputy Director AF Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) and Associate Professor US Air War College; and Dr. Robert Sands, Culture Chair and Assistant Professor of Anthropology, US Air War College. The discussion focused on how we apply at the operational levels strategic understanding of differences and the need to know the causal relationships between actions and reactions when different cultures interact. The presentations included the need to understand negotiation techniques and challenges when languages and cultures are different.

The Diplomat Panel included: Ambassador David L. Lyon (recently retired from foreign service) whose last posting was as US Ambassador in Suva, Fiji; Dr. Elena Brineman, USAID, Director of Office of Military Affairs; Colonel Phillipe Rogers, USMC, NATO Plans and Policy Directorate European Division; and LtCol Jon Duke, USMC, OpsO MARSOC Regiment. There was a lot of discussion about interagency cooperation and previous experience with the lack of coordination on the country-team. There was a consensus that all agencies involved in planning and development activities need better coordination. “Defense, Diplomacy and Development” was reiterated.

The keynote speech was delivered by RADM Jeffrey Lemmons, USN, Director of International Engagement, OPNAV N52. His address highlighted the new Cooperative Maritime Strategy developed with US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard and its re-
The relationship to strategic security and international engagement. He emphasized the need for FAOs from all the services to write and publish.

The objective for the conference was met by the panelists sharing their expertise, resources, and wisdom. The networking of ideas at the conference achieved two goals:

1) FAOs/RAOs/RASs/PASs in training received invaluable insights on global issues and future assignments to complement their education and training.

2) The hosted experts and other attendees received an appreciation for the robust force-multiplier capabilities that FAOs/RAOs/RASs/PASs provide.

This year’s conference is the fourth such event held at the Naval Postgraduate School in as many years. Since the first FAO conference in 2007, the scope and interest in the Conference has grown in step with the growing size and importance of the DoD’s various FAO programs.

The FAOA Board of Governors would like to congratulate FAOA-Monterey for executing a truly outstanding conference. Further, we thank all of those who supported the conference without whom it could not have been done.

You have our admiration and appreciation. Coyt Hargus, Editor
Beyond Diversity and Tolerance: 
Reassessing Islam and Islamism in the United States Military
By: Mark Silinsky, Civilian, EURASIA FAO

The US military has set national standards for promoting diversity and tolerance. Proclaiming an end to archaic and counter-productive racial practices, President Harry Truman desegregated the armed forces with the stroke of a pen after the Second World War. Changing deeply held opinions on race and religion in the services was more difficult, but not insurmountable. The military provided a sphere of US life in which people of all ethnicities, religions, and national origin could better themselves, prepare for their future, and prove their patriotism, upon pledging their allegiance to US and swearing to uphold the Constitution. The US military became more ethnically diverse and servicemen became more tolerant of this diversity. However, there is a new dynamic in the armed forces for which many officers and enlisted personnel have proven unprepared and ill equipped. This is the threat of militant Islam, or Islamism.

Islam must be seen by security and counterintelligence operators in the armed forces in a different light than other religious, namely Christianity and Judaism. Diversity in the US armed forces has its benefits. Earlier racial restrictions limited the pool of potential war fighters and the armed forces would be weaker without non-whites, but skin color says nothing of personal beliefs, political affiliation, or loyalty. Similarly, the inclusion of women into military brought talent, improving the status of a wide-array of non-combat– intelligence, logistics, medicine, engineering, aviation … and increasingly combat fields. But women have no exclusive political, religious, or social belief systems distinct from those of their male counterparts.

Estimates of the Muslim population within the US armed forces range from 1,850 to 3,000.

An Army psychiatrist at Fort Hood shoots indiscriminately on his fellow soldiers while yelling in Arabic that God is the greatest. Earlier, an Army non-commissioned officer is sentenced to death for the premeditated murder of two of his comrades and the intentional wounding of 14 others in Kuwait. Elsewhere, a middle-class convert to Islam from Washington State offers to sell secrets of US armed vehicles to give al Qaeda the tactical edge in killing US soldiers. Calmly, methodically, and very intelligently an Egyptian-born, commando-trained sergeant in the US Army indoctrinates US Army personnel and supplies al Qaeda with Army-related information and secrets. On desolate beaches in New Jersey, he trains fellow Muslims to kill Americans. A US Army chaplain engages in highly suspect activity with al Qaeda inmates at Guantanamo prison. Are these discrete events, or are they threaded together by a subversive ideology and homicidal hatred for the United States and those charged to protect its citizens?

This paper will argue three principles: First, Islam must be seen by security and counterintelligence operators in the armed forces in a different light than other religions, namely Christianity and Judaism. Second, the threat of Islamism in the US Armed Forces is widely misunderstood. Third, the armed forces and the DoD must establish a robust and unfettered capability to identify and neutralize hostile Islamic elements.
Religion is different from race or ethnicity because it, by definition, is an expansive belief system. A person’s race, ethnicity, and gender say very little about their values. This cannot be said about religion. Islam is certainly a religion, but it is more. Its theological base, which centers on an extended dialogue between Mohammad, an ambitious fifth century warlord whom Muslims consider a prophet, and the angel Gabriel, who passed divine revelations, may be no more or less grounded in history or myth than Judaism or Christianity. And much of Islam’s sacred literature is innocuous and has no bearing on US national security. But Islam differs from the other two Abrahamic faiths because its metaphysical theistic beliefs are inseparable from the religion’s political and legal requirements.

For this reason, while it is accurate to define Islam as a religion, it is incomplete to define it as only a religion. It is a religion, a political body, and legal code, which mandates a certain life style. These political and legal requirements have profound and enduring implications for security in the US military. If Jesus said, “Render unto God what is God’s and unto Caesar what is Caesar’s,” Muhammad did not agree. His approach towards living as a Muslim contained no similar separation of the mosque and the state. Because Islam is as political as it is religious it offers a unique set of challenges to the military for several reasons.

First, many Islamic political and legal requirements conflict with democratic principles. Western norms that guide US law, customs, and values bear little resemblance to those of Islam. The biography of Mohammad, the most revered man in Islam, is equally problematic. If Muslims serving in US military uniforms believe that Mohammad was the perfect man, then it is worth noting that much of Mohammad’s personal narrative celebrates mass murder, looting, laying waste to enemy villages, taking slaves, raping women, killing and ordering the death of those who criticized him … not to mention pedophilia. For all of Mohammad’s battlefield acumen and dynamic political leadership, few American non-Muslims would welcome his legacy as a player in American politics.

Second, many Muslims believe that the Koran is the direct, undiluted, word of God that cannot be modified or abrogated. This is not unique among religions, but it presents a basic problem for Muslim service members. Islam is a political system that sets Muslims in perpetual and unavoidable conflict with non-Muslims until judgment day. Many passages in the Koran demand war against non-Muslims, that non-believers be converted or subjugated to second-class status, and that non-Muslims not be taken as friends. There is no broad consensus among American Muslims that these passages are archaic and irrelevant relics of the past.

The third challenge is the command for ruthless violence. Much of Islam is predicated on violence, celebrates violence, and demands violence against non-Muslims. Verses in the holy Islamic text drip with the blood of beheadings, amputations, eye gouging, and mutilation. Myriad passages celebrate Caligula-like torture and sexual slavery. If Islam is a religion of peace it is also one of war. Although apologists for Islam in the US Armed forces declare that this violence is un-Islamic, the perpetrators themselves commit the violence in the name of Islam; recite Islamic verses to justify the violence; are often supported materially, financially, rhetorically, and spiritually by significant numbers of the Islamic global community. When they have killed American soldiers they killed in the name of their God.

Elements of this life style and political code can be accommodated within the parameters of military life, just as the military has provided for the needs of other faiths. For example, chaplains of dominant faiths minister to the spiritual needs of servicemen; provisions are often made for Jews requiring kosher food and Muslims eating Halal meat, as long these dietary needs are subordinated to the military mission; and Jews, Christians, and Muslims are often permitted to celebrate religious holidays, when and where these celebrations do not conflict with military duty.

Two examples:

“O Prophet! Urge the believers to war; if there are twenty patient ones of you they shall overcome two hundred, and if there are a hundred of you they shall overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they are a people who do not understand” (Quran 8:065).

Another is - ”Warfare is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know.” (2:216).
Fourth, the Koranic use of the word “tolerance,” as applied towards Jews, Christians, homosexuals, and women has a distinct meaning from its common use in contemporary US society. Islam tolerates other religions as long as they accept an inferior status — the status of dhimmi, pay financial tribute to Muslims, and agree to ritualistic humiliations. Women are valued primarily for their reproductive abilities, particularly their bearing and raising sons, and for maintaining the honor of the family. Homosexuals are not tolerated at all. In many places, the Koran does not teach tolerance towards Jews or Christians. In fact, there are passages that deny the Judaism of Abraham and the divinity of Jesus.

The fifth Islamist challenge allows for lying, or Takiya, in pursuit of Islamic causes. There is no blanket permission to lie in Islam, but a Muslim is given great license in dissimulating to protect himself and the Muslim community. There is much evidence of Takiya in US society, which has implications for the armed services.

A common takiya tactic is disingenuously creating a victim status for Muslims in US society and in the armed forces. Islamists are skilled at shifting scrutiny from the perpetrators of threatening comments, anti-US rhetoric, and anti-Semitism and onto those who protest these hate-filled statements. Islamists insist that there is a generalized misunderstanding of Islam’s true, peaceful nature and that criticisms of Islamism are manifestations of institutionalized “Islamaphobia.” Through this lens, the victims become the victims, a status sometimes supported by mainstream civil rights organizations. Many civil libertarians view Muslims in the US as they do underrepresented and disenfranchised minority groups where the discrimination is based on racial or ethnic rather than political differences.

Islamism in the Armed Forces is Not Understood

Certainly, Islamism presents unique challenges to the armed forces that need to be confronted. But, before offering ways to grapple with these dangers, it is helpful to examine four dominant myths in the US armed forces, which need to be debunked. They are: violence has nothing to do with Islam; the killers and would-be killers are mentally ill; violence is driven by anti-Islamic harassment; and that the armed forces must accept, as inevitable, an accommodation with angry Islam.

The first central misunderstanding is that high-profile violence is un-Islamic. This argument holds that violence committed by Muslims, in the name of Islam, to promote the interests of Islam, has nothing to do with Islam. In fact, in at least several cases, violence had everything to do with Islam. Muslims, of course, are not the only servicemen who commit violence nor is there sufficient evidence to indicate that the aggregate level of violence committed by Muslims is any greater or less than that committed by Christians or Jews. This is a common refrain by Islamic leaders who tend to blame a multitude of causes, such as depression, alienation, anxiety resulting from taunts by anti-Islamic servicemen, but neglect to include the calls to arms by leading Islamic clerics and political leaders.

For servicemen of all religions, there are bar fights, brawls over women, violent outbursts prompted by arduous training and the nerve-shattering fatigue associated with combat. The fog of war sometimes clouds judgment and wears down self-restraint. Further, it is true that there have been only several incidents of Islamist-inspired murder or accessory to murder in the ranks. But the murders committed by Sergeant Hassan Akbar and Major Hassan and the conspiracy to help murder US troops, Sergeant Ali Mohammad, Specialist Ryan Anderson were born of Islamist rage at America and its services. In his own words, MAJ Hassan was a “soldier of Allah” and not a soldier of the USA.

The second misunderstanding is that the killers are insane or extremely unbalanced. Ibrahim
Hooper of CAIR asked a television commentator, in reference to the Hassan murders, “Why can't these Muslims just be crazy?” They can be, just as Jews and Christians can be and sometimes are crazy. However, there is no evidence that the high-profile Army killers or would be killers - Akbar, Hassan, Anderson - were mentally ill. Nor has history demonstrated that evil men who commit their crimes in the name of ideology are necessarily insane. Were the Muslims who committed and tried to commit violent crimes against fellow Americans driven to do so by irresistible impulses, uncontrollable voices, or ghostly apparitions seen only by them? In fact, those who knew these homicidal soldiers spoke of their devotion to Islam and conviction that the US is at war with Islam.

Akbar intentionally murdered two US military officers in Kuwait. He explained, "I may not have killed any Muslims, but being in the Army is the same thing. I may have to make a choice very soon on who to kill."

The third misunderstanding of Islam is that its killers in the US armed forces have been driven to violence because of anti-Muslim persecution. The victimizers are victims. In fact, there is no evidence that those who violently turned against US servicemen were targeted extensively for anti-Muslim harassment. Islamic outreach and public relations organizations such as CAIR and MPAC have cast Muslims in the role of victims of an intolerant, ignorant, and mean-spirited American society. In fact, FBI statistics do not support claims that Muslims have been disproportionately targeted in hate crimes.

The fourth misunderstanding is fatalism. There is nothing the armed forces can do about Islamism and so it must be accommodated. This unnecessary fatalism surrenders the integrity, security, and future of the US Armed forces to a hostile ideology without a fight. It also surrenders the dignity of the armed forces.

Reasons Why the Threat of Islamism in the US Armed Forces is Widely Misunderstood

If the threat of Islamism is so profound, why isn’t it well known and when it is recognized, why is it often misunderstood? There are five reasons that help explain this. They are disagreement, confusion, deception, fear, delusion.

First, there is disagreement over the threat of Islamism in the armed forces. Reasonable citizens can observe the same facts and circumstances, and draw different conclusions. Many university professors, civil rights activists, theologians, journalists, and DoD analysts read the same data as this author, but do not agree that political Islam, which encourages or requires violence, is the primary causal agent of these killings and betrayals.

The second reason for misunderstanding the threat of Islamism in the armed forces is the skull-crashing confusion about Islam, diversity, and civil rights. It is difficult for servicemen not to be confused when they are encouraged to believe that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance and yet see evidence of daily Islamic violence and a broad-based, seething hatred of the West. This confusion, even among the most educated and intelligent servicemen, helps to explain why Major Hassan’s often-repeated expressions of anger against the United States went largely unreported. Observers of his behavior, even fellow physicians, did not know what to make of it.

The third reason is deception. Some leaders in US Muslim organizations adopted a janus-faced pattern telling civilians and servicemen that theirs is a peaceful religion while rallying US Muslims to Jihad. For example, a leading expert on US Islamism, Steven Emerson, exposed Edina Lekovic, of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), as praising the greatness of Osama bin Laden to fellow Muslim students at UCLA and later claiming “Nobody has fought—working harder to fight terrorism and extremism than the Muslim American community. We work with all levels of law enforcement, we work with our communities.” Another example comes from Mahdi Bray of the Muslim American Society who condemns the Islamic violence surrounding the cartoon controversy in public but later exhorts Muslims to enter Jihad and attack Jews. There are many other examples.

"When we hear someone refer to the great mujahid Osama bin Laden as a 'terrorist', we should defend our brother and refer to him as a freedom fighter..."

Quote from Al-Talib, the Muslim News magazine at UCLA (July 1999 edition) when Lekovic was a managing editor
A fourth factor is fear. Some of those who understand the Islamist threat in the Armed Forces are afraid to voice their opinions. To some extent, this reflects a generalized fear in Western society. It is difficult to predict what comment, satire, novel, or cartoon will set Islamic passions aflame. An Indian-British novelist is sentenced to death by one of the world’s most influential Islamic clerics for satirizing the life of Mohammad. Cartoonists living in European countries hide in fear of their lives. Dutch parliamentarians require constant protection for fear of having their throats cut. An artist is slaughtered in the streets of Amsterdam like a sacrificial animal. And Europe has taken note. Some statesmen, artists, and intellectuals have stood and fought, most keep silent. Many of the Continent have reluctantly, but nonetheless firmly, embraced a new “Vichy Syndrome.”

The fifth and final factor generating a misunderstanding of Islamism in the US armed forces is self-delusion. Confronting the enormity of the Islamist threat in the services, the nation, and the world, tries the intellects and the souls of Christians and Jews who simply want to live in peace with Muslims. Faith McDonnell of the Institute of Religion and Democracy notes that “many churches are obsessed with making themselves likeable to Islamists…such churches opt for sessions of feel-good dialogue with the local mosque, gushing about how much Christianity and Islam have in common, and never challenging Muslims to serious debate on those so-called commonalities.” Jews, particularly those of the left of the political spectrum, sometimes prefer accommodation to confrontation.

**Tactical Steps to Mitigate the Islamist Threat in the Armed Forces**

What should be done about the Islamist threat in the armed forces? The armed forces and the Department of Defense must establish a robust and unfettered capability to identify and neutralize hostile Islamic elements. This effort must consist of five components. They are screening and vetting, recognizing, warning, monitoring, and firing Islamists.

Theodore Dalrymple is credited with coining the term “Vichy Syndrome” describing continental resignation to the progressive Islamization of Europe.

The fear of Islamic anger haunts America, too. It exists in editorial offices of leading newspapers, universities, and government offices. In the armed forces there is an ambient fear — the concern of making an inappropriate statement, asking the wrong question, writing a potentially misunderstood article — which lowers readiness in the ranks. At work in the armed forces is a quiet Jihad, which is not the stuff of guns and bombs. Persistent and patient, Islamic leaders have built connections in the armed forces. Some of these connections are completely legitimate and are similar to those built by Christian and Jewish leaders. Others are duplicitous; designed to promote Islamism. In fact, one of the most influential Islamic leaders, the individual most responsible for giving Islam equal representation in the Armed Forces Chaplaincy, was sentenced to many years in prison for his role in financing Islamic terrorism. Robert Spencer is a leading authority on, what he refers to as, the **stealth Jihad**, and he has written a book of that title.

The print media blackout cartoons of Mohammed, and Ivy League universities ban their inclusion in books. Critics of Islam, such as Daniel Pipes, require armed escorts while speaking at universities; public, particularly international, transportation is reinvented to prevent mass murder, a popular conservative talk show host, Michael Graham, is pressured off the air for criticizing Islamism.
The first component is screening and vetting candidates for the US Armed forces. There is no right to serve in this country’s services. In some circumstances, men are required to serve if drafted. It is a privilege to serve, and this privilege can be revoked at the discretion of security officials.

Because the political and religious elements of Islam cannot be separated, the mosque, social organization, and other elements of a Muslim’s participation in civil society must be scrutinized. It is vital for security officials to understand which Islamic organizations promote ideologies hostile towards the US. For example, military recruiters on high schools or university campuses should understand any connections that the Muslim Students Association has or had with radical organizations. Further, the literature and the rhetoric associated with the organization should be examined in the context of national security. If a candidate for the armed forces is a member of a campus or local organization that articulates a generalized contempt for American society, American religions, other than Islam; American foreign policy; and American leaders, he may not be an asset in the military services.

The second component is recognizing the traits of an Islamist. Daniel Pipes has coined the term “sudden Jihad syndrome” to refer to a mosaic of warning signs that a Muslim has become dangerously, and often very quickly, radicalized. Service-men should understand some of the warning signs by asking five questions:

1 - Does he demonstrate a generalized and high-level of anger at US society, domestic or foreign policy, or at US participation in wars in which the US is engaged? Is the intensity of the anger and the frequency with which it is expressed significantly greater than shown by other servicemen.

2 - Does he suggest his primary loyalty is with another country/society other than the US? Does he view himself as Muslim before he is an American?

3 - Does he express satisfaction or pleasure when US forces are killed or defeated by Muslims? Does he show inappropriate rage at criticism of Islam?

4 - Does he read or suggest that other service members read violent Islamic literature that promotes world Islamic conquest or the subjugation of Christians and Jews? As an example, the anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion sells briskly in a number of Islamic book stores in the US.

5 - Is he associated with Islamist organizations?

Prompting servicemen to ask these questions requires improving the way security information is delivered to the forces. A first step would be to develop an annual, hard-hitting briefing to give servicemen a framework to understand Islamism. This should be done on a DoD level and should be required annually.

The third and fourth components, warning and monitoring, are inseparable. If a serviceman is concerned about an Islamist in the ranks, he should know whom to contact in the chain of command and he should follow-up with his concerns. This requires monitoring the behavior of the possible Islamists but it also requires that service officials act adequately on the information.

The fifth and final component is cashiering, or firing, the Islamist. If a serviceman’s behavior is consistent with any of the five questions about Islamist behavior he needs to be investigated. Sometimes he needs to be fired.

Develop a Master Strategy against Islamism in the Armed Forces

Beyond these immediate, tactical steps, the armed forces must adopt a comprehensive strategy to combat Islamism. They must change the way they look at Islam, particularly its violent political component- Islamism.

First, the prism through which US armed forces view Islam must shift. Islam is treated as a religion indistinguishable from other religions. But Islam brings with it Islamism, which threatens the values of the US armed forces and the safety of its men and women. The political component of Islam should be stressed in security awareness briefings. Soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines must understand the political and legal basics of Islam and Islamism.

Second, the services must act decisively on this new perspective. Muslim chaplains, Muslim outreach speakers and university professors and contractors who influence servicemen on Islamic issues must be given increased scrutiny. Annual officer evaluations must be revisited to ensure those officers who suspect and report incidents or concerns of Islamism are not penalized for doing so.

The top related authors on this topic include Bruce Bawer, Christopher Caldwell, Walter Bernard Lewis, Steven Emerson, Daniel Pipes, Melanie Phillips and Robert Spencer.
Finally, the armed forces must continue to recognize that there are many Muslims who have fought the trend of radicalization in American Islam. The armed forces must partner with Muslim activists who love America and are eager to defend it, rather than with pseudo-patriots who use takiya to infest its ranks. Dr. M. Zhudi Jasser of the American Forum for Islam and Democracy and Dr. Ali Ayami, executive director of the Washington, DC-based, Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Saudi Arabia are two of the best sources of information on democratic, humanistic-oriented Islam. They are sources that have not been sufficiently tapped.

Leaders in the US armed forces- men and women of good will and good intentions- have promoted diversity and tolerance in the ranks. Sometimes diversity brings varied technical and intellectual skills that boost military capabilities. But is it militarily beneficial or ethically virtuous to promote diversity when it corrodes morale in the armed forces; injects religious bigotry, particularly anti-Semitism; denigrates the status of women; alienates and threatens homosexuals; and increases the threat of subversion? Jews and Christians who promote a hostile political ideology have no place preaching their messages to servicemen. Should the US armed forces use a different standard for today's Muslims?

Many have commented on the tragedy of Fort Hood. But they are wrong. Fort Hood was not a tragedy; it was an atrocity. The tragedy contained in this atrocity was that there were ample warning signs that were not understood in the ranks. It would be a continuing tragedy if this threat continues to incubate unchallenged. And this tragedy will, undoubtedly, lead to more atrocities.

Tolerance is another fashionable word in American society and its armed forces. Why should the armed forces tolerate any literature or speech, whether in the Koran or the Talmud or the New Testament, whether spoken in a mosque, or a church, or a synagogue that promotes violence, anti-western supremacy, and primary allegiance to a religion rather than to the US.

The great novelist and humanist Thomas Mann said, “Tolerance becomes a crime when applied to evil,” and Supreme Court justice Robert Jackson said, “The Constitution is not a suicide pact.” Men and women wearing the uniforms of their country’s services have pledged to defend this Constitution, and their country has an obligation to protect them.

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editor@faoa.org
There are a plethora of factors that determine a country’s foreign policy. The resources a country has and the way it uses them can be helpful to understand how its foreign policy is shaped. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until now, oil has been the most important resource that has played a significant role in international relations, due to the sheer fact that it has been one of the leading resources of industrialization. There has, although, been a growing literature harbingering the peak of oil, and alerting the greatly oil dependent countries to seek alternative resources.

With global climate change, population growth, mismanagement, and uncontrolled usage, water has also become an alerting resource as well. Unlike oil, simply put, water is vital to life on earth. It is the most important and most abundant molecule in the world. Seventy percent of Earth’s surface is covered with water; however, only a diminutive amount of it is drinkable. The majority of humans, animals, and crops mainly depend on underground and river waters for life.

Two or more countries share 214 rivers of the world. This fact, then, brings along an important challenge. How do these riparian countries manage their ‘common’ resource? There is a wide literature on this issue. There are mainly two theories that attempt to explain how states use their water resources. The realist view posits that states strive to protect and use their resources, as they deem appropriate, and that it is not uncommon to see possible violent conflict breaking out between two countries disputing a resource. Upstream states (countries where a river originates and flows a substantial length within their borders) have a right to use their rivers as they want. On the other hand, downstream states (countries where a river flows down through) oppose this and demand that rivers should be left in their natural course without any shift, or restriction.

A more liberal view, contending the realist approach, claims that water is such a significant and vital resource that states eventually cooperate in terms of the rights to use it, rather than going to war. Where it can be a zero-sum game, due to its sheer vitality, states – as rational actors – strive to eschew any possible conflicts.

A close look at different cases supports the liberal view in this issue. Despite doomsday scenarios by many scholars, and politicians we left behind the first decade of the twenty-first century without any wars over water. The case of Turkish-Syrian relations over the Euphrates River also shows that water is not a primary cause for inter-state violence. It is an intervening variable in an international problem rather than the interdependent variable.

This paper focuses on the Turkish-Syrian relations in terms of the issue over the Euphrates River. In the first part, I look at water in international politics, the legal system, and its importance as a vital resource. I then focus on the Euphrates and Tigris basin, with a subtitle on Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP-Southeastern Anatolian Project), one of the biggest projects in the world, that once completed will have 21 dams and 19 hydropower plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Lastly I will look at the determinants of Turkish-Syrian relations. I conclude that water has not been a cause of war, instead, it has helped bring countries together, and that water is not the only determinant of the relations between these two countries that share a common culture and history. This conclusion is, of course, based on what we now know. The vagueness of a future driven by the unknowable, like global climate change, hinders any scholarly predicting of future events.

I. Water in International Relations: Vital Resource

There are three types of rivers described in legal terms. If a river rises in a single sovereign state, flows exclusively within its borders till it finally flows out to a sea or lake, that river is a “national river”. The second type is “boundary rivers” that provide the
The political borders of two countries. The third type, to which the Euphrates and the Tigris belong, is "multinational rivers" that flow through two or more states. Most of the rivers in the world fall in the third category. Most of the rivers in the world are shared between more than two countries. Furthermore, almost 40 percent of people depend on 214 rivers shared by two or more states for their drinking water, hydropower and irrigation needs. A number of these river systems are shared by five or more countries.

Due to this chronic problem, downstream and upstream countries have different perceptions of the rivers. Upstream states generally tend to assume that if a river rises within a country's borders, it is a part of that country's territory, and that it can use it, as it deems appropriate and useful. On the other hand, a downstream state would support "the Natural Flow Doctrine" that "grants an exclusive right to the natural, uninterrupted flow of the river from the territory of upstream riparians." According to Hakki, neither theory has found much ground in international law, or international tribunals, however, "both demonstrate a preference for the principle of 'equitable utilization'...Chapter IV of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers states that 'Each basin state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.'" Despite this notion, most riparian countries continue to follow their own perception of watercourses.

There is a vast literature positing that water is or can become a global issue and that it will be the chief cause for conflict in the future. For instance Falkenmark argues that 'the serious water problems, now confronting humanity, are all inherently international and many of them even global scope.' The former World Bank vice-president for environmentally sustainable development, Ismail Serageldin, claims that "many of the wars this century were about oil, but wars of the next century will be over water."
Water is a vital part of a country's national security. Conflict over water between riparian states occupies many minds within US Intelligence. On the other hand, Dolatyar and Gray do say the doomsday scenarios are grossly exaggerated and that water scarcity will not lead to violent conflict. It will rather push the policy makers to seek sustainable solutions to not to resort to violence but rather to cooperation.

A close look at different cases shows that there has not been a significant problem between two riparian states. Water has not been the primary reason for overt conflicts; rather, it has been an intervening variable in most occasions. The case of Turkey and Syria also supports the hypothesis of Dolatyar and Gray. Before looking at the case water as a determinant in Turkish-Syrian relations, I will present a brief part on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

II. Euphrates and Tigris

Euphrates is an international river that rises in Turkey and flows down to Syria and Iraq. The Tigris also originates in Turkey and flows due south down to Iraq, and slightly enters Syria and Iran. Both rivers unite in Shatt al-Arab in Iraq before they flow out to the Arab/Persian Gulf.

As can be seen from the table below, both rivers play important roles within the countries through which they flow. The Euphrates is the longest river in west Asia and is crucial for all three of the above-mentioned countries. The Euphrates is particularly important for Syria, because it is the main water supply for the entire country. In this paper, I mainly focus on the relationship between Turkey and Syria in terms of the use of the Euphrates. One of the important aspects of the relations is the GAP.

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Source: Soffer, Arnon “Rivers of Fire: The conflict over Water in the Middle East” 1999 pages 74-75

a. Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP)

Turkey has not always used its rivers effectively, particularly in the southeast. Some small projects were put forth in the first half of the twentieth century; however none reached real significance. By the 1970s, the Turkish government developed a project called Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP-Southeastern Anatolian Project) to improve irrigation in the region, and produce hydraulic energy. By the 1980s, the projects were advanced to include economic and social development in the region that is predominantly Kurdish. It is one of the largest development projects in the world, once completed it will have 21 dams and 19 hydropower plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. GAP will increase “irrigation capabilities to one million hectares of land, while adding an additional 625,000 hectares with waters from the Tigris.” GAP will also increase energy production. It will add 27 billion kilowatt-hours of power production. Another goal of the GAP is to change the lives of the people in the southeastern part of Turkey, which was neglected for a long time. GAP has also created numerous new jobs for the local Kurdish population. So far there are nine dams and five hydropower plants in use, which constitutes 50 % of the planned development. These developments in Turkey, on the other hand, have raised concerns among the downstream countries of Syria and Iraq. Both countries, particularly, Syria has been uneasy with the project. The biggest allegation has been that the flow of water might be cut down to 16 billion cubic meters from the current 30 billion cubic meters.

b. Determinants of Turkish-Syrian Relations

Historically Turkey has had two main disputes with its southern neighbor. The most adamant one is the territorial dispute over the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), and the second one is, as mentioned, over the use of the Euphrates. Alexandretta was a sanjak (province) predominantly inhabited by Arabs, under the Ottoman rule. After the World War I the
province from the French. Concerned about that Turkey might fall in the German influence sphere, France “ceded the sanjak to Turkey by treaty in 1939.” The dispute over Alexandretta has affected relations between these two countries since then.

The more important of these two problems is the dispute over the use of the Euphrates River. Turkey has argued that it has absolute control over the rivers that rise in Turkey. Suleyman Demirel expressed this Harmonian approach in July 1992, by claiming that “water resources are Turkey’s and oil is theirs [Syria and Iraq]. Since we do not tell them, ‘Look, we have a right to half of your oil,’ they cannot lay claim to what is ours”. This kind of bold claims, though, did not reverberate the minds of most policy makers in Turkey. Turkey has pioneered to solve the water problem with its neighbor by agreeing in 1987 to allow a minimum average of 500 cubic meters per second to flow to Syria. However, there have been some reductions in the amount of water, which were considered as fait accompli by the Turkish side, but interpreted in a different way by the Syrians. Turkey also proposed a three stage plan that would include a full-fledged study of the water courses examining the evaporation losses, different uses of water and its quality. The second stage would be a thorough study of the soils in similar terms. These two stages would then lead to the third stage, a discussion of how the rivers could properly be utilized. Syria, however, did not come to terms with Turkey about the co-management of the Euphrates, fearing that this would strengthen Turkey’s role in the future agreements.

Water, however, is not the only reason that has raised tensions between the two countries. Syria supported the Kurdish separatist group known as PKK that has, till today, fought a guerilla war against the Turkish state demanding autonomy for the Kurdish minority in Turkey. In November 1998, Turkey sent troops to the Syrian border and “issued an ultimatum to Syria, asking it to terminate its support of the PKK as evidenced, among other things, by its tolerance if PKK training camps in the Syrian-controlled Beka’a Valley in Lebanon and its allowing the PKK leadership to operate out of Damascus.”

The then Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad, complied with the Turkish demand and moved the PKK leader out of Syria. As a result of this compliance, Turkey interestingly raised the flow of water to Syria up to nine hundred cubic meters per second.

Despite vast literature foreseeing conflicts between countries sharing vital rivers, Syria and Turkey have maintained a relative peace. Both have common interests that bring them together. Both (even before the US-led invasion of Iraq) have been committed to the unity of Iraq. This was first expressed in a meeting between Hafez al-Assad and then Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, that “neither country would support the creation of an independent Kurdish state.” The relations between the two countries have warmed up since 2000, after the extradition of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, from Syria. As the first sign of this rapprochement, the Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended the funeral of Hafez al-Assad. The new Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, started a new page in relations with Turkey in 2004 by being the first Syrian president to visit Turkey. It is also important to note that Recep Tayip Erdogan, the leader of the ruling Adilet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), and the prime minister of Turkey since 2003, played an important role in the restoration of the relations. AKP has quit the traditional Turkish foreign policy of indifference toward the Middle East, and started to engage Turkey in peace talks, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and claimed to revive the Turkish leadership in the region. Syria in particular has supported this image of Turkey. The main interest that both countries share is stability and integration of Iraq.

**Conclusion**

Prior to the end of the Cold War, scholars neglected Turkish foreign policy. Turkey was preoccupied with its deadlock over Cyprus, and integration to the European Union. In the recent decade, we have seen Turkey more active in regional and global politics. After the establishment of a new, secular Western leaning republic, Ataturk was not interested in the Middle East, and this indifference continued until the
end of the 20th century, and thru the beginning of the 21st century. Turkey has now realized its interests in neighboring Middle Eastern countries; most importantly Iraq, Syria and Iran. Besides sharing long borders with Iraq and Syria, Turkey also shares the two big rivers … the Tigris and the Euphrates.

There have been some disputes over the usage of these two important rivers, which do not differentiate from similar disputes between other riparian countries. While particularly Syria accuses Turkey of not letting the required flow of the Euphrates into the country, Turkey claims that it has complied with the international norms. Turkey accuses Syria of mismanaging its water. The disputes, despite some scholarly predictions otherwise, have not led to violent clashes. As Dolatyar and Gray argue water is such a vital resource that states tend to cooperate.

In an anarchic world, where there is imperfect information about each other, one might expect states to sometimes choose to defect taking their absolute and relative gains into consideration; however, this basic notion of international relations changes in terms of water due to its sheer vitality, therefore, states – as rational actors – strive to eschew any possible conflicts.

This same rule applies to Turkish-Syrian relations as well. Turkey, even though the upstream state, cannot risk its investments on the Euphrates River in a conflict. Similarly Syria cannot risk functionally its sole water resource. As we have seen through the most current developments, both countries have chosen cooperation. It appears that we will have Pax Aquaria for the future.

About the Author: Hacı Osman Gündüz is a Lecturer in Arabic at the George Washington University. He has recently finished his MA in International Relations and possesses a BA degree in Arabic Language and Literature. He has been interested in the Middle Eastern politics, culture and languages. He has also been working on religious brotherhoods in Turkey and their influence on Turkish politics and society.

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Cicero - 55 BC

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Islam and Christianity in Africa

By: Mr. Coyt D. Hargus, USAF Civilian

Africa is often viewed as a religious battleground between Islam, Christianity and indigenous forms of worship. Over recent decades there has been an apparent surge of Wahabbi effort to expand the Salafist Islam (meaning ultra-fundamentalist) throughout Africa, counterbalancing Christian missionary work in Africa dating back to the Victorian era — the perception of a religious struggle for the soul of Africa is not new. But is that perception correct?

In April, the Pew Research Center (www.pewresearch.org) published the results of some interesting work they recently completed about religion in Africa. Their resulting product is titled Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between Dec ‘08 and Apr ‘09, Pew’s Forum on Religion and Public Life conducted more than 25,000 face-to-face interviews in more than 60 languages/dialects in 19 Sub-Saharan nations.

Their opinion polls indicate the vast majority of people in many sub-Saharan African nations are deeply committed to the practices and tenets of one or the other of the world’s two largest religions, Christianity and Islam. Large majorities say they belong to one of these faiths (and, in sharp contrast with Europe and the US) very few people are religiously unaffiliated. Despite the dominance of Christianity and Islam, traditional African religious beliefs have not disappeared, but coexist with Islam and Christianity. Whether or not this entails some theological tension, it is a reality in people’s lives: Large numbers of Africans actively participate in Christianity or Islam yet also believe in witchcraft, evil spirits, sacrifices to ancestors, healers, reincarnation and other elements of traditional African religions.

Christianity and Islam coexist. Many Christians and Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa describe members of the other faith as tolerant and honest. In most countries, relatively few see evidence of widespread anti-Muslim or anti-Christian hostility, and (as a whole) they give their government high marks for treating both religious groups fairly. They acknowledge knowing relatively little they other’s faith, and substantial numbers of African Christians (roughly 40% or more in a dozen nations) say they consider Muslims to be violent. Muslims are significantly more positive in their assessment of Christians than Christians are in their assessment of Muslims.

There are few significant gaps in the degree of support among Christians and Muslims for democracy. Regardless of their faith, most sub-Saharan Africans say they favor democracy and think it is for people from other religions are able to practice their faith freely. At the same time, there is substantial backing among Muslims and Christians alike for government based on either the Bible or Islamic Sharia law, and considerable support among Muslims for imposing severe punishments such as stoning those who commit adultery.
Clausewitz on Counterinsurgency
By: Dr. Terry Tucker

Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine essentially describes counterinsurgency as an inherently political and cultural contest for the trust of the population and an inherent principle in this contest is the primacy of legitimate government: essentially politics has primacy and in counterinsurgency, “all politics is local.”

Clausewitz said “the ideal of a logically complete or sufficient answer to any problem in warfare is sheer delusion”. Many might ask how a book written over 150 years ago would be relevant today or worth the investment of time within and worth the time in a counterinsurgency.

From a conventional point of view we always understood that war was fought for a political purpose. As described in one of the masters most often repeated quotes as that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. Here is where it may be misleading to use selective key phrases or proverbs to capture the essence of counterinsurgency and War as this contributes to establishing mindset.

What if we misunderstood the underlying intent? Not as readily accepted, understood or apparent is that the master also meant the subsequent consequences and implications of war. If war is intended to achieve political objectives, then everything else also enters into the equation. This includes political, economic, social, informational, strategic planning, and actual conduct of operations that all determine war's course and its purpose.

In essence, a key component of any warfare (and most assuredly counterinsurgency warfare) is the need/requirement to be versatile, flexible, and adaptable in order to serve the desired objectives.

Is this the premise for a whole of government, comprehensive and integrated approach to counterinsurgency?

For instance, “If war is an act of force, the emotion cannot fail to be involved. War may not spring from them but they will affect it to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend not on the level of civilization but on how important the conflicting interests are and on how long the conflict lasts” This seems to have in interesting parallel to the fundamental and historical principles of counterinsurgency.

War and especially counterinsurgency is a social phenomenon rather than just a technical phenomenon and the principles of war are necessary in a subjective sense, an educational sense, from the point that they never are sufficient for one to decide what one should do in actual practice nor necessary for a right military decision. “[T]heory does not teach commanders the rules of war as an art, but only attempts to analyze war as an object”.

The objective of a vignette, a STX, and the process of examining and re-enacting is not just to learn correct procedures but to engage and come to terms with the rational and emotional elements of command dilemma; to understand the multiple vectors that influence decision making under difficult conditions.

Science and history is in essence a collection of observations. Doctrinal theory is derived from these observations. The master himself lays out rules for learning and proscribes three primary activities: finding all the pertinent facts, tracing the effects of their causes, and the investigation and assessment of all available means. He also offers key considerations such as: every effect has more than one cause (in Counterinsurgency Targeting and Measures of Effectiveness?), war involves a real rather than abstract social component and the analysis had to be thorough. In essence, the past could be used to prove anything and it is said that Napoleon remarked that history is “fable agreed upon”; as the proverb goes; “beauty (historical truth and applying the seemingly correct doctrinal theory/lessons in counterinsurgency) is in the eyes of the beholder”
One might accuse the author of selecting key phrases or proverbs to capture the essence of counterinsurgency and On War as misleading. But the nature of war, to which counterinsurgency is also a type, is to be referred to from the sum total of its fundamental cause and effect relationships as: “Each era had its own kinds of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own biases. Each would also have its own theory of war.” For instance, the shift in purpose, ways and means is not always multilateral. By way of illustration using historical context look at Mogadishu in ’93, and in Iraq where operations swiftly turned into a complex insurgency.

Interpretations and theory of On War has been said to emphasize the primacy of policy in the conduct of war. In fact the Weinberger /Powell doctrine explicitly cites him. But more importantly, counterinsurgency doctrine, like On War should be a foundation for thinking about counterinsurgency rather than a prescriptive/descriptive way of thinking.

Clausewitz maintained that conflict does not suspend the intercourse between government and people; like the counterinsurgency conflict ecosystem the actors all influence and operate on each other in which effect has more than one cause and the nature of war has its own limitations and its own theory. But most importantly, “in war, as in life generally, all parts of a whole are interconnected and thus the effects produced, however small there cause, must influence all subsequent military operations” and “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking.”

Tactical considerations with far reaching strategic impact are that one must unequivocally understand the true nature of the local conflict, understand that local distribution of power, local solutions to local problems and no broad scalable or replicable template exists in counterinsurgency; but the doctrinal principles are a good starting point for understanding the general framework.

About the Author: Dr. Terry Tucker served in the US Army for 23 years, retired, and now works as a DoD contractor for Cubic in Lessons Learned Integration at DLI. He recently returned from Afghanistan where he was a Counterinsurgency Trainer and Advisor at the ISAF Counterinsurgency Training Center in Kabul. Previously, he has served as a trainer to the Afghan National Army and Police forces, and as a doctrine writer. Dr. Tucker’s PhD is in History, and he currently resides in Monterey, CA.

The Last COIN Lecture
By Dr. Terry Tucker

Science, History and Art all have something in common: they all depend on metaphor, on the recognition of patterns, and the realization that something is like something else to focus attention on a vantage point. On where we have been. We only know our future by the past we project into it; in a sense our history is all we have. Let’s briefly explore this sense of history with an example:

I begin with a brief look at the war; Many Americans opposed it, Europe was hostile to the idea as well, conventional operations were generally speaking successful, but it was clear that post-conflict or phase IV operations was a catastrophe, an enemy defeated in battle resumed resistance after his army had been shattered.

We do not need to rehash the amount of violence and misery. But in retrospect was our effort at
social engineering despite our best intentions, simply impossible to attempt or a failure of good execution? In retrospect, is the central theme is “good idea, impossible to achieve” or “good idea, badly executed”?

The example is critical for it describes the US Civil War; for how the political elements are inextricably tied to the social and economic elements and failing to understanding the past is as important to understanding the present and the future. There is a broader historical context but it is also clearly more than just the broader historical context as well.

We seem to have trouble with identifying continuity with the past as revolutions, small wars and insurrections seem to be treated more as an episode in time than a kind of war. Even strategy treated as an idea with a continuous history is interesting but the results of success seem to be only just more plausible than definitive, while failure becomes an object lesson in what not to do. What we have with doctrine is a set of principles learned from history; and with these principles we expect to project into the future and to predict some measure of success.

For instance, the political nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency defies codification; it is difficult to understand the relationship between political and military action and the public is critical of operations. With the wrong metaphor, the wrong lessons have dangerous implications. Doctrine therefore is a general framework and any notion or suggestion of predictability, scalability or replication should be viewed with suspicion.

Although the underlying theory of war does not change and of which insurgency and counterinsurgency are a complex sub set; the form, scope and consequences do. We are oft reminded that those that fail to study history are doomed to repeat it. In this sense COIN has failed as equally as it has succeeded – replete with lessons learned the hard way and the myriad principles and theory misapplied.

Over the last several years insurgency and counterinsurgency has not enjoyed such popularity since the Kennedy administration. Hubert Humphrey expressed this when he spoke of this bold new type of warfare and aggression which would rank with the discovery of gunpowder as constituting the most significant threat to a State’s security.

Once again, this popularity in this type of warfare symbolizes the progressive severance of traditional social and economic links, the erosion of governance and a moral explosion and polarization of the disenfranchised and the disinherited. Insurgency as a form of warfare constitutes man’s supreme challenge to the awesome power of modern machines and modern technology. Algeria, Vietnam and Russian Afghanistan are cases in point: they engaged the most advanced war machines of the time and defeated the presumption of technology.

America’s interest in insurgency (and/or counterinsurgency) in the 60’s was primarily one of a defensive nature; loses in China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam is cases in point. As a result, thus, have we become more attracted to the myths and methods of insurgency and counterinsurgency than to understanding the causes of these type wars?

We have routinely approached this fact with the simple idea that the simple task of the insurgent is to destroy while that of the counterinsurgent is to build and protect. But this is to disregard not only the lessons of history, but contemporary lessons in Afghanistan as well. The insurgent does not simply seek to destroy his enemy and to inflict loss, but to delegitimize the government and to establish rival governance and systems through the establishment of parallel hierarchies because even in its clandestine state, even in the lack of official presence, the shadow governance must prove its efficacy.
For instance, China, Vietnam, Algeria and the Mexican Revolution were all different insurgencies, yet they shared the commonality of how insurgents were able to establish and exploit effective shadow governance. Perhaps more importantly, the problem was further exacerbated by ineffective responses from the respective national governments. In Afghanistan the presence of “Shadow Governance” has grown which, in essence, supports the fact that the enemies’ task to use selective violence, is less important than the task to “out administer” the Kabul government … not just out fight his enemy.

In essence describing and thinking about insurgency and counterinsurgency might be an attempt to recognize what the insurgents and counterinsurgents attempt to control versus what they might actually control, and, while attempting to interpret this drama recognizing that ones actions directly and indirectly involve multiple actors and multiple audiences – local and global.

Therefore the conditions of insurgency as defined by the prerequisites of an insurgency are not entirely created by the violence, the conspiracy, or disinformation, but are already partially inherent in the cultural and social structure and the availability of external sanctuary as a dynamic of an insurgency is of far greater psychological and diplomatic value than just the political and military value.

In essence the organizers of an insurgency place far more emphasis on the “human factors”; they exploit a triple dislocation of the PMESII that the military is incapable of countering alone; primarily the political, social and economic elements.

Politically it is the dislocation of traditional authority; an increasing freedom from domination by foreigners; socially it is characterized by the emergence of entire new classes of societies in the form of displaced persons, urban workers, gaps in generational views and classes as the young, the marginalized and disinherit reject either the old, the new or the existing, and, economically by the demand and unequal distribution of economic development.

Does this lead to the question: Where is the distribution of poverty and austerity as opposed to the distribution of wealth?

These pressures led to direct and indirect confrontation with those that would adhere to, or prefer to, maintain the cultural, political and economic status quo. The choices for target sets of both the insurgents and counterinsurgents become, and are, a deliberation of intent and opportunity and information dissemination and non-lethal effect seem to have a far greater impact.

Current doctrine is premised on hearts and minds, carrots and sticks and transformation. Fundamentally this is social and cultural re-engineering. The keystone concept in this doctrine; a keystone not completely understood is the development of “social capital”. The building of networks of trust that use the components’ of social capital, because to achieve moral and political isolation of the enemy requires not only a severance, a cutting of the old but also the forging of new links. And as the French so aptly describe it: it is to legislate in the void.

The insurgent legislates this void by establishing the new, while maintaining congruence with the old. He exploits the distribution of poverty, he legislates in the void by providing key governance and social leadership tied to the existing cultural/social base; the primacy of politics at the local level is demonstrated by the fact that prime attention is paid to the human and social dynamics – the human factor’s of war in which common past experience, culture, grievance, territory and history might suggest, taken together, a common identity – thereby maintaining congruence with the old while establishing the new.
For instance, we traditionally view the departure of the intelligentsia as escape from the violence; what if this migration and abandonment of the intelligentsia was in reality a measure of the success of the insurgency? What if measures of effectiveness such as shipping costs, smuggling rates and absentee land ownership provided the clues to the relationship and similarities of the perceived and simultaneous effectiveness of security, governance and development? Is there more concern for order than with local participation, with obedience over consent; how do you separate behavior toward policies and actions from one’s feelings and attitudes?

In conclusion, the term counterinsurgency fails to adequately describe the type of conflict within which we find ourselves engaged. This conflict lies in a blurred area of the spectrum of warfare. It fails to denote the conventional, the civil, the punitive, the militarist, the civil-military, the enabling concepts, or the comprehensive and integrated approach. The very term seems to treat the problem as one that is more administrative, managerial, and technical in the solution, and it appears to be more concerned with procedural approaches than substantive ones. For the military, it seems to denote a kinetic approach with less consideration for the important considerations of political, economic and social elements in which “out administering” the enemy is infinitely more important than out fighting the enemy.

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On The Road Again …

FAOA Board of Governor Travel Notes
By: John Haseman

Members of your FAO Association Board of Governors (BoG) are committed to expanding contacts with members – and potential members – who live outside the Beltway (sometimes FAR outside). Your BoG members frequently travel on business and personal trips to the regions in which they are ‘experts’, and take advantage of the opportunities those travels provide to interact with FAOs and potential FAOs stationed in embassies, defense attaché offices, and security assistance organizations, as well within major command headquarters.

In Jan 2010, BoG member John Haseman traveled to Thailand, Laos, and Indonesia on one of his semi-annual trips to Southeast Asia. In Vientiane, he met with DATT LTC Jamie McAden, the first US military attaché in Laos since the end of the Vietnam War. LTC McAden opened the DAO in 2009. Jamie is a Southeast Asia FAO with prior assignments including the ODC, Jakarta and as Deputy Political Advisor within US Pacific Command’s headquarters.

John next traveled to Jakarta (where he served three separate tours from 1978 thru 1994) to gather information to update a book he co-authored in 2009 about the US-Indonesian security relationship. (An article was published in the last FAO Journal, Feb 2010.) He spent time with personnel in both the ODC and the DAO. The DATT, COL Kevin Richards, and the ODC Chief, LTC (P) James Robinson, are superb FAOs working together to improve the military-to-military relationship that was virtually moribund in 1999. It is an exciting time for the “FAO business” in Indonesia. Our bilateral relationships have almost been fully restored and is being skillfully managed by the DAO/SAO team.

John’s final stop was Bangkok, where both the DAO and JUSMAG THAI were deeply involved in planning the annual Cobra Gold exercise. At each stop, John left copies of the Association’s Journal, discussed the Association with those he met, and urged non-members to join. He also asked each to consider writing an article for the Journal relating their experiences as a FAO, or about important security aspects/events in their respective countries of assignment.

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: What is it and why does it matter?
By: Major Vincent G. Martinelli, US Army FAO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental group of nations formed to address security and stability issues in Central Asia. Despite significant evolution and achievements since it was founded in 2001, SCO members don’t have a unified vision for the organization, which undermines efforts to categorize it. Portrayals of the SCO from members and outsiders range from a pacific, visionary, multilateral organization, to a security bulwark against NATO and western encroachment, to a modern version of the Great Game. In fact, the SCO should be viewed as a blend of these natures; a prism reflecting different colors depending on the light shined on it. Its ultimate roles and capabilities in the region are still solidifying and its members often disagree on what they should be. Moreover, any future decisions along these lines will not be made in a vacuum, but will be informed by the policies and actions of external actors such as the US, EU and NATO. Predictive indicators might signal the shape the SCO is assuming and the direction in which it’s moving, and could include the response of member nations to the unrest in Kyrgyzstan; decisions accepting new members; fate of the US airbase in Kyrgyzstan; and SCO statements/actions regarding the war in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the best way to understand the SCO is through engagement, which for the US, has been limited. US or NATO engagement with the SCO offers the hope of shaping it (to a degree) and, given the importance of the region, will yield greater policy benefits than detachment.

The combined population of SCO member nations is roughly one and a half billion people, a quarter of the world’s population, with an aggregate nominal GDP of over US$6 trillion. The combined gas and oil production of its members rank them as the top producer of both commodities worldwide. Oil and gas producing nations in the SCO are strategically located within Eurasia and serve as pipeline hubs for the transit of these commodities to Europe and East and South Asia.
The Central Asian lands of the SCO’s six members – the geographic heart of an organization whose body covers much of Asia – have been at the center of the grand theories and calculations of geopolitical giants from Mackinder to Brzezinski. Central Asia forms a geopolitical ball bearing at the center of the most sensitive parts of US foreign policy interests. These critical components, immediately surrounding Central Asia, read like a foreign policy Top Ten list, including energy security, a fractured Caucasus region, resurgent Russia, emerging China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nuclear Iran. Either the region can operate smoothly, without friction to aid US interests, or excessive friction caused by such endemic regional issues as radicalism, corruption, civil strife, drug trafficking and nuclear proliferation can cause it to overheat and severely damage US interests.

The SCO has undergone significant development since 1996, which can be viewed in three stages: The first phase from 1996-2001, the second from 2001-2004 and the third from 2005 to the present. In the first phase, the Shanghai Five, as it was called then, consisted of China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, all states that shared common borders with each other after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It was a relatively unstructured group brought together through a Chinese initiative, with a singular focus on border security issues and conflict avoidance to mitigate potential tension arising from border disputes. The group’s membership reflected this focus, as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, who don’t share borders with China, were not part of the group. The Five signed the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in 1996, followed by the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1997.

On June 15, 2001, the Five admitted Uzbekistan and the organization was renamed the SCO. The admission of a new member that doesn’t share a common border with either Russia or China signified a shift in the organization’s purpose, from a narrow focus on reducing tensions along borders, to a broader mandate to address security issues encapsulated by the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, extremism and radicalism. In the economic arena, China proposed the development of a Free Trade Area in 2003. In 2004 Mongolia joined as an observer and the organizational and institutional nature of the SCO took a significant step forward with the creation of the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. This second phase identified the SCO as a legitimate, long-term and comprehensive organization for addressing regional security, stability and economic issues, albeit with a decidedly inward focus.

In the third phase, beginning in 2004, the SCO began turning outward to the world and establishing itself as a significant entity to be dealt with concerning Central Asian issues. In 2004 the SCO signed agreements with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), received observer status at the UN and the SCO Secretary General addressed the UN General Assembly. In July 2005, at the Astana summit, the SCO issued a statement calling for a timeline for the withdrawal of US forces from the region. Although some claim that this statement was the result of heavy lobbying by Russia agreed to reluctantly by the Central Asian states, this seems hardly credible, as the perceived Western encroachment in Central Asia that led to this statement was of concern not only to Russia, but to China and the Central Asian members as well. The issue was alleged US encouragement to revolutions in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and condemnation of the Uzbek government’s violent response to an uprising in May 2005. When, in 2005, Iran (along with Pakistan and India) became an official Observer to the SCO, and China and Russia held joint military exercises entitled Peace Mission 2005, the SCO seemed, to many in the West, to be transforming into an anti-Western security alliance.

In this phase of the SCO’s development, other events signified the SCO’s further integration in the security and economic arena. In 2005 the SCO announced that it would prioritize energy projects, with its members agreeing to create an Interbank Association (which first met in 2006) to fund such projects. In 2006 Russia announced its intention to develop plans for an SCO Energy Club. And in 2007 the SCO signed an agreement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and a joint action plan with the CSTO in 2008.

In 2009, China promised US$10 billion in aid to Central Asian states hit by the global economic crisis. Also in 2009, the SCO held a conference in Russia on Afghanistan, which was attended by President Obama. This effort marked an ambitious attempt by the SCO to address a major international issue in the region outside the borders of its member states.

Currently, the SCO’s stated goals are “strengthening mutual confidence and good-
neighborly relations among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and rational political and economic international order.” In the security realm the SCO continues to focus on combating the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism, while the economic focus remains on energy cooperation, infrastructure projects and loans. Culturally, the organization promotes common heritage and educational opportunities.

The SCO has a well-developed organizational structure consisting of councils of Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign Ministers and National Coordinators. The Heads of State meet annually at different capitals. A Secretariat is the executive body, implementing the decisions of the Heads of State Council. Sri Lanka and Belarus are Dialogue Partners with the SCO. Of the Observer nations, Iran and Pakistan have applied for full membership. The US was denied Observer status in 2005 because it isn’t a Central Asian state, while Turkmenistan has not chosen to apply for membership.

Discourse on the SCO is widely divergent, both inside and outside the SCO. From member states and some outside observers there is a view that the SCO represents something of a post-modern organization – a model for multilateral cooperation among nations in a multi-polar world. In this narrative, the SCO, under the leadership of Russia and China, is addressing security issues in a responsible manner by resolving border issues, giving smaller nations a voice, and encouraging economic development as a means to achieving lasting stability. By focusing inward on the evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism, the SCO addresses areas of concern for all members and the world at large, thus filling a niche and contributing to world stability. SCO statements highlight normative, values-based aspects of the organization’s philosophy of non-interference in member’s internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty. The motto of this SCO can be imagined as, “We’re good neighbors, minding our own business and contributing to regional prosperity and stability, so someone else doesn’t have to.”

In a second narrative, the SCO is evolving into a traditional security alliance – an embryonic NATO – albeit one that is still focused inward rather than outward. Promulgators of this view focus on military exercises conducted by the SCO and the aforementioned statement from the 2005 Astana summit calling on the withdrawal of US forces. Typical discourse describes the organization as a counter to expansion of US and NATO influence in the region, especially under pressure from Russia. Alternatively, the narrative might contain somber warnings that further SCO integration could lead to a gas cartel that would threaten US and European energy security. The motto of this SCO might be, “We must be strong to keep outsiders from meddling.”
Lastly, there exist frequent references harking back to the Great Game between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century. This is the Great Game, Part II, a zero-sum affair rooted in natural resources, economics and geopolitics, where the players scrabble to amass the most points. In this view, the wily Russians are trying to reassert their hegemony over the Central Asian Khanates of old. China, the weak player in the last Great Game, has played its cards right and holds the advantage through its investment, loans, and construction of pipelines and other infrastructure in the Central Asian states that will suck resources east. In this game China and Russia cooperate only as much or as long as necessary to weaken the traditionally strong player – The British Raj – (this time played by its intriguing but less experienced and often fumbling understudy, the US). Just as in the last Great Game, the wild card to victory may be Afghanistan. This version of the SCO might have as its motto, “Shhh, if we draw the weak Central Asian states into our web, we can control them and control Asia.”

Does the SCO deserve these versions of itself? In some ways it behaves like a security bloc, and in other ways its economic and energy focus appears to be to the disadvantage of the US and the West. But it has created a legitimate multilateral forum for cooperation at the expense of conflict, development at the expense of disrepair, and stability at the expense of chaos. Progress in the security domain has been balanced by disagreements between China and Russia as to the priority of the SCO versus the CSTO in this area. Economic proposals often lack funding or follow through. Energy cooperation and consensus are frequently lacking, or deals are struck bilaterally outside the SCO.

The three narratives of the SCO are just that – narratives. Descriptions are not reality, they attempt to explain reality. They serve as caricatures of the real entity; pictures that accentuate certain prominent or distinctive features. Common sense points to the notion that the SCO is comprised of a complex web of motivations and interests striving toward a multitude of goals that are not shared by all members. The nature of the organization is clearly evolving and its identity today may be different in a year, which only highlights the need to engage with it to the greatest extent possible. A notion of maintaining distance in order not to confer greater legitimacy to the SCO than is due would be shortsighted at best.

Certain events and actions could forecast shifts in the SCO. The Russian invasion of Georgia signaled the Central Asian nations of Russia’s ability and willingness to use force against a former Soviet republic. This strengthened China’s influence in the SCO in the economic arena. How Russia and China respond to continuing unrest in Kyrgyzstan could impact the cohesiveness of the SCO. Providing full membership to Iran, absent a resolution of the nuclear issue, or a decrease in tensions with the West, would point to an SCO poised to counter NATO and US vital interests. Changes in the size, type, frequency and transparency of military exercises would provide a clear indication of the capabilities and intentions of the SCO. A decision by Kyrgyzstan to close the US airbase in Manas might be an indication of consensus to further limit NATO and US influence in the region.

Central Asia, by virtue of its location and resources, is a region with the potential to hinder or help US interests and the SCO is an organization that can play an important role in that outcome. However, varying interests among its members render it difficult to understand. Views range from the hopeful notion that the SCO represents an embodiment of a model for future international cooperation in a multi-polar world, to an emerging security bloc to counterbalance NATO and US influence in Central Asia, to a modern version of the economic and resource driven Great Game. Its essence is most likely a mix of these views and will certainly evolve and adapt due to internal debate and external stimuli. For its achievements and its potential the SCO warrants continued close observation and, more importantly, engagement by the US and NATO.

About the Author:
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Major Martinelli graduated from the US Military Academy as Infantryman. He later transitioned into the Special Forces and held two Detachment commands; including Afghanistan from 2002-03. Assessed as a 48C FAO, Martinelli completed in-country training in France and served as the XO for the Office of Defense Cooperation, Turkey from 2007-09. He is currently at Boston University pursuing an MA in International Relations. He is an elected member of the FAO Association’s Board of Governors.
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan After Eight Years: Should UN Assistance Continue?
By: CPT Ivan E. Raiklin, US Army National Guard

While many still wonder what the strategic importance of being in Afghanistan brings to world stability and to the security interests of the nations involved in Afghanistan (particularly those from NATO, Iran, and Pakistan) this essay outlines the UN’s role in Afghanistan and includes examples of then costs and benefits associated with various projects. It will introduce the reader to the overall level of involvement of the UN in Afghanistan and how each of the 23 subunits of the UN System assist in the development of this war-torn nation. As we will see, each of the 23 subordinate bodies offer varied levels of value-added to the COIN strategy in Afghanistan. It is necessary to recognize the UN’s role and capabilities by all parties in Afghanistan in order to fully maximize its benefits avoid redundancies and combine momentum where feasible.

First, the creation of UNAMA. “Over the past sixty years, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security.” Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and without a viable government controlling Afghanistan in 1990s, it became a safe haven for terrorists. With the attack on the United States in 2001, Afghanistan became priority #1 in the fight against global terrorism. It was and (to some extent) remains a safe haven for terrorism due to weak government institutions unable to repel the terrorist and criminal threat.

At the end of 2001 in Bonn, Germany, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations to Afghanistan in order to maintain security and public order, and to develop a plan in order to establish a government in Afghanistan after the initial US intervention. The UN organization charged with overseeing this, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) laid out the framework for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This mandate created the requisite legitimacy for conducting peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.

Following the Bonn Agreement, UNAMA was created on 28 Mar 2002 with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1401 wherein, “Endorses the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution, of a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, with the mandate and structure laid out in the report of the SecGen of 18 Mar 2002. This mandate has been renewed on a yearly basis with the current mandate set to expire at the end of 2010. In addition to these mandates, the framework for cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations and the international community has been outlined and agreed in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Paris Conference of June 2008. All lay the framework for working towards peace and security, rule of law, good governance, human rights protection and sustainable economic and social development.

“With a mixed record, and dim prospects, what are the costs and benefits of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan remaining versus withdrawing?”

Overall, the UN’s peacekeeping role in Afghanistan focuses on the following:
1 - Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
2 - Facilitate the political process promoting dialogue and reconciliation, and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective government institutions;
3 - Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.”

As an ‘integrated’ Mission, UNAMA has two main areas of activities: political affairs and development and humanitarian issues. The Mission currently has some 1,500 staff, the vast majority of whom (around
80 per cent) are Afghan nationals. UNAMA has 18 regional and provincial offices across Afghanistan and liaison offices in Islamabad and Teheran. In the Secretary-General's March 2009 report to the UN Security Council, Ban Ki-Moon noted that the General Assembly had agreed to a 91.5 per cent increase in budget for UNAMA to US$ 168 million. This funding was geared to increase international staff by 115, national Professionals by 57, national support staff by 249, United Nations Volunteers by 16, and to open four additional provincial offices (Ghazni, Sar-e-Pul, Helmand and Farah) while simultaneously strengthening of UNAMA's regional liaison offices in Islamabad and Teheran. These liaison offices are the primary centers for coordination between UNAMA and Afghan's neighbors. It is essential to note that the UNAMA effort is multilateral in scope, factoring in the interests of the two nations with the greatest interest in Afghani internal affairs. This is a key element if a political solution is to be had-the involvement of key constituencies: Pakistan and Iran. While "extra military resources committed to Afghanistan by US President Barack Obama and other members of NATO are much appreciated … they must be accompanied by a coherent political strategy". In fact Kai Eide, the UN Special representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan further states that "we need a strategy that is politically and not militarily driven….the political strategy is too often shaped as an appendix to military thinking." This political strategy is accomplished through UNAMA and its 23 elements constituting the UN "Country Team", similar to a US Embassy "Country Team". Below, we will discuss these elements and the most salient activities of each. Where relevant, I provide some analysis on their benefit to Afghanistan and its stability. In addition, where appropriate, I will offer a counterargument or alternative approach to each element. Keeping in mind that ISAF, with its focus on the military aspect of power projection, the UN is expected to provide the diplomatic, information and economic capability to the host government to support its efforts to quell an insurgency. The level of success will be based on the ability of organs of the UN to coordinate with organs of ISAF, and to share their experiences. This relationship begins by understanding each others' roles and responsibilities. Here are the 23 elements engaged in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program - The most recent activity has been the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups program totaling $116m with 9 nations participating. While the program is well-intentioned, it appears the amount of money required to disarm the groups is quite high. If the only method at actually disarming is done through the purchase of these arms, the negative impact could be that the program is creating a legal market for the sale of arms that were obtained through illegal means such as through theft or the like, creating a large profit to those giving up arms to fund other illicit activities. To date 44,916 weapons have been collected under DIAG with 626 IAGs disarmed as of 30 Jun 2009.

Asian Development Bank - An area of acclaimed success by the ADB, is in the investment in infrastructure; specifically, by bringing electricity to parts of Kabul. In fact, the ADB website boasts that "For the first time in a generation, many of Kabul's four million people can enjoy the benefits a regular supply of electricity." While the capability to build the capacity for electricity is present both in the military and civilian engineers in Afghanistan, the ADB, through its access to donors can implement improvements in infrastructure in the near and long term for UNAMA.

International Labor Organization - The ILO is working closely with other UN and International agencies in reconstruction activities in Afghanistan since 2003. More specifically the ILO Liaison Office in Kabul is providing support in building the capacity of ILO's tripartite constituents e.g. restructuring the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, strengthening workers' and employers' organizations, providing employment services to the job seekers in 10 provinces; and on return, reintegration and temporary migration of Afghan workers and their protection; in coordination with the German Government, UNHCR and Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

International Organization for Migration - IOM provides emergency relief to displaced persons, stabilizes migrant communities and helps plan for and support mass population displacement. IOM programs are sponsored by the European Union, Australia, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). While this program is needed to help track and manage those that are displaced due to security, environmental or other concerns, it is likely that the listed donor nations above, contribute in order to avoid an exodus of Afghans from emigrating to those
nations and regions. Nonetheless, the IOM program at least provides some level of support to those displaced due to the vagaries of war.

**Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan** - This UN program focuses on the clearing of mines, educating locals on how to reduce and avoid along with assisting victims of mines. While this necessary program has made some strides in clearing many areas of Afghanistan that were mined by the Soviets, there still remain 2,082 contaminated communities according to MACCA. This equates to 689km² containing 5,384 hazardous areas with different types of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Shown below in green are the areas already cleared, a significant portion of the most heavily populated areas of Afghanistan. While much still needs to be done as many parts of the country still have mines, the map below shows the positive results of MACCA.

**Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights** - Because of a weak rule of law, Afghanistan continues to suffer from a pervasive culture of impunity leading to a lack of right to life, safety, freedom of movement, access to education and health, and access to livelihoods where insurgents fester. This UN office helps the local government to assist in rooting out human rights violations and promote the rule of law by protecting individuals through education and training. This office’s work is subjective in nature, wherein most of the results of its work are through making others aware of human rights violation, and thus applying international pressures to those committing the violations, this is a difficult task without an enforcement mechanism in place to actually diminish these violations. Press reports and public knowledge of human rights violations do nothing to stop those that are not punished for these acts. Other organizations within the UN deal with specific groups of people such as discussed next, the UN Children’s Fund.

**United Nations Children’s Fund** - UNICEF’s primary focus is to protect children and assist in their development. This includes providing for proper nutrition, developing programs to provide basic educational equality between boys and girls, educating parents on basic pediatric care, and protecting children from violence, exploitation and abuse. While this is a wide range of issues, it is a necessary task, so the next generation of Afghans will be better suited to not only survive, but also to provide for themselves, their family and to someday compete in the global arena which will provide a stable environment for their communities and future generations. This is a long-term effort and, again, the task is outside the responsibility and capability of a military force.

**UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs** - This office deals with the coordination of various different programs as outlined in the Afghanistan Humanitarian Action Plan. This plan requested about $666 million for 146 projects by 39 NGOs and 8 UN agencies. With $452 million being granted, this program assists 235,000 displaced people in Afghanistan, 2.6 million refugees; the approximately 7.4 million (1/3 of the population) without food security; 400,000 Afghans affected by natural disasters on an annual basis; 15,000 dying of tuberculosis annually; a part of the women who die every 30 minutes from pregnancy and 1.3 million girls and 700k boys that are not in school. This coordinating body helps fight the ramifications of natural disasters such as flooding, Health, Shelter, Nutrition, Water and sanitation and Agriculture issues that arise throughout the nation. While the alternative would be to let these folks live the way they currently do as many other parts of the world are, without such UN intervention, however, by doing so, in my opinion would be to allow Afghanistan to become a breeding ground for humans who care less about their own lives as they have nothing to live for and resort to crime, violence, drugs in order to live out the remainder of their life without any potential for improvement.

**UN Development Program** - This project focuses on government development and projects which analysis the effectiveness of governance in Afghanistan. Recently, the UNDP released a “Police Perception Survey 2009 - The Afghan Perspective. This docu-
ment assists the existing government to see what the public perception of police is and to make necessary adjustments for the population to have more faith in the existing security organs within Afghanistan.

UN Development Fund for Women - Since 2002, UNIFEM has focused on meeting the needs of women taking into account the country’s history and culture. UNIFEM is similar to UNICEF, however, in countries such as Afghanistan where women experience much less rights than their male counterparts, the UNIFEM program attempts to bring women’s rights to a level that is at least humane if not equal to men. As mentioned in the UNICEF section, educating women is also a priority for UNIFEM.

UN Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization - UNESCO focuses on protecting landmarks of great historical value to Afghanistan, the region or the world. Some examples of this include the 12th century minaret of Jam, the Bamiyan site and the restoration of the National Museum. Other projects include the development of the Kabul University and the preservation of 1,400 Afghan ethnographic and archaeological objects at the Afghanistan Museum-in-Exile in Switzerland. While these projects help protect a national pride in these sites, probably the educational development wing of UNESCO is the most important in order to develop conscientious leaders from Kabul University, which is the most prestigious institution of higher learning in the country. In 2009, a $560 million plan to double the number of higher education institutions was launched and UNESCO contributed $1 million.

United Nations Environment Program - UNEP enables and educates nations and peoples to improve their quality of life by improving the environment, without compromising that of future generations. While it may appear that environmental issues are the least concerns of Afghans, parts of the country which are more secure such as in the north and west, society may be ready to tackle these issues.

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization - The focus of FAO is to improve the country’s agricultural development for the people of Afghanistan to become more food secure and self-reliant and engage in economically viable activities – food production, off-farm employment and trade - rather than in the production of poppy which is used to fuel the world’s opium trade. Working with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, it has a presence in Kabul with regional offices in Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad, with sub-regional offices in Bamiyan, Farah, Ghazni and Kunduz. Nations throughout the world are concerned that Afghanistan lacks economic viability aside from crime, terrorism and the production of poppy for heroine. FAO attempts to counter this by advising on alternative ways to utilize this land for benevolent and beneficial purposes to include various crop developments and partnering with institutions to create demand for poppy for medicinal use.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - Working hand in hand with IOM, UNHCR ensures refugees have a place to stay and are able to transition back into society as productive citizens. The 2010 budget is estimated at 107 million which will provide for the return of refugees from Pakistan and Iran and other displaced persons within Afghanistan. As of mid-November, the assisted return of refugees included 48,320 from Pakistan and 5,758 from Iran.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization - UNIDO focuses on sustainable industrial development through the dissemination of industry-related knowledge, providing technical support for project implementation, and helping local industries integrate into global trade along with improving access to energy. With a weak economy and very little substantive industries, much work needs to be done in this area. The best prospects for Afghan industry are to create a secure enough environment for the completion of the Trans-Afghan Pipeline which would bring Turkmen gas to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan with Afghanistan receiving a percentage of the transit fees. With an estimated price of $6 billion and completion date of no earlier than 2018, the rewards from this project will not be reaped for quite some time. A project that may reap rewards in the nearer term is the extraction of iron ore deposits. Recently, Kai Eide reported that Afghanistan “has Asia’s largest iron ore deposits and a number of other exploitable minerals.” Thus, creating mining projects could prove economically beneficial.

UN Integrated Regional Information Network - IRIN is a radio project in Afghanistan designed to assist local radio journalists. Since its inception in 2003, the program has trained 100 Afghan journalists, 25 local correspondents in 18 of 34 provinces. By supporting 20 local radio stations, providing hands-on training and mentoring on making programs on humanitarian issues and producing upwards of 600 programs in Dari and Pashto for national broadcast
via local partners Radio Azadi, Salaam Watandar, and other FM stations, IRIN has educated the Afghani population on issues of humanitarian concern.

**United Nations Population Fund** - “UNFPA supports countries in using population data for policies and programs to reduce poverty and to ensure that every pregnancy is wanted, every birth is safe, every young person is free of HIV/AIDS, and every girl and woman is treated with dignity and respect.” Demographic information that UNFPA helps compile, can prove to be beneficial to MG Flynn, the senior intelligence officer of ISAF forces. In a recent article he wrote on the intel community there, “Why the Intel Fusion Center can’t give me data about the population is beyond me,” remarked the operations officer of one US task force, echoing a common complaint: “I don’t want to say we’re clueless, but we are. We’re no more than fingernail deep in our understanding of the environment.” Well, it appears that the UN may have the sort of information that ISAF forces are looking for, however, it appears that most are “clueless” that the UN is in the business of political development and engagement with the local population. It may not hurt to ask and see what the UN may have to offer. After all, doesn’t ISAF’s goal fit with US strategy, which fits with the strategy of the UN Security council, of which the US is a permanent member? Better yet, it is probably all open source. “What we conclude is there must be a concurrent effort under the ISAF commander’s strategy to acquire and provide knowledge about the population, the economy, the government, and other aspects of the dynamic environment we are trying to shape, secure, and successfully leave behind.” I believe that a majority of the information the intel officers seek, and don’t find, is due to the fact that they do not want to look at data produced by other organizations within Afghanistan (to include NGOs and the UN) for fear that they will be labeled bleeding heart liberals if seen navigating to those websites. Worse yet, they are required to resort to these sources because the intel community is irrelevant to the point that they are forced to get the data they need from non-standard sources.

**United Nations Office for Project Services** - With more than 10 years of experience in the country, the UNOPS Afghanistan Operations Centre (AGOC) supports national reconstruction and development efforts by providing projects with goods and services - from stand-alone, to long-term management and capacity development support. The primary focus is on infrastructure, education, environment and agriculture, governance and rule of law.

**United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** - UNODC’s assists Afghanistan in the struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. More importantly, it conducts research and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs, crime issues such as human trafficking and expand the evidence base for policy and operational decisions. Once, again, it appears that another portion of the United Nations could play a beneficial role to ISAF forces. Greater coordination, as MG Flynn suggests with the UN, NGOs and the local community are important in stabilizing the nation of Afghanistan so that a military withdrawal can even be considered.

**United Nations World Food Program** - WFP has had an Afghan presence since 1963, active in all 34 provinces, providing “food to the poor and vulnerable families, schoolchildren, teachers, illiterate people, tuberculosis patients and their families, returning refugees, internally displaced persons and disabled people – with an emphasis on vulnerable women and girls.” Several programs, such as food for school and food for work programs literally pave the way for the unemployed to build roads, bridges, reservoirs and irrigation systems by providing these laborers with food. All projects are agreed upon with the consultation of the government and local communities. These projects are laying the foundation for goodwill and relevancy of the UN, providing an immediate and long-term need for the communities involved. In addition to the above programs, a campaign against tuberculosis, mother and child health nutrition and the Greening of Afghanistan Initiative aimed at improving Afghanistan’s devastated environment help to foster an improved relationship with the local population. This staying power of over 45 years needs to be used as an example by other entities. Another program worthy of note is the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service which provides safe and efficient air transport and cargo services which provided some 21,000 passengers and 39.4 metric tons of cargo the ability to move to necessary locations.

**United Nations World Health Organization** - WHO provides leadership on global health issues. These include: shaping health research, providing technical support to countries by monitoring and assessing health trends of the overall health sector policy and its management. Also, WHO provides education on subjects as diverse as reproduction and child health, disease prevention, mental health, control of communicable diseases, along with emergency preparedness and response.
World Bank - Build capacity of the state and its accountability to its citizens to ensure the provision of services that are affordable, accessible and of adequate quality. Promote growth on the rural economy and improve rural livelihoods. Support growth of a formal, modern and competitive private sector. The World Bank is the primary vehicle for donor nations to fund the various projects under the auspices of the UN system. Without this requisite funding, many projects would fail to come to fruition.

CONCLUSIONS

The UN has provided a value added to the stability of Afghanistan and in 2010 faces an opportunity to address many challenges in Afghanistan. A high-level international conference to be held in late January in London will provide an opportunity for the international community to set that agenda, with their Afghan partners. However, greater success will only be achieved when UN and ISAF can coordinate their activities so as to avoid redundancies or lack of knowledge of a local area. As the senior intelligence officer of ISAF recently explained, the focus on intelligence analysis should be focused on the people of Afghanistan rather than the enemy. Thankfully, senior ISAF leadership recognize more coordination with the UN is needed and that the military apparatus needs to look to the UN as it has information that is critical to succeeding in stabilizing and securing Afghanistan. It is incumbent on the UN and ISAF to work together so that when conducting military operations, local politics are not ignored. Currently, there is not enough coordination, because currently the military apparatus is “ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers”. This ignorance could be avoided at times by interacting with the UN and NGOs throughout a district or province.

Which mosques and bazaars attract the most people from week to week? The best place to start is could be UNESCO. However, since the “is also a culture that is emphatic about secrecy but regrettably less concerned about mission effectiveness.” Even senior military officials agree that “it is useful to think of the Afghanistan war as a political campaign, albeit a violent one.” This echoes the words of the UN spokesperson above. “UN peacekeeping is an im-

partial and widely accepted vehicle for both burden-sharing and effective action.”

“The other alternative to the UN is that we do nothing and that these conflicts fester, spill over, and create an environment where criminals can operate and where terrorists can find a safe haven.” Because “the UN is the largest multilateral contributor to post-conflict stabilization worldwide [and] only the US deploys more military personnel to the field than the UN.” It is necessary for both to collaborate for maximum effect in Afghanistan which will create more benefit than costs.

In terms of the UN’s cost effectiveness, according to the UN Factsheet on Peacekeeping Operations, the cost is much less than other forms of international intervention and more equitably shared among UN member states. Also, the budge, for example, as taken from the period 1 July 2008-30 June 2009 was 7.1 billion US, or about ½% of world military spending, much less when compared to NATO, US or other regional organizations.” In fact, Ambassador Susan Rice, the US permanent Representative to the UN stated that “If the US was to act on its own-unilaterally-and deploy its own forces in many of these countries; for every dollar that the US would spend, the UN can accomplish the Mission for twenty cents.” While it is clear that the intentions of the UN and its actions in Afghanistan show a benefit of improved security, it also clear that the UN (from a US perspective) provides value added.

About the Author:
Captain Ivan Raiklin (ARNG) is a Eurasia FAO currently is completing the Special Forces Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Ivan’s military career includes duty as the Assistant Army Attaché in Tbilisi, Georgia in 2007. Previously, he worked at the NGB as the Intel Community Liaison in support of national requirements. He also served as the NBG’s Operations Security Program Manager. He deployed with 7th & 20th Special Forces Groups to Kabul, Afg. serving as an AOB Executive Officer/NATO LNO planning and conducting Special Operations in RC East. Prior to joining the Special Forces regiment, Ivan was an intelligence officer in the HUMINT/CI fields and attended the MSSI program at the JMIC. Ivan was elected as a member of the FAO Association Board of Governors in 2009. As a civilian, Ivan works as an attorney.
Civilian Integration: 
The Expansion of FAO Expeditionary Reach and Cultural Expertise
By: Jeff Hoffmann

Based on the Air Force Research Institute Strategic Concept for 2018-2023, on any given day over 33,000 Airmen are engaged in expeditionary operations around the globe, conducting conventional and Irregular Warfare (IW); stability, security, transition, and reconstruction, humanitarian relief, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and coalition building or what is commonly defined throughout the Defense communities as Building Partnership Capacity.

This past January, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lt. General (Ret.) James Clapper, tasked the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to lead development of a Civilian Foreign Area Specialist (CIVFAS) program within the greater Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE).

Primary guidance for the CIVFAS program is to model the military FAO programs in general terms and leverage findings from the 2009 CIVFAS Tiger Team, which consisted of representatives from each of the Services and the major Combat Support Agencies; National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and DIA.

Mr. Mark Neighbors has been designated the CIVFAS Program Director and has received $2M to establish a program management office along with a training & development utilization plan for a very limited number of CIVFAS accessions to begin in FY11 over a five year period.

Upon arriving at DIA in Feb 2010 on a Joint Duty Assignment from the U.S. Navy, Mr. Neighbors established several goals:

- Accelerate in order to get the program implemented for an FY11 Initial Operating Capability
- Establish a working group of representatives from the DIE Components to assure transparency of process and stakeholder participation, including determination of CIVFAS requirements among components
- Advocate and support the program among DIE civilian leadership
- Establish a funding plan/resource Program of Record base through the FY12-16 POM

Mr. Neighbors remains patient and awaits coordination and approval of a Program Concept of Operations (CONOPS). His initial plan is to screen and select 10 fresh candidates to begin a training pipeline and immediately designate an additional 10-20 CIVFAS personnel who meet eligibility requirements, including a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2/2/2.

Case Study: 
Naval Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS)

In Apr ’07, NCIS created an organic FAO program aimed to select, build and maintain a cadre of NCIS Special Agents (career code 1811) and Intelligence Specialists (0132) with an in-depth knowledge of specific nations and geographic areas to include their language, and related economic, cultural and political influences. Three primary missions include:

1 - Cooperation with host nation partners in achieving maritime domain awareness (MDA) through the Force Protection Detachment (FPD), expeditionary support, and other relevant programs;

2 - Improved host nation efforts in bilateral criminal investigations, counterintelligence (CI), and counterterrorism (CT) operations such as liaison with foreign law enforcement (LE) officials, security forces, and global organizations like INTERPOL; and

3 - Provide critical and expert sociological, geopolitical, and cultural advice to NCIS senior managers (Field Office and Headquarters) as well as provide region specific advice to Department of Navy decision makers with a focus on LE, CI/CT, and security.

After interviewing the NCIS Civilian FAO Program Manager and former Special Agent, Mr. Bryan Boyd, it is clear that there are future challenges; limited staff & budget constraints, and allocation of training billets. Mr. Mark Clookie’s recent appointment as the NCIS Director in Feb ’10 will provide further Senior Leadership intent. As an indicator of this intent, during Mr. Clookie’s swearing in ceremony, Secretary of Navy Ray Mabus stated, “You’re a part of that first line of defense against espionage and against terror. You are expeditionary. You go where Sailors and Marines are. You go where the issues are.”

Additionally, when compared to the Navy Military FAOs training career pyramid, the gap is substantial; 3.5 years versus 6 years along with the issue of FAO training certification standardization.
Currently there are 39 NCIS Civilian FAOs managed under the NCIS CT Division, with estimated costs of $8.6M through FY15. The FAOs are located worldwide throughout Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Far East and Latin America; one of these is the current FPD Chief in Egypt.

The Future of Integrating Civilian FAOs

According to Dr. Tristan Mabry, Executive Director of the Joint Foreign Area Officer Skill Sustainment Pilot Program (JFSSPP),

“From the very inception of the JFSSPP, it has been clear that civilians must be engaged if a FAO education and skill sustainment program is to reach full potential.”

Dr. Mabry believes many FAO roles require direct engagement with civilian officials in our own government such as the Department of State, which sustains a community of Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs), as well as civilians in US industries.

He also believes FAO roles require direct engagement with civilians in foreign governments, especially related to political/military affairs, security assistance and cooperation activity.

Providing advanced education to civilians working in regional security affairs will deepen and broaden a critical talent pool, which the JFSSPP has made a point of including civilians among its in-residence course. Dr. Mabry further states, “the results of the military and civilian FAO training integration are consistently positive providing another dimension of security policy and defense operations into relief for the first time.”

“Your’re a part of that first line of defense against espionage and against terror. You are expeditionary. You go where Sailors and Marines are. You go where the issues are.”  SecNav Ray Mabus, Feb ’10

As the efforts of the NCIS FAO Program continue to develop and a hopeful DIA CIVFAS CONOPS is approved, after a review of Dr. Thomas Barnett’s new map there appear to be several venue options for Civilian FAO assignments. Two ideas include the augmentation of FAOs to support the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) program and to serve as a substitute for a military Attaché Office better suited for civilian FAO engagement or unable to sustain itself due to budgetary constraints.

Regardless, all Civilian FAO programs, future initiatives, and pilot projects aim to work in direct support of emphasized 2010 QDR guidance to prepare defense personnel “for the full range of complex missions that the future security environment will demand” by “building expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills” and by “recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs.”

The POLADs are senior State Department officers (usually flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to leading US military leaders and commanders in the US and overseas. They provide policy support regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ military responsibilities.
In this book review, I will first give a brief summary of the components of both books, second, I will discuss their similarities, and lastly, I will conclude with the differences of each text in terms of their approach to intelligence policy and national security. I will try to focus on the varied approaches, if any, with regards to traditions and values in American security policy to executive-legislative tensions, covert operations, secrecy and democracy and nongovernment actors in shaping and informing policy.

Let me first begin by outlining the key aspects of the book, “American National Security”. This book introduces the reader in a single volume to the overarching subject of American National Security. In part I, the authors lay down a foundation of international relations theory and how it impacts national security policymakers in general and how this applies to the United States. Part II, sets forth all of the actors and the processes that these actors follow in order to formulate US National Security Policy. This includes the national command authority within the executive branch, congress, and the intelligence community along with homeland security entities. It goes without saying that the processes included in the discussion are those related to resourcing and ultimately priorities. Part III, touches on the different aspects of national power, that is, through what means the US shapes its international environment: through Economics and military power. In part IV, the authors focus on international security issues throughout the world, covering all regions by the following categories: East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, Europe and Latin America. To conclude, part V discusses what the future holds in terms of issues to the United States with regard to its national security policy.

In contrast, the book “Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy”, Fourth Edition, by Mark M. Lowenthal, focuses on Intelligence from a different perspective. This book first defines what intelligence is, explains the need for intelligence agencies and their purpose. After this justification of the intelligence community apparatus, the author delves into the history and current status of the intelligence structure within the United States. This part discusses the budgeting process for funding the IC and the relationships that have an important role in determining which entities get what funding.

With this foundation in place, Lowenthal then focuses the reader’s attention to the Intelligence process. This includes setting the priorities by policymakers in which he calls “requirements”, followed by collection, processing, analysis, production, and finally dissemination of the gathered information to the ultimate consumers. The next three chapters focus on the various collection disciplines, analytical issues, measures to counter the threats to the intelligence community through counterintelligence. A separate chapter is laid out to the ultimate high risk foreign policy tool of covert action, and the various ranges therein. Chapters 9 and 10 deal with the relationship that the intelligence community has with policy-makers and the IC’s relationship with congress’ oversight and accountability function. The next three chapters deal with the agenda of the past, the ethical and moral issues of intelligence along with an explanation for
the reform of the IC. Lowenthal concludes with a cursory showing of the world’s preeminent intelligence services which compete for global dominance with the United States. Lowenthal at every stage of the book introduces the reader to various additional texts to view in the event one needs further clarification.

Due to the subject matter of the two texts, one can see that the similarities are great. Both deal with the American intelligence and national security apparatus. Specifically, the two books dedicate a good portion of the text to the relationship between the intelligence community with the rest of government, that is to say, the executive branch and congress. Also, the two books give the reader historical context on where the intelligence community was, where it is now and what the author the IC to look like in the future. Similarly, at the end of both books, the author dedicates a part/section to international threats. For Jordan, the list specifies regions, except for Russia, whereas Lowenthal focuses on the intelligence services of Israel and the four other UN Security Council permanent members. Both are mentioned due to their capability to pose a threat or to dilute American hegemony.

Some key areas of overlap between the two books are displayed in their discussion of the relationship between congress, the executive branch and the IC with a fairly comprehensive description in terms of the budgeting process for the IC. Also, it is worthy to note that the rift between policymakers and the IC is discussed in both texts. While there seem to be many similarities between the two texts, there are nonetheless differences in approach and content that are worthy of note as well.

The most important difference between the two texts is that Lowenthal focuses his attention on the Intelligence community, while Jordan focuses his book’s attention on the overall national security schema of the United States. The latter text hones in on the players involved in structuring the national security debate and ways of creating it and influencing it globally. Also, the international and regional security section really delves into the threat posed by those various regions in relation to the United States’ interests. Lowenthal on the other hand hones his book in on the inner workings of the intelligence community and compares them with the structures that exist in countries such as France, Russia, China, United Kingdom and Israel. All of which are considered the most capable intelligence services on the planet alongside the US.

There are a few topics addressed in Lowenthal’s text that are hardly present in “American National Security”, such as the detailed expose on the range of covert action tools available to the policymaker while, on the flip side, the ethical and moral dilemmas facing the intelligence professional. In addition, Lowenthal, as this text only focuses on one aspect of national power-information (intelligence), he doesn’t mention a great deal about the military or economics. In today’s day and age, these are the most important foreign policy levers that can have a significant impact on US national security. In fact, I agree wholeheartedly with a quote from the book that states, “the end of the cold war, gave fresh impetus to the long-held view that economic factors are paramount elements in national security affairs” and that “military capabilities are likely to be less important than they have been in the past.” Unfortunately, very little is written about this topic in Lowenthal’s book, because the US intelligence community does not do a very good job focusing its efforts on economic intelligence as is the case in China or France. This economic aspect is but one of several that is covered in the National Security text, as it is broader in scope, dealing with all aspects of national security and not strictly intelligence. However, Lowenthal has better coverage in terms of explaining to the reader the organization of the US IC and others around the world.

Overall, both texts are comprehensive in scope in terms of their coverage. Although Lowenthal’s work is written from the intelligence community’s vantage point, Jordan et al’s text seems to be written from that of a policymaker from the executive branch. While the two texts cover many of the same topics, there is enough contrasting material to benefit today’s national security expert or intelligence community professional. In addition, both are written in such a manner to allow a new student to the profession to follow along, since both books set forth in their first chapter definitions to the concepts that they expand upon.
The Russia-Georgia War of 2008 represented Europe’s most serious political crisis since the breakup of Yugoslavia and perhaps since the end of the Cold War. Ronald Asmus, Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund and a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration, attempts to cast the war as a shattering of the post-Cold War European security consensus as well as a serious failure of Western policy and resolve. While Asmus succeeds in writing a very readable narrative with occasional surprising revelations, as a work of policy analysis the work is a disappointment.

The strength of the book derives from the author’s access to the key actors, though regrettably no Russians, of the Georgian War or its aftermath. Asmus is able to describe in great detail the US shuttle diplomacy prior to the war and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s bold peace proposal to settle the frozen conflicts in 2008. The book describes clearly the dilemmas for US policymakers after the war 2008. He shows the duplicity of Russian political leadership in negotiations and the often disgraceful behavior of Russian politicians and soldiers (and their Ossetian allies) before, during, and after the conflict. Finally, he relates with great flair the tension and confusion in the Georgian government in the hours before the war, and the high-strung, complicated negotiations by French President Sarkozy on behalf of the EU to reach a ceasefire palatable to Russians, Americans, and Georgians. Asmus wisely avoids historically deterministic arguments of “age old” conflict and rightly focuses on the conflict’s root causes as a wholly unequal Russian-led “peace-keeping” arrangements of the 1990s and the western recognition of Kosovar independence in 2008.

However, Asmus never establishes why NATO membership for Georgia was the best means to achieve Western strategic goals in the Caucasus. Asmus states that Western allies wanted to encourage Georgia “to go West” (a tiresome and overused Asmus phrase), but the practical meaning of such an orientation is never explored. Would a Georgia that looked and acted like Norway, Sweden, Finland or Switzerland satisfy the strategic objective? These countries for various reasons have eschewed NATO or EU membership, yet few would argue that these states are not “integrated” with the West or incapable of military interoperability. For Asmus, only membership in a defensive military alliance could be counted on to “lock in” a Western orientation for Georgia. He seriously considers no other reforms, institutions, or policies as a means to encourage the emerging Georgian state to embrace democratic political, economic, and social values.

Asmus’s overemphasis on the democratizing mission of NATO leads him to minimize the internal divisions among NATO members over the proper strategic role of the Alliance—a dispute at the heart of the controversy over granting a Georgian Membership Action Plan. Despite Asmus’s exhortations that NATO after the end of the Cold War enabled former Warsaw Pact members to prepare for EU membership, many states in the 1990s and today wanted to join NATO precisely because they saw it as a security guarantee against Russian resurgence. Expanding membership, or potential membership, to the border of Russia had considerable differences of meaning for all Allies, old and new, depending on whether they saw NATO primarily as a collective defense organization or a collective security organization. Asmus never wrestles with this concrete difference of opinion and instead colorlessly describes the divide as due to personal dynamics or an inability to stomach further expansion, as if opposing continued expansion were unthinkable or tantamount to accepting Russian hegemony. Asmus never answers the obvious question—if indeed many European states saw Georgia as of insignificant national interest, would Georgian security and state-building be enhanced or degraded through the granting of nearly meaningless NATO Article V guarantees?
Finally, Asmus never seriously analyzes the policy choices of the Georgian leadership. Asmus, renewing the image of the Georgian President as a passionate, if erratic Westernizer, accepts Saakashvili’s assertion that he could not govern Georgia without “doing something” about the Frozen Conflicts in the short term. Historical examples, such as, West Germany’s patient Ospolitik towards East Germany, suggests that tendentious sovereignty disputes do not have to lead to short-term military gambling. Saakashvili’s insistence on the legitimacy of the use (and likelihood of success) of force to reintegrate Georgia is likewise described as a settled, if unfortunate, fact rather than as a conscious political choice. Only finally, with the war already lost, does Asmus on the last pages of his book encourage Georgia to give up temporarily its dream of regaining territorial integrity and emphasize political and economic reform in the territory it does control, so as to tempt back Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the long term. Why, one is led to ask, was this not sufficient before the war?

It is not yet clear, and too early to tell, if the Russia-Georgia War were a singular event or the first stage of Russian military resurgence in its self-defined “zone of privileged interests.” What does remain is the challenge to continue to build a Europe in which states allow for the full economic and social development of its citizenries while at peace with neighbors. For an author that believes that better Western strategic application is the key to a better future in the region, Asmus has written a book that is almost devoid of discussions of strategic vision, risk-reward calculations, genuine policy alternatives, or even an admission that friendly states can have different perceptions of self interest. For all of the impressive endorsement of Dr. Asmus’s work on the dust jacket, this book provides few sophisticated alternatives to the policies of the past.

About the Author: MAJ Geoffrey Wright is a Eurasian FAO currently serving as the XO at ODC Ankara, Turkey. He earned his commissioned as an Armor officer from the North Carolina’s at Chapel Hill.

Book Review:

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: Inside the Secret World of Corporate Espionage
Reviewed By: CAPT Ivan Raiklan, USAR

Written by Eamon Javers - This is quite an insightful book into the world of corporate espionage. While most books related to espionage deal with the sleuth of governments versus governments, and more recently, the global fight against international terrorism and Al Qaida, this book delves into the business of espionage.

Javers, who has written numerous pieces for Business Week, Politico and worked at the financial TV station CNBC, interviews many players within the industry that helps businesses target other businesses and CEOs via surveillance, deception and aggressive lobbying. In the book, Javers, discusses the battle between Nestle and Mars in a chapter entitled “The Chocolate War”. Furthermore he discusses how a company, BAI, mentored Wall Street firms, to include the Behemoth Goldman Sachs, on how to read CEOs during conference calls to determine if they were lying, or simply not fully disclosing material information. These mentors were none other than veteran CIA interrogators and polygraphers.

This book includes intrigue that reaches the highest levels of international business, government and intelligence. Javers even gives the historical context of corporate espionage and explains how Allan Pinkerton in the middle of the 19th century became the father of private intelligence. Global accounting firms KPMG, consulting companies like McKinsey and investment banks all are involved in this high stakes game. Each seeks information dominance in order to accumulate wealth and the only way to do so, is to use the same means that is done by Langley, Thames House, and even Lubyanka, by those that used to work there.

Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy will give a detailed explanation on how businesses hire firms such as Diligence, Kroll, BIA, Veracity, TD International, Hakluyt, Hamilton Trading Group, Trident Group, and Esoteric Ltd, to name a few, to gain an advantage over their competition.
The unique nature of the global maritime environment and the U.S. Navy’s role in advancing cooperative sea power in support of national security creates a huge demand for a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community with a distinct maritime flavor. The Navy has been a “global navy” since the beginning. Our CNO, ADM Roughead is a strong advocate of a FAO Community and sees the community playing a major role in our current Maritime Strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power (CS-21),” signed by the three Maritime Service Chiefs in October 2007. This strategy states: “Preventing war is as important as winning wars...Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged.” Over 90 percent of world trade happens in Maritime Domain. In a time defined by limited resources, the Navy cannot put every ship to sea in a futile attempt to cover 140 million square miles of ocean. We must go out and seek the international communities that are willing to engage in mutually beneficial relationships to help us obtain the goal of maximizing maritime security. Finding a global solution to this global problem is no simple task, but it is possible. The Navy has to look through its toolbox to find the right tools for the job. One of these tools is the FAO.

What does this mean for the Navy FAO? This means that the Navy FAO is a key part of the CS-21 by engaging our foreign partners in OCONUS as well as CONUS. FAOs are key enablers in building partnerships with foreign navies. I see Navy FAOs playing a critical function as the “tip of the spear” in Foreign Naval Engagement.

The Foreign Area Officer is a highly trained individual sent into the field with Pol-Mil expertise, operational experience in the maritime arena, and training in the regional language and culture to which they are assigned. The FAO is on ground level with the skills necessary to provide accurate interpretations of the reaction to a given engagement tool. Thus, the FAO is not just an instrument to engage with, it is also a device by which we can measure our success with our foreign partners. This requires extensive experience, education and capabilities in dealing with complex issues such as Anti-Piracy, Building Partner Capacity, Maritime Security and HA/DR.

As I stated before, a FAO is about international engagement. FAOs are critical in recognizing the changes in their host countries and providing ways for the US to adapt to these changing contexts. FAOs gain regional experience by being in country. From being there, they are able to synchronize and synergize what they have learned in language and formal education to develop a framework to learn about our partner nations and the contexts they operate. FAOs build on the experiences gained from repeated tours in-country/region and staff assignments, and use this experience and networks to serve as trusted advisors to national decision makers, Combatant Commanders, Component Commanders, Country Teams, and Inter-Agencies. One critical thing to remember is that while FAOs maintain close relationships with foreign counterparts, FAOs must have a strong relationship with the U.S. chain of command. After all, we are here to support U.S. leaders and, in the end, we need our leaders to support and speak out on the values of the FAO community brings to foreign engagement.

The Navy FAO program is a single career track and is half way through its building plan. The program was established over 4 years ago. Optimally, we would like to reach the end state of 400 officers - 300 operational and 100 in training.
Under the current conversion plan, we will achieve 303 billets by 2015. We are heading towards 212 billets by end of FY2010. These include opportunities at major staffs, attachés, security assistance, Inter-Agencies, and other foreign liaison positions.

We recognized that language, education, and experience are critical enablers for the FAO community and we are building a community of officers who can continually build on these enablers. Additionally, we are working through the funding system to get In-Country-Training implemented.

We are creating every opportunity for our FAO community to be on the tip of the foreign maritime engagement spear, accomplishing good things and building political equity. When critical times come, FAOs will be able to leverage trust and cooperation gained to coordinate necessary actions to accomplish our naval missions.

“WE CANNOT SURGE TRUST. Trust is built one day at a time so it is there when we need it the most. This is where a FAO will be ‘Value Added’.”

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5 - *Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay*
   By Warren Kozak
The Army Foreign Area Officer Program

What is it?
The Army FAO program, or career field 48, is made up of advanced degree holders skilled in particular languages and regional issues who can serve commanders and senior policy makers as political-military advisors, military attachés and security assistance experts. On March 10, 2010, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., Army chief of staff, approved training for 96 new FAOs whose service is needed in South Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia.

What has the Army done?
An Army G3-led task force recently explored how the Army could meet the challenge of recruiting and training nearly 100 new FAOs within three years while not increasing the overall end-strength of the force. The task force agreed a 25 percent increase (about 96 officer positions) could be identified, recruited and trained from within the Army's existing commissioned officer population and manpower structure.

What efforts does the Army plan to continue in the future?
Officers who meet the prerequisites and who are interested in becoming FAOs should consult Military Personnel message 09-259 and the Officer Service Management Pilot Program (OSMPP). The OSMPP, soon to be renamed the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP), helps the Army balance out the officer force by moving officers from overmanned to undermanned career fields. VTIP will permit officers who meet the rank, time-in-service, and career field criteria to be considered for acceptance into a new branch or functional area after their Functional Designation (FD) board has met. Officers in year group 2003 will be able to compete for FAO slots when the FD board convenes on May 6, 2010. Officers who are not in YG 2003 but have between 8 and 14 years of commissioned service may submit their request for the VTIP panel between March 15 and May 2. The panel is scheduled to convene May 25 and 26, 2010. Basic branch HRC assignments officers can be contacted for more information on VTIP.

Why is this important to the Army?
The four areas in which these new FAOs will be trained are areas in which the Army envisions the greatest need for officers with enhanced language skills, cultural acumen and regional expertise as we move through the 21st century. Our commanders in the field have reiterated this to Army and DoD leaders and our strategic and operational plans and counterinsurgency doctrine make it clear; FAOs will continue to play a key role in engaging our partners in the arc of instability and providing expert advice to our nations' military and civilian decision makers.

Noticed your new FAOA logos?
- Launched May 2010 -

Coins, Shirts and other FAOA gear is on the way.

How Can You Help FAOA ...?
Everyone working for FAOA is a volunteer and we need your talents to advance the FAO Association's mission

- Graphic Design - Historian - Blog Master
- Web Design - Editorial Board - Reporter
- Outreach Coordinator - Banquet Committee
- And many more

To learn about volunteering for FAOA contact the Association's President at president@FAOA.org
Or visit us on the web www.FAOA.org
Subject: USMC International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) FAOA Input – May 2010

1. **Desk Officer Adjustments.** The 2010 summer rotation of International Affairs Branch officers will commence in June. The International Affairs Branch Head, Col Paul Greenwood, will retire and will be replaced by Col John Parker. LtCol Chris Sill will be replaced in the East Europe/Eurasia Desk by Maj Jason Smith; LtCol David Holahan in the Southeast Asia/PACOM Desk will be replaced by Maj Jon Brown; and LtCol Dan Hicks, currently the Head for Security Cooperation Issues, will be replaced by LtCol Bob Rice.

2. **FAOs outbound to commence In-Country Training (ICT) in spring 2010.** Twenty-six USMC FAOs will conduct ICT during 2010. Of these, nine will execute orders this spring and summer.
   
   a. **Latin America (MOS 8241).** One FAO will complete Portuguese language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute ICT in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil this spring.
   
   b. **China (MOS 8243).** Three FAOs will complete Chinese language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. All three officers will be based in Beijing, China.
   
   c. **Middle East/North Africa (MOS 8244).** Two FAOs will complete Arabic language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. One FAO will be based in Cairo, Egypt and one will be based in Tunis, Tunisia.
   
   d. **East Asia (MOS 8248).** Three FAOs will complete Indonesian language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. All three officers will be based in Jakarta, Indonesia; one will attend the Indonesian Naval Command and Staff Course, which convenes in December 2010.

3. **IAOP Order Rewrite.** Revision of the 2005 IAOP Marine Corps Order (MCO 1520.11E) continues to gather steam and is scheduled for one-star review at the end of April. The final order will realign several regions and incorporate changes to program criteria that in turn will ensure the USMC’s International Affairs Officer Program is in full compliance with DoD Directive 1315.17.

4. **Monterey FAO Conference.** The International Affairs Branch Head and IAOP Coordinator attended the fourth annual FAO Organization of Monterey conference from 8-9 April 2010. The conference included presentations by former Ambassador David Lyon and RADM Jeffrey Lemmons, and the event provided FAOs from all four services a forum in which to interface, share ideas, and build professional relationships.

5. **USMC FAO Orientation Course.** Beginning in June 2010, the International Affairs Branch, in concert with the Defense Language Institute’s Marine Detachment, will host its first-ever FAO Orientation Conference. This three-day conference will serve as a welcome aboard for newly selected FAOs, will provide curriculum, utilization, and career guidance, and will include representatives from the Marine Corps Component Command headquarters and other USMC organizations that employ FAOs on a regular basis.

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**Quotable Quotes …**

“... deter would-be aggressors through forward presence and sustained operations to Build Partnership Capacity.”

QDR 2010
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Department of Defense vs Department of State
Overlapping Areas of Responsibility
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Ambassador Ryan Crocker Featured Speaker
At FAOA’s Annual Black Tie Dinner, 20 May 2010
Army and Navy Club, Washington DC

The FAOA is proud to host Amb Ryan Crocker as our featured speaker at the 2010 FAOA Annual Black Tie Dinner, held at the Army and Navy Club at Farragut Square. Designated a Career Ambassador by President Bush in 2004, Amb Crocker served as the US Amb to Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon. He has also served in Iran, Qatar, and Egypt, and as the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in DC. On 15 Jan 2009, President Bush awarded Amb Crocker the Presidential Medal of Freedom in honor of “his courage, his integrity, and his un wavering commitment to strengthening our nation and building a freer and more peaceful world.” Now from the Foreign Service, Amb Crocker is currently Dean and Executive Professor at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Amb Crocker’s presence at the FAOA Banquet is as much an honor for the association as it is reflective of our charter. FAOA’s mission is to promote esprit-de-corps and information sharing among FAOs past and present, and “to feature guest speakers who are relevant to the FAO discipline.” Ambassador Crocker’s breadth of experience in the Foreign Service, coupled with his extensive interaction with the DoD (particularly in Iraq) fulfills supports a core requirement to ensure that FAOs remain relevant and retain strong professional bonds within the interagency. Since establishment of the first military attaché’s in 1889, links between the FAO community and the State Department have created a framework for successful collaboration and policy implementation in service to the US. As a career Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Crocker has been in a position to work directly with and benefit from the contributions of FAOs. His presence reaffirms the role of FAOs in the interagency, and the relationship between the departments of Defense, and State.

“Today’s foreign policy is a unified diplomatic, military, and intelligence effort that must be a tightly integrated- a team approach.” Secretary of State George Schultz