

# FAO JOURNAL

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March 2004



**A Generational Approach to Augmented  
Security Cooperation**

**The Iron Majors: Promoting Democracy**

**A Former Iraqi Minister Speaks: The  
Memoirs of Ex-Planning Minister  
Jawad Hasim**

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**Regional Specialists**

**March 2004**

**VOLUME VIII, NO. 1**

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# ASSOCIATION NEWS

## Letter from the President

Since our last issue, the Foreign Area Officer community continues to provide excellent support across the range of conflict, in crisis areas throughout the world. Nowhere are FAO contributions more intense or valuable than in the CENTCOM AOR.

I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our FAO Journal Editor, Steve Gotowicki, for his superb and continuing contributions as Editor. Truly his efforts have been a linchpin of the FAO Association these past four years, and we appreciate both his energetic professionalism as well as excellent judgment in keeping us abreast of FAO community. Speaking of the Journal, this issue of the FAO Journal offers outstanding articles on Augmented Security Cooperation, Promoting Democracy, and a review of the memoirs of an Iraqi Ex-Planning Minister.

If you have an article that you would like to contribute to the greater benefit of our FAO community, please submit it to Steve Gotowicki for consideration. We are particularly interested in articles that inform others about events (e.g., FAO conferences and professional development opportunities) in the FAO community, from all services.

Please note the proponent updates and the Points of Contact provided on the back cover. From my recent discussions with each of the FAO Service Proponents, I know each of them wants to know your concerns and counsel -- please stay in contact with both your service proponent and with your assignments officer, for your own career as well as the health of the entire FAO community.

Turning to the business of our Association, we need to elect a Board of Governors. We solicit nominations for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and nine Members. Of course, service is voluntary - but we'll ask those who accept nomination for Board Membership to contribute from their wisdom, expertise, and effort to support the Association. For Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member nominations, we'll accept nominations from the membership through

the end of May 2004. Please send in your nominations for the Board to our email address at <faoa@erols.com>. In our next issue, we'll provide a "ballot" to select the Board, and hope to have a sitting Board by July. We won't stand on ceremony for the nominations - in fact, self-nominations are fine; and all we need is a name of a energetic, committed FAO, preferably one who lives in the Washington area (the Board will need to meet occasionally to transact the Association's business).

Speaking of energetic, committed FAOs, thanks to MAJ Don Baker of the Army Human Resources Command, and a dedicated team of assistants, who will be hosting the first FAO Dining Out in recent memory on Friday, 7 MAY 2004, at 1900 hours, at the Fort Belvoir Officers' Club. Plan on attending, if you're in North America! We're expecting 200 or so FAOs from all services, active, reserve, and retired to converge on a suitably distinguished event. Invitations went out to each member in the second week of April.

As always, thanks to those of you who contribute your professional and personal efforts to enhance our Association and our FAO community, and build the worldwide reputation of our Armed Forces' Foreign Area Officers.

Finally, please contribute your prayers, thoughts, in support our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who cannot be with their loved ones as they serve our nation in far-flung locales.

V/R,  
John Adams  
Colonel (P), USA  
President, Foreign Area Officer Association  
president@faoa.org



## ***A Generational Approach to Augmented Security Cooperation***

### ***Major Robert K. Holzhauser, USA***

With the ouster of the Taliban as the governing body of Afghanistan, the United States has an opportunity to use “augmented security cooperation” to assist in the establishment of a strong central government in that nation. As an essential part of the operations in Afghanistan, the United States engaged other nations in the Central Asian States, and re-opened security cooperation programs with other nations previously sanctioned.

In using security cooperation as a tool of foreign policy, I would like to caution formulators of foreign policy that this is not a “quick fix” situation. What is needed is a long term solution, which can be achieved only by a long-term commitment to US participation in Afghanistan and the region. Afghanistan is an opportunity to show the world that we truly are a superpower by doing the job right. Afghanistan has the potential to serve as a glowing example of international assistance rebuilding a society torn by civil strife for decades.

I will list several reasons why it is difficult to take a long-term approach and then explain the benefits of a long term approach. I will conclude by advocating a new “Marshall Plan” for the Central Asian States that provides for the long term needs of emerging democracies in the region.

One of the primary causes perpetrating a short term approach is that our electoral cycle does not reward long term projects. With election cycles based on two, four and six year terms, it is difficult for a political candidate or incumbent to say: “Vote for me, my programs will show results in fifteen to twenty years.” Americans want to see results, or something they can quantify prior to voting. This is the same reason it is difficult for Congress to implement long term domestic programs. It is also the same reason

that DoD has repeatedly been denied request for five and ten year budgets.

Because our election cycle is relatively short, especially in the House of Representatives, where elected officials are running for office the entire time they are in office, it is difficult to enact and sustain long term financial legislation. Legislation supporting a single country or issue is impossible without an effective political coalition. We have a bi-partisan consensus that is working to the benefit of the Central Asian States for the first time in history as a result of attacks on American soil.

The Central Asian States and Afghanistan don't have the political lobbying or political coalitions in our system that even begin to approach the effectiveness of other countries' lobbies. Two more visible examples of potent use of our political process are Taiwan and Israel. It will take at least a generation to see permanent change in Afghanistan, but why should elected officials back Afghanistan, or any other state, when there's no political payoff or constituency? Because the prestige of our government will be damaged by “abandoning” Afghanistan, and that we can prove our true status as a superpower by using our resources to improve conditions for the common man in the region. This requires an enduring bi-partisan coalition or commitment to the region and the political leadership and vision to create and sustain it.

One of the international criticisms of America is that, as a nation, we tend to have a short attention span, and fear long term involvement in other nations' affairs. There is much evidence to the contrary. We have maintained troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo for extended periods of time. Even during the reign of the Taliban, the US was the single

largest provider of aid to the Afghani peoples. This criticism should not be confused with the “no more Viet Nams” syndrome found where we engaged in a conflict with largely conventional thinking and tactics against an unconventional enemy. In Afghanistan we effectively mixed forces to accomplish the initial mission; we ended the Taliban’s ability to rule the country.

Our actions in Afghanistan are justifiable and popularly supported. They were undertaken to rid America and the world of a state-sheltered terrorist organization’s primary base of operations. We now require a sustainable military presence in Afghanistan as a signal of our commitment to the emerging government. Politicians have difficulty funding overseas commitments of troops that show little visible benefits to the American people. It is much easier to send aid than it is to put people at risk. That said, people on the ground signal commitment and purpose.

We have facilitated the re-emergence of the democratic process in Afghanistan, even if some of the party leaders are not the individuals we’d hand-pick to run the government. It is good that we are not “picking” anyone. We are counting on the collective wisdom of Afghans, regardless of derivation or origin, to choose from the best they have available and improve steadily thereafter by electing people that provide services to their people, not build personal fiefdoms. Leaving Afghanistan early will merely allow local power centers and factions to re-emerge, which would weaken the central government and likely produce another power vacuum as seen in the 1990’s. Do we really want instability in the region again?

A time period of fifteen to twenty years is the amount of time for demographic change to affect a political system. It is the amount of time it takes for some of the older power brokers in a system to leave the system and for younger voters to step up to the polls. An example of this

demographic influence is Iran. Most of the population in Iran was born after the 1979 revolution. It has been over twenty years since the second revolution placed religious figures in power. Younger voters consistently back the reformist agenda and wish for less state control of personal affairs. With a voting age of fifteen, and a relatively young population, the tide of voters favors reform. This could easily be the pattern in all of the Central Asian States.

The region is accustomed to Soviet administration and five and ten-year plans. Short term solutions can lead to the rejection of America as an influence in the region within one generation. A coherent, long-term plan of aid for the region should be enacted now, while political support exists.

It may take a generation without conflict to stabilize Afghanistan as a functional democracy. A long time may be needed for the central government to extend its influence outside of Kabul and for local power brokers to be either neutralized by democratic processes, inclusion in a broader system of power sharing, or removal from power by the central government. Fifteen years is also the amount of time needed for children to grow up in an atmosphere free of sectarian or ethnic rivalry. To do this, all groups must be included in the political process, and not solely because they possess a standing private military force. Expanding the strength and influence of UN/ISAF troops in Afghanistan to allow the central government to assert control over outlying population centers will serve to establish the legitimacy of the new government. ISAF should not, however, become the interim government’s police force, but assure order and that aid is properly distributed. We would be doing Afghanistan, and the entire region, a disservice were we to leave without restoring order and institutions. We should commit to the region for the long haul, just as President Truman did in his 1947 approval of a Marshall Plan.

One of the difficulties in security cooperation programs and long term programs is that they are hard to sell to the American public. Constituents want something that benefits them, as opposed to the next generation. It is even more difficult to sell a plan for the Central Asian States as, unlike the Marshall Plan where expertise, established social institutions and an organized infrastructure existed in largely industrialized societies, these things will have to be built into these emerging democracies. Only in Pakistan is there an industrial and technological base with sufficient expertise to manage it. The long term goal is regional stability with sustainable economies. This presents enormous opportunities for utilizing the inherent strengths of the American economy using assets down to the local levels—chambers of commerce and rotary clubs should be engaged in economic dialogue with partner cities.

Multinational corporations doing business in the region should be strongly encouraged to provide infrastructure and maintenance instead of cash flow into these economies. Cash is too easily diverted. It is much more difficult to divert profits from infrastructure. This practice should also apply to commercial systems sales, with negotiated offsets being applied to manufacturing or coproduction infrastructure. This causes growth of national infrastructure and manufacturing capability that leads to a more diversified economy. The Central Asian States have “in the ground” nearly every element in the periodic table. They possess vast energy reserves and regional trade potential. They should not be exploited as a mere source of raw materials. This differs significantly from the Soviet model.

A project that would contribute to regional growth is a pipeline running from Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan to South Asia, carrying badly needed natural gas and oil directly to huge markets in Pakistan and India. An alternate energy market is China, with its market and potential. All of the economies involved would benefit to some degree. Multinational corporations will need

guarantees of security before committing to such a project, especially one that may take billions of dollars and years to build. This also provides an alternate route around Chechnya, with its current problems, and Iran, a country currently under unilateral US sanctions.

Every country in the region suffers from aging infrastructure that has not been maintained effectively since the early 1990's. Water and sewerage services in most areas are not adequate to guarantee safe or sufficient drinking water. Irrigation projects have been destroyed by years of civil strife in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Electrical services are reliable only in capital cities. Perhaps the largest problem is that there are not sufficient jobs from infrastructure support for highly trained personnel such as pharmacists, medical professionals and engineers. Massive efforts to develop or restore infrastructure are needed. This would employ some of these skills and retain them in the region.

Skills are also lost when poor economic opportunities cause a loss of human capital as trained people go elsewhere to find employment. Unemployment and underemployment are common to all states in the region. Political systems should allow for inclusion in the economic affairs of a state. People are more likely to invest themselves, and their funds, in an economy that they have some influence over, with a chance to change their economic destiny through personal effort.

Allowing the populace a say in the economic destiny of a country or region also removes one of the key causes of discontent. People or groups that feel disenfranchised by their government, or the local power brokers that exercise control over the countryside away from centralized government authority, are the people that may support insurgency or become members of organizations opposing central governments.

This feeling of disenfranchisement may also be linked to issues of ethnicity or religion,

when one group feels it is at the disadvantage of another group. This type of rivalry exists to some extent in all of Central Asia. Clan, tribal, or ethnic loyalties are ingrained. It may take at least a generation after effectively providing the services to the populace for the government, not another authority, to become the "go-to" person or authority to obtain the services needed for life or commerce. This means that government should be impartial and should not be used as a vehicle for retribution against groups or perceived wrongs between groups. Ideally, governments should provide services to all citizens equitably, regardless of the past.

It is important to consider how security cooperation programs will address some of these issues and fit into a grand plan that could require billions of dollars from private enterprise and government assistance

from not only the United States, but other regional actors.

Arguably the longest term payoff for security cooperation programs is in training. Training may be associated either with a system sale, sold to the country under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Agreement, or given in the form of grant aid under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Training, particularly under IMET, brings students into the United States and exposes them to the Department of Defense Information Program (DODIP) and to American culture.

Training and contacts facilitating security cooperation programs are more enduring as they use human capital. It is not uncommon for graduates of professional military education programs in the United States to advance into relatively senior positions in government. Former students may be either senior military officers or continue service to their country in another capacity after conclusion of their military service. In the environment of change that currently exists, we have a golden opportunity to have sen-

ior decision makers with an understanding of American processes occupying key positions in a relatively short period of time.

We should link aid projects in the region to sustainable infrastructure improvement placed under the control of a legitimate authority. To do this, it is important to assure that no single power broker has complete control of a critical commodity or service provided to the populace. By using coalitions or consensus to establish services, it is more difficult for a single individual or interest group to divert funding or resources for other purposes.

We must carefully integrate all assets and security cooperation programs to provide a synergistic effect. For example, when we do humanitarian demining programs in a region, we need to integrate grants and aid from all sources, including the assistance of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and training in a train-the-trainer mode to establish capabilities that may be sustained, while obtaining the maximum benefit from limited resources and programs. It is important to note that the US forces do no demining except for force protection reasons. They train host nation personnel to establish local capabilities. There are ample opportunities for demining programs in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

All of the countries in the region stand to benefit from Humanitarian Assistance programs. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) programs are integrated with exercises. HCA may be integrated with other programs, including Partnership for Peace exercises in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Other exercises may benefit from the use of Exercise Related Construction whose primary benefit is for US forces, but may leave behind sustainable portions of airfields and other transportation assets. However, if the country desires construction equipment on a grant basis, it must ob-

tain this through Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property. Construction equipment is not available as Excess Defense Articles.

A capability could be built on this model: HCA funds a building, HAP-EP stocks it with medical equipment, and as part of an exercise, medical personnel train with the host nation staff of the new clinic. There are even ways to obtain grant funds to transport HAP-EP, hire contractors or procure supplies. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has a webpage that lists ongoing humanitarian programs, opportunities to conduct these programs and programmed events. DSCA is the DOD manager of humanitarian programs.

Combatant Commander's use of initiative funds may further enhance a project. This is simply a gold mine of opportunity for USCENTCOM and other regional players, especially those interested in the long-term benefits of sustainable development projects.

While certain programs are limited in that the funds for them must be expended during the fiscal year for which they are authorized, a series of related projects at the same location may give rise to a capability in the host nation. The ideas for programs may come from the embassy's country team and the agencies represented in it. Ideas may also come from NGOs or from the host nation. All of the humanitarian programs are intended to benefit the civilian populace.

Another method is to provide the bulk of the programs outside of capital cities, in areas that will have the greatest psychological effect. Citizens outside of the capital need to see early benefits of projects and services that are linked to central government control. This reduces the impression that only the group in charge of the capital is important. Cities will benefit from the provision of hospital, educational, sanitation and other key services. These may originally take the form of regional hubs, in areas with the most anti-government sentiment. If another power base provides the necessities of life, then the government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In the outset, it may be necessary to provide for the security of some of these projects, as groups with anti-government sentiments may choose to disrupt such projects, even though they deprive the people

of badly needed services.

Through IMET, EDA and other programs, we must provide nations with the capability to secure their borders. On a diplomatic level we must validate their sovereignty in the international community. This assistance may take the form of communications gear, vehicles and training in small unit tactics. As these units become more effective in combating smuggling, they will increase revenues to the central government by creating an environment where customs and other import or export duties are paid to the central government, not the group in charge of that particular portion of a given border. This will reduce the abilities of regional power brokers to levy taxes and customs duties inside national borders without the consent of the elected governments. A further benefit of increased border security is the reduction in narcotics and human trafficking and criminal or terrorist activity from country to country. With each nation capable of securing its own borders, the opportunities for regional stability increase.

It is important to remember that in the past, organizations such as Al-Qaeda have provided aid to groups like the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan. Estimates of this aid are as high as 20 million dollars. This aid was given with the specific intent of destabilizing elected governments and causing authoritarian responses to an insurgency. Certainly the United States, as the richest nation on earth, can match the efforts of Al-Qaeda. This sends a message to the region that we are willing to put our money, and Americans, where our rhetoric is, and make our investment a long term one with a goal of supporting the emerging democratic institutions in the region.

In order to accomplish the goal of augmented security cooperation in the Central Asian States, we must increase the size and capabilities of our Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs) in the region. Increasing the permanent staffs of these key organizations housed in embassies throughout the region will enhance contacts with governments and military departments in the region. This requires that joint billets be approved for emerging SAOs in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Some of these billets are now funded by using operational funds in a stop-gap manner. The Joint Manning Document for these billets requires attention at the Unified Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff



and DSCA levels. Congress must approve expanding joint billets to facilitate this.

Larger SAOs will facilitate communication on new and expanding programs while allowing the host countries the ability to have multiple points of contact within the SAO when there are personnel turnovers. Currently some security cooperation functions are performed by Temporary Duty personnel. This makes for even greater personnel turnover. A minimum of two permanent military and one permanent civilian billets in the SAO should be authorized in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. This will reduce the gapping of billets and lead to continuity in security cooperation programs. A larger structure already exists in Pakistan. Afghanistan's billets should conform to the emerging mission of building a national defense capability under civilian control.

Another benefit of larger SAOs and embassies is that it shows the countries that they are important to America. Presence of a permanent embassy and SAO in a country acknowledges our commitment to relationships of all types with a country. Nothing sends a more powerful message to a country about its importance to America than US diplomats and other Americans resident in a country.

In the event of a contingency or humanitarian operation in the region, SAOs are the organizations that have the know-how and contacts to get troops, supplies and equipment into a country in the most efficient manner. As members of an ambassador's country team, SAO chiefs are best suited to assist a Unified Command with detailed local knowledge and access to infrastructure and agencies during contingencies. They are also focal points for disaster preparedness programs, important in a region with earthquake and landslide potential.

If logistics, economics or a desire for training in international relations is an issue, instruction may be provided by the Naval Postgraduate School (primarily in residence) in Monterey, California. Sometimes it is more cost-effective to arrange for a large group of students to be trained by either the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) or NPS in the host country. Typically, these Mobile Education Teams (METs) are scheduled by SAOs at annual Training Program Management Re-

views (TPMRs) hosted by the Unified Command. Each military department offers a host of training options, many available as METs.

The organization that provides training for governments desiring knowledge of security cooperation programs is the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). DISAM provides specific training for foreign purchasers both in residence and in country. DISAM also has the mission of training US SAO personnel prior to their departure overseas. Early entry of DISAM teams into a country developing security cooperation ties with the US will allow the country to place students into US training programs more rapidly and expose decision makers to rules governing security cooperation processes. DISAM resident courses, besides falling into the E-IMET category, are waived for less than five weeks' stay in the United States.

Incorporating security cooperation into a larger package of loans and assistance to build infrastructure and expertise may require increasing grant aid to the region. Increasing the availability of Economic Support Funds and forgiving past debt in Pakistan will start the process and free funds for use in other programs benefiting the civilian populace. Further, the United States could guarantee loans from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund committed to specific projects.

Pakistan, similar to India, has considerable technological expertise at its disposal. Pakistan could easily be another technological center for software companies, very much like Ireland or India. This would further diversify the economy and provide employment for personnel already trained to proficiency in Pakistan. What the technology sector requires is government concentration on this aspect of the economy. Even if original programs are merely duplicative, innovation quickly follows. Japan is a lasting example of a country that benefited from similar programs.

Of primary importance to a "new Marshall Plan" is the idea that the Central Asian States that wish to participate will specify what they want to do and cooperate with the US or world community to accomplish these ends. It is imperative that the countries involved have control of their own destinies as sovereign states. Initiatives that are locally con-

ceived and designed with US government assistance stand the best chance of lasting success.

Unlike the situation after World War Two, these countries were not defeated in a conflict; they are emerging as democracies onto the world stage. This emergence is occurring in a region where volatility and instability may have long-term consequences for the entire international community. Currently, many Americans are focused on the global war against terrorism. One of the proven methods of combating insurgency or terrorism is an increase in local standards of living.

Providing aid to these countries will do this, and as a secondary benefit, assist the economies of their neighbors. This applies especially to India, China and Russia. Stable states on their borders would reduce the need for the deployment of military assets. Currently, a Russian motorized rifle division assists Tajikistan in closing its border with Afghanistan. India has approximately one third of its standing forces forward deployed on its border with Pakistan. China has concerns with insurgents in provinces near its western borders with the Central Asian States. Arguably, an increase in economic interdependence on the part of India and Pakistan would reduce the likelihood of conflict over Kashmir. Were negotiations on the fate of Kashmir, or its autonomous status, to be linked to participation in this regional plan, a significant area of potential conflict between three nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, and China) would be reduced. By stabilizing Afghanistan and Kashmir, we reduce the possibility that there could again be a regional phenomenon similar to the Taliban that could gain access to, or control of nuclear weapons in the world's most populous "nuclear neighborhood".

Reducing border tensions with potential nuclear adversaries and establishing demarcated borders in the region will set the conditions for a successful regional demining campaign. This program will be of great impact on the shared Tajik-Uzbek border. Demining is consistent with US foreign policy on controlling anti-personnel landmines. The US government extended a self-imposed moratorium on sales of landmines, and consistently dedicates resources to demining world-wide. The Central Asian States would benefit greatly by increased land use as a result of demining programs.

How the region differs from Europe, Japan and the Marshall Plan is that there were existing power structures with which the US government conducted long-term business, infrastructure remained and the societies had a consensus on where they wanted to be in the next generation. A recent visitor to the US from Central Asia commented to me that a small city in America had more supporting infrastructure than his entire country.

Assisting the Central Asian states with water resource management and diversifying their economies away from cotton production would reduce the amount of water taken from rivers draining into the Aral Sea. It will take decades to ameliorate or repair the effects of environmental mismanagement in this region. A regional water sharing infrastructure that took advantage of hydroelectric power generation opportunities would speed this process and allow for more rapid infrastructure and economic development. Done on a regional basis with consensus, it would prevent disputes between riparians like the disputes that currently exist on the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile and Jordan-Yarmuk river basins.

In Afghanistan we need to start with national consensus, and get them through the first long winter. To do this, the international community must deliver the aid it promised. Short-term winter food programs must be followed by Spring initiatives that focus on rapid reconstruction of the water, educational, health and transport infrastructures. With the right package of initiatives, Afghanistan could be self-sufficient for food in three to five years, and begin exporting foodstuffs in ten.

The idea of a regional plan could work in this area of the world as it has emerging democratic institutions, a young populace seeking employment and all the natural resources necessary for both manufacturing and service economies. Adding aid, and combining aid at the embassy level, using the SAOs to develop the DOD programs, and achieving synergy by working these programs together will give the US government true impact from these programs at a key time in history.

*(Continued on page 32)*

# ***The Iron Majors: Promoting Democracy***

## ***Major Joseph Izaguirre, USA, 48B***

*"And in the fog of uncertainty, a wide-ranging intellect is called for to feel out the truth with instinctive judgment."*

Karl Von Clausewitz

and meet our objectives will require knowledgeable and skilled individuals (area specialists) who can operate in a variety of circumstances, where other organizations cannot.

### **Introduction**

American foreign policy is established and created at the highest levels of government and approved by our President. Although American foreign policy, led by the State Department is implemented by numerous organizations, in times of conflict, foreign policy is mainly executed by relatively mid-level American military officers. Robert Kaplan, in his article "Supremacy by Stealth," refers to these officers as "The Iron Majors."<sup>1</sup>

Today, around the world, from South West Asia to South America, it is these young military men and women who interact with officers of foreign governments within the toughest environments. They are truly the face of American foreign policy.

In explaining the unique role of the Iron Majors in his article *Supremacy by Stealth*, Robert Kaplan quotes author John Henry in his book, *A Bell for Adano*:

*[Men like Joppolo are] our future in the world. Neither the eloquence of Churchill nor the humanness of Roosevelt, no Charter, no four freedoms or fourteen points, no dreamer's diagram so symmetrical and so faultless on paper, no plan, no hope, no treaty—none of these things can guarantee anything. Only men can guarantee, only the behavior of men under pressure, only our Joppolos.*<sup>2</sup>

My point is simple. America needs to build more "Joppolos." As we continue to place ourselves in challenging situations (such as Afghanistan and Iraq), our need to exercise foreign policy

The military is the best organization to support this national requirement; it has the character and possesses the qualities necessary to adapt to such dynamic circumstances. Military philosophers from Sun Tzu to Machiavelli, and more modern statesmen such as Winston Churchill, all understood the importance of leveraging the military's wide-ranging intellect: those individuals, selfless and tenaciously curious, with an uncanny ability to reach people and understand their environments --- our eyes and ears, and feelers in the world.

While this article stresses the need to develop and sustain our eyes and ears around the world, it is important to understand that our threat — unrest — is not modern at all. In fact history shows how this unrest is a normal product of development. But most important, history shows us that our current dilemmas are the same as those faced by empires of the past. The issue is whether we only choose to heed those lessons.

*"Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by waking."*<sup>3</sup>

*Spanish Proverb*

### **Understanding modern-day threats**

The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> demonstrated America's vulnerabilities and her inability (or unwillingness) to understand the world. As America prospered, disparities around the world grew. While mediums broadcasted American wealth, resentment towards our affluence grew, setting the conditions --- a petri-dish for the culti-

vation of terrorism.<sup>4</sup> We are in the most dangerous time in history.<sup>5</sup> Why? Simply put... they resent us.

Asymmetric threats are not so much a matter of actions but a matter of resentment. The true concern is not the acts of terrorism themselves, but the deep hatred at the source of those attacks. Although clearly the Bin Ladens of the world pose a direct threat, the greater danger is their ability to influence credulous people to take, or support, such shortsighted acts.

These threats are not isolated to the Mid-East. Quite the opposite—the state of the world has left itself ripe for the spread of this inane yet menacing mindset. America's great prosperity, whether right or wrong, is felt as unjust and humiliating. The masses of poor and uneducated people (exploited by corrupt regimes and power seeking elements) fail to understand that prosperity is a reward of the western way of life and not the root cause of their condition.<sup>6</sup>

Poverty has not created the current upheaval; on the contrary, the cause of this turmoil has been development.<sup>7/8</sup> The natural process of development creates conflict particularly with those who are unwilling to adapt to the demands of globalization. Temporary disparities create anger. The problem lies in rising expectations that overwhelm governments and create the sort of resentment and conditions that we see today.<sup>9</sup> Add a growing population (young males between 15 and 30), the technology of media (displaying the great wealth of the American citizen), and abuses or corruption of governments, you'll find a situation where populist movements (political and spiritual) arise and monstrously exploit the masses in the name of some utopian idea. It is here where resentment (not having the same American quality of life) is transformed into hatred.

Jason Burke's book, *Al-Qaeda*, furthers this idea by categorizing the threat in two groups

of people: Intellectual Activists, such as the Osama Bin Ladins, and Violent Activist, such as those recruited from the most poorest and brutalized elements of society.<sup>10/11</sup>

The Intellectual Activists are the master-minds of modern populous movements rallying the masses to their calling. These are not poor men, but are in all essence undeclared politicians. They are generally wealthy educated people. As Burke states, "These are the men who use the words of great religious teachers for their own unenlightened ends."<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, there are the Violent Activists. Tactically, these are the greater concern. A more illusive threat, they are generally young males who make up the majority of the growing population and are brutal as well as difficult to track. These are the mid-level leaders and executors, disciples, those who embrace the teachings of the intellectuals, and in exchange for their commitment, receive the reward of empowerment and pride.<sup>13</sup> Look at the alarming demographics of unemployed young males around the world and you'll find an ample supply of easily influenced young men looking for meaning, purpose, and power.

Latin America, for instance, a region which most Americans consider to be generally unthreatening to the US, is displaying similar characteristics. Honduras, for example, is plagued with an intimidating anarchistic gang problem. Brazil's social problems are so large that its military is finding it difficult to maintain order against populist movements such as the Landless Peasants Movement "Sim Terra" and those found in the drug-backed "favelas" of Rio.<sup>14</sup> Add the region's increasing economic disparities caused by mass corruption and elitist greed, and one can see how Intellectual Activists can leverage populous resentment and wield it against the "Big Brother" up North. The rhetoric "in your face" character of some Latin American leaders only instigates this resentment.

Let's not forget that Latin America's terrain, corruption, illicit financial activities, and our porous borders make it a perfect staging base for terrorist operations. We must be vigilant, for it is as easy to supply shoulder-fired missiles to the South American continent as it is to smuggle them (or something worse) past our borders.

Again, America, although valued because of the quality of life it provides its citizens, is not liked for that very same reason. Resentment, whether justified or not, leads to a sense of injustice and humiliation. This is what our foreign officers and intelligence specialists need to gauge. It is the regular citizens that we must reach and understand in order to influence foreign policy and respond when crisis arises.

*"Code of conduct (law), the supreme, though essentially imperfect, it is the instrument for the moral salvation of society; the dispensation of reason"*

Plato

### **Establishing order while promoting democracy**

The tragedy and damaging effects of Sept 11<sup>th</sup> gave the US new focus and commitment regarding its interaction with the world. As a result we will be ever more involved, and our military will have a tremendous role in implementing foreign policy and establishing the order necessary for democratic peace and growth. However, to do this we must correct three major obstacles that impede field commanders' success:<sup>15</sup>

1. We must lead, that is adopting Kaplan's "Speak Victorian and Think Pagan".<sup>16</sup>
2. We must limit restrictions on those who execute policy.<sup>17</sup>
3. We must produce and field more area specialists.<sup>18</sup>

In his most recent book, *Diplomacy, Kiss-*

inger states, "America is able neither to dominate nor withdraw from the world; we are powerful and totally vulnerable... we must not abandon the ideas which have accounted for its greatness!" Therefore, when confronted with the question, "why should we lead the world?" the answer is that we must.<sup>19</sup>

The fact of the matter is that western economic power, military might, and our value of the rule of law and social contracts are without a doubt the model for a better way of life. The Chinese model was perhaps a strong candidate. But today China's direction appears to be parallel with that of the West --- rather than sporting little red books, the Chinese are carrying check-books.<sup>20</sup> Future Sino-American tensions will be more economic than political.

However, looking at the results of history and the nature of antithesis, Kaplan indicates that America will continue to be faced with an ancient dilemma - the controversy of being ruthless when needed while continuing to be the beacon of democracy. The military professional will require a Pagan Ethos.<sup>21</sup>

War will continue to be increasingly asymmetric - unconventional, undeclared and fought within the states as opposed to between them. Tie in the technology, urbanization, and populous movements and you have a recipe for disorder --- our true enemy.<sup>22</sup>

Kaplan references philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who in his book, *The Leviathan*, about the social contract, warns of a particular problem that plagued past-empires during their "dangerous" times --- the mistake of confusing freedom and order.

*"The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not."*

Here Hobbes warns, "Let not (during conflict) Victorian principles and Right be the normal

*behavior against those who do not honor or understand the virtue of social contract...*

*Freedom becomes an issue only after order is established.*" The nature of man is to comply only through reason or fear. When reason fails, one must use fear. Failure to use the necessary force or fear will waste one's Army, decay support, and leave in question the ability to maintain order and lead development.<sup>23</sup>

New York Times Correspondent, Peter Maass, interviews Professor Major John Nagl who provides us historical example of how to deal with the "disturbers". *"The key issue for a counter insurgency army is to calibrate the amount of lethal force necessary to do the job with the minimum amount of nasty, counterproductive side effects."*<sup>24</sup> However given the lack of international unity, naïve liberal ideals, and the media's critical eye, it has become difficult for the military to do what must be done in order to establish order for a future democratic peace.

How should our field officers (both military and diplomatic --- if there is a difference today) accomplish the state's goals? Kaplan will argue that restricting a field commander and questioning their methods is certainly not the way.

A clear example of this is the recent dismissal and reprimand of Lieutenant Colonel Adam B. West, whose questionable actions yielded success on the battlefield. West understood his realities. As a just man, West employed Hobbes' principles, being formidable when needed, for the good of the mission.<sup>26</sup> The fact of the matter is that our military officers, respected and loved by their society and detrimentally obedient, are being restricted by public idealistic principles in an environment of a malevolent reality. Fear, not kindness, yields results when dealing with this clever and lucid enemy. To root-out insurgents, a good soldier must be ruthless.

My personal experience in Iraq led me to understand the importance of Human Intelli-

gence gained from captives. This information was critical for rooting out the "Violent Activists" that take a daily toll on our soldiers and our efforts to establish order. My impression was that application of Victorian methods against these people just did not work --- they feared nothing from our kindness and enjoyed better conditions as a POW than they had out in the streets. As Hobbes states, fear is the only way to yield compliance from a people who have no understanding of order. At times, fear must be instilled by good hearted and just people --- and we must trust their judgment and minimize the influences of critical entities who are not responsible for our nation's interests. If we continue on the path of questioning commanders, we work to defeat ourselves.<sup>27</sup>

Hobbes writes, *"Vanity and overconfidence make men blind... so does fear make them see clearly and act morally."* As a just and moral society we must not fear being formidable when necessary. If we know we are just, then our actions are reasonable, such as in the case of LTC Adam West. In order to lead effectively, we, as a nation, must be committed to democracy but willing to act forcefully.

*"To prevent total destruction, reason must prevail and those in the pre-political state of nature must collectively acknowledge the creation of a civil authority as the only solution if peace is to be achieved and self-preservation assured."*

Thomas Hobbes

*"The decisive fact about human beings is that at any time and in any place they can be made into soldiers; the most urgent or important task of politics is to make them so and to use them well."*

Niccolo Machiavelli

### **Using the military to implement foreign policy and promote democracy**

If there were ever doubts on this theme,

certainly current military operations around the world dismiss them. It is indeed these Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels, who are actively executing (and at times developing) foreign policy.<sup>28</sup>

General John Abizaid (CINC-CENTCOM) understands this when quoting English Brigadier Micheal Harbottle, “there is no doubt in my mind that the success of peacekeeping operations depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his non-commissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests.”<sup>29</sup>

Kaplan states, “*The U.S military will increasingly churn out such chameleons: operatives who combine the traits of soldier, intelligence agent, diplomat, civilian aid worker, and academic.*”<sup>30</sup> This has been witnessed in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Department of Defense recognizes this and has placed special emphasis on developing “country-specialists”: Special Forces, Foreign Area, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Officers. While highly effective in a strategic setting, the problem is that there aren’t enough of them at the levels needed to effectively execute tactical missions.

Look at current military operations in Iraq. One example is Captain Greg Mitchell<sup>31</sup> who, while assigned as his squadron’s adjutant, performed the following duties:

1. Commander’s linguist
2. Unit liaison to the mayor of Fallujah<sup>32</sup>
3. Chief police trainer for the Free Iraqi Police
4. Director of public utilities
5. Public projects and funds manager

6. Project coordinator and liaison to Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other government agencies.

7. Soldier

Although quite talented, the intensity of daily operations in such an austere environment and the lack of “specialists” wear on these individuals. The process to get anything done is slow at best. This in turn results in demonstrations, violence, and a perception (propagated by the media) that US Forces are incapable. The threat understands the importance of hampering and discrediting US humanitarian assistance. Because of this, they often target these talented movers and shakers thereby seriously impeding unit efforts.

To borrow from Kaplan, we need more “Joppolos” at all levels. Having two or three Civil Affairs Teams per division covering an area the size of Los Angeles during the summer months just won’t cut it. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) consists of eight thousand police officers<sup>33</sup> dedicated specifically to law enforcement in the city of Los Angeles. Now, imagine asking them to do not only law enforcement but also the myriad of nation-building tasks in a hostile-uncertain environment, while under the close scrutiny of a critical media? Oh, and tell them to do it in a foreign language and culture. The Army is doing exactly this, but with half the numbers.

Field commanders never envisioned that they would be required to build towns on their own. (They had been told to expect assistance from other nations, NGOs and other contractors).<sup>34</sup> Once reality set in, they found that sustaining post war operations was challenging. They needed more linguists, specialists and additional personnel to execute the myriad of nation building and daily security tasks at the speed required by political pressures.<sup>35</sup> Daily tasks revolved around three things: rooting out violent ac-

*(Continued from page 15)*

tivists, establishing and enforcing the rule of law, and conducting rebuilding operations such as establishing and maintaining government utilities, medical and education services, and setting the conditions for NGO and humanitarian support. All of this requires cross-the-border language abilities.

When I was in Iraq, our inability to communicate hampered our ability to instill confidence in the people. For example, our analysis in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's area of operations indicated that the Iraqi people were frightened, confused, and very reluctant to assist with rebuilding efforts. Simultaneously, public works leaders and religious clerics (most of them employed by the Baath Party) discredited US efforts, by destroying or sabotaging what we had rebuilt. Adding to the problem were Baath Party efforts to target anyone suspected of leading or supporting these efforts, as in the case of CPT Greg Mitchell.<sup>36</sup> Though civil affairs and psyops officers implemented a noteworthy information campaign, the task was monumental given the area of coverage necessary and the enemy's counter information efforts. Again, efforts to establish order were limited by the lack of linguists and area specialists at all levels.

As the Army continues to transform, it will not only be required to be rapid, lethal and mobile, but also capable of conducting these post-war occupation tasks. The swiftness and lethality of US forces is beyond question, but our ability to establish order and create the conditions necessary for a post-regime democracy after a conventional force is vanquished still remains a challenge. To establish post-battle order, our forces must have sufficient understanding of the culture and language in order to use the necessary force when old Victorian means fail. So what can we do?

First, we need more WHINSECs.<sup>37</sup> Our presence will be needed not just in the Western Hemisphere, but also throughout the other regions of the world. Both invited foreign instruc-

tors and students to receive advanced education in the application of democratic principles while understanding how economics and politics apply and dispelling whatever misconceptions and conspiracy theories exist about the way the US does business. Not only will establishing other hemispheric or regional schools help create more "Joppolos", but it will expose foreign officers to western values and ideals that could be applied in their respective countries.<sup>38</sup> But if for no other reason, the relationships established here between our officers and theirs will be a catalyst towards future crisis resolutions and the establishment for global order and peace.

Second, the US should establish Country Specialist Response Teams (CSRTs): A team of about 30 area experts, who can assist battalion commanders and their staffs in identifying post war needs, focus occupation efforts, coordinate for unique requirements/resources, and quantifiably gauge progress. These personnel would be a mixture of DOD (JOINT), CIA, DOS, and Engineers who can help Tactical Commanders accomplish post-war objectives. These teams would create effective communications and transportation, while bringing regional expertise and communications to the operational unit.

Third, emphasize language training within the new military force structure, particularly the Striker Brigades. Although Captains and Majors are leading the majority of post war nation-building tasks, it is the ground soldiers, the non-commissioned officers, who are directly implementing these strategies. While a rapid-deployable force will be capable of responding in record time to defeat a threat anywhere around the world, the challenges of post-battle operations against an illusive insurgent threat remains, and so will our need for the linguist-soldier.

Only through effective communications will we have the capability to gain actionable human intelligence, gain public trust, support and execute nation-building tasks, and better focus the necessary force needed to root-out remnants of a



nuisance regime.

*"Nothing is great which is not at the same time calm." "Gladiators are protected by their skill, but left defenseless by anger."*<sup>39</sup>

Seneca,

as referenced by Robert Kaplan

## Conclusion

As the war in the mid-east region subsides, others, with greater experiences, will return and echo similar thoughts on this subject. The force will return with an unprecedented amount of experience and apply great lessons learned in dealing with the "modern" threat. After action reviews will prove the need to sustain a lethal, and mobile force, but will also lead to recommendations of development of techniques in dealing with crowds and insurgents.

But of the greater theme, will be the call for more linguists and area specialists. For it is through them, from the strategic to tactical levels, where we will be able to conduct foreign operations, better gauge progress and resolve conflicts. We must use the experience of today's young Lieutenants and Sergeants and mold them into future "Joppolos", for they are the ones who understand through firsthand experience, the challenges that lay ahead for commanders. They will be our Iron Majors; the future of democracy.

## Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup> See Robert Kaplan's article referencing Major Victor Joppolo's positive impact as governor appointed of recently liberated Sicilian town of Andano. Kaplan mentions Joppolo's full resourcefulness, with minimal or vague guidance, to solutions on behalf of the town. Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, Supremacy by Stealth, 10 rules for managing the world, Robert D. Kaplan, pg69

<sup>2</sup> See web-site review of John Henry in his book, *A bell for Adano*, [http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=upsell\\_review&reviewID=VE1117788977&cs=1](http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=upsell_review&reviewID=VE1117788977&cs=1)

<sup>3</sup> As referenced in Henry Kissinger's book, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, 1994, conclusion.

<sup>4</sup> See Financial Sense News Hour's interview of Robert Kaplan's and review of *Warrior Politics*, <http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> See Jason Burke's, *Al Qaeda*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003, NY, pg 246.

<sup>7</sup> See Financial Sense News Hour's interview of Robert Kaplan's and review of *Warrior Politics*, <http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm>

<sup>8</sup> See Hernando de Soto's book, *The Mystery of Capitalism, Why capitalism triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, pg 2 "The triumph of capitalism only in the West could be a recipe for economic and political disaster."

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> See Jason Burke's, *Al Qaeda*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003, NY, pg 246.

<sup>11</sup> See John Fitzpatrick's Article, *Lula as Pontius Pilate*, Infobrazil, March 2003, [www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm](http://www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm)

<sup>12</sup> See Jason Burke's, *Al Qaeda*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003, NY, pg 246.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> See John Fitzpatrick's Article, *Lula as Pontius Pilate*, Infobrazil, March 2003, [www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm](http://www.brazzil.com/p137mar03.htm)

<sup>15</sup> See Robert Kaplan's article, *Supremacy by Stealth*, 10 rules for managing the world, Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, pg69.

(Continued from page 17)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Note rule #10

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. Note rule #8

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. Note rule #1

<sup>19</sup> See Robert Kaplan's, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, pg 82. Note he references philosopher Thomas Hobbes, "but it is morality of need not of choice."

<sup>20</sup> NPR radio commentary by Daniel Shorr on President Bushes visit to China; indications that China may be leaning more towards capitalism.

<sup>21</sup> See Robert Kaplan's, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage Books, 2003, NY

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, pg 132 referencing the term chieftaincy alluding to the need for one leader and her ability to maintain order.

<sup>23</sup> See Robert Kaplan's, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, pg 81, referencing Thomas Hobbes philosophy on the social contract.

<sup>24</sup> See Peter Maass' article, Professor Nagl's War, 11 Jan 2003, New York Times Magazine, <http://nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/11IRAQ.html?ex=10748472138&ei=1&en=50a5f4062a3fd1c5>

<sup>25</sup> See web-site article on case of LTC Adam B. West. [http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=36062](http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36062)

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> See Robert Kaplan's, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, pg 124.

<sup>28</sup> Personal experience during military operations in the cities of Ar Ramadi, Al Fallujah, and Habbaniyah, Iraq, May 2003.

<sup>29</sup> See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.'s Article, *Brief Lives: Abizaid of Arabia*, Atlantic Monthly, December 2003, pg32

<sup>30</sup> See Robert Kaplan's article, *Supremacy by Stealth*, 10 rules for managing the world, Atlantic Monthly, July/Aug 2003, pg76

<sup>31</sup> CPT Greg Mitchell is an Armor Officer serving 2nd Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in central and western Iraq.

<sup>32</sup> Al Fallujah is one of the western cities near Baghdad forming part of the Suni-Triangle.

<sup>33</sup> See LAPD organization chart and statistics, <http://lapdonline.org>

<sup>34</sup> Observation during the V Corp's phased planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom; Germany, 2002.

<sup>35</sup> Daily tasks revolved around three things: Rooting out violent activists, establishing and enforcing the rule of law, conducting rebuilding operations such as, establishing and maintaining government utilities, medical and educational services, and setting the conditions for NGO and humanitarian support.

<sup>36</sup> CPT Greg Mitchell was wounded during an ambush in Ar Rubtah, Iraq on 12 October 2003.

<sup>37</sup> Western Hemisphere for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) is a DOD program, located at Fort Benning, GA, hosting a large number of Latin American and Canadian Officers each year, <http://www.benning.army.mil/whinsec>

<sup>38</sup> Article by SGT Daniel Monroy, *Strengthening International Ties*, 2003, <http://www.army.mil/soldiers/jun2002/textonly/whinsec.htm>

<sup>39</sup> See See Robert Kaplan's, *Warrior Politics*, Vintage Books, 2003, NY, Also see Seneca's,

On Anger, in his moral and Political Essays, John M. Cooper and J.F. Procope, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1955 pg 41,28.

### About the Author:

Major Joseph G. Izaguirre is an intelligence and foreign area officer (LATAM specialist) currently attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), Fort Benning, GA. He has had numerous tactical intelligence assignments in maneuver units to include his latest deployment to the mid-east, where he served as the Regimental S2 for the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. There he observed the myriad of challenges of tactical intelligence as applied to the threat, as well its impacts on commanders and soldiers.

The author hopes that his audience will understand that building quality area specialists and supporting the institutions that produce them is a critical necessity when implementing foreign policy through the use of the military. It is the military that will continue to embody diplomatic, civil, and intelligence skills necessary for planning and crisis resolution at all levels of military operations. If we are to establish global order, it is these talented young men and women who will set the conditions for peace, democracy, and human progress around the world.

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## Foreign Area Officer Association BOARD of GOVERNORS ELECTIONS

Our current Board of Governors finishes its term in September 2004. This is a call for those who are interested in serving or in nominating someone to serve on the next Board. Board Membership requires only minimal work and most correspondence is accomplished by fax and/or phone. A slate of nominees will be submitted to the membership for approval in the June 2004 issue of the Journal. We ask that nominees be restricted to individuals who are known within the community for their service as FAOs or for their efforts to help FAOs. There is no serving limit, so you can also nominate current Board Members, as well. The idea is to elect a slate of officers that represent all three segments of our population – active service, reservists, and former service. The slate should also represent a broad spectrum of our regional specialties. The current Board of Governors has members from every the active, reserve, and retired communities, as well as Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, China, Africa, the Middle East, and Korea/Japan. We are also looking to have representation from each of the services.

**How large is the Board?** The Board includes a minimum of nine (9) elected members and one appointed member (President/Executive Director).

**Is there a set distribution for the Board?** No, but based on our membership, the Board should be representative of the broadest spectrum of regions possible, as well as include at least one member from each Service, as well as represent Active, Reserve, and Retirees.

**What is expected of the Board?** The President/Executive Director keeps the Board informed of day-to-day operations, reacting to their suggestions and direction. Major expenditures and new

projects are only undertaken after discussion and approval by the Board. Specific duties are kept minimal in recognition that serving on the Board is an “extra duty.”

### **What does a Board member get for serving?**

Only gratis membership for the three-year term of Board membership. It is a voluntary position.

**Who can nominate?** Any member in good standing can nominate.

**Who can be nominated?** Any Active, Reserve, or Retired FAO, from any Service. This includes members of the current Board.

**Who are we looking for?** Since the members of the Board, more than any other element of the Association, reflect our goals and represent the best of our specialty, they should be well-known and well-considered individuals within their individual regions.

### **What Happens When I Nominate Someone?**

The Association will get in touch with that individual to see if he/she is willing to serve. If they agree, then their name will be added to the ballot to be shipped to members in the June 2004 issue of the Journal.

**Where do I Send My Nomination?** Send it to FAOA, P.O. Box 710231, Herndon, VA 20171 or E-Mail it to [fao@faoa.org](mailto:fao@faoa.org) or [faoa@erols.com](mailto:faoa@erols.com) by 30 May 2004.



# ***A Former Iraqi Minister Speaks: The Memoirs of Ex-Planning Minister Jawad Hashim***

***Reviewed by: LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN***

One of the little highlighted benefits of Operation Iraqi Freedom is an expectation for a whole series of books, articles and discussion assessing the nation's Baathist years from 1967 to 2003. As the United States becomes involved in the long-term reconstruction of Iraq and ensuring the viability of that traumatized nation it is vital that Arabic books coming out of a free Iraq be examined by American military planners and policy-makers. One of the first books to be published in 2003 is by Jawad Hashim, one of the few Shiite Ministers in the Baathist regimes of both Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. Hashim served as Planning Minister from 1967-1971 and again from 1972-1974, and served until 1982 as a member of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

His book *Muzakiraat Wazeer Iraqi Maa Al-Bakr Wa Saddam, Zhikryaat Fee Al-Siyasah Al-Iraqiyah* 1967-2000 (Translated Memoirs of an Iraqi Minister Under Al-Bakr and Saddam: Iraqi Political Memories from 1967-2000) published by Dar-Al-Saqi in Beirut, Lebanon, offers insight to Arab readers as a person intimate with the inner-workings of the Baathist regimes and discusses how Saddam hijacked Baathism to serve his own personal ambitions. Readers must understand that Jawad Hashim was a committed Baathist upset with the manipulation of this ideology by Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. He wrote the book in exile and on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

## **Jawad's Early Years (1955-1967)**

Jawad Hashim initially wanted to become a fighter pilot and submitted an application to attend Iraq's air academy. He writes that during

that time military academy slots were allotted to each region of Iraq, numbers were also manipulated based on a person's religious, ethnic and family connections. Hashim was rejected and his father got him an audience with the Defense Minister Ghazi Al-Dagestani, which too was unsuccessful, it would be a year before he could apply again and he spent the time in London attending an English language academy. Aside from language training, Hashim was introduced to Baathism by a fellow Iraqi student; he writes that his circle of Iraqi friends in England introduced him to concepts of Arab nationalism, freedom, civil society and socialism. He returned to Iraq in 1956 and joined Baghdad University School of Business, for four years he made the gradual transition from entertaining Baathist ideas to full member, participating in strikes and political agitation that brought down the monarchy of King Feysal II in 1958.

After the 1958 revolution, Hashim would become a member of the Baath Arab Socialist Union, during this time Baathists and Nasserists both worked in tandem and its students were conducting joint trips and political retreats. This was considered intolerable by the military junta of General Abdel-Karim Kasem, his interior minister General Saaleh Al-Abdy cracked down, particularly after the failed assassination attempt of Kasem in 1959 (One of the four assassins was Saddam Hussein). Hashim graduating top of his class was given a chance to attend the London School of Economics and study petroleum economics. Hashim would be selected as a means of appeasing nationalists and to get them out of the country and engaged in study. He would watch the violent overthrow of General Kasem

from England in 1963 and would receive his Masters degree that same year. Incredibly the Iraqi education attaché penalized Hashim for violating the terms of his scholarship by graduating in two versus three years and associating with Iraqis who were known communists and not under the cognizance of the embassy. He had to return to Baghdad and make alternate arrangements to bypass the education attaché. He returned to London and completed his doctorate in 1966.

In 1967, he would be introduced to Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, who was attempting to contact many of the old Baathist loyalists and agitators from the late fifties and sixties. Jawad Hashim was particularly attractive because of his education and credentials, in many ways Bakr, who went on to establish the first Baathist state in Iraq in 1968, was making contact with persons that would make up his new government in waiting.

### Seeds of the Iraqi Baathism

April 4, 1947 is commemorated in Syria and in the former Iraqi regime as the day in which the first Baath Party Congress was convened in Syria. Its' founders Michel Aflaq and Salah-al-Din Bittar would be designated, Party Leader (ideologue) and General Director respectively. In 1949, two non-Iraqi Arabs from Alexandretta, Syria studying in Iraq, Faiz Ismail and Wasfi Ghanem joined the poet and political writer Suleiman Al-Essa to create the first Baathist cell in Baghdad University in 1950. The first Iraqi-wide Baathist Congress was convened in 1954 at Al-Azamiyah. This history may seem humdrum, but these dates and locations carry a lot of meaning to former Iraqi Baathist elements that attempting to undermine progress in Iraq. From college campuses they would organize cells in the military, enticing members with their vision of pan-Arabism and union with the already established Baathist presence in Syria.

### Anatomy of the July 1968 Revolution

It is important to realize the coup that removed General Kasem and brought in Abdel-Salam and Adel-Rahman Arif (brothers) in to leadership involved their consolidation of Nassreists, Baathists and Communists into the coup. As soon as the Arif brothers came to power, it would be an internal struggle between those elements for absolute political control of Iraq. The success of Hassan Al-Bakr and his Baathist faction in overthrowing the Arif regime, lays in the fact they recruited Ibrahim Daoud, who led the Republican Guard (not to be confused with Saddam's Republican Guard, in 1968 this was mainly an elite presidential guard) and Abdel-Razaq Al-Naif, Deputy Director of Military Intelligence into the coup plot. These senior military leaders were key persons in identifying docile, discontented and loyal units within the Iraqi armed forces.

Al-Bakr and other senior officers discussed and worried about what the book terms (*Al-Ghitaa Al-Shaabi*) populist cover, basically ensuring the illusion that the majority of Iraqis would support and not oppose their coup. The Baathist's relied on Fuad Rikabi, the only Baathist in the 1958 government of General Kasem's regime. He had since left Baathism and became more involved in Nasserist aspirations before becoming a senior leader in Iraq's Arab Socialist Union. Rikabi's efforts were not successful and it appears he had no desire to see the Baathists take power and displace the Arab Socialist Union. The Arab Socialists despised the pro-western leanings of the Baathists. Al-Bakr would change the name of the Baath party to the Baath Arab Socialist Party and press on with his coup which occurred on July 17, 1968.

The author does not go into details of the night of the coup except to say that Hardan Al-Tikriti made the radio announcement and the commander of the Republican Guard, Hamid Al-Tikriti ensured his unit did not stand in the way of Al-Bakr. General Hamid Al-Tikriti also arranged a

meeting with all officers and troops of the Republican Guard with Al-Bakr on the July 21<sup>st</sup>, to explain the reasons for the coup du etat. Note the Al-Tikriti names of the coup leaders; Hassan Al-Bakr is related to Al-Tikritis and is the cousin of Saddam Hussein. The first major announcement after declaring that Al-Bakr had seized control of the government was a series of five pronouncements to the Iraqi people that was designed to placate the masses:

- Achievement of National Unity, and equality before the law, a government that does not distinguish between its citizens, and offering an opportunity for all.
- Work towards a solution in the north, as it pertains to the unity of Iraq and the aspirations of the Kurds.
- Repair rights of Iraqis as expressed in the constitution that includes freedom of expression, freedom of political action, guaranteeing civil society under the law as a first step towards restoring parliament and democratic life in Iraq.
- Working with brother Arab nations in all fields.
- Guaranteeing economic prosperity and developing Iraq's natural resources.

As Al-Bakr was making these pronouncements and freeing dissidents from Iraqi jails, at the same time he was moving against those who made it possible for him to attain power. The first was to relieve Abdul-Razaq Al-Naif and Ibrahim Daoud (Minister of Defense for only two weeks) from their posts. Of the twenty-five ministers in Al-Bakr's Council of Ministers (cabinet), eight were military officers and seventeen were civilians. Their ethnic makeup was 15 Sunni, 7 Shia and 3 Kurds. In a cabinet shakeup a month after the coup, of twenty-five ministers, 18 would be Sunni, 5 Shia and 2 Kurds, with Hardan Al-Tikriti as Defense Minister. Saddam at this time would become a Baath Party apparatchik and begin his dominance of the party's internal secu-

rity apparatus.

During Al-Bakr's first meeting of the Council of Ministers in August 1968, after concluding the agenda, he turns to Defense Minister Hardan Al-Tikriti and expresses a desire to take revenge on Ali Al-Mithnu, his finance minister. His crime was a personal squabble they had when Al-Bakr and Al-Mithnu were students in London.

### **Minister Jawad Hashim**

As Iraq's top surveyor on development and infrastructure, Jawad Hashim had to tour various regions of Iraq and in 1968 went to survey Karbala, Najaf, Ramadi and Al-Hilla. He submitted a report that angered President Al-Bakr that highlighted the economic disparity between the Shiite and Sunni regions that could cause instability in Iraq and his beloved Baathist cause. Al-Bakr gave Hashim the cold-shoulder and had his Chief of Staff advise him not to send such reports and that the government is not here to listen to the requests and complaints of community leaders. It became clear that those Shiite ministers were placed to in effect circumvent the Shiite community by labeling their ministers as pro-Shiite and not a true Iraqi nationalist. Jawad included a report on the Sunni areas of Al-Hilla and Ramadi but it fell on deaf ears, he could only think of the Shiite areas that contained a larger population. It was a primitive political game that further alienated the Shiites from the central government.

### **Nasser and Minister Hashim**

According to the author, he traveled in August 1969 to meet with Egyptian counterparts to discuss economic and infrastructure planning. He met with Nasser and the Egyptian leader, mistook him for Interior Minister Hazem Jawad versus the author whose name is Jawad Hashim. Nasser was primed to discuss a range of internal security matters and asked Hashim to send a message to Baghdad that he would like to see the release and transfer to Egypt of two former

Iraqi Prime Ministers Taher Yahya and Abdul-Rahman Bazaaz under the guarantee that they

would never interfere in Iraq's Baathist politics again.

The Egyptian leader then focused his attention in inquiring about how Saddam Hussein outsmarted Mahdy Ammash in taking over as Deputy Head of Revolutionary Command Council. Nasser was not pleased to see the ascendancy of Saddam Hussein with the help of his cousin Defense Minister Hardan Al-Tikiriti and warned the author saying: "The issue of choosing a Deputy Head of the Revolutionary Command Council is a matter that is up to our Iraqi brothers, however we know this boy (used the derogatory *waad*) Saddam, he is unstable and a brute."

Hashim chose not to report on Nasser's feelings towards Saddam to Iraqi leader Hassan Al-Bakr, but did pass on his request to release the former Iraqi Prime Ministers. Al-Bakr was not amused and said Nasser is a liar and will not rest unless he is plotting coups and counter-coups. When Nasser died in September 1970, Al-Bakr

initially gave orders to all Iraqi dignitaries not to go to the Egyptian embassy and sign the condolences book. He relented after the second day, convinced by Mahdy Ammash that it would be a great breach of protocol.

### Party and Intelligence Missions Blend

The most fascinating aspect of the book is how Iraqi business, diplomatic and intelligence units around the Arab world were focused on creating Baathist cells in the late 1970s to the late 1980s.

**UAE Operations:** When the author assumed the Directorship of the Arab Banking and Loan in Abu Dhabi he would come to know first-hand the clandestine operations of Iraqi intelligence in the United Arab Emirates. In 1980, an Iraqi bomb-making ring was caught when an explosion happened in their apartment in Abu Dhabi. Emirati investigators found links to the ring with the Iraqi Trade Center, Manager of Iraq Airways and Iraqi intelligence officials in the embassy. Iraqi intelligence used Iraqi business contacts to provide visas and cover for operatives in the emirate of Sharjah. The author writes the Iraqi business-

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man based in Sharjah Tareq Abdul-Razaq Al-Qadduri was connected with Abdel-Karim Al-Sheikhly (Iraq's Interior Minister) and the Tikriti cousins Abdul-Karim and Barzan (Both Saddam's personal guard).

**Kuwaiti Misunderstanding:** Hardan Al-Tikriti who sponsored Saddam's ascent to power traveled to Kuwait in 1969 on a secret mission to confer with his counterpart Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah. He proposed that Iraqi forces have access to Kuwaiti territory in to protect Iraq's only port of Umm Qasr and in exchange Kuwaiti forces could enter Iraq near Al-Basra to achieve strategic depth against mutual enemies such as Iran. Such a proposal was never officially endorsed by Kuwait and Iraqi forces on the orders of Hardan mobilized into Northern Kuwait setting up a military base, which escalated to an exchange of fire between Kuwaitis and Iraqi troops in 1973. Iraqi army units did not leave Kuwaiti territory until 1977.

**Saudi Arabia and Iraq's Plans to Become the New Power East of the Suez:** The book delves into Baathist dreams of filling the void of British forces protecting Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. As early as 1969, when London announced its policy of withdrawing its forces east of the Suez, this led to a scramble between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran to dominate the Persian Gulf. It began as a propaganda war in which Iraq's paper Al-Thawra began attacking the House of Saud and in the aftermath of the 1973 War, Saddam and Al-Bakr attempted clandestine operations on the Saudi bases of Khamis Mushait, Jeddah and Dhahran. The Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini had been exile over a decade in Najaf, and Baathist leaders got him to issue a *fatwa* (religious edict) during the 1973 oil embargo, it read as follows:

*"It is incumbent on Islamic petroleum producing nations to use oil and other means in its possession like a weapon against Israel and the colonialists, and to prevent oil to those nations aiding Israel."*

Despite Saddam attempting to undermine the Saudis, he seemed to have genuine admiration for the single family rule of the Al-Sauds and wanted to copy this in Iraq for his own Tikriti clan.

**Iraq versus the United States:** Iraq's strategic designs to dominate the Gulf, was met by an increasing U.S. interest in the region. In the debates to impose an oil embargo on the United States after the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, Iraq proposed that Arab nations nationalize all U.S. assets and withdraw all investments and cash reserves from U.S. banks and finally cut all diplomatic relations with Washington. The Saudis proposed a gradual reduction of oil exports to manage both the shock of the oil markets on Arab economies and that of the U.S.

### Discussions on Iraqi Foreign Policy

Hashim divides Iraq's foreign policy into two phases, the first from 1967 to 1979, in which the ideals of Baathism (A single Arab nation, with the right to live in a single Arab state) dominated. The second was from 1979 until Saddam Hussein's removal, Hashim writes that Iraq's foreign policy was not dictated by its founding ideology but by the whims of Saddam Hussein. The first period was dictated by Arab unity and socialist plights. The Baathists found Yasser Arafat's attempt to overthrow King Hussein in September 1970 abhorrent and detracting from the main cause of fighting Israel. By 1971, they created its own Palestinian Baathist liberation front, called the Arab Liberation Front (ALF). Iraq was dismayed at not being informed of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War and sent forces to Syria, which were used to guard rear echelon units, freeing Syrian forces to fight in the Golan Heights.

By 1974, Saddam Hussein had rid the Baath Party and Revolutionary Command Council of all officers who opposed his ascendancy and took more responsibility for directing the course of Iraq after that year. It became apparent

to Hashim who joined Saddam in the Algiers Conference to settle border disputes with Iran that Saddam was firmly in control of Iraq's destiny. He writes that Saddam, the Shah of Iran and Algerian leader Houari Boumedienne locked themselves up without advisors or ministers and hammered out an agreement.

In 1977, it was Saddam who championed the isolation of Egypt from the Arab world after Sadat's historic visit to Israel. From this came plans to move the Arab League from Egypt to Tunisia and cut all diplomatic and economic aid to Egypt. Among the policies Iraq's Baathists championed was a complete economic subsidy of front-line states (Syria, Jordan and the PLO in Lebanon) continuing hostilities against Israel. In July 1979, Saddam had assumed complete control of Iraq, removing his cousin Hassan Al-Bakr from power under the guise of giving Damascus more power in a union between the two Baathist states of Syria and Iraq. The author then discusses the stream of futile military adventures Saddam leads the nation towards, beginning with the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War I (Operation Desert Storm).

### **The Nazim Kazzar Coup of 1973**

The Director for General Security Nahzim Kazzar did more to push Saddam Hussein into power than any other Iraqi. The book devotes a chapter on the failed coup plans against Iraqi strongman Hassan Al-Bakr, while he and Saddam Hussein were in Prague in June 1973. The book does a poor job in explaining the details of Kazzar's plot, but its aftermath of the coup was the pretext for Saddam to consolidate power into his hands and begin the process of moving Al-Bakr out of the presidency. The Baath regime labeled Kazzar's attempt to overthrow the Baath as driven by his Shiite origins, although the author, a Shiite, disputes this and brings an interesting point that the Sunni Baathists would label all Shia as Ajami (foreigners) even though those Shia according to the author, descend from Ad-

nan and Qahtan (original Arab tribes) and Khalid Bin Walid (the Muslim warrior who in the sixth century conquered Iraq from the Persians).

Saddam began in earnest in the summer of 1973 to reorganize Iraq security apparatus bringing in advisors from the Soviet KGB and East German Stasi. He also took control of Iraq's oil, fiscal and planning ministries under the guise of providing RCC oversight in those sectors. Saddam would use assassinations, appointments and intimidation to silence opponents within the Baath Party. His main focus from 1973 to 1975 was the removal of problematic elements of the Baath Party; this included the old guard that brought the Baath to power in 1968.

Saddam had retained the author as an advisor and he writes of the tension he created as he slowly purged party members. Jawad Hashim requested an overseas diplomatic assignment and got one in May 1977, when he was given the directorship of the Arab Economic Development Fund. It saved his life, for on July 17, 1979, Saddam has removed Al-Bakr citing health reasons and installed himself president of Iraq. That day Head of Intelligence Barzan Al-Tikriti was attempting to bring all Baathists for a National meeting on August 21<sup>st</sup>. Jawad Hashim decided not to attend and take his family on a needed holiday, after conferring with Barzan Tikriti who told him to take his time in coming back to Baghdad. The meeting would be the infamous public purge of Baath officials as Saddam smoked his cigar in complete control. The author received reports of this public and systematic murder of Baath opponents to Saddam from western news media while in England and wondered about his future. Trusting his instinct Hashim was spared this event and possible implication but on 18<sup>th</sup> of October was recalled to Baghdad. He writes how both the Iraqi ambassador to the UAE and station intelligence chief wanted to ensure he made this flight. This would begin his entrance into Saddam's dungeons.

## Saddam's New Order

When looking at the grainy black and white video of Saddam calmly smoking a Cuban cigar, while the names of alleged enemies were read out loud, it is easy to see him acting alone. The book goes into the apparatus he had in place led by his Tikriti clan that enabled his absolute control over Iraq. Shortly after Jawad Hashim's return to Baghdad, he was arrested at his home and taken to a torture cell at Iraqi Intelligence. There he writes Barzan Al-Tikriti proceeds to ask him a series of questions designed to discredit the previous regime and demonstrate the Saddam saved the nation both economically and fiscally. His detention was designed to put the former minister and bank governor under stress to probe for his loyalty to Saddam. What is revealing is a system whereby intellectuals are told that Saddam has given specific orders not to torture them while hearing the agony of others. The two pages of questions and answers from the Lieutenant Colonel of Iraqi intelligence who interrogated the author reveal the need to have the author discredit not only individuals but the entire Baath Party congress elected during Al-Bakr's final years in power as fiscally irresponsible and whose plans led to economic chaos. Saddam's henchmen were creating and rewriting history and beginning what would be the cult of Saddam Hussein.

The interrogation also delved into his criticisms of Iraq and Saddam that only a select few of the author's associates would have known as they were given in private not public conversations. He wrote that getting to the bottom of who betrayed him obsessed his mind and allowed him to focus not on Saddam's evil but getting even. Jawad Hashim would return to Abu Dhabi to resume his duties on October 25, 1979, it would be the last time he would see Baghdad again.

## Hashim Outlines Saddam's Methodical Control of the State

The book contains a fascinating chapter the gradual efforts Saddam made to exert control on the state, starting from 1968. His early days was conducting the security apparatus for the Baath Party and he slowly created a layer of bureaucracy ensuring oversight of the Revolutionary Command Council and devolving Iraq's ministries into merely executing Saddam's decisions. The first step was the creation of Consultative Offices (*Makatib Al-Istishariyah*), these were created three months after the 1968 coup as a means of coordinating the RCC with ministerial policies, not unlike a transitional government. The difference is these offices made several evolutions, from consultative, to RCC informants. It is here Saddam would take these offices to the next level as internal intelligence apparatus that monitored the civil service, military, the judiciary and much more. Its sole purpose was to protect Hassan Al-Bakr and the regime. The first task of the office was removal of non-Baathists from government, and the replacement with Baath loyalists, Saddam would then remove Baath loyalist and replace them with those loyal to him alone. By 1971, these offices dictated policy to Iraqi ministries and ministers had no effective control except to execute the directions of the consultative offices. All papers of state, studies and financial records would be reviewed by Saddam and those daring to go to President Hassan Al-Bakr would be replaced.

Saddam's main interest was oil and security affairs, when Saddam took power these Consultative Offices swallowed ministries whole. Power sharing of the different offices were as follows:

Saddam Hussein oversaw:

- Planning.
- Intelligence.
- National Security.
- Petroleum Affairs.
- Economic Affairs.

- Military Affairs.
- Nuclear Power Committee.
- Education.
- Scientific Research.
- Northern (Kuridsh) Affairs.

Hassan Al-Bakr oversaw:

- + Agriculture.
- + Legal and Judicial Affairs.
- + Labor Affairs.

Rule of law in Iraq digressed to nepotism, favoritism, Baath loyalties and connections. These offices changed form many times over, but Saddam took to the day to day affairs of state, and President Al-Bakr was increasingly viewed as (*Al-Shaiba*) the old fatherly man. When Al-Bakr exploded in anger at the author over a decision that Al-Bakr took, the author went to Saddam who said: "These are small matters, as long as we can deal with it quickly, kindly come to me with your problems, and there is no need to bother Al-Bakr in the future," leaning forward Saddam concluded, "you must tell me everything, and do not worry yourself with the thinking of a republican palace fool who takes direction from Yahya Yassin and his like." Saddam would often listen to ministers and generals reserving the last word to make a decision.

By 1974, all security, intelligence and military offices were under Saddam's oversight. From 1974 to 1987, Hashim covers the edicts passed that merited a mandatory death sentence in Iraq. It included organizing other political parties, leaving the Baath Party, military desertion, military absence without leave exceeding five days, currency speculation, and much more. Through the passage of edicts and mass executions and disappearances the Iraqi people were slowly lulled into a sense of helplessness against a brutal dictator.

In 1976, Saddam added the title of Deputy Preserver of Secrets and Security, to his portfolio a title previously reserved for President Al-Bakr

himself. When the message needed to be sent to the Iraqi people regarding coup plotters, Al-Bakr, Saddam, and his clique would arrange Special Courts (*Al-Mahakim Al-Khassa*) with five major trials highlighted in the book in 1970, 1973, 1974, 1977 and 1979. These were summary courts with no appeal, no defense and designed to mete out the death penalty. These were not new inventions in Iraq, but became an efficient means of ridding the nation of political and military threats to Saddam and Al-Bakr. Its model was the Revolutionary Courts (*Mahkama Al-Thawra*) designed in 1969 to quickly process those charged with treason, espionage and attempting to overthrow the Baath Party. It is important to realize that from 1968 to 1979, there was a method to getting rid of mass discontent, and that under Saddam this further devolved into the Special Service Offices and Uday's Fedayeen Saddam doing what they please and murdering citizens openly and without method.


In July 1979, at 10:00 in the morning local Baghdad time, Saddam by this time had effectively ran Iraq for five years, it was time to move on President Al-Bakr. The President was invited to the villa of Saddam's uncle Khairullah Tulfah, with Al-Bakr was his elder son Haitham. Joining Tulfah, was Saddam, and Adnan Khairullah. Al-Bakr was invited to discuss an important matter of state, and Adnan Khairullah and Saddam laid it before Al-Bakr that morning: "Al-Bakr would announce that he would step-down in favor of Saddam Hussein." Al-Bakr's son angry at the ultimatum drew his pistol and shot Adnan Khairullah in the hand. Saddam's uncle calmed the situation down, Saddam then reasoned with Al-Bakr saying: "You no longer enjoy the support of the army, the intelligence apparatus or even the Republican Guards." The next day the Baath Party committee and Revolutionary Command Council met to consider Al-Bakr's desire to step-down for health reasons in favor of Saddam. A few protested, and Saddam would note those who opposed the transition, and many would be purged starting with the infamous July 1979 Baath meeting in which party members were called by name to the execution squads.

## Conclusion

Jawad Hashim ends his book pointing the finger at Saddam and saying it was he who:

(Continued on page 32)

## Quarterly Column

**MIDDLE EAST  
REVIEWS**

Reviews by LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein  
(USNR)

***The Politicization of Islam: Essays on Democratic Governance*** by Mohammed Eihachmi Hamdi. Westview Press ([www.westviewpress.com](http://www.westviewpress.com)), 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301. 206 pages, 1998.

Among Islamic militant circles, the Tunisian Al-Nahda (Renaissance) Party is held up as a model of modern Islamic governance. Its ideologue Rachid Ghannouchi has written several books that combined elements of liberal democracy, socialism and heavy doses of Islamic fundamentalist theories to come up with an appealing system of governance. This has led to western scholars like Dr. John Esposito to claim that this represents the moderation of Islamic political thought. Mohammed Eihachmi Hamdi is a Tunisian editor of the magazine *Diplomat* and a pan-Arab newspaper *Mustakilla*. His book is derived from his doctoral dissertation at the University of London and offers a historical and ideological glimpse into the unique nature of Tunisian Islamic activism.

The book begins by taking readers through the origins of Islamic political activism in the campuses of Tunisian colleges. 1967 would be a pivotal year, as many Tunisians sought answers for the Six-Day War and the failures of Arab nationalism. Rachid Ghannouchi, who was enamoured with Nasser would find his self-identity shattered by the Six-Day War and would look towards theology to reclaim a new identity. During this time he was a student in Syria and joined the Syrian Islamic Brotherhood. From Damascus he went for advanced studies in Paris. Another defining event for Ghannouchi is the 1979 Iranian Revolution, from which he began to derive a philosophy of organizing Islamist groups under constitutional framework. This framework included:

**Majlis al-Shura**, small parliament or legislative branch made up of 14 members;

**Executive bureaus** run by an amir (leader);

**Ummal**, which are provincial leaders selected by the amir;

**Wukala**, bureaucrats who run day to day provincial affairs;

**University division**, that works solely in recruitment and organizing campus activities and demonstrations;

**Secondary Schools division**, that plans activities within schools;

**Cells**, that train would-be members for three years before granting full membership, the curriculum is indoctrination into the ideals of the Islamic brotherhood.

When analyzing key manifestos of the Tunisian Islamic movements, embedded language such as a rejection of violence to bring about change, a rejection of the one-party system and support for trade unions. On its face, Ghannouchi may sound reasonable but careful analysis shows clauses such as liberating the Muslim conscience from the civilizational defeat by the West and a commitment to assist liberation movements around the world. He argues that non-Muslims in a Muslim polity gain the right to practice their faith but give up their rights for political leadership. Ghannouchi writes that an independent judiciary and free press is necessary to serve as a check on the Islamic executive. Make no mistake however; such mixture of liberal democratic ideas within a Tunisian Islamist framework betrays the fact that Ghannouchi draws his inspiration from Islamic militant leaders. He dedicates his book *Civil Liberties and the Islamic State* to the Sudanese Sheikh Hassan Al-Turabi and the late Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam both have mentored Usama Bin Laden.

Take time to read Hamdi's work and understand Rachid Ghannouchi who represents the moderate face of Islamic militancy. His ideas will no doubt be used as a means of political discourse between jihadists and the government they wish to topple whether by force or using the electoral system in place.



# ARMY NOTES

*LTC(P) Peter Brigham , Chief, Strategic Leadership Division*



It is my great privilege to write to you all as the interim Chief of the Strategic Leadership Division (DAMO-SSF). COL Pete Brigham will be TDY for the next six months and has tasked me in his absence to continue to look out for the interests of FAOs serving around the world, while ensuring the Army's need for trained FAOs is satisfied. If you haven't taken a close look at what the Army



is doing in terms of transformation and force stabilization, I highly recommend that you become familiar with both issues. These changes will have profound impact on the force as a whole, and as FAOs we need to be aware of what's going on.

As part of the Army's transformation process, HRC and the Army G1 are examining many fundamental facets of OPMS III, to include the FAD and CFD processes and functional area management, in general. This development holds the potential to significantly impact how FAOs are accessed, trained and utilized. Proponent and FAO Assignments are committed to actively participating in all such deliberations. Similarly, as the Army examines force structure changes, Proponent is seeking to ensure all such considerations take into account how FAOs can best contribute to the force. One timely issue in-

volves the building of the modular force structures. At present, we feel that FAO force structure should be established down to the Unit of Employment (UEy) level and are working toward that end. In April the Proponent will participate in discussions exploring the UEy MTOE requirements. Again, one cannot stress enough that the transformation of the Army is a fast-moving train, and whether you are in school or in a US Embassy far removed from any military flagpoles, you need to keep abreast of these changes. As always, we will endeavor to get the word out regarding what the FAO Proponent does for the Army and for its serving FAOs.

LTC(P) Ray Hodgkins



U.S. Army Photographs

## USMC FAO Notes

***LtCol John May, International Affairs Officer  
Program Coordinator***



The USMC International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) received favorable review in the OSD-commissioned Defense Language Transformation Study. The program was reported to be meeting requirements articulated by the service and was in compliance with the DoD directives. Garnering special attention was the unique aspect of the IAOP that created the Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) designation to augment the USMC FAO population. This designation recognizes the value of the regional expertise these officers bring to Ops and Plans billets on high-level Marine, Joint, and Combined staffs that don't necessarily require a foreign language capability. RAOs have been designated since 1999 and make up roughly one fourth of the entire International Affairs Officer population.

In a previous edition of the Journal, it was reported that Capt Sullivan—on ICT in Egypt—had requested and been granted an ICT extension to more fully complete his education/training. The extension was subsequently canceled in order to facilitate an assignment to forces deploying for OIF II. Capt Sullivan joined the deploying MEF as part of the FAO cadre that had been requested to augment the force, down to the tactical level. Assignment at the MEF level and subordinate echelons represent a paradigm shift in the program and is a result of lessons learned from OEF and OIF. This trend may be the clearest indicator of the expanding roles and responsibilities for International Affairs Officers that has been recommended by the SAIC study

In Apr, three Marines were selected to participate in the Olmsted Scholarship Foundation's graduate study program; these officers will man sites in Jordan, Vietnam, and Russia. Their language training and two years of foreign post-

graduate work will lead to a FAO designation via the experience track. These particular sites were selected by the Foundation in close coordination with HQMC to ensure that both the objectives of the Foundation and the Marine Corps International Relations Plan were being effectively met.

The IAOP will participate in a curriculum review being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in June. This will coincide with the Program's annual 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter trip to Monterey to begin the assignment process for International Affairs Officers completing training in FY 05. Efforts to identify utilization tours for the RAOs as soon as possible in their program—in order to provide greater focus to their research—continue; this practice achieved mixed results in FY 04 with several officers receiving orders to billets different than initially planned. All but one RAO graduating in June 04 have been assigned to a validated utilization tour or have received a programmed deferment. The IAOP will work this issue with MMOA through the next assignment cycle.

The first of the FAOs selected in FY01 has completed ICT in Senegal; Capt Avila returned to 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment for a tour in his primary MOS. The other "class of 01" ICT FAOs are scheduled to complete ICT by the end of FY04: Major Ercolano in Japan, Major Finney in Brazil, Major Lucius in Indonesia, Major Major McLaughlin in Croatia, Capt Rizner in Vietnam, Major Rosser in Korea, Major Sbragia in China, and Major Thurman in Moscow.

Majors Karega and Logue completed language training this spring and will man the ICT

sites in Oman and Egypt. Other FAOs in training slated for standing ICT in FY04-05 include: Major Connolly in China, Major Donahoe in Croatia, Major Freeman in Turkey, Major Knapp in Republic of Philippines, Major Middleton in Korea, Major Reas in Thailand, and Major Smith in Moscow. Additionally, the program hopes to send Capt Cherry to stand up a site in Cambodia

As always, the International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC welcomes comments and suggestions regarding the administration of the IAOP. Please see the FAO Proponent Page in this Journal for POC information.

(Continued from page 10)

Finally, I propose the US government and the international community use Afghanistan as the ultimate test case. With a minimum commitment period of ten years, we should reconstruct Afghanistan. If it is successful, make this a transportable model for reconstruction world-wide. Let's do it right this time, and create an international model in the process. America, with a multi-trillion dollar economy can assist in developing the entire region at the same time.

(Continued from page 28)

- formulated Iraq's petroleum policy;
- planned nationalization of Iraqi industry;
- pushed for a nuclear option;
- planned the brutal suppression of the Kurds;
- controlled education, thought and media;
- dictated national Baath policy;
- directed foreign affairs with other states;
- who created an Iraqi citizen who possesses a schizophrenic personality that cannot escape fear;

- declared war on free thought

The final sentences of the book questions if such a man (Saddam) has a conscience. These is just a glimpse of what will come when Saddam goes on trial, the author, who is Shia, does not mention the atrocities committed by his own people and does not talk at all about his exile from Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

***LCDR Aboul-Enein is a Navy Middle East Foreign Area Officer currently assigned at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Arabic translation of Hashim's book represents his understanding of the material.***

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# USAF FAO Notes

*LtCol Mike Nolte, USAF*



## In a State of Shock: The Public Health Situation in Haiti

Edited and Adapted with permission by 1Lt Walker N. Moody, USAF

While the majority of the world's attention has been focused on the US and coalition forces in Iraq, the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – Haiti continue to help the country's 7.5 million inhabitants as they try to return to a state of normalcy following the state of anarchy that resulted from the forced exile of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by rebel forces. As coverage by the major news outlets has tapered off the situation in country is still critical, especially in the vital areas of public health and services. Lt Col Stewart LeBlanc, USAF, is a European and Latin American FAO and has been assigned as Deputy Director, Air Coordination and Control Element (ACCE) at CJTF-Haiti since March. In his own words he recalls a visit to a local Port-au-Prince hospital where he witnessed first hand, the daunting task of

helping those who are in need, and was reminded of why US forces are there.

“At about 2000 hrs our Civil Affairs (CA) Team was tasked to go to the hospital and do a quick assessment of how the hospital was coping with an accident that had happened earlier in the evening. Our medic was given the go ahead to give them any help or supplies he could. The trip was eerie, like a scene

out of a post-apocalypse science fiction movie. The streets were dark (no electricity) and lit only by the orange glow of small trash fires. Through the smoke you caught glimpses of the surrounding buildings and every once in a while you could see a person as they were caught in the beam of the Humvee's headlights. As we maneuvered around the fires in the road we tried to keep an eye out for any potential threats. The mind plays tricks on you in such an environment and you begin to see phantom gunmen in every shadow. Fortunately the gunmen remained in our imaginations and we arrived at the hospital safely. We left two team members outfitted with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) and laser sights as security. The grounds of the hospital were as dark as the city so with NVGs our guys had a tactical advantage over any would-be attackers.

The rest of us entered the hospital emergency room, which was running on generator power, and were immediately plunged into a world of misery and horror. The term "emergency room" is a misnomer because we tend to apply our American standards to the term. A more fitting description would be a holding pen for the sick, injured and dying. Patients were haphazardly set up all over the hospital; some were in beds, others in chairs and still others on the floor. There were so many people in the room that it was difficult to move about. There was blood, and body fluids everywhere,



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and privacy was not an option. The smell of urine and excrement hung heavy in the air, leading me to think that a HAZMAT team would need a month to clean it properly. The lucky patients had IV bags hooked up to them to ease their pain. Others went without when the limited supply ran out.

The accident victims were the first people we saw. A young man about 20 years old saw my uniform and reached out to me for help. I spoke to him in Creole for a few minutes and it broke my heart that I couldn't help him. He had an improvised splint made from a broom handle on his obviously broken left leg. He was asking for something for the pain. He had been lying there since he was brought in over three hours before and had not yet been seen by a doctor. He had been given morphine by our medics at the scene but it had worn off and he was in lots of pain. The guy next to him was in even worse shape. His left leg below the knee was shredded and the kneecap itself was the size of a football. He will have to have it amputated. He was lethargic and from the looks of it in an advanced state of shock.

We finally got the attention of an intern and asked for a list of what medical supplies they needed. Since she had her hands full she quickly scratched out a list of the most basic needs that included gloves, gauze, bandages, alcohol, IV bags, etc. Since the medical staff was occupied we decided to take an unescorted tour of the hospital to complete our assessment. As we passed several other people asked for help assuming we were all doctors. We spoke with them a little and had to move on. We made our way to the men's ward and had to use our flashlights because the ward was not a priority for the limited generator power. The scene here was appalling. Fifty beds lined the walls each with a patient. At our feet the floors were filled with their relatives or friends spending the night providing what care they

could to ease the suffering of their loved ones. There were no doctors or nurses in sight. There was no airflow and the heat in the enclosed space was oppressive. I tried to push from my head what the health consequences of such a setup might be.

Our final stop was the Operating Room (OR) but when we tried to enter the OR area we were stopped by the head surgeon. He explained that we needed administration approval to enter. We told the doctor that we were doing an assessment and asked what we could do to help. He gave us a list of surgical supplies and we told him we would be back in less than five minutes. We went back to the vehicles and the medics tore into their ready bags. They came up with a pile of supplies and equipment for the surgeon. We headed out and returned to base without any problems.



The state of the medical system in Haiti is beyond critical. While there are private hospitals here that are better equipped and staffed, they are only for the rich. In fact I've been told by the locals that a good portion of the supplies we give to

public hospitals find their way into the stockpiles of the private ones. Problems here in Haiti are huge and the systemic corruption makes the task building a better Haiti that much more difficult."

Lt Col LeBlanc's mission has recently increased its operational scope to include the Southern Clav region, in an effort to provide an increased level of support to areas outside of the Port-au-Prince region. While the situation in Haiti has improved since the violence earlier in the year, the infrastructure still isn't in place to support a full-scale return to normalcy for the nation. The Air Force FAO program will continue to train officers so that they may be able to accomplish the USAF global mission with the professionalism and skill of Lt Col LeBlanc.

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DSN 222-4254

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
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